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THE ABRIDGMENT.

MESSAGE

FROM THE

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

TO THE

TWO HOUSES OF CONGRESS

AT THE BEGINNING OF THE

FIRST SESSION OF THE FIFTY-SIXTH CONGRESS,

WITH THE

REPORTS OF THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS

AND

SELECTIONS FROM ACCOMPANYING REPORTS.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOLUME II.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1900.

TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOL. II.

	Page.
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR	733–781
Adjutant-General	782–821
Inspector-General	822–848
Judge-Advocate-General	848–855
Quartermaster-General	856–895
Commissary-General of Subsistence	896–905
Surgeon-General	906–918
Paymaster-General	919–923
Chief Signal Officer	923–939
Chief of Record and Pension Office	939–946
Major-General Commanding the Army	947–951
Military Governor of the City of Havana	951–982
General Commanding Department of Santiago	983–991
General Commanding Department of Puerto Rico	891–996
Summary of Principal Events Connected with Military Operations in the Philippine Islands	997–1009
Military Governor of the Philippine Islands	1010–1212
General Commanding Expedition to La Laguna	1212–1224
General Commanding Expedition to Bulacan	1224–1254
General Commanding Expedition to Morong	1254–1257
General Commanding Expedition on Pasig River	1258–1260
General Commanding Expedition to Cavite	1260–1265
Military Governor of Cuba	1266–1282
Military Governor of Puerto Rico	1283–1358
Military Governor Department of Santiago	1359–1386
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY	1387–1448
Assistant Secretary	1449–1451
Judge-Advocate-General	1451–1460
Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks	1460–1486
Chief of the Bureau of Equipment	1486–1495
Chief of the Bureau of Navigation	1495–1506
Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance	1506–1525
Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair	1526–1541
Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering	1541–1550
Surgeon-General	1551–1559
Commandant of the Marine Corps	1559–1563

1977

REPORT

OF

THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., November 29, 1899.

To the PRESIDENT:

I have the honor to submit the following report of operations of this Department for the past year:

On the 29th of November, 1898, the date of the last annual report, the Army of the United States consisted of 2,324 officers and 61,444 enlisted men of the regular force, and of 5,216 officers and 110,202 enlisted men of the volunteer force, making an aggregate of 7,540 officers and 171,646 enlisted men.

The signing of the protocol between the United States and Spain on the 12th of August, 1898, had suspended hostilities between the two nations, and the signing of the treaty of peace at Paris on the 10th of December, 1898, followed by its ratification on the part of the United States February 6, 1899, and on the part of Spain March 19, 1899, brought into operation the provisions of the acts of April 22 and April 26, 1898, which required that at the end of the war the entire volunteer force should be discharged from the service, and the Regular Army should be reduced to a peace basis, thus making necessary the discharge of 34,834 regulars and 110,202 volunteers, besides substantially all the 5,216 volunteer officers.

These provisions have been complied with, and a large part of the labor of the year has consisted of the transportation and mustering out of these forces, with the examinations and accountings incident thereto.

The act of March 2, 1899, passed in view of the insurrection among the Tagalogs on the island of Luzon, gave authority to again increase the Regular Army to a strength not exceeding 65,000 enlisted men, and to raise a force of not more than 35,000 volunteers to be recruited from the country at large. This authority has been exercised, and the Regular Army has been increased to the number of 61,999 enlisted men and 2,248 officers, making a total of 64,247, and a new volunteer force has been raised from the country at large numbering 33,050 enlisted men and 1,524 officers, making an aggregate of 34,574.

The men thus enlisted, both for the regular and volunteer forces, were carefully selected from a greater number of applicants, a majority of whom were rejected. As the volunteer forces were designed for immediate employment in the field, rapid organization and training were necessary. The field officers were accordingly in the main selected from officers of the Regular Army. The line officers were taken from the officers who had served in the war with Spain, apportioned as nearly as practicable among the several States, and selected on the basis of the efficiency which they had displayed during their former service.

As to two of the volunteer regiments, the Forty-eighth and Forty-ninth, the enlisted men and most of the line officers are colored. A large part of these line officers were taken from the most efficient non-commissioned officers serving in the colored regiments of the Regular Army, on the recommendations of the colonels commanding those regiments.

One battalion of 400 men has been organized in Porto Rico, composed of native Porto Ricans. The reports of their conduct and discipline are satisfactory.

The Regular Army is now distributed as follows:

	Officers.	Enlisted men.
In Cuba	334	10,796
In Porto Rico	87	2,855
On the continent of North America	910	17,317
In Hawaii	12	453
In the Philippine Islands	905	30,578
Total	2,248	61,999

All the new regiments of volunteers are in the Philippine Islands or on the way to the Philippines.

The details of these operations and many interesting facts and suggestions relating to them are set forth in the accompanying reports of the Major-General Commanding the Army and the Adjutant-General of the Army.

OPERATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES.

The principal military operations of the year have been in the Philippine Islands. At the date of the last annual report the Eighth Army Corps, under the command of Maj. Gen. E. S. Otis, held possession of the city of Manila under the provisions of the protocol of August 12, 1898, which required the United States to occupy and hold that city pending the conclusion of the treaty of peace, and which imposed upon the troops in possession at once the obligation to protect life and property within the city and to refrain from infringing upon Spanish territory outside of the city limits. In the performance of this duty many annoyances were experienced from the army of the Tagalogs, who

were in insurrection against the Government of Spain, and who had been collected about the city, after its capture by the American forces had become inevitable, under the promise of their leaders that they should share in the plunder of the inhabitants.

General Otis was ordered to avoid any conflict with them, and, strictly complying with these orders, he made every effort to secure a peaceable understanding. The peaceable attitude of the American forces was unfortunately misconstrued as indicating weakness and fear of a conflict. On the night of the 4th of February, 1899, our forces were attacked by the Tagalogs, who attempted to capture the city. They were promptly repulsed in a series of active engagements which extended through the night of the 4th, and the 5th, 6th, and 10th days of February. Our lines were extended and established at a considerable distance from the city in every direction. On the 22d of February a concerted rising of the Tagalogs in the city of Manila, of whom there are about 200,000, was attempted, under instructions to massacre all the Americans and Europeans in the city. This attempt was promptly suppressed and the city was placed under strict control.

The troops composing the Eighth Army Corps under General Otis's command at that time were of regulars 171 officers and 5,201 enlisted men and of volunteers 667 officers and 14,831 enlisted men, making an aggregate of 838 officers and 20,032 enlisted men.

All of the volunteers and 1,650 of the regulars were, or were about to become, entitled to their discharge, and their right was perfected by the exchange of ratifications of the treaty on the 11th of April.

The total force which Major-General Otis was thus entitled to command for any considerable period consisted of only 171 officers and 3,551 enlisted men. The numbers of the Eighth Army Corps, above stated, give the entire numerical strength of all troops present in the islands, including those at Cavite and Iloilo, the sick and wounded, those serving in the civil departments and in the staff organizations, and deducting these, the effective men of the line, officers and soldiers, were about 14,000. Of these 3,000 constituted a provost guard necessary to preserve order within Manila and prevent the known intention of the secret hostile organizations in that city to burn and sack the city when our troops were engaged on the lines of defense. Including, therefore, all the troops who were entitled to be discharged, there were not more than 11,000 officers and men available to engage the insurgent army, which was two or three times that number, well armed and equipped, and included many of the native troops formerly comprised in the Spanish army, and to occupy and hold positions in a comparatively unknown country, densely populated by inhabitants speaking in the main an unknown language. The months of the most intense heat, followed by the very severe rainy season of that climate, were immediately approaching, and for any effective occupation of the country it was necessary to await both the close of the rainy season and the

supply of new troops to take the place of those about to be discharged. Practically all the volunteers who were then in the Philippines consented to forego the just expectation of an immediate return to their homes, and to remain in the field until their places could be supplied by new troops. They voluntarily subjected themselves to the dangers and casualties of numerous engagements, and to the very great hardships of the climate. They exhibited fortitude and courage, and are entitled to high commendation for their patriotic spirit and soldierly conduct.

The operations of the period extending from February to the 31st day of August, the date of the annual report of General Otis as commander of the Department of the Pacific, were marked by a steady maintenance and strengthening of the position occupied by our forces, a gradual extension of our lines, a restoration of security and confidence in the city of Manila, numerous sharp engagements in the field marked by unbroken success, and many instances of very gratifying conduct on the part of both officers and men. It is probable that at any time a column of troops could have been sent anywhere on the island of Luzon as against any armed resistance which the insurgents could have offered after the demoralization in their ranks, resulting from the severe defeats inflicted upon them in February; but there were not the troops necessary to garrison the towns, or to maintain any far extended lines of communication. No attempt was accordingly made to occupy the country, except in the vicinity of Manila, and at such points as were important for the protection of our lines. Such movements as passed beyond this territory were designed primarily to break up threatening concentrations of insurgent troops, and to prevent undue annoyance to the positions which we occupied.

On the 11th of February the city of Iloilo, on the island of Panay, the second port of the Philippines in importance, was occupied. After the capture of Iloilo the navy took possession of the city of Cebu, on the island of Cebu, and on the 26th of February a battalion of the Twenty-third Infantry was dispatched to that port for the protection of the inhabitants and property.

On the 1st of March a military district comprising the islands of Panay, Negros, and Cebu, and such other Visayan islands as might be thereafter designated, to be known as the "Visayan Military District," was established and placed under the supervision of Brig. Gen. Marcus P. Miller, commanding First Separate Brigade, Eighth Army Corps, with headquarters at Iloilo.

The Third Battalion of the First California Volunteer Infantry was thereupon ordered to the island of Negros, under the command of Col. (now Brig. Gen.) James F. Smith, and took possession of the city of Bacolod, on that island, without resistance.

On the 5th of May Brig. Gen. James F. Smith assumed temporary command of the Visayan military district, and on the 25th of May

Brig. Gen. R. P. Hughes, United States Volunteers, was assigned to the command of the district.

On the 19th of May the Spanish garrison at Jolo, in the Sulu Archipelago, was replaced by American troops.

By the 31st of August the number of troops stationed at Jolo and the Visayan Islands, including a small guard at the Cavite Arsenal, amounted to 4,145.

These operations are set forth fully in General Otis's report, which is submitted herewith.

All of the forces who were entitled to be discharged as above mentioned have now been returned to this country and mustered out. The new troops designed to take the place of those returning to this country, and to constitute an effective army for the occupation of the Philippines, have been transported to Manila to the number of 581 officers and 26,322 enlisted men of the Regular Army and 594 officers and 15,388 enlisted men of the new volunteer force. Five hundred and four officers and 14,119 men of the volunteer force have sailed from New York and San Francisco and have not yet arrived at Manila. One regiment has reached San Francisco, but has not yet sailed.

The troops now in the Philippines comprise 905 officers and 30,578 men of the regular force, and 594 officers and 15,388 men of the volunteer force, making an aggregate of 1,499 officers and 45,966 men, and when the troops on the way have arrived the total force constituting the Eighth Army Corps will be 2,051 officers and 63,483 men.

By the 10th of October the process of changing armies and the approach of the dry season had reached a point where an advance toward the general occupation of the country was justified.

At that time the American lines extended from the Bay of Manila to Laguna de Bay, and included considerable parts of the provinces of Cavite, Laguna, and Morong to the south and east of Manila, substantially all of the province of Manila and the southern parts of Bulacan and Pampanga, dividing the insurgent forces into two widely separated parts. To the south and east of our lines in Cavite and Morong were numerous bands occasionally concentrating for attack on our lines, and as frequently dispersed and driven back toward the mountains. On the 8th of October, the insurgents in this region having again gathered and attacked our lines of communication, General Schwan with a column of 1,726 men commenced a movement from Bacoor, in the province of Cavite, driving the enemy through Old Cavite, Noveleta, Santa Cruz, San Francisco de Malabon, Saban, and Perez das Marinas, punishing them severely, scattering them and destroying them as organized forces, and returning on the 13th to Bacoor.

On the north of our lines stretched the great plain of central Luzon extending north from Manila about 120 miles. This plain comprises parts of the provinces of Manila, Pampanga, Bulacan, Tarlac, Nueva

Ecija, and Pangasinan. It is, roughly speaking, bounded on the south by the Bay of Manila; on the east and west by high mountain ranges separating it from the seacoasts, and on the north by mountains and the Gulf of Lingayen. Through the northeast and central portion flows the Rio Grande from the northern mountains southwesterly to the Bay of Manila, and near the western edge runs the only railroad on the island of Luzon, in a general southeasterly direction from Dagupan, on the Bay of Lingayen, to Manila. In this territory Aguinaldo exercised a military dictatorship, and with a so-called cabinet imitated the forms of civil government, having his headquarters at Tarlac, which he called his capital, and which is situated near the center of the western boundary of the plain.

The operations commenced in October involved the movement of three separate forces: (1) A column proceeding up the Rio Grande and along the northeastern borders of the plain and bending around to the westward across the northern boundary toward the Gulf of Lingayen, garrisoning the towns and occupying the mountain passes which gave exit into the northeastern division of the island. (2) An expedition proceeding by transports to the Gulf of Lingayen, there to land at the northwestern corner of the plain and occupy the great coast road which from that point runs between the mountains and the sea to the northern extremity of the island, and to proceed eastward to a junction with the first column. (3) A third column proceeding directly up the railroad to the capture of Tarlac, and thence still up the road to Dagupan, driving the insurgent forces before it toward the line held by the first two columns. These movements were executed with energy, rapidity, and success, notwithstanding the exceedingly unfavorable weather and deluges of rain, which rendered the progress of troops and transportation of subsistence most difficult.

On the 12th of October a strong column under General Lawton, with General Young commanding the advance, commenced the northerly movement up the Rio Grande from Arayat, driving the insurgents before it to the northward and westward. On the 18th the advance reached Cabiao. On the 19th San Isidro was captured, and a garrison established; on the 27th Cabanatuan was occupied, and a permanent station established there. On the 1st of November Aliaga and Talavera were occupied. In the meantime detachments, chiefly of Young's cavalry, were operating to the west of the general line of advance, striking insurgent parties wherever they were found and driving them toward the line of the railroad. By the 13th of November the advance had turned to the westward, and our troops had captured San Jose, Lupao, Bunningan, San Quintin, Tayug, and San Nicolas. By the 18th of November the advance had occupied Asingan and Rosales, and was moving on Pozorrubio, a strongly intrenched post about 12 miles east of San Fabian. General Lawton's forces now held a line of posts

extending up the eastern side of the plain and curving around and across the northern end to within a few miles of the Gulf of Lingayen.

On the 6th of November a force of 2,500, under command of General Wheaton, sailed from Manila for the Gulf of Lingayen, convoyed by ships of the Navy, and on the 7th the expedition was successfully landed at San Fabian with effective assistance from a naval convoy against spirited opposition. On the 12th the Thirty-third Volunteers, of Wheaton's command, under Colonel Hare, proceeded southeastward to San Jacinto, attacked and routed 1,200 intrenched insurgents, with the loss of the gallant Maj. John A. Logan and 6 enlisted men killed, and 1 officer and 11 men wounded. The enemy left 81 dead in the trenches and suffered a total loss estimated at 300.

In the meantime, on the 5th of November, a column under General McArthur advanced up the railroad from Angeles to Magalang, clearing the country between Angeles and Arayat, encountering and routing bodies of the enemy at different points, and capturing Magalang. On the 11th it took Bamban, Capas, and Concepcion, and on the 12th of November entered Tarlac, from which the enemy fled on its approach. Meantime, parties, mainly of the Thirty-sixth Volunteers, under Col. J. F. Bell, cleared the country to the right of the line of advance as far east as the points reached by General Lawton's flanking parties. On the 17th of November McArthur's column had occupied Gerona and Panique, to the north of Tarlac. On the 19th, Wheaton's troops, and on the 20th, McArthur's troops, entered Dagupan.

On the 24th of November General Otis was able to telegraph to the Department as follows:

> Claim to government by insurgents can be made no longer under any fiction. Its treasurer, secretary of the interior, and president of congress in our hands; its president and remaining cabinet officers in hiding, evidently in different central Luzon provinces; its generals and troops in small bands scattered through these provinces, acting as banditti, or dispersed, playing the rôle of "Amigos," with arms concealed.

Since that time our troops have been actively pursuing the flying and scattered bands of insurgents, further dispersing them, making many prisoners, and releasing many Spanish prisoners who had been in the insurgents' hands.

On the 23d General Young's column had reached Namacpacan, 30 miles north of San Fernando, in the province of Union, and passed north into the mountains; and on the 24th Vigan, the principal port of the northwest coast, was occupied by a body of marines landed from the battle ship *Oregon*. In the meantime the destruction of the organized insurgent power in central Luzon found a response from the natives of the province of Nueva Viscaya, offering their services to drive out the insurgents who were in possession of Bayambong, the

capital of that province, upon which the insurgent army had been prevented from retreating by the disposition of General Lawton's forces, commanding the passes of the mountains; and which Lawton's troops were rapidly approaching.

All these movements were accomplished under great difficulties owing to the almost impassable condition of the country. In the course of them, large quantities of insurgent supplies of all descriptions were captured, including stores of food, clothing, arms, munitions of war, quick-firing and Krupp guns, powder factory and arsenal, engineering tools, money, war department records, personal effects of officers, and numerous private dispatches.

It is gratifying to know that as our troops got away from the immediate vicinity of Manila they found the natives of the country exceedingly friendly, and both men and animals were able to live upon the country, and for considerable periods leave their supply trains behind. This was doubtless due in some measure to the fact that the Pampangos, who inhabit the provinces of Pampanga and Tarlac, and the Pangasinanes, who inhabit Pangasinan, as well as the more northerly tribes, are unfriendly to the Tagalogs, and had simply submitted to the military domination of that tribe, from which they were glad to be relieved. This is emphasized by a report from General Wheaton that he had been obliged to guard the mother and infant son of Aguinaldo to prevent the natives of Pampanga from killing them.

I submit herewith, marked "Appendix A," the cable dispatches received from General Otis since the date of his annual report of August 31, 1899, which briefly describe these various operations, together with other operations of interest, both on the island of Luzon, and in the Visayan and southern islands, which I have not thought it necessary to set forth specifically in this report.

I think it proper to quote from a dispatch from General Otis of November 13, in which he says:

> Our troops have suffered great hardships, and have performed most severe service, but are reported in excellent condition and spirits. The enterprise and indomitable will displayed by officers never excelled.

And to refer to his dispatch of November 18, in which he quotes from General Lawton a tribute to the fortitude, endurance, and cheerfulness of his command.

Acknowledgments are due to the naval forces of the United States for their cheerful and efficient cooperation with the operations of the army on land upon many occasions.

Wherever the permanent occupation of our troops has extended in the Philippine Islands civil law has been immediately put in force. The courts have been organized and the most learned and competent native lawyers have been appointed to preside over them.

A system of education has been introduced and numerous schools

have been established. It is believed that in the city of Manila a greater number of good schools, affording better facilities for primary instruction, exist to-day than at any previous time in the history of the city.

OPERATIONS IN CUBA.

On the 13th of December, 1898, the Division of Cuba was created, consisting of the geographical departments and provinces of the island of Cuba, with headquarters in the city of Havana. The division was placed under the command of Maj. Gen. John R. Brooke, who, in addition to the command of the troops of the division, was directed to exercise authority as military governor of the island. On the 1st of January, 1899, pursuant to the provisions of the protocol and the arrangements made by the evacuation commission, Spanish sovereignty was formally relinquished and the government of the island was transferred to the military governor as the representative of the President of the United States. On the 6th of February, 1899, the evacuation of Cuba was completed by the sailing of the last of the Spanish army from the port of Cienfuegos.

The United States forces stationed in Cuba at the time of the transfer of the control consisted of 1,604 officers and 22,827 enlisted men.

The retiring army left a large Spanish population, and the long war for independence had engendered an excited and bitter feeling between them and the Cubans. The country had long been with little governmental control, except that exercised in the immediate neighborhood of the troops who were about departing. The ordinary social restraints had been destroyed, the cities were crowded with thousands of refugees and reconcentrados, who were exasperated by suffering and the death of their families and friends, and it was deemed necessary to take especial precautions for the prevention of riot and bloodshed at the time when Spanish control was removed. It is gratifying to note that the transfer was accomplished with entire harmony and without disorder, the troops of the United States replacing those of Spain step by step, as the latter retired, until a complete substitution was effected.

On the 24th of January the Division of Cuba was divided into seven geographical divisions, as follows: Pinar del Rio, Province of Havana, Havana, Matanzas, Santa Clara, Santiago, and Puerto Principe.

On the 19th of April and 1st of July, 1899, these departments were consolidated into four, leaving the Division of Cuba divided into the Department of the Province of Havana and Pinar del Rio, Department of Havana, Department of Matanzas and Santa Clara, and Department of Santiago and Puerto Principe.

Since the Spanish evacuation there have been no strictly military operations, and the officers of the army in Cuba have been largely occupied in conducting, under the direction of the military governor

and the department commanders, a general civil administration for which no other governmental machinery existed, and in aiding the existing municipal governments in the performance of their duties. The first and imperative duties of the army in the condition of social disorganization which existed were the maintenance of order, the immediate relief of prevailing distress among the starving reconcentrados, the sanitation of the towns, which had been left in a filthy condition, and in which none of the precautions against disease known to modern sanitary science had ever been adopted, and the promotion of a return to peaceful industry on the part of the people whose homes and farms had been by force abandoned and laid waste.

In all these respects satisfactory progress has been made. The use of troops to maintain order was necessary for but a short period. Forces of civil police organized from the people of the island have been substituted, and are performing their duties efficiently. The part played by our troops in the maintenance of order is now substantially but the restraining influence of their presence.

For the relief of distress the city of Havana was divided into districts for the distribution of rations and medicine under the direction of officers of the Army. House-to-house inspection in cooperation with a committee of citizens, a regular system of reporting all cases of destitution, and a wagon-train service to outlying points were established. Through these means, and through the existing hospitals and asylums 1,644,000 rations were distributed in the province of Havana between the 1st of January and 30th of June, 1899. In the Department of Santiago 1,699,366 rations were distributed between the 20th of November, 1898, and 16th of May, 1899. In the provinces of Matanzas and Santa Clara 1,930,130 rations were distributed between the 1st of January and the 30th of June, 1899. The amount required to be distributed has been steadily decreasing, and at the present time it is practically confined to distribution to hospitals and asylums.

The total issuances of rations to destitute persons in Cuba through the agency of the officers of the Army have amounted to 5,493,009 rations at a cost of $1,417,554.07.

The condition of the soldiers of the Cuban army, who had long been separated from any productive industry, and who upon the conclusion of hostilities were left substantially without homes or occupation, and with no pay coming to them from any source, seemed to require that, in the interest of public order as well as of humanity, some relief should be afforded which would enable them to disband and return to peaceful employment. It was accordingly determined to apply so much as might be necessary of the three million emergency fund provided by the act of January 5, 1899, for that purpose.

Arrangements were made under which the sum of $75 was paid to each Cuban soldier borne upon the duly authenticated rolls, on his bringing in and depositing his arms. Two million five hundred and

forty-seven thousand seven hundred and fifty dollars were paid out in this way, and upon the payment the army separated and has ceased to exist. Some claims to equal consideration for soldiers who are said to have been omitted from the list, and to especial consideration for sick and disabled soldiers who did not present themselves, are made, and the question of further payment to them is under consideration.

The sanitary conditions of the cities and towns throughout the island were found to be as bad as it is possible to conceive. Thorough and systematic inspections were made, sanitary corps were organized, streets were cleaned, sewers were opened, cesspools and sinks were emptied, public and private buildings were disinfected, methods of disposing of refuse were adopted, water supplies were improved, and rules were established and enforced to prevent a recurrence of similar conditions. In the larger cities a thoroughly good sanitary condition will require the establishment of grades, the construction of adequate sewer systems, and increase of water supplies. These have not as yet been practicable to any considerable extent. Great improvement, however, has been made to the advantage of cleanliness and health, and notwithstanding the peculiarly threatening conditions which existed at the close of the war, the island has been, throughout the heated season which is drawing to a close, unusually free from disease.

The city of Havana is now undergoing a house-to-house renovation and disinfection. Some 2,000 houses have already been treated, and the work continues at the rate of 120 to 125 houses per day. The reports show that in no case has the process of disinfection failed to eradicate the infection, and no case of fever has occurred except from a fresh infection. The total deaths from yellow fever in Havana for the first ten months of each year since 1889 have been as follows:

1890	314	1895	512
1891	318	1896	950
1892	272	1897	991
1893	469	1898	134
1894	369	1899	63

The deaths from all causes in Havana during the first few months after our occupation were numerous, owing to the great number of sick and dying who were there at the time of the Spanish evacuation. The rate has been steadily decreased until in September it was brought down to the annual rate of 27 per thousand and in October to 26.6 per thousand.

Similar conditions existing at Santiago were treated in a similar manner and with great thoroughness and effectiveness, and an outbreak of yellow fever at that point was speedily controlled and overcome.

During the six months ending June 30, 1899, we expended from the insular revenues $1,712,014.20 for sanitation, $293,881.27 for charities and hospitals, and $88,944.03 for aid to the destitute.

The revival of industry has been necessarily slow, but has made gratifying progress. Many of the people who had been driven into the towns during the reconcentration period have returned to the country and recommenced the cultivation of the land. Tobacco has been planted very largely and sugar to a less degree. In many parts of the island there is an adequate demand for labor at the rates which were customary before the war. The complete restoration of the sugar industry is seriously hindered by the fact that the sugar plantations are heavily mortgaged, their machinery has been destroyed, and the owners find it difficult to secure additional capital to restore the plant, because of the uncertainty which capitalists feel regarding the character of the future government of the island, and the protection which it will afford to investments. Not only are the owners of large estates affected by this circumstance, but many of the Cuban people who are ready and anxious to resume the cultivation of their farms with their own hands are still unable to do so because they have not the means to purchase the necessary animals and agricultural implements for that purpose.

The rule of administration of the civil government of the island has been to employ the people of Cuba themselves to the fullest extent possible, and to furnish to the Cubans, during our occupation, an opportunity for training in the honest and efficient performance of official duties which has never been afforded to them before.

As soon as the social conditions had become sufficiently normal to make it practicable, provision was made for taking a census of the island, designed to furnish the basis for the organization of the Cuban government to which we shall transfer the control now held by us in trust for the people of Cuba. The order was issued on the 19th day of August, 1899, and required the actual census to be commenced on the 16th day of October and to be completed by the 30th day of November, 1899. Col. Joseph P. Sanger, assistant inspector general, and formerly brigadier general of volunteers, commanding the Department of Matanzas, was appointed director, and he has as an assistant director an expert from the Census Bureau of the United States, with his headquarters in Cuba.

The entire force through which the census is being taken is composed of Cubans, with one well-known citizen of each of the six provinces as the supervisor for that province, and with enumerators nominated by him from residents of the province. The scope of the inquiry and the blanks, forms, and orders employed were determined upon by the Department after conference between the officials of the United States Census Bureau and the six supervisors who came to Washington for that purpose. The taking of the census was commenced at the appointed time, and it is now substantially completed, with entire success.

As order has been restored the number of troops in Cuba has been

gradually decreased. The troops now in the division are all of the Regular Army, and are as follows:

	Officers.	Enlisted men.
Department of Havana and Pinar del Rio	105	3,298
Department of Havana	25	880
Department of Matanzas and Santa Clara	88	2,821
Department of Santiago and Puerto Principe	116	3,797
Total	334	10,796

Orders have recently been given for the further withdrawal of 8 companies of infantry and 8 troops of cavalry.

OPERATIONS IN PORTO RICO.

The troops in Porto Rico at the end of November, 1898, consisted of 306 officers and 7,468 enlisted men. There are now in the department 87 officers and 2,855 enlisted men, all of the Regular Army, besides 400 men of the Porto Rican battalion.

The year has been devoted to administering and improving the civil government of the island and instructing the people in the rudiments of self-government, and this has been done at every step in conference with the leading citizens of the island, and upon lines agreed upon between them and the military governor. The work has been retarded by the unfortunate industrial condition of the island, caused by the fact that the people were unable to find remunerative markets for their products.

The prevailing distress was heightened by the terrific hurricane which swept over the entire length of the island on the 8th of August, 1899, followed by a deluge of rain and a tidal wave on the south coast. The result of this disaster was the loss of about 3,000 lives, the destruction of sugar mills, dwellings, roads, bridges, and growing crops. The principal crop of the island is coffee, and fully two-thirds of the coffee crop of the year was destroyed. Over 100,000 people were reduced to absolute destitution, without homes or food or means to obtain food, and at the same time the avenues of communication were destroyed, so that many of the destitute were reached with the greatest difficulty.

An immediate appeal to the people of the United States through the War Department met with a prompt and vigorous response. Relief committees were organized in our principal cities, and their work was systematized by a central relief committee with its headquarters in New York. One thousand tons of food were sent to the island for distribution during each week until the middle of October, when it was possible to reduce the quantity to 500 tons a week. Great quantities of medicines and other supplies were also furnished. Whenever the

quantities of food furnished by private charity were insufficient to maintain the regular supply, the deficiency was made up by this Department, at an aggregate cost of $392,342.63, not including cost of transportation.

For the distribution of these supplies and the succor of the unfortunate victims of the hurricane, the entire army in Porto Rico became a relief corps, and the work was prosecuted with a zeal, effectiveness, and humane spirit curiously at variance with traditional ideas of the object of military organization.

Care has been taken, and has been necessary, to prevent abuse of this charity by those who were able to support themselves, but preferred to live in idleness. Many of the persons whose means of livelihood were destroyed by the hurricane are able and willing to work for their living, and steps have been taken to furnish them with an opportunity for the time being by employing them in the construction and repair of military roads upon plans prepared by the chief engineer of the department.

As the difficulty to be met consists in the actual destruction of food supplies, it will be necessary to continue to furnish supplies from outside of the island until sufficient time has elapsed for new crops to be raised, but the amount which it is necessary to distribute in charity is steadily decreasing.

During the current year 786,290 persons (practically the entire population of the island) have been vaccinated at a cost of 3 cents and 6 mills for each person. A general system of education has been established, under a board of education consisting of two Americans and three Porto Ricans; a large number of American teachers have been secured in this country, and nearly every transport that sails from New York is carrying additions to the number. Under the former government the schools afforded opportunity for education of any description for only 8 per cent of the children of school age in the island. Only from 10 to 12½ per cent of the inhabitants of the island can read and write. At the time of American occupation the jails were found crowded with prisoners who had been confined for long periods without trial, and in many cases without being informed of the charges against them. These unfortunates have either been tried or set free. The courts have been to a great extent reorganized, and their proceedings simplified and expedited. The writ of habeas corpus has been introduced.

Arrangements have been made for the taking of the census in Porto Rico by the same methods applied to the island of Cuba.

At the time of change of sovereignty the island was in a condition of great disorder, and for a considerable period bandits collected in the mountains and committed depredations and maintained themselves by robbing the peaceful inhabitants. These have been dispersed and punished, and order has been thoroughly restored. A number of attempts have been made to secure a general participation by the people

in municipal elections and the reform of municipal governments. The results in this respect have not been very satisfactory thus far. Further experiments in the way of municipal elections are now in progress.

FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION IN THE ISLANDS.

The revenues of Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines have been collected and disbursed under the direction of officers of the Army. The disturbed internal conditions of all the islands have greatly reduced the possibilities of revenue from internal taxation, and the principal source of revenue has been the customs duties. These have been levied under tariffs established, after consultation with the United States Treasury Department, on the basis of the Spanish tariffs, with such modifications as seemed best adapted to the interests of the islands. In Cuba, particularly, these modifications were adopted after extensive consultations with the representatives of substantially all the industrial interests of the island.

The collection and disbursement of the funds have, it is believed, been marked in all the islands by honesty and adherence to law wholly unknown in former administrations, and I feel warranted in the assertion that never before in the history of these islands has there been so small a proportion of the revenues applied to the cost of collection and the expenses of government, or diverted to private uses, or so great a proportion of the revenue applied to the benefit of the people of the island. I annex hereto, marked Appendix "B," a statement of the receipts and disbursements in all the islands. The revenues of the island of Cuba have been treated as a trust fund for which the United States was accountable to the people of Cuba, and the accounts have been so kept that this department will be ready to account for all the money received, whenever the proper time comes.

TRANSPORT SERVICE.

The transportation of such large bodies of troops between Manila and the United States has made necessary the creation of a large fleet of ocean transports, and the great length of the voyage has required the exercise of special care in the sanitary arrangements and provisions for ventilation, cleanliness, and comfort. The experience acquired since the commencement of the war with Spain in April, 1898, has enabled the Quartermaster's Department to make steady improvement in these respects, and it is gratifying to note that the entire movement has been accomplished practically without loss of life, disease, or injury to health.

The army in the Philippines at the time of the Tagalog attack on Manila had been dispatched in great haste as soon as possible after the destruction of the Spanish fleet, and had little provision for inland transportation and a small force of cavalry. Both were

needed for the operations of the present campaign against the Tagalog forces. The roads in Luzon are few and poor, the native horses are very small, not suited either for cavalry or artillery or for carrying or drawing heavy loads. The usual means of transportation is by the water buffalo, which are very slow and not adapted to keep up supplies even for infantry operations. It has accordingly been necessary to send a large number of horses and mules from this country, and it has been necessary to fit out a large number of transports especially for that purpose. The last report shows that 2,238 horses and 1,075 mules have been safely landed in Manila and are reported to be in good condition and fit for use, while 2,180 horses and 1,373 mules have been shipped and have not yet arrived.

No losses worthy of note in this service have occurred, except on one vessel, which was overtaken by a typhoon on the north coast of Luzon, and was brought safely through the storm, with the loss of the greater part of her animals. Experiments have been tried in the introduction of horses from Australia and from China, but the results were not satisfactory. The animals brought into Luzon from this country can not as yet subsist entirely upon any food found there, and it has been necessary to transport most of their forage from this country. They may in time become accustomed to the peculiar grasses of the Philippine Islands, so that they can live upon them wholly or in a great part, but they can not do so at present. The great quantities of oats and hay which this fact has made it necessary to send have necessitated the use of still further transports.

On the 20th of November we had 8 vessels owned by the United States engaged in the transportation of troops and freight between the United States and the Philippines; 25 vessels chartered and fitted up by us engaged in the same service, and 18 vessels chartered and fitted up by us engaged in the transportation of animals, forage, and freight, making a total transport fleet in the Philippine service of 51 steam vessels.

The immediate pressure occasioned by the first transportation of troops and animals having passed, the chartered transports are now being surrendered as they successively return to the home port, and the fleet will be reduced within a short time to the vessels owned by the Government, with the possible addition of some of the chartered vessels which we have a right to purchase on advantageous terms. Not less than 10 vessels will be required for a considerable time to come in the regular service between San Francisco and Manila.

In performance of the obligations assumed under the fifth and sixth articles of the treaty of peace, all the Spanish soldiers taken as prisoners of war on the capture of Manila, and all other persons made prisoners of war by the American forces, or released from the hands of the insurgents in Cuba and the Philippines, have been returned to Spain, with the exception of such individuals as may not have desired

to return to Spain, and prisoners released from the hands of the Philippine insurgents during the past few weeks.

The cost of returning the prisoners from the Philippines incurred during the past year has amounted to $908,583.75.

The report of the Quartermaster-General shows that during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899, that branch of the service transported between Cuba, Porto Rico, Honolulu, the Philippines, and the United States, 202,587 passengers, 27,353 animals, and 86,150 tons of freight, and that transportation was furnished during the same period, by rail and water, exclusive of the army transport service, for 1,064,383 persons, 72,711 animals, and 544,644 tons of material. The efficiency and safety of this service and the freedom from disease and accident which have characterized it are very gratifying.

The transport service on the Atlantic is conducted entirely by vessels owned by the Government, which now make regular trips between New York, Havana, Santiago, and Porto Rico. They carried during the six months from January 1 to June 30, 1899, 45,507 passengers, 29,133 tons of freight, 2,449 parcels and pieces of baggage, and 6,558 animals. The total cost of that service for this period was $1,697,744.49, including the cost of rations, amounting to $90,500. A comparison between this and the freight and passenger rates of commercial lines plying between the same points shows that the cost of conducting the business was $501,001.51 less than it would have cost to send the same passengers and freight by the commercial lines.

Under orders issued by the Department in January of this year, a burial corps was organized, which proceeded to Santiago, Cuba, and thence to Porto Rico, and disinterred in those islands and brought to this country the remains of 1,122 American soldiers, sailors, and marines, 969 of which were identified and 153 unidentified. Six hundred and one of the remains thus returned were reinterred in a special section prepared and set apart for that purpose in the Arlington National Cemetery, with appropriate ceremonies, in which the President and members of his Cabinet, the Major-General Commanding the Army, and other high officers of the Federal Government took part.

A similar expedition sailed on the 28th of October last from the port of San Francisco for Manila to perform the same sad office for the Americans who have fallen during the struggles with Spain and the Tagalog insurgents in the Philippine Islands.

Considerations of public health in all the islands have prevented disinterments except during the coolest and dryest periods of the year. The return of the remains which are to be brought from the Philippines, as well as those which are still to be brought from Cuba and Porto Rico, may be expected about the month of January or February, 1900.

COMFORT AND HEALTH.

The clothing of the Army appears to have been satisfactory, except the earlier issues of khaki cloth. An attempt has been made to

secure the manufacture of this cloth by American manufacturers, so that we would not be dependent on any other country for our supply. The demand for a very light material led at first to the production of an article without sufficient strength, and the dyes used at first proved not sufficiently fast to stand field use. It is believed that these difficulties have now been overcome, and that we produce in this country an article equal to that procured abroad.

The food supplied to the Army during the year has been of good quality and has been furnished promptly. Special attention has been paid to securing rations suited as far as possible to a tropical climate. Tests have been made of emergency rations affording a high degree of nourishment in small compass, and not easily spoiled, and a combination recently adopted seems to be giving satisfaction in the Philippines.

The health of the Army from the beginning of the Spanish war has been remarkably good. The deaths from all causes (including casualties in action) in the whole Army, regulars and volunteers, for the fourteen months from May, 1898, to June, 1899, inclusive, were 6,619. This is equivalent to an annual rate of 33.03 per thousand of strength. The deaths from disease during the whole period were at an annual rate of but 25.68 per thousand. These were as follows:

Stations.	Number of deaths.	Rate per 1,000.
United States	3,577	23.81
Cuba	928	45.14
Porto Rico	238	28.15
Philippines	402	17.20

For an army largely drawn from a cold climate and transported suddenly to the Tropics, mainly composed of new recruits not trained to care for themselves in camp or on the march, and a great part of which was stationed in a malarial country or quartered in and about cities infected with yellow fever, and especially adapted to the production of typhoid, this is an extraordinary result and reflects credit upon all the branches of the service engaged in clothing, feeding, and caring for the men.

The total deaths in the army of the Philippines for the ten months from the 1st of January, 1899, to the 1st of November, 1899—that is to say, for the entire period covered by the war with the insurgents—have been of those killed in battle and dying of wounds and other injuries 477; those dying of disease, 366—making a total of 843.

It is to be hoped that the exceptional healthfulness maintained among the troops in the Philippines, notwithstanding the hardships to which they are subjected in the field, will be brought to the general attention of their relatives and friends at home, to whom it can not fail to give satisfaction.

The significance of the annual rate of death from disease in the

Philippines (17.20 per thousand) may be better appreciated by comparison with the rates in some of our well-known American cities.

The annual death rate per 1,000 is—

Washington	20.74
Boston	20.09
San Francisco	19.41
New York	19.28
Baltimore	19.10
Soldiers in the Philippines	17.20

INSULAR GOVERNMENT.

The treaty of Paris provides:

> The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress.

I assume, for I do not think that it can be successfully disputed, that all acquisition of territory under this treaty was the exercise of a power which belonged to the United States, because it was a nation, and for that reason was endowed with the powers essential to national life, and that the United States has all the powers in respect of the territory which it has thus acquired, and the inhabitants of that territory, which any nation in the world has in respect of territory which it has acquired: that as between the people of the ceded islands and the United States the former are subject to the complete sovereignty of the latter, controlled by no legal limitations except those which may be found in the treaty of cession; that the people of the islands have no right to have them treated as States, or to have them treated as the territories previously held by the United States have been treated, or to assert a legal right under the provisions of the constitution which was established for the people of the United States themselves and to meet the conditions existing upon this continent, or to assert against the United States any legal right whatever not found in the treaty.

I assume, also, that the obligations correlative to this great power are of the highest character, and that it is our unquestioned duty to make the interests of the people over whom we assert sovereignty the first and controlling consideration in all legislation and administration which concerns them, and to give them, to the greatest possible extent, individual freedom, self-government in accordance with their capacity, just and equal laws, and opportunity for education, for profitable industry, and for development in civilization.

The people of the ceded islands have acquired a moral right to be treated by the United States in accordance with the underlying principles of justice and freedom which we have declared in our Constitution, and which are the essential safeguards of every individual against the powers of government, not because those provisions were enacted for them, but because they are essential limitations inherent in the very existence of the American Government. To illustrate: The

people of Porto Rico have not the right to demand that duties should be uniform as between Porto Rico and the United States, because the provision of the Constitution prescribing uniformity of duties throughout the United States was not made for them, but was a provision of expediency solely adapted to the conditions existing in the United States upon the continent of North America; but the people of Porto Rico are entitled to demand that they shall not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, that private property shall not be taken for public use without compensation, that no law shall be passed impairing the obligation of contracts, etc., because our nation has declared these to be rights belonging to all men. Observance of them is a part of the nature of our Government. It is impossible that there should be any delegation of power by the people of the United States to any legislative, executive, or judicial officer which should carry the right to violate these rules toward anyone anywhere; and there is an implied contract on the part of the people of the United States with every man who voluntarily submits himself or is submitted to our dominion that they shall be observed as between our Government and him, and that in the exercise of the power conferred by the Constitution upon Congress, "to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States," Congress will hold itself bound by those limitations which arise from the law of its own existence.

The problem of civil government in the islands yielded or ceded by Spain presents itself in the simplest form in the case of Porto Rico. That island is fully and without question under the sovereignty of the United States. It came to us not only by legal right, but with the cheerful and unanimous desire of its people, who are peaceful and loyal and eager for the benefits to be derived from the application of American ideas of government. There is no obstacle in the way of our providing for Porto Rico the best government which we are capable of devising for people situated as are the inhabitants of that island.

The questions presented by the consideration of the measures which ought to be taken for the government of Porto Rico are threefold: (1) What form of government shall be established, and what participation in that government shall the people of the island have? (2) What shall be the treatment of the municipal law of the island, and how far shall the laws which now regulate the rights and conduct of the people be changed to conform to the ideas prevalent among the people of the United States? (3) What economic relations shall be established between the island and the United States?

(1) In determining the question as to the form of government, and the participation of the people of the island therein, the most important fact to be considered is that the people have not yet been educated in the art of self-government, or any really honest government. In all their experience and in all their traditions, law and freedom have been ideas which were not associated with each other, but opposed to each

other; and it is impossible that a people with this history—only 10 per cent of whom can read or write—should ever have acquired any real understanding of the way to conduct a popular government. I do not doubt their capacity to learn to govern themselves; but they have not yet learned. There are among them many highly educated and able men, public spirited and patriotic, and these show what their people are capable of becoming; but there are not enough of them to make a working government which would be anything but an oligarchy, and many of them have merely a theoretical rather than a practical acquaintance with the processes of government.

The difficulty does not consist merely of a lack of familiarity with the methods and processes of government; it lies deeper than that in the fact that the Porto Ricans, as a people, have never learned the fundamental and essential lesson of obedience to the decision of the majority. They have had no opportunity to learn and they never have learned. There can be no free government without a loyal, voluntary personal subjection to the peaceful decisions reached by lawful processes.

In the experiments which have already been tried in municipal elections, and toward government by municipal boards, the minority which is voted down almost invariably refuses to participate further in the business of government.

The attitude of the defeated party is precisely that which causes the continual revolutions in the government of other West India islands and the Central American States in the same latitude. This habit marks a rudimentary stage of political development, and before the people of Porto Rico can be fully intrusted with self-government they must first learn the lesson of self-control and respect for the principles of constitutional government, which require acceptance of its peaceful decisions. This lesson will necessarily be slowly learned, because it is a matter not of intellectual apprehension, but of character and of acquired habits of thought and feeling. It would be of no use to present to the people of Porto Rico now a written constitution or frame of laws, however perfect, and tell them to live under it. They would inevitably fail without a course of tuition under a strong and guiding hand. With that tuition for a time their natural capacity will, it is hoped, make them a self-governing people. A form of government should be provided for Porto Rico which will assure the kind of administration to which we are accustomed, with just as much participation on the part of Porto Ricans as is possible without enabling their inexperience to make it ineffective, and with opportunity for them to demonstrate their increasing capacity to govern themselves with less and less assistance.

I think that some such provision should be made for future government as the following:

That we should first declare definitely, by statute, what general laws of the United States are to be extended to the Porto Ricans, such as,

for instance, the postal laws, the banking laws, the customs, navigation and internal revenue laws with such modifications as may be deemed advisable, the laws against counterfeiting, the antitrust laws, etc.; and provide for Federal officers to execute these laws just as they are executed in the various States and Territories of the Union; that there should be a provision for a Federal judiciary in the island, with the same kind of jurisdiction which is exercised by the circuit and district courts of the United States, and that jurisdiction to review their determinations should be vested in the Supreme Court of the United States, or in a designated circuit court of appeals and the Supreme Court of the United States.

That there should be a form of local insular government provided which shall have complete control over the rights, property, and obligations of the people of the island, substantially covering the field covered by the government of our respective States, and subject to limitations prescribed by Congress of the same character as the constitutional limitations generally imposed upon our state legislatures.

That the framework of this government should be substantially as follows: A governor, to be appointed by the President of the United States with the advice and consent of the Senate; the chief officers of state customary under our system, such as secretary of state, attorney-general, treasurer, auditor or comptroller, superintendent of public works, and superintendent of education, to be appointed in like manner; and a legislative council, to be composed of the chief officers of state, and a minority selected from the people of the island by the President; that all acts of the council should be subject to the veto power of the governor and to be passed over the veto by a two-thirds vote, and no law should take effect until it has remained without disapproval for thirty days after presentation to Congress or to the President of the United States, if passed when Congress is not in session; that there should be a supreme court of the island, composed of judges appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate and having appellate jurisdiction only; trial courts in separate districts, having general original jurisdiction, with judges and officers to be appointed by the governor, and a petty court in each municipality; that the several municipalities now existing in the island, with such consolidations and alterations of boundaries as the council shall prescribe, shall be governed by mayors and municipal councils, to be elected by the people of the municipalities, each municipality to be free from control in the exercise of the powers of local government, except as it shall be controlled by statute, and except as its officers shall be liable to removal by the governor in case of failure to faithfully perform their duties, and with power in the governor in case of such failure to order a new election and to fill vacancies in the meantime.

Such a system as this is not without precedent in our own experience,

for the provision of a governor and council was frequently adopted in our early territorial legislation. It would give to the people of the island participation in the government, and would afford them an opportunity both to acquire and to demonstrate capacity for the conduct of government.

The question whether there might not now be provision made for a legislature elected by the people of the island is not free from doubt, but in view of their present inexperience I think that it would be better to postpone such a provision until the people can have had an opportunity for exercise in municipal government and until the first formative period of adapting the laws and procedure of the island to the new conditions shall have passed under the direction of a council composed of Porto Ricans selected for their known capacity and wisdom and Americans from the States competent and experienced in dealing with legislative and administrative problems. The constitution of such a legislature should be contemplated as a step to be taken in the near future.

I think the basis of suffrage should be that all who can read and write, or who hold property up to a specified small amount, may vote, and no others. With a sufficient system of free primary education, the entire people should acquire the suffrage on this basis fully as soon as they are capable of using it understandingly.

For the successful working of such a scheme, or of any scheme of government for the island, it will be necessary that some cardinal rule shall be adopted and rigidly followed regarding appointment to office. Wherever a Porto Rican can be found capable and willing to perform official duties he should be selected, and the aim should be to include in the civil service of the island no greater number of Americans from the United States than are necessary for the introduction of the methods of administration in which Americans have been trained and Porto Ricans have not.

Wherever it is necessary to employ Americans, except in the chief offices, a system of civil-service examination should be provided, under which requests from the governor of Porto Rico for suitable persons to be appointed may be filled.

A necessary element to the success of this, or any scheme of government in Porto Rico, is the complete establishment of a system of education which will afford the opportunity for every child of school age in the island to acquire elementary instruction. The cost of this should be defrayed from the insular treasury, if its revenues are sufficient, and if not it should be regarded as a duty of the highest obligation resting upon the United States, and the expense should be borne by the United States.

I ask especial attention to the very valuable discussion of this subject contained in the report of Brig. Gen. George W. Davis, military governor of the island, submitted herewith.

(2) The answer to the second question, "What shall be the treatment of the municipal law of the island, and how far shall the laws which now regulate the rights and conduct of the people be changed to conform to ideas which prevail among the people of the United States," presents little real difficulty. The civil code established by Spain for Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines, and in force at the time of the cession, is an excellent body of laws, adequate in the main, and adapted to the customs and conditions of the people. It should be continued in force, with such gradual modification as experience from time to time suggests to those who are actually engaged in enforcing it.

The trouble has been not that the law was defective or vicious, but that it has never been fairly and honestly administered. The course of such an administration will naturally lead to amendments and improvements, regarding which the people themselves who are to be affected by them should have a voice. The customs and conditions of the people who are to be governed must furnish the true basis for the law under which they are to live, and any attempt to substitute in these southern islands a system of laws based on the experience and characteristics of a New England community would be both oppressive and futile.

In order to secure a good administration of the laws, extensive changes in procedure will be necessary, and there should be material changes in the criminal law. The conditions of life are comparatively simple, and both the criminal laws and the methods of procedure may, in the first instance at least, be made simple also.

One of the ablest groups of men who ever addressed themselves to such a question in this or any other country undertook a similar task in adapting the laws of Louisiana, long living under Spanish law, to the new conditions which followed the cession of that territory to the United States. They followed with signal success the precise course above outlined.

A similar course was followed after the acquisition of Lower Canada by the English in 1763. The French province had been governed by the laws and ordinances of France and the custom of Paris, a mingled system of Roman and Frankish law. By the statute of 14, George III, the English law was introduced in criminal matters, and the private law in civil matters was left undisturbed. The result appears to have been entirely satisfactory both to the French population of Quebec and to the remainder of the Dominion which has been settled and governed under English law.

(3) The question of the economic treatment of the island underlies all the others. If the people are prosperous and have an abundance of the necessities of life, they will with justice be easily governed, and will with patience be easily educated. If they are left in hunger and hopeless poverty, they will be discontented, intractable, and mutinous. The principal difficulty now in the island of Porto Rico is that the transfer

of the island from Spain to the United States has not resulted in an increase of prosperity, but in the reverse. The industry of the island is almost entirely agricultural. The people live upon the products of their own soil and upon the articles for which they exchange their surplus products abroad. Their production is in the main of coffee, sugar, and tobacco. The prosperity of the island depends upon their success in selling these products.

So long as the island was a part of the Spanish possessions there was substantially free trade with Spain and with Cuba. The total exports from Porto Rico for the four years preceding 1897 averaged about $16,609,000, of which an average of less than one-sixth part ($2,630,000) was sold to the United States and an average of one-half ($8,025,000) was sold to Spain and Cuba. Immediately upon the transfer of the island from Spain to the United States, Spain erected a tariff barrier against the introduction of Porto Rican products. The interests of Cuban agriculture led to the erection of a similar barrier in the tariff adopted for Cuba, so that Porto Rico was debarred from the principal markets which she had previously enjoyed, and at the same time this country has maintained its tariff against Porto Rican products just as it existed while the island was Spanish territory. The result is that there has been a wall built around the industry of Porto Rico.

Even before the hurricane of August 8, 1899, two crops of tobacco lay in the warehouses of Porto Rico, which the owners were unable to sell at prices equal to the cost of production. Their sugar shared the prevailing depression in that commodity, arising from the competition of bounty-fed beet sugar. Their coffee was practically unknown in the United States and had no market here. It is plain that it is essential to the prosperity of the island that she should receive substantially the same treatment at our hands as she received from Spain while a Spanish colony, and that the markets of the United States should be opened to her as were the markets of Spain and Cuba before the transfer of allegiance. Congress has the legal right to regulate the customs duties between the United States and Porto Rico as it pleases; but the highest considerations of justice and good faith demand that we should not disappoint the confident expectation of sharing in our prosperity with which the people of Porto Rico so gladly transferred their allegiance to the United States, and that we should treat the interests of this people as our own; and I wish most strongly to urge that the customs duties between Porto Rico and the United States be removed.

Our temporary occupation of the island of Cuba involves a very simple plan of operation, with some difficulties in its application which are apt to be overlooked by those who are impatient for immediate results. The control which we are exercising in trust for the people of Cuba should not be, and of course will not be, continued any longer than is necessary to enable that people to establish a suitable government to

which the control shall be transferred, which shall really represent the people of Cuba and be able to maintain order and discharge its international obligations. When that government is established it will be its duty and right to solve for Cuba the problems above discussed in regard to Porto Rico. Our present duty is limited to giving every assistance in our power to the establishment of such a government, and to maintaining order and promoting the welfare of the people of Cuba during the period necessarily required for that process.

The conduct of the Cuban people has been admirable. There have, of course, been some agitators who have loudly voiced their discontent over not being allowed to personally conduct the government themselves, but the substantial body of educated Cubans have shown themselves to be patriotic, appreciative, and helpful, while the great body of uneducated Cubans have been patient and law abiding. The fact, however, that probably two-thirds of the people of the island are unable to read and write; that the people in general have had no experience in any real self-government, but have been for centuries under the dominion of arbitrary power; that the bloody conflicts which raged so long have necessarily left behind bitter factional feeling, make it necessary to proceed somewhat more slowly in the formation of a government which is to command universal respect and allegiance than would be necessary in a country accustomed to the discussion of public questions, familiar with the problems presented, and trained to the acceptance of the decisions reached by the ballot.

The year allowed by the treaty for the Spanish population of the island to elect whether they will be Cuban or Spanish citizens will expire on the 11th of April next. It will then, for the first time, be possible to determine who are the citizens of Cuba entitled to take a part in her government. By that time it is believed that, the results of the census having been computed and tabulated, we shall be ready to provide for municipal elections, which will place all the local governments of the island in the hands of representatives elected by the people, and that when these local governments, thus elected, are established they will be ready to proceed to the formation of a representative convention to frame a constitution and provide for a general government of the island, to which the United States will surrender the reins of government. When that government is established the relations which exist between it and the United States will be matter for free and uncontrolled agreement between the two parties.

The uncertainty which retards the industrial development of Cuba and prevents the influx of capital is not only as to the character of the future government and the safety of investments, but an uncertainty as to the future market for the sugar product of the island, upon which the prosperity of the island chiefly rests. The competition of the bounty-fed beet-sugar product of Europe has already reduced the price which can be realized for cane sugar to a point so near the cost of pro-

duction that the cane producer can not pay expenses by the old method of production. Only the new and improved methods of production, on a large scale and in the most economical method and requiring large capital, make a successful competition on his part possible. The sugar producer of Cuba now finds himself confronted by two additional dangers—one, the prospect that the sugar of Porto Rico, like that of Hawaii and possibly that of the Philippines, may be admitted into the great market of the United States free of duty, while Cuban sugar is required to pay duty; and the other, the prospect of ratification by the Senate of the reciprocity treaties already negotiated, under which the sugar of the British West India Islands would be admitted to the United States at a 20-per-cent reduction of duties, while Cuban sugar would continue to pay the full duty.

The following table shows the comparative returns to the producers of sugar in the principal countries from which the United States derives its supply, after allowing for the duties imposed under the conditions above stated, and assuming the basis of the New York price July 1, 1899, of 4½ cents per pound for standard, 96 test, centrifugal sugar.

Charges.	Germany.	Cuba.	Java.	English colonies.	Porto Rico.	Hawaii.
Duties:	*Cents.*	*Cents.*	*Cents.*	*Cents.*	*Cents.*	*Cents.*
Tariff	1.685	1.685	1.685	1.318	None.	None.
Countervailing	.259	None.	None.	None.	None.	None.
Estimated freights	.080	.100	.300	.100	.180	.270
Insurance on f. o. b. value	.020	.025	.050	.028	.032	.090
	2.044					
Less bounty	.259					
	1.785					
F. o. b. value	2.715	2.690	2.465	3.024	4.288	4.140
	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.50
Foreign value above	2.71	2.69	2.46	3.02	4.28	4.14

It appears from this comparison that if these conditions are to exist, the Cuban producer would realize but 2.69 cents per pound for his product, as against 2.71 cents for the German, 3.02 cents for the British West Indian, 4.14 cents for the Hawaiian, and 4.28 cents for the Porto Rican producer.

Under these conditions, as the United States is the great market for Cuban sugar, and the prosperity of Cuba depends upon that market, it is highly probable that, however competent and efficient may be the government of Cuba into whose hands we surrender the control of the island, the first measure of self-preservation which that government will be compelled to consider will be to undertake to secure from the United States some tariff arrangement under which Cuba can sell her sugar at a profit. The uncertainty whether that arrangement can be made now stands in the way of the revival of the sugar industry in Cuba.

It can not be doubted that when the question of future relations between this country and Cuba comes to be considered by the representatives of the two countries the United States will deal generously in all respects with the people for whom she has made such great sacrifices.

It does not seem that, so long as we retain the control of Cuba and preclude her people from making trade agreements or treaties on their own account, we ought to treat her sugar producers less favorably than we do their competitors in the West India Islands which are subject to other powers, and I recommend that during the period of our occupation of the island the duties imposed upon the importation into the United States from Cuba of the products of that island be reduced to the same rates which will be imposed upon the goods imported from Jamaica in case the Senate shall ratify the pending reciprocity treaties.

The full report which will be presented by the Philippine Commission renders unnecessary any extended statement by me on the subject of government in those islands. Since the members of the commission left Manila on their return to this country, a civil government has been installed in the island of Negros under the temporary constitution framed by representatives of the people and modified by agreement between them and Brig. Gen. James F. Smith, U. S. Volunteers, commander of the United States forces at that point. The relative participation of the people of Negros and of the officers of the United States in the government is entirely satisfactory to both parties, as a temporary expedient, and the reports indicate that Negros is now enjoying a greater degree of order and contentment than at any time in her recent history.

The Sultan and principal chiefs of the islands have recognized the succession of the United States to the rights of Spain, in the Sulu Archipelago by an agreement negotiated and executed on the part of the United States by Brig. Gen. J. C. Bates, U. S. Volunteers, on the 10th of August, 1899, subject to the approval of the President. This agreement has been approved subject to the action of Congress in the exercise of the power expressed in the clause of the treaty, which provides that "the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territory ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress," and with the understanding, which the military governor of the Philippines has been directed to communicate to the Sultan, that the approval of the agreement was not to be deemed to give the authority or consent of the United States to the existence of slavery.

PACIFIC CABLE.

I wish to call especial attention to the importance of direct cable communication between the United States and the Philippine Islands. Our present telegraphic communication is by way of England, France,

Egypt, India, and China. The cable tolls of the War Department messages alone to and from the Philippines for the last five months have averaged $27,114.12 monthly, a rate of over $325,000 a year. The communication would have been much more extensive and frequent had it not been limited by the great cost to the most important messages. While it is not to be anticipated that army communication to such an extent will be necessary for a very long period, it is plain that the necessities of government will continue to require an amount of communication sufficient to furnish a large item of revenue to a direct cable line, while the growing business relations between this country, the Hawaiian Islands, the Philippines, and the East require this facility and will greatly profit by it.

Trade tends to follow the line of least resistance in communication, and the construction of such a line is a necessity if we are to realize our just anticipations of an increased market in the East for American products. The opening of communication for the people of the Hawaiian Islands will be of great value to them. It would be better not to rely upon lines running through the territory of other powers and subject to their control for communication between the United States and the civil and military authorities in the islands over which we have assumed the duty of protection and government.

A very thorough investigation recently made by Great Britain preparatory to the laying of a trans-Pacific cable between British Columbia and Australasia has demonstrated beyond question the practicability not only of the cable proposed by Great Britain, and for which bids are now being received, but of a cable between California and the Philippines via Hawaii, Wake Island, and Guam. The length of such a cable would be 7,493 miles, as against 7,986 miles for the proposed British cable, and the cost is estimated by the United States Signal Office as not exceeding $8,500,000 at the present market rates for material.

If the intermediate landing between Hawaii and Guam be made at Midway Island instead of Wake Island the route would be some 125 miles longer, but it would give a better station and would avoid the greatest ocean depth encountered on the other route.

The history of Atlantic cables and the opportunity and capacity of the American people to secure a large share of the vast trade of the East justify confidence that such a cable would be a remunerative investment for the capital employed, as well as a great and substantial benefit to our country and to our new territory.

OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES.

The operations of the Army in the United States present little of special interest, except in the nature of preparation for the service in the Philippines and the continuance of the seacoast defenses. The plan of coast defense adopted by the Board of Fortifications and Other Defense appointed pursuant to the act of March 3, 1885, commonly

known as the "Endicott Board," provided for a system of fortifications at twenty-seven ports, requiring 677 heavy guns and 824 mortars of modern construction, at the cost of $97,782,800. Three ports have since been added to the plan and rapid fire guns have been embraced in the proposed armament. Detailed and preliminary projects have been prepared or approved for all of these thirty points, and the construction of permanent works under these projects at twenty-five points has been well advanced. The recent progress has been rapid and gratifying. The present condition of the engineering work is such as to permit of effective defense against naval attack at most of the principal ports of the country when the guns are provided and properly manned.

The plan as originally adopted with the modifications and developments contemplates the use of two hundred and four 12-inch, one hundred and ninety-four 10-inch, and ninety eight 8-inch heavy guns, eight hundred and twenty nine rapid-fire guns, and one thousand and thirty-seven 12-inch mortars. At the end of the fiscal year, June 30, 1899, provision had been made for emplacing 297 heavy guns, 308 rapid fire guns, and 344 mortars, being about 60 per cent, 37 per cent, and 34 per cent, respectively, of the aggregate number of heavy guns, rapid-fire guns, and mortars projected for the defense of the seacoast.

The following table shows the progress made in the provision of guns for the above-mentioned emplacements:

	12 inch.	10 inch.	8 inch.	Rapid fire.	12-inch mortars.
Guns, mounted	43	101	66	46	208
Ready for armament	32	10	24	*a* 148	48
Under construction	10	7	4	89	88
Not yet begun				25	
Total	85	118	94	308	344

a Including seventy 6-pounders not requiring permanent emplacements.

Of the guns now mounted, eleven 12-inch guns, thirteen 10-inch guns, twenty four 8-inch guns, twenty rapid fire guns, and thirty-two 12-inch mortars were placed in position during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899.

The number of heavy guns completed up to November 30, 1899, was eighty three 8-inch, one hundred and fourteen 10-inch, eighty-three 12-inch, and two hundred and sixty-nine mortars.

Under the provisions of the fortifications act approved March 3, 1899, additional contracts have been placed for five sets of 10-inch gun forgings, fifteen sets of 12-inch gun forgings, and thirty-eight sets of 12-inch mortar forgings. Three hundred and fifty-eight 12-inch mortars in all have been completed or are under manufacture. Six hundred and five seacoast gun carriages of all classes had been delivered by the Ordnance Bureau up to June 30, 1899, of which 216 were delivered

during the fiscal year ending at that time. Three hundred and eighty such carriages remain under manufacture. Many tests of gun carriages, projectiles, and explosives have been actively prosecuted during the year. The entire amount expended in the plan of seacoast defense down to the 30th of June, 1899, was $45,979,285.93. There still remain to be provided for under the plan 171 heavy guns, 452 rapid-fire guns, and 679[1] mortars. The total cost of completing the work is estimated at $63,274,766.

The submarine mines which were planted and maintained in twenty-eight harbors of the United States during the war with Spain have been removed. The material recovered has been cleaned, carefully tested, and stored, and large additions have been made and distributed to prepare the system for any future use which may be required. The experience acquired has been valuable. The system adopted fully realized all expectations.

Provision for quarters of the men to care for and use the guns in the seacoast defense is less advanced than it should be. In a number of cases the land acquired for the fortifications was not sufficient to provide the necessary space for quarters also. Proceedings are now pending to acquire additional land.

Both the regular and volunteer forces are entirely equipped with .30 caliber rifles of the Krag-Jörgensen type and smokeless powder.

POST EXCHANGES.

By the act of June 13, 1890, Congress provided:

That no alcoholic liquors, beer, or wine shall be sold or supplied to the enlisted men in any canteen or post-trader's store, or in any room or building at any garrison or military post in any State or Territory in which the sale of alcoholic liquors, beer, or wine is prohibited by law.

By section 17 of the act of March 2, 1899, Congress provided:

That no officer or private soldier shall be detailed to sell intoxicating drinks, as a bar tender or otherwise, in any post exchange or canteen, nor shall any other person be required or allowed to sell such liquors in any encampment or fort or on any premises used for military purposes by the United States; and the Secretary of War is hereby directed to issue such general order as may be necessary to carry the provisions of this section into full force and effect.

The post exchange is thus described by the regulations prescribed by the War Department:

The post exchange will combine the features of reading and recreation rooms, a cooperative store, and a restaurant. Its primary purpose is to supply the troops at reasonable prices with the articles of ordinary use, wear, and consumption not supplied by the Government, and to afford the means of rational recreation and amusement.

Its secondary purpose is through exchange profits to provide the means for improving the messes.

[1] This number may be reduced nearly 50 per cent by substitution of 8- for 16-mortar batteries.

The money which constitutes the capital employed in the operation of the exchange is the money of the men themselves, so that the business conducted is their own business conducted for them, and the benefits of all kinds are equally shared by them.

The regulations relating to the conduct of exchanges have for several years provided:

9. *Exchange features.*—An exchange doing its full work should embrace the following sections: (*a*) A well-stocked general store, in which such goods are kept as are usually required at military posts, and as extensive in number and variety as conditions will justify; (*b*) a well-kept lunch counter, supplied with as great a variety of viands as circumstances permit, such as tea, coffee, cocoa, nonalcoholic drinks, soup, fish, cooked and canned meats, sandwiches, pastries, etc.; (*c*) a canteen, at which, under the conditions hereinafter set forth, beer and light wines by the drink, and tobaccos, may be sold; (*d*) reading and recreation rooms, supplied with books, periodicals, and other reading matter, billiard and pool tables, bowling alley, and facilities for other proper indoor games, as well as apparatus for outdoor sports and exercises, such as cricket, football, baseball, tennis, etc.: a well-equipped gymnasium, possessing also the requisite paraphernalia for outdoor athletics. At small posts it may be impracticable to maintain all of these sections, but at every exchange there should be no less than two departments—the refreshment, embracing store, lunch counter, and canteen, and the recreation, which includes all the other branches.

10. *Sale of liquors prohibited.*—The sale or use of ardent spirits in any branch of the exchange, and in any encampment or fort or on any premises used for military purposes by the United States, is strictly prohibited; but on the recommendation of the exchange council the commanding officer may permit beer and light wines to be sold at the canteen by the drink whenever he is satisfied that giving to the troops the opportunity of obtaining such beverages within the post limits will prevent them from resorting for strong intoxicants to places without such limits, and tend to promote temperance and discipline among them. Should the commanding officer not approve the recommendation of the exchange council, it will be submitted for final decision to the department commander. The canteen must be in a room used for no other purpose, and when practicable in a building apart from that in which the recreation and reading rooms are located. The sale of beer must be limited to week days, and the beer consumed upon the premises. The practice known as "treating" will not be permitted.

These exchanges have largely replaced the old and objectionable post trader store at military posts, and have furnished the only means to relieve the cheerlessness and tedium of an enlisted man's life in time of peace, which lower the morale of the force and repel the better class of enlistments.

During the year ending June 30, 1898, the aggregate receipts of the exchanges in operation in the Army amounted to $1,621,398.67, and there was received as money on deposit $189,258.81, making the total amount of money received $1,810,657.48. There was expended for merchandise purchased, rent, fixtures, and repairs, and expenses of operation $1,297,737.16, which, less deposit, gives a profit of $323,661.51. From this amount there was donated to the funds of the several regimental bands $9,154.51; to the maintenance of post gardens, $1,559.17; to post libraries, $610.06; to gymnasiums, $2,913.75; as prizes for the encouragement of athletic sports, $3,538.11, and after setting aside the sum of $60,877.58 as a

reserve fund to meet anticipated expenses for at least one month, there was returned to the members in the form of dividends the sum of $254,890.93.

During the year ending June 30, 1899, the aggregate receipts of the 80 post exchanges and the 34 regimental exchanges in the Army, so far as reports have been received, amounted to $1,609,492.33, and the expenditures $979,012.26, which, less deposit, gives a net profit of $399,588.27. From this amount there was donated to the funds of the several regimental bands $5,563.09, to the maintenance of post gardens $1,089.74, to post libraries $1,121.55, to gymnasiums $1,527.07, to athletic sports $1,312.18, and after setting aside the sum of $104,008.03 as a reserve fund, there was returned to the members in the form of dividends the sum of $275,580.74.

The aggregate receipts of the post exchanges therefore during the past two years has been $3,420,149.81, and the dividends $530,471.67. The net value of these exchanges—that is to say, the balance of their combined assets over their liabilities—was on June 30, 1899, $253,792.26.

The wide difference between the terms used by Congress in the act of June 13, 1890, distinctly and unmistakably prohibiting all sales of alcoholic liquors, beer, or wine, in military posts in States where sales to civilians are prohibited by law, and the terms used in the act of March 2, 1899, which seemed to be designed as a regulation of the sale in post exchanges and a prohibition of such sale by post traders, led to a reference by my predecessor to the Attorney-General for a construction of this provision of the act of March 2, 1899.

The Attorney General, on the 12th of April, rendered an opinion to the effect that the section in question "does not prohibit the continuance of the sale of intoxicating drinks through the canteen sections of the post exchanges as heretofore organized and carried on, except that of course no officer or soldier can be put on duty in the canteen section to do the selling, either directly or indirectly."

The regulations have been amended to comply with the statute as thus construed. I agree with the view that this is the more reasonable construction of the statute. It is, however, questioned by many citizens, and it is very desirable that if Congress does in fact intend to absolutely prohibit the sale of beers and light wines in post exchanges to the soldiers of our Army in States where such sale is permitted by law to all other persons, this intention should be expressed in terms which are free from doubt.

It is to be observed that the sale of ardent spirits is now strictly prohibited by the Army Regulations, and that the sale of beer and light wines is limited to the cases where the commanding officer of the post "is satisfied that giving to the troops the opportunity of obtaining such beverages within the post limits will prevent them from resorting for strong intoxicants to places without such limits, and tends to promote temperance and discipline among them."

For the purpose of ascertaining the effect of this regulation a circular letter was sent to each department commander on the 2d of May last, directing the submission of a series of questions to the officers of the Army, designed to elicit the results of their experience and observation as to the effect of the sale of beer, etc., in post exchanges upon the morality, sobriety, and discipline of the troops, and their opinions as to the effect of an actual prohibition.

I append hereto (marked Appendix C) a copy of the circular letter, and an abstract giving the substance of the expressions which have been received in response.

Some troops were of course so situated at the time that it was not practicable to secure expressions from them. Expressions have been received from twenty-four of the twenty-five regiments of infantry, substantially all of the ten regiments of cavalry, and of the seven regiments of artillery. It will be perceived that the overwhelming testimony of the Army is to the effect that the present regulation has promoted the temperance, discipline, morals, and health of the enlisted men, and that in the interest of morality and effective service it should be retained. No change has accordingly been made in the regulation.

In considering the testimony of these officers it should be borne in mind that enlisted men are not always on duty; that during considerable portions of their time they always are, and necessarily must be, permitted to go about outside of their camps and posts just as other citizens do, and that when they are thus at liberty it is impossible to subject them to restraints which are not also imposed upon the other members of the community. In States where the sale of intoxicants is permitted by law, soldiers will drink outside the camp or post just as other people drink, and it can not be prevented except by confining them to the limits of the camp or post. This would not only be unjust and injurious but would reduce enlistment to imprisonment, and immediately put an end to enlistments. The practical question to be considered is not whether soldiers should drink or not drink, but whether they should be permitted to drink beer in the camp, surrounded by the restraining influences of discipline and good association, or whether they should be driven to drink bad whisky in the vile resorts which cluster around the limits of every military post and camp, and especially around those in which prohibition is maintained. I have no doubt that the present regulation furnishes the wise answer to this question.

I present the subject thus fully in order that, if Congress takes a different view, the matter may be fully before it for action.

RIVER AND HARBOR IMPROVEMENTS.

The sum necessary to provide for work under the continuing contracts upon which the Corps of Engineers has entered under direction of Congress will, during the ensuing year, amount to $15,436,626.68.

The prosecution of the improvements under the Mississippi River and the Missouri River commissions in the most economical and efficient manner will require a further sum of $4,946,000. The estimates for the general work of river and harbor improvement submitted by the Engineers amount to a further sum of $21,906,821.78, which would make an aggregate estimate of $42,289,448.46, or some $18,000,000 in excess of the appropriations for the last year.

The improvements for which these estimates are made, so far as they have not already been authorized by Congress, have all been examined by the Engineers, pursuant to the directions of Congress, and have been approved by them as meritorious. I have not felt willing, however, to ask for this large increase of appropriations for this purpose at a time when we are incurring such great and extraordinary expenditures for military purposes, and I have reduced the estimates to be submitted to Congress for general river and harbor purposes from $21,906,821.78 to $14,993,741.31, excluding those projects which can be permitted to wait with the least disadvantage. The contemplated projects may well be recommended at some future time, and the engineers' estimates are available at any time for the use of Congress, in case that body disagree either with the view which I have taken or with the specific selection which has been made.

RETIREMENT OF GENERAL SHAFTER.

On October 16 Brigadier-General Shafter was retired by reason of having reached the age limit. Under instructions of the President, he has been retained in command of the Department of California under his volunteer rank of major-general of volunteers.

This officer's services have been of a character which entitle him to go upon the retired list with the full rank of major-general. Legislation to this end is respectfully recommended.

STATUE OF GENERAL GRANT.

I renew the recommendation so frequently made by my predecessors that provision be made for the erection in the National Capital of a suitable monument in memory of General Grant. The bill which was introduced in the first session, Fifty-fourth Congress, at the instance of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee, appears to contain adequate and suitable provisions.

MEMORIAL BRIDGE.

It is greatly to be desired that progress be made toward the erection of the proposed memorial bridge between the city of Washington and the heights of Arlington. The value of the sentiment inspired in all the people of our country who visit the National cemetery upon these heights, and are affected by its associations, can not be overesti-

mated. The cemetery is now practically far removed from the city by the long, circuitous, and disagreeable approach. The proposed bridge would afford a dignified and suitable approach to this historic place, make it accessible to all the people who inhabit or who visit Washington, and the bridge, under proper treatment, can be made itself an architectural structure worthy to rank with the monument to Washington, the Capitol, and the Congressional Library, as an ornament to the capital city.

After the bridge should come the construction of a broad avenue connecting Arlington with Mount Vernon, and making the access from the capital to the home of Washington worthy of the reverence in which all Americans hold his memory.

BATTLEFIELD PARKS.

Satisfactory progress has been made toward the development of the plans contemplated in the establishment of the different parks designed to commemorate the great battlefields of the civil war, which are under national control. A careful examination of the territory including the battlefields of Fredericksburg, Salem Church, Chancellorsville, the Wilderness, and Spottsylvania Court-House, has been made by officers of the Quartermaster's Department. All of these battles were fought within a radius of 8 miles. Every State of the Union, both North and South, was represented in them. The earthworks constructed during the different battles are said to be still in a good state of preservation. It is said that the whole tract can be purchased for $3 an acre, and at an aggregate cost of $65,000. While any considerable expenditure upon the land should probably be postponed, I recommend that a national park be constituted at that place, and that the requisite land be acquired.

WAR DEPARTMENT CLERKS.

The clerks in the War Department are the most poorly paid of those in any department of the Government. The conditions of the past two years have greatly increased their labors. My predecessor sent a communication to the House of Representatives on the 20th of February last, showing that the employees of the several bureaus and offices of the War Department had, during the Spanish war, uniformly worked without regard to the customary office hours, early and late, Sundays and holidays, and foregoing the customary thirty days' annual leave of absence, with a zeal and fidelity deserving the highest commendation. He recommended that provision be made to compensate them for the extra work thus done. I urgently renew this recommendation. There are numerous precedents for such action, and it would be an act of justice for faithful public servants, to whom it is of the greatest importance.

IMPROVEMENT OF ARMY ORGANIZATION.

Before the 1st of July, 1901, when, under existing law, the present volunteer force must be disbanded and the present regular force restored to its peace basis of 26,610, we shall be compelled to face the practical necessity of providing for some increase of the Regular Army. It is manifest that however speedily the insurrection in the Philippines may be quelled, we shall be required to maintain for a long time in those islands a considerable force to furnish the protection which the inhabitants are entitled to receive from us, and to maintain order among the savage and semicivilized tribes which still exist in nearly every island. There is no occasion to doubt that the expense of this portion of the military establishment can readily and properly be defrayed from the insular revenues.

It is not conceivable that a practical people should expend the great sums we are devoting to our seacoast fortifications, and the delicate and complicated machinery of modern ordnance with which we are equipping them, and not provide an adequate force of men to care for, preserve, and become familiar with the use of the guns and machinery. An increase in our artillery force will be absolutely necessary for this purpose. The present heavy-artillery force is about one-fifth of the requisite number.

I beg to suggest that the manifold services which have been rendered by officers of the Army of the United States during the past year in almost every branch of civil government, and the effective zeal and devotion which they have exhibited in succoring the distressed, teaching the ignorant, establishing and maintaining civil law, fighting against pestilence, introducing sanitary reforms, and promoting and aiding peaceful industry should be regarded as proof, if any were needed, that American soldiers do not cease to be American citizens, and that no danger is to be apprehended from a reasonable enlargement of the Army which affords such evidence of its character and spirit.

It is greatly to be desired that at the same time, while the lessons drawn from the experience of recent war are fresh in our minds, some improvements should be made in the organization of the Army.

For many years various criticisms upon our present organization have been made and discussed, and a number of measures for improvement have been recommended by my predecessors or embodied in bills introduced in Congress. Some marked improvements have been made, notably the three-battalion form of regimental organization, which, after being urged by several successive Secretaries of War and advocated by all the high military authorities in the country for a generation, was finally authorized by the act of April 26, 1898.

As to most of the proposed changes, however, there has not been a sufficient public interest in the subject or a sufficiently strong convic-

tion of the importance of good organization to overcome the diversity of opinions and personal interests desirous of being left undisturbed.

The method of proposing and considering, one by one, specific remedies for specific defects does not seem to be an adequate treatment of the subject. It seems to me that the best course would be to settle upon the true principle which should govern the use to be made of the Army and then inquire in what respect our present arrangement fails to conform to that principle, and make it conform.

Two propositions seem to me fundamental in the consideration of the subject:

First. That the real object of having an Army is to provide for war.

Second. That the regular establishment in the United States will probably never be by itself the whole machine with which any war will be fought.

The first of these statements seems like a truism, and it will probably be received everywhere without conscious denial. Yet the precise contrary is really the theory upon which the entire treatment of our Army proceeded for the thirty-three years between the civil war and the war with Spain. Present utility was really the controlling consideration, and the possibility of war seemed at all times so vague and unreal that it had no formative power in shaping legislation regarding the Army. The result was an elaborate system admirably adapted to secure pecuniary accountability and economy of expenditure in time of peace; a large number of small and separate commands, well officered and well disciplined, very efficient for police duty against Indians, and as separate commands unsurpassed anywhere in fighting qualities; and a class of officers most of whom were of a high order of individual excellence, who rendered valuable service in the construction of public works, as instructors in colleges, and in a great variety of professional duties at separate posts and with their commands, but who, with the exception of the general officers, were arranged in rank without any reference whatever to their respective abilities to command or to render effective service. The result did not include the effective organization and training of the Army as a whole for the purposes of war. This was not because the Army did not wish such organization and training, but because it was not permitted to organize and train for that object. The Army has many able, educated, and competent officers who have thought much upon the subject and deeply regretted this condition, but who have been unable to secure a change.

I believe that without any revolutionary interference with the general scheme of organization or with individual rights, and without excessive expense, a great improvement can be made in the way of conforming the organization and training of the Army to its true purpose. It is not reorganization which is needed, but the grant of opportunities for development along lines which are well understood and appreciated by the Army itself.

The preparation of an army for war involves at least these four things:

First. Systematic study by responsible officers of plans for action under all contingencies of possible conflict, and with this, study of the larger problems of military science and the most complete information of the state of the art, study of the constant improvements in implements and methods of warfare, and of the adaptability of improvements and inventions for the purpose of carrying out the plans devised, and study of the arrangement of territorial and tactical organizations, and the establishment of depots, camps, fortifications, and lines of communication with reference to these plans, so that all expenditures for each separate step of development may contribute toward the practical realization of a comprehensive and consistent scheme. This requirement is not to be met by the separate study and reflection of single officers not charged with the duty or able to give effect to their conclusions. The responsibility of declared duty, the comparison of different views, the contribution of different minds, the correction and evolution of discussion, the long continued, laborious, and systematic application of a considerable number of minds of a high order, and with a recognized status giving authority to their conclusions, are needed to produce the desired result.

To illustrate: The War Department has recently received numerous applications from different parts of the country for the acquisition of tracts of land and the establishment of permanent camping places for the encampment and training of soldiers in large bodies, which the people of the country evidently realize ought to be provided for. There are different ways in which these applications may be treated. They may be rejected or favored with reference to the advantages which they will afford to the people of the towns in the neighborhood of the proposed camps through the business which would result from the maintenance of troops there, or they may be rejected or favored according to the healthfulness of the locations and the conveniences which they will afford and the ease of access from the points whence troops would naturally be drawn. Neither of these methods is at all satisfactory. If such camps are to be established, their locations should be selected with reference to carefully devised and comprehensive plans, one feature of which consists in determining the points at which troops can most usefully be mobilized for immediate use in case of war, so that by sending troops to them in time of peace we would be doing the very same thing which we have to do in time of urgent necessity, and so that every railroad that is built, every side track that is laid, and every building that is erected will leave so much less to do when war threatens. Such plans can not be improvised; they can not be produced by any other process than that above indicated.

Second. The preparation of material of war, keeping pace with the

progress of military science and adapted to the conditions to be anticipated when war shall arise.

Gratifying progress has been made recently in this respect, but with the restoration of peace we may apprehend that there will be to some extent a return to the same indifference which left us without smokeless powder or small bore magazine rifles in the spring of 1898. Under such conditions it is necessary that questions as to the character and form of material should be settled by authority beyond reasonable question, and that the things which ought to be done should be indicated clearly and positively. In no other way is it possible that such things shall be done. At present the opinions of the artillery or infantry using a weapon, of the ordnance officers making it, of the department commander, and of the Major-General Commanding the Army, may all differ on such questions, and there is no way of settling them except after an appropriation, by the decision of the Secretary of War, who can not possibly study the subject thoroughly, or before the appropriation, by a committee of Congress with whom the differing opinions naturally tend to destroy each other and to prevent any action whatever. Some body of competent men whose business it is to be familiar with the whole field of invention, to consider it, to discuss it, and to reach conclusions upon it, alone can furnish those authoritative determinations which are necessary to effective demands for adequate material.

Third. An adequate process of selection according to merit and effectiveness among the officers of the Army, so that the men of superior ability and power may be known and placed in positions involving responsibility and authority.

Without some such process in time of peace the selection has to be made after war has commenced, at the expense always of treasure and of life, and sometimes of temporary failure and humiliation. Such a process of selection will necessarily at the same time afford an incentive to exertion and a reward for professional attainments and effective service, while stimulating the development of the capable officer and bringing to the front the men best able to bear responsibility and perform the difficult duties to be confronted in actual hostilities.

Fourth. The exercise and training of the officers and men of the Army in the movements of large bodies of troops by brigade, division, and corps under conditions approaching as nearly as possible those to be anticipated in executing the plans devised for their action in war.

Officers who have never seen a corps, division, or brigade organized and on the march can not be expected to perform perfectly the duties required of them when war comes. The collection of large bodies of men presents, not the same difficulties presented by a small body, multiplied or increased in degree, but entirely new difficulties which only experience can qualify men to meet. The sanitation, the care, the discipline, and many of the duties are new to the man who has dealt

only with a company or a regiment. The highest efficiency under these conditions can be attained only by giving experience approximating as nearly as possible to that which will be encountered when the war machinery is required to do its proper work.

I think the following steps may be taken to advantage:

(1) That an army war college should be established, which shall be composed of the heads of the staff departments, properly so called, and a number of the ablest and most competent officers of high rank in the Army (including, of course, the Major-General Commanding), these officers to be detailed for service in the college for limited periods, so that while the college shall be continuous in records, character, and performance, it shall continually and gradually change in its personal elements. It should be the duty of this body of officers to direct the instruction and intellectual exercise of the Army, to acquire the information, devise the plans, and study the subjects above indicated, and to advise the Commander in Chief upon all questions of plans, armament, transportation, mobilization, and military preparation and movement.

This college should have combined with it, reinforced and enlarged in its scope and effectiveness, the present division of military information of the Adjutant-General's Office, where its records and its conclusions should be preserved. It should not supersede, but should incorporate, continue, and bring under the same general management the present service schools, supplementing where it is necessary their courses, which now, so far as instruction is concerned, largely cover the ground. Its instruction would, at the outset and perhaps permanently, be given through these schools, but it should give unity, influence, authority, and effectiveness in military affairs to the work and the thought developed in them, aside from mere instruction, and a weight and utility to their records of the efficiency and merit of their pupils not hitherto accorded to them in proportion to the high character of the work they have done.

(2) That every officer of the Army below the rank of a field officer, and not already a graduate of one of the service schools, should be detailed for some fixed period during his service to receive instruction at this college in the science of war, including the duties of the staff, and in all matters pertaining to the application of military science to national defense; that provision should be made for the continuance of such instruction by correspondence after the expiration of the period of each officer's detail, and that all officers should be invited and entitled to present, by written papers and reports, as a part of the regular course and for credit upon their efficiency records, the results of their investigations, explorations, reflections, and professional and scientific work, and upon such special subjects as may be prescribed by the college.

(3) That all staff appointments other than medical should hereafter

be made from the line of the Army for a fixed period of, say, four or five years, the holder to return to the line at the end of the period, and not to be eligible to reappointment until after at least one year's service in the line, and that after the expiration of a reasonable period the selection of staff appointments should be made on the basis of proficiency and fitness, as shown in the War College or heretofore in the service schools, including as elements for consideration both the work done during the period of detail, and the postgraduate work. Excepting, however, that such appointments should also be permitted for gallant and meritorious conduct in the field, shown by recommendations of commanding officers for brevet promotion made during the progress of a war, and excepting that for the technical and scientific branches of Engineering, Ordnance, and Signal Service, examinations should be continued; that all promotions in the staff itself should be upon the basis prescribed for original appointment, combined with efficiency of service in the staff.

(4) That the present system of promotion by seniority should be modified as to all officers now or hereafter below field rank, by making a specific proportion of the promotions to each grade for seniority, and a specific proportion on the basis either of efficiency records in the war college, or heretofore in the service schools, including both elements of work done during actual attendance and subsequent thereto, or for gallantry in the field during war, or both, accompanied in each case by evidence of faithful performance of the ordinary duties of the line.

(5) That all selections of candidates for staff appointments and for staff promotions and for line promotions, other than those made for seniority, should be made by boards of officers appointed for that purpose, upon an examination and estimate of the efficiency records exhibiting the grounds for appointment or promotion above stated. Nothing can be more important than that the officers of the Army shall feel that their rise in rank depends upon what they do; that ability, intellectual activity, faithful performance of duty, and gallant conduct are more certain claims to preferment than social or political influence. A system of promotions which is divorced from the efficiency record is not merely unjust, but it destroys ambition and checks the effort of the Army. The way to prevent the separation is by a systematic provision to enable every officer to show what there is in him, and to preserve a full record of what he does, by providing a competent and disinterested body to pass judgment on the record, and by a law making the judgment thus reached on this basis the imperative and sole ground of selection for promotion.

These provisions will go far toward accomplishing results which are provided for in the organization of every considerable army in the world, and which under our organization are not the business of anybody in particular, and for the most part can not be accomplished by anyone whomsoever; and if Congress will then make the appropriations

necessary for periodical mobilization and maneuvers, the four requisites of preparation for war above stated can be substantially attained. The only element in these recommendations which does not result necessarily from a statement of the requirements is the limitation on the period of staff duty and the periodical return to the line. I think this will be beneficial to the staff, and will do away with the feeling quite prevalent in the line that the staff is a privileged class, divorced from its old associates, and a tendency toward unfriendly criticism which seems to me to be prejudicial to good discipline and effective service.

Another function which is now performed to a very slight degree, and which is of very great importance, should be performed by the proposed war college acting in cooperation with the existing naval war college, that is, the union of the Army and the Navy in the collection and utilization of information, studying and formulating plans for defense and attack, and the testing and selection of material of war. Communication, conference, and interchange of instructors between the two institutions could not fail to be of great value to both services, and to make easier and more certain that perfect cooperation which is so essential both in forming and executing the plans which involve the operations of both forces.

There are two special changes which, I am clear, the same principles require. One is that the artillery branch of the service should have a head. The present guns, carriages, projectiles, explosives, and all the complicated and delicate machinery which belong with them are made and delivered over to the artillery branch, and there is no one to represent or speak for the men who are to work with the tools thus furnished. There are seven colonels of artillery, and it is not the business of any one of them more than another to speak for his branch of the service. The valuable results of experience in the use of the ordnance machinery are not utilized because it is not the business of anyone in particular to insist upon it. Little complaints against the ordnance or engineers, which could easily be set right if it were somebody's business to attend to it, remain as causes of irritation. The use of modern ordnance is a highly specialized and scientific business, and there ought to be an expert charged with the duty and the responsibility of seeing that the officers and men of the corps understand their business and are properly trained in it. This officer should be a member of the war college, and might well be on the staff of the Major-General Commanding. He should not be the head of an additional bureau.

The other change referred to is the increase of the number of inspectors general, so that the entire work of the Army may be adequately inspected. Among these should be a sufficient number of inspectors-general for the sanitary, artillery, ordnance, and engineering inspection, selected for their special qualifications in those several branches and specifically assigned to those duties. Thorough inspection is essential to thorough work, but no inspector can be expected to know every-

thing, and inspection of these matters which require special training made by a man who has not received the training is necessarily perfunctory and of little value.

The second proposition which I stated as underlying the consideration of this subject—that the regular establishment is not the whole machine with which a war will ever be fought—has been too signally illustrated both in the civil war and in the war with Spain and the Philippine war to require further demonstration. Our method is, and always will be, immediately upon the outbreak of a war, to create an army of which the Regular Army on its peace footing forms but a part, and usually but a small part, and the great body of which is composed of volunteers.

That the relations between the regulars and volunteers in this new force shall be such that it constitutes a homogeneous body, using the same arms, familiar with the same drill, answering to the same ideas of discipline, inspired by the same spirit, and capable of equal and even performance, and that the preparation of the Regular Army in time of peace for the event of war shall to the greatest possible extent inure to the benefit of the whole Army, both Regular and Volunteer, and make it easy to put that body in a state of preparation, is an end toward which the best military thought of the country may well be addressed.

It should be a special subject of consideration by the war college, and upon it that body should invite the conference and cooperation of the military authorities of the several States. As one step toward attaining the end, courses of instruction in the college should be open to officers of the National Guard of the States, and the efficiency records of such officers in the college, and by written papers and reports after their terms of instruction have ended, should be made a part of the records of the War Department as the authorized and accepted basis of appointments to office in any volunteer force which may be raised.

The provisions of the act of March 2, 1899, under which the army now serving in the Philippines was created, partly out of the old regular force, partly by new recruits in the regular establishment, and partly by additional volunteer regiments, was a long step in advance toward attaining the homogeneity which I have endeavored to describe. The facts that the officers of the entire Army receive their commissions from the same source, and look for their promotions and rewards to the same authority, while in every volunteer regiment regular officers have been joined with volunteer officers in forming, training, and commanding the regiment, produce this result to a degree not previously attained.

Following these lines and working through the methods which I have described, a permanent plan ought to be wrought out with the concurrence of the military authorities of the several States, and enacted by Congress, for the creation of a war army composed of both regulars and volunteers whenever such an army is required. The part to be taken by the Regular Army in the new organization and the part to be

taken by the volunteers should be prescribed, and the parts should be so assigned that the new organization shall have the fullest possible benefit of the preparation of the Regular Army.

The form and the machinery for the organization of the new army and the part to be taken in the raising of the army by the military authorities and organizations of the several States should be indicated, so that whenever war threatens, and long before it is declared, the multitude of men who are to do the work of organization may know, without waiting for an act of Congress, what will be required of them when the hour strikes, and may be engaged in the quiet and deliberate preparation so necessary in advance of action to prevent confusion and mistake.

The value and importance of securing during the time of peace information as to the capacity and fitness of civilians instructed in military affairs, and available for volunteer commissions, can not be overestimated. It was well illustrated by the great advantage which we had in appointing the officers of the present volunteer force by reason of having in the War Department the efficiency records of their service during the war with Spain. Without some such information all names are alike. When war has come, or is imminent, there is no time for examination or investigation. There are too many officers to be appointed in too short a time. Efficiency records can be established not only in war but in peace also. Courage may fairly be assumed among Americans, and intellectual and moral qualities can be ascertained and recorded in the way I have indicated.

The foregoing considerations naturally bring to mind the Military Academy at West Point. I believe that the great service which it has rendered the country was never more conspicuous than it has been during the past two years. The faithful and efficient services of its graduates since the declaration of war with Spain have more than repaid the cost of the institution since its foundation. They have been too few in number and most heavily burdened.

The capacity of the Academy is not sufficient for the present needs of the Army on a peace footing. It will be far more deficient for the Army with the absolutely necessary increase. Preparation for the greater army which we should be ready to create in case of future war should be made. Our experience during the past two years has shown that we had not too many trained officers, but too few, both in the staff and in the line, and both ought to be increased. I urgently recommend that the capacity of the Academy be enlarged and the number of its students increased.

There are other respects in which the existing system can be improved in the direction of simplicity and effectiveness, but I regard them as less vital than the matters which I have mentioned. I hope to make specific recommendations regarding them before the time comes for such action as Congress may see fit to take.

These suggestions for the improvement of our army organization should not be taken as involving a condemnation or disparagement of the system generally. Such a conclusion could be reached only by a narrow and prejudiced view looking for the defects and refusing to see the merits.

No organization could have produced the results exhibited by the Army during the past two years which was not in the main sound and efficient. With its handful of regular officers and its small body of trained troops, merged with nearly double their number of raw recruits, and combined with large forces of new, untrained volunteers, it has in surprisingly short periods of time produced a great body of men, uniformly well disciplined, of good conduct and morale, patient in endurance of hardships, steady, indomitable, and heroic in action, and who against the debilitating influences of tropical climates, against physical obstacles which seemed insurmountable, and against enemies of superior numbers and approved courage, and armed with weapons of modern warfare, have won a long series of victories unbroken by a single defeat.

The officers of the volunteer force are entitled to their full share of the credit of this achievement. Without the splendid virility and courage of the enlisted men it could not have been accomplished; but it is fair to all to say that the chief formative power—the dominating influence which made the achievement possible—was the organization, the training, the discipline, and the example of the officers and men of the Regular Army. The officers of that Army have maintained the honor, advanced the interests, and exalted the reputation of our country in the discipline and command of our troops on the battlefield, and in successful civil and military administration under most difficult circumstances, where failure would have been a national humiliation.

EXPENDITURES, APPROPRIATIONS, AND ESTIMATES.

The expenditures for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1899, the appropriations for the present fiscal year, and the estimates of appropriations required for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1901, are as follows:

General object.	Expenditures for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1899.	Appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1900.	Estimates for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1901.
CIVIL ESTABLISHMENT.			
Salaries, regular force	$1,260,023.85	$1,361,186.00	$1,722,546.00
Salaries, temporary force	529,250.28	450,000.00	274,020.00
Stationery, War Department	42,963.68	32,500.00	32,500.00
Contingent expenses, War Department	85,186.20	58,000.00	58,000.00
Rent, War Department	18,295.00	13,500.00	13,500.00
Postage, War Department	500.00	500.00	1,000.00
Salaries and contingent expenses under Superintendent Public Buildings and Grounds	45,870.12	52,020.00	66,500.00
Total civil establishment	1,986,089.13	1,967,706.00	2,168,066.00

General object.	Expenditures for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1899.	Appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1900.	Estimates for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1901.
MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT.			
All contingent expenses	260,998.25	212,390.00	215,390.00
Pay, etc., of the Army	74,013,355.58	29,106,846.97	47,198,076.80
Subsistence of the Army	25,359,312.56	9,752,621.09	11,112,242.75
Signal Service of the Army	403,188.31	47,500.00	67,500.00
United States Service schools	8,500.00	8,500.00	8,500.00
Regular supplies, Quartermaster's Department	13,258,406.16	7,200,000.00	9,264,000.00
Incidental expenses, Quartermaster's Department	3,496,575.45	2,400,000.00	2,400,000.00
Barracks and quarters	5,423,262.37	3,000,000.00	3,000,000.00
Army transportation	57,392,132.57	17,500,000.00	38,578,547.00
Cavalry and artillery horses	443,840.87	750,000.00	750,000.00
Clothing, etc	29,697,050.81	5,952,246.00	8,702,877.00
Construction and repair of hospitals	87,463.86	275,000.00	250,000.00
Quarters for hospital stewards	6,795.49	20,000.00	20,000.00
Shooting galleries and ranges	7,832.60	10,000.00	10,000.00
Medical and hospital department	1,946,804.43	1,500,000.00	2,500,000.00
Army medical museum and library	15,000.00	15,000.00	15,000.00
Engineer depot	22,845.73	10,000.00	10,000.00
Equipment for engineer troops	107,483.98	25,000.00	25,000.00
Assistants to engineer officers	39,432.57	25,000.00	25,000.00
Ordnance service	440,128.91	235,000.00	300,000.00
Ordnance, ordnance stores, and supplies	7,953,057.61	1,200,100.00	2,125,000.00
Manufacture of arms	2,050,088.22	800,000.00	1,100,000.00
Rock Island Armory		350,000.00	
Ammunition for morning and evening gun	4,945.00	25,000.00	25,000.00
Artillery targets	4,983.81	10,000.00	10,000.00
Military Academy	353,768.18	410,085.97	458,449.99
Emergency fund, War Department	3,000,000.00	6,000,000.00	
Total military establishment	225,797,262.32	86,840,290.03	128,170,583.54
PUBLIC WORKS.			
Arsenals, etc	368,586.38	206,901.24	504,219.00
Gun and mortar batteries	3,825,642.09	1,000,000.00	5,130,000.00
Torpedoes for harbor defense	794,542.67	50,000.00	100,000.00
Sites for fortifications and seacoast defenses	276,908.39	300,000.00	250,000.00
Preservation and repair and plans for fortifications	76,103.76	105,000.00	105,000.00
Sea walls and embankments	57,767.46	2,500.00	72,000.00
Armament of fortifications	5,265,476.14	3,214,502.00	5,916,038.00
Board of Ordnance and Fortification	102,548.98	100,000.00	100,000.00
Other fortifications appropriations	37,362.45	137,900.00	105,900.00
Buildings and grounds in Washington	311,665.11	159,259.50	132,426.00
Buildings and grounds, Military Academy	51,390.71	165,688.50	243,843.00
Military posts	436,172.16	676,864.00	2,207,417.50
National military parks	168,893.36	280,922.50	595,060.00
River and harbor improvements under the continuing contract system	16,082,547.04	6,224,864.00	15,582,626.68
River and harbor improvements under the Mississippi River Commission		2,583,333.00	3,760,000.00
River and harbor improvements under the Missouri River Commission		200,000.00	1,010,000.00
Improving rivers and harbors under the Chief of Engineers		15,091,841.94	15,193,741.31
Total public works	27,855,606.70	30,499,576.68	50,988,271.49
MISCELLANEOUS.			
National cemeteries, etc	197,305.87	205,880.00	210,880.00
Surveys, maps, etc	27,214.55	38,100.00	170,100.00
Artificial limbs and appliances	129,930.76	549,275.00	175,000.00
California Débris Commission	12,236.83	15,000.00	15,000.00
National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers	4,088,128.25	4,234,544.00	3,783,450.00
Bringing home the remains of officers and men who die abroad	208,415.60		100,000.00
Prevention of deposits, New York Harbor	70,228.19	110,500.00	69,200.00
Miscellaneous items	195,450.78	43,500.00	53,000.00
Total miscellaneous	4,928,910.83	5,196,799.00	4,576,630.00
Grand total	260,567,868.98	124,504,371.71	185,003,551.03

Expenditures from indefinite and permanent annual appropriations and appropriations for war claims and relief acts are not included in the above statement, but are shown in Appendix D to this report.

There was allotted to the War Department from the $50,000,000 national defense fund (act of March 9, 1898) the sum of $18,969,627.68 for the purposes indicated in the following tabulated statement:

Condition of the special emergency appropriation for national defense (war) under the War Department.

Allotments.	Amounts allotted to June 30, 1899.	Balances June 30, 1899.
Office of Secretary of War	$225,000.00	$91,352.79
Ordnance Department	9,081,496.86	2,853,503.28
Engineer Department	5,585,000.00	5,270.31
Quartermaster's Department	1,989,230.82	450.21
Medical Department	1,520,000.00	51,350.90
Pay Department	255,000.00	36,158.76
Signal Service	238,900.00	.....
Light-House Board	75,000.00	8,137.32
Total	18,969,627.68	3,046,223.57

The expenditures from this fund during the past fiscal year amounted to $8,889,291.81.

The summary of expenditures for the fiscal year 1899, appropriations and allotments for 1900, and estimates for 1901 is as follows:

General object.	Expenditures for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1899.	Appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1900.	Estimates for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1901.
Civil establishment	$1,986,089.13	$1,967,706.00	$2,168,066.00
Military establishment (support of the Army and Military Academy	[1]234,686,554.13	[2]87,015,290.03	128,170,583.54
Public works (including fortifications and river and harbor improvements)	27,855,606.70	30,499,576.68	50,988,271.49
Miscellaneous	4,928,910.83	5,196,799.00	4,576,630.00
Grand total	269,457,160.79	124,679,371.71	185,903,551.03

[1] Including expenditures from national defense.
[2] Including allotments from national defense.

The appropriations for the year ending June 30, 1900, were made on a basis of a military force which has been greatly exceeded by the exercise of the authority conferred under the act of March 2, 1899, and the raising, equipping, and transporting to the Philippines of additional troops and supplies. It will therefore be necessary to ask Congress for a deficiency appropriation of about $51,000,000, bringing the total amount of the appropriation for the current year up to about the amount of the estimates which have been submitted for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1901.

This will not be altogether a new appropriation in any but a technical sense, as more than two-thirds of the sum can be made available by the reappropriation of sums which have once been appropriated for purposes of the war with Spain, and which the speedy termination of that war has enabled the Department to save and report as unpledged. On the 30th of November, 1898, the Department transmitted a statement showing the unpledged balances from the extraordinary war appropriations available, if reappropriated, to meet the War Department deficiency estimates for the expenses of the Army for the remainder of the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899.

By the act of January 5, 1899, Congress reappropriated and made available for such expenditure $40,000,000 of the total sum so reported.

The Department is now prepared to report the further sum of $35,000,000 from the same appropriations, which has not been used and can be reappropriated by Congress to help meet the above-mentioned War Department deficiences for the remainder of the fiscal year ending June 30, 1900, leaving about $16,000,000 of really new appropriation to be made for the same purpose.

I submit herewith the annual reports of the heads of the bureaus of the War Department and of the Major-General Commanding, to which are appended the reports to him by the Adjutant-General, the Inspector-General, and the division and department commanders, including the report of Major-General Otis, U. S. V., commanding Department of the Pacific, which has been received since the date of the report of the Major-General Commanding.

I also submit a separate civil report of Maj. Gen. John R. Brooke as military governor of the island of Cuba, to which are appended the reports of the secretaries of state and government, of finance, of justice and public instruction, of agriculture, commerce, industries, and public works of that island, and the civil reports of Brig. Gen. James H. Wilson, U. S. V., commanding Department of Matanzas and Santa Clara; Brig. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee, commanding Department of Havana and Pinar del Rio; Brig. Gen. William Ludlow, U. S. V., commanding Department of Havana; Brig. Gen. Leonard Wood, U. S. V., commanding Department of Santiago and Puerto Principe, and Maj. Tasker H. Bliss, collector of customs; Maj. E. F. Ladd, treasurer of the island, and E. G. Rathbone, esq., director-general of posts in the island of Cuba, and I submit a report of Brig. Gen. George W. Davis, U. S. V., commanding the Department of Porto Rico, on civil government in that island.

ELIHU ROOT,
Secretary of War.

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PAPERS

ACCOMPANYING

THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, October 25, 1899.

THE HONORABLE THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

SIR: The military forces now in the service of the United States are composed as follows:

Regular Army.

	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.
General officers	-	.....	-
Adjutant-General's Department	14	.....	14
Inspector-General's Department	8	.....	8
Judge-Advocate-General's Department	7	.....	7
Quartermaster's Department	39	105	144
Subsistence Department	19	163	182
Medical Department	167	3,314	3,481
Pay Department	26	.....	26
Corps of Engineers	123	628	751
Ordnance Department	62	681	743
Signal Corps	5	550	555
Chaplains	30	.....	30
Record and Pension Office	2	.....	2
Military Academy	.....	246	246
Electrician sergeants	.....	15	15
Total	509	5,702	6,211
10 regiments of cavalry	.....	.....	12,922
7 regiments of artillery	.....	.....	10,191
25 regiments of infantry	.....	.....	34,383
Indian scouts and recruits	.....	.....	1,579
			64,586

U. S. VOLUNTEERS.

General officers and staff corps	260
1 regiment of cavalry	1,284
24 regiments of infantry	32,616
Porto Rico battalion	414
	34,574

RECAPITULATION.

Regular Army	64,586
U. S. Volunteers	34,574
Grand total	99,160

The following statement gives the distribution of the regular and volunteer forces October 1, 1899:

Regular Army.

	General staff.		Cavalry.		Artillery.		Infantry.		Indian scouts.	Recruits.	Total.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.			Officers.	Enlisted men.	
United States	376	3,034	165	3,869	222	6,189	240	2,981	75	685	1,003	16,833	17,836
Porto Rico	19	224	30	1,192	4	190	34	1,249	....	.....	87	2,855	2,942
Cuba	30	663	113	4,307	31	1,127	150	4,699	....	.....	324	10,796	11,120
Philippine Islands	80	1,526	64	2,279	49	1,944	561	24,195	....	.....	754	29,944	30,698
En route to Philippine Islands	....	192	3	.....	2	.....	8	.....	....	819	13	1,011	1,024
Alaska	1	32	....	.....	....	.....	14	452	....	.....	15	484	499
Hawaiian Islands	1	31	....	.....	11	422	.....	.....	....	.....	12	453	465
Total	507	5,702	375	11,647	319	9,872	1,007	33,576	75	1,504	2,208	62,376	64,584

Volunteer Army.

United States	85	.....	....	.....	....	.....	600	15,708	....	.....	685	15,708	16,393
Porto Rico	7	.....	....	.....	....	.....	14	400	....	.....	21	400	421
Cuba	67	.....	45	280	....	.....	.....	.....	....	.....	67	.....	67
Philippine Islands	87	.....	45	280	....	.....	85	1,120	....	.....	217	1,400	1,617
En route to Philippine Islands	13	.....	5	954	....	.....	515	14,588	....	.....	533	15,542	16,075
Hawaiian Islands	1	.....	....	.....	....	.....	.....	.....	....	.....	1	.....	1
Total	260	.....	50	1,234	....	.....	1,214	31,816	....	.....	1,524	33,050	34,574
Grand total	767	5,702	425	12,881	319	9,872	2,221	66,392	75	1,504	3,732	95,426	99,158

Grand total regulars and volunteers.

	Officers.	Men.	Total.
In the United States	1,688	32,541	34,229
In Porto Rico	108	3,255	3,363
In Cuba	391	10,796	11,187
In Philippine Islands	971	31,344	32,315
En route to Philippine Islands	546	16,553	17,099
In Alaska	15	484	499
In Hawaiian Islands	13	453	466
	3,732	95,426	99,158

It is expected that by December 1, next, all the infantry regiments United States Volunteers, shown above as in the United States, will have sailed for the Philippine Islands. These, with the troops now there, will give a total strength of 2,117 officers and 63,608 enlisted men (an aggregate of 65,725).

THE REGULAR ARMY.

The act of March 2, 1899, for increasing the efficiency of the Army of the United States, prescribed a three battalion organization of each regiment of the three arms of the service, and, to meet the exigencies of the military service, authorized the President to maintain the Regular Army at an enlisted strength not exceeding 65,000 men. In view of the disbandment of the Volunteer Army, provided for by the acts of April 22 and May 11, 1898, Congress further authorized the raising of not more than 35,000 volunteers to be recruited from the country at large—the increased Regular Army and the United States Volunteers to continue in service not later than July 1, 1901.

Section 13 of the law, above quoted, empowered the President to continue in service or to appoint such general officers as to provide, with those of the Regular Army, one brigadier general for every 4,000 enlisted men and one major-general for every 12,000 enlisted men.

The following is a list of the major-generals and brigadier-generals of volunteers now in the service of the United States:

MAJOR-GENERALS.

William R. Shafter (brigadier-general, U. S. Army, retired).
Elwell S. Otis (brigadier-general, U. S. Army).
Henry W. Lawton (colonel, inspector-general, U. S. Army).
Arthur MacArthur (lieutenant-colonel, assistant adjutant-general, U. S. Army).

BRIGADIER-GENERALS.

James H. Wilson.
Fitzhugh Lee.
Joseph Wheeler.
John C. Bates (colonel, Second United States Infantry).
Samuel B. M. Young (colonel, Third United States Cavalry).
Adna R. Chaffee (colonel, Eighth United States Cavalry).
William Ludlow (lieutenant-colonel, Corps of Engineers).
Leonard Wood (captain, assistant surgeon, U. S. Army).
George W. Davis (lieutenant-colonel, Fourteenth United States Infantry).
Theodore Schwan (colonel, assistant adjutant-general, U. S. Army).
Robert H. Hall (colonel, Fourth United States Infantry).
Loyd Wheaton (colonel, Twentieth United States Infantry).
Frederick D. Grant.
Robert P. Hughes (colonel, inspector-general, U. S. Army).
James F. Smith (colonel, First California Volunteers).
Frederick Funston (colonel, Twentieth Kansas Volunteers).

In section 15 of the same act the following occurs:

Provided also, That each and every provision of this act shall continue in force until July first, nineteen hundred and one; and on and after that date all the general, staff, and line officers appointed to the Army under this act shall be discharged and the numbers restored in each grade to those existing at the passage of this act, and the enlisted force of the line of the Army shall be reduced to the number as provided for by a law prior to April first, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, exclusive of such additions as have been, or may be, made under this act to the artillery, and except the cadets provided for by this act who may be appointed prior to July first, nineteen hundred and one: *And provided further*, That no officer who has been, or may be, promoted under the existing laws or under the rules of seniority shall be disturbed in his rank.

The repeal of this section, so far as it affects or relates to those appointed to the grade of second lieutenant in the Regular Army, is earnestly recommended because the promotions which have already occurred since the passage of this act have scattered the officers to all points of the globe occupied by our Army, and to attempt to decide to what positions these officers should be restored on July 1, 1901, would result in endless confusion.

The following table exhibits the strength and distribution of the Army of the United States for each month from May, 1898, to June, 1899:

Commands.	May, 1898.		June, 1898.		July, 1898.		August, 1898.	
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.
Department of California	138	2,688	122	2,507	191	4,610	210	4,905
" the Colorado	108	1,301	102	1,481	101	1,635	104	1,826
" the Columbia	67	924	47	1,004	48	1,341	47	1,337
" Dakota	55	700	44	759	91	2,131	91	2,208
" the East	625	12,416	705	16,036	774	19,675	779	20,372
" the Gulf	281	5,262	290	5,947	315	7,387	355	8,164
" the Lakes	16	223	31	599	30	677	67	1,358
" the Missouri	35	821	29	608	26	611	25	567
" the Pacific	.....	.....	105	2,386	460	10,464	672	15,058
" Porto Rico	.....	.....	.....	.....	377	9,084	458	11,178
" Santiago	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	335	7,342
Camp Thomas, Georgia[1]	2,254	42,237	2,211	52,574	1,760	43,856	1,582	39,816
Second Army Corps	922	17,467	1,103	26,002	1,183	29,747	1,347	33,765
Fourth Army Corps	442	7,689	969	21,759	625	14,019	534	12,609
Fifth Army Corps	1,061	16,482	1,107	17,011	1,272	22,610	1,109	20,761
Seventh Army Corps	501	8,904	873	18,778	978	23,704	1,226	29,940
Miscellaneous (embracing troops at State camps, en route, recruits, etc.)	1,907	38,066	1,620	31,398	2,736	63,011	2,277	50,794
Total	8,412	155,180	9,358	198,879	10,967	254,562	11,218	261,400

[1] Combined strength First and Third Corps.

Commands.	September, 1898.		October, 1898.		November, 1898.		December, 1898.		January, 1899.	
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.
Division of Cuba							11		17	
Department of California	166	3,715	167	3,682	164	3,658	115	2,215	96	1,450
" the Colorado	98	1,997	144	3,741	140	3,903	140	3,889	143	3,350
" the Columbia	64	1,960	46	1,340	48	1,333	46	1,356	32	961
" Dakota	83	1,877	67	1,649	65	1,792	66	1,596	42	10,482
" the East	687	18,432	508	14,098	352	10,061	357	10,482	347	10,357
" the Gulf	315	7,982	305	7,518	231	6,245	233	6,284	250	8,969
" Havana									166	5,021
" the Lakes	138	2,534	174	4,159	144	3,272	146	3,782	85	1,902
" Matanzas									219	4,956
" the Missouri	153	3,459	169	3,766	174	4,297	181	4,840	154	4,062
" the Pacific	686	15,062	696	15,087	840	19,628	930	21,143	919	20,871
" Pinar del Rio									109	2,897
" Porto Rico	438	10,429	332	8,047	306	7,468	252	6,239	250	6,122
" Puerto Principe									138	3,489
Department of Santa Clara									117	2,509
" Santiago	337	7,257	364	7,963	355	7,945	364	7,833	358	7,679
First Army Corps	824	19,519	862	20,083	837	19,536	812	19,220		
Second Army Corps	879	21,436	887	21,576	976	22,646	973	22,185	1,304	29,446
Third Army Corps	339	8,076								
Fourth Army Corps	329	6,616	733	16,797	689	16,470	545	13,337		
Fifth Army Corps	218	5,136								
Seventh Army Corps	779	17,514	724	16,365	674	14,421	732	15,693	678	14,806
Miscellaneous (troops at State camps, en route, recruits, etc.)	4,518	104,129	3,275	70,051	1,545	28,971	1,183	21,757	1,187	19,197
Total	10,051	257,130	9,453	215,922	7,540	171,646	7,086	161,851	6,611	149,161

Commands.	February, 1899.		March, 1899.		April, 1899.		May, 1899.		June, 1899.	
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.
Division of Cuba	19		19		19		17		17	
Department of California	87	1,164	84	908	97	1,590	111	1,789	89	1,447
" the Colorado	141	2,712	141	3,449	99	2,600	96	2,482	60	1,471
" the Columbia	28	777	26	632	30	874	22	717	35	1,075
" Dakota	42	761	44	793	41	1,183	51	1,212	43	899
" the East	351	8,331	320	7,985	182	4,264	203	4,818	216	5,075
" the Gulf	231	4,509	178	3,804	145	3,527	86	2,179	57	1,330
" Havana	166	4,909	131	3,617	89	2,771	88	2,060	90	2,222
" the Lakes	72	1,280	73	2,426	102	1,349	64	1,117	55	857
" Matanzas	177	4,224	192	4,402						
" Matanzas and Santa Clara					121	3,238	147	3,539	147	3,400
Department of the Missouri	118	3,008	145	3,924	149	4,222	102	2,539	89	2,009
" the Pacific	968	21,865	1,102	26,545	1,208	29,569	1,346	33,972	1,310	33,351
" Pinar del Rio	121	3,183	78	2,027						
" Province of Havana and Pinar del Rio					125	2,728	114	2,716	106	2,627
Department of Porto Rico	217	5,601	190	4,587	176	2,892	135	3,039	130	3,024
" Puerto Principe	136	3,499	94	2,474	90	2,217	88	1,644	94	1,634
Department of Santa Clara	223	4,494	167	3,293						
" Santiago	344	6,264	253	4,042	203	3,160	113	2,465	114	2,301
" Texas									27	940
Second Army Corps	814	17,972	242	4,954	49	795				
Seventh Army Corps	672	14,300	275	5,342						
Miscellaneous (troops at State camps, en route, recruits, etc.)	962	15,012	1,343	23,492	1,359	22,102	758	10,243	715	13,095
Total	5,888	123,865	5,097	108,696	4,284	89,081	3,541	76,591	3,394	76,757

General experience has shown the inadvisability of maintaining men of northern races continuously on service in tropical countries. Not only are the losses from disease great, but the entire body of men becomes deteriorated from climatic and other effects.

For these reasons, and for the general purpose of drill and instruction, one battalion of each of the following regiments has been constituted a depot battalion, to be stationed at the post indicated opposite each organization:

Second Artillery, stationed in Department of the East.
First Infantry, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.
Second Infantry, Fort Thomas, Ky.
Fifth Infantry, Fort Sheridan, Ill.
Eighth Infantry, Fort Snelling, Minn.
Tenth Infantry, Fort Crook, Nebr.
Fifteenth Infantry, Madison Barracks, N. Y.
Twenty-fourth Infantry, Vancouver Barracks, Wash.
Twenty-fifth Infantry, Fort Sam Houston, Tex.

Officers and men who are unfit for duty, grade for grade, as nearly as possible, to be transferred from the active to the depot battalion, and to the station of the latter will be sent all recruits, invalids, and other transients pertaining to the respective regiments.

Officers on the active list who have died since October 1, 1898.

Name and rank.	Date of death.	Place of death.
Second Lieut. Henry Abbot, First Infantry	Dec. 23, 1898	Fort Bliss, Texas.
Capt. Madison M. Brewer, assistant surgeon	Oct. 4, 1898	Washington, D. C.
Capt. Paul Clendenin, assistant surgeon	July 4, 1899	Santiago, Cuba.
First Lieut. Ralph A. Clay, Fourteenth Infantry	Aug. 30, 1899	Presidio, San Francisco, Cal.
Capt. Charles L. Collins, Twenty-third Infantry	Sept. 7, 1899	Cebu Island, Philippine Islands.
First Lieut. Alfred W. Drew, Twelfth Infantry	Aug. 19, 1899	Killed in action near Angeles, Luzon, Philippine Islands.
Capt. William Everett, Fourth Artillery	Mar. 15, 1899	Battery Point, Delaware.
Col. Harry C. Egbert, Twenty-second Infantry	Mar. 26, 1899	Killed in action at Marilao.
Capt. James E. Eastman, Second Artillery	Aug. 28, 1899	Chase's Lake, New York.
Capt. Bogardus Eldridge, Fourteenth Infantry	Oct. 2, 1899	Of wounds received in action near Bacoor, Luzon, Philippine Islands.
Brig.-Gen. Daniel W. Flagler, Chief of Ordnance	Mar. 29, 1899	Fort Monroe, Virginia.
Second Lieut. Pierce C. Foster, Third Infantry	May 22, 1899	Manila, Philippine Islands.
Maj. Joshua S. Fowler, Tenth Cavalry	July 11, 1899	At sea, enroute from Cuba.
Capt. Woodbridge Geary, Thirteenth Infantry	Oct. 11, 1899	Of wounds received in action, San Francisco de Malabon, Luzon, Philippine Islands.
Col. James Gilliss, Quartermaster's Department	Nov. 13, 1898	Governors Island, N. Y.
Col. George E. Glenn, Pay Department	Mar. 31, 1899	Baltimore, Md.
Capt. John C. Gregg, Fourth Infantry	Mar. 31, 1899	Killed in action near Mariquana, Luzon, Philippine Islands.
First Lieut. Hayden Y. Grubbs, Sixth Infantry	Oct. 1, 1899	Killed in action at Tabuan, Island of Negros, Philippine Islands.
Capt. John T. Honeycutt, Sixth Artillery	Oct. 7, 1898	St. Augustine, Fla.
Capt. Guy Howard, Quartermaster's Department	Oct. 22, 1899	Killed near Arayat, Luzon, Philippine Islands.
Capt. Joseph Hale, Third Infantry	Oct. 12, 1898	St. Luke's Hospital, New York.
Second Lieut. Frank Hassmarek, Seventeenth Infantry.	May 19, 1899	Manila, Philippine Islands.
First Lieut. Maurice G. Krayenbuhl, Third Artillery.	Mar. 26, 1899	Killed in action at Meycauayan, Luzon, Philippine Islands.
Capt. Harlan E. McVay, assistant surgeon	Jan. 4, 1899	Manila, Philippine Islands.
First Lieut. James Mitchell, Fourteenth Infantry	Feb. 6, 1899	Of wounds received in action at Manila, Philippine Islands.
Second Lieut. Ralph E. Meyer, Twelfth Infantry	Apr. 11, 1899	At sea en route to Manila.
Second Lieut. Joseph B. Morse, Ninth Infantry	Aug. 15, 1899	Manila, Philippine Islands.
First Lieut. John D. Miley, Second Artillery	Sept. 19, 1899	Do.
Maj. Henry J. Nowlan, Seventh Cavalry	Nov. 10, 1898	Hot Springs, Ark.
First Lieut. James E. Nolan, Fourth Cavalry	Dec. 5, 1898	Presidio, San Francisco, Cal.
Second Lieut. Fred A. Pearce, Sixth Artillery	June 6, 1899	Manila, Philippine Islands.
First Lieut. Charles P. Russ, Eleventh Infantry	Feb. 13, 1899	San Juan, Porto Rico.
Lieut. Col. Joseph G. Ramsay, Seventh Artillery	..... do	Augusta, Ga.
Capt. Marion B. Saffold, Thirteenth Infantry	Oct. 8, 1899	Killed in action near Noveleta, Luzon, Philippine Islands.
Capt. Jean M. Stadtsenbaur, Sixth Cavalry	Apr. 25, 1899	Killed in action at Quingua, Luzon, Philippine Islands.
Capt. Sidney E. Stuart, Ordnance Department	Apr. 29, 1899	Killed accidentally at Du Pont Powder Mills, near Wilmington, Del.
Lieut. Col. Gilbert C. Smith, Quartermaster's Department.	July 13, 1899	St. Louis, Mo.
Capt. Charles B. Satterlee, Sixth Artillery	July 10, 1899	Camp McKinley, Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands.
Capt. Melville C. Wilkinson, Third Infantry	Oct. 5, 1898	Killed in action with Indians at Bear Island, Leech Lake, Minn.

Officers on the active list who have died since October 1, 1898—Continued.

Name and rank.	Date of death.	Place of death.
Capt. Henry E. Waterman, Corps of Engineers	Oct. 26, 1898	St. Louis, Mo.
Lieut. Col. Charles W. Williams, Quartermaster's Department.	Nov. 11, 1898	Havana, Cuba.
Second Lieut. William R. Webb, Sixteenth Infantry.	Mar. 9, 1899	Huntsville, Ala.
First Lieut. Harry E. Whitney, Second Infantry.	May 13, 1899	Cienfuegos, Cuba.
First Lieut. Richard B. Westnedge, assistant surgeon.	June 10, 1899	Manila, Philippine Islands.
Capt. Thomas M. Woodruff, Fifth Infantry	July 11, 1899	Santiago, Cuba.

List of officers on the retired list who have died since October 1, 1898.

Name and rank.	Date of death.	Place of death.
Prof. George L. Andrews	Apr. 4, 1899	Brookline, Mass.
Lieut. Col. George K. Brady	Jan. 19, 1899	Chicago, Ill.
Capt. Edward S. Chapin	May 3, 1899	Do.
Maj. William E. Creary	July 29, 1899	Jordan Springs, Va.
Maj. Augustus A. De Loffre	Sept. 4, 1899	Fort Sam Houston, Tex.
Capt. John J. Dougherty	Aug. 11, 1899	San Antonio, Tex.
Lieut. Col. Joshua S. Fletcher	Jan. 3, 1899	Philadelphia, Pa.
Col. William R. Gibson	Mar. 1, 1899	Philadelphia, Pa.
Capt. Charles G. Gordon	Oct. 26, 1898	Hyattsville, Md.
First Lieut. George S. Greene	Jan. 28, 1899	Morristown, N. J.
Capt. Paul Harwood	Aug. 7, 1899	New York City, N. Y.
Lieut. Col. Charles S. Ilsley	Apr. 17, 1899	Salt Lake City, Utah.
Chaplain Joseph E. Irish	May 2, 1899	South Madison, Wis.
Col. Charles L. Kilburn	Mar. 17, 1899	Germantown, Pa.
Capt. Frederick M. Lynde	Dec. 26, 1898	Washington, D. C.
Capt. Frank H. Mills	July 29, 1899	Fort Leavenworth, Kans.
Lieut. Col. Louis T. Morris	June 7, 1899	Philadelphia, Pa.
Col. Joseph J. Reynolds	Feb. 25, 1899	Washington, D. C.
Col. Joseph Roberts	Oct. 18, 1898	Philadelphia, Pa.
Col. Augustus G. Robinson	Oct. 1, 1898	Vineyard Haven, Mass.
Capt. John F. Rodgers	Aug. 25, 1899	Washington, D. C.
Col. Edmund Schriver	Feb. 10, 1899	Do.
Capt. James F. Simpson	June 29, 1899	Prescott, Ariz.
Col. Andrew K. Smith	Aug. 14, 1899	West Point, N. Y.
Col. John J. Upham	Oct. 21, 1898	Milwaukee, Wis.
Capt. Frank K. Upham	Oct. 17, 1899	Soldiers' Home, Santa Monica, Cal.
Chaplain George P. Van Wyck	Aug. 5, 1899	Milford, Pa.
Maj. George O. Webster	Oct. 10, 1899	Fort Sheridan, Ill.
Col. Joseph N. G. Whistler	Apr. 20, 1899	Fort Wadsworth, N. Y.
Col. William Winthrop	Apr. 8, 1899	Atlantic City, N. J.
Brig. Gen. Horatio G. Wright	July 2, 1899	Washington, D. C.
Col. Theodore Yates	Jan. 15, 1899	Milwaukee, Wis.

THE VOLUNTEER ARMY.

Under the calls of the President for 125,000 men and 75,000 men (April 23 and May 25, 1898, respectively), and in pursuance of the act of Congress dated April 22, 1898, providing for the organization of a Volunteer Army, State militia organizations enlisting as a body were received into the military service of the United States.

The immediate pressure for recognition on the part of the commissioned personnel of each State organization throughout the country became so great that the total number of State organizations apportioned under that call, excluding three regiments of engineers, three regiments of special cavalry from the nation at large, and ten immune regiments of infantry, aggregated:

Cavalry: Two regiments, 2 squadrons, and 9 troops.

Artillery: One regiment (heavy), 8 batteries of heavy artillery, and 16 battalions of light artillery.

Infantry: One hundred and nineteen regiments and 13 battalions.

The distribution of the 125,000 men among this number of organizations compelled a modification of the prescribed organization of the different arms, and reductions in strength were made in several exceptional cases.

The usual maximum per company of the organized State militia did not exceed 60, and many were not maintained at that number.

Of the number actually borne upon company rolls a portion declined to volunteer, upon reasonable grounds. About 25 per cent were rejected on physical examination prior to muster and an additional number were rejected on physical reexamination after muster, a systematic inquiry having been made with a view to the elimination of all men unfitted for military service; so that about 30 of the original company is a fair estimate of the number of men previously trained, armed, and equipped in each company finally received into the United States service.

The minimum number per company required for muster in was 77, and hence in many instances about 47 recruits, mostly untrained and without uniform or equipment, were hastily obtained and physically examined without opportunity to inquire into their moral or mental fitness, and a number were found on the expiration of muster-out furlough to be actual residents of neighboring or distant States.

Deficiencies in numbers from these causes became immediately apparent, and the necessity of providing in almost every particular for the recruits necessary to expand State companies to the State maximum and thence to the minimum required for muster into the United States service at once developed deficiencies in clothing, arms, and equipment.

Consolidation of military organizations urged by this Department to meet this situation, presenting fewer regiments containing a greater number of trained men, fairly clothed, armed, and equipped, was not accomplished.

There were obtained for State organizations, mustered in under the first call, about 40,000 recruits to approximate to the maximum authorized by law—106 per infantry company.

States presented for muster into the United States service regimental and battalion, staff and noncommissioned staff officers, unknown to any law or regulation of the Army, viz, regimental paymasters, regimental inspectors of rifle practice, regimental commissaries and ordnance officers, regimental signal officers, battalion adjutants and quartermasters, assistant surgeons—with the rank of captain—regimental and battalion commissary, quartermaster and ordnance sergeants and battalion sergeant majors, presenting, on mobilization, a heterogeneous army, unsatisfactory not only from a military and economical view, but because of dissatisfaction created on account of officers performing precisely similar duties under different rank and emoluments.

These were the very trying and delicate conditions that confronted mustering and medical officers. That they proved equal to this duty is fully attested by the results accomplished.

Deducting the 40,000 men recruited under the first call from the 75,000 men called by the President's proclamation, dated May 25, 1898, left 35,000 men, apportioned as follows:

Cavalry: None.

Artillery: Sixteen batteries of light artillery and 3 batteries of heavy artillery.

Infantry: Twenty-two regiments, 10 battalions, and 46 companies.

The muster in of these additional organizations was completed August 26, 1898.

Under section 4 of the act approved April 25, 1898, viz, "That the

Volunteer Army shall be maintained only during the existence of war, or while war is imminent, and shall be raised and organized, as in this act provided, only after Congress has or shall have authorized the President to raise such a force or to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States: *Provided*, That all enlistments for the Volunteer Army shall be for the term of two years, unless sooner terminated, and that all officers and men composing said army shall be discharged from the service of the United States when the purposes for which they were called into service shall have been accomplished, or on the conclusion of hostilities," instructions were received August 20, 1898, from the President, through the Secretary of War, to muster out one-half of the volunteers then in the service; but before the order was put into execution the Seventy-first New York and the Second Massachusetts were granted furloughs of thirty days prior to muster out, which was later increased to sixty days, and on August 28, 1898, it was granted to all organizations having had foreign service and thirty days to those serving at home stations.

Experience demonstrated that the "furlough," intended to mark the appreciation by the Government of the arduous service rendered and hardships endured by the troops, was productive of many evils and few benefits; the amount of pay received during furlough being insufficient to support the beneficiary; the maintenance of proper discipline was not possible; the men, equipped with light summer clothing, did not wish to draw in addition thereto suitable clothing, their muster out being so near at hand; the sudden change of climate produced much sickness; uncertainty of position prevented men from obtaining situations. The giving of the furlough also greatly increased the amount of clerical labor incident to completion of records and returns, and in the matter of commutation of subsistence alone produced complications difficult of speedy solution.

This undesirable condition was ended by the act of January 12, 1899, which granted one month's and two months' extra pay to officers and men, conditioned upon faithful service within or without the limits of the United States.

The records required by the regulations were found either to have been indifferently kept or not posted at all in many volunteer organizations. The addresses of many absentees were unknown, and for a large number of these no descriptive lists had been prepared. Hospital trains from cities of various States were run to different camps and carried to State hospitals sick and convalescent soldiers unaccompanied by any descriptive list, which should show amount of pay received and clothing drawn, etc., upon which a statement of their accounts could be based by paymasters.

The cases of 3,013 volunteer absentees were acted upon and disposed of in this office. The character of the work is difficult to describe, owing to the incompleteness of the individual records presented and which had to be made whole by patient search and correspondence.

The organizations mustered out in their own States (113 after furlough and 15 without) were mustered out at 305 different rendezvous and required the services of 162 officers of the Regular Army.

The organizations mustered out at United States camps (3 after furlough and 96 without furlough) required the services of but 50 officers, and were mustered out at 21 rendezvous.

The average time required to muster out a regiment of infantry, after furlough, at State rendezvous, was sixty-nine days. The average length of furlough granted regiments was thirty-eight and one-half

days. The average time required to muster out a regiment of infantry, without furlough, at United States camps was twenty-seven days.

It will be seen from the above that it required four and one half days longer to muster out a regiment at a State rendezvous than it did at a United States camp, exclusive of the furlough period, during which time, however, work was continued on the records of the organizations. The records of the organizations mustered out show that the work has been done in a less satisfactory manner at State rendezvous than at the United States camps, where there was every facility for the work and every convenience for the comfort of both officers and men with a minimum expense to the Government.

January 30, 1899, the beginning of the muster-out period of the regiments stationed in Cuba, there were on that island and in Porto Rico, distributed at Havana, Santiago, Matanzas, Santa Clara, Cienfuegos, Trinidad, Manzanillo, and San Juan, the following:

Third Georgia, Second Illinois, Fourth Illinois, Eighth Illinois, Ninth Illinois, One hundred and sixtieth Indiana, One hundred and sixty-first Indiana, Forty ninth Iowa, Twenty-third Kansas, Third Kentucky, Second Louisiana, Batteries A, B, C, and D, Maine Heavy Artillery, Eighth Massachusetts, Thirty first Michigan, Sixth Missouri, Third Nebraska, Forty-seventh New York (assembled from its several stations at San Juan, Island of Porto Rico), Two hundred and second New York, Twelfth New York, First North Carolina, Sixth Ohio, Second South Carolina, Fourth Tennessee, First Texas, Fourth Virginia, Sixth U. S. Volunteer Infantry, Third U. S. Volunteer Infantry, one two battalion organization (Second Engineers), Second U. S. Volunteer Infantry, Fourth U. S. Volunteer Infantry, Fifth U. S. Volunteer Infantry, Ninth U. S. Volunteer Infantry, Third U. S. Volunteer Engineers: total, 36 organizations, or thirty regiments of infantry, four batteries of artillery, and one regiment engineers.

The total strength of the above-named organizations, as shown by the muster out rolls, was 32,001.

Six of the regiments were mustered out at State rendezvous, as follows:

Twenty third Kansas at Fort Leavenworth, Kans.; Eighth Illinois at Chicago, Ill.; Eighth Massachusetts at Boston, Mass.; Twelfth New York at armory, New York City; Forty seventh New York at armory, Brooklyn, N. Y.; First Texas at Galveston, Tex.

None of these organizations received furloughs, as they were entitled to two months' extra pay in lieu thereof under the act of January 12, 1899.

The first organization left Cuba on March 1, 1899, and was mustered out April 10, 1899; the last organization left on May 25, 1899, and was mustered out June 22, 1899.

The first regiment of volunteers called into service during the war with Spain was mustered into service May 1, 1898. The muster-out of the volunteer regiments, except those in the Philippines, was commenced September 5, 1898, and was completed June 8, 1899.

The withdrawal of the volunteer troops from the Philippines was commenced June 14, 1899, and at this date all have returned to the United States for muster out of service and return to their homes except the troop of Nevada cavalry, which sailed September 29 and due at San Francisco, October 29, 1899, and the First Tennessee, which sailed October 8 and due at San Francisco, November 8, 1899. Likewise, the men of the Regular Army who enlisted for the war with Spain have been discharged the service.

The patriotism of the regulars and volunteers who enlisted only for the war with Spain, by willingly and actively serving after the expiration of their terms of service, calls for evidence of appreciation on the part of the Department. To this end it is respectfully recommended that each officer of the several volunteer organizations and each enlisted man who continued in service in the Philippine Islands after the 2d of March, 1899, until honorably discharged, be awarded a suitably inscribed medal.

The appendix accompanying this report contains the orders, circulars, etc., relative to the measures taken for the comfort and well being of the Volunteer Army issued since the date of last annual report.

Officers of the staff departments, U. S. Volunteers (appointed from civil life), who have died since October 1, 1898.

Name.	Rank.	Date of death.	Place of death.
A. Wilson Norris	Captain and assistant adjutant-general.	Jan. 15, 1899	Harrisburg, Pa.
James L. Botsford	Lieutenant-colonel and chief quartermaster.	Oct. 6, 1898	Youngstown, Ohio.
Joseph Heatwole	Major and commissary of subsistence.	July 6, 1899	Santiago de Cuba.
Oliver Perry-Smith	Captain and commissary of subsistence.	Feb. 11, 1899	Hospital ship Missouri, Havana, Cuba.
George Vandegrift	Major and additional paymaster.	Apr. 23, 1899	Atlanta, Ga.
William S. Beebe	Major and chief ordnance officer.	Oct. 12, 1898	Havana, Cuba.
George H. Tilly	Captain, signal officer	May 27, 1899	Escalante, Negros, Philippine Islands. (Killed.)
Francis Creighton	Second lieutenant, signal officer.	Oct. 24, 1898	Santiago de Cuba.
Frank W. Dunn	do	Mar. 16, 1899	Do.
James B. McLaughlin	do	July 6, 1899	Do.

The following is a list of the organizations mustered out of the service since August, 1898, the month in which each was mustered out being indicated after the designation of the command:

Organization.	Date of muster out.
Alabama:	
First Infantry	Oct., 1898
Second Infantry	Do.
Third Infantry	Mar., 1899
Arkansas:	
First Infantry	Oct., 1898
Second Infantry	Feb., 1899
California:	
Battery B, artillery	Jan., 1899
Battery C, artillery	Feb., 1899
Batteries A and D, artillery	Sept., 1899
First Infantry	Do.
Sixth Infantry	Dec., 1898
Seventh Infantry	Do.
Eighth Infantry (7 companies)	Jan., 1899
Eighth Infantry (field and staff and 5 companies)	Feb., 1899
Colorado:	
Battery of artillery	Nov., 1898
First Infantry	Sept., 1899
Connecticut:	
Light Battery A	Oct., 1898
Heavy Battery C	Do.
Heavy Battery B	Dec., 1898
First Infantry	Oct., 1898
Third Infantry	Mar., 1899
Delaware:	
First Infantry (2 battalions)	Nov., 1898
First Infantry (1 battalion)	Dec., 1898
Florida:	
First Infantry (2 battalions)	Dec., 1898
First Infantry (1 battalion)	Jan., 1899
Georgia	
Light batteries A and B	Oct., 1898
First Infantry	Nov., 1898
Second Infantry	Do.
Third Infantry	Apr., 1899
Idaho:	
First Infantry (2 battalions)	Sept., 1899
Indiana:	
Twenty-seventh Battery, artillery	Nov., 1898
Twenty-eighth Battery, artillery	Oct., 1898
First Infantry (two companies, A and B)	Jan., 1899
One hundred and fifty-seventh Infantry	Nov., 1898
One hundred and fifty-eighth Infantry	Do.
One hundred and fifty-ninth Infantry	Do.
One hundred and sixtieth Infantry	Apr., 1899
One hundred and sixty-first Infantry	Do.
Iowa:	
Fifth Battery, artillery	Sept., 1898
Sixth Battery, artillery	Do.
Forty-ninth Infantry	May, 1899
Fiftieth Infantry	Nov., 1898
Fifty-second Infantry	Oct., 1898
Kansas:	
Twenty-first Infantry	Dec., 1898

Organization.	Date of muster out.
Kansas—Continued.	
Twenty-second Infantry	Nov., 1898
Twenty-third Infantry	Apr., 1899
Kentucky:	
Troops A and B, cavalry	May, 1899
First Infantry	Feb., 1899
Second Infantry	Oct., 1898
Third Infantry	May, 1899
Louisiana:	
Batteries A, B, and C, artillery	Nov., 1898
First Infantry	May, 1899
Second Infantry	Apr., 1899
Maine:	
Batteries A, B, C, and D, artillery	Mar., 1899
First Infantry	Oct., 1898
Maryland:	
First Infantry	Feb., 1899
Fifth Infantry	Oct., 1898
Massachusetts:	
First Artillery	Nov., 1898
Second Infantry	Nov., 1898
Fifth Infantry	Mar., 1899
Sixth Infantry	Jan., 1899
Eighth Infantry	Apr., 1899
Ninth Infantry	Nov., 1898
Michigan:	
Thirty-first Infantry	May, 1899
Thirty-second Infantry (field staff and 5 companies)	Oct., 1898
Thirty-second Infantry (7 companies)	Nov., 1898
Thirty-third Infantry (1 company)	Do.
Thirty-third Infantry (field staff and 9 companies)	Dec., 1898
Thirty-third Infantry (2 companies)	Jan., 1899
Thirty-fourth Infantry (field staff and 5 companies)	Nov., 1898
Thirty-fourth Infantry (5 companies)	Dec., 1898
Thirty-fourth Infantry (1 company)	Jan., 1899
Thirty-fifth Infantry	Mar., 1899
Minnesota:	
Twelfth Infantry	Nov., 1898
Thirteenth Infantry	Oct., 1899
Fourteenth Infantry	Nov., 1898
Fifteenth Infantry	Mar., 1899
Mississippi:	
First Infantry	Dec., 1898
Second Infantry	Do.
Third Infantry	Mar., 1899
Missouri:	
Light Battery A, artillery	Nov., 1898
First Infantry	Oct., 1898
Second Infantry (4 companies)	Feb., 1899
Second Infantry (field, staff, and 8 companies)	Mar., 1899
Third Infantry	Nov., 1898
Fourth Infantry	Feb., 1899
Fifth Infantry	Nov., 1898
Sixth Infantry	May, 1899
Montana:	
First Infantry	Oct., 1899
Nebraska:	
First Infantry	Aug., 1899
Second Infantry	Oct., 1899
Third Infantry	May, 1899
Nevada:	
1 battalion of infantry	Nov., 1898
New Hampshire:	
First Infantry	Do.
New Jersey:	
First Infantry	Do.
Second Infantry	Do.
Third Infantry	Feb., 1899
Fourth Infantry	Apr., 1899
New York:	
Troops A and C, cavalry	Nov., 1898
Fourth Battery, artillery	Oct., 1898
Fifth Battery, artillery	Do.
Seventh Battery, artillery	Nov., 1898
Astor Battery	Feb., 1899
First Infantry	Do.

Organization.	Date of muster out.
New York—Continued.	
Second Infantry	Oct., 1898
Third Infantry	Dec., 1898
Eighth Infantry	Nov., 1898
Ninth Infantry	Do.
Twelfth Infantry	April, 1899
Fourteenth Infantry	Oct., 1898
Twenty-second Infantry	Nov., 1898
Forty-seventh Infantry	Mar., 1899
Sixty-fifth Infantry	Nov., 1898
Sixty-ninth Infantry	Jan., 1899
Seventy-first Infantry	Nov., 1898
Two hundred and first Infantry	April, 1899
Two hundred and second Infantry	Do.
Two hundred and third Infantry	Mar., 1899
North Carolina:	
First Infantry	Apr., 1899
Second Infantry	Nov., 1898
Third Infantry (2 battalions)	Feb., 1899
North Dakota:	
First Infantry (2 battalions)	Sept., 1899
Ohio:	
Two squadrons of cavalry	Oct., 1898
Battalion of artillery	Do.
First Infantry	Do.
Second Infantry	Feb., 1899
Third Infantry	Oct., 1898
Fourth Infantry	Jan., 1899
Fifth Infantry	Nov., 1898
Sixth Infantry	May, 1899
Seventh Infantry	Nov., 1898
Eighth Infantry	Do.
Ninth Infantry	Jan., 1899
Tenth Infantry	Mar., 1899
Oregon:	
Light Batteries A, B, artillery	Oct., 1898
Second Infantry	Aug., 1899
Pennsylvania:	
Governor's Troop, cavalry	Nov., 1898
Philadelphia Troop, cavalry	Do.
Sheridan's Troop, cavalry	Do.
Batteries A, B, C, artillery	Do.
First Infantry	Oct., 1898
Second Infantry	Nov., 1898
Third Infantry	Oct., 1898
Fourth Infantry	Nov., 1898
Fifth Infantry	Do.
Sixth Infantry	Oct., 1898
Eighth Infantry	Mar., 1899
Ninth Infantry	Oct., 1898
Tenth Infantry (2 battalions)	Aug., 1899
Twelfth Infantry	Oct., 1898
Thirteenth Infantry (2 battalions)	Mar., 1899
Fourteenth Infantry (2 battalions)	Feb., 1899
Fifteenth Infantry (2 battalions)	Jan., 1899
Sixteenth Infantry	Dec., 1898
Eighteenth Infantry (2 battalions)	Oct., 1898
Rhode Island:	
Light batteries A, B, artillery	Oct., 1898
First Infantry	Mar., 1899
South Carolina:	
Heavy battery, artillery	Feb., 1899
First Infantry	Nov., 1898
Second Infantry	Apr., 1899
South Dakota:	
First Infantry	Oct., 1899
Tennessee:	
Second Infantry	Feb., 1899
Third Infantry (2 battalions)	Jan., 1899
Fourth Infantry	May, 1899
Texas:	
First Cavalry	Nov., 1898
First Infantry	Apr., 1899
Second Infantry	Nov., 1898
Third Infantry	Feb., 1899
Fourth Infantry	Mar., 1899
Utah:	
Troop of cavalry	Dec., 1898
Battery A, B, artillery	Aug., 1899
Battery C, artillery	Dec., 1898

Organization.	Date of muster out.
Vermont:	
First Infantry (6 companies)	Oct., 1898
First Infantry (field, staff, and 6 companies)	Nov., 1898
Virginia:	
Second Infantry	Dec., 1898
Third Infantry	Nov., 1898
Fourth Infantry	Apr., 1899
Sixth Infantry (2 battalions)	Jan., 1899
Washington:	
Battalion of infantry	Oct., 1898
West Virginia:	
First Infantry	Feb., 1899
Second Infantry	Apr., 1899
Wisconsin:	
First Battery Artillery	Oct., 1898
First Infantry	Do.
Second Infantry	Nov., 1898
Third Infantry	Jan., 1899
Fourth Infantry	Feb., 1899
Wyoming:	
Battery of artillery	Sept., 1899
First Infantry (1 battalion)	Do.
District of Columbia:	
First Infantry	Nov., 1898
Territorial Regiment:	
First Infantry	Feb., 1899
U. S. Volunteers:	
First Engineers	Jan., 1899
Second Engineers	May., 1899
Third Engineers	Do.
First Cavalry	Sept., 1898
Second Cavalry	Oct., 1898
Third Cavalry	Sept., 1898
First Infantry	Oct., 1898
Second Infantry	June, 1899
Fourth Infantry	Do.
Fifth Infantry	May, 1899
Sixth Infantry	Mar., 1899
Seventh Infantry	Feb., 1899
Eighth Infantry	Mar., 1899
Ninth Infantry	May, 1899
Tenth Infantry	Mar., 1899

The status of the last remaining State volunteer organizations is as follows:

Organization.	Left Manila.	Arrival at San Francisco.	Date of muster out.
Twentieth Kansas	Sept. 3	Oct. 9	Oct. 28
First Washington	Sept. 5	Oct. 10	Nov. 1
Fifty-first Iowa	Sept. 23	[1]Oct. 22	Nov. 2
Troop Nevada Cavalry	Sept. 29	[1]Oct. 29	[1]Nov. 13
First Tennessee	Oct. 8	[1]Nov. 7	[1]Nov. 30

[1] Probable.

Deaths in the Volunteer Army from May 1, 1898, to June 30, 1899.

Nature of death.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.
Killed in action	17	188	205
Died of wounds	3	78	81
Died of disease	114	3,820	3,934
Suicide	1	20	21
Accident	5	137	142
Drowned	1	40	41
Murder or homicide		26	26
Total	141	4,309	4,450

U. S. VOLUNTEERS.

Under the provisions of the act of March 2, 1899, the President of the United States, on July 5, 1899, authorized the organization of ten regiments of volunteers, to be designated as the 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 31st, 32d, 33d, 34th, and 35th regiments of infantry, U. S. Volunteers; on July 18, 1899, of two regiments of volunteers to be known as the 36th and 37th regiments of infantry, U. S. Volunteers, to be recruited and organized in the Philippine Islands; on August 10, 1899, of a regiment of cavalry to be known as the Eleventh Regiment of Cavalry, U. S. Volunteers; on August 17, 1899, of ten additional regiments of volunteer infantry to be known as the 38th, 39th, 40th, 41st, 42d, 43d, 44th, 45th, 46th, and 47th regiments of infantry, U. S. Volunteers; and on September 2, 1899, of two additional regiments to be designated as the 48th and 49th regiments of infantry, U. S. Volunteers. Of the two latter regiments, the enlisted men and company officers (captains and

lieutenants) to be colored; the field officers to be appointed from the commissioned officers of the Regular Army.

The captains and lieutenants were selected with much care from among the noncommissioned officers of the colored regiments of the Regular Army, those having distinguished themselves in battle in the Santiago campaign being given preference. After this class had been given recognition, men having had service in the Spanish American war were considered, and an equal number from each organization of colored volunteers serving in the Spanish-American war was selected. It is believed that the best equipped men of our colored citizens have been commissioned in these regiments, many of them having given evidence of fitness by long service in the Regular Army and excellent conduct in battle.

The point of rendezvous appointed for each of the above organizations is indicated opposite the regimental designation, and the field and staff officers of each regiment are as follows:

Eleventh Cavalry, U. S. Volunteers (to be organized in the Philippine Islands).—Colonel, James Lockett (captain, Fourth U. S. Cavalry); lieutenant-colonel, Charles G. Starr (captain, First U. S. Infantry); majors, Hugh T. Sime (major, First California Volunteers), Thomas G. Carson (first lieutenant, Fourth U. S. Cavalry), Dennis E. Nolan (first lieutenant, Thirteenth U. S. Infantry); surgeons, major, George D. De Shon (captain, assistant surgeon, U. S. A.); captain, Alexander D. Ghiselin (acting assistant surgeon, U. S. A.); first lieutenant, Shadworth O. Beasley (acting assistant surgeon, U. S. A.).

Twenty-sixth Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, Plattsburg Barracks, N. Y.—Colonel, Edmund Rice (major, Third U. S. Infantry); lieutenant-colonel, Joseph T. Dickman (captain, Eighth U. S. Cavalry); majors, Edward D. Anderson (first lieutenant, Tenth U. S. Cavalry), Frank A. Cook (late lieutenant-colonel, First Rhode Island Volunteers), Guy V. Henry, jr. (first lieutenant, First U. S. Cavalry); surgeons, major, Charles P. Mason (captain, assistant surgeon, U. S. A.); captain, Frederic A. Washburn, jr. (surgeon, Sixth Massachusetts Volunteers); first lieutenant, Richard S. Griswold (late assistant surgeon, First Connecticut Volunteers.

Twenty-seventh Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, Camp Meade, Pa.—Colonel, James M. Bell (major, First U. S. Cavalry); lieutenant-colonel, Albert S. Cummins (captain, Fourth U. S. Artillery); majors, George L. Byram (first lieutenant, First U. S. Cavalry), Clyde D. V. Hunt (captain, assistant quartermaster, U. S. Volunteers), Edward B. Cassatt (first lieutenant, Fourth U. S. Cavalry); surgeons, major, Ogden Rafferty (captain, assistant surgeon, U. S. A.), captain, William Bowen (major, Third Tennessee Volunteers), first lieutenant, Leonard K. Graves (late assistant surgeon, Two hundred and first New York Volunteers).

Twenty eighth Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, Camp Meade, Pa.—Colonel, William E. Birkhimer (captain, Third U. S. Artillery); lieutenant-colonel, Robert W. Leonard (colonel, Twelfth New York Volunteers); majors, George H. Morgan (captain, Third U. S. Cavalry), John B. Porter (colonel, Second Pennsylvania Volunteers), Elmore F. Taggart (captain, Sixth U. S. Infantry); surgeons, major, Thomas C. Chalmers (late surgeon, Twelfth New York Volunteers), captain, S. Chase de Krafft (late assistant surgeon, First Maryland Volunteers), first lieutenant, George P. Peed (assistant surgeon, Fourth Virginia Volunteers).

Twenty ninth Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, Fort McPherson, Ga.—Colonel, Edward E. Hardin (captain, Seventh U. S. Infantry); lieutenant-colonel, Herbert H. Sargent (captain, Second U. S. Cavalry); majors, Harry L. Hawthorne (first lieutenant, Sixth U. S. Artillery), David B. Case (colonel, Fourth Pennsylvania Volunteers), Evan M. Johnson, jr.,

(captain, Nineteenth U. S. Infantry); surgeons, major, Charles L. G. Anderson (assistant surgeon, U. S. A., and acting assistant surgeon, U. S. A.); captain, James C. Minor (surgeon, First Arkansas Volunteers); first lieutenant, Joseph L. Sanford (acting assistant surgeon, U. S. A.).

Thirtieth Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, Fort Sheridan, Ill.—Colonel, Cornelius Gardener (captain, Nineteenth U. S. Infantry); lieutenant-colonel, James R. Campbell (colonel, Ninth Illinois Volunteers); majors, Matthew F. Steele (captain, Sixth U. S. Cavalry), Thomas L. Hartigan (colonel, Seventh Illinois National Guard), Leonard A. Lovering (captain, Fourth U. S. Infantry); surgeons, major, John R. McDill (brigade surgeon, and acting assistant surgeon, U. S. A.); captain, James J. Erwin (late assistant surgeon, Tenth Ohio Volunteers), first lieutenant, Albert H. Eber (assistant surgeon, Thirty-fifth Michigan Volunteers).

Thirty-first Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, Fort Thomas, Ky.—Colonel, James S. Pettit (captain, First U. S. Infantry); lieutenant colonel, Webb C. Hayes (major, First Ohio Volunteer Cavalry); majors, John E. McMahon (first lieutenant, Fourth U. S. Artillery), Hunter Liggett (captain, Fifth U. S. Infantry), Lloyd M. Brett (captain, Second U. S. Cavalry); surgeons, major, Joseph N. Henry (surgeon Fourth U. S. Volunteer Infantry); captain, Abram L. Haines (surgeon Two hundred and third New York Volunteers); first lieutenant, Ralph S. Porter (assistant surgeon Second Illinois Volunteers).

Thirty-second Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.—Colonel, Louis A. Craig (captain, Sixth U. S. Cavalry); lieutenant-colonel, Lewis H. Strother (captain, Twenty second U. S. Infantry); majors, Robert E. L. Spence (first lieutenant, Sixteenth U. S. Infantry), Charles Ellet Cabell (major, Sixth Virginia Volunteers), Morton J. Henry (captain, commissary of subsistence, U. S. V.); surgeons, major, Frank C. Armstrong (surgeon, Twenty-first Kansas Volunteers); captain, John R. Hereford (surgeon, First Missouri Volunteers, and acting assistant surgeon, U. S. A.); first lieutenant, William H. Cook (acting assistant surgeon, U. S. A.).

Thirty-third Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, Fort Sam Houston, Tex.—Colonel, Luther R. Hare (captain, Seventh U. S. Cavalry); lieutenant-colonel, John J. Brereton (captain, Twenty-fourth U. S. Infantry); majors, Marcus D. Cronin (captain, Twenty-fifth U. S. Infantry), Peyton C. March (first lieutenant, Fifth U. S. Artillery), John A. Logan (major, assistant adjutant general, U. S. Volunteers); surgeons, major, B. Albert Lieberman (surgeon, Sixth Missouri Volunteers), captain, Frederick Hadra (major, surgeon, First Texas Volunteers), first lieutenant, John C. Greenewalt (first lieutenant, assistant surgeon, Fifth U. S. Volunteers).

Thirty-fourth Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, Fort Logan, Colo.—Colonel, Lyman W. V. Kennon (captain, Sixth U. S. Infantry); lieutenant-colonel, Robert L. Howze (first lieutenant, Sixth U. S. Cavalry); majors, Julius A. Penn (captain, Seventh U. S. Infantry), Joseph Wheeler, jr., (first lieutenant, Fourth U. S. Artillery), William A. Shunk (captain, Eighth U. S. Cavalry); surgeons, major, James E. Shellenberger (surgeon, Third Ohio Volunteers, and acting assistant surgeon, U. S. A.), captain, Frank W. Foxworthy (assistant surgeon, One hundred and sixtieth Indiana Volunteers, and acting assistant surgeon, U. S. A.), first lieutenant, Joseph L. Bell.

Thirty-fifth Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, Vancouver Barracks, Wash.—Colonel, William A. Kobbé (major, Third U. S. Artillery); lieutenant-colonel, Edward H. Plummer (captain, Tenth U. S. Infantry); majors, Walter C. Short (first lieutenant, Tenth U. S. Cavalry), Albert Laws (first lieutenant, Twenty-fourth U. S. Infantry), Robert D. Walsh (captain, Ninth U. S. Cavalry); surgeons, major, Julius A. Schuelke

(surgeon, Third U. S. Volunteer Engineers), captain, Luther B. Grandy (acting assistant surgeon, U. S. A., at Manila), first lieutenant, John A. Metzgar (acting assistant surgeon, U. S. A.).

Thirty-sixth Infantry, U. S. Volunteers (to be organized in the Philippines).—Colonel, J. Franklin Bell (captain, Seventh U. S. Cavalry); lieutenant-colonel, William R. Grove (major, First Colorado Volunteers); majors, William H. Bishop (major, Twentieth Kansas Volunteers), John Q. A. Braden (first lieutenant, First South Dakota Volunteers), William L. Luhn (first lieutenant, First Washington Volunteers); surgeons, major, Paul F. Straub (captain, assistant surgeon, U. S. A.), captain, George W. Mathews (acting assistant surgeon, U. S. A.), first lieutenant, Isaac W. Brewer (acting assistant surgeon, U. S. A.).

Thirty-seventh Infantry, U. S. Volunteers (to be organized in the Philippines).—Colonel, Robert B. Wallace (first lieutenant, Second U. S. Cavalry), lieutenant-colonel, First Montana Volunteers; lieutenant-colonel, Thomas R. Hamer (lieutenant-colonel, First Colorado Volunteers); majors, B. Frank Cheatham (major, First Tennessee Volunteers); Charles T. Boyd (second lieutenant, Fourth U. S. Cavalry); Henry B. Orwig (captain, Twentieth Kansas Volunteers); surgeons, major, F. A. Winter (acting assistant surgeon, U. S. A.); captain, Thomas B. Anderson (acting assistant surgeon, U. S. A.); first lieutenant, Edward D. Sinks (acting assistant surgeon, U. S. A.).

Thirty-eighth Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, Jefferson Barracks, Mo.—Colonel, George S. Anderson (major, Sixth U. S. Cavalry), lieutenant-colonel, Charles J. Crane (captain, Twenty fourth U. S. Infantry); majors, Willard A. Holbrook (first lieutenant, Seventh U. S. Cavalry), Charles H. Muir (captain, Second U. S. Infantry); Lewis E. Goodlet (lieutenant-colonel Two hundred and third New York Volunteers); surgeons, major, James D. Glennan (captain, assistant surgeon, U. S. A.); captain, Frederick S. Dewey (acting assistant surgeon, U. S. A.); first lieutenant, George L. Hicks, jr. (captain, assistant surgeon, First Maryland Volunteers, and acting assistant surgeon U. S. A.).

Thirty-ninth Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, Fort Crook, Nebr.—Colonel, Robert L. Bullard (captain and commissary of subsistence, U. S. A.); lieutenant-colonel, Enoch H. Crowder (major and judge-advocate, U. S. A.); majors, Harry B. Mulford (colonel First Nebraska Volunteers); John H. Parker (first lieutenant, Twenty-fifth U. S. Infantry); surgeons, major, Philip G. Wales (captain, assistant surgeon, U. S. A.); captain, Seaton Norman (surgeon, Third U. S. Volunteer Engineers, and acting assistant surgeon, U. S. A.); first lieutenant, Edward G. Beeson (assistant surgeon, Forty-ninth Iowa Volunteers).

Fortieth Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, Fort Riley, Kans.—Colonel, Edward A. Godwin (major, Seventh U. S. Cavalry); lieutenant-colonel, Bernard A. Byrne (captain, Sixth U. S. Infantry); majors, Michael M. McNamee (first lieutenant, Ninth U. S. Cavalry); William E. Craighill (captain, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A.); James F. Case (captain, Second Oregon Volunteers); surgeons, major, Thomas U. Raymond (captain, assistant surgeon, U. S. A.); captain, Edward A. Romig (acting assistant surgeon, U. S. A.); first lieutenant, Easton Burchard (assistant surgeon, Fifth Missouri Volunteers).

Forty-first Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, Camp Meade, Pa.—Colonel, Ephraim T. C. Richmond (captain, Second U. S. Artillery); lieutenant-colonel, John S. Mallory (captain, Second U. S. Infantry); majors, Guy H. Preston (first lieutenant, Ninth U. S. Cavalry), Palmer G. Wood (captain, Twelfth U. S. Infantry), John H. Wholley (first lieutenant, Twenty-fourth U. S. Infantry, and colonel First Washington Volunteers); surgeons, major, Allen M. Smith (captain, assistant surgeon, U. S. A.);

captain, Thomas R. Marshall (acting assistant surgeon, U. S. A.); first lieutenant, Edward J. Barrett (surgeon, Second U. S. Volunteers).

Forty-second Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, Fort Niagara, N. Y.—Colonel, J. Milton Thompson (major, Twenty-fourth U. S. Infantry); lieutenant-colonel, John H. Beacom (captain, Sixth U. S. Infantry); majors, William C. Brown (captain, First U. S. Cavalry), John R. Prime (adjutant-general of Iowa), Edward C. Carey (first lieutenant Sixteenth U. S. Infantry); surgeons, major, Walter D. McCaw (captain, assistant surgeon, U. S. A.); captain, William D. Bell (surgeon, Seventy-first New York Volunteers), first lieutenant, Louis J. Stueber (assistant surgeon, Second Ohio Volunteers).

Forty-third Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, Fort Ethan Allen, Vt.—Colonel, Arthur Murray (captain, First U. S. Artillery); lieutenant-colonel, Wilber E. Wilder, (captain, Fourth U. S. Cavalry); majors, Henry T. Allen (captain, Sixth U. S. Cavalry), John C. Gilmore, jr. (first lieutenant, Fourth U. S. Artillery), Lincoln C. Andrews (first lieutenant, Third U. S. Cavalry); surgeons, major, Henry D. Snyder (captain, assistant surgeon, U. S. A.), captain, Walter D. Webb (first lieutenant, assistant surgeon, First U. S. Volunteer Engineers), first lieutenant, Dudley W. Welch.

Forty-fourth Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.—Colonel, Edward J. McClernand (captain, Second U. S. Cavalry); lieutenant-colonel, William S. Scott (captain, First U. S. Cavalry); majors, Harry C. Hale (captain, Twentieth U. S. Infantry), Charles C. Walcutt, jr. (first lieutenant, Eighth U. S. Cavalry), Henry B. McCoy (colonel, First Colorado Volunteers); surgeons, major, William F. Lippitt, jr. (captain, assistant surgeon, U. S. A.), captain, Charles L. Furbush (acting assistant surgeon, U. S. A.), first lieutenant, Thomas T. Jackson (assistant surgeon, First Texas Volunteers).

Forty-fifth Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, Fort Snelling, Minn.—Colonel, Joseph H. Dorst (major, Second U. S. Cavalry); lieutenant-colonel, James Parker (captain, Fourth U. S. Cavalry); majors, Daniel A. Frederick (captain, Seventh U. S. Infantry), Edwin T. Cole (captain, Eleventh U. S. Infantry), Theodore K. Birkhaeuser (major, Fourth Wisconsin Volunteers); surgeons, major, Merritte W. Ireland (captain, assistant surgeon, U. S. A.); captain, Frank E. Artaud (surgeon, First Florida Volunteers, and acting assistant surgeon, U. S. A.); first lieutenant, William C. Berlin.

Forty-sixth Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, South Framingham, Mass.—Colonel, Walter S. Schuyler (major, Second U. S. Cavalry); lieutenant-colonel, Edward B. Pratt (major, Twenty-third U. S. Infantry); majors, Samuel W. Miller (captain, Fifth U. S. Infantry), William H. Johnston (captain, Sixteenth U. S. Infantry), William Brooke (first lieutenant, Fourth U. S. Infantry); surgeons, major, William Cogswell (surgeon, Eighth Massachusetts Volunteers); captain, Henry H. Lee (major, brigade surgeon, U. S. Volunteers); first lieutenant, Robert W. Andrews (acting assistant surgeon, U. S. A.).

Forty-seventh Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, Camp Meade, Pa.—Colonel, Walter Howe (captain, Fourth Artillery); lieutenant-colonel, Clarence R. Edwards (captain, Tenth U. S. Infantry); majors, Hugh D. Wise (first lieutenant, Ninth U. S. Infantry), Henry W. Hubbell (captain, First U. S. Artillery), Keller Anderson (colonel Second Tennessee Volunteers); surgeons, major, Joseph T. Clarke (captain, assistant surgeon, U. S. A.); captain, Robert P. Robins (assistant surgeon, Second Pennsylvania Volunteers, and acting assistant surgeon, U. S. A.); first lieutenant, Charles M. Galbraith (assistant surgeon, Fourth Illinois Volunteers).

Forty-eighth Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, Fort Thomas, Ky.—Colonel, William P. Duvall (captain, First U. S. Artillery); lieutenant-colonel,

Thaddeus W. Jones (captain, Tenth U. S. Cavalry; majors, Sedgwick Rice (first lieutenant, Seventh U. S. Cavalry), Alexander L. Dade (first lieutenant, Third U. S. Cavalry), John Howard (first lieutenant, Nineteenth U. S. Infantry); surgeons, major, Charles F. Kieffer (captain, assistant surgeon, U. S. A.); captain, Howard A. Grube (surgeon, Thirty-fifth Michigan Volunteers); first lieutenant, William W. Parnell (first lieutenant, assistant surgeon, Eighth U. S. Volunteers).

Forty-ninth Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, Jefferson Barracks, Mo.—Colonel, William H. Beck (captain, Tenth U. S. Cavalry; lieutenant-colonel, Arthur C. Ducat (captain, Twenty-fourth U. S. Infantry; majors, Ernest Hinds (first lieutenant, Second U. S. Artillery), George W. Kirkman (captain, Twenty-third U. S. Infantry), Carter P. Johnson (captain, Tenth U. S. Cavalry; surgeons, major, Thomas E. Evins (major, brigade surgeon, U. S. Volunteers); captain, Robert Burns (surgeon, First New Hampshire Volunteers, and brigade surgeon, U. S. Volunteers, and acting assistant surgeon, U. S. A.; first lieutenant, William C. Warmsley (acting assistant surgeon, U. S. A.).

The colonels of all the volunteer regiments called into service are officers of the Regular Army, and were selected on their efficiency records and upon recommendation of their superior officers for having shown skill and bravery in battle and demonstrated special fitness for command and efficient administration. The same is true of the lieutenant-colonels and majors, although a number of these were selected from the volunteers, as shown by their records to have had creditable service. The captains and lieutenants were also appointed on their record of service in the Regular and Volunteer armies. These appointments were, as nearly as possible, equitably distributed among the several States and Territories of the Union in proportion to the population. The reports and inspections of these regiments since their organization show them to be efficient and possessed of excellent material, both in officers and enlisted men; in truth, it is not too much to say that better volunteer regiments have never been organized.

Under your instructions, vacancies occurring in these regiments are being filled by promotion of the enlisted men of the same, upon the recommendation of the colonels. Classes of enlisted men promising aptitude and qualities of good officers have been formed in each regiment for the instruction that will fit them best for the discharge of higher duties. Already a number of resignations and discharges have taken place among commissioned officers, and the vacancies have been filled from the class herein mentioned. This policy gives satisfaction both to officers and men, and no better encouragement can be given for soldierly conduct than this hope of reward held out to meritorious enlisted men.

Appointments were made as follows:

From the Regular Army:	
Officers	136
Enlisted men	91
From the volunteers having service in the Spanish-American war:	
Officers	785
Enlisted men	198

A model camp for theoretical and practical instruction of recruits has been established at the Presidio of San Francisco, where at one time were sheltered and disciplined over 4,000 recruits in charge of officers under orders for the Philippines. The recruits in this camp are systematically and thoroughly instructed in their various duties, much attention being paid at all times to target practice.

By this plan not only were the men fairly instructed before sailing for their destination, but it allowed the weeding out of men unsuited for military service, thus saving the Government the great expense of send-

ing undesirable recruits to the Philippines only to bring them back broken down after a short service there. It is deemed of the utmost importance that recruits for regiments on foreign service should have the benefit of military training and have some idea of military discipline instilled into them at some depot or post in the United States where officers and specially fitted noncommissioned officers can devote more of their time and personal attention to the training of the men than can be done at foreign stations, owing to the scarcity of officers and the onerous duties devolving upon troops abroad.

The table below indicates the number of men (as shown by the enlistment papers) obtained by recruiting officers in the several States and Territories for the 11th Cavalry, the 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 31st, 32d, 33d, 34th, 35th, 36th, 37th, 38th, 39th, 40th, 41st, 42d, 43d, 44th, 45th, 46th, 47th, 48th, and 49th regiments of infantry, general and unassigned recruits for regiments in the Philippines:

States and Territories.	Citizens of the State or Territory.	Enlisted in State or Territory, but no residence given.	Total.	Quota.[1]	
Alabama	392	2	394	654	−260
Arkansas	274	2	276	530	−254
California	670	.....	670	846	−176
Colorado	473	6	479	346	+133
Connecticut	363	3	366	404	− 38
Delaware	40	.....	40	89	− 49
Florida	51	2	53	196	−143
Georgia	1,023	4	1,027	830	+197
Idaho	51	.....	51	60	− 9
Illinois	2,312	6	2,318	2,105	+213
Indiana	1,364	11	1,375	1,125	+250
Iowa	398	2	400	986	−586
Kansas	970	5	975	729	+246
Kentucky	1,015	59	1,074	891	+183
Louisiana	60	1	61	506	−445
Maine	151	.....	151	328	−177
Maryland	328	1	329	508	−179
Massachusetts	1,679	14	1,693	1,232	+461
Michigan	1,191	8	1,199	1,142	+ 57
Minnesota	432	.....	432	751	−319
Mississippi	66	.....	66	564	−498
Missouri	1,192	6	1,198	1,151	+ 47
Montana	78	.....	78	137	− 59
Nebraska	394	5	399	631	−232
Nevada	12	.....	12	36	− 24
New Hampshire	146	1	147	197	− 50
New Jersey	548	5	553	774	−221
New York	[2]2,473	58	2,531	3,274	−743
North Carolina	444	8	452	676	−224
North Dakota	61	.....	61	120	− 59
Ohio	1,335	12	1,347	1,896	−549
Oregon	177	.....	177	217	− 40
Pennsylvania	2,201	14	2,215	2,820	−605
Rhode Island	220	1	221	186	+ 35
South Carolina	91	.....	91	484	−393
South Dakota	63	.....	63	195	−132
Tennessee	1,127	9	1,136	800	+336
Texas	943	4	947	1,104	−157
Utah	99	4	103	111	− 8
Vermont	221	1	222	166	+ 56
Virginia	242	1	243	729	−486
Washington	271	.....	271	308	− 37
West Virginia	401	1	402	363	+ 39
Wisconsin	302	1	303	858	−555
Wyoming	47	1	48	60	− 12
Arizona	120	3	125	47	+ 78
District of Columbia	378	2	380	117	+263
New Mexico	180	3	183	89	+ 94
Oklahoma	156	.....	156	37	+119
Indian Territory	154	.....	154	.....	+154
Alaska	1	.....	1	.....	.....

[1] The figures in the "Quota" column indicate the number of men that under an apportionment based on the number of men of militia age as given in the last census would have had to be furnished by each State and Territory.

[2] Seventeen men credited to New York gave residences in foreign countries, but enlisted in that State. Foreign residences: Canada, 6; England, 4; Germany, 2; Ireland, 1; Mexico, 1; Hawaii, 3.

MILITARY GEOGRAPHICAL DEPARTMENTS.

The present territorial limits of the military departments in the United States are as follows:

Department of California.—The States of California and Nevada and the Hawaiian Islands and their dependencies.

Department of the Colorado.—The States of Wyoming (except so much thereof as is embraced in the Yellowstone National Park), Colorado, and Utah, and the Territories of Arizona and New Mexico.

Department of the Columbia.—The States of Oregon, Washington, and Idaho (except so much of the latter as is embraced in the Yellowstone National Park), and the Territory of Alaska.

Department of Dakota.—The States of Minnesota, North and South Dakota, Montana, and so much of Wyoming and Idaho as is embraced in the Yellowstone National Park.

Department of the East.—The New England States, the States of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and the District of Columbia. The Department of the Gulf (created March 11, 1898, was discontinued October 2, 1899, and the States composing it were transferred back to the Department of the East, with the exception of the State of Texas, which, May 26, 1899, had been withdrawn from the Department of the Gulf and constituted the Department of Texas.

Department of the Lakes.—The States of Michigan, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee.

Department of the Missouri.—The States of Iowa, Nebraska, Missouri, Kansas, Arkansas, the Indian and the Oklahoma Territories.

Department of Texas.—The State of Texas. Revived May 26, 1899.

The geographical military commands beyond the limits of the United States are:

Department of Porto Rico.—The island of Porto Rico and the islands and keys adjacent and belonging thereto.

Department of the Pacific.—The Philippine Islands.

CUBA.

August 10, 1898, the Department of Santiago was created, consisting of all that part of the island of Cuba and the islands and keys adjacent and belonging thereto as have or may hereafter come under the control of the United States. This was the only military department in the island until December 13, 1898, at which date Cuba was constituted a military division, each of its provinces constituting a military department. Four of the latter were subsequently consolidated, as indicated below.

Division of Cuba.—Consisting of the geographical departments and provinces of the island of Cuba, with headquarters in the city of Havana.

Department of Havana.—Created December 30, 1898, to consist of that portion of the island of Cuba embraced within the following boundaries: Beginning at the mouth of the Almendares River, thence south and west following the Almendares to its tributary, the Rio Grande; thence along the Rio Grande to near its head; thence north, via Sancta Maria del Rosario, to the headquarters of the Rio las Vegas; thence along the Rio las Vegas and Rio Cojimar to the sea.

Department of the Province of Havana and Pinar del Rio.—Decem-

ber 30, 1898, the Department of the Province of Havana was created, to consist of all that portion of the island of Cuba within the limits of the Province of Havana, including the Isle of Pines, except such portion of the province as is embraced within the Department of Havana; and December 31 that portion of Cuba embraced within the boundaries of the Province of Pinar del Rio was constituted the Department of Pinar del Rio. April 19, 1899, these two Departments were consolidated and designated the Department of the Province of Havana and Pinar del Rio.

Department of Matanzas and Santa Clara.—The provinces of Matanzas and of Santa Clara were constituted two departments December 31, 1898, to be known respectively as the Department of Matanzas and the Department of Santa Clara. April 17, 1899, the two departments were united and designated the Department of Matanzas and Santa Clara.

Department of Santiago and Puerto Principe.—The Department of Santiago, created August 10, 1898, consisting of all that part of the island of Cuba then or afterwards under the control of the United States, was, by operation of the order of December 31, 1898, restricted to the province of Santiago; at this latter date the province of Puerto Principe was constituted the Department of Puerto Principe; and July 1, 1899, these two departments were consolidated and designated the Department of Santiago and Puerto Principe.

ARMY CORPS.

First Army Corps.—By order from the War Department, dated December 30, 1898, Maj. Gen. James H. Wilson, U. S. Volunteers (who had relieved General J. C. Breckinridge in the command of the corps October 20), was directed to prepare a portion of his command, including his headquarters, for service in Cuba. He sailed from Savannah, Ga., January 7, 1899, and arrived at Matanzas, Cuba, three days afterwards, and his troops were distributed in the provinces of Matanzas and Santa Clara.

The First Corps was discontinued by General Orders, No. 8, Adjutant General's Office, January 16, 1899, and the few troops of that organization remaining in the United States were assigned as separate brigades of the Second Army Corps.

The strength of this corps on the last days of the months named below was as follows:

Months.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.
September, 1898	824	19,519	20,343
October, 1898	862	20,083	20,945
November, 1898	837	19,536	20,373
December, 1898	812	19,220	20,032

Second Army Corps.—Maj. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young, U. S. Volunteers, relieved Major-General Wm. M. Graham in command of the corps November 2, 1898.

This corps, organized at Camp Alger, near Falls Church, Va., was removed to Camp George G. Meade, near Middletown, Pa., during the months of August and September, 1898, and as winter approached camps for the command were selected at various stations in the South, General Young making his headquarters at Augusta, Ga., and remain-

ing in command until May 5, 1899, when the corps was discontinued. The strength of the Second Army Corps for the months from September, 1898, to April, 1899, was as given below:

Months.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.
September, 1898	879	21,436	22,315
October, 1898	887	21,576	22,463
November, 1898	976	22,646	23,622
December, 1898	973	22,185	23,158
January, 1899	1,388	29,446	30,750
February, 1899	814	17,972	18,786
March, 1899	242	4,954	5,196
April, 1899	49	795	844

Third Army Corps.—Brig. Gen. Royal T. Frank, U. S. Volunteers, was assigned to the command of this corps September 1, 1898.

The Third Corps was transferred early in September to the camps established at Anniston, Ala., and by the end of that month but a small detachment remained at its original station—Camp Thomas, Ga. This corps was discontinued October 7, 1898. By the time the corps was fully under way for Anniston, it had been reduced to but a few regiments, the larger number of the troops having been ordered home for muster out. The strength of the Third Corps September 30, 1898, was 339 officers and 8,076 enlisted men.

Fourth Army Corps.—This corps, under the command of Maj. Gen. John J. Coppinger, U. S. Volunteers, was assembled at Huntsville, Ala., during August, 1898. General Coppinger having been retired from active service, Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler, U. S. Volunteers, was assigned to the command of the corps, and served with it from October 13 to December 3, 1898. He was succeeded by Brig. Gen. A. K. Arnold, U. S. Volunteers, who commanded it from December 14 to December 20, when he was relieved by Maj. Gen. Henry W. Lawton, U. S. Volunteers, who retained command until December 29, at which date the command devolved upon Brig. Gen. Royal T. Frank, U. S. Volunteers, the senior officer present, and the head-quarters were removed to Anniston, Ala. The camp was discontinued January 16, 1899, and its strength during the last four months of its existence was as follows:

Months.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.
September, 1898	329	6,616	6,945
October, 1898	733	16,797	17,530
November, 1898	689	16,470	17,159
December, 1898	545	13,337	13,882

Fifth Army Corps.—The repatriation of this corps was completed by August 24, 1898, the command being concentrated at Camp Wikoff, Montauk Point, New York, and the corps was discontinued October 3, 1898. Its strength September 30, 1898, was 218 officers and 5,136 enlisted men.

Sixth Army Corps.—As stated in last report, the Sixth Corps failed of organization.

Seventh Army Corps.—On October 8, 1898, orders were issued for the movement of the corps to Savannah, Ga., after suitable camps had been prepared, and October 21, 1898, the corps was reorganized. Hav-

ing been designated for service in Cuba, the entire command, under Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee, U. S. Volunteers, was embarked from Savannah during the months of December, 1898, and January, 1899, and distributed in the province of Havana, Cuba.

The Seventh Corps was discontinued May 1, 1899. Its strength from September, 1898, to March, 1899, was as follows:

Months.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.
September, 1898	779	17,514	18,293
October, 1898	724	16,365	17,089
November, 1898	674	14,421	15,095
December, 1898	732	15,693	16,425
January, 1899	678	14,806	15,484
February, 1899	672	14,300	14,972
March, 1899	275	5,342	5,617

Eighth Army Corps.—Maj. Gen. Elwell S. Otis, U. S. Volunteers, relieved Major-General Merritt in the command of the Eighth Corps August 29, 1898.

At the date of the last report there had been forwarded to the Philippine Islands 641 officers and 15,058 enlisted men. Since that time the following transports carrying troops, as herein indicated, have left:

Date of sailing.	Transport.	Commanding officer.	Command.	Strength.		Date of arrival at Manila.
				Officers	Enlisted men.	
1898.						1898.
Aug. 21	Arizona	Brig. Gen. [illegible] Kobbé	I, K, L, and M, 18th U. S. Inf., and detachments 1st Nebr., 10th Pa., and 1st Colo.	18	1,[illegible]	Nov. [illegible]
Oct. 17	Senator	Maj. G. A. [illegible] 2d Inf	A, I, K, and M, 23d U. S. Inf.; D, Co. I, Art., and det. recruits for 2d Oreg.	16	378	Nov. 27
Oct. 19	Valencia	Lieut. Col. W. [illegible] Wilcox	F, G, L, and L, 1st Wash. Inf., and det. Battn. Cal. Art	17	484	Dec.
Oct. 27	Indiana	Col. F. [illegible], 20th Kans	Hdqrs. and band C, D, E, G, H, I, K, and M, 20th Kans	30	72	Dec. 1
Oct. 28	Ohio	Col. J. H. Wholley, 1st Wash	A, B, C, D, E, H, K, and M, 1st Wash. Inf., and det. Cal. Art	28	779	Nov. 26
Oct. 30	Zealandia	Col. W. C. Smith, 1st Tenn	Band, Hdqrs., A, B, C, E, F, L, and M, 1st Tenn. Inf	24	543	Nov. 29
Nov. 3	Pennsylvania	Col. J. C. Loper, 51st Iowa	51st Iowa Inf	47	987	Dec. 5
Nov. 6	City of Puebla	Lieut. Col. [illegible] 1st Tenn	D, G, H, I, and K, 1st Tenn. Inf., det. Cal. Art., and 1st Troop Nev. Cav.	27	[illegible]	Dec.
Nov. 9	Newport	Brig. Gen. A. [illegible]	A, B, F, and L, 20th Kansas and Wyoming Battery	24	466	Dec. 6
1899.						1899.
Jan. 19	Grant (from New York City).	Maj. Gen. H. W. Lawton	4th U. S. Inf. and B, G, I, and M, 17th U. S. Inf	42	1,716	Mar. 10
Jan. 26	Scandia and Morgan City.	Brig. Gen. Loyd Wheaton	20th U. S. Inf	41	1,213	Feb. 28
Feb. 1	Ohio and Senator	Col. H. C. Egbert, 22d Inf	22d U. S. Inf	37	1,230	Mar. 4
Feb. 3	Sherman (from New York City).	Col. J. H. Page, 3d Inf	3d U. S. Inf. and D, H, K, and L, 17th U. S. Inf	34	1,702	Mar. 22
Feb. 19	Sheridan (from New York City).	Lt. Col. J. H. Smith, 22d Inf	12th U. S. Inf. and Hdqrs. and A, C, E, and F, 17th U. S. Inf	[illegible]	1,[illegible]	Apr. 14
Mar. 24	City of Puebla	Capt. Jas. Regan, 9th Inf	Hdqrs., A, F, G, I, L, and M, 9th U. S. Inf	20	693	Apr. 22
Mar. 28	Zealandia	Capt. C. M. Rockefeller, 9th Inf	B, C, D, E, H, and K, 9th U. S. Inf	14	599	Apr. 26
Apr. 18	Hancock	Col. J. Kline, 21st Inf	21st U. S. Inf., Lt. Batty, E, 1st U. S. Art	39	1,451	May 11
Apr. 20	Newport	Maj. J. L. Tiernon, 1st Art	Lt. Batteries F, 4th and F, 5th Art	8	224	May [illegible]
Do.	Warren	Brig. Gen. [illegible]	Hdqrs., B, C, [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	May [illegible]
Apr. 28	Senator	Col. A. T. Smith, 13th Inf	Hdqrs., A, C, F, G, H, and I, 13th U. S. Inf	19	724	May 29
Do.	Ohio	Capt. J. H. H. Peshine, 13th Inf	B, D, E, K, L, and M, 13th U. S. Inf	1	729	Dec.
May 22	Sherman	Brig. Gen. J. C. Bates	6th U. S. Inf. and recruits	41	1,858	June 19
May 30	Grant	Lt. Col. W. P. Spurgin, 4th Inf	16th U. S. Inf. and recruits	40	1,665	June 27
June 22	Zealandia	Maj. J. M. Thompson, 4th Inf	C, E, G, and I, 24th U. S. Inf	8	373	July 22
June 24	Sheridan	Brig. Gen. S. B. M. Young	A and F, 4th U. S. Cav., Band H, 14th U. S. Inf., and recruits	35	1,029	July 24
June 28	Valencia	Maj. Chas. Morton, 4th Cav	Hdqrs., E and M, 4th U. S. Cav., F and H, 24th U. S. Inf	10	134	July 29
July 1	Pennsylvania	Col. A. S. Burt, 25th Inf	Hdqrs., F, I, K, L, and M, 25th Inf	27	907	Aug. 1
July 11	Conemaugh	First Lt. L. E. Wyman, jr., 4th Cav	Det. 4th U. S. Cav. and 27 horses	1	33	Aug. 18
July 13	City of Para	Brig. Gen. T. Schwan	D and H, 4th U. S. Cav., Hdqrs., A, F, H, and K, 24th U. S. Inf., and E, Engr. Battn.	36	911	Aug. 14

1899.						1899.
July 25	Tartar	Col. S. Snyder, 19th Inf	Hdqrs., B, D, F, G, H, I, K, and M, U. S. 19th Inf	41	1,163	Aug. 20
July 26	Ohio	Maj. O. J. Sweet, 23d Inf	C and L, 19th U. S. Inf., and recruits	11	726	Aug. 25
July 26	Tacoma (sailing ship)	Capt. G. O. Cress, 4th Cav	Det. 4th U. S. Cav. and 200 horses	1	39	Oct. 13
Do	Newport	Capt. F. H. French, 19th Inf	A and E, 19th Inf., and recruits	11	489	Aug. 24
Aug. 2	Indiana	Col. C. C. Hood, 16th Inf	Recruits and casuals	10	807	Sept. 1
Aug. 10	Morgan City	Maj. W. Wittich, 21st Inf	Det. recruits	8	689	Sept. 19
Aug. 15	Senator	Lt. Col. E. M. Hayes, 4th Cav	Det. recruits	10	660	Sept. 10
Aug. 18	City of Sydney	Capt. F. H. Albright, 25th Inf	Det. recruits	2	351	Sept. 19
Aug. 20	Garrone (from Seattle, Wash.).	1st Lt. E. M. Suplee, 3d Cav	Det. 3d Cav. and 389 horses	2	74	Sept. 30
Aug. 25	St. Paul (from Seattle, Wash.).	Lt. Col. H. W. Wessels, jr., 3d Cav	A, C, E, F, K, L, and M, 3d U. S. Cav	18	705	Oct. 1
Do	Athenian (from Seattle, Wash.).	Capt. G. F. Chase, 3d Cav	Troop D, 3d U. S. Cav	3	102	Oct. 3
Aug. 29	City of Puebla	Capt. B. D. Devore, 23d Inf	Det. recruits	6	659	Sept. 25
Sept. 1	Victoria (from Tacoma, Wash.).	1st Lt. W. T. Johnston, 3d Cav	Det. 3d U. S. Cav	3	80	Oct. 9
Sept. 2	Leelawna	2d Lt. B. H. Dorcy, 4th Cav	Det. 4th U. S. Cav., and 250 horses	1	16	
Do	Warren	Capt. T. W. Moore, 21st Inf	Det. Signal Corps and recruits	10	1,056	Oct. 9
Sept. 8	Columbia	Col. L. W. V. Kennon, 34th Vol. Inf	Hdqrs. band, E, F, G, H, and L, 34th Vol. Inf., and 3 Hospital Corps men	19	566	Oct. 11
Sept. 16	Belgian King	Lt. Col. R. L. Howze, 34th Vol. Inf	A, B, C, D, I, K, and M, 34th Vol. Inf., 9 Hospital Corps men, and det. recruits.	26	779	Oct. 14
Do	Aztec	1st Lt. H. A. Sievert, 4th Cav	Det. 4th U. S. Cav. and 366 horses	1	9	Oct. 25
Sept. 21	S. S. Tacoma	Col. J. M. Bell, 27th Vol. Inf	Hdqrs., band, A, B, C, D, I, K, and L, 27th Vol. Inf., and 6 Hospital Corps men.	26	735	Oct. 27
Do	George W. Elder	Lt. Col. A. S. Cummins, 27th Vol. Inf	E, F, G, H, and M, 27th Vol. Inf., and 6 Hospital Corps men	20	494	Oct. 21
Sept. 23	Sherman	Col. C. Gardener, 30th Vol. Inf	30th Vol. Inf., dets. recruits, Hospital Corps men, and 2 casuals	54	1,658	Do.
Sept. 25	Grant	Col. E. Rice, 26th Vol. Inf	26th Vol. Inf., dets. officers, Hospital Corps men, and recruits	55	1,631	Oct. 24
Sept. 27	Centennial		Det. casuals and 300 horses	1	15	
Sept. 30	Sheridan	Col. L. R. Hare, 33d Vol. Inf	33d Vol. Inf.; B, H, and I, 32d Vol. Inf.; dets. officers, Hospital Corps men, and recruits.	64	1,663	Oct. 27
Oct. 1	Charles Nelson	Maj. C. E. Cabell, 32d Vol. Inf	Field and Staff, C and D, 32d Vol. Inf.	21	209	
Oct. 1	Glenogle	Col. L. A. Craig, 32d Vol. Inf	Hdqrs., A, E, F, G, H, K, L, and M, 32d Vol. Inf., and det. men for 31st and 33d Vol. Inf.	31	718	
Oct. 4	Sikh (from Portland, Oreg.).	Maj. R. D. Walsh, 35th Vol. Inf	Det. 35th Vol. Inf., Hospital Corps, and recruits	21	637	
Do	Rio de Janeiro (from Portland Oreg.).	Lt. Col. E. H. Plummer, 35th Vol. Inf	Det. 35th Vol. Inf., and 21 female Red Cross nurses	28	692	
Oct. 5	City of Para	Col. E. E. Hardin, 29th Vol. Inf	Hdqrs., and A, B, C, I, K, L, and M, 29th Vol. Inf., det. Hospital Corps, and recruits.	32	788	
Do	Zealandia	Lt. Col. H. H. Sargent, 29th Vol. Inf	D, E, F, G, and H, 29th Vol. Inf., and det. Signal Corps, and recruits	21	557	
Do	Valencia	Capt. C. B. Hardin, 18th Inf	Det. recruits	13	432	
	Total			1,342	46,859	

[1] Transports sailed from San Francisco, unless indicated otherwise.

Volunteer organizations were returned to the United States on the dates and in the order outlined in the following table:

Date of sailing from Manila.	Transport.	Command.	Commanding officer.	Date of arrival at San Francisco, Cal.
1899.				1899.
June 14	Ohio and Newport	2d Oregon	Col. Owen Summers	July 12
July 1	Hancock	1st Nebr., and A and B, Utah Art.	Col. H. B. Mulford	July 30
Do.	Senator	10th Pennsylvania	Lieut. Col. J. E. Barnett	Aug. 1
July 17	Warren	1st Colorado	Col. H. B. McCoy	Aug. 16
July 26	Sherman	1st Cal., and A and D, Cal. Art.	Col. V. D. Dubocc	Aug. 23
July 31	Grant	1st Wyo., 1st N. Dak., Wyo. Batty., and 1st Idaho.	Lt. Col. W. C. Frenmann	Aug. 29
Aug. 11	Sheridan	13th Minn. and 1st S. Dak	Col. A. S. Frost	Sept. 7
Aug. 23	Valencia and Zealandia.	1st Montana	Col. H. C. Kessler	[1]Sept. 22 [1]Sept. 24
Sept. 3	Tartar	20th Kansas	Col. W. S. Metcalf	Oct. 10
Sept. 5	Pennsylvania	1st Washington	Col. J. H. Wholley	Oct. 9
Sept. 22	Senator	51st Iowa	Col. J. C. Loper	Oct. 22
Sept. 29	Ohio	Troop Nevada Cavalry	Capt. F. M. Linscot	[1]Oct. 29
Oct. 8	Indiana	1st Tennessee	Col. Gracey Childers	[1]Nov. 8

[1] Probable date of arrival.

CAMPS FOR PURPOSE OF DRILL AND INSTRUCTION.

The necessity for fully equipped camp grounds, one each for the North, South, East, and West, is very great. These should be large and fitted with all the appliances known to modern civilization, and kept in constant repair, ready for occupancy at any time. The experience of the last two years makes this necessity apparent and should receive the favorable consideration of those charged with the care and instruction of our military forces. Special appropriation to this end should be made at an early day.

THE RECRUITING SERVICE.

Regular Army.—In October, 1898, the enlisted strength of the Regular Army was about 53,000 men, or 10,000 less than its authorized strength under the provisions of the act of April 26, 1898. Section 7 of the act provided for the honorable discharge or transfer of enlisted men rendered supernumerary at the end of any war in which the United States might become involved.

In view of this legislation the War Department announced in General Orders dated May 10, 1898, that men enlisted or reenlisted in the Regular Army during the Spanish American war would be granted their discharge at the close of the war if they so desired. This privilege, however, was withdrawn by General Orders, No. 173, dated October 26, 1898, in the cases of men enlisting or reenlisting in the Regular Army after that date.

The number of men enlisted and reenlisted in the Regular Army between April 21, 1898, the opening of the war with Spain, and October 26, 1898, was 38,000. Allowing for casualties from other causes, upward of 30,000 men of the Regular Army could have claimed their discharge at the cessation of hostilities.

Recruiting for the Regular Army was therefore actively continued. In December, 1898, six additional regular regiments (3d, 4th, 12th, 17th, 20th, and 22d Infantry) having been designated for service in the

Philippines, and orders given for the discharge therefrom of such men as would be entitled thereto at the close of the war under General Orders, No. 40, of 1898, it became important to fill these regiments before their departure, and this was done, in addition to the ordinary operations of the recruiting service. The last of these six regiments sailed for Manila February 19, 1899.

Among other measures for securing the enlistment of specially desirable men, recruiting stations were established at all camps for the muster out of volunteers, and up to August 31, 1899, 10,770 former volunteers had been enlisted or reenlisted in the Regular Army.

With the passage of the act approved March 2, 1899, section 12 of which authorized the President "to maintain the Regular Army at a strength of not exceeding 65,000 enlisted men" until July 1, 1901, if necessary, the most active measures were taken with a view to filling the Regular Army to the authorized maximum. The number of general recruiting stations was largely increased and recruiting officers were instructed to put forth their best efforts and use every endeavor to obtain desirable men, not only at their main stations, but by means of substations in the surrounding country. Special efforts were directed to filling the other regiments designated for the Philippines, as well as providing men for vacancies to occur in regiments already there and in Cuba and Porto Rico, by the discharge of men who had enlisted for the war.

Besides filling regiments sailing for Manila, prior to their departure, 7,816 recruits for regiments were forwarded to the Philippines between March 1 and September 20, 1899. During the same time 3,584 recruits were forwarded to regiments in Cuba and 1,728 to Porto Rico.

In October, 1898, there were 26 city recruiting stations of the general service in operation, with 14 branch or temporary stations in connection therewith, and 18 regiments had special recruiting parties out.

The number of general recruiting stations in cities was increased during the year to 64, with 70 or more branch stations (not counting places canvassed by volunteer recruiting officers under the direction of general recruiting officers).

Three stations in the South and one in California have recently been closed, having ceased to be productive, leaving at present 60 city recruiting stations for the general service, with upward of 70 branches.

The total number of enlistments and reenlistments in the Regular Army during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899, exclusive of the Hospital Corps, was 62,175, classified as follows:

For the general service	53,123	
For the special recruiting service	8,516	
		61,639
For staff departments		536
Total		62,175

Of the 62,175 accepted applicants, 53,024 were native born and 9,151 of foreign birth; 56,154 were white, 6,001 colored, and 20 Indians. The enlistments numbered 43,780 and the reenlistments 18,395. Excluding reenlistments, the percentage of native born among the original enlistments was 88. The reports show that the recruiting officers making the 61,639 enlistments embraced in the first two items of foregoing list rejected 147,669 applicants—between 70 and 71 per cent of the number seeking enlistment—as lacking in either legal, mental, moral, or physical qualifications; 3,177 of these were rejected as aliens, and 5,174 for illiteracy.

U. S. Volunteers.—General Orders, No. 122, July 5, 1899, published instructions of the President for recruiting U. S. Volunteers from the country at large, as provided for by the act of Congress approved March 2, 1899, and for organizing the same into ten regiments, to be designated the 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 31st, 32d, 33d, 34th, and 35th Regiments of Infantry, U. S. Volunteers. The same order also published detailed instructions for the enlistment of men for these regiments, to be made by the regular recruiting officers at recruiting stations and military posts of the United States. Recruiting for the ten regiments was commenced July 10. By August 15 the number of men required to fill these regiments had been enlisted.

July 18 General Otis, commanding the Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, was authorized, by direction of the President, to recruit and organize two regiments of infantry volunteers and one regiment of cavalry volunteers, to be designated the 36th and 37th Regiments Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, and the 11th Regiment of Cavalry, U. S. Volunteers, and recruiting for these regiments in the United States, to supplement enlistments therefor in the Philippines, was also carried on at regular stations until September 13.

August 17, 1899, the President gave instructions for recruiting ten additional regiments, to be designated the 38th, 39th, 40th, 41st, 42d, 43d, 44th, 45th, 46th, and 47th Regiments of Infantry, U. S. Volunteers. The recruiting of these regiments commenced August 24 and was completed October 18. Enlistments were made for these regiments by general recruiting officers, assisted by officers of the volunteer regiments, who were kept on recruiting service for a limited time in the immediate neighborhood of their homes, and also sent to substations in other localities wherever there was a probability of securing desirable men, especially those who had prior service in the Volunteers, the Regulars, or the National Guard.

September 9, 1899, the President directed the organization of two additional regiments, under the provisions of the act of Congress approved March 2, 1899, the enlisted men thereof to be colored, and the regiments to be designated the 48th and 49th Regiments of Infantry, U. S. Volunteers. The recruiting of these regiments, in practically the same manner as the others, was commenced September 14. The number of volunteers enlisted for the 25 regiments indicated, between July 10 and September 20, 1899, was 26,442, of whom 1,396 were enlisted in the Philippines.

Porto Rico Battalion, U. S. Volunteers.—Pursuant to section 12 of the act of Congress approved March 2, 1899, which authorized the President to "raise a force of not more than 35,000 volunteers, to be recruited as he may determine from the country at large, or from the localities where their services are needed, without restriction as to citizenship or educational qualifications * * *," authority was given the commanding general, Department of Porto Rico, to recruit a battalion of volunteers from among the Porto Ricans.

Instructions for recruiting such a battalion, to consist of 400 men, by enlistments to be made at 16 different posts in that island were promulgated in Circular No. 6, Headquarters, Department of Porto Rico, March 24, 1899, and the following announcement was made:

> This organization is intended for service on this island, and has been authorized by the Secretary of War and an act of Congress, and it is hoped that the object will be attained of cultivating patriotism and a feeling be inspired that the Porto Rican soldier has, with the American, assumed similar obligations to defend the flag and the laws of the United States.

According to latest report 390 men had been enlisted for this battalion.

The recruitment of the Regular Army was a creditable piece of work, both in the time of its accomplishment and the character of men obtained. This remark also applies to the recruitment of the volunteers. The work was largely done by officers of the Regular Army away from their regiments by reason of wounds and disability incident to exposure in the line of duty, many of whom were hardly able for any duty whatever, but volunteered for this work to enable the Department to meet the emergency. It is proper to acknowledge the efficiency and industry with which this work was accomplished.

PAY AND RANK OF OFFICERS.

The pay of all officers below the grade of brigadier-general should be increased at least 33⅓ per cent while on duty in Cuba or our new possessions. Most of the gentlemen have families that they are unable to have with them, and are therefore compelled to maintain two establishments—a difficult undertaking when the amount of their pay is considered. The increase would meet in a measure their actual living expenses. This legislation is urgently recommended. Also, that provision be made that all officers below the grade of major-general who retire by reason of age or wounds received in action shall do so on the next grade above the rank held by them in the Regular Army on the date of their retirement.

Much has been written of late concerning a better staff system. Ours may be, and doubtless is, open to improvements, but it should be borne in mind that the present organization is the result of years of legislation, born of the best thought and labors of our best military men, and has stood successfully the test of all our wars. The criticisms of our system are too often the result of disappointment. Seldom has there one appeared in print whose author has not been a long-standing applicant for a place in one of the staff corps or departments. The suggestion that our staff officers are not experienced in the duties of line officers is not borne out by facts. The average length of service in the line of the Army, prior to their appointment to the staff, by the officers of the Adjutant-General's Department is twenty-one years; Inspector-General's Department is twenty-one years; the Quartermaster's Department is seventeen years; the Subsistence Department is twelve years; the Ordnance Department is three years and six months, and the Signal Corps is twelve years. With these facts before you it is a question if they have not been required to give too much time in company duties before transfer to the staff. One remedy for this would be to have an extra first lieutenant in each troop, battery, and company for temporary duty in the several staff departments and thus fitting more officers for appointment to the permanent staff departments, at the same time giving the Department sufficient officers for duty at the Military Academy, colleges, and instructors of the militia, etc., without impairing the efficiency of the line of the Army, which has been too often done by making details for detached service of various kinds, the Department having been forced to decide between the lesser of two evils.

ALLOTMENT OF PAY.

By the provisions of the act of March 2, 1899, section 16, the Secretary of War is authorized to permit enlisted men of the Army to make allotments of their pay, under such regulations as he may prescribe,

for the support of their families or relations during such time as they may be absent on distant duty. It is recommended that Congress be asked to extend the same privilege to officers ordered to duty on foreign service.

INTERNATIONAL COURTESIES.

The first expedition of troops to the distant field of operations in the Philippines sent forward through the Mediterranean Sea and the Suez Canal gave occasion for a demonstration of kindly feelings by the British Government that will long live in the memories of both participants in the spontaneous exchange of international courtesies.

The U. S. transport *Sheridan* left New York February 19, 1899, having on board, under command of Col. Jacob H. Smith, 12th Infantry, the 12th regiment United States Infantry and four companies (A, C, E, and F) of the 17th United States Infantry—57 officers and 1,790 men. The transport arrived at the port of Vallate, Malta, on the morning of March 8, with all on board in good health and spirits, although the men were badly in need of exercise after their uneventful sail of over two weeks' duration. With thoughtful consideration of the well being of our troops and in anticipation of the arrival of the transport the American consul at that port, John H. Grout, jr., esq., requested the governor of Malta to permit the troops to land. This request of our consul was made with full knowledge of the fact that since the Crimean War, at which time a few allied troops were permitted to land there, no foreign troops had ever been permitted to land under any circumstances, the British authorities of the island having always strictly guarded against establishing a precedent in this respect.

In due course of time, his excellency the governor-general, Sir Francis Grenfeld, advised the American consul that, after full consideration, he had decided to permit the American troops to land without arms. This graceful action was received with full appreciation of the honor conferred and as a signal evidence of the marked friendship of Her Majesty's Government on the island. The following day the dockyard authorities tendered the use, free of cost, of two large tugs and several lighters, and the entire command landed for exercise. The companies, without arms, were marched from the pier to the Florian parade, where they were met by the bands of the British garrison and escorted to their places in the formation designated. After the companies were all assembled the command was reviewed by the governor-general, accompanied by his staff and officers of the garrison, including Major General Congleton, commanding the infantry division, and Admiral Noel, commanding the fleet. The troops then proceeded to the Marsa, a large exercise ground beyond the city, and returned to the transport the same day.

On Thursday, March 9, Governor-General Grenfeld invited Colonel Smith and a few of his officers to luncheon, an equal number of British officers being present to meet them. On Saturday, March 11, the members of the Malta Union Club, composed wholly of British army and naval officers, gave a largely attended lunch in honor of the American visitors. During the stay of the *Sheridan* every possible courtesy was extended to our troops, officers and men, and in some cases the authorities even went out of their way to make the visit thoroughly enjoyable. The enlisted men were, as a rule, in good spirits, and greatly appreciated the shore liberty granted them, and their behavior was such as became American soldiers.

At Colombo and Singapore there was the same cordial interchange of official courtesies between the British authorities and the commander of the American expedition, and at both places the British officers did much to add to the pleasure of the occasions.

MILITARY RESERVATIONS IN THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

The joint resolution of Congress, dated July 7, 1898, section 1, recites:

> The existing laws of the United States relative to public lands shall not apply to such lands in the Hawaiian Islands; but the Congress of the United States shall enact special laws for their management and disposition: *Provided*, That all revenue from or proceeds of the same, except as regards such parts thereof as may be used or occupied for the civil, military, or naval purposes of the United States, or may be assigned for the use of the local government, shall be used solely for the benefit of the inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands for educational and other public purposes.

Under the above cited resolution the Hawaiian Government has continued, as heretofore, to deal with and dispose of its public lands. This action, if continued, is likely to result in embarrassment, if not to individuals certainly to the United States, as it is questionable whether the Hawaiian Government can give a clear title to the land already formally ceded to the United States. The latter is likely to need for governmental use public lands not used at present by the Hawaiian Government, but which it may lease or otherwise dispose of in the future. This is especially true of lands which may be required for posts, barracks, or hospital sites, and, in the present state of values, such lands if once in private ownership will be held at prices the United States would be unwilling to pay, and the selected lands could not be obtainable at acceptable figures either by purchase or condemnation proceedings. It is, therefore, urgently recommended that Congress be asked to provide, by legislative action, for securing the reservation of such public lands as the War Department may indicate as necessary and desirable for military purposes.

It was found, after consultation with the authorities in the surveyor-general's office of the Hawaiian Islands, that nearly all of the public land had passed from governmental control by reason of a system of sale and lease for a term ranging from ten to thirty years.

A brief history of transition from the feudal system to the fee simple system, which took place in the period from 1846 to 1850, is as follows:

The chiefs, under Kamehameha, held lands in fief, ranging in the number of those held by any individual chief from 40 or more to 1, according to rank or past service of the holder. The common people were tenants, either of those chiefs or of the King, when living on his private lands.

Each chief made a division in writing with Kamehameha III, in which the chief relinquished all right in one-half of the lands held by himself, and received from the Sovereign a similar relinquishment in toto of the Sovereign's claim to the remaining half. Each transaction was entered in the mahili book (mahili meaning division), one page bearing the deed from the King to the chief of the half of the lands enumerated by name, the opposite page the relinquishment by the chief of all claim to the other half.

The next step was the assignment by the King of much of the larger portion of his half to the Government or public domain; similarly, the chiefs also gave up a small portion of their half to the same public domain.

The property known as Government land has ever since been more or less in the market, and the choicest portions were by special effort placed at sale at a nominal price in the hands of native Hawaiians.

The lands known as Crown lands consist of the land reserved by Kamehameha III, as above mentioned, and the choice lands which he had previously regarded as his own were united in theory and treated by the King and his successor as private lands. The Legislature, cooperating with Kamehameha V, made them inalienable, and created the board of Crown commissions to take charge of them. Thus they became national property, but the income derived from them belonged to the King without accountability to the Legislature.

Under the act of January 3, 1865, the Crown lands can not be alienated by fee, but can be leased by a board of commissioners for a term not exceeding thirty years.

Early in 1892 a new system of leasing was introduced, the main feature being to secure to small holders, natives particularly, an opportunity to acquire under fair conditions suitable sections on the Crown lands for homestead and agricultural purposes.

Sales of Government lands and leases of Crown lands have continued to the present time, and there is very little of either class left in immediate control of the Government. Should this action be permitted to continue it will result in embarrassment to the United States. It is urged therefore that certain tracts indicated be taken without delay from the control of the Hawaiian Government and secured to the future uses of the United States, and have them declared as reservations for military purposes.

An examination of map of Government and Crown lands on island of Oahu discloses the fact that all public land available for useful purposes is now beyond the control of the Government by reason of leases ranging from two to forty years. The low prices paid by lessees are out of all proportion to the value of the land; but possession by any other means than by condemnation would subject the Government to extortionate rates. The barracks and property of the military department of the Hawaiian Government are now occupied by the troops in garrison at Honolulu.

THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

The legal organization of the Department remains the same as at the date of last report, and, with the exception of two, all the officers are in the performance of their regular duty. The two officers excepted are Col. Theodore Schwan and Lieut. Col. Arthur MacArthur. The former, appointed a brigadier general of volunteers, is now serving in the Philippines as chief of staff of the Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, and principal assistant to the military governor in the Philippine Islands; the latter, promoted last year to major-general of volunteers for distinguished services in the battle of Manila, is still in command of a division of troops operating in those islands.

THE MILITARY INFORMATION DIVISION.

All military technical publications, dispatches, etc., received from abroad have been noted and properly classified, and communications written in foreign languages, addressed to the War Department, have been translated.

The preparation for press of a French-English military technical dictionary was begun, and the first part—A to E—printed and distributed.

A number of Spanish law books have been translated. This work, requiring skill and careful research, amounts to some 3,000 typewritten

pages. The translated titles of these books are: Instructions for Drafting Public Documents for Record; Law of Criminal Procedure; Civil Code; Organic Law; Part of the Penal Code; Blank Forms of Mortgage Regulations; Alien Law; Administration Procedure; Law of Civil Procedure; Law on Copyrights, Trade-marks; Civil Administration, etc.

The following is a list of the publications since those enumerated in the last report:

No. 21. Military notes on Cuba.

No. 22. Staffs of various armies.

No. 23. Observations abroad.

A French-English Military Technical Dictionary, by C. De W. Willcox, first lieutenant of artillery, U. S. A. (Part I, issued).

No. 24. Explorations in Alaska.

No. 26. Autumn maneuvers in Europe in 1898 (in press).

In the map section the following work has been accomplished:

Map of Porto Rico, 1: 150000 (1 sheet).

Map of Porto Rico, 1; 126720 (3 sheets).

Index to proposed progressive military map of Porto Rico.

Theater of military operations in the vicinity of Manila; scale 1: 1000000.

Theater of military operations in Luzon, 1899; scale 1: 198000 (2 sheets).

Carta General del Archipelago (?) Filipinos, republished from Spanish chart.

Plan of Manila, showing Spanish defense.

Province of Manila, with section of adjacent provinces; scale, 1: 100000.

Index to map of the Philippines.

Outline military map of Cuba; scale, 1: 200000.

Railroad and index map of Cuba.

Plan of defenses of Havana.

Map of country between Mariel and Cardenas, Cuba: scale, 1: 63360.

Bird's-eye view of Havana and vicinity.

Map of Alaska military reconnaissance of 1898; scale, 1: 380160.

Map of Alaska military reconnaissance of 1898; scale, 1: 180000.

Map of the Hawaiian Islands (in preparation).

Many maps and charts have been mounted by the draftsman for the use of officers of the Army, and numerous minor sketches, illustrations, etc., required in the publications issued have been prepared.

During the past year the map files have been increased by the addition of over 1,900 sheets.

Photographic Collection for War Album.—In reply to a circular dated December 12, 1898, sent out from this office to officers and men carrying cameras during the war with Spain, there have been received over 500 negatives and 300 prints of Porto Rican subjects, over 700 negatives and nearly 400 prints of Cuban and reserve camp subjects, and nearly 150 negatives of Philippine subjects, from which something like 350 Porto Rican, nearly 500 Cuban, and a few Philippine subjects have been chosen to make the final selections for an album, and these negatives and prints were then returned to their owners. There are still on hand from which to make further selections over 200 Porto Rican negatives, 350 negatives and nearly 700 prints of Cuban and reserve-camp subjects, and over 600 Philippine prints.

The work so far has been to make selections from the negatives and prints sent in, which are usually very small. The ones selected are

then enlarged to the size of 11 by 14 inches. After having collected and enlarged everything desirable, it is the intention to retouch these enlargements and then make negatives from them for the purpose of making the final pictures. This is necessary on account of the small size of the negatives and prints received, and on account of the poor quality of most of them, as they have been taken under disadvantageous circumstances, often by persons inexperienced in the handling of their cameras, and at times under circumstances when it would have been impossible to have taken any other kind of pictures. After as much material as can be obtained has been gotten together, the final compilation will be made.

This work is regarded as of importance, having already served to determine disputed questions. It is thought that in time the collection will be of such value as to induce the Congress to publish the same for distribution to libraries throughout the country.

MILITARY ATTACHÉS.

The following is a list of the military attaches at the several embassies and legations abroad:

Embassies.—London, Col. Samuel S. Sumner, Sixth United States Cavalry; Mexico, Lieut. Powell Clayton, jr., Fifth United States Cavalry.

Legations.—Berne, Capt. George R. Cecil, Thirteenth United States Infantry; The Hague, Lieut. Col. James N. Whelan, Seventh United States Cavalry; Copenhagen and Stockholm, Lieut. Col. William R. Livermore, Corps of Engineers; Lisbon, Capt. Stephen L'H. Slocum, Eighth United States Cavalry.

The following officers have been directed to proceed to the Transvaal to witness the operations there, and the courtesy of the British Government to be extended to them has been requested through the State Department: Col. Samuel S. Sumner, Sixth United States Cavalry; Capt. William W. Gibson, Ordnance Department; and Capt. Stephen L'H. Slocum, Eighth United States Cavalry.

Attention is invited to the remarks submitted in the last report relative to the necessity of granting increased rank and pay to officers while serving abroad as military attaches. This is due to the dignity of the nation they represent, the importance of the duties of the position, and simple justice to officers splendidly equipped professionally, but who may not possess sufficient pecuniary means to sustain their representive character.

THE MILITARY ACADEMY.

The number of officers and instructors on duty September 1, 1899, was 62, viz, 7 professors, 1 associate professor, 51 commissioned officers, 1 chaplain, 1 sword master, and 1 teacher of music.

The present academic year opens with 357 cadets, the largest number entering any one year. Of this number 3 are foreigners, who receive instruction at their own expense under special authority of Congress. During the year 113 cadets were separated from the Academy—23 for deficiencies in studies, 2 for deficiency in discipline, 2 for physical disability, 3 were dismissed, 11 resigned, and 72 were graduated. The number of candidates admitted during the year was 145, including 2

foreigners. The health of the cadets on the whole has been good. The exceptions were an epidemic of influenza, which attacked the battalion during the winter, and an outbreak of scarlet fever during the summer. These outbreaks demonstrated the inadequateness of the present cadet hospital accommodations, there being no isolation ward for treatment of infectious diseases.

The following recommendations of the Superintendent are concurred in:

For construction of south wing of Cadet Hospital building, and for building for treatment of definite cases of contagious diseases.

That the cadets be placed on the same footing, with respect to pay, as cadets at the Naval Academy.

That the band be increased to 40 musicians by permanent transfer of the 16 men now temporarily assigned.

That increased barrack accommodation be provided for Company E, Battalion of Engineers.

That steps be taken to secure Long Pond, which will be necessary for an increased water supply, in the event of any considerable enlargement of the Academy.

That the War Department approve to Congress the estimate for the remodeling of the West Point Hotel.

That the War Department approve to Congress the estimate for a building for a bachelor officers' mess.

The further recommendation is made that the West Point detachment be discontinued as enlisted men and a like number be employed by the Quartermaster's Department to perform the labor now done by this detachment. It does violence to all rules of discipline to make common laborers of any enlisted men; particularly is this so under the eyes of cadets who are so soon to become commissioned officers. It has long been the opinion of those who have given the subject thought that there should be a model military post at West Point, composed of not less than two troops of cavalry, one light battery, one battalion of infantry, and one company of engineers. The subaltern officers of these organizations should, in addition to their other duties, serve as assistant instructors of their several arms of service. The beneficial effects of this proposition are too manifest to call for further statement. An appropriation for the erection of buildings to meet this recommendation is respectfully urged.

Under probable future conditions the number of cadets authorized at the Military Academy will not supply a sufficiently large graduating class each year to fill the vacancies in the grade of second lieutenant. It is recommended that the number of cadets at large, to be appointed by the President, be increased to ten annually, the number formerly authorized, and that, in addition, two cadets at large from each State be provided for by law. This would require some additional expense, but as the Academy is already established upon a liberal basis the increase would be comparatively small. The conditions confronting the Department at the present time do not give much room for hope that the service schools can be again put in operation in the near future; the wisdom of providing large classes of highly trained cadets to fill the gaps constantly being made by the new and severe service in which the Army is now engaged can not be questioned.

COLLEGE DETAILS.

The demand for officers with their regiments has been so great that it has been found inadvisable to make any college details from the officers on the active list. Under recent laws, as construed by the

Comptroller, that officers of the retired list can receive full pay while on college duty if detailed under section 1225, Revised Statutes, and the laws amendatory thereof, it is expected that the full details from this class of officers will soon be made to all colleges formerly supplied from the active list of the Army.

POST EXCHANGES.

The military operations of last year, together with the delay in the receipt of reports occasioned by the scattering of the regular regiments, many of whom were on foreign station, rendered it impracticable to embrace a report of the operations of post exchanges during that year. The operations of two years are therefore included in this report. The work of these exchanges so far as the regular regiments are concerned has been fulfilled in a satisfactory manner. Some considerable criticism has grown out of the operations of certain regimental exchanges in the volunteer regiments due to a variety of causes, mainly in a disregard of the regulations governing their establishment and maintenance. It is very probable that a great majority of the exchanges in the volunteer regiments from the several States were limited to the canteen feature and to the sale of beer, which is directly contrary to the principle of the exchange system. The mustering out of these regiments, together with the recent act of Congress which prohibits the employment in the canteen section of the exchange of any officer or enlisted man, as well as the prohibition of the sale of beer on any military premises by persons not connected with the Army, has relieved the War Department from an embarrassing situation and at the same time has placed the post exchange on a more satisfactory basis.

During the year ending June 30, 1898, the aggregate receipts of the exchanges in operation in the Army amounted to $1,621,398.67, and there was received as money on deposit $189,258.81, making the total amount of money received $1,810,657.48. There was expended for merchandise purchased, rent, fixtures and repairs, and expenses of operation $1,297,737.16, which, less deposit, gives a profit of $323,661.51. From this amount there was donated to the funds of the several regimental bands $9,154.51; to the maintenance of post gardens, $1,559.17; to post libraries, $640.06; to gymnasiums, $2,913.75; as prizes for the encouragement of athletic sports, $3,338.11, and after setting aside the sum of $60,877.58 as a reserve fund to meet anticipated expenses for at least one month, there was returned to the members in the form of dividends the sum of $254,890.93.

During the year ending June 30, 1899, the aggregate receipts of the 80 post exchanges and the 34 regimental exchanges in the Army, so far as reports have been received, amounted to $1,609,492.33, and the expenditures $979,012.26, which, less deposit, gives a net profit of $399,588.27. From this amount there was donated to the funds of the several regimental bands $5,563.09, to the maintenance of post gardens $1,089.74, to post libraries $1,121.55, to gymnasiums $1,527.07, to athletic sports $1,312.18, and after setting aside the sum of $104,008.03 as a reserve fund, there was returned to the members in the form of dividends the sum of $275,580.74.

The aggregate receipts of the post exchanges therefore during the past two years has been $3,420,149.81, and the dividends $530,471.67. The net value of these exchanges—that is to say, the balance of their combined assets over their liabilities—was on June 30, 1899, $253,792.26.

PAY OF NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS.

Attention is invited to the remarks on this subject submitted in the last report. The class of men that can be secured for the military service and retained in it depends largely upon what a man who enlists can reasonably aspire to, for the men in any calling have aspirations, and the best men are the ones most needed in each. While the tempting offer of a commission to enlisted men who should be found to possess the requisite qualifications has no doubt greatly stimulated the enlistment of bright and capable young men, the prize can only be gained by comparatively few, and the rank and file of the Army derives no appreciable benefit, but rather loss, by the separation from it of the successful men. What is more especially needed are men who will develop into first class noncommissioned officers and who are willing to remain as such. In order to secure this desirable class and keep it the positions must carry with them emoluments and privileges to which such men will aspire, and the corollary of this proposition is that the conditions of our service demand more pay.

THE RETIRED LIST FOR ENLISTED MEN.

By the act of Congress approved February 18, 1885, a retired list was created for the benefit of enlisted men of the Army who should have completed a faithful and honorable term of service for thirty years. This well-deserved and beneficent enactment has not proved, however, full relief to worthy soldiers in the ranks, by reason of the length of the term of service exacted. The average man is seldom physically qualified to serve so long. It is, therefore, recommended that the law of February 18, 1885, be amended so as to allow the retirement of enlisted men, on their applications, after twenty-five years of faithful service.

INDIAN PRISONERS.

There are still at Fort Sill, Okla., 278 Apache prisoners of war, of which 62 are men, 100 women, and 65 male children and 51 female children. The confinement of these Indians by the Government as prisoners of war dates from the year 1886, when various bands of Chiricahua, Mescalero, and War Springs Apaches, under the leadership of such chiefs as Geronimo, Chichuahua, Chatto, and Naiche, surrendered and were sent east to Fort Marion and Fort Pickens, Florida, and later in that year, together with other members of the San Carlos and White Mountain Apaches, under Mangus, were removed to a point on the military reservation at Mount Vernon Barracks, Ala. In 1892 46 other Apaches were sent from New Mexico and Arizona to join the party, and in October, 1894, 305, being the whole number in captivity at that time, were sent to Fort Sill, Okla., where the climatic conditions were more suitable to their habits and physical welfare.

The officer in charge of these Indians (Lieut. F. H. Beach, Seventh Cavalry) reports them as prosperous, well disciplined, and contented, engaged in stock raising and agricultural pursuits, and living in villages well policed and in excellent sanitary condition.

GENERAL COURTS-MARTIAL.

For various reasons a better class of men are now entering the ranks than formerly. In consequence, cases calling for the action of general courts-martial are comparatively rare; and the great majority of those

which do occur, while beyond the jurisdiction of the inferior courts, are not of the graver kind, or such as require the expulsion of the offenders from the service. Ever since the commencement of the late war with Spain it has become a matter of extreme difficulty, owing to the paucity of available officers, to organize general courts martial. It is also a fact that punishment in order to be efficacious must be prompt, and that under the most favorable conditions the proceedings involved in a general court martial trial consume considerable time. Hence it frequently occurs that men offending—such as are found drunk on duty, commit minor acts of insubordination toward officers, or have been absent without leave for prolonged periods—either receive only the inadequate punishment that an inferior court may impose, or escape punishment entirely.

For these reasons it is found that there is an almost general agreement among officers of large experience that the sphere of garrison and regimental courts should be so extended as to give them jurisdiction of the class of cases not capital, and to confer on them power to award sentences of confinement at hard labor and forfeiture of pay for not more than four months; also to empower commanders of separate battalions to institute courts of like jurisdiction. The composition of such courts as now provided for need not be altered. The effect of the proposed legislation could not fail to be beneficial. General courts martial would be instituted on rare occasions only: all except the gravest offenses would be promptly disposed of with a minimum of expense, delay, and the discipline of the Army be confirmed.

GOVERNMENT HOSPITAL FOR THE INSANE.

The following is a list of persons committed to the Government Hospital for the Insane, under the order of the Secretary of War, from September 1, 1898, to September 1, 1899:

Officer of the United States Army	1
Officer of the late Volunteer Army	1
Enlisted men of the United States Army	78
Enlisted men of the United States Army (retired)	2
Enlisted men of the Volunteer Army	48
Late soldiers of the Volunteer Army	4
Total	134

THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE.

No change has occurred in the legal organization of the regular clerical force of this office, but the large volume of business has made necessary a continuance of the temporary force first authorized by Congress in May, 1898. One hundred and seventy-five temporary clerks are now employed, a force barely adequate to the dispatch of business, but limited, of necessity, by the scant accommodations available. The strength of this temporary force is not at all proportionate to the work resulting from a tenfold increase of the military establishment during the Spanish-American war, nor even to the fourfold increase made necessary by circumstances since the disbandment of the Volunteer Army. The labor involved in the muster out of nearly 200,000 men and the organization and recruitment of the twenty-five regiments of United States Volunteers has taxed this office heavily.

The temporary force has largely consisted of people without previous knowledge or experience in handling military papers, thus charging chiefs of divisions and their principal assistants with the task of

training and instruction. The death last winter of Mr. David E. Holmes (then chief of the division of mail and record) and of Mr. Benjamin Engel, two of the oldest and most valuable clerks, was a loss greatly felt. Praise is especially due to all the chiefs of divisions for valuable assistance afforded by their efforts and judicious handling of the personnel and business of their respective divisions. Older clerks have denied themselves even a short period of rest, and have remained at their desks, for the past eighteen months, regardless of hours, eager to lend all the assistance possible to the success of the work in hand.

An amendment is suggested to the law governing leave of absence that will permit of an accumulation of leaves of absence from year to year, available to meritorious clerks, who, under the stress of office work, forego the leave to which they are entitled; and thus provide an opportunity for these clerks to obtain leave of which they are deserving, for recreation or recuperation, without loss of pay.

In accordance with section 8 of the act of April 28, 1898, directing that, upon the disbandment of volunteer organizations, the records pertaining to them should be transferred to the Record and Pension Office, there has been transferred to the present time records pertaining to 62,109 volunteer soldiers.

In the division of orders, books, blanks, etc., it is estimated that during the past year 5,530,000 blanks of all kinds, blank books, and books of instruction were issued to the Army, which were mailed in 32,689 packages. One thousand three hundred and forty-eight boxes of records and colors were received from the several discontinued commands, of which 974 boxes were transferred to the Record and Pension Office.

To the officers on duty in this office—Col. Thomas Ward, Lieut. Col. William H. Carter, Majs. H. O. S. Heistand, John A. Johnston, and William A. Simpson—acknowledgment of faithful service is made of record. Also to Mr. R. P. Thian, the chief clerk, and Mr. W. S. Coursey, private secretary.

ARTILLERY SERVICE.

The condition of the artillery service, especially of the seacoast, is not altogether satisfactory. It has been a question for many years as to whether or not a change in the artillery organization is not demanded to meet the new conditions. Many millions have been expended in the preparation of our extensive seacoast for defense. A magnificent armament of modern guns and mortars has been installed from Maine to Puget Sound. It is not probable, nor perhaps necessary, that a sufficient number of troops to garrison all the artillery posts, and man all the guns, be authorized by law, but a sufficient number should be always with the colors to insure the armament being kept in working order, so that in the event of war the guns could be operated. It is believed that the time has arrived when the artillery branch of the service should be reorganized and the field artillery separated from that engaged in the coast defense. The consensus of opinion of artillery officers is that the regimental organization does not fulfill the requirements of the service. It is recommended that the regimental organization of the artillery be abolished and that a corps of field artillery and of seacoast artillery be provided for, separate and distinct from each other.

The question of centralizing the defenses of harbors at one post and furnishing small details for the detached posts in time of peace is believed to be in the direction of economical administration. In any

event, the immense cost of keeping up the seacoast defenses makes it necessary that the subject should be taken up and some method devised by which the armament can be kept in proper condition, and the troops ready to man them in time of war, at the smallest cost possible to the country.

It would seem reasonable that if the seacoast artillery should be organized with a properly graded corps of officers and enlisted men, assignable to the various posts in accordance with the requirements of the service, it would be better than the present regimental organization. A battery of the large disappearing guns requires an entirely different number of men to man it than are required to man the mortar batteries.

The distribution of the artillery forces which this plan would admit of would enable some scheme to be devised by which the Quartermaster's Department could regulate the construction of the public buildings necessary at each seacoast post.

One of the principal difficulties met with in this construction during the past two years has been the variable size of the battery of artillery, the term battery being used to indicate the companies of men that man the various batteries. The number of men authorized in each battery has varied from 65 to 200, and now is 120. It is quite evident from this variation how difficult it is to construct quarters without great extravagance and at the same time meet the demands.

The corps of field artillery, which would include mountain and siege guns, would be as efficient, if not more so than now, when attached to regiments with which they seldom serve.

RÉSUMÉ.

On the passage of the joint resolution approved April 20, 1898, demanding that Spain relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba and to withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, the Army of the United States consisted of 2,143 officers and 26,040 enlisted men.

Under the above resolution and the act of April 22, 1898, the President issued a proclamation April 23, 1898, calling for 125,000 volunteers. This was followed on May 25, 1898, by a proclamation calling for 75,000 volunteers.

The approval of the act of April 26, 1898, increased the Regular Army to 63,106 men, to be reduced at the end of any war to a peace basis, namely, to 26,610 enlisted men. Meeting this instruction of the Congress, the men enlisted under the above act (practically for the war with Spain) were informed, in General Orders, No. 40, May 10, 1898, that they would be granted their discharge, if desired, at the close of the war upon individual application.

By the act approved May 11, 1898, Congress authorized, in addition to the volunteers provided by the act of April 22, the organization of a volunteer brigade of engineers of not more than 3,500 men. The same act authorized the organization of an additional volunteer force not exceeding 10,000 men, possessing immunity from disease incident to tropical climates.

The protocol was signed August 12, 1898, and on September 5, 1898, the first organization of volunteers was mustered out of the service. This was followed immediately by orders for the muster out of nearly one-half of the Volunteer Army.

On the signing of the treaty of peace, April 12, 1899, it at once became necessary to muster out all the volunteer organizations, but,

as stated heretofore, the volunteers in the Philippines cheerfully remained and rendered service until the Government was able to send regular and volunteer regiments to relieve them.

The act of March 2, 1899, authorized the President to "enlist" from the nation at large 35,000 volunteers, or so much thereof as might be necessary. Under the same act Congress authorized the recruitment of the Regular Army to 65,000 men.

Under the act of March 2, 1899, authority was given the commanding general, Department of Porto Rico, to recruit a battalion of volunteers (400 men) from among the Porto Ricans, and such recruiting began on March 24, 1899.

On July 5, 1899, the President, through the Secretary of War, ordered the organization of ten regiments of volunteer infantry; on July 18, 1899, of two regiments of volunteer infantry and a regiment of volunteer cavalry (the three last-named regiments to be organized and recruited in the Philippine Islands); on August 17, 1899, of ten additional regiments of volunteer infantry; and on September 9, 1899, of two additional regiments of volunteer infantry (the enlisted men and company officers of the two last regiments to be colored).

The Regular Army is now practically at a maximum, as are also the volunteer regiments. The work incident to all these changes, brought about by the acts aforesaid, involving the enlistment of 238,500 volunteers; the increase of the Regular Army from 26,000 to 62,000; its subsequent reduction, and then again its increase to 65,000, necessitating numerous orders and instructions bearing on the same, to say nothing of the complete military record of every officer and man of this large force, threw upon this office work the magnitude of which can not be understood until undertaken. That this work has been done with accuracy and intelligence is now history. All credit is due to the assistants and the clerical force of the office.

The discharge of the volunteers in the Philippine Islands and men of the Regular Army there, under General Orders 40, 1899, as contemplated in the act of April 26, 1898, virtually left General Otis with only 4,410 enlisted men of the Regular Army that he could legally hold for service, thus practically tying his hands for any extensive or prolonged active operations. It is worthy of note that in the transportation of troops to and from the Philippine Islands record will yet have to be made of the loss of a single life by accident incident to travel. For this excellent work the Quartermaster's Department is entitled to great credit.

Since the occupation of the islands of Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines officers of the Army have been called upon to fill various positions connected with the administration of the civil governments thereof, such as military governor, collector of customs, treasurer, etc., and that they have performed these duties satisfactorily is fully attested by the results accomplished.

The law for the organization of volunteer regiments failed to make provision for chaplains. It was doubtless an oversight on the part of Congress. It is recommended that chaplains be provided for by law as soon as possible, as the presence of one with each regiment is deemed very necessary.

Later recommendations will be made looking to such legislation as the conditions of affairs may require.

Respectfully submitted.

H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.

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REPORT OF THE INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF THE ARMY.

WAR DEPARTMENT, INSPECTOR-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, D. C., October 6, 1899.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of this Department during the past year:

Since the rendition of the last report the changes in the military establishment have been marked. The conclusion of peace with Spain, the occupation of Cuba, and the war in the Philippine Islands have united to bring to the Army new conditions. The muster out of the volunteers in this hemisphere reduced largely the strength of the Army. The volunteers who have so gallantly served in the Philippines have been returned to this country, and will soon be mustered out. Their places have been partially taken by the regiments of the regular establishment, reorganized and recruited under the act approved March 2, 1899. Further provision for replacing these volunteers in the Philippines is now being made by the organization of thirteen regiments of the provisional army authorized by act of March 2, 1899. In view of the provisions of the act cited regarding the regimental organization it may be permissible to quote from the report of the Inspector-General to the Secretary of War and Major General Commanding, October 25, 1889:

> The three-battalion regiment, with four companies to a battalion and the regimental staff additional captains, suits our national characteristics, and no modern improvement is more absolutely and immediately necessary in our Army.

And to the report of Inspector-General to the Major-General Commanding, September 15, 1892:

> But the practical instruction of our infantry can never be what it should be until the organization of the regiment conforms to the tactical requirements of the day. Each regiment should have companies enough to form three battalions of not less than four companies if we expect to give thorough instruction in formations for attack and defense.

The views quoted were shared by trained soldiers and ofttimes called to the attention of the Congress. It required, however, the experience of war to bring about their adoption in the service.

In all these changes this Department has stood ready to do its share toward strengthening and improving the Army, and it has been the earnest desire of the Inspector-General to have the officers of the Department used to the fullest possible extent for this purpose in order that all details, both of personnel and equipment, semipermanent camp or transportation by land or sea, might be carefully observed and promptly reported upon.

PERSONNEL.

The Inspector-General's Department has shared in the changes of the Army. At the time of the last report the strength was 10 officers of the regular establishment, 3 of whom were classed as a war increase, and, under the law, were to be absorbed after peace was declared; and 8 lieutenant-colonels and 19 majors of volunteers.

The act of March 2, 1899, made permanent the 10 officers of the regular establishment, and provided for the 3 lieutenant colonels and 6 majors of volunteers, who are now in the Department.

As indicating the wide scope of duty performed by members of the corps, it may be noted that two officers of the regular establishment are now general officers of volunteers; one is doing duty in the office of

the Assistant Secretary of War, in charge of Cuban census; one is under orders for duty as inspector-general, Division of Cuba; one as inspector-general, Department of Pacific and Eighth Corps; one in Porto Rico; one inspector-general, Department of the East; and the Inspector-General and two officers are on duty in the central office in this city.

Of the volunteer force, one lieutenant colonel is inspector-general, Department of Dakota; one inspector-general, Departments of California and Columbia, and one was collector of customs at Manila until very recently, when he fell a victim to typhoid fever.

Of the majors, four are on inspection duty abroad; one is military secretary to the commanding general at Manila, and one is judge-advocate, Department of Porto Rico.

Five of the officers are, therefore, on duty other than their legitimate inspection duty. This, while a tribute to the all-around ability of the officers of the Department, renders necessary the detail of officers from the line to take their places; and the persistent obstacles in the way against this are interminable and sometimes almost comical. There are now on duty as acting inspectors-general 7 officers of the line, of whom 3 are on duty abroad, and 4 at various military departments in this country. We have, then, at present, a total of 25 officers, regular, volunteer, and attached for service with the Department, 20 of whom are available for inspection duty, 5 being on detached service; and this is a decided improvement upon the condition which recently existed.

That this force is inadequate to the demands upon the Department is shown by the frequent necessity of detailing special inspectors. If the inspection service is to be complete and thorough it should be done by officers who are detached from all local interests in other departments or branches of the Army, and free from any reasonable anticipation of serving under the officers afterwards whose affairs they are now called upon by public duty to inspect and report upon.

Experience is of great value, and a wide acquaintance with the service and its conditions makes the recommendations of any inspector of greater benefit to the authorities and to the service. For these reasons, and in order that there may be made the complete, careful inspection of the Army, which experience of all countries shows is necessary to the highest development of military power, it is earnestly recommended that this Department be increased by 3 colonels, 3 lieutenant-colonels, and 3 majors, making a total of 18 subordinate officers. This force would be none too large to enable the Department to perform its legitimate duties in connection with the line of the Army, make the required inspections of methods of the disbursement of Governmental funds, and generally be the eyes and ears of the Secretary of War and the Major-General Commanding in connection with the military service, bringing to their notice prompt and carefully authenticated knowledge of the conditions and needs of the armed forces.

When workmen are taken from their work it naturally suffers. With only 19 officers commissioned to inspect 100,000 men, $270,000,000 of disbursements, and over $2,700,000 property, and with Generals Hughes and Lawton, Lieutenant-Colonels Sanger and Miley, and Majors Murray and Sharpe—about one-fourth of the officers commissioned in this Department—performing other duties instead of our own, the results to inspection duty, might easily be anticipated even with the most earnest support and assistance from all our comrades, which is habitually given our work by the marching regiments of the line. And

the past year may possibly be long memorable in army circles, not only for the unbounded glory so well won at the front, but also in the minor key, concerning the struggle for the best care and supplies for the troops that won them. Of course this was always desired and intended by all, and there was no one who wished them to suffer; but all, from highest to lowest, were enthusiastic and tireless in their behalf. And to many it may still appear that despite the lack of peace practice of mobilization by which all other nations acquire skill in guarding their suddenly summoned soldiers from undue suffering in the field, there was at no time or place any more discomfort than the soldiers of every army must expect to undergo at some stage of their career, and particularly under similar circumstances in war; and that the abundant, even lavish, provision for every want and the absolute and comparative lack of all excessive suffering or deaths or disease is one of the marvelous and most marked features of the conduct and conclusion of this short, sharp, and decisive war which has effected such a sudden revolution in the American destiny and duties. Indeed, what was done was accomplished so easily that in some places it may have assumed some of the characteristics of peace practice not in face of the enemy, though most important in educating the present generation in the requirements for war.

TRANSITION TO WAR.

Regulars.

The events embraced within the last fiscal year have brought every branch of the service to the actual test of war. The battles of San Juan and El Caney opened the fiscal year; and the honors universally accorded to the fighting force have proved the efficiency of the methods employed for the military training and discipline of the companies, and have demonstrated the adaptability of the Americans to every requirement of military life. The past year suddenly brought new and unmeasured responsibilities, special expenditures, extensive outfits, and enforced familiarity with unwonted experiences in far distant fields of service with new Asiatic and tropical environments. It has now become a historical record, affecting the fame of our country, how the exigencies of organization, mobilization, campaign, battle, and military government have been met by men who were hurried from the plains to the tropics, and to the other side of the world, men who at the beginning of the previous fiscal year were endeavoring to elevate and protect our fierce aborigines, then just striving to enter into some experience in our ways of labor and in our prevailing civilization. In the broadest view the military results have been almost phenomenally successful, almost revolutionary to the national policy and career, and perhaps not less exacting and instructive on land than the supremely glorious achievements of the Navy, which mark the epoch and render it the cynosure of every eye.

Some day a careful and dispassionate study of every detail should, and probably will, be made of all that relates to the soldier and his trade in this Spanish war by the men who were actually on the firing line and in the forefront of battle, whether belonging to some technical branch or to the line; and then it will be clearly known how the current of events and the methods of movement and care and supply appeared to those who most pointedly, and not unintelligently, felt the effects of either the excellence or remissness displayed. Then the record and the events may appear to be more nearly in juxtaposition and not separated by half the world, so the same soldierly spirit can actuate both. Indeed, this phase of feeling has already found expression in

more than one book. In the meantime, and without any comparison with others who have played their part so admirably, it should be recognized how largely the burden of field work fell upon the regular company officers; who not only had the duties of their grade to perform, but were assigned by the score to every type of duty, both of the line and staff, and civil duties; while the simply superb organizations were subsequently swamped with untrained recruits, and indeed filled with them again and again, until it seemed miraculous, though the recruits were particularly admirable, that the characteristics of distinguished organizations could be so long retained despite such circumstances. How different this is from calling to the colors, as other civilized nations do, reserves trained for war in the very organizations they rejoin, all perfectly equipped at the outbreak of hostilities, is evident to every thinking mind. And it becomes us to consider that there are other qualities quite beneficial in war in addition to enthusiastic patriotism, intelligence, and admirable individual qualities; and it may be worth our while in view of the portents of destiny drawing close upon us to make a serious effort to keep our Army secure in constant possession of every quality that leads to reliability and victory. Extreme fluctuations in the training of the men from perfect excellence to perfect greenness may doubtless be adequately guarded against if desired.

Before this war regimental organizations were comparatively little recognized in military administration. This radical change from the habitual to the legal unit of supply upon the outbreak of hostilities is a noticeable feature deserving attentive consideration, and may be fundamental to our bureaucratic system and overburdened force. Even the companies may feel its effects. But the regiment is universally recognized as the unit of administration for war, and everything should be done to insure efficient and experienced regimental commanders and staff and confirm them in their legitimate duties and accustom the men to their methods and personal equation, especially in the first swift stages of war; though the calls for officers are so great elsewhere that the percentage must be quite small of regular regiments which went to the assault on the first day of the past fiscal year under their own colonels. This is one of the many fruits of maintaining a merely skeleton military organization without an organized and prescribed system of reserves and mobilization. To compare this situation with a similar grade in our sister service, what would be thought if nearly every ship at Manila or Santiago had gone into action without its captain? Certainly such a situation would be exceptional and not the rule in warfare by the Regular Navy on the sea. How ought a similar and essential contingency to be provided for or avoided on land?

If our Army practiced the art of mobilization annually every feature and requirement would be thoroughly prescribed and organized and be as familiar a characteristic of military training with us as with foreign countries, and as perfectly and easily done as company drill. The only thing that prevented this fundamental preliminary practice in times of peace was lack of money. It depends wholly upon the appropriation bill. Within the decade all that could be done simply at the posts has been carefully and instructively carried out, so that military problems and minor tactics have become familiar as household words at the Western posts, and the junior officers were generally thorough masters of their art. And years ago General Miles had given out the problem for one post to assail the force at another throughout the department he then commanded, so that the instruction was not confined to a single post, but embraced two; and one year there were larger camps,

commands, and maneuvers for actual practice and instruction at Chickamauga under General Merritt, and at Camp Crook under General Brooke, where a brigade or more was assembled. How inadequate and infrequent this united experience was, and how earnest and persistent were the efforts to continue and extend it, and what were the obstacles that proved insurmountable, and how even the inadequate field equipment was reduced, are doubtless evident to all and well understood, at least in the Army. The National Guard also had its experiences, and had accomplished a most commendable work of instruction.

As usual in our wars we have experienced some of the effects of lack of preparation (though probably fewer ill effects than ever known before), and with customary intelligence and energy have remedied defects and overcome obstacles as they appeared, even in the very face of the enemy, if need be. And those who have had the burden to bear have borne it cheerfully and well. But ought we to allow this to remain our habitual system, with the discomforts and expense it involves?

How much had been done in advance to make model companies of regulars in all discipline, instruction, and care, by such captains as Fornance, who laid down his life at San Juan, or Dodd, who still pursues the even tenor of his way after doing his full duty in those scenes, may perhaps never be fully appreciated outside of the service; and the full effects of the admirable service schools have not yet been fully reaped. They can not be too promptly rehabilitated. The country is awakened to military needs, which are something more than liberal expenditures or calling out untrained troops in the hour of need; and the problem that presses for attention is something more than for the present. The problem of the future has also to be met, and should be met wisely and well.

As an indication how our arrangements met the actual exigency of war, it is noticeable that the general commanding at Santiago was and is stationed in San Francisco, and the general at Manila in New York. Whether the Navy had assigned their commands in relation to the contingency that actually developed is doubtless also historically interesting.

Volunteers.

Our wars have been habitually fought by the volunteers, and the Spanish war was not an entire exception to this rule, though the per cent of regulars among the first to reach the front during this last struggle was perhaps as great or greater than in any of our previous wars. Some days before the call for volunteers was issued most of the regular regiments had already been ordered to points in the South, principally Chickamauga Park, Ga.; Tampa, Fla.; Mobile, Ala., and New Orleans, La., and as soon as the 200,000 volunteers called for by the President's proclamations of April 23 and May 25, 1898, and the sixteen regiments of volunteer engineers, cavalry, and infantry were mustered into the service of the United States, they, too, were rapidly concentrated at the same points, and at Camp Alger, Va., and San Francisco, Cal., and together with the regulars formed into seven army corps. The First and Third corps were organized at Camp George H. Thomas (Chickamauga Park), Ga.; the Second at Camp Alger, Va.; the Fourth at Mobile, Ala.; the Fifth and Seventh at Tampa, Fla., and the Eighth at San Francisco, Cal. The Sixth was not organized.

The mobilization of so large a force, which by the close of May numbered nearly 170,000 men and received an increase of over 100,000 more during the next three months, was no unimportant task (even though

under the well-practiced mobilizations of Europe they can turn out millions of men perfectly equipped in the same length of time without any undue sacrifice or discomfort), and its successful culmination under adverse conditions seems no less marvelous than our glorious achievements on land or water, which overshadowed all other events.

From legislative action to the final muster out every step was comparatively new to the participants and an experiment; and the arrival of regiments unarmed or half armed, or of regiments needing clothing and other supplies, was one feature, and the organization of expeditions by water to tropical islands in different oceans was another, illustrating the difficulties that seemed almost insurmountable: and much that was accomplished may have appeared to be done under telegraphic or hurry orders, meeting every exigency. American ingenuity and energy and perseverance triumphed then, and will again, whether we profit by the past or begin all over again in the next emergency. But no matter how large our resources, our duty in the premises is plain. The foremost powers of the European continent have every step thought out beforehand for every possible emergency, and we should do no less. Our experience has been varied, covering wars fought on land and on sea, at home and abroad, and doubtless some day the wisdom of the axiom "Si vis pacem para bellum" will dawn upon us. Let us therefore anticipate and be prepared in time.

The habit of concentrating inexperienced soldiers in large camps or requiring new legislation for every important step may entail serious delay or unnecessary suffering from camp diseases, which are more to be dreaded and guarded against than bullets. The past has now indicated what preparatory practical instruction is essential for war and also the absolute necessity of continuing beyond the day of signing the treaty of peace some organized force at the point of contact with the enemy to maintain order and clear up the debris of war. If it takes more than a fortnight to prepare the muster out papers, the trying time at the close of service should not be made more disorganizing by the uncertain and unsettled questions of soldierly duty about the date of discharge. How strongly this condition bore upon some of the organizations sent upon the Texas expedition at the close of the civil war may be remembered still by some who were there.

To discipline and teach a man to take care of and be kind to himself requires far more effort than to learn the manual of arms or battalion drill, especially when the whole regiment is green. Without previous experience one can not be expected to learn in a minute how to overcome natural obstacles as merely a matter of instinct and habit, especially while mastering the heart and rudiments of a new trade, and living in such crowds and inconveniences as to seem almost an exaggerated state of nature, with such unfamiliar words as sanitation, castrametation, or logistics, recurring and pressed upon the attention of each separate command until at last the sickness of many plucks out the heart of the mystery, and all find they are seasoned to a new business and instructed veterans in the soldiers' trade. If under the military law, general drill regulations, and the annual appropriation bill, this mobilization and practice was regularly provided for in times of peace, much misery and expense would be guarded against in the only practicable way. Now that the need is felt is perhaps the only time that the attention of Congress can be attracted to such questions; but, like the Arkansas traveler, it may be felt that war is no time for it and in peace there is no need of it.

When I visited Chickamauga Park, in May, 1898, among thirty-three volunteer regiments, representing eighteen States, from Maine to Mississippi and westward to Kansas, there were reported 40.6 per cent raw recruits, 34.4 per cent soldiers with less than one year's military training, and only 25 per cent with over one year's training. The military experience was mostly had in the National Guard, but there was also a sprinkling of men in these regiments who had served in the Regular Army or graduated from military colleges. So it seems about half were practically recruits, and perhaps but few of the other half had ever been in camp under conditions simulating war. But the splendid intelligence and physique made up for any deficiency, and the almost complete absence of foreign born element was notable; over 91 per cent of the enlisted men being native born. And the officers, too, were an exceptionally fine body of men, cultured, and eager to learn their new duties. About 6 per cent of them had seen service during the civil war or in the Regular Army and about 8 per cent were graduates from military schools. No finer improvised army could well be gotten together in so short a time; but the endless details and paper work and worry from the date of the legislative authority of April 22, 1898, creating the Volunteer Army, to the final muster out, which was first ordered August 18, 1898, and had not yet been finally completed on September 30, 1899, may never be fully appreciated. Every step was new and every step met new conditions; and while the mustering out process was going on twenty-five new volunteer regiments were being recruited under the act of March 2, 1899.

It seems almost an anomaly to muster out regiment after regiment of trained men and at the same time endeavor to create new regiments not wholly from the material thus discarded. From the 200,000 State and 16,000 United States volunteers enlisted for the Spanish war it seems enough men were not secured for the twenty-five new regiments recruited under the act of March 2, 1899, for service in the Philippines; but as only about 40 per cent of the men in these new regiments have served previously, the per cent of mustered out volunteers reenlisting must fall below 8. This subject may deserve further study and consideration in future legislation affecting the military establishment.

We should endeavor to send only trained men to the front; and how to accomplish it with the best results is one of the problems before us. But when everything is considered, it is hard to see how our Army, whether regular or volunteer, could have done better. And in the enthusiastic desire to serve their country the splendid young, and not least the college men, who left their books and associations to face unknown dangers, should not be forgotten. The military instruction so wisely fostered by the Government served them and the country well. Over one fifth of the 15,000 or more young men under military instruction at over 100 colleges throughout the United States abandoned their pursuits and joined the Army, almost every one of them competent to perform the functions of an officer. So far as reported, 97 graduates of these colleges were commissioned in the Regular Army and over 700 received commissions in the volunteers during this war—enough to officer seventeen regiments.

Under our peculiar military system it is our duty to disseminate military instruction and knowledge among the masses; but our first attention seems due the National Guard and these colleges which furnished about half the volunteers or their officers, and we should do for them the best we can—far better than we ever have done.

CHRONIC ABSENTEEISM.

The law of March 2, 1899, provides that for each Regular Army officer of a staff corps or department who may be retained in or appointed to a higher volunteer rank in said staff corps or department than that actually held by him in the regular establishment there may be appointed one officer of volunteers of the lowest grade provided for such staff corps or department, but no appointment shall be made which will increase the total number of officers, regular and volunteer, serving in any grade, above the number authorized. While this relieves the staff departments to a large extent, there are no provisions for replacing staff officers who have been promoted to general officers or assigned to other duties. In the Inspector-General's Department, where about 25 per cent of its officers are detected to other duties and about 10 per cent have their health affected, the lack of inspectors is severely felt.

But the burden falls heaviest in war upon the regimental officers. As in the civil war, the Regular Army is seriously suffering from necessary absenteeism, inadequately provided for by law. Then we had an unlimited number of additional aids de-camp, up to the rank of colonel, and a provost-marshal's and other corps authorized by law, which necessarily gave some relief. But even then absenteeism was sorely felt and regular companies were sometimes left without an officer, and this corps could not but feel it with such gallant and distinguished officers absent from inspection duties as general officers or otherwise, as Marcy, chief of staff in the Army of the Potomac, and Mansfield, mortally wounded at Antietam, and Buford at Gettysburg, and Baird and McCall leading divisions. General officers who can insure victories must, wherever found, be borne to the front where needed and given the men and quality of officers they need around them, let whatever else suffer that may. But it would be wise if provision was also made to adequately fill the gaps thus created as good soldiers step in to fill the gaps in war; and the system adopted for such an essential purpose should be definitely crystallized in our permanent military laws, so hereafter the first year of war will find every proper contingency as well provided for as any subsequent period.

Perhaps it is useless to dwell on this evident military necessity which has been, if not habitually disregarded, still in some respects apparently inadequately met in our military legislation or history, though everyone not only means well, but earnestly desires the Army to be wisely organized and liberally provided for. Whatever is expected of the Army, it will duly perform, however hampered. And something more than wealth and sympathy is needed to provide and care for it. The Biblical injunction to soldiers is to "be content," so it may be difficult to learn from the best what it is they need or why they suffer, as they are apt to try to make the best of things. Certainly the appropriations and expenditures in the midst of actual war seem more than liberal; and when the Congress unanimously voted $50,000,000, placed wholly in the President's hands, with an utter obliteration of party lines, but all for one common country, it deserved to be written down as a red-letter day, illustrating well-placed confidence and a true spirit. Such incidents and sentiments accomplish wonders and more than repay for any previous lack of forethought or perfect organization. The intelligent energy then aroused makes good all deficiencies in due time and we are now beginning to feel the full benefits and uplift of the spirit of

that hour. Witness the prompt inspection by your order and favorable reports upon the present volunteer regiments, compared with the slow movement and slower results of a year ago. The change may almost appear phenomenal.

The necessity for reforming an army in the midst of active operations, from a military point of view, is one that should be most carefully guarded against and not lightly treated. In our history this practice has more than once been the bane of our military operations and situation, and perhaps some alleviation or remedy could be found for it. How disintegrating, demoralizing, and subversive of discipline the practice is needs no prophet from the tomb to teach us. A newborn child is not ready for the battle of life and it is almost cruel to force him into the midst of it, nor can he wholly replace his older brother in the family circle, even the one that is dead. Our new volunteer regiments, with about 40 per cent of ex volunteers enlisted in them, which is perhaps some 5 per cent of those just mustered out, may possibly not have to illustrate the same experience of replacing experienced organizations with inexperienced at some critical period; but as compared with a perfect military system, does it not appear that there is some flaw in this enlisting and discharging phase of our practice that produces undue difficulties and uncertainties in the field, and unnecessary suffering or discomfort to the soldiers and injury to their efficiency and to military operations? Evidently these newborn regiments do not possess immediately all the training and military qualities well won in the face of the enemy by the old ones disbanded.

General Sherman said, concerning certain Northwestern regiments, and the way they were recruited, instead of the usual way of raising entirely new regiments:

> The greatest mistake in our civil war was in the mode of recruitment and promotion. When a regiment became reduced by the necessary wear and tear of service, instead of being filled up at the bottom, and the vacancies among the officers filled from the best noncommissioned officers and men, the habit was to raise new regiments, with new colonels, captains, and men, leaving the old and experienced battalions to dwindle away into mere skeleton organizations. I believe with the volunteers this matter was left to the States exclusively, and I remember that Wisconsin kept her regiments filled with recruits, whereas other States generally filled their quotas by new regiments, and the result was that we estimated a Wisconsin regiment equal to an ordinary brigade. I believe that 500 new men added to an old and experienced regiment were more valuable than a thousand men in the form of a new regiment, for the former by association with good, experienced captains, lieutenants, and noncommissioned officers, soon become veterans, whereas the latter were generally unavailable for a year. The German method of recruitment is simply perfect, and there is no good reason why we should not follow it substantially.

If a general law can be passed now for the proper preparation for the recognized exigency of a declaration of war, it would save much suffering among the new troops and be far more timely and efficient and wise than if we wait till the wolf is at the door. Even in purchasing the absolute necessities of life for a soldier, it has been found necessary in the midst of war to repeal the law compelling disbursing officers to advertise a month for bids.

In this connection the remarks of the Acting Inspector-General, of May 28, 1898, on the chronic absenteeism so inadequately provided for in our wars may be recalled:

> The experience of the civil war demonstrated the great importance of establishing reserves for all organizations in the field as a means of maintaining them in a state of efficiency. The annual casualties per thousand due to active service, as shown in the Report of the Provost-Marshal-General at the close of the war, page 102, amounted to a little more than one-third the aggregate strength. This included

the men detailed from companies for duty in the various staff departments and reported absent.

According to a statement in the Washington Morning Post of the 25th instant, the number of sick due to fevers, etc., among unacclimated soldiers serving in Cuba is estimated by native physicians as likely to be two-fifths of the entire force, or 40 per cent. From sickness alone, therefore, the number incapacitated for active service will approximate 400 per 1,000, to which, unless the administrative services be organized, we must add at least 12 per cent for details, making a total of 52 per cent, or 520 per 1,000, withdrawn from the fighting force.

It is not likely that many of the volunteers who go into hospitals will ever return to duty again, so we must be prepared to furnish within a short time after the army lands 520 men per 1,000 to cover losses by sickness and details. Conservative foreign estimates place the number of killed and wounded in the most sanguinary battles of modern times at not to exceed 16⅔ per cent, or 166.6 men per 1,000, so that if the army of invasion meets with the most serious resistance, the losses will not probably equal that number, after a landing has been effected; but they should be provided for nevertheless.

The great danger to be apprehended from a campaign in tropical climates conducted by unacclimated soldiers is the sudden depletion of companies and regiments to the point of inefficiency, which, unless we have means of rapid replenishment, would bring offensive military operations to a standstill. A few days and nights of exposure may do this despite all sanitary precautions. How shall we provide against these losses?

Just as at the commencement of the civil war, the only territorial limits of recruitment recognized in the law recently enacted organizing the Volunteer Army are the States with their great difference in area and population. The State system, without company or battalion districts, or regimental depots, proved an entire failure during the civil war as a means of supply. Regiments soon dwindled to mere detachments, and voluntary enlistments under the supervision of the governors of States gave place to the draft under the supervision of the Government.

It would seem of great importance, therefore, in the prosecution of this war to avoid the well-known errors of the last war, and establish as far as practicable, a system of recruitment in harmony with the best military experience of the age, and fully adapted to the necessities of the military service in this country.

The system of almost universal adoption, even in England, is that of company districts and regimental depots, coupled, on the Continent, with compulsory service as distinguished from voluntary service, which is the case in England and here. The district system is by no means new even in this country, and, although now a dead letter, was established by law in 1792, and will be found in section 1626, Revised Statutes, as follows:

"It shall be the duty of every captain or commanding officer of a company to enroll every such citizen (that is, between 18 and 45 years of age) residing within the bounds of his company, and all those who may, from time to time, arrive at the age of 18 years, and under the age of 45 years, come to reside within his bounds."

Thus, at the very beginning of our history as a nation we adopted what has since become the recruiting basis of every civilized army in the world. This law should now be given effect as far as practicable, districts should be formed and joined to regimental depots, which in turn should be the links connecting the regiments to their respective States. If company districts are found to be infeasible, then battalion, or even regimental districts might be substituted, although company districts are unquestionably better than either battalion or regimental districts, and have the advantage of being now authorized by law.

The districts and depots should be conducted under the supervision of regimental commanders by officers and noncommissioned officers of the regiments with which they are connected. A complete descriptive list of every member of a regiment should be kept in the districts or at regimental depots, and to the latter should be sent all regimental recruits, convalescents, deserters, furloughed men, paroled prisoners, stragglers, and, in fact, every other member of the regiments, batteries, etc., absent from the army in the field. At regimental depots they would be known, their exact status determined and recorded, and they would be sent to the front, brought to trial, discharged the service, or otherwise disposed of as the best interests of the service might suggest. Under this system the depot becomes an unfailing source of supply to the regiment. It is the place where the recruit is instructed and equipped and to which when he leaves the field he should return. It is the place to which, in the absence of direct and reliable news, his family and friends turn for information concerning him; those who wish to join him in the field by enlisting there are able to do so, and he is at all times under the supervision and control of officers most interested in his discipline, instruction, and faithful military service, and in the efficiency of the organizations upon which such service depends.

Whenever regiments fall below 10 per cent of their strength, colonels should be authorized to send to the depots direct for the required number of men, who should

start for the field at once under care of their own officers or noncommissioned staff, all without circumlocution of any sort.

What a relief such a system would be to the already overburdened office of the adjutant-general, and how fully it would meet the requirements of the service.

If something of this kind be not done, and the war continues, we will soon develop all the evils of the voluntary system under State control which proved an entire failure during the civil war, and will again, if tried. Agents of the United States under the military control of the Government can alone be depended on to perform such duties. The governors act by request as representatives of "sovereign States;" the others act under orders, and are responsible with their commissions and lives for the faithful performance of their duties.

Recruits enlisted to fill State quotas without reference to regiments and companies may, and probably will, be sent among strangers. If disabled or otherwise separated from their regiments, or lost sight of, they will lose connection with their companies, their families, and their friends, and they will be one despondent, and desert, or remain away indefinitely, lost to the colors in some camp or hospital.

It was under the State system that absenteeism and desertion grew to such vast proportions during the civil war. As the inevitable result, convalescent camps, camps of distribution, city rendezvous, State and general hospitals under the control of surgeons or the Surgeon-General of the Army and not under military commanders, were established and soon filled with thousands of idle men, good and bad, the zealous, faithful, and patriotic, as well as the shirk, the skulker, and bounty jumper. In these establishments the identity of the men was often lost, and consequently desertion as well as every form of absence likely to destroy the efficiency of the army in the field was vastly facilitated.

To counteract these evils, resort was had to large camps of instruction, notably at Annapolis, where it was proposed to assemble troops of all arms to the number of 20,000, commanded by general officers with a competent staff of instructors. But they proved a failure owing to the demand for reenforcements, and the troops then assembled went to the field without the much-needed discipline and instruction so easily given to individual recruits at regimental depots.

The evil of raising new regiments in place of filling old ones resulted directly from the absence of regimental depots, although it is probable that the dispensation of State patronage had much to do with it. Still it is certain that had the old regiments been maintained at their full strength there would have been no pressing necessity for new ones. The same may be said now.

The authorized strength of the Army is—

Regulars	62,000
Volunteers, under calls from States, 125,000, 75,000	200,000
Volunteers, special	16,877
Total	278,877

exclusive of volunteer signal corps.

The sphere of operations will embrace the island of Cuba, Porto Rico, the Philippines, and the United States. Assuming that we will need 100,000 men for Cuba, 25,000 for Porto Rico, and 35,000 for the Philippines, the remainder, or 118,877 men, will be available for service along the seacoast and frontier, and as regimental reserves. Of the latter there should not be less than 25 per cent of the entire force, or 69,719 men.

Apropos of this subject, I venture to suggest that of the 75,000 volunteers just called for 12 per cent be enlisted for the administrative departments of the Army, so that no details for such purposes need be made hereafter from the fighting force.

These views are partly the result of my own observation and experience, but are in some measure the views of the late Maj. Gen. E. Upton, a profound student of our military institutions and policy.

DISBURSEMENTS.

During the past year 682 inspections of the accounts of disbursing officers, involving $325,382,177.71, were made by officers of this Department, which is by far the largest amount inspected in any one fiscal year since these inspections were authorized by law in 1874, and may indicate one phase of the increased amount of work incident to the increased military establishment. A report of the operations of this Department during the past year pertaining to the inspection of disbursements and to inspections under Army Regulations, 867 and 868, are shown in Appendixes A and B, respectively.

SICKNESS IN THE ANTILLES.

Santiago will long have a special interest to Americans, and in connection with the report of the inspection of that department and the outbreak of both yellow fever and smallpox there, some extracts from the medical and other reports may possibly be quoted as illustrations of the situation. In my report I said:

The men who enlisted only for the war can doubtless be discharged soon enough for many of them to escape the worst results of the insanitary dangers to which they are subjected. In Porto Rico their appearance does not give the same impression of struggle against disease. It seems a balmier climate and more contented scene. Indeed, the insurrection in Cuba may have given not only to its war and politics, but even to existence, this consciousness of intense struggle. Almost all the soldiers in Porto Rico were in barracks.

The overcrowding of some of the hired quarters and the occasional presence of typhoid fever (some talk of a peculiar type, which kills in comparatively a few days), and the presence of smallpox and possibility of epidemics, may account for the prominence and usually abundant supply of hospitals apparent in both islands, which appeared particularly complete and perfect in the departments of Porto Rico and Santiago; and some reference is due to how much the soldiers are also indebted to the trained female nurses and the Red Cross work and supplies, and that of other organizations, like the Daughters of the American Revolution and certain religious denominations, which seem to be a boon wherever they appear. And special attention is deserved for the great struggle still in progress against not only such epidemics as smallpox and yellow and typhoid fevers, but also the more insidious malaria, and occasionally against venereal diseases. The most dreaded are not always the most deadly. Such unusual diseases seen among civilians as leprosy, elephantiasis, yaws and their congeners, can hardly escape mention.

The outbreak of disease on each island when the troops first arrived during the wet season suggest what is to be anticipated or successfully guarded against during the repetition of like conditions, unless these conditions, by careful provision, may possibly be radically changed or modified favorably.

At the hospital at Guantanamo were noticed several cases of hæmaturia, which seems to be one of the more fatal symptoms in malarial cases surgeons have had to contend with in that locality, and no cases of this character were seen in Porto Rico.

It is with regret that the information as to the sick, which has been asked for from every accessible authority, seem still to be so meager.

The tables which have been submitted in the preliminary reports, such as concerned the Fifth Infantry at Santiago, or the monthly averges for Porto Rico, may indicate the considerable fluctuations in the sickness that have occurred. These, of course, will be watched hereafter with interest. But the loss of 50 per cent of the Spaniards, despite their admirable barracks, gives an indication of what is the threatening outlook before us.

[Extract from report of Brig. Gen. Leonard Wood.]

Yellow fever.

Our experience with yellow fever in Cuba has been that of all nations who have dealt with it intelligently, i. e., we have found it to be a disease of the towns, developing in damp masonry buildings with earthen and masonry floors; that the points of infection are in the towns themselves, and that any amount of precaution will not prevent infection of barracks and hospitals which are situated in these old towns. We have found also that it is a disease which can be most readily checked by isolation, sanitation, sunshine, and plenty of fresh air.

[Extracts from report of Maj. Valery Havard, chief surgeon, Department of Santiago.]

Military hospital.

The military hospital having been left very dirty and dilapidated by the Spaniards, vigorous work was at once begun to place it in a suitable condition to receive our sick; this was successfully accomplished, and early in September the field hospital was abandoned and its remaining sick transferred to the military hospital, which from that time became the general hospital of the department. The decision to use this hospital, in spite of our knowledge that it had been crowded with Spanish patients and possibly infected with yellow fever, was not reached without much deliberation and the full assent of the general commanding the city and the department commander. It was believed it could be successfully disinfected, and time has justified our belief.

Arrival of immune regiments.

While the Fifth Corps was embarking for the United States, several regiments of United States volunteer infantry, or so-called immunes, were arriving in the department, the Second early in August, then the Third, the Fifth, and the Ninth, all landing at Santiago, while the Fourth arrived somewhat later at Manzanillo. These regiments had been raised in the hope that a larger majority of their members would be yellow-fever immunes and could safely spend the summer in the Tropics; as a matter of fact, very little attention appears to have been paid to this question of immunity by recruiting officers, and from inquiries made of captains I doubt whether there were more than an average of three or four true immunes in each company. Subsequent experience showed that these regiments suffered as much as other troops from tropical diseases.

Mercedes Barracks.

As it was intended to quarter the Fifth United States Infantry in the Mercedes Barracks, a large comfortable brick and stone structure, which Spanish troops had previously occupied, and during the war transformed into a vast and crowded hospital, measures were at once taken to clean, disinfect, and repair them thoroughly; a large number of Cubans were employed on this work until November, when the regiment, or as much of it as could be accommodated, moved in. There was no room for the regimental hospital, which was kept outside under canvas; later this hospital was done away with, and patients needing hospital treatment were conveyed directly to the general hospital, an objectionable course which later caused the infection of the general hospital.

Third Immune.

The Third Immune was assigned to Guantanamo and surrounding places, where it likewise suffered very much from malarial fever; there, also, the camp of the three or four companies at Guantanamo was on what seemed an ideal site, a high, sandy plateau, sloping gently to the east, with a deep river on the west and north, preventing any flooding of camp grounds; but in this camp malarial fever was as rife as anywhere, and often of a pernicious type.

Yellow fever existed among Spanish troops, and between September 1 and December 2 attacked 16 of our men, causing 10 deaths, none of the cases originating in camp. It is worthy of record, and another indication of the difficulties surrounding the etiology of the disease, that, although Guantanamo was pretty thoroughly infected last summer, no case developed there this summer, while Manzanillo, which had no previous history of infection, was only saved from an epidemic this summer by the prompt evacuation of the barracks.

About 1,300 cases of smallpox had been treated and 12,000 people vaccinated.

It was found that in all cases where soldiers had been buried without being placed in box or coffin, and they were the vast majority, nothing but bones remained. These were gathered in a sheet and dipped into a strong solution of corrosive sublimate, then placed in sawdust impregnated with the same solution; casket and box were then disinfected on the outside.

This work continued for nearly two months, or until 1,091 bodies—that is, all but those buried at the Bay Yellow Fever Hospital—had been exhumed. As the season was then too far advanced, a large number of filled caskets could not be transported to the United States, and are now kept in a shed, under proper guard, on the western shore of the bay.

It is a most remarkable and melancholy fact that of the bodies buried during the active period of the campaign and up to the time of reembarkation of the Fifth Corps, 134, or over one-fourth, when exhumed bore no name and gave no clew to their identity. This was specially the case on battlefields. Thus at El Caney there was a solid row of 40 unknown soldiers; but it also occurred at some of our hospitals, notably the large field hospital first established near General Shafter's headquarters, where the necessary time and trouble to mark the graves should have been taken. One of the unhappy results of this large proportion of unknown dead was the great number of inquiries made by anxious relatives and friends which could not and will never be answered.

This deplorable condition shows the necessity of adopting the German system of identification, the only effective one, whereby each soldier on being mobilized for a campaign is made to wear a medallion on which are engraved name, home, rank, and regiment, suspended from a chain tied around the neck. So long as the skeleton endures, this medallion will remain fastened to the spinal column and yield its information.

Improvement of hospitals.

From the time we entered the general hospital commenced the active work of renovation and modernization, and this never ceased until the day when yellow fever compelled our evacuation. Bathrooms, water-closets, etc., were attached to each ward, pipes and sewers laid, old underground drains clogged with filth opened, torn up, and filled in.

The general work of sanitation throughout the province is well known and needs no description here. It is especially in the city of Santiago itself that it was carried out with system and thoroughness, under the supervision of four medical officers whose principal duty was to make house-to-house inspections.

Yellow fever in 1899.

The careful, every-day cleaning of Santiago had led us to hope that yellow fever would probably not break out this summer except, perhaps, in a few sporadic cases of mild type, but we were doomed to disappointment.

On June 15 an American civilian was found with yellow fever (black vomit) in a dirty lodging house, where he had slept for several weeks, in Enramadas street; he was conveyed to the yellow fever hospital, where he died the next day, the post-mortem confirming the diagnosis.

On the 16th 5 enlisted men from the Fifth Infantry, under observation at the general hospital, were also taken to the yellow fever hospital—2 from the band quarters, 1 from the guardhouse, 1 from the commissary storehouse, and 1 from the city. On the 17th another case occurred in the guardhouse; on the 18th 1 more in the guardhouse and another in some other part of the building. It had become almost certain that the Fifth Infantry barracks were infected in several places, especially the guardhouse and band quarters.

Officers and soldiers were not the only sufferers in this epidemic. American civilians, mostly Government employees, and a few Spaniards were likewise attacked, cases occurring in hotels, lodging houses, and even private houses, so that by the end of July at least a dozen distinct foci of infection could be traced.

A cause of great concern to the medical department was the infection of the general hospital, produced by the cases brought to its isolation and observation wards from the Fifth Infantry barracks. The grounds were so extensive that such course seemed justifiable, but it was running a risk, which events showed to be an unreasonable one. The general hospital was accordingly vacated early in July, and it has been determined, with keen regret, not to occupy it again as a military hospital, but to turn it over to the city as a civil hospital.

To the several reasons advanced to explain this epidemic, such as the disinterment of yellow fever bodies, the digging of streets to lay pipes, etc., I am not inclined to attach much importance.

In my opinion there is no such thing as acclimation in Cuba for North American soldiers; a few months, or even a year or two, will give them no immunity whatever against tropical diseases, and may benefit them only by teaching the absolute necessity of temperate habits. Only one thing immunizes against yellow fever, and it is an attack of the disease. Malarial fever prevails all over the province, and no white or colored American soldier is safe against it; it decreases somewhat in the winter months, but much less than had been expected, while altitude, if more than 300 or 400 feet, has a distinct effect upon it. All American troops coming to Cuba at any season will suffer more or less from malarial fever and other tropical diseases, especially if camped under canvas, being then exposed to many great and sudden changes of temperature; thus, during the winter, the Fifth Immunes, in tents, had a rate of sickness at least twice as great as that of the Fifth Regulars, in barracks. It seems possible, by building comfortable barracks on high and salubrious sites, to reduce malarial fever to a minimum of 3 or 4 per cent. As to yellow fever, it may break out in any town in spite of all ordinary precautions, and soldiers can only avoid it by remaining in the country, either in barracks or in tents.

NATIONAL HOME FOR DISABLED VOLUNTEER SOLDIERS.

The annual inspection of this important and constantly growing institution was made by Maj. C. H. Heyl, inspector-general, accompanied by Mr. W. T. Kent, accountant of the Inspector-General's Department, and occupied the time from August 9 to November 12, 1898.

This was the first inspection of the Home under paragraph 866 of the Army Regulations as amended by General Orders, No. 56, Headquarters of the Army, May 27, 1898, which provides that this inspection may be made by any officer of the Inspector-General's Department, instead of by the Inspector-General in person, as was previously the case.

The inspection showed that a praiseworthy desire for an economic administration of affairs pervades the entire institution, that excellent results had been obtained, and that the officers of the various Branches had shown very commendable zeal and efficiency; that they have generally maintained a very satisfactory state of discipline, and that their efforts seem directed with kindly consideration toward the welfare of

the veterans as well as toward a strict compliance with the laws and regulations governing the Home.

During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899, the population of the Home, as shown by the trimonthly reports from all the Branches, ranged from 17,756 on July 10, 1898, to 19,671 on February 20, 1899, and the average population for the entire year was 18,835, an increase of 265 over the average for the fiscal year 1898 and of 657 over that for the preceding year, 1897.

The first members for the new Branch at Danville, Ill., were reported January 30, 1899, when 142 were present, and the membership of that Branch ranged from that number to 249 on June 30, 1899, and the average population for the period from January to June was 218. So the actual increase during the fiscal year at the other seven Branches was only 47. The wonder, however, is not that the increase at these Branches was so small, but rather that there could be any increase whatever, since the Homes have long been overcrowded, even with aged and infirm men sleeping in all kinds of out-of-the-way and unsuitable places. Many of the worthy veterans who desire to avail themselves of the benefits of the Home must necessarily be denied for lack of room and accommodations. It has often been pointed out that this grave difficulty might be overcome or ameliorated if means were provided for carrying into effect the outdoor relief already authorized by law, and very many of the worthy veterans themselves would hail such a provision with the greatest satisfaction. The fiscal affairs of the Home are shown in Appendix C.

Outdoor relief.

It is not understood that outdoor relief is in the same favor with the Board of Managers of the Volunteer Home as with the regulars, the latter having 32 per cent in 1898 of its members under this heading. But, if it should seem desirable, the following tabulation indicates the absolute amount of money turned into the surplus fund from the appropriations for the National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers from 1893 to 1897, and the number of men per year that could have been furnished outdoor relief, at $8 per month, by using the surplus fund alone, which amounted to nearly a million in five years:

Fiscal year.	Carried to the surplus fund.	Would furnish outdoor relief at $96 per year to —(men).
1893	$122,788.69	1,279
1894	182,313.64	1,899
1895	276,925.76	2,885
1896	223,751.52	2,331
1897	175,363.76	1,827
Total	981,143.37	10,221

Average, 2,044 men.

It is thought by some that the maximum membership of these Homes will not be reached in something like eight years, and the number of veterans unsuccessfully applying for admission is only diminished temporarily by the erection of new Homes which may not be needed long; but if outdoor relief, say of $8 per month, was offered in lieu of admission, it would be availed of not only by many now in the Homes, but also have a tendency toward reducing the number of applicants, thus more fully meeting an exigency necessarily temporary in character.

This expenditure seems to be warranted by section 4833 of the Revised Statutes, which is as follows:

The Managers of the National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers are authorized to aid persons who are entitled to its benefits by outdoor relief in such manner and to such extent as they may deem proper, but such relief shall not exceed the average cost of maintaining an inmate of the Home.

The plan has been tried and works admirably at the Regular Home and it is understood it is in vogue and considered with favor at several of the State Homes, and only requires authority to use the surplus already accumulating annually, as shown in the preceding table.

SOLDIERS' HOME, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

Under the act of Congress of March 3, 1883, the Inspector-General of the Army is required to make in person, once each year, a thorough inspection of the Home, its records, accounts, management, discipline, and sanitary condition, and make report thereof in writing. The last annual inspection was made during the week ending July 22, 1899, and report thereof submitted, accompanied by the usual exhibits concerning men, money, supplies, and other matters. A summary of the report is shown in Appendix D.

MILITARY INSTRUCTION AT COLLEGES.

The connection of the War Department with military instruction at agricultural colleges and State and private institutions of learning dates back to 1866, when Congress authorized the detail of twenty army officers to duty at colleges as instructors of military science and tactics. This number was gradually increased by various acts of Congress until now there are authorized for this duty 100 army officers of the active list and an indefinite number of the retired list, and under the act of May 14, 1870, arms and equipments were provided for these colleges.

In 1887 the first inspections by this Department of the military feature and organization of these colleges were made, which resulted in renewed efforts and a largely increased number of colleges giving improved military instruction under army officers. Since then inspections have been regularly made in the spring near the close of the college year, which was the most acceptable time, except in 1898, when the officers detailed had been previously withdrawn on account of being more urgently needed for active field service, and in 1899, because the lack of officers prevented a renewal of these details. But it is believed (and known in some instances) that the military organization and instruction, being firmly established and recognized as a valuable factor of education, was not discontinued altogether with the withdrawal of the army officers, which seems to have been accepted as a very temporary emergency. Two colleges only have been inspected at the particular request of their authorities, as follows: University of Wisconsin, at Madison, and Michigan Agricultural College, at Lansing.

The excellent work carried on at these colleges, where more than 15,000 young men annually received military training by a corps of experienced army officers, has not been without beneficial results; and the United States have been fortunate in having so large a field to select from in recruiting its forces, whether commissioned or enlisted. The material is superb, and none better can be found anywhere. It is sincerely hoped and earnestly recommended that some way may be

found, which will not interfere with operations in our new possessions, by which military instruction can be resumed under the supervision of army officers, and that representatives of these battalions be assembled in an annual encampment under perfect arrangements. The colleges desire it, and the Government can hardly afford to widen the breach which has already engulfed a whole school year and threatens another.

Would it not be well to give those officers a chance who, on account of wounds or disease or long service in the tropics, are in need of a change, but still capable or desirous of performing light duty? The minimum amount of work prescribed (vide General Orders, No. 93, Adjutant-General's Office, 1893) is only one hour per week for theoretical and two hours per week for practical instruction. There should be no difficulty in finding a sufficient number of capable officers who would prefer a detail of such light duty to enforced idleness. Our standing Army, which must remain the center whence military information emanates, is our main reliance for disseminating knowledge gained by practice and experience, and inculcating correct military principles and imbuing the young generation with patriotism and a martial spirit. The more young men we train annually in military affairs the stronger grows the nation as a military power, and the more reliable and commendable the care and conduct of the men in the ranks; and it is our traditional policy to rely upon impressing the people with correct military principles and knowledge.

INSPECTION SERVICE.

The departmental system of inspections which was inaugurated by General Orders, No. 11, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant General's Office, series of 1898, has now been in operation for about eighteen months. It superseded the six inspection districts into which the United States had previously been divided and which gave thoroughly satisfactory service in all that pertained to inspections and their central supervision, and insured intelligent and uniform methods with increased efficiency and beneficial results to the service. But all may not prefer such incisive and effective inspection, though it is believed that it did not arouse any new opposition among the regiments or companies of our organized fighting force.

If uniformity, efficiency, regularity, and completeness of inspections are desirable in the system of general inspection, it must be recognized that under the department system the department commander orders all inspections of matters under his immediate control, but the Secretary of War orders all other inspections, which cover many millions of dollars; and there is, therefore, a dual control which is liable to interfere with the prompt discharge of the duties imposed, and unconsciously hamper uniformity and effective supervision. When all inspections were prescribed in orders and regulations, which insured complete, thorough, and uniform annual inspections of everything and an effective central supervision, the good results of an unhampered inspection, under the closest touch and sympathy with the Secretary of War and Major-General Commanding, were very clearly demonstrated by experience, so that the military service has been particularly free from irregularities or aspersions where the general inspection has been directed by and reported only to the immediate superiors of this Bureau; and the evil results when this general inspection is obstructed or unduly hampered by others have been also demonstrated.

During the last lustrum it is believed that a thoroughly satisfactory and irreproachable method was adopted, at least, as far as the line of

the Army was concerned, in response to an appeal submitted to the Honorable Secretary of War; and perhaps some of the success then attained may again appear desirable. In an indorsement to the Secretary of War of July 15, 1889, from this Bureau it was stated that—

> Whatever pertains to general inspection in the United States military forces and War Department, the Inspector-General's Department is ready and zealous to do and asks to be wholly trusted with, and craves in doing it the assistance and support of all who wish well to the service. If we are to be excluded from our proper sphere of activity and responsibility or handicapped by inadequate or half hearted assistance the best results can not be expected. And this leads directly to an appeal to the Secretary to give this Department a moment's kindly thought and attention if he can make the time, and then give it the force, the amount and importance of its work demands, not only within these walls but everywhere the honesty and efficiency of the military service is most thoroughly established.
>
> Congress was asked to bestow some essential increase, and it was understood the Secretary, General Sheridan, General Schofield, and one or both military committees approved.
>
> The working force is so small that if it were doubled it still would hardly be noticed except for the good it may do.
>
> By its organization it is almost precluded from doing any harm, but may do good, and if improved and strengthened it can be made capable of much further benefit to all phases of the public service. The mere incidental statement early in this indorsement showing that the few officers in this Department have over a thousand regular inspections to make, located everywhere and including almost every military subject and incident, and often touching closely the honor or efficiency of the service, indicates these officers are not idlers nor untrustworthy, and yet these inspections are hardly half of what is or ought to be required of us.

Both the number and importance of these inspections have since been vastly increased.

The return to the departmental system of inspections at a time when we were on the eve of war seems to have been a step backward, and in the general readjustment may have been the cause of overlooking matters in the earlier stages of mobilization which should have had the attention of inspectors. It is the legalized fighting organization—the brigades, the divisions, the corps, and the Army—which deserves the first attention and assignment of inspectors. There was a general readjustment of officers and service throughout the entire military establishment during the preparation for war both in 1861 and 1898; and line officers were promoted and detailed to perform staff duties, and staff officers given command of troops with a higher rank in the Volunteer Army, as must always be expected in a skeleton army on declaration of war.

And in the matter of handling inspection reports it is found that the reports which do reach the office are not received so regularly or promptly as was formerly the case, and some have never reached this office, thereby making the records here incomplete.

In some cases reports of inspections made on the recommendation of the Inspector-General have appeared in the public press before they were received in the office of the Inspector General of the Army.

Can it not be fairly recognized that under the Secretary's immediate directions the inspection service and the reports thereof pertain to this Bureau, and that on it should rest the responsibility for a complete, prompt, and thorough general inspection of all branches of the military service, and the proper handling of the reports thereof as they are received in the War Department.

But where there is no central supervision of the work of detached officers there can be no certainty of uniform methods being used nor of equal attention being paid throughout the service to the more pressing details. Nor can a systematic, well rounded plan of inspections, applicable to all parts of the Army, be possible.

If the reports of the inspections are not all received in this Bureau,

there can be no complete record of the condition and efficiency of the Army available at all times for the authorities. Nor can it be expected that the defects and irregularities of the service, whether in disbursements, personnel, equipment, uniform, or transportation, will be promptly called to the attention of the Secretary of War and Major-General Commanding, if this department to whom this duty pertains is unable to get this information. However well done may be the work of the outlying officers, and however complete their reports and recommendations may be, the work is still not completely done, if no steps can possibly be taken looking to a general analysis and comparison with definite deductions therefrom as to what is needed for the good of the whole service; as decided by the Secretary himself.

Where this central supervision is lacking the work is individual only, and being exerted along several and possibly divergent lines, it loses force instead of gathering strength from the aggregation of effort as it comes together in the central office, there to be recorded and used.

It is earnestly recommended that steps be taken which will insure prompt rendition of inspection reports and their receipt in this Bureau, with as little delay as practicable.

Prior to the Spanish war the regular rendition of the reports had been absolutely assured, and the maximum delay in their receipt in the War Department was reduced to about as many weeks as it had been months; and similar excellence and promptness may again be hoped for now—when an officer on duty in this Department is assigned to every point and inspection duty receives their undivided attention without interference from other bureaus.

PROPERTY INSPECTION AND CONDEMNATION.

Care of public property largely decides whether extravagance or due care shall prevail in the public service.

Unserviceable property.

The total number of inventory and inspection reports received at this office during the year ending June 30, 1899, was 3,125, and 210, or 6 per cent, were made by officers of this department; 1,013, or 29 per cent, by officers assigned to the department as acting inspectors-general; 877, or 26 per cent, by inspectors-general of volunteers, and 1,325, or 39 per cent, by special inspectors.

Of the above inspections, 413 were made in Cuba, 132 in Porto Rico, 109 in the Philippines, and 4 in the Sandwich Islands.

Included in the special inspectors are the inspections made by the officers of the Quartermaster's Department (Col. D. D. Wheeler, United States Volunteers, 64, and Lieut. Col. F. H. Hathaway, United States Volunteers, 30). These inspectors were designated in compliance with the provisions of the act of July 7, 1898, entitled "An act to increase the efficiency of the Quartermaster's Department," which authorized the assignment to duty as special inspectors of the Quartermaster's Department officers of that Department with an increased rank of one grade up to colonel while so acting.

The intent of Congress by this act possibly is clear; but especially in conjunction with the remainder of the act it seems evident that the functions intended for these inspectors were those of examining and inspecting articles coming into the service, not going out. The law of 1825 seems perfectly clear on the subject of elimination of stores from the public service. No new law was necessary; and, taken in connection with the later law of April 20, 1874, providing for the inspection of money accounts, in which the same conditions as to inspectors are

attached, viz., that the inquiry is to be made (1) by officers of the inspection department of the Army (2) or others detailed for that purpose, it would appear that Congress recognized the importance of having such inspections made only by officers in no way responsible to the same bureau or corps, and this proviso was expressly added: "That no officer so detailed shall be in any way connected with the department or corps making the disbursement."

In this connection it may be well to add the conclusions of a former Assistant Secretary of War on this subject, which are as follows:

It is maintained as a cardinal principle of administrative policy that the elimination of public property from the returns of an officer responsible therefor should not be authorized without proper inspection by some officer entirely disinterested. * * *

It is a purely business proposition, so clear and simple, so evidently sound and right, that it is difficult to see how any honest public servant can oppose its application; and, so far as known, its wisdom has never been disputed. * * *

In any event, the law of July 7, 1898, was repealed by section 11 of the "Act for increasing the efficiency of the Army," approved March 2, 1899. This action seemed definite; yet these inspections continued and, as late as June, 1899, were being made by one of the officers as a "Special inspector of the Quartermaster's Department."

The inventory and inspection reports received at this office to June 30, 1899, indicate, from the fairest approximation possible, that stores to the value of $2,733,686.21 were examined by the different inspectors; that of this amount $2,418,076.27 was condemned and $315,609.94 retained in service. Is not this third of a million saved worth considering in view of the frequent efforts to avoid inspections while eliminating public property? The total amount offered for inspection shows an increase of more than a million dollars over last year, accounted for by the muster out of the volunteers and the exigencies of the war.

Considerable complaint has been made of the so-called "khaki" clothing furnished for use in the Tropics, which did not hold its color, apparently owing to inferior dye or goods; or which was cut scant and improperly sized, loosely made with bad thread, and deficient workmanship. In one instance probably all the so-called "khaki" clothing issued to a regiment was recalled after issue to the men and the price charged against them canceled. Possibly this was clothing purchased in the hurry of the war and the defects have been remedied and better clothing is now being issued, and the old material was essentially different to the khaki adopted for issue to the troops now.

It is noted that inspectors sometimes recommend the turning in to depot of worn clothing, with some such remark as "to be issued to general prisoners." In the crowded condition of the depots, where it is understood that everything is being pushed to its utmost to equip and keep equipped the large force of men raised under the present exigencies, it seems bad policy to accumulate worn material which probably will never be reissued, but which lies at the depot occupying valuable space until it is again placed on an inventory and inspection report and submitted to an inspector, thus making double work for the inspector, besides the clerical labor involved in preparing the returns and accounting for the property. It may be a better plan, if such clothing is required for general prisoners, that it be shipped directly from the place of inspection to the nearest post where prisoners are confined.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sanger, in his report of an inspection of one of the depots in 1897, says:

While the shipment of unserviceable supplies or obsolete articles to the depot from posts still continues and is most distinctly an evil to be abolished entirely, the prac-

tice is not so general or frequent as a year ago, and will no doubt cease entirely as the views of the Secretary of War and the Quartermaster-General become better known and the detail of special inspectors to act on unserviceable property is discontinued. I again renew the suggestion that orders be issued from the War Department providing for the inspection, destruction, or sale of unserviceable property at the place where it may be found and the sale or transfer to military posts of property which has been in use but is no longer required.

On the same subject, in the same year, Lieutenant-Colonel Vroom said:

In the examination of the unserviceable property submitted to me for inspection my attention was called to the fact that unserviceable and obsolete property is frequently shipped to this depot from military posts only to be condemned and sold or otherwise disposed of. For example, a quantity of old iron bunks was recently received from Fort Omaha, Nebr. These articles would no doubt have realized as much had they been sold at that place as they will here, and the cost of their transportation would have been saved to the Government. Four hundred and fifty one old bunk bottoms were also received from Fort Omaha, which were sold at once, by order of the Quartermaster-General, and realized $1.50. The cost of their transportation from Omaha to St. Louis is, of course, a dead loss to the Government.

Major Moore said:

I found a large quantity of obsolete and valueless property on hand, such as large horse and mule shoes, tools, etc., which should be sold, as they will never be of any use in the service.

And in the last inspection report of Schuylkill Arsenal, made by Maj. T. T. Knox, inspector general, June 6, 1899, the following appears:

It is understood that the turning in to this depot from posts of obsolete or unserviceable property has been reduced to a minimum, but authority is still given to turn in from posts such clothing and equipage, not needed, as may be in a serviceable condition. While many of these stores may be considered serviceable, they are not new or issuable; and it is suggested in future, where authority is granted for the transfer from posts of supplies that are not needed, that they be issuable as well as serviceable.

The condemnations of subsistence stores made during the year approximately cost, as shown in the reports received, $91,089.99.

Among the condemnations since the beginning of the war to the 30th of June, 1899, are: Bacon, 110,808 pounds; beans, navy, 6,978 pounds; bread, hard, 102,661 pounds, 244 cases and 304 boxes; corn meal, 11,558 pounds; crackers, 2,153 pounds; flour, 405,820 pounds and 5 sacks; macaroni, 15,888 pounds; oat meal, 4,204 pounds; onions, 87,160 pounds; pork, 10,988 pounds; potatoes, 271,853 pounds; rice, 3,834 pounds; sugar, 30,695 pounds; tomatoes, 117,842 cans of different sizes; probably considerably more was disposed of which never got on an inspection report.

Nine hundred inspection reports, in 147 volunteer organizations, of property for which officers directly connected with these organizations were accountable, were received during the year, and property which approximated in value $363,550.67 was eliminated from the service. Four hundred and eighty six of these inspections were made by inspectors general of volunteers, 361 by special inspectors, 46 by acting inspectors general and 7 by the regular inspectors of the Department.

Two hundred and two inspections of engineer property were received to June 30, 1899, 1 by inspectors general of volunteers, 16 by regular inspectors, 60 by special inspectors, and 122 by acting inspectors general. Last year 168 inspections were made, all by officers connected with this Department. The 60 inpections made this year by special inspectors were made by the division engineers, under authority contained in letter from Adjutant-General's Office of January 14, 1899, as published in General Orders, No. 1, Headquarters Corps of Engineers, January 18, 1899.

Perhaps it may be questioned whether it is wise or good business policy to assign men already overburdened with technical work of the highest character, like these division engineers, to the performance, additionally, of a duty so clearly pertaining to another department; and the remarks under quartermaster's supplies seem equally applicable here.

To more fully identify this class of property, and to keep it separate and distinct from the appropriations which pertain directly to the Army, it is recommended that accountable officers habitually stamp or write the appropriation to which it pertains on each inventory and inspection report.

Public animals.

Six thousand seven hundred and thirty-seven public animals were offered for inspection during the year, and 5,578 were condemned, and 1,159 retained in service. Many were sold without such inventory and inspection reports. If the law requires modification, so that a regular method can be adopted, the various methods resorted to during the Spanish war may illustrate some one way that can be accepted as best for all Government property. This aspect of the case was hardly decided during the previous investigations by Congress of the sale of property or its destruction when no longer needed.

The cavalry horses offered for inspection, included in the above figures, number 2,734; 2,427 were condemned and 307 retained in service.

In the volunteer service, 954 cavalry horses, aggregating $83,400.38, the average price of which was $88.47 when purchased, were eliminated from the service.

The spectacle of an officer inspecting and condemning property for which he was accountable is presented in this connection, and consisted of 479 horses, which cost, when purchased, $29,458.50; 464 of which were recommended sold.

One hundred and thirty seven artillery horses were inspected during the year, 120 of which were condemned.

Perhaps the Quartermaster's Department can tabulate the cavalry and artillery horses condemned during this year, showing the age, length of service, cause of condemnation, etc., though the disturbed condition of the Army in consequence of the late war caused little attention to be paid to details. But enough data has been collected from former years to demonstrate to a reasonable degree of certainty that in time of peace the average age at condemnation of a cavalry horse is between 13 and 14 years, and in the artillery the average appears to be slightly under 12. The average reported length of service appears to be near six and a third years, and is a trifle longer in the artillery than in the cavalry.

In the cavalry 21 per cent of the animals condemned in the last three years were for old age, 18 per cent for lameness, 10 per cent for being runaways and vicious, and 6 per cent were stated as broken down.

In the artillery, 21 per cent for lameness, 18 per cent for old age, and 8 per cent for being stove up.

A tabulated statement for the three years is shown in Appendix E. The largest number of horses seems to be condemned in the second year of service and seventh year of age.

SALES AT AUCTION.

The act of March 3, 1825, entitled "An act to authorize the sale of unserviceable ordnance and military stores," states that stores which

are damaged or otherwise unsuitable for the public service shall be sold, "upon proper inspection or survey," whenever in the opinion of the President "the sale of such unserviceable stores will be advantageous to the public service." As to the proper application and interpretation of this law the opinion of the Judge-Advocate-General has been recorded twice:

First, as to certain property at the Leavenworth Military Prison, as follows:

Section 1241 of the Revised Statutes provides that "The President may cause to be sold any military stores which, upon proper inspection or survey, appear to be damaged or unsuitable for public service." This section is the reenactment of the statute of March 3, 1825 (4 Stats., 127), entitled, "An act to authorize the sale of unserviceable ordnance, arms, and military stores."

And in regard to which Attorney-General R. B. Taney (to whom the question had been submitted by the President) said:

"After the passage of this law and the regulations made under it, I think it evident that no sale of ordnance, or iron, or stores of any description can lawfully be made without the order of the President, upon proper inspection and condemnation as therein directed, and according to the regulations of the War Department on this subject above referred to." (2 Opinions, 582.)

That opinion clearly answers the question as to how unserviceable stores may be legally disposed of, and is, in my opinion, as applicable to-day as it was when written.

This property should be submitted for the action of an inspector. (February 7, 1895.)

Second, as to certain transportation or animals sold in Cuba and Georgia, as follows:

The Constitution gives to Congress the "power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States," and it is well settled that no public property can be disposed of without the authority of law, either by an express act of Congress for that purpose or by giving the authority to some Department or subordinate agent. Congress has given authority to "cause to be sold any military stores which, upon proper inspection or survey, appear to be damaged or unsuitable for the public service" (sec. 1241, R. S.), but no authority to sell military stores which have not been condemned as unserviceable, and the sale of the mules in question was therefore illegal. * * * (September 12, 1899.)

Laws may be silent in war, even without the necessity which knows no law. And however they obtained "proper inspection or survey;" one third fewer horses were inspected for condemnation by officers of this Department in 1898 than in 1896, as shown by the table in Appendix E.

The matter of the amount paid to auctioneers should also be regulated, as it ranges from 2 per cent to 10 per cent of the gross receipts of the sale; and in one instance the sum of $238.50 was paid to an employee of the Government for one sale which probably took less than a day to consummate.

I reiterate the recommendation that a uniform blank should be authorized for use of the different branches of the service in reporting these sales. These reports are auxiliary to the inventory and inspection report blank, which is universally used by all. They are required to accompany the form for rendering accounts of sales of old materials which was prescribed by Circular No. 6, Treasury Department, Comptroller's Office, January 9, 1897, and in several respects an universal form, one that establishes a direct line from the elimination of the stores by condemnation to their sale by auction and the deposit of the money in the Treasury, seems needed.

A comparative table is given below showing the number of reports,

number of animals sold, and the amount received from such auction sales, this year and last:

Designation.	Number of reports received.		Number of animals sold.		Net amount received from sales.	
	1898.	1899.	1898.	1899.	1898.	1899.
Quartermaster's Department:						
Cavalry and artillery horses	221	179	720	1,747	$11,128.77	$51,109.76
Mules and draft horses			308	1,561	6,036.60	103,458.27
Quartermaster's supplies					14,082.39	47,198.48
Commissary Department	23	16			266.21	656.14
Engineer Department	45	19			5,914.15	5,017.10
Medical Department	33	14			1,204.75	106.57
Ordnance Department	2	1			2.00	2.00
Signal Department	1				1.00	
Total	325	229	1,028	3,308	38,635.87	207,548.32

ARMY AND NAVY BOARD.

The advantages of a proper cooperation and cohesion between Army and Navy, whether in peace or war, must be apparent to all. These great Departments of the Government were created for a common purpose and with a similar object in view—the defense of our country. What to do and how to do it, to accomplish the best results, are questions that must be met by the military and naval authorities when our national honor and safety are threatened. How well this was done during the recent war with Spain now forms an interesting chapter of history. Perhaps it was a wise provision of our institutions that these two Departments of the Government should each have an independent head, who is responsible only to the President for the proper administration of his own Department, and that he should be neither subordinate nor superior to the other; and while there can be no doubt that each Department tried faithfully to subserve public interests, conditions seem to have arisen occasionally in which a closer tie between these two forces might have been of great advantage and avoided unnecessary suffering and loss of stores.

In this connection the following published extracts from "Notes of the Administration of the United States Army in the Philippines," by Capt. S. S. Long, deputy assistant adjutant-general, Hongkong, may, though informal, be of interest:

> The Army chartered, superintended the fitting, equipping, and coaling of all transports, with the result that when they proceeded to sea they discovered that in some instances they were badly or deficiently found, and after arrival at Manila it was noticed that the chief quartermaster was occupied with questions regarding the coaling and detention, etc., of transports more than with the necessities and requirements of the Army.
>
> No steps appear to have been taken by the Navy to sound and buoy the best landing places for troops. On their arrival, for two days, some assistance was rendered to land a portion of them, but after that they were left to their own devices to do the best they could, having as a means of transport an old paddle-wheel steamer and two or three very worn-out, cranky launches, with a few crazy boats and lighters.
>
> No naval transport officer was appointed, and as a result of this lack of professional assistance the troops suffered greatly in landing and a quantity of valuable stores were lost in being brought ashore through the heavy surf.
>
> In this way the whole of the ammunition for the Astor battery was lost, and, although a portion was afterwards recovered, this battery was rendered practically useless till the day before the fall of Manila.

In my annual report for 1893 I invited attention to the fact that our Navy had adopted .236 as the proper caliber for small arms—said to be the smallest in use by any country in the world—while our Army had adopted the Krag-Jorgensen of .30 caliber, and that this might prevent

the interchangeability of ammunition between the two services. The experience of the past year has forced this subject upon the attention of the Departments; and it now seems that a uniform caliber for small arms is to prevail, and that the Navy, which has a smaller number of rifles in use than the Army, will change to caliber .30.

It would seem to be almost impossible for such things to occur if we had a board composed of an equal number of experienced army and navy officers of high rank, whose duty it should be to decide all proper questions and determine standards for both services. With our newly acquired possessions, thousands of miles apart, requiring the maintenance there of both military and naval forces for the protection of American interests, this subject assumes additional importance and seems to deserve the attention of higher authority. A perfectly harmonious cooperation between the Army and Navy is essential to insure the most favorable results, and this can best be obtained by creating such a board of officers, whose decision, when duly approved, shall be final in all matters between the two services.

NOTE FROM THE PHILIPPINES.

A familiar description of the water buffalo which figures so prominently hitherto in questions of inland transportation and labor was received from one of the inspectors general on duty in the Philippines, and may be of interest:

Cariboa.

Our cariboa (also spelled caribou and cariboo at times) is quite a different animal from the one of the cold countries, and especially the game animal of Quebec and other British American provinces. He is in make-up something like the elk except as to horns, but a cross between our own ox and an elk would more nearly strike it. The horns are single and flat, of sickle shape, and at times of great spread, 4 to 5 feet between tips not being uncommon. The head and mild, gentle expression of the eyes cause the resemblance to the elk. The weight runs between 1,000 and 1,300 pounds, the body being large and the legs short, with a spreading or cloven hoof.

The hide and hair are like those of the ox, and from the formation of the neck a yoke is used to pull against, any slightly bent piece of wood or bamboo answering for the purpose. They are very docile and will work willingly to the limit of their endurance, and often fall and die in harness. The legs are so short that their movement is very slow, and not much more than 2½ miles per hour can be gotten out of them.

Their great and most peculiar characteristic is their love for water (water buffalo being also a common name for them). This is the one great necessity of their life. They can go without food, but water they must have, not only to drink but to lie in. They do best when kept wet all the time, as in our present rainy weather (43 inches in the first twenty-one days of July and still "acoming"), and must be taken from harness and soaked every hour or so when on the road. Any mud hole or ditch answers so long as it is wet. I have seen them drop flat in a little chuck hole in the road just because it had an inch or so of water in it. They delight in getting in all over, leaving out only the face and horns, and will stay for hours so submerged. Their staying power is by no means so great as that of our oxen, nor does their strength seem to be in proportion to their size. They are common and not expensive to keep, which accounts for their popularity. They feed on the grasses of the country, but when fed the grain (rice) it is usually prepared for them with a good deal of water. I have never seen it fed dry.

They are driven by a ring through the nose and a line passed over the horns. A stubborn or balky cariboa is not uncommon, but runaways are not often seen.

The cart commonly in use is a strong, heavy affair of native wood, the better ones having wheels of ordinary type and others having those of solid blocks of wood. In these latter ones the axles turn with the wheels, on the sills being fastened blocks with grooves cut in them to carry the rounded axle. The maximum load on a good road ought not to exceed 1,000 pounds. Sometimes two animals are driven tandem, the traces of the lead ox being fastened to the ends of the shafts of the cart. While the Chinamen (Chinos) are the usual drivers, the native drivers (Filipinos) are able to get the most work out of the animals and seem to understand them the best.

The cariboa is of great value in cultivating the rice fields, as he will pull a plow or harrow all day through 18 inches of water and soft mud, and delight in it. The same amount of work on a dry road would kill him.

The natives use them to pull sleds made of bamboo along the muddy roads and trails, and also ride them. In crossing a stream they go right in and swim across, the rider standing up on the broad back in only a few inches of water.

In short, they are very useful animals in their proper place, but as transportation for a command on the march are pretty poor excuses for good escort wagons and the honest, hard-working American mule. The latter do well here, and we need lots of them. Of course, the grain must be brought here for them, but sailing vessels are plenty, and so are oats and barley.

I inclose photographs which will give you an idea of the transportation in general use up to a short time since, and on which we are still forced to depend to a great extent.

Health. Not much has been going on since the hard rains set in in the way of fighting, but we hold most of what we have taken. The health of the command is fair and the number of sick is not so great as might be expected under the conditions we have to contend with.

Brigade inspections. General Lawton is just starting a thorough system of monthly inspections in this division by acting brigade inspectors. Field inspections have been much neglected. Our idea is to have one about the 15th to 20th of each month, and a report made on the "Field inspection" blank No. 6, with a "Company inspection" blank for each company attached. I have just made requisition for 100 of the first and 1,000 of the second blanks.

For the illustrations accompanying this report thanks are due to Lieut. Col. C. G. Starr, U. S. Volunteers, and Mr. C. L. Clayton, of Circle City, Alaska, and others, especially to the gentlemen who took the photographs for their kind permission to use them.

CASUALTY.

Since this report was written the news has come that Lieut. Col. John D. Miley, inspector-general, United States Volunteers, died at Manila, Philippine Islands, September 19, 1899. His death leaves the volunteer officers of the Inspector General's Corps without a representative from the artillery arm of the service.

Colonel Miley was appointed to the Military Academy from Illinois. On graduation in 1887 he was assigned to the artillery arm of the service and served with his regiment until May of 1897, when he was appointed aid de-camp to Brigadier-General Shafter, United States Army.

He accompanied General Shafter to Cuba during the Spanish war, and in the battles and military operations near Santiago was conspicuous for his ability, energy, and personal gallantry. He was earnestly recommended by General Shafter for appointment as brigadier-general, United States Volunteers.

Appointed a major, assistant adjutant-general, United States Volunteers, July 12, 1898, and lieutenant colonel, inspector-general, United States Volunteers, September 8, 1898, Colonel Miley, with his customary intense industry and in a department where his artillery arm was prominent, served as inspector-general, Department of the East, until January, 1899, when he was ordered to Manila for duty as inspector-general, Eighth Army Corps.

In May, 1899, he was appointed collector of customs at Manila, in addition to his regular duties, and was on this duty when he died.

Among the last papers received from him were reports of inspection of 4,367 articles of khaki clothing of the Sixth Artillery, costing $5,896.18, and of 1,096,750 pounds hard bread, costing $49,353.75 and sold at auction for $2,614.50.

In his death the service loses one of its most promising young officers.

CLERICAL FORCE.

In concluding this report, it seems fair to invite attention to the faithfulness, intelligence, and perseverence with which the clerks of this Bureau have discharged their duties during the most trying period

through which we have just passed. These public servants have labored hard and conscientiously, regardless of hours and on Sundays, and the share of duty that fell to their lot has not been unimportant, and will be long remembered by each of them, and has been borne most willingly and enthusiastically and without the prospect of reward.

Some recognition is due them, and it is earnestly hoped and recommended that the limited and much needed increase of clerks submitted in the annual estimate will be granted. And in the matter of compensation, too, these capable and tried clerks should not be permitted to labor without a reasonable hope of advancement. To serve year after year with increased efficiency in the same grade, and no hope of increase of pay, except what may be offered by death or resignation in a higher grade, is discouraging and not based on sound business principles. Stagnation in promotion is unjust to the efficient and trustworthy, and apt to react to the injury of the public service.

Respectfully submitted.

J. C. BRECKINRIDGE,
Inspector-General.

The SECRETARY OF WAR.

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REPORT OF THE JUDGE-ADVOCATE-GENERAL, U. S. A.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
JUDGE-ADVOCATE-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, D. C., September 23, 1899.

Hon. ELIHU ROOT,
Secretary of War.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the annual report of the Judge-Advocate-General's Department for the year ending June 30, 1899.

Commissioned officers tried by general court-martial:	
Regulars (convicted)	3
Volunteers (convicted, 47; acquitted, 20; sentences disapproved, 11)	78
Cadets tried by general court-martial (convicted)	5
Enlisted men tried by general court-martial:	
Regulars (convicted, 2,359; acquitted, 248; sentences disapproved, 70)	2,677
Volunteers (convicted, 2,405; acquitted, 347; sentences disapproved, 265)	3,017
Civilians tried by general court-martial:	
Those serving with Army in the field (convicted, 3; acquitted, 3)	6
Discharged men held as general prisoners (convicted)	2
Total trials by general court-martial	5,788

The following table shows, approximately, the number of convictions in the Regular Army of different offences by general court-martial during the year ending June 30, 1899:

Sixteenth article of war:	
Giving away ammunition	1
Seventeenth article of war:	
Losing accoutrements	2
Losing clothing	24
Losing Government property	20
Selling arms	1
Selling clothing	43
Spoiling horse, arms, accoutrements, etc	3
Twentieth article of war:	
Disrespect to commanding officer	25

Twenty-first article of war:	
Assaulting superior officer	3
Attempt to assault superior officer	1
Disobeying superior officer	129
Twenty-fourth article of war:	
Disobeying noncommissioned officer quelling a fray	5
Thirty-first article of war:	
Lying out of camp without leave	1
Thirty-second article of war:	
Absence without leave	542
Thirty-third article of war:	
Failure to attend drill, roll call, etc	141
Thirty-fourth article of war:	
Found 1 mile from camp without leave	1
Thirty-eighth article of war:	
Drunkenness on duty	372
Thirty-ninth article of war:	
Quitting post	66
Sleeping on post	96
Fortieth article of war:	
Quitting guard	76
Forty-second article of war:	
Deserting in face of enemy	1
Quitting post to plunder and pillage	1
Forty-seventh article of war:	
Desertion	174
Fifty-eighth article of war:	
Assault with intent to kill	1
Larceny	14
Mayhem	1
Manslaughter	5
Murder	1
Robbery	1
Sixtieth article of war:	
Larceny	26
Selling Government property	4
Sixty-first article of war:	
Conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman	3
Sixty-second article of war:	
Absence without leave, not chargeable under the thirty-second article of war	65
Abusive language of superior officer, by officer	1
Abusing public animal	9
Aiding and abetting larceny	2
Aiding and abetting the passing of stolen goods	1
Allowing prisoner to escape	34
Annoying cadet	1
Assault	68
Assault and battery	28
Assault with dangerous or deadly weapon	47
Assault upon noncommissioned officer	32
Assault upon sentry	12
Assault with intent to kill	21
Assault with intent to do bodily harm	7
Attempt at arson	1
Attempt to defraud the Government	1
Attempt to escape from sentinel	2
Attempt to escape from guardhouse	1
Attempt to sell or pawn clothing	2
Breach of arrest	79
Breach of parole	1
Breach of trust	1
Burglary	3
Careless handling of loaded firearms	1
Carrying concealed weapons	6
Challenging to fight a duel	1
Committing a nuisance	35
Conspiracy	1
Creating a disturbance	5
Criminal carelessness	4
Deserting in face of the enemy	1

Sixty-second article of war—Continued.	
Destroying public property	7
Destroying private property	3
Disobedience of standing orders or regulations	59
Disobeying commissioned officer	63
Disobeying noncommissioned officer	200
Disobeying sentinel	13
Disorderly conduct	63
Disposing of clothing	1
Disrespect to instructions by cadet	2
Disrespect to noncommissioned officer	70
Disrespect to sentinel	11
Disrespect to superior officer	54
Drawing weapon on noncommissioned officer	1
Drunkenness	161
Drunk and disorderly	227
Drunk on guard	1
Drunkenness, etc., causing arrest by civil authorities	4
Embezzlement	11
Escaping from guardhouse	3
Escaping from sentinel	2
Failure to pay debts	1
False accusation	1
False statement or report	63
Fighting	9
Forgery	11
Fraudulent enlistment	156
Gambling	2
Indecent exposure of person	2
Insubordinate conduct toward commissioned officer	22
Insubordinate conduct toward noncommissioned officer	51
Insubordinate conduct toward sentry	2
Introducing liquor into quarters or camp	9
Introducing liquor into guardroom	4
Larceny	181
Leaving post and abandoning rifle	2
Losing Government property	1
Lying down on post	1
Making preparations to desert the service	1
Malicious destruction of private property	3
Mutinous conduct	3
Neglect of duty	70
Perjury	1
Permitting member of guard to obtain intoxicating liquor	1
Permitting prisoner to obtain intoxicating liquor	5
Receiving and disposing of stolen property	4
Resisting arrest	17
Resisting arrest by civil authority	1
Resisting being disarmed	2
Resisting sentinel	2
Robbery	13
Selling, losing, or wasting Government property	13
Sentinel permitting prisoner to obtain liquor	9
Sentinel permitting prisoner to enter saloon	1
Shooting with intent to kill	1
Sitting down on post	2
Sleeping while on duty	3
Striking noncommissioned officer	7
Taking life by carelessness	1
Taking rifle from quarters	3
Theft	2
Threatening noncommissioned officer	46
Threatening superior officer	17
Threatening to kill private	3
Trespass	16
Using profane and indecent language	108
Using threatening and abusive language	4
Disorder, etc., charged as "conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline" (not included under previous heads)	169
Sixty-fifth article of war:	
Breach of arrest by officer	1

The following table shows, approximately, the number of convictions in the Volunteer Army of different offences by general court-martial for the year ending June 30, 1899:

Sixteenth article of war:	
Wasting ammunition	2
Seventeenth article of war:	
Losing arms	1
Losing clothing	7
Losing Government property	5
Selling clothing	13
Spoiling horse, arms, accoutrements, etc	2
Twentieth article of war:	
Disrespect to commanding officer	149
Twenty-first article of war:	
Assaulting superior officer	74
Attempt to assault superior officer	3
Disobeying superior officer	349
Drawing weapon on superior officer	3
Threatening language to superior officer	8
Twenty-second article of war:	
Causing and joining in sedition	2
Inciting mutiny	9
Joining in mutiny	9
Twenty-third article of war:	
Failure to suppress mutiny	1
Not giving information of sedition	1
Twenty-fourth article of war:	
Disobeying noncommissioned officer quelling a fray	10
Disobeying commissioned officer quelling a fray	2
Drawing weapon upon commissioned officer quelling a fray	1
Resisting commissioned officer quelling a fray	2
Resisting noncommissioned officer quelling a fray	2
Twenty-fifth article of war:	
Using provoking speeches to another	2
Thirty-first article of war:	
Lying out of camp or quarters	10
Thirty-second article of war:	
Absence without leave	610
Thirty-third article of war:	
Failure to attend drill, roll call, etc	85
Thirty-fourth article of war:	
Found one mile from camp without leave	4
Thirty-fifth article of war:	
Failing to retire to quarters	1
Thirty-sixth article of war:	
Hiring another to do his duty	2
Thirty-eighth article of war:	
Drunkenness on duty	261
Thirty ninth article of war:	
Quitting post	41
Sleeping on post	191
Fortieth article of war:	
Quitting company	1
Quitting guard	85
Forty-second article of war:	
Cowardice	1
Forty-seventh article of war:	
Desertion	114
Fifty-first article of war:	
Advising another soldier to desert	1
Fifty-third article of war:	
Using profane oaths	2
Fifty-fifth article of war:	
Disorderly in quarters	1
Fifty-sixth article of war:	
Robbery of person bringing provisions	1
Fifty-eighth article of war:	
Assault with intent to kill	4
Burglary	1

Fifty-eighth article of war—Continued.	
Larceny	26
Manslaughter	5
Murder	6
Robbery	8
Wounding by shooting with intent to commit murder	1
Sixtieth article of war:	
Embezzlement	12
Larceny	25
Selling Government property	3
Wrongful disposition of property	1
Sixty-first article of war:	
Conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman	19
Sixty-second article of war:	
Absence without leave, not chargeable under the thirty-second article of war	28
Aiding and abetting larceny	1
Aiding prisoner to escape	1
Allowing prisoner to escape	11
Assault	74
Assault and battery	29
Assault upon noncommissioned officer in performance of duty	22
Assault with dangerous or deadly weapon	31
Assault with intent to kill	28
Assault upon sentry	78
Attempt to disarm sentinel	1
Attempt to escape from guardhouse	7
Attempt to pass liquor to prisoners	1
Attempt to pass sentry without pass	3
Breach of arrest	3
Burglary	1
Carelessly firing a rifle, wounding a boy	1
Carelessly firing a rifle, resulting in manslaughter	1
Carrying concealed weapons	4
Committing a nuisance	7
Creating disturbance in private residence	3
Creating disturbance in guardhouse	4
Criminal carelessness	2
Desecrating a grave and displaying parts of a human body	1
Destroying public property	2
Disobedience of standing orders or regulations	15
Disobeying commissioned officer	51
Disobeying noncommissioned officer	167
Disobeying sentinel	10
Disorderly conduct	65
Disposing of clothing	2
Disposing of subsistence stores	1
Disrespect to noncommissioned officer	69
Disrespect to sentinel	14
Disrespect to superior officer	115
Drunk and disorderly	268
Drunkenness	89
Drunkenness, etc., causing arrest by civil authorities	1
Drunkenness on post	1
Embezzlement	9
Escaping from guard	7
Escaping from guardhouse	26
Failure to pay debts	2
False accusation	3
False statement or report	18
False swearing	1
Fighting	13
Forcing entrance into private dwelling	3
Forgery	10
Giving false alarm	1
Impersonating an officer	2
Inciting disobedience and mutiny	8
Indecent exposure of person	3
Insubordinate conduct toward commissioned officer	50
Insubordinate conduct toward noncommissioned officer	44
Introducing liquor into camp	2

Sixty-second article of war—Continued.	
Joining in mutiny; breaking in storehouse	7
Larceny	93
Leaving post	1
Leaving ranks without permission	1
Lying	2
Malicious destruction of private property	3
Malingering	1
Neglect of duty	35
Out of quarters after taps	1
Permitting prisoners to obtain intoxicating liquors	7
Receiving and disposing of stolen property	2
Resisting arrest	53
Resisting arrest by civil authorities	1
Robbery	2
Selling liquor to enlisted men, without license	7
Selling liquor to prisoners in confinement	1
Selling, losing, or wasting Government property	4
Selling tobacco to enlisted men, without license	1
Sentinel permitting prisoner to obtain liquor	2
Sitting down on post	3
Striking superior officer	1
Threatening noncommissioned officer	50
Threatening sentinel	2
Threatening soldier	9
Threatening superior officer	53
Trespass	2
Using profane and indecent language	97
Uttering counterfeit money	2
Uttering forged paper	2
Wounding prisoner by carelessness	1
Disorder, etc., charged as "conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline" (not included under previous heads)	152
Sixty-fifth article of war:	
Breach of arrest by officer	1

The following table shows the convictions of desertion, classified according to the limit of punishment prescribed in the order of the President, published in General Orders, No. 16, Headquarters of the Army, 1898:

	Regulars.	Volunteers.	Limit of confinement.
			Months.
Surrendered:			
After an absence of not more than 30 days	6	8	12
After an absence of more than 30 days	32	12	18
Apprehended:			
In service not more than 6 months at time of desertion	70	86	18
In service more than 6 months	66	8	30
Total number of desertions	174	114	
Average limit of confinement ..... months	22.34	18.42	

In connection with this table it is to be observed that the limits of punishment are prescribed for "time of peace" only.

The number of men sentenced to dishonorable discharge in the Regular Army was 975 and in the Volunteer Army 644. Total, 1,619.

Death sentences were imposed in 5 cases on conviction of murder—4 of the trials being by court-martial and 1 by military commission, but the sentence in each case was commuted by the President to life imprisonment, with dishonorable discharge and forfeiture of all pay and allowances added in the cases of soldiers. Three of the trials by court-martial were of enlisted men and the remaining one of a civilian packer in the employ of the Quartermaster's Department. The trial by military commission was of a native of Porto Rico for the murder of a soldier.

The records of military commissions received at this office during the year covered by this report show that 82 persons were tried, of which number 45 were convicted, 35 were acquitted, and the sentences in two cases were disapproved. The convictions were of the following offences:

Arson	7
Assault	1
Assault with intent to do bodily harm	5
Associating with marauders	1
Assault with intent to kill	4
Attempted assault upon a young girl	1
Burglary	3
Carrying concealed weapons	1
Conspiracy to embezzle public funds	2
Conspiracy to extort money	2
Cruelty to animals	4
Disturbing the peace	1
Drunk and disorderly	1
Extorting money	3
Extorting money, conspiracy to	2
Embezzlement of public funds	2
Housebreaking	1
Inciting to lawlessness	1
Larceny	1
Looting	3
Murder	2
Publishing seditious newspaper articles	1
Rape	1
Riot	5
Robbery	12
Robbery, accessory to	2
Threatening to kill	5
Theft	3
Trespass on Government property	1

At the last session of the Congress a bill "To prevent the failure of military justice, and for other purposes" (S. 5019; H. R. 11311), passed the Senate, but was not reported in the House of Representatives, owing to the pressure of business before the Judiciary Committee. The bill as it passed the Senate was as follows:

AN ACT to prevent the failure of military justice, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That every person not belonging to the Army of the United States who, being duly subpœnaed to appear as a witness before a general court-martial of the Army, willfully neglects or refuses to appear, or refuses to qualify as a witness or to testify or produce documentary evidence which such person may have been legally subpœnaed to produce, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, for which such person shall be punished on information in the district court of the United States; and it shall be the duty of the United States district attorney, on the certification of the facts to him by the general court-martial, to file an information against and prosecute the person so offending, and the punishment of such person, on conviction, shall be a fine of not more than five hundred dollars or imprisonment not to exceed six months, or both, at the discretion of the court.

SEC. 2. That article ninety-four, section thirteen hundred and forty-two, of the Revised Statutes of the United States be, and the same is hereby, repealed.

SEC. 3. That section one hundred and eighty-three of the Revised Statutes of the United States be, and the same is hereby, amended so as to read as follows:

"SEC. 183. Any officer or clerk of any of the Departments lawfully detailed to investigate frauds on, or attempts to defraud, the Government, or any irregularity or misconduct of any officer or agent of the United States, and any officer of the Army detailed to conduct an investigation, and the recorder, and, if there be none, the presiding officer of any military board appointed for such purpose, shall have authority to administer an oath to any witness attending to testify or depose in the course of such investigation."

By the first section it is intended to invest courts-martial with the means of obtaining evidence which, by reason of their present lack of power to compel civilian witnesses to testify, they do not possess.

The want of this power has made itself felt more than once. It will be noticed that instead of seeking to attain the desired object by investing courts-martial with the power to punish such witness for contempt, it is proposed to make the refusal to testify an indictable offence, it being understood that the former measure would probably be considered objectionable but the latter not. In order, however, to meet and dispose of some questions that have been suggested, I would recommend the addition of the following proviso to the first section:

Provided, That this shall not apply to persons residing beyond the State, Territory, or District in which such general court-martial is held, and that the fees of such witness, at the rate of five cents a mile from his place of residence to the place of trial and one dollar and fifty cents for each day required for such travel, shall be tendered him, and that after testifying he shall be paid at the same rate for returning and one dollar and fifty cents per day while in attendance on the court-martial, such amounts to be paid by the Pay Department of the Army out of the appropriation for compensation of witnesses.

The second section repeals the ninety-fourth article of war, which fixes the hours of session of courts-martial at "between the hours of 8 in the morning and 3 in the afternoon." The article was copied from the British code, and writers on military law do not agree as to the original reason for it. Whatever it may have been, no good reason for the restriction any longer exists.

The third section amends section 183 of the Revised Statutes by the insertion of the words "and any officer of the Army detailed to conduct an investigation, and the recorder, and, if there be none, the presiding officer of any military board appointed for such purpose," the object of the amendment being to vest such officers and boards with the authority to administer oaths to witnesses—authority which they do not now possess, but which they need in order that they may have adequate power to ascertain the facts in the matters under investigation.

To the bill as passed by the Senate I would further recommend the addition of the following section, viz:

SEC. 4. That in time of war the summary court shall have power to adjudge punishment not to exceed confinement at hard labor or forfeiture of pay for three months, or both, and in case of a noncommissioned officer reduction to the ranks in addition thereto.

The jurisdiction of the summary court now extends to the award of one month's confinement and forfeiture of pay. In the cases of offences for which their power of punishment is inadequate it is necessary to convene general courts-martial. During active operations in the field this is impracticable, and, in order as far as possible to avoid delays in the trials, it is very desirable that the jurisdiction of the summary court should be extended as indicated, so as to cover a larger class of minor offences.

The present organization of the Judge-Advocate-General's Department is that which was provided for an army of 25,000. For an army of the present size it is entirely inadequate. The corps consists of seven officers, besides the Judge-Advocate-General. Of these, two are needed in the Judge-Advocate-General's Office, and one is assigned to duty as professor of law at the United States Military Academy, leaving only four for all other duty. The mere statement of these facts is sufficient to show the inadequacy of the present corps.

Attention is invited to the extracts from reports of judge-advocates of departments appended to this report

Very respectfully,

G. N. LIEBER,
Judge-Advocate-General.

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REPORT OF THE QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL.

QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, October 16, 1899.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the annual report of the operations of the Quartermaster's Department for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1899:

FINANCIAL STATEMENT.

By acts of Congress approved July 1, 7, and 8, 1898, and March 3, 1899, there was appropriated for the regular service of the Quartermaster's Department for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1899, the sum of		$17,979,634.75
During the fiscal year there was deposited to the credit of appropriations, 1898–99, amounts received from sales to officers, etc., the sum of		614,391.13
There was placed to the credit of appropriations by Treasury transfer warrants the sum of		28,234,539.00
Making a total of		46,828,564.88
Of this amount there was remitted to disbursing officers	$26,857,170.95	
There was paid out on account of settlements made at Treasury for claims and accounts the sum of	473,975.26	
		27,331,146.21
Leaving a balance on July 1, 1899, available for payment of outstanding obligations incurred or fulfillment of contracts properly entered into within the fiscal year		19,497,418.67
On July 1, 1898, there remained on hand from deficiency appropriation January 1, 1899 (act approved May 4, 1898)		8,538,396.68
By act approved July 7, 1898, there was appropriated for deficiencies "January 1, 1899," for regular supplies, incidental expenses, horses for cavalry and artillery, barracks and quarters, transportation of the Army, and clothing, camp and garrison equipage		103,200,000.00
During year there was placed to credit of this appropriation from sales to officers		1,149,713.67
		112,888,110.35
Of this amount there was remitted to disbursing officers	$54,886,898.51	
There was paid on account of settlements made at Treasury for claims and accounts	1,384,131.52	
There was charged against appropriation by Treasury transfer warrants	28,234,539.00	
		84,505,569.03
Leaving a balance on hand July 1, 1899, of		28,382,541.32
On the 1st of July, 1898, there was on hand from regular appropriations for the service of the Quartermaster's Department pertaining to fiscal year ended June 30, 1898	340,154.71	
And from appropriations pertaining to previous fiscal years the sum of	961,845.77	
And from appropriations for special and indefinite purposes, certified claims, etc	20,054.72	
Making a total balance on hand from these appropriations of		1,322,055.20

For specific purposes there was appropriated during the fiscal year ended June 30, 1899	586,372.11	
During the year there was deposited and transferred to credit of appropriations other than those of 1899, as shown above, the sum of	592,839.76	
		1,179,211.87
Making a total of		2,501,267.07
Of said amount there was remitted to disbursing officers the sum of	978,489.04	
There was paid out on account of Treasury settlements, and transferred	343,505.85	
There was carried to surplus fund	726,271.94	
		2,048,266.83
Leaving a balance on hand July 1, 1899, of		453,000.24

The total balances on July 1, 1899, from all appropriations pertaining to the Quartermaster's Department are as follows:	
From appropriations for the regular service of the Quartermaster's Department, fiscal year ended June 30, 1899	19,497,418.67
From deficiency appropriation, January 1, 1899	28,382,541.32
From appropriations previous fiscal years and from indefinite and special appropriations	453,000.24
Grand total	48,332,960.23

Of the $200,000 appropriated by act approved December 18, 1897, for "relief of people in mining regions of Alaska," the sum of $57,274.47 has been charged against the same on the books of this office during the past fiscal year.

Of the $50,000,000 appropriated by act approved March 9, 1898, for "National defense," there has been charged against the same on the books of this office during the past fiscal year the sum of $2,823,734.87.

Of the $3,630.15 appropriated by act approved March 3, 1899, for "Claims for quartermaster's stores and commissary supplies, act July 4, 1864," the sum of $2,887.55 has been charged against the same on the books of this office.

Of the sum of $2,500 appropriated by act approved March 3, 1899, for "Garfield Hospital buildings," etc., there has been charged against the same on the books of this office the sum of $500.

DUTIES OF THE QUARTERMASTER'S DEPARTMENT.

Under existing laws the Quartermaster's Department, under the direction of the Secretary of War, provides the Army with military stores and supplies requisite for its use, such as clothing and equipage, tents, band instruments, tableware and mess furniture, equipments for post bakeries, fuel, forage, stationery, lumber, straw for bedding for men and animals, all materials for camp and for shelter for troops and stores, furniture for barracks, such as bunks, benches, chairs, tables, lockers, heating and cooking stoves for use in public barracks and quarters, tools for mechanics and laborers in the Quartermaster's Department, furniture, text-books, papers, and equipment for post schools, reading matter for post libraries, wagons, ambulances, carts, saddles, harness, water supply, sewerage, plumbing, illuminating supplies, and heating for all military posts and buildings.

The Department is also charged with the duty of providing transportation, by land and water, for troops, munitions of war, equipments, and all articles of military supplies from the place of purchase to the several armies, garrisons, posts, and recruiting places.

Under act of Congress amending section 1661, Revised Statutes, for arming and equipping the militia, this Department supplies quartermaster stores, clothing, and equipage to the militia of the several States and Territories, and transports the same to said States and Territories. It also furnishes transportation for ordnance and ordnance stores issued by the United States to the militia of the several States and Territories. It also transports the property for other Executive Departments on requisitions, payments therefor being made by the respective Departments to the carriers upon accounts forwarded through the Quartermaster-General's Office for that purpose.

This Department prepares the necessary plans and constructs all buildings at military posts, such as barracks, quarters, storehouses, hospitals, etc.; builds wharfs; constructs and repairs roads for military purposes; builds all necessary military bridges; provides, by hire or purchase, grounds for military encampments and buildings; contracts for all horses for cavalry, artillery, and for the Indian scouts, and for such infantry and members of the Hospital Corps in the field campaigns as may be required to be mounted; pays for all incidental expenses of the military service which are not provided by other corps.

The care and maintenance of national cemeteries is an additional duty of this Department. It also provides suitable headstones to mark the graves of all soldiers, sailors, or marines who served during the late war, including those who have been buried in private cemeteries and other burial places.

Section 1139, Revised Statutes, makes it the duty of the Quartermaster-General, under the direction of the Secretary of War, to prescribe and enforce a system of accountability for all quartermaster's supplies furnished the Army, its officers, seamen, and marines.

CLOTHING AND EQUIPAGE SUPPLIES.

There was available for this branch of the service, during the last fiscal year, the sum of $34,080,947.59. From this amount the sum of $23,597,508.10 was remitted to disbursing officers of the Department, and requisitions for $100,105.60 issued on settlements made at Treasury of accounts and claims, leaving a balance on hand June 30, 1899, of $10,383,333.89, which will be further drawn upon to meet obligations entered into prior to the close of the fiscal year.

Lists giving the principal articles of clothing and equipage supplies which were purchased for use of the Army during the past fiscal year in the United States, in the Philippines, and in Cuba, and also the principal articles that were manufactured at the general depots during the same period, are incorporated in the accompanying report of the officer on duty in this office having charge of this branch of the work.

Issues of clothing and equipage and other stores to the amount of $135,224.82 were made to the Governors of the several States and Territories for use of the militia, under the provisions of the act of Congress, approved July 1, 1887, for which this Department has been reimbursed.

There was also issued to the militia of the District of Columbia during the last fiscal year, under act approved March 1, 1899, clothing, equipage, and other quartermaster supplies, amounting in value to $13,624.91, for which this Department will not be reimbursed.

The sum of $9,256.32 was expended during the year for clothing

and other quartermaster supplies for the Apache Indian prisoners of war, who are confined at Fort Sill, Okla.

The sum of $85,232.38 was realized from the sale of condemned articles of clothing, equipage, and cuttings, which amount, less $178.72, the expenses of the sale, was covered into the Treasury and credited to "Miscellaneous receipts."

Through the courtesy of the Postmaster General there were manufactured at the Government mail-bag repair shop, in this city, during the last fiscal year for this Department, 4,126 conical and 6,781 common tents. This Department furnished all the materials for the purpose, paying only such amounts as were required for the necessary labor connected with the manufacture.

CLOTHING FOR TROOPS STATIONED IN TROPICAL COUNTRIES.

This subject has received the most thorough consideration by the Department, and the following articles of clothing have been decided upon by the Secretary of War as the most suitable and comfortable for service in Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines:

Drab campaign hats.
Cork helmets, covered with khaki.
Khaki coats and trousers.
White duck coats and trousers.
Leggings, khaki color.
Russet shoes.
Light-weight cotton stockings.
Jean drawers.
Chambray shirts.
Light-weight wool knit undershirts.
Light-weight dark-blue flannel shirts.
Unlined blouses.
Light-weight kersey trousers.
Abdominal bandages.

CAMPAIGN HATS.

The campaign hat is unquestionably the most comfortable field headgear, and as improved with large ventilators in the sides and with proposed corrugated leather insertion underneath the sweat band will, it is believed, prove to be a very satisfactory article for use in hot climates.

KHAKI-COLORED CORK HELMETS.

The rear brim of the khaki colored cork helmets now purchased and issued to the troops has been enlarged, with a view to giving greater protection to the neck of the wearer.

KHAKI GARMENTS.

The supply of khaki clothing, consisting of coat and trousers, adopted for use of enlisted men in tropical countries, has been attended with serious difficulties, due, first, to the entire lack in our home market of suitable material, and, afterwards, to the necessary delay incident to the production of an acceptable fabric by manufacturers in the United States, after innumerable experiments on their

part. During this experimental period many disappointments and vexatious delays were experienced.

After nearly a year's effort on the part of manufacturers in the United States to produce a material of sufficient strength and of fast color to withstand the hard usage incident to marches and battles, it is believed that their efforts have at last been successful, and that a fabric can now be obtained in sufficient quantities and satisfactory in texture, strength, and color to meet the demands of our troops wherever stationed.

RUSSET SHOES.

To better meet the climatic conditions of the countries in which the greater part of the army is now serving, it was decided to furnish these troops with russet calfskin shoes. It has been found that they are better adapted and greatly preferred to the black calfskin shoes for use there. These russet shoes are made upon the same lasts adopted for the black calfskin shoes.

ABDOMINAL BANDAGES.

Abdominal bandages being considered of assistance in the preservation of the health of the enlisted men, they are now supplied to troops. The adopted standard is an all-wool knitted fabric of gray color.

RAIN CLOTHING.

It having been reported that rubber clothing is necessary, as a health measure, for the protection of the troops serving in Cuba and Porto Rico, a supply of slickers (pommel and common), rain suits, rubber coats, pantasote coats, southwester hats, rubber hats, rubber boots, rubber talmas, and large rubber ponchos were provided and sent there.

SHELTER TENTS AND CLOTHING ROLLS.

All the shelter tents on hand at the Philadelphia, St. Louis, and San Francisco depots are being converted into clothing rolls by attaching thereto the necessary slides, buckles, and straps, and these are now being issued.

CLOTHING FOR UNITED STATES TRANSPORT SERVICE.

Standard samples and specifications for uniform clothing to be worn by officers and men of the United States transport service, and regulations governing the same, have been prepared for adoption and publication, and the crews have been accordingly supplied.

CLOTHING FOR TROOPS SERVING IN ALASKA.

This Department has supplied the troops serving in the district of North Alaska, and those composing the Cooks Inlet and Copper River military exploring expeditions, with the necessary articles of clothing and equipage, including such articles as German socks, Mackinaw suits, moccasins, felt shoes, porpoise shoes, boot and shoe packs, fur clothing, smoked goggles, Yukon stoves, and other special articles of supply required for service in those regions.

MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION.

The following statement shows the number and cost of public animals, wagons, and harness purchased from July 1, 1898, to June 30, 1899:

	Number.	Total cost.	Average cost each.
Cavalry horses	2,094	$219,727.17	$104.94
Artillery horses	775	96,374.04	124.35
Riding horses	176	22,730.00	129.15
Draft horses	15	2,496.50	166.43
Pack horses	71	3,595.00	50.63
Bell horses	1	50.00	50.00
Draft mules	3,834	416,131.50	108.54
Pack mules	301	28,294.00	94.00
Oxen	16	1,600.00	100.00
Army wagons	201	21,303.50	105.99
Escort wagons	168	14,914.25	88.77
Farm wagons	656	42,404.00	64.64
Spring wagons, Daugherty	92	23,820.50	258.91
Wagonette, or other kind	42	7,451.75	177.90
Ambulances:			
Rucker	101	20,200.00	200.00
Red Cross	49	11,012.00	224.73
Trucks, 2 and 4 horse	8	1,959.00	244.87
Dump carts	314	9,872.75	31.44
Dump carts, sanitary	51	10,540.00	206.67
Carts, spring	2	45.00	22.50
Express wagons	21	2,197.50	104.64
Water wagons	17	4,268.13	251.07
Spring wagons, delivery	110	11,741.00	106.74
Miscellaneous wagons	2	425.00	212.50
Sleighs	2	111.50	55.75
Single sets harness	8,021	122,340.00	15.13
Harness, spring cart	2	17.50	8.75
Total		1,096,071.59	

Up to June 30, 86 draft and 72 riding horses, 590 draft and 106 pack mules, 90 escort and 86 light-top wagons, 86 ambulances and 175 carts, and 1,797 sets harness were shipped to the Philippines for use of the army there. Eighty-eight draft and 23 pack mules were also shipped to Honolulu.

During the year forage was purchased and shipped to Cuba, Porto Rico, Honolulu, and Manila as follows:

	Pounds.
Oats	48,037,723
Straw	471,623
Hay	61,595,900
Bran	2,185,338

Five thousand cords of soft wood were also shipped to Cuba and Porto Rico.

FIELD RANGES, TABLEWARE, AND KITCHEN UTENSILS.

The total cost of all field ranges, tableware, and kitchen utensils purchased during the last fiscal year amounted to $353,647.65.

ENROLLMENT CLAIMS.

Since the declaration of war with Spain 2,130 claims have been filed in this office for expenses incident to the organization, mobilization, recruiting, and supply of the large number of volunteers called into the service.

These claims amounted in the aggregate to $262,069.34. Of these claims, 2,102 have been examined and disposed of—allowed or otherwise—leaving 28 claims on hand for further action, amounting to $861.29.

SALE OF SURPLUS AND CONDEMNED ANIMALS.

[As far as fully reported to this office.]

During the last fiscal year, by authority of the Secretary of War and under instructions of this office directing sale at public auction after advertisement, there were sold 2,442 surplus horses, for which the sum of $66,416.58 was realized; average price per animal, $27.50. Among these horses are included 1,056 small sized "Rough Rider" horses and 461 small Texas ponies.

There were also condemned and sold during the same period 2,576 horses for the sum of $69,924.32; average price per animal, $27.10.

There were sold during the last fiscal year 3,961 surplus mules for $285,300.70; average price per animal, $72.02; and 817 mules condemned, for which the sum of $44,752.40 was realized; average price per animal, $54.77.

In addition to the foregoing, 111 surplus mules were sold to the Cuban civil government for the sum of $10,435; average price per animal, $94. There were also sold to the Red Cross Society, in Cuba, 4 mules for $440, or $110 each.

During the fiscal year there were 2,002 horses and 1,389 mules lost, died, stolen, etc. There remained on hand at the close of the fiscal year, June 30, 1899, according to the latest reports, 12,622 horses and 13,158 mules.

TRANSPORTATION.

During the fiscal year transportation was furnished by rail and water, exclusive of army transport sea service, for 1,064,383 persons, 72,711 animals, and 544,644 tons of material.

In furnishing the transportation for this large number of officers and men, public animals, and army supplies of every description, this office has required of the officers charged with the duty of providing the same a most rigid and watchful scrutiny as to the best route to travel and the comfort and welfare of the troops and animals en route.

All movements of organizations of troops, large numbers of public animals, and important shipments of public stores have been regulated by competition invited from all lines that could perform the service. As a consequence, rates far below those accorded by tariffs to the general public have been secured, and these rates have not exceeded 1½ cents per mile per capita, and in numerous instances, where the journey was long and the number of men carried was large, the rate has not exceeded 1 cent per mile per capita.

The Union Pacific Railroad Company, having canceled its bonded debt with the United States, the services of the lines of said company from Omaha, Nebr., to Ogden, Utah (1,029 miles), and from Kansas City to Monument or Gopher (394 miles), have been paid for in cash during the fiscal year 1899, and will continue to be used as other cash lines, which will add materially to the cash outlay on account of transportation for the Army.

The cost of maintaining the 11 steamboats owned by this Department, including repairs during the past fiscal year, was $89,934.11. This is exclusive of transports purchased or chartered for the prosecution of the war with Spain or the insurrection in the Philippines.

THE ARMY TRANSPORT SERVICE.

At the beginning of the last fiscal year this Department had in service on the Atlantic coast, in connection with the army transport service, 43 chartered vessels, which had been fitted up for the trans-

portation of troops, animals, and army supplies. These vessels had a total tonnage of 140,201, and a carrying capacity of 1,287 officers, 22,335 men, and 6,746 animals.

In addition to the above, there were also under charter at the beginning of the last fiscal year, 1 water boats, 3 lighters, 2 tugs, a cable boat for the Signal Service, and a steamer for the Secret Service. Subsequent to the beginning of the last fiscal year, 6 vessels and 2 tugs were chartered for service on the Atlantic coast.

The inability of the Department to secure by charter a suitable class of vessels for the transportation of large bodies of troops, for the reason that ships of foreign registry could not be employed while the Government was at war with a foreign power, and Congress declining to admit foreign ships to American registry, 14 large steamships were purchased during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1898, which were hastily fitted up to meet the demands for transportation of troops and supplies to Cuba and Porto Rico.

After the cessation of hostilities at Santiago, the troops there engaged were returned to the United States and others were sent to Cuba to replace them.

As rapidly as the chartered vessels could be spared from the service they have been sent to their home ports for termination of charter. During the past fiscal year the charters of 59 of such vessels have been canceled. On June 30, 1899, there were no chartered vessels in service on the Atlantic coast.

The total cost for charter of vessels of all classes employed on the Atlantic coast during the past fiscal year was $1,906,419.57.

The following is a list of the army transports purchased during the last fiscal year, showing their new names, class, cost, and where they are now employed:

Old name of vessel.	New name.	Tonnage.	Class.	Cost.	Where employed.
Mohawk	Grant	5,658	Troop ship	$660,000	In Pacific fleet.
Mobile	Sherman	5,780	do	660,000	Do.
Massachusetts	Sheridan	5,673	do	660,000	Do.
Arizona	Hancock	5,000	do	600,000	Do.
Scandia	Warren	4,243	do	200,000	Do.
Panama	Hooker	2,085	Cable ship	41,000	Do.
Manitoba	Logan	5,763	Troop ship	660,000	Being fitted for Pacific fleet.
Minnewaska	Thomas	5,796	do	660,000	Do.
Berlin	Meade	5,641	do	400,000	Do.
Port Victor	McClellan	2,792	Troop and freight ship.	175,000	Atlantic fleet.
Rita	Burnside	2,194	do	125,000	Do.
Mississippi	Buford	3,732	do	350,000	Do.
Michigan	Kilpatrick	3,722	do	350,000	Do.
Roumanian	Crook	4,126	do	240,000	Do.
Obdam	McPherson	3,656	do	250,000	Do.
Chester	Sedgwick	4,770	do	200,000	Do.
Clearwater	Ingalls	1,147	do	150,000	Do.
Bay State	Wright	777	do	100,000	Do.
Hartford	Terry	1,338	Hospital ship	150,000	Do.
Missouri	Missouri	1,857	do	200,000	Pacific fleet.
Eugene Grasselli	Poe	157	Steam lighter	39,500	Atlantic fleet.
Adonis	Williams	198	do	26,000	Do.
Ed. Ward	Baker	200	do	25,000	Do.
Iron King	Canby	209	do	36,000	Transferred to depot quartermaster, New York City.
Britannia	Reno		Tug	40,000	Atlantic fleet.
Gypsum King	Slocum		do	150,000	Do.
Sarah	Ord		do	6,300	Do.
Major McKinley	Sumner		do	13,000	Do.
Olympic	Weitzel		do	12,000	Do.
Harry	Richardson		do	6,000	Do.
J. C. Watson	Reynolds		do	14,000	Do.
E. L. Bartley			Barge	5,000	Do.
Willie			do	5,000	Do.

Old name of vessel.	New name.	Tonnage.	Class.	Cost.	Where employed.
Mocha			Barge	$10,000	Atlantic fleet.
Annie			do	10,000	Do.
Helen			do	10,000	Do.
L. E. Reinhardt			do	5,500	Do.
Esperanza		9.50	Sloop	850	Do.
Miguel		21.88	do	550	Do.
Total				7,245,700	

The steam lighters, tugs, and sloops referred to in the foregoing tables are in service in the various harbors in Cuba and Porto Rico, except the steam lighter *Canby*, which has been transferred to the depot quartermaster in New York for service in that harbor, and the tug *Reno*, which is now in New York being repaired.

The steam lighter *Bessie*, which was chartered from the Galveston Steamship and Lighter Company on May 24, 1898, under the terms of the charter party was acquired and became the property of the United States on February 5, 1899, on which date her owners had received from the Government for her use her appraised value, stated at $10,000, with 33 per cent per annum additional. The vessel has been put in thorough repair and fitted up for service, renamed *Kearney*, and is now usefully employed in the Harbor of Havana, Cuba.

The steamship *Wright*, originally named *Bay State*, was purchased and fitted up for a hospital ship, and was sent to Cuba for service of the Medical Department. Not being found entirely suitable for that service, the vessel was exchanged with the Quartermaster's Department for the steamship *Terry*, which vessel is now in service of the Medical Department in Cuba. The hospital ship *Relief*, which was purchased prior to the beginning of the last fiscal year and fitted for service of the Medical Department, has been transferred from service on the Atlantic to service on the Pacific.

The steamship *Missouri*, which has been in service of the Medical Department as a hospital ship, was purchased during the year for $200,000. It has been provided with every modern convenience and appliance required in a hospital, and is now en route from New York to Manila for service as a hospital ship.

The signal department of the Army requiring a vessel to transport to the Philippines a large quantity of deep sea cable and lay the same, the army transport *Hooker*, formerly the prize steamer *Panama*, which was purchased by the Quartermaster's Department, was detailed for this work, and after receiving on board the cable and all appliances required for the successful locating, laying, and repairing deep sea telegraph cable, the vessel sailed from New York on May 1, 1899, arriving at Manila on June 27, 1899. Information was received in this office on August 11, 1899, that the vessel had struck a reef near Cavite; but arrangements have been made to save the vessel and have her repaired.

The steamships *Grant*, *Sherman*, and *Sheridan* were, in the fall of 1898, put out of commission and placed in the hands of leading shipbuilders to be fitted up for the transportation of troops to the Philippines by way of the Suez Canal route.

The *Grant*, which was fitted up by the Bath Iron Works at Bath, Me., was completed, and on January 19, 1899, the vessel left New York Harbor en route to Manila with the Fourth United States Infantry and one battalion of the Seventeenth United States Infantry—50 officers and 1,703 enlisted men, an aggregate of 1,753 troops on board. The *Sher-*

man, which was fitted up by the William Cramp & Sons' Ship and Engine Building Company, of Philadelphia, Pa., sailed from New York for Manila on February 2, 1899, with the Third United States Infantry, a battalion of the Seventeenth United States Infantry—41 officers, 1,725 enlisted men—and 46 civilian passengers; making an aggregate of 1,812 persons. The *Sheridan*, which was fitted up by the John N. Robins Company, of New York, sailed from New York for Manila on February 19, 1899, with the Twelfth United States Infantry, a battalion of the Seventeenth United States Infantry—58 officers and 1,876 enlisted men—and 83 civilians; making an aggregate of 2,017 passengers.

These ships made the voyage to Manila successfully, and the accommodations and comforts afforded on them to the large number of passengers were highly commended by the officers in command of the troops on board, whose reports were subsequently received in this office. These reports contained valuable suggestions as to improvement of the accommodations afforded on the ships, which are being availed of in the work upon the other ships now being fitted up for the transportation of troops from the Atlantic coast to the Philippines via the Suez Canal route.

MOVEMENT OF TROOPS BY TRANSPORTS TO AND FROM CUBA AND PORTO RICO.

After the ratifications of the protocol agreed upon between the generals commanding the American and Spanish armies at Santiago it became necessary to send a large body of troops to garrison the western portion of the island of Cuba. This movement commenced in November, 1898, and continued to February 17, 1899, during which time there were transported from Savannah, Ga., to Cuba, 1,089 officers and 27,624 men; from Charleston, S. C., 197 officers and 5,939 men; and from Tampa and Miami, Fla., 63 officers and 2,505 men; a total of 37,417 passengers.

Early in the spring of 1899 it became necessary to return the volunteer troops from Cuba to the United States for discharge from the service; and in order to facilitate the movement and get the troops back to the United States prior to the close of quarantine, it became necessary to engage the service of the New York and Cuba Mail Steamship Company and the Plant Investment Company, both of which had vessels engaged in transportation between the ports in the United States and Cuba. Their ships, in addition to the army transport ships which could be spared from their regular duties and the U. S. S. *Dixie*, loaned to the Department by the Navy Department, transported from Cuba to various ports in the United States a total of 28,905 officers and men and 1,816 incidental passengers, including discharged men and civilian employees.

In my last annual report it is shown that for the invasion of the island of Porto Rico there were transported from the United States to that island a total of 17,460 troops. The return of these troops to the United States and the transportation of others to and from the island has made the total movement of troops as follows:

Transported to Porto Rico:	
Officers	817
Men	23,121
From Porto Rico to the United States:	
Officers	708
Men	20,481
Total	45,127

WEEKLY STEAMSHIP LINE FROM NEW YORK TO CUBA AND PORTO RICO.

Upon the permanent occupation by the United States of the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico there was established a regular line of army transport ships between New York and those islands. This line was opened on Wednesday, August 31, 1898, and has since been maintained, the regular sailing days being, as a rule, Wednesdays of each week.

Three steamships are found to be sufficient to maintain this weekly line, and the army transports *McClellan*, *McPherson*, and *Burnside* are designated for this service.

THE ARMY TRANSPORT SERVICE ON THE PACIFIC.

At the beginning of the last fiscal year there were 14 vessels under charter for service on the Pacific Ocean transporting troops and supplies to the Philippines. During the fiscal year 15 other vessels were chartered for service on the Pacific. On June 30, 1899, there were 15 chartered vessels in service for duty on the Pacific Ocean.

The total amount paid during the last fiscal year on account of vessels chartered on the Pacific was $3,449,050.66.

Since the close of the fiscal year active and energetic measures have been taken to provide transportation for the new levies of troops to the Philippines, and to transport the volunteer troops serving there back to the United States. Thus far there have been returned from the Philippines to San Francisco, Cal., the following troops, viz: Second Oregon, First Nebraska, Utah Light Artillery, Tenth Pennsylvania, First Colorado, First Wyoming, First North Dakota, First Idaho, First California Infantry, California Heavy Artillery, Thirteenth Minnesota, First South Dakota, First Montana, and First Washington. There are now en route from Manila to San Francisco the Twentieth Kansas, the Fifty-first Iowa, First Tennessee, and the Nevada Cavalry.

Since the close of the fiscal year 24 vessels have been chartered for the transportation of troops, animals, and supplies from the Pacific coast to the Philippines.

It is anticipated that the arrangements being made by this Department for the transportation of troops to the Philippines will be successful in delivering all the commands now designated for service there, on or before the last day of the present calendar year.

The two large steamships, *Arizona* and *Scandia*, which were purchased by this Department and fitted up for the transportation of troops, have been renamed the *Hancock* and *Warren*, respectively.

These vessels have been continuously employed in carrying troops from San Francisco to Manila, and though not yet thoroughly refitted for service as troopships, they have furnished safe and comfortable accommodations to the officers and men who have made the long and tedious voyage upon them to the Philippines without a single loss of human life due to accident.

At the close of the fiscal year ended June 30, 1898, there had been three expeditions sent from San Francisco to the Philippines, composed of 10,924 officers and men. These were followed in July, 1898, by two other expeditions composed of 4,765 officers and men. Later in the season several volunteer commands were sent to Manila via San Francisco, viz: First Tennessee Infantry, Twentieth Kansas Infantry, First Washington Infantry, Fifty-first Iowa Infantry, and the California Heavy Artillery, and also one battalion each of the Eighteenth and Twenty-third United States Infantry. These comprised 262 officers and 6,959 men. The four regiments of regular troops sent

from New York, via Suez Canal, heretofore referred to, was the first movement made to relieve the volunteer troops serving in the Philippines. The outbreak of the insurrection on the island of Luzon hastened the shipment of other bodies of troops, and there was subsequently sent from San Francisco, prior to the close of the fiscal year, of the Regular Army, 702 officers and 17,512 men, making a total of 18,214 men.

Total number of passengers transported during the fiscal year to Manila from San Francisco	30,643
From New York	5,582
Total	36,225

Since the close of the last fiscal year 701 officers, 20,905 enlisted men, and 194 civilians have been transported to Manila from San Francisco.

SHIPMENT OF FREIGHT AND ANIMALS TO MANILA.

For the maintenance of the army serving in the Philippines, large quantities of forage, lumber, subsistence, ammunition, and other stores have been transported from the Pacific coast to the Philippine Islands.

From San Francisco there were transported during the year 37,021 tons of freight, 734,555 packages, and 16,365 pieces of baggage. Forage and lumber, which can be procured at reasonable prices in the markets of the North Pacific States, are purchased and shipped from Puget Sound direct to Manila, and since the close of the fiscal year four large steamships have been fitted up for the transportation of horses and mules and dispatched from Tacoma and Seattle, Wash.

Another large steamship is now being fitted up at Portland for the transportation of animals to Manila and the Quartermaster's Department is availing itself of every means afforded by the markets and the large shipping interests of the North Pacific coast to use the excellent ports on Puget Sound for the shipment of military supplies required for the army in the Philippines.

One sailing vessel, the *Tacoma*, has been under charter from July 11, 1898, for the transportation of animals from San Francisco to Manila, and has been fitted up at considerable expense for the safe and commodious conveyance of the animals. Several other vessels, all steamships, have recently been chartered for the conveyance of animals from San Francisco to the Philippines. The ships now sailing from San Francisco on arrival at Honolulu unload their animals at that place, where there has been established a corral for their care and recuperation before resuming the voyage to Manila. Those sailing from Puget Sound stop at Dutch Harbor, Aleutian Islands, and again at Kobe, Japan, at which places the animals are unloaded from the ship and rested.

Since the close of the fiscal year, 1,466 animals have been shipped from San Francisco and 1,711 from Seattle and Tacoma to the Philippines.

Great difficulty was experienced in the harbor of Manila in supplying the army transport ships arriving there with coal needed to begin the return voyage to the United States, by reason of there being no facilities for loading it upon the ships, and the slow process of loading it by hand from the lighters caused much delay and greatly increased the expense of maintaining the service.

There have been purchased and sent to Manila hoisting apparatus which will load upon the ships 600 tons per day and greatly lessen their delay in that port. From Manila the ships sail via Nagasaki,

Japan, where arrangements have been made for the supply of coal sufficient to run the ships to San Francisco without further stop.

The ships sailing from San Francisco to the Philippines have sailed via Honolulu, at which port they were recoaled and provided with such other supplies as were required for the further voyage to the Philippines and for such repairs as were found necessary to be made.

Three thousand three hundred and fifty one troops and passengers were transported to and from Honolulu during the past fiscal year. A portion of this transportation was furnished on merchant vessels, at a per capita rate.

A recapitulation of the work performed by the vessels employed in the army transport service during the fiscal year shows that there have been transported—

	Passengers.
From the United States to Cuba	54,136
From Cuba to the United States	58,113
From the United States to Porto Rico	25,459
From Porto Rico to the United States	22,903
From the United States to the Philippines	36,225
From the Philippines to the United States	2,400
From the United States to Honolulu	1,901
From Honolulu to the United States	1,450
Total	202,587

From May 25, 1898, to October 10, 1899, a total of 270,154 passengers have been transported to Cuba, Porto Rico, Honolulu, and the Philippines, and returned to the United States from those places by the army transports of this Department.

The reports received show that during the year there were shipped—

From the United States to—	Animals.
Cuba	17,141
Porto Rico	5,722
Manila	865
From Cuba to the United States	1,772
From Porto Rico to the United States	1,853
Total	27,353

The shipments of freight, as shown by the reports received, have been on the—

	Tons.
Atlantic	49,074
Pacific	37,076
Total	86,150

In addition there have been transported large quantities of miscellaneous packages and baggage not included in the above.

The sum of $5,355,470.23 was paid during the past fiscal year for charter of all classes of vessels employed in the transport service; the sum of $7,445,700 for the purchase of all classes of vessels, and the sum of $2,654,696.92 for fitting up army transport ships and for supplies purchased for their maintenance at the two principal ports of the transport service, including pay of employees connected therewith.

The total amount of coal purchased during the fiscal year for use of transport vessels, as far as reported, is 121,200 tons.

FITTING UP ARMY TRANSPORTS.

The large steamships purchased for the transportation of troops on the Atlantic were merchant vessels, eight of them having been formerly used for the transportation of cattle and dressed meat, and were pro-

vided with refrigerators for preservation of large quantities of fresh meat. They were hastily fitted up for the transportation of troops to meet the needs then existing for the prompt landing of troops on the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico, and in addition rendered efficient service in furnishing fresh meat and other supplies to the troops on those islands. As the needs for this service diminished, action was taken for these ships to be permanently fitted up for the more comfortable and commodious accommodation of the officers and enlisted men taken on them. The army transports *Grant*, *Sherman*, and *Sheridan*, as heretofore stated, were the first to be refitted and put in thorough repair. They have proved to be model transport ships, and have fully met the expectations of the Department.

The *Hooker* was next refitted, with a view to its use for transportation of the deep-sea cable to the Philippines and for laying the cable, and extensive alterations in the work upon her were necessary to fit her for this service.

Three other army transports—the *Thomas*, *Logan*, and *Meade*—are now being refitted, and upon completion they will be transferred to the Pacific fleet, each taking a load of troops to Manila from the Atlantic coast via the Suez Canal early in November next.

The steamship *Missouri*, which had been loaned to the Medical Department as a hospital ship, and was purchased by this Department in April, 1899, has now been refitted so that it is a modern hospital ship. She has sailed for Manila.

The fleet of army transport ships which will remain in service on the Atlantic will also be refitted to make them model troop and freight ships. Two of these, the *Crook* and the *Sedgwick*, are now in the hands of contractors for refitting. When these vessels are completed contracts will be entered into for refitting others as they can be spared from the service.

REPATRIATION OF SPANISH PRISONERS IN THE PHILIPPINES.

Under the terms of the treaty of peace with Spain the prisoners of war in the Philippines have been transported thence to Spain. For this service, after advertisement for bids, the proposal of Messrs. J. M. Ceballos & Co., to transport these prisoners to Spain at the rate of $215 per capita for officers, furnishing them cabin accommodations and subsistence en route, and $73.75 per capita for enlisted men, furnishing them subsistence equal to the United States garrison ration, was accepted and contract entered into on March 4, 1899.

The proposal of Messrs. J. M. Ceballos & Co. was accompanied by a list of the vessels they proposed to use in the service, with a full description of their classification, capacity, speed, and accommodations, and stated the dates each ship would be ready to load.

No other proposal received complied with the terms of the advertisement in respect to furnishing lists of the ships to be used and their accommodations, or gave assurance that the entire service would be performed.

Up to the present time 1,218 officers and 8,769 enlisted men—Spanish prisoners of war—have been returned from the Philippines to Spain under the above contract, involving a cost of $908,583.75.

REGULATIONS FOR THE ARMY TRANSPORT SERVICE.

On November 16, 1898, the regulations for the government of the army transport service were approved by the Secretary of War and published for the information and guidance of all concerned.

After nearly a year's experience these regulations have been found to be ample for the efficient management of the army transport service.

An army transport flag has been adopted.

The conduct and maintenance of the army transport service have required the constant attention, the most arduous labor, and the utmost vigilance on the part of those whose duty it is to superintend and direct its affairs.

BARRACKS AND QUARTERS.

By act of Congress, approved March 15, 1898, the sum of $750,000 was provided under head of "Barracks and quarters." In the deficiency act, approved July 7, 1898, for the fiscal year 1898, but made available to January 1, 1899, the sum of $200,000 was appropriated. In the same act there was provided for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1898, the sum of $2,250,000, and in the deficiency act, approved March 3, 1899, the sum of $750,000 was appropriated. From appropriation for fiscal year 1897–98 there was a balance made available to January 1, 1899, amounting to $269,500, making a grand total of $4,219,500 available for construction, rent, etc.

During the last fiscal year the sum of $3,038,242.16 was authorized and expended for construction and repair of barracks and quarters, storehouses, temporary buildings at camps and depots, tent floors, etc., and for rent of storehouses, offices, barracks and quarters, and camp grounds, which included the sum of $1,180,552.98 expended from above-mentioned appropriations for temporary buildings, flooring tents, etc., in Cuba, Porto Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippines.

Included in the above expenditure the sum of $572,586.29 was expended during the year from barracks and quarters' appropriations for 1898–99 for flooring tents, constructing temporary shelter for troops at the various camps in the United States, and for building storehouses and temporary depots, and for rent of camp grounds and buildings in connection therewith; and the sum of $258,711.91 was expended from army transportation appropriation for water supply, sewerage, etc., making the total expenditures for the above mentioned purposes $831,298.20.

The sum of $453,704.97 was expended during the fiscal year for the erection of pavilion hospitals at the places mentioned below, which includes the cost of plumbing, water and sewer connections, lighting, roads, etc., necessary to complete the buildings for occupancy:

Fort Columbus, N. Y	$8,931.00
Fort Hamilton, N. Y	24,633.00
Fort Wadsworth, N. Y	16,855.00
Washington Barracks, D. C	8,775.00
Fort McPherson, Ga	20,528.49
Jefferson Barracks, Mo	2,108.00
Josiah Simpson General Hospital, near Fort Monroe, Va	123,571.64
Savannah, Ga., general hospital	109,926.28
Presidio, San Francisco, general hospital	118,376.56

During the fiscal year the sum of $103,184.16 for construction and $1,040.32 for water and sewer connections was expended for temporary barracks, mess halls, officers' quarters, hospitals, etc., erected during the fiscal year at various posts in the Department of the East in providing temporary winter quarters for artillery troops. The buildings were constructed in accordance with plans and specifications prepared in this office, giving about 40 feet of floor space for each man, with dormitories to hold from 60 to 75 men each, kitchen and mess room in rear, the buildings being located with a view to future utilization.

With the exception of Camp Meade, Pa., Chickamauga Park, Ga., the camp at the Presidio, the detention camp at Angel Island, Cal., and the depot at St. Asaph, Va., all the camps and temporary depots in the United States established since the beginning of the war with Spain have been practically discontinued.

The amounts expended during the fiscal year from barracks and quarters funds and for material and labor for flooring tents, constructing temporary buildings and repairing old buildings, and from army transportation and other appropriations for water supply, sewerage, plumbing, etc., in the islands occupied is, as far as reported, as follows:

Division of Cuba:	
From barracks and quarters appropriation	$908,985.86
From army transportation and other appropriations	452,653.39
Department of Porto Rico:	
From barracks and quarters appropriation	143,973.83
From army transportation appropriation	58,997.91
Honolulu:	
From barracks and quarters appropriation	27,536.38
From army transportation appropriation	18,492.52
Philippine Islands: From barracks and quarters appropriation	109,949.92
Total	1,720,589.81

MILITARY POSTS IN UNITED STATES.

In the act of Congress making appropriation for the sundry civil expenses of the Government for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899, the sum of $620,000 was appropriated for the construction of buildings at and the enlargement of such military posts as in the judgment of the Secretary of War may be necessary, and for the erection of barracks and quarters for artillery in connection with adopted project for seacoast defense (of which $50,000 was reserved for the purchase of suitable building sites), with the proviso that not more than $60,000 should be expended for barracks and quarters at a 1-battery post and $20,000 for each additional battery. The $620,000 above mentioned was apportioned as follows:

Fort Adams, R. I	$8,657.00
Fort Banks, Mass	50,851.78
Egmont Key, Fla	21,663.31
Fort Ethan Allen, Vt	93,543.85
Fort Point, Tex	9,449.00
Fort Greble, R. I	47,105.00
Hilton Head, S. C	965.00
Fort Hunt, Va	42,350.00
Fort McHenry, Md	4,590.00
Magnolia Bluff, Wash	15,095.00
Marrowstone Point, Wash	43,813.77
Fort Morgan, Ala	9,200.00
Fort Mott, N. J	3,160.00
Fort Myer, Va	50,585.00
Presidio of San Francisco, Cal	14,000.00
Fort Screven, Ga	7,400.00
Fort Stevens, Oreg	58,259.00
Fort Warren, Mass	19,360.00
Fort Williams, Me	15,786.00
Printing and advertising	1,504.97
Due on account of purchase of sites for artillery posts and available for extras at above-mentioned posts	102,661.32

Buildings at Forts Banks, Greble, and Hunt and the posts at Egmont Key and Marrowstone Point are being constructed for one battery of artillery, and Fort Stevens for two batteries. The hospital and the hospital stewards' quarters at Fort Point, Fort Morgan, and Fort Screven have been completed.

The act of Congress approved July 1, 1898, appropriated for continuing construction and improvements at the military post at Spokane, Wash., the sum of $40,000, and for construction and repairs of buildings at the military post at Fort Meade, S. Dak., $30,000, and for construction and repairs of buildings at Fort D. A. Russell, Wyo., $30,000. This act also renewed for the fiscal year 1899 the appropriation of $40,000 for beginning the construction of buildings, providing for sewerage, water supply, roads, and other means of communication and other necessary improvements at the military post at Bismarck, N. Dak.

The work authorized from the above appropriations is as follows:

NEW POST NEAR SPOKANE.

Proposals were invited for the construction of one double barrack and one double set of officers' quarters, but, owing to the great rise in the prices of material and labor, the lowest bid was much in excess of the amount appropriated, and the Comptroller of the Treasury having decided that the special appropriation could not be supplemented by the general appropriations, it was deemed best to reject all bids received, and to erect no more buildings until Congress had appropriated sufficient money for the purpose. For roads, walks, and crossings, however, there was allotted from the amount available, $9,000.

FORT MEADE, S. DAK.

Repairs to buildings, construction of barracks for one company, and for plumbing, gas piping, and heating apparatus for same, $25,092.50.

FORT D. A. RUSSELL, WYO.

Repairs to buildings, construction of bachelor officers' quarters, and for two double sets of officers' quarters, $29,778.

BISMARCK, N. DAK.

Construction of one double set of officers' quarters and barrack, plumbing, heating, and gas piping for same, and for laying out walks, etc., $39,662.

The work of constructing 774 linear feet of stone wall along the southern boundary at the military reservation of the Presidio of San Francisco was completed during the fiscal year, at a cost of $4,935.46.

The sum of $89,727.69 was expended during the fiscal year for the construction and repair of hospitals at military posts already established and occupied.

WATER SUPPLY, SEWERAGE, HEATING, LIGHTING, ETC.

From the appropriation for army transportation the sum of $787,722.22 has been expended for structural water supply, sewerage, plumbing, and drainage; $347,493.06 for roads, walks, grading, bridges, etc.; $77,208.45 for wharves, and $125,893.86 for miscellaneous purposes.

From the appropriation "regular supplies" the sum of $119,550.61 was expended during the year for heating, lighting, and cooking apparatus, etc.

In the act making appropriations for the sundry civil expenses of the Government for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899, approved July 1, 1898, Congress provided that "for the erection of barracks and quarters for artillery, in connection with the project adopted for seacoast defenses, there shall not hereafter be expended at any one point more

than $60,000 for a one-battery post, and $20,000 for each additional battery, from any appropriation made by Congress, unless special authority of Congress be granted for a greater expenditure." This act contemplated a strength of 65 men for batteries, whereas to-day the permanent authorized strength of heavy batteries is 80 men each, and the actual present strength 113 men. Since this act was passed all classes of building material and labor have advanced from 25 to 40 per cent, and this Department finds itself seriously hampered in providing suitable buildings under these restrictions. It is therefore recommended that Congress be requested to raise this limit of expenditure for barracks and quarters for one battery at seacoast defenses from $60,000 to $80,000, and for each additional battery or regimental headquarters from $20,000 to $30,000.

RESERVATIONS.

Under act of Congress approved July 8, 1886, forty-seven lots, comprising old Fort Brady, Mich., have been sold at public and private sale, and the sum of $42,350 received therefor, which sum, less cost of sales, has been deposited in the Treasury. Seventeen lots remain unsold.

Under act approved March 1, 1890, twelve lots, comprising old Fort Bliss, Tex., have been sold and the sum of $7,398 realized therefrom.

Under act of March 2, 1895, and July 1, 1898, providing for the establishment of a military post at or near Bismarck, N. Dak., certain tracts of land, covering post, garden, and target range sites, have been tendered by the citizens of the city to the Department, together with certain right of way for sewer line, and title thereto having been favorably reported upon by the Department of Justice, were duly accepted by the Secretary of War on May 4, 1899.

By paragraph 59, Special Orders, No. 37, Adjutant-General's Office, 1899, the Secretary of War appointed a board of officers to investigate and report upon the additional land necessary at the following named places, and to provide for the garrison which it was the intention to station at each place: also to ascertain the cost of such additional land, and whether the same could be obtained by purchase or by condemnation proceedings:

Fort Preble, Me.
Portland Head, Maine.
Cushing Island, Maine.
Great Hog Island, Maine.
Fort Constitution, N. H.
Long Island, Boston Harbor, Massachusetts.
Delaware City, Del.
Finns Point, New Jersey.
Hawkins Point, Maryland.
Northpoint, Md.
Sullivans Island, South Carolina.

Satisfactory sites for the artillery in connection with the adopted project for seacoast defenses have been acquired at Battery Point, Delaware; Tybee Island, Georgia, and Chinook Point, Washington, and negotiations are in progress for acquiring sites at Northpoint, Md., and Long Island Head, Massachusetts; and it is expected that proper titles will soon be obtained.

In connection with the muster out of troops returning from the Philippine Islands, provision has been made for their accommodation in a model camp established at the Presidio; also at Seattle Vancouver Barracks, and at Angel Island.

The Secretary of War directed reoccupation of Camp Meade, Pa., and various leases of the premises have since been executed.

Great care has been exercised and no reasonable expense spared to meet all needed water, sewer, and sanitary requirements at the several posts where the volunteer regiments are being organized, so as to fully insure the comfort and health of the men.

REFRIGERATING PLANT AT MANILA.

In view of urgent representation of need of a refrigerating and ice machine plant for comfort of troops in Manila, the Secretary of War authorized the erection of such a plant from revenues of the island.

This plant as designed and approved calls for a building 252 by 255 feet, two stories.

CAPACITY.

Dressed beef	long tons..	1,200
Dressed mutton	do....	200
Bacon	do....	100
Butter	do....	50
Vegetables	do....	100
Ice-making capacity per day	do....	40

EQUIPMENT.

Compound condensing engines, 100 horsepower each	3
Auxiliary engine of 100 horsepower	1
Water-tube boilers, 220 horsepower each	3
Refrigerating machines, 100 tons each	3

500-light dynamo with engine attached.

For the necessary machinery and setting up thereof, a contract was made on July 8, 1899, with the De la Vergne Refrigerating Company, for $195,162. Other contracts have followed with other parties for other needed materials and sent forward from San Francisco. The site for plant is located between the bridge of Spain and the suspension bridge on the south side of the Pasig River, being centrally located and especially accessible by both land and water, having a water frontage of 247 yards; depth, maximum, 150 yards; minimum, 125 yards; with street frontage on south side of 186 yards.

MILITARY DEPARTMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES.

During the past fiscal year there were nine military departments in the United States, viz: Department of the East, Department of the Lakes, Department of Dakota, Department of the Missouri, Department of the Gulf, Department of the Colorado, Department of California, Department of the Columbia, and Department of Texas. The Department of Texas was only reestablished on June 6, 1899. The Department of the Gulf was discontinued on October 2, 1899.

The work pertaining to the Quartermaster's Department in the abovementioned military departments was largely increased during the past fiscal year by reason of the supply and transportation incident to the increased army. The various posts situated within the limits of these respective departments were promptly and fully provided with all needful quartermaster supplies during the fiscal year.

The chief quartermaster, Department of the Columbia, states that the troops at Fort Wrangell, and Dyea, Alaska, at the close of the fiscal year were quartered in rented buildings. On July 28, 1899, forest fires destroyed the wharf and buildings occupied by the troops at Dyea, since which time the troops have been in camp at Skagway, Alaska.

NEW YORK DEPOT.

Col. Amos S. Kimball is the officer of this department in charge, assisted by Capt. I. W. Littell, assistant quartermaster, U. S. A.

The business transacted at this depot during the past fiscal year reached very large proportions.

The quartermaster's steamer *Ordnance*, including the crew, was turned over to the Ordnance Department on June 30, 1899, for use exclusively by that department, with the understanding that the right of ownership shall remain in the Quartermaster's Department. The steam lighter *Canby* was ordered from Havana to take the place of the *Ordnance*, and it is thought she can be of good service in connection with transportation of ordnance and other heavy freight to and from the various military posts located in the vicinity of New York City.

During the fiscal year transportation was furnished through the New York depot for 104,485 persons, 355 animals, and 83,787 tons of supplies, not including transportation furnished on Government transports.

Fifty-two millions eight hundred and seventy-two thousand and sixty-three pounds of hay, 39,778,301 pounds of oats, 1,119,400 pounds of bran, and 186,361 pounds of straw were shipped during the fiscal year to Cuba and Porto Rico through this depot.

Colonel Kimball, in addition to his duties as depot quartermaster, performed the duties of general superintendent, army transport service, during the first seven months of the past fiscal year, which were of great magnitude.

WASHINGTON DEPOT.

Maj. T. E. True, quartermaster, U. S. A., is in charge of this general depot.

He reports a large increase in the business transacted at this depot during the past fiscal year; that transportation was furnished by his depot to 45,275 officers and men, 2,694 horses, and 23,381 tons of supplies shipped and received.

PHILADELPHIA DEPOT.

Lieut. Col. J. V. Furey, deputy quartermaster general, U. S. A., is the officer in charge of this depot, assisted by Lieut. Col. C. A. H. McCauley, deputy quartermaster-general, U. S. A., and Maj. G. S. Bingham, quartermaster, U. S. Volunteers (captain and assistant quartermaster, U. S. A.).

Lieutenant-Colonel Furey states in his report that—

At the commencement of hostilities with Spain the storage facilities at Schuylkill Arsenal were found totally inadequate. The rental of storage room as well as facilities for cutting garments gave temporary relief. In the meantime two temporary buildings were erected on the Arsenal grounds. Further demands for storage room was imperative, and two additional buildings are now being constructed. These will afford considerable additional space for storage, yet it is feared that they will not prove adequate to house all the supplies required to have on hand to meet present and future demands.

Plans are now in course of preparation for the erection of a receiving and sponging room building, which, if authorized, will relieve some of the congestion referred to. Steps have been taken looking to the erection of a building at the Schuylkill Arsenal for storage purposes only. The grounds are suitable, with ample space to construct a building of sufficient capacity to meet the wants of the service for many years to come.

During the fiscal year transportation was furnished from this depot for 9,753 officers and men and 52,425 tons of material.

JEFFERSONVILLE DEPOT.

Lieut. Col. Charles R. Barnett, deputy quartermaster general, U. S. A. assumed charge of this depot on October 3, 1898. He is assisted in the work by Maj. John W. Pullman, quartermaster, U. S. A.

From a report made to this office by Lieutenant Colonel Barnett, under date of August 31, 1899, it is shown that during the past fiscal year the work at this depot relative to the purchase, manufacture, and issue of quartermaster supplies has been very large, requiring the services of 1,320 employees, 1,200 of whom are operatives and 20 are cutters, who are engaged in the manufacturing department.

Sixteen thousand seven hundred and thirty one tons of freight were handled at this depot during the fiscal year.

ST. LOUIS, MO., DEPOT.

Lieut. Col. G. C. Smith, deputy quartermaster-general, U. S. A., was in charge of this depot during the past fiscal year. He died suddenly on July 13, 1899.

Maj. Charles A. Booth, quartermaster, U. S. A., who was assistant to the depot quartermaster and temporarily in charge of the St. Louis depot, reports that during the past fiscal year transportation was provided at that depot for 867 officers, 27,143 men, and 18,183 tons of military supplies.

SAN FRANCISCO DEPOT.

Maj. O. F. Long, quartermaster, U. S. Volunteers (captain and assistant quartermaster, U. S. A.), has been in charge of this general depot of the Quartermaster's Department from August 10, 1898. He was assisted by Capt. N. P. Batchelder, assistant quartermaster, U. S. Volunteers.

By reason of the operation of the army in the Philippines, the work of this depot has very largely increased during the past fiscal year.

In addition to the arduous duties devolving upon this depot in supplying the troops stationed in the vicinity of California, large quantities of clothing and other quartermaster supplies were sent therefrom to Manila, Honolulu, and to the North Alaska expedition under Maj. P. H. Ray, U. S. A.

Major Long, in addition to his depot duties, performed the work required in connection with the army transport service at San Francisco, Cal., to April 1, 1899. On that date he was regularly assigned as general superintendent army transport service, San Francisco, Cal., in addition to his other duties, and for the remainder of the fiscal year he performed the duties relating to the transport service separate and distinct from his depot duties.

During the fiscal year 91,070 persons, 1,249 animals, and 75,630 tons of supplies were transported, which shows a large increase over the previous fiscal year.

During October, November, and December, 1898, over 9,000 Christmas boxes and packages for the troops in Manila and Honolulu were received and shipped at this depot.

QUARTERMASTER'S OFFICE, BOSTON, MASS.

Maj. J. McE. Hyde, quartermaster, U. S. A., was in charge of this office.

The volume of work falling upon the Boston office was considerably increased over that of the preceding fiscal year.

SAVANNAH DEPOT.

On November 19, 1898, Lieut. Col. John B. Bellinger, depot quartermaster, Tampa, Fla., was, in addition to that duty, assigned in charge of the quartermaster's depot at Savannah, Ga.

He arrived at Savannah on November 24, 1898, and immediately organized the depot on a large scale, and assumed charge of the important work to be accomplished at that place, in connection with the storage, issue, and forwarding of the vast amount of property and supplies by transports to Cuba and Porto Rico, including supplies for troops encamped at Savannah and embarking from and returning there for muster out.

As the camps located at Augusta and Macon, Ga.; Greenville, S. C.; Anniston and Huntsville, Ala., were broken up, large quantities of supplies no longer required at these places were shipped to the Savannah and Chickamauga depots.

Colonel Bellinger also made the necessary preparations for the return of the volunteer troops from Cuba through the Savannah quarantine stations, and from thence to detention camps. The total number of officers, enlisted men, and civilian employees arriving at Savannah quarantine station between March 20 and April 26, 1899, was 17,744.

On April 12, 1899, the quartermaster's office and business at Charleston, S. C., was placed under the direction of the depot quartermaster at Savannah.

Capt. Robert L. Brown, assistant quartermaster, U. S. Volunteers, at Tampa, Fla., and Capt. E. Willis, assistant quartermaster, U. S. Volunteers, at Charleston, S. C., performed duty under the direction of Colonel Bellinger.

The following is a partial résumé of the work accomplished at Savannah, under Colonel Bellinger's direction, from December 1, 1898, to June 30, 1899:

Troops shipped by rail	number	11,557
Troops embarked on transports	do	27,737
Troops returned by transports	do	18,650
Public property received by rail	pounds	58,648,474
Public property shipped by rail	do	33,895,996
Public property shipped by transport	do	32,945,670
Transports cleared		64
Animals received and shipped		11,507
Animals sold		1,040

CHICKAMAUGA PARK DEPOT.

Capt. D. E. McCarthy, assistant quartermaster, U. S. A., is the officer in charge of the quartermaster's depot located at Chickamauga Park, Georgia.

During the past fiscal year, as long as any troops were encamped at Chickamauga Park, they were furnished with all necessary quartermaster supplies from this depot. The work at times reached very large proportions.

The principal operations of this depot during the past fiscal year consisted of the following:

Freight cars loaded and unloaded	2,502
Officers and men transported	17,299
Horses and mules issued	4,566
Horses and mules shipped	3,947
Horses and mules received	9,934
Horses and mules sold	2,260

As rapidly as the camps in the South were discontinued, large quantities of supplies pertaining to this Department, no longer required at such camps, were sent to Chickamauga depot for storage and issue or other disposition.

CAMP MEADE DEPOT.

This depot was first established on August 17, 1898, in connection with the supply of the Second Army Corps. Maj. F. Von Schrader, quartermaster, U. S. Volunteers (captain and assistant quartermaster, U. S. A.), was assigned to take charge of the work. Under his direction storehouses were built and necessary supplies purchased. Hay, grain, and straw were shipped in from the West; wood was obtained in the vicinity of the camp until the supply was exhausted, when it was secured from points in West Virginia. Lumber for tent floors and other purposes was obtained from the hemlock regions around Williamsport, Pa.

The camp of the Second Army Corps, before its departure from Camp Meade, was stretched over an area of 7½ miles or more. It was supplied with water from three deep wells, which was pumped into three tanks, having a capacity of about 100,000 gallons.

After the departure of the Second Army Corps to new camps in the South, active operations at Camp Meade were practically suspended, but on March 11, 1899, the camp was reestablished on a limited scale, and is still in operation.

ST. ASAPH DEPOT, VA.

Capt. E. H. Parsons, assistant quartermaster, U. S. Volunteers, is in charge of this depot. It is situated about 6 miles from Washington and 2 miles from Alexandria, Va., on the Washington, Alexandria and Mount Vernon Electric Railway and the Southern Railroad.

The site consists of about 70 acres of land, upon which are four warehouses erected by the Government, and one building used as the main warehouse and office. There is stabling capacity at this depot for 1,000 animals.

Nine thousand six hundred and eighty five mules, 2,649 horses, and 130,210,480 pounds of property were handled at this depot during the past fiscal year.

HAVANA, CUBA.

Lieut. Col. Charles W. Williams, deputy quartermaster-general, U. S. A., was the first officer of this Department to be assigned to duty in Havana. He arrived there on October 12, 1898, but soon after was taken down with the yellow fever, from which he died on November 11, 1898.

Lieut. Col. C. F. Humphrey, deputy quartermaster general, U. S. A., was then assigned to duty as chief quartermaster at Havana, where he arrived on November 16, 1898. On January 1, 1899, he was announced as chief quartermaster, Division of Cuba, with station at Havana. He was appointed brigadier general of volunteers September 21, 1898, which volunteer rank he held until June 12, 1899.

Colonel Humphrey reports that at the time of his arrival at Havana, on November 16, 1898, the city was still garrisoned and patroled by Spanish troops and the Cuban forces were camped in the surrounding country; that the first organization of Spanish troops left Havana on

November 6, 1898, and the last on January 14, 1899. Between these dates 45,000 Spanish troops embarked from the city, which are the figures furnished by the agent of the transportation company which carried the troops. In the meantime the United States troops commenced to arrive at Havana, for which preparation had to be made.

Colonel Humphrey states that—

The first work to be undertaken was the establishment of a camp on the site selected therefor, near Marianao, Cuba, about 9 miles distant from the city of Havana. This work was in the main intrusted to the Second United States Volunteer Engineers, under command of Col. Willard Young, materials therefor being supplied by this office. It included the cleaning and grading of the ground, and the construction of numerous temporary hospitals, kitchens, sheds, bakeries, etc. The most important and expensive feature of the work was the digging of sinks, the soil being but from 4 to 6 inches deep, below which lies a solid lava rock, and the sinks which were necessarily at least 6 feet in depth, were blasted in this rock, and many thousands of dollars were expended in this work alone. It was done mainly under the supervision of the Second United States Volunteer Engineers, but the actual labor was performed by Cubans employed and paid by his office.

The lumber used in the construction of the temporary camp, the laying of tent floors, and the erection of kitchens, sheds, sinks, and other minor temporary buildings amounted, in the aggregate, to 2,700,000 feet, part of which was utilized in the construction of the more permanent buildings.

As soon as the preliminary arrangements for the camp were determined, and the clearing and grubbing of the ground had been completed, the next most important work was the water supply. For this purpose it was decided to make connection with the Vinto Springs supply, from which the supply of the city of Havana is derived. This necessitated the construction of a pumping station and the installation of two pumps, each of 400,000 gallons daily capacity, with the necessary boiler plant, etc., and the laying of 12,500 feet of 6-inch pipe for connection with said supply, and the laying of innumerable branch lines, amounting in all to not less than 25 miles of pipe, ranging in size from 1 to 8 inches. This, of course, was not all laid at one time; but, as the troops came in and were located, the necessary supply and distributing pipes were laid or changed to suit the location of troops.

To render this supply steady and reliable, an iron tank, on timber foundation, was constructed, with a capacity of 60,000 gallons. This tank or reservoir answered the double purpose of regulating the pressure upon the pumps and storing a supply for emergency, in case of temporary disability of the pumping station.

Next, after providing means of water supply, came the question of the disposition of the sewage from so large a camp. To meet this requirement, a sewer was constructed extending from the main hospital to the sea, and with it the camp and main buildings are to be connected. This necessitated the laying of 18,396 feet of 8-inch and 1,412 feet of 6-inch pipe. The plans also called for the construction of bath houses and closets. Fourteen bath houses were built, but were never put in general use, as the regiments were withdrawn before their completion.

The plumbing materials used in this work and the lumber used in the construction of the houses were saved as far as possible and utilized in the construction of the more permanent camp.

The troops arriving here during the months of November, December, and January, and for Pinar del Rio as late as February 19, were all supplied with tents, which were floored to the number of 3,500, using in this work alone 945,000 feet of lumber. Two large warehouses, 210 by 18 feet each, for the quartermaster's and subsistence departments were among the buildings first constructed. In connection with the two warehouses and for convenience in handling lumber, wood, and other supplies for troops, railroad tracks were built at Buena Vista and Quemados to the extent of 3,150 feet, extending to and connecting with the warehouses referred to.

In connection with the semipermanent work at the camp, there was also constructed a cemetery for the burial of deceased soldiers and civilian employees. The same difficulty was met here in the excavation for graves and the digging of post holes that was encountered in digging sinks throughout the camp—in both cases they were blasted out of the solid rock. In connection with this camp it was also found necessary to repair the main roadway leading to Havana and its various laterals extending throughout the camp. This work involved the repair or construction of about 11 miles of wagon roads, aside from roads located within the camp. Such of the foregoing work as was done in the establishment of the temporary camp for the Seventh Army Corps, with the exception of the water system, the roadway, and the sewer, in part, was necessarily destroyed when the troops were withdrawn, and replaced with new constructions in making the latter and more permanent camp, now occupied by the troops and known as Camp Columbia.

The original selection of the site for the purpose required was doubtless the best that could be made under the circumstances, and its retention as the site of the newly-built post was a necessity, though it involved the re-bearing of the ground and the removal of much débris, including some 4,000 wagonloads of rock, which had been deposited there during the earlier occupation of the neighboring grounds.

The following is a brief recapitulation of the building operations and other works and improvements at Camp Columbia:

Number of building constructed		157
Quantity of lumber used	feet	3,500,000
Water-supply pipe laid	do	18,000
Sewer pipe laid	do	19,808
Pumping stations constructed and equipped		2
Railroad constructed	feet	3,150
Wagon road repaired, rebuilt, and constructed	miles	17
Value of lumber used, estimated		$70,000
Value of miscellaneous building material, nails, hardware, etc., estimated		$55,000
Cost of civilian labor employed		$240,000

For the accommodation of the troops and the quartermaster's and other departments, 157 buildings were constructed at Camp Columbia, near Havana, 52 at Pinar del Rio, 31 at Guanajay, 6 at Triscornia, and 24 shops, sheds, etc., at Havana, for quartermaster's department corral. Twenty-eight buildings are in course of construction at Cabanas. The sum of $171,036.62 was expended for construction of barracks at Marianao.

The troops and property transported under Colonel Humphrey's direction aggregated 848 officers, 27,344 men, 868 horses, 1,673 mules, and 48,408 tons of supplies.

The sum of $211,581.74 was expended during the fiscal year on account of the construction of military railroad, Triscornia, Cuba, including pier, and the sum of $17,582.48 for the maintenance and repair thereof. Under orders of the Secretary of War, the Quartermaster's Department is to be reimbursed for the expenditures made for this road and wharf from the Cuban civil fund.

Col. Frank J. Hecker, quartermaster, U. S. Volunteers, arranged for the construction of the above-mentioned railroad and wharf, and performed energetic and important service in this and other work until the date of his resignation, May 1, 1899.

Colonel Humphrey states that the handling and shipping of large quantities of Cuban rations and relief supplies which have been sent to the island has entailed much additional labor on the Quartermaster's Department.

In connection with the subject of the revenues of the island, upon his office has devolved the disbursing during the present fiscal year of $217,747.71 derived from this source, of which sum $50,000 was deposited in the Treasury to reimburse the Quartermaster's Department for amount paid from appropriation "National defense" for street cleaning, etc., in Havana.

Under the direction of the major general commanding the division, the remaining funds have been expended in the repair and renovation of public buildings, the title to which is not vested in the United States, but which are now in its possession and devoted to its uses and purposes, such as the permanent hospital in the city of Havana, the headquarters of the major general commanding the division, and the pirotecnia militar, to be devoted to the uses of the Quartermaster's and Ordnance departments for storage purposes.

The repair and renovation of these buildings, while paid for from the revenues of the island, have added to the labors and responsibilities of his office to no inconsiderable extent.

Colonel Humphrey submits with his report a statement showing the arrival and departure of vessels at Havana, Cuba, from November, 1898, to June 30, 1899, indicating from whence they came, their destination, and how loaded.

DEPARTMENT OF PROVINCE OF HAVANA AND PINAR DEL RIO.

Maj. James L. Wilson quartermaster, U. S. Volunteers (captain, Sixth Artillery, U. S. A.), is the chief quartermaster of this department.

He reports that on December 15, 1898, he arrived at Havana. Headquarters of the Second Division, Seventh Army Corps, of which he was then chief quartermaster, were established at Buena Vista, afterwards Camp Columbia. On March 9, 1899, he was assigned as chief quartermaster of the province of Havana. His duties related chiefly to the supply of troops with clothing and such stores as were called for and required in the field, the issue of forage and wood, and on the breaking up of the Seventh Army Corps the receiving and caring for the quantities of tentage, stores, and means of transportation which had been previously supplied this corps.

DEPARTMENT OF HAVANA.

Maj. John T. French, jr., quartermaster, U. S. Volunteers (captain and assistant quartermaster, U. S. A.), is chief quartermaster, Department of Havana, to which duty he was assigned on April 28, 1899.

He reports that on May 17, 1899, the department commander ordered the construction on the site east of Cabanas of the following buildings: Ten barracks and mess rooms, two officers' quarters and mess rooms, stable, storehouse, forage storehouse, etc., part of which were completed at close of fiscal year and remainder in course of erection.

DEPARTMENT OF MATANZAS AND SANTA CLARA.

Maj. James B. Aleshire, quartermaster, U. S. Volunteers (captain and assistant quartermaster, U. S. A.), is chief quartermaster of the abovementioned department, but he is now temporarily absent on detached duty in the United States, under the instructions of the Quartermaster-General.

Maj. W. H. Miller, quartermaster, U. S. Volunteers (captain and assistant quartermaster, U. S. A.), in addition to his other duties, is acting chief quartermaster during the absence of Major Aleshire.

Major Miller reports that from January 3, 1899, to April 17, 1899, he was chief quartermaster, Department of Santa Clara. He assumed duty as disbursing quartermaster at Matanzas on May 8, 1899, and since July 4, 1899, he has been acting chief quartermaster of the consolidated Department of Matanzas and Santa Clara.

He reports that the headquarters of the First Army Corps arrived at Matanzas on January 11, 1899. Upon arrival of the troops, camps were selected, tent floors laid, and the camps fully established. Suitable buildings for offices were also rented.

When the volunteers were replaced by regulars, preparation was made for permanent barracks for their occupation. The repair of Santa Cristina Barracks, the Cuartel de Caballeria, the Santa Ysbel Hospital in Matanzas, and the Spanish barracks in the city of Cardenas was determined upon, to be paid from the island funds. The work of repairing these buildings has been fully completed.

A new post for six troops of the Second United States Cavalry was directed to be built by division headquarters, according to plans furnished by the chief quartermaster of the division. Work was commenced in the middle of April, and was so far finished at the expiration of the last fiscal year that two troops of the Second United States Cavalry had moved in. The remaining troops removed into these quarters on July 6, 1899.

The water supplied to the troops in Matanzas is from the city waterworks.

SANTIAGO, CUBA.

Maj. John T. Knight, quartermaster, U. S. Volunteers (captain and assistant quartermaster, U. S. A.), submits a report of the operations of the quartermaster's department in the Department of Santiago from September 18, 1898, to June 30, 1899.

He was first assigned to duty as depot quartermaster at Santiago, and later, in addition thereto, assumed the duties of chief quartermaster of the department. Upon him devolved very largely the work of organizing the permanent quartermaster's depot at Santiago and erecting the necessary storehouses, etc., required.

His assistants were Capt. A. M. Palmer, assistant quartermaster, U. S. A., and Capt. W. S. Scott, assistant quartermaster, U. S. Volunteers, the latter being in charge of ocean transportation.

The construction work accomplished during the year consisted of the following: Crematory, ten bath houses at general hospital, plumbing same, fence around quartermaster's corral, quartermaster's storehouse, exclusive of labor and paint.

Under Major Knight's administration many thousand dollars' worth of Government property and animals were recovered from the Cubans. Much of the property had been abandoned by the Fifth Army Corps, and to recover it required the most untiring and persistent efforts.

DEPARTMENT OF PORTO RICO.

Maj. John W. Pullman, quartermaster, U. S. A., who was in charge of the temporary quartermaster's depot at Ponce from August 22, 1898, to October 15, 1898, removed the same to San Juan on the latter date, and on October 19, 1898, was, in addition to his duties as depot quartermaster, announced as chief quartermaster of the Department of Porto Rico, with station at San Juan. He was relieved from these duties by Maj. John L. Clem, quartermaster, U. S. A., on May 8, 1899.

Major Clem reports, under date of August 28, 1899, that the topography of the island of Porto Rico, and the lack of roads, renders it difficult to transport stores from the quartermaster's depot to posts. Some of the posts, he states, are inaccessible except by pack trains, the military road leading from San Juan to Ponce being the only road by which wagon transportation is in any way serviceable in wet weather. From his report it is shown that the Department of Porto Rico is liberally supplied with means of transportation.

A corral has been established at Rio Piedras as a hospital, and is still in operation, where all stock turned in at San Juan is subjected to a rigid inspection and quarantine. The sound stock is turned into pasture to recuperate, and those showing unmistakable evidence of glanders are submitted to a board of survey or at once shot.

The Government buildings at Aguadilla, Arecibo, Cayey, Ponce, Mayaguez, and San German, consist of eleven brick and stone and six

frame structures. With the exception of the three sets of brick and stone quarters at Mayaguez, and the six frame structures which were provided by the United States, all the brick and stone buildings at the above-mentioned posts were acquired from Spain. They had been used by Spanish troops, and were left by them in a bad state of repair. The arrangements of these buildings did not conform to modern ideas of proper sanitary arrangements. This required large expenditures in the way of repairs, so that they might be made habitable.

Major Clem reports that the breaking up of the posts at Yauco, Bayamon, Utuado, Vieques, and Santurce, and the abandonment of Ponce as a quartermaster's depot has very materially reduced the expenses, and has been to the great interest of the service. The policy recently inaugurated of maintaining fewer posts, with outlying detachments, has proven advantageous so far as the Quartermaster's Department is concerned.

DEPOT AT HONOLULU.

Four batteries of the Sixth United States Artillery, together with a number of men of the hospital corps, at present constitute the United States garrison at Honolulu.

Maj. George Ruhlen, quartermaster, U. S. Volunteers (captain and assistant quartermaster, U. S. A.), is in charge of the quartermaster's depot at Honolulu, where he arrived August 28, 1898.

The following buildings have been erected at Honolulu for the accommodation of the troops:

4 barracks for troops, one story, 30 by 160 feet.
1 guardhouse, one story, 20 by 40 feet, with an addition 20 by 18 feet.
1 administration building, one story, 16 by 20 feet, with an L 20 by 25 feet.
1 post hospital building, one story, 20 by 100 feet.
4 bath houses for enlisted men, one story, 12 by 18 feet.
4 water-closets for the dry-earth-closet system, 10 by 20 feet.
2 water tanks on trestles, each 5,000 gallons capacity.
1 bakehouse, 20 by 20 feet.
1 quartermaster and subsistence storehouse, 30 by 175 feet.
1 stable, with shelter for 40 animals, and wagon shed.

The materials for these buildings were furnished by the Quartermaster's Department, but the buildings themselves were erected by the enlisted men of the engineer battalion, and no expense therefor incurred.

The Hawaiian Government owns and controls the water supply plant of the city of Honolulu. All the water used by the troops in camp and at the hospitals and for the quartermaster's department corral has been supplied free of charge. It was necessary to lay about 2,200 feet of 3-inch galvanized iron distributing pipe from the point of supply to the garrison site. The sewage is conducted by means of vitrified sewer pipes to a lagoon, which connects eventually with the ocean. All labor connected with the construction of the water-supply and sewerage system was largely performed by enlisted men of the battalion of volunteer engineers.

The building previously provided for hospital, affording accommodations for 100 patients, was found insufficient, and on November 24, 1898, measures were taken to erect a pavilion hospital ward, with room for 125 patients, and separate structures connected with the main ward by broad, protected board walks. These buildings were completed on January 5, 1899, and contained an administration office and dispensary building, a kitchen and mess room, a bath house with hot and cold water, water-closets, etc., together with a complete water-supply and

sewerage systems; also a storeroom for medicines and medical property, and a cold storage room or refrigerator, and a dormitory for 30 attendants.

The total expenditure of the Quartermaster's Department for construction, repairs, alterations, etc., of hospitals and for the care of sick since August, 1898, exclusive of rentals for leased premises, amounts to $17,137.93.

Major Ruhlen states that the draft mules sent from the United States for service in Honolulu are doing well. Experience has shown that light animals, below rather than above medium size, are better adapted for local conditions of climate and topography than large and heavy animals.

The transports carrying troops and supplies from San Francisco to Manila have generally stopped at Honolulu for coal and water. Fifty-nine ships have been thus supplied and provided with minor repairs to their equipment and machinery. All port charges for wharfage, pilotage, and for water furnished at wharves to army transports have been remitted by the Hawaiian Government, which at the rates paid by vessels in the merchant service would be very considerable. The wharves are owned and contributed by the Hawaiian Government.

The harbor accommodations are at present very limited. Extensive improvements under the direction of the United States Navy Department are under way, looking to the construction of large slips and docks, with sufficient depth of water for the largest war ships and with especial appliances for coaling and for discharging cargo, all to be available for vessels of the United States Navy. Until this work is completed and it is determined to what extent the facilities being made by the Navy for naval vessels can be used by the army transport service it is not deemed advisable that any work be done by the Quartermaster's Department toward the same end. The same remarks apply to the subject of constructing coal sheds or other facilities for storing steam coal for transports.

The average cost of coal delivered on the wharf at Honolulu for the Quartermaster's Department is $7.75 per ton. The coal thus far delivered consists of Nanaimo and Australian coal.

The work of coaling transports is done by an organized body of native Hawaiian laborers, under the control of the Pacific Mail and Occidental and Oriental and the Oceanic Steamship companies. The steamship companies furnish the required number of men and render itemized bills for their services for each transport. The work is carried on under the supervision of Major Ruhlen. The laborers receive as compensation $2 per day for eight hours' work, with double pay for night and Sunday work.

Major Ruhlen reports that the matter of finding a site that would be suitable in all respects for a military post in or near Honolulu, in the event that it is determined to station a permanent garrison there, is being considered, and report thereof will be submitted hereafter. He further reports that all forage for animals, except a small quantity of green sorghum, raised in some places for dairy cows, is imported into the islands. That no timber suitable for building purposes is found. Even wood for fuel is becoming scarce and commands a high price. A very refractory grayish volcanic rock, which is abundant everywhere, is used to some extent for building purposes, but the difficulty of working it into shape makes it very costly for any purposes except where it can be used in the rough. No soil adapted for making brick has yet been found. All limes and cements used in building are imported. The

lumber almost wholly used is the so called "Nor'west" or Oregon and Washington fir and the redwoods of the Pacific coast of the United States. Corrugated galvanized iron is much used for roofing, but the salty sea air is very destructive to unprotected, exposed metallic surfaces. Ordinary sheet iron, even when painted, deteriorates so rapidly that it is practically useless. All blacksmith's iron and steel, even when kept under shelter, is in a short time covered with a coating of rust.

Major Ruhlen makes due acknowledgments to all the executive departments of the Hawaiian Government for courtesies and assistance extended to him in the discharge of his official duties.

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

Lieut. Col. J. W. Pope, quartermaster, U. S. Volunteers (major and quartermaster, U. S. A.), was chief quartermaster, Department of the Pacific, with station at Manila, during the past fiscal year.

On November 16 of last year Colonel Pope made a partial report to this office, which was received too late to incorporate in my last annual report. From this report it is shown that on May 17, 1898, he was assigned to duty as chief quartermaster of the expeditionary forces for the Philippines. He arrived in San Francisco en route to Manila on May 25, 1898.

The work of preparation in San Francisco for the expedition to the Philippine Islands was pushed with great vigor. The first expedition under General Anderson had departed before Colonel Pope's arrival at San Francisco, and the second left on the 15th of June. He sailed on the *Newport* June 29, two days after the rest of the fleet, and arrived at Manila Bay on July 25, 1898.

Colonel Pope states that upon his arrival at Manila Bay the situation of affairs, so far as the Quartermaster's Department was concerned, was one of the most remarkable that ever confronted a transportation officer. The fleet of the second expedition was mostly to be unloaded; the troops of that expedition were investing the city of Manila and holding the town of Cavite; they were to be fed and clothed from two different points, separated by the bay, and communication kept open. The camp of the investing force was situated near the shore of the bay, several miles from the city of Manila, to the north, where the water was so shallow that neither the steamers which did the towing nor the steam launch of the Quartermaster's Department could approach, as the bay was rough. It was often difficult to get the cascoes containing rations and other supplies to the shore without endangering the destruction of the vessels and of the stores.

Rowboats, generally hired from the natives, somewhat like northern kyacks, had to be utilized to take off those arriving at the camp. The boats of the transports were too large to be suitable for the purpose.

The casco, which is the "lighter" of the natives, consists of a heavy flat-bottomed boat, capable of holding from 50 to 100 tons of freight, which was covered over with matting to protect the stores.

While the question of water transportation was vital, that of land transportation was also very important, as more troops and supplies were landed. The means of land transportation consisted of ox carts and pony carts for supplies, and ponies, caramatos, and carriages for persons. Hiring became so expensive and difficult that buying of ponies and teams had to be resorted to in a large measure. The price of a pony ran up from $15 and $20 to $100 and $150 per animal.

The need of such transportation increased, as rough weather soon began to compel landing at a distance from Camp Dewey, chiefly at Paranaque, 3 miles away. A landing was found at Paranaque, at the mouth of a river, where was a species of wharf, and this landing was much more secure than that at Camp Dewey, though a bar across the mouth of the river in the bay made ingress and egress difficult at low tide. Some of the landing was done at Bakor, but this was too far from the camp (7 miles), and the road too bad to make the place suitable for landing.

A train was organized from ponies and carts, which sufficed to move the effects landed at Paranaque. Natives and Chinamen were engaged to assist, and some carabou carts, a very slow but by far the best of all modes of transportation of stores, were also secured to aid in transporting the numerous supplies for the increasing command at Camp Dewey.

A large side-wheel steamer, the *Kwong Hoi*, was chartered, which proved of inestimable value in moving troops and supplies during some two weeks immediately preceding the capture of Manila, and in moving the main portion of the escort of the commanding general into Manila on the occasion of the surrender. This boat could, in high water, land at the wharf at Cavite, and at the time of the greatest need Colonel Pope succeeded in moving on this vessel a good part of the troops left on the transports into Cavite, whence they were also sent as needed to Paranaque. This vessel could carry 1,000 men and many tons of freight at once. It became necessary, however, to hasten operations, and the navy was asked to aid in landing the remainder of the troops at Cavite and on the transports at Paranaque, and three or four navy launches, with some navy rowboats and those of the transports, were used to complete landing of the residue of the command at Paranaque.

Colonel Pope further states that after our troops occupied Manila, the duties of the Quartermaster's Department in providing quarters for the troops, by constructing or renting; transportation by land and water, which included purchase of boats, ponies, bulls, and carts; forage for the animals; fuel, warehouses, printing, etc., were very arduous. There had been no building done at Manila for a number of years, and the sudden advent of 15,000 troops made it very difficult to provide sufficient quarters for the troops.

In a report dated August 11, 1899, recently received from Colonel Pope, he completes his narrative of the operations of the Quartermaster's Department in the Philippines to the end of June 30, 1899. He states that a large portion of the expenditures in connection with the duties mentioned in the preceding paragraphs were made from the "public civil funds."

He further states that it was necessary to provide native forage, consisting of "paddy" (rice in the husk) and grass for the ponies and oxen purchased and hired; but it was difficult to do this after the war with the Filipinos broke out, as much of the forage had come from beyond the hostile lines, and this could not always be done without trouble. The price was raised accordingly. He says that it has been found that the American animals—horses and mules—can become accustomed to native forage to a considerable extent.

A considerable part of the duties of his office, as well as those of the depot quartermaster, has been the purchase of various miscellaneous supplies, in addition to clothing, immediately needed, such as stationery, plumbing supplies, horse medicines, brick, lime, cement, furniture, and

a great variety of such articles. When such could not be found on the islands, purchase has been occasionally made at Hongkong.

Colonel Pope favors the supply of the troops in the Philippines from the United States in all respects, so far as possible, and he knows of nothing that can be furnished with more certainty of satisfaction than mules and horses. The horses thrive there just as well as the mules.

After the radius of the captured territory about Manila increased so as to take in a considerable portion of the bay shore, supply of troops was rapidly changed from land to water transportation, which was much more desirable and available, especially during the calmer season previous to July. The river gunboats ran up the Rio Grande and added to their usefulness by towing barges and cascoes to supply garrisons along that and other rivers. Paranaque, Bacoor, and other southern towns were also supplied from the bay, and all troops along the Pasig River have been so supplied.

Since the capture of Iloilo and the taking possession of the islands of Cebu, Negros, and Jolo it has been necessary to supply the forces stationed in those islands from Manila. Fortunately there is a line of steamers owned by the Compania Maritima, which run about the islands, and these have been of great aid when no transports have been available, and their vessels have been frequently chartered as needed. A depot has been established at Iloilo, which partially supplies the wants of these forces.

Under the orders of the department commander, Colonel Pope purchased thirteen Spanish gunboats and several launches, and chartered a number of small steamers, the expense of which has been borne by the public civil fund. Numerous cascoes and launches have been under hire habitually for use of unloading transports and coaling same, and taking coal from colliers, unloading and loading supplies, and all the various needs of water transportation.

Colonel Pope further reports that as soon as Caloocan was taken a considerable amount of rolling stock of the Manila and Dagupan Railroad fell into the hands of our forces, and, as it would greatly facilitate the supply of the troops to use this road, possession was taken of the same and the road was worked by detailed enlisted men and quartermaster's employees. This road has been steadily repaired as the troops have moved forward, and was a constant base of supply until San Fernando was reached, when a permanent base was formed at the other extremity of our possessions. Under the supervision of Maj. C. A. Devol, the transportation quartermaster, this road has been kept constantly running, to the great comfort and convenience of the troops. Corporal Haisch (now lieutenant), of the Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry, deserves great credit for his work as active manager of the train service. With the exception of a short time, on one or two occasions when the road had been torn up by insurgents, the railroad has performed regular service and has been well conducted.

The hiring of common and skilled labor at Manila has involved much work and care, and it is difficult, he states, to see what could be done without the Chinese in this respect, as they do most of the heavy work of loading and unloading of supplies, coaling, and carrying. Common labor had to be hired for unloading and loading stores, coaling, carrying small supplies, cleaning public buildings occupied, and all the small wants of the large command. Wherever proper, such work as could be engaged has been employed under contract, which is by far the most efficient method of doing business there.

To a large extent, Colonel Pope says, coolies were employed to per-

form the labor for the forces operating in the field. Seventy-two were hired to the regiment, and each coolie was tagged, to show where he belonged and to keep an accurate account of the number engaged and in use. These coolies have proved of the greatest benefit to the command in its active operations, and the usefulness of such labor has been fully demonstrated. When properly cared for and used with discretion, he thinks there is no more useful kind of transportation. The coolie can carry about half the amount of supplies that can be carried by a pack mule.

Every building and all the quarters used by the troops were in a most wretched condition, so far as sanitation was concerned, and a great deal of work has had to be done in putting these buildings in a condition to secure a reasonable state of wholesomeness for the troops occupying them. This has been done at the expense of the public civil fund wherever the location was public quarters, and when private it has been the endeavor to have the owners do this work of repair, but even in case of private buildings it has been necessary to expend this fund in repairing the buildings when the owner declined to do so. The whole city is in a most unsanitary condition and modern plumbing and sewerage are generally wanting.

Before leaving San Francisco five plants for distilling water were purchased and turned over for the use of the troops in these islands. Of these, three have been set up and have proved of great benefit to the troops. The water has been sent out to the lines where the troops could be reached, and these distilling plants have proved of inestimable benefit to such troops as could be reached. Where troops have been stationed along the line of the railroad, at San Fernando, Malolos, Caloocan, etc., it has been possible to supply them, and thus prevent the troubles innumerable caused by bad water. In addition, several engines of these distilling plants have been turned over to the medical department for the use of the ice plant at Cavite, which has been of great benefit to the sick.

It has been found absolutely necessary to raise the soldier above the ground while sleeping, to insure any degree of health, and this has been done by the purchase of a large number of bamboo bunks. The dampness and effluvia arising from the soil make it dangerous to sleep on the ground or on the first floor of the houses.

The buildings taken or rented for hospitals have been those used by the Spaniards, and such other suitable buildings as could be secured, and one hospital has been built at Corregidor Island, and enlargements have been made at San Fernando and other places, the cost of which has been borne by the public civil fund. The buildings secured have needed many repairs, which have been made as rapidly and as well as the condition of labor there has permitted. In this way the many sick and wounded of the command have been attended to.

MARKING OF GRAVES AT SANTIAGO AND VICINITY.

With a view of complying with the order of the President, in reference to the marking of the graves of our soldiers at Santiago, referred to in my last annual report, Mr. D. H. Rhodes, of this Department, who had been detailed for this special duty of identifying and marking said graves, left Washington on August 23, 1898, for Santiago, Cuba, where he arrived on the 31st of that month.

On the following day, September 1, he began his work of locating and noting the graves on the battlefield. Mr. Rhodes found many

imperfect markings on the graves, which were already badly effaced and blurred.

He went over the field daily until he had located and made a note of every grave that could possibly be found on the battlefield. The time absorbed in this work was over five weeks, which was consumed in going over the territory located in the vicinity of Santiago, San Juan, El Caney, and Siboney. The entire work of locating and marking these graves was completed on October 8, 1898.

Mr. Rhodes states that in proceeding with this work the greatest possible care was taken, not only to find graves, but also to obtain names or other markings that might be found at the graves. The majority of the graves found were marked simply by small pieces of sticks, stones, tiles, tin, and strips of boxes. In many cases these had become covered with vines, weeds, grass, etc., rendering the graves difficult to be found, even when only a few feet distant.

One unfamiliar with the actual conditions and difficulties encountered during the progress of the work can scarcely imagine the great obstacles and disadvantages that had to be overcome. Practically no information could be gathered from the persons then in Santiago with reference to the identification of the dead or the location of the graves.

Mr. Rhodes says that hundreds of miles over trails, hills, abandoned fever and camp sites, and through valleys, swamps, and pest holes, had to be traversed on foot in going over the field of operation.

He submits with his report a series of sketches, which show the approximate locality of the graves found and marked; also the relative position of each grave or trench and the number of the grave which corresponds with the place on each of the headboards. A complete record is also submitted which contains the name, initial, rank, organization, date of death, as he found it on the graves, etc., or obtained it from other reliable sources. In each case where a grave or trench was found unmarked, or where a temporary marker had become totally obliterated, they were designated by a headboard with the words "Unknown United States soldier" and the proper grave number, in order to identify and preserve this spot as that of a grave.

A record was also made of such graves as had simply a stick, etc., with a number upon it, so that if at any future time any data could be obtained from those in charge of the interment at the time they were made, the exact position of the graves and the identity of the soldiers interred therein might be fully established and properly recorded.

In reference to the unknown graves, he states generally that it is possible some additional record of information may yet be obtained from some of the surgeons and other officers who were in charge of the burials at the several hospitals and other points and thus reduce the number of unknown dead which he was unable to identify.

He further states that upon his arrival in Cuba he found that Chaplain Henry C. McCook, U. S. Volunteers, had been going over the battlefield for the purpose of making a list of such names of our dead soldiers buried there as he could obtain, and also taking photographs and making sketches of some of the graves. Dr. McCook, he thinks, is entitled to the highest commendation for the self-sacrificing spirit and sentiment that prompted him to undertake the perils and hardships of such a task.

Mr. Rhodes succeeded in locating the graves of 654 of our soldiers and citizens who were killed or died in Cuba. Out of this number he was unable to identify the remains of 141. His work was done with great care and thoroughness, and has greatly simplified the task of disinterment and transfer of these remains to the United States, which followed later.

DISINTERMENT OF REMAINS OF AMERICAN SOLDIERS, SAILORS, AND MARINES WHO HAD BEEN BURIED IN CUBA AND PORTO RICO, AND THEIR RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES.

It having been determined in January last that the remains of our soldiers and sailors who had been buried in Cuba and Porto Rico should at once be disinterred and brought back to the United States and sent either to their relatives and friends or reinterred in national cemeteries, Mr. D. H. Rhodes, who had, during September and October of last year, located and marked the graves of our soldiers buried at Santiago and vicinity, and by reason of his familiarity with the work to be done, was detailed for this duty, and was placed in charge of the burial corps organized for the purpose of accomplishing this work. Mr. Solon F. Massey, agent of the Department, was detailed as his principal assistant.

On June 12, 1899, Mr. Rhodes rendered his detailed report to this office, from which it is shown that on February 4, 1899, the burial corps, under his charge, with Mr. Massey and the other members of the party, consisting of 10 undertakers, 10 foremen, 6 representatives employed as laborers, and 19 other representatives—47 persons in all—left New York on the transport *Roumanian* (now *Crook*), with the necessary caskets and other supplies required for their work.

They arrived at San Juan, Porto Rico, February 10, 1899, and entered upon the work of disinterment of 15 bodies at that place, which they completed on February 13. The next morning they sailed on the *Crook* for Ponce, arriving there February 15, where they made 80 disinterments. On February 20 they proceeded to Coamo, Porto Rico, 20 miles from Ponce, and made 32 disinterments in that vicinity, returning to Ponce on February 22. Mr. Massey, with 2 undertakers and 1 foreman, remained at Ponce to complete the work of disinterment of about 98 bodies buried at other points on the island of Porto Rico.

The remainder of the burial corps, in charge of Mr. Rhodes, left Ponce for Santiago on February 23, on the *Crook*, having the remains of those already disinterred aboard, arriving at Santiago February 26. On March 6, after the materials and supplies had been unloaded from the *Crook*, the corps entered upon the work of disinterring the remains at Santiago and vicinity. Five hundred and fifty disinterments were made there between March 6 and 22.

Mr. R. J. Bates, one of the representatives who accompanied the burial corps, was on March 9, 1899, given authority to return to the United States on one of the transports with 13 bodies that had been previously disinterred by him at Santiago.

On March 23 the *Crook* left Santiago with her first cargo of 550 bodies from Santiago and 127 from Porto Rico, or a total of 677 bodies.

Within three or four days after the departure of the *Crook*, the disinterments at and around Santiago were practically completed. Operations were then begun on the graves at the camps south of Santiago, Morro Castle, San Luis, Cristo, Songo, Las Guasimas, Daiquiri, and Siboney. Completing the disinterments at the latter place, the burial corps returned to Santiago on the evening of April 8.

The remains of those disinterred in the vicinity of Siboney, and all other points where yellow fever cases had been buried, were carefully disinfected. They were practically sterilized by complete immersion and saturation in a strong solution of corrosive sublimate. The tents, cots, etc., used by the burial corps at Siboney were burned by order of the surgeon, and the clothing and personal effects of the party fumigated and disinfected prior to leaving for Santiago.

After the return of the burial corps to Santiago, arrangements were made to disinter the remains of 32 American soldiers in the yellow-fever hospital grounds, Santiago Harbor. Before this could be done instructions were communicated through Major Knight that no yellow-fever cases were to be exhumed or shipped to the United States; and further, that the burial corps should cease all disinterments in Cuba, except the 12 marines and sailors who were buried at Guantanamo.

On April 9 the *Crook* arrived from Ponce with Mr. Massey and party, and with 98 bodies exhumed by them at Porto Rico.

The *Crook*, on April 21, with the burial corps on board, sailed from Santiago to Guantanamo Bay, and after taking aboard the remains of the 12 marines and sailors which had been disinterred at "Marines' Hill" that day, she sailed for New York, where she arrived on April 26.

Mr. Rhodes submits with his report an alphabetical record of the names of all disinterments made by the burial corps in Cuba and Porto Rico, which includes the 57 identified bodies and 15 unknown bodies, being the yellow-fever cases which were disinterred and stored at Santiago, Cuba. This shows a total of 1,122 bodies disinterred, divided as follows:

Cuba:	
Identified (of which 57 are stored at Santiago)	746
Unknown (of which 15 are stored at Santiago)	151
Porto Rico:	
Identified	223
Unknown	2
Total	1,122

It will thus be seen that, out of the total of 1,122 disinterments made by the burial corps at Cuba and Porto Rico, only 13.63 per cent were unidentified.

In addition to the foregoing, Mr. Rhodes reports that he has made a number of sketches, showing the approximate location of every grave from which disinterments were made. He also submits separate lists for Cuba and Porto Rico, showing the organization, arm of service—both regular and volunteer—to which those who have been disinterred belong or were accredited.

He submits, also, a partial list of the disinterments in Cuba made by private persons prior to February, 1899, and reported through various nonofficial sources. These number 68 disinterments, and, added to the 1,122 exhumed by the Government, make a total of 1,190 disinterments.

Mr. Rhodes files with his report a list of the remains disinterred by the burial corps that were stored in a building at the yellow-fever hospital at Santiago, which, as heretofore shown, consists of 57 known and 15 unknown bodies.

He also furnishes a list of various articles found with the remains of those disinterred. These articles will be placed in the custody of this office, and will be delivered, upon application, to relatives or friends of the deceased who are entitled to receive them.

Mr. Solon F. Massey, in his report, dated April 6, 1899, shows the work accomplished by him in disinterring remains at Porto Rico, relating particularly to that portion of the duty performed by him after the main body of the burial corps had left Ponce for Santiago.

Messrs. Rhodes and Massey, as well as the other members of the burial corps who were entrusted with this important work of disinterring the remains of our dead in Cuba and Porto Rico, deserve the highest commendation for the prompt, thorough, and satisfactory manner in which the work committed to their charge was accomplished.

The remains of our dead which had been disinterred in Cuba and Porto Rico under the direction of Messrs. Rhodes and Massey were, upon arrival of the *Crook* at New York City, either transported to their relatives and friends or sent to national cemeteries for reinterment, as will further appear in my remarks under the head of "National cemeteries."

It seems proper to remark here that this is probably the first instance in history where a country at war with a foreign power has undertaken to disinter the remains of all its soldiers, who, in defense of their country, had given up their lives on a distant foreign shore, and bring them, by a long sea voyage, to their native land for return to their relatives and friends, or their reinterment in the beautiful national cemeteries which have been provided by our Government for its brave defenders.

NATIONAL CEMETERIES.

There are 83 national cemeteries and 75 superintendents. The total interments in these cemeteries to June 30, 1899, numbered 339,998, being an increase of 2,702 interments during the fiscal year.

During the past fiscal year the remains of soldiers and others connected with the United States service were brought to the United States from Cuba, Porto Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippines, and either sent to relatives and friends or reinterred in national cemeteries, as follows:

FROM CUBA.

Identified remains brought to New York City from Santiago and Havana on Government transports, etc., in charge of private parties (which number includes 16 bodies disinterred by burial corps in charge of Mr. Rhodes)	82
Identified remains received at New York City on transport *Crook* March 30 and April 27, 1899 (disinterred by burial corps), and sent to relatives or friends	251
Identified remains received at New York City on transport *Crook* March 30 and April 27, 1899 (disinterred by burial corps), and sent to Arlington National Cemetery, Virginia	412
Unknown bodies received at New York City on transport *Crook* March 30 and April 27, 1899 (disinterred by burial corps), and sent to Arlington National Cemetery, Virginia	134
Remains of marines received at New York City on transport *Crook* April 27, 1899 (disinterred by burial corps), and turned over to Navy officials	12
Total bodies returned from Cuba	891

Of which 825 were disinterred by the burial corps. To these should be added the 57 identified and 15 unidentified yellow fever cases disinterred at Santiago and stored there, showing a total of 897 bodies disinterred in Cuba by the burial corps.

FROM PORTO RICO.

Identified remains brought to New York City on transport by private parties and interred in Arlington National Cemetery, Virginia	1
Identified remains brought to New York City on Government transport in charge of private parties	24
Identified remains received at New York City on transport *Crook* March 30 and April 27, 1899 (disinterred by burial corps), and sent to relatives and friends	170
Identified remains received at New York City on transport *Crook* March 30 and April 27, 1899 (disinterred by burial corps), and reinterred in Arlington National Cemetery, Virginia	53
Unknown bodies received at New York City on transport *Crook* March 30, 1899 (disinterred by burial corps), and reinterred in Arlington National Cemetery, Virginia	2
Total bodies returned from Porto Rico	250

Of which 225 were disinterred by the burial corps. This number added to the 897 bodies disinterred in Cuba make a grand total of 1,122 bodies disinterred by the burial corps in Cuba and Porto Rico. Of this number 72 bodies, yellow fever cases, are now stored at Santiago, Cuba, for future disposition.

FROM PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

Received at San Francisco, Cal., on Government transports and sent to relatives or friends	46
Received at San Francisco, Cal., on Government transports and reinterred in the national cemetery, Presidio of San Francisco	10
Total bodies returned from Philippine Islands	56

FROM HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

Received at San Francisco, Cal., on Government transports and sent to relatives or friend	17

RECAPITULATION.

Bodies returned from—	
Cuba	891
Porto Rico	250
Philippine Islands	56
Hawaiian Islands	17
Total bodies returned to June 30, 1899	1,214
Total yellow fever cases disinterred which are now stored at Santiago for future disposition	72

The remains of 601 of those above reported as returned from Cuba and Porto Rico were reinterred with appropriate ceremonies at the Arlington National Cemetery, near this city, being placed in a burial section specially prepared and set apart for that purpose. The President, members of the Cabinet, the Major-General of the Army, and other prominent officials, some military organizations, and a large concourse of citizens were present on this solemn occasion.

The remains of 4 officers returned from Cuba and Porto Rico were reinterred at the Arlington National Cemetery, and 10 bodies returned from the Philippines were reinterred in the national cemetery at the Presidio, San Francisco, Cal. The remaining 559 bodies, of those returned to the United States, were sent to relatives and friends.

Twelve hundred and eighty-three white marble headstones were provided during the past fiscal year to mark the graves of known Union soldiers, sailors, and marines in national, post, city, and village cemeteries.

The sum of $6,598.68 was expended during the fiscal year for repairs to roadways to national cemeteries, which had been constructed by special authority of Congress.

The work of rebuilding the superintendent's lodge, outbuildings, inclosing wall, erecting drive and walk gates, at the Fort Smith, Ark., National Cemetery, authorized by act approved January 28, 1898, for which $15,000 was provided, has been completed and the cemetery placed in good condition, the water supply being obtained by connection with the city main. The total expenditures being $14,653.47, leaves a balance of $346.53 for improving the grounds.

During the fiscal year all necessary improvements and repairs have been made at the various national cemeteries and the grounds kept in good condition.

OFFICERS OF THE QUARTERMASTER'S DEPARTMENT.

Under existing laws the number of officers authorized for this Department is as follows:

Regular establishment:
- 1 Quartermaster-General, with rank of brigadier-general.
- 4 assistant quartermasters-general, with rank of colonel.
- 8 deputy quartermasters-general, with rank of lieutenant-colonel.
- 14 quartermasters, with rank of major.
- 30 assistant quartermasters, with rank of captain.
- 1 military storekeeper, with rank of captain.

Volunteers (act March 2, 1899):
- 30 quartermasters, with rank of major.
- 40 assistant quartermasters, with rank of captain.

Under section 2, act approved March 2, 1899, the increased rank which had been conferred upon certain officers of the Quartermaster's Department, by virtue of their special assignments, under authority of the act of Congress approved July 7, 1898, were discontinued from the date of the approval of the above-mentioned act.

Since the date of my last annual report this Department has suffered a severe loss in the death of three of its most capable and efficient officers. On November 11, 1898, Lieut. Col. Charles W. Williams, deputy quartermaster-general, U. S. A., died at Havana, Cuba, of yellow fever which he contracted while on duty there. On November 13, 1898, Col. James Gilliss, assistant quartermaster-general, U. S. A., departed this life while on duty as chief quartermaster, Department of the East, at Governor's Island, New York Harbor. On July 13, 1899, Lieut. Col. Gilbert C. Smith, deputy quartermaster-general, U. S. A., and depot quartermaster, St. Louis, Mo., died suddenly at his home at that place. These officers have all rendered very important and efficient service to the Department, and all died at their posts of duty.

The increased work falling upon this Department in all branches of its service created such a demand for quartermasters that it has been difficult to immediately meet all the requirements in this direction, but with a judicious assignment of the 128 officers authorized by law no important interest of the service has been allowed to suffer.

POST QUARTERMASTER SERGEANTS.

Existing law provides for 105 post quartermaster-sergeants. This number are now in the service, and during the past fiscal year they generally performed their duties in a satisfactory manner. The number, however, as now authorized, is inadequate. Many requests for the services of such sergeants could not be complied with, by reason of the limited number at the disposal of the Department. The most urgent demands for their services in our colonial possessions have been met. More are needed there, as well as at home stations. Besides, it would be of great benefit to the service if such a sergeant could be assigned on each of the transports of the Department, in lieu of citizen quartermaster's clerks. One hundred and fifty of these sergeants could now be used to the great advantage of the service, and I earnestly recommend that Congress be requested, at its next session, to provide that number by new legislation.

CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES, QUARTERMASTER'S DEPARTMENT AT LARGE.

Since the proclamation of the President of April 11, 1899, terminating the war with Spain, a large number of the civilian employees

of the Department, hired temporarily during the war emergency, have been discontinued. Other reductions in this temporary force will follow from time to time, and only such number will be retained as are found to be actually necessary to meet the enlarged requirements of this Department.

CONCLUSION.

During the past fiscal year the larger part of the Volunteer Army was mustered out of the service, and practically an entire new army created in its place. To provide for and supply this army, located at home and at such distant points as Cuba, Porto Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippines with all needful quartermaster's supplies, and at the same time furnish the troops going to and returning from the colonies with the necessary land and water transportation, was a work of considerable magnitude. For the prompt and thorough accomplishment of this task the very best efforts of this Department were directed. To this end experienced and efficient officers were placed in charge of the more important branches of the work, and to them, as well as to all the officers of the corps who assisted in these duties, I desire to extend my sincere thanks for their valuable services. To the volunteer officers of the Department I also feel indebted for their faithful and intelligent discharge of the duties committed to their charge. A number of these officers during the past fiscal year have rendered valuable service in the several lines of work upon which they have been engaged.

It is a pleasure for me to again bear testimony to the valuable services rendered during the past year by the officers associated with me in this office. With their constant assistance, the large volume of business requiring consideration and action has been promptly dispatched.

I also desire to record here my appreciation of the important service rendered by the faithful and capable employees of this office and of the Department at large. They deserve and are entitled to much credit for duty well and efficiently performed.

In closing this report I wish to invite special attention to the fact that under existing law the highest rank provided for officers of this Department holding volunteer rank is that of major. In my opinion the very important and responsible duties attaching to the Quartermaster's Department merit, at least in the cases of those occupying positions as chief officer of this Department on the staff of the commanding general at foreign stations, a higher grade of volunteer rank than is now authorized. In the case of Cuba and the Philippines, the rank of colonel, I consider, is deserved and warranted. It is hoped and recommended that Congress will at its next session provide for a higher grade of volunteer rank to meet such cases.

Very respectfully,

M. I. LUDINGTON,
Quartermaster-General, U. S. A.

The SECRETARY OF WAR.

REPORT OF THE ACTING COMMISSARY-GENERAL OF SUBSISTENCE.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE COMMISSARY-GENERAL OF SUBSISTENCE,
Washington, D. C., October 1, 1899.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the Subsistence Department for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899:

RESOURCES AND EXPENDITURES.

The following statement exhibits the aggregate fiscal resources and expenditures of the department, and the balances at the close of the period mentioned:

RESOURCES.

Amounts in the Treasury to the credit of the appropriations of the Subsistence Department on June 30, 1898, (in which is included the appropriation of $15,367,112.28, made by act of July 7, 1898), as follows:		
Subsistence of the Army, 1897	$277,753.21	
Subsistence of the Army, 1898	706.07	
Subsistence of the Army, January 1, 1899	3,391,478.94	
Subsistence of the Army, January 1, 1899, act of July 7, 1898	15,367,112.28	
Commutation of rations to prisoners of war in rebel States and soldiers on furlough—		
Certified claims, acts March 2, 1889, and April 4, 1890	2,044.11	
Certified claims, 1897, act June 11, 1896	489.88	
Claim for quartermaster stores and commissary supplies, acts July 4, 1864, and March 2, 1895	.18	
Relief of sufferers from overflow of Mississippi River and its tributaries, and the Red River of the North, joint resolution approved April 7, 1897	125,992.13	
Relief of people in mining regions of Alaska, act of December 18, 1897	174,433.87	
		$19,338,001.57
Amounts to the credit of officers of the Subsistence Department, and of officers doing duty in the Subsistence Department with the Treasurer, assistant treasurers, and designated depositaries, and in their personal possession on June 30, 1898, as follows:		
Subsistence of the Army, 1898	59,220.23	
Subsistence of the Army, January 1, 1899	814,183.06	
Commutation of rations to prisoners of war in rebel States and soldiers on furlough—		
Certified claims, 1897, act June 11, 1896	488.45	
Certified claims, 1897, act June 4, 1897	17.17	
Relief of people in mining regions of Alaska, act of December 18, 1897	7,166.15	
		881,075.06
Amounts refunded to the Treasury near close of fiscal year 1898, since carried to the credit of the appropriation as follows:		
Subsistence of the Army, 1898	1,774.61	
Subsistence of the Army, January 1, 1899	1,738.17	
		3,512.78
Amounts appropriated for the Subsistence Department for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899, as follows:		
Subsistence of the Army, 1899, act March 15, 1898	1,550,000.00	
Subsistence of the Army, 1899, act January 5, 1899	3,710,225.56	
Subsistence of the Army, deficiency act, March 3, 1899	23.00	
Subsistence of the Army, certified claims, deficiency act, July 7, 1898	262.77	
Commutation of rations to prisoners of war in rebel States and soldiers on furlough—		
Certified claims, deficiency act, July 7, 1898	123.50	
		5,260,634.83

Transfer from Subsistence of the Army, January 1, 1899, to Subsistence of the Army, 1899, act January 5, 1899		$8,165,799.44
Amounts collected from various sources and refunded to the appropriations of the Subsistence Department on the books of the Treasury during the fiscal year 1899, as follows:		
Subsistence of the Army, 1896 and prior years	$184.40	
Subsistence of the Army, 1897	25.80	
Subsistence of the Army, 1898	1,112.81	
Subsistence of the Army, January 1, 1899	11,646.28	
Subsistence of the Army, 1899	3,440.63	
Subsistence, Army, certified claims, act July 7, 1898	1.50	
		16,411.42
Amounts charged against officers still in the service on account of funds and stores alleged to have been lost by theft, etc., for which relief can only be obtained in the Court of Claims under sections 1059 and 1062, Revised Statutes, or from Congress, as follows:		
Subsistence of the Army, 1880	75.92	
Subsistence of the Army, 1889	24.04	
		99.96
Amounts received by officers of the Subsistence Department and by officers doing duty in the Subsistence Department from sales of subsistence stores to the following purchasers during the fiscal year 1899, and taken up for immediate disbursement under the following appropriations:		
Subsistence of the Army, 1898: Sales to officers, $2,009.54; to enlisted men, $1,381.67; to post exchange, $29.92	3,421.13	
Subsistence of the Army, 1899: Sales to officers, $556,822.50; to enlisted men, companies, detachments, and hospitals, $966,799.47; to civilian employees, $34,400.09; at auction, stores and property, $120,780.87; to destitute flood sufferers, $150.26; of boxes, barrels, etc., $1,222.08; of garden seeds, etc., $2,057.94; to Quartermaster's Department, $6,086.67; to post exchange, $75,823.99; to naval officers, $655.07; to United States Boundary Commission, $95.02; to Spanish prisoners of war, $37,311.75; to leper hospital, $5,553.87; to bakeries, $561.40; to Indian agents and employees, $2,251.08; to Cuban rural police, $7,967.25; to Yellowstone Park employees, $207.57; sales of unused rations, $14.88; for meals on transports, $59,894.69; for meals on hospital ships, $670.50; for meals in hospital, $587.57	1,879,914.52	
Amounts taken up by officers doing duty in the Subsistence Department on account of reclamations for stores lost, damaged, etc., and in correction of errors in their accounts, etc., as follows:		
Subsistence of the Army, 1898	38.66	
Subsistence of the Army, January 1, 1899	16,953.05	
Subsistence of the Army, 1899	22,309.92	
Relief of people in mining regions of Alaska, act of December 18, 1897	293.96	
Received from Porto Rican authorities, Porto Rico funds, $9,434.36; equivalent in United States money	4,717.18	
		1,927,648.42
Total resources		35,593,183.48

EXPENDITURES.

Amounts expended on the books of the Treasury from the appropriations of the Subsistence Department during the fiscal year 1899, as follows:		
Subsistence of the Army, 1898	$1,096.30	
Subsistence of the Army, January 1, 1899	77,512.91	
Subsistence of the Army, 1899	13,741.17	
Subsistence of the Army, deficiency act, March 3, 1899	23.00	
Subsistence of the Army, certified claims, deficiency act, July 7, 1898	262.77	
Commutation of rations to prisoners of war in rebel States and soldiers on furlough—		
Certified claims, deficiency act, July 7, 1898	6.50	
Relief of sufferers from overflow of the Mississippi River and its tributaries and the Red River of the North, joint resolution approved April 7, 1897	28.40	
		$92,671.05
Amounts disbursed by officers of the Subsistence Department and officers doing duty in the Subsistence Department during the fiscal year 1899, as follows:		
Subsistence of the Army, 1898	37,169.83	
Subsistence of the Army, January 1, 1899	10,805,691.75	
Subsistence of the Army, 1899	7,361,371.75	
Porto Rico funds, equivalent in United States funds	4,717.18	
Amounts dropped by officers doing duty in the Subsistence Department in correction of errors in their accounts during the fiscal year 1899:		
Subsistence of the Army, January 1, 1899	133.55	
Subsistence of the Army, 1899	138.18	
		18,209,222.24
Amounts carried to the surplus fund on June 30, 1899:		
Subsistence of the Army, 1896 and prior years	184.40	
Subsistence of the Army, 1897	277,779.01	
Commutation of rations to prisoners of war in rebel States and soldiers on furlough—		
Certified claims, 1897	969.33	
Relief of sufferers from overflow of Mississippi River and its tributaries and Red River of the North	123,963.73	
		402,896.47
Amount transferred from Subsistence of the Army, January 1, 1899, to Subsistence of the Army, 1899, act January 5, 1899		8,165,799.44
Amount in Treasury relinquished to the use of other departments of the Army:		
Relief of people in mining regions of Alaska, act of December 18, 1897	174,433.87	
Amount in hands of disbursing officers transferred to uses of Quartermaster's Department:		
Relief of people in mining regions of Alaska, act of December 18, 1897	7,460.11	
Amounts in Treasury transferred to Pay Department under instruction from Secretary of War dated January 17, 1898:		
Commutation of rations to prisoners of war in rebel States and soldiers on furlough—		
Act approved March 21, 1889, and April 4, 1890	2,044.11	
Act approved January 7, 1898	118.50	
Amount dropped from further accountability:		
Claims for quartermaster stores and commissary supplies, acts July 4, 1864, and March 2, 1895	.08	
		184,056.67
Total expenditures		27,054,645.87

BALANCES.

Amounts in the Treasury to the credit of the appropriations of the Subsistence Department, June 30, 1899:		
Subsistence of the Army, 1898	$25,147.31	
Subsistence of the Army, January 1, 1899	139,494.59	
Subsistence of the Army, 1899	6,661,443.40	
		$6,826,085.30
Amounts to the credit of officers of the Subsistence Department and of officers doing duty in the Subsistence Department with the Treasurer, assistant treasurers, designated depositaries, and fiscal agents of the Government, and in their personal possession, on June 30, 1899, as follows:		
Subsistence of the Army, 1898	2,446.66	
Subsistence of the Army, January 1, 1899	351,625.81	
Subsistence of the Army, 1899	1,054,507.03	
		1,408,579.50
Amounts refunded to the Treasury near close of fiscal year 1899, but not carried to the credit of the appropriation by June 30, 1899, as follows:		
Subsistence of the Army, 1898	413.41	
Subsistence of the Army, January 1, 1899	62,618.63	
Subsistence of the Army, 1899	239,697.36	
		302,729.40
Amounts charged against officers still in the service on account of funds and stores alleged to have been lost by theft, etc., for which relief can only be obtained in the Court of Claims under sections 1059 and 1062, Revised Statutes, or from Congress, as follows:		
Subsistence of the Army, 1880	75.92	
Subsistence of the Army, 1889	24.04	
Subsistence of the Army, January 1, 1899	195.18	
Subsistence of the Army, 1899	848.27	
		1,143.41
Total balances		8,538,537.61

MISCELLANEOUS EXPENDITURES.

The accounts for the fiscal year 1899 thus far examined show the following miscellaneous expenditures, viz:

For liquid coffee there was expended $154,084.51, an increase over previous year of $82,946.51; for advertising, $8,604.46, an increase of $6,076.79; for meals for recruiting parties and recruits and troops moving, $461,392.12, an increase of $372,131.57, due to the movements of the Army, both Regulars and Volunteers.

No expenditures were made for extra-duty services, payments therefor being prohibited during war time by act of Congress approved April 26, 1898.

LOSSES OF STORES AND PROPERTY.

The value of the stores lost by accident, by wastage in transportation, while in store, etc., during the year, for which no one was held responsible, as shown by returns so far examined, was $169,440.84, a very large increase over previous years. This increase was due to the moving and storing of the vastly larger quantities of subsistence stores required by the much larger army that was to be supplied.

Supplies lost during the year, for which responsibility was fixed, as shown by returns thus far examined, amount to $1,815.99, of which $1,492.40 has been collected, leaving still to be collected $323.59.

SALES OF CONDEMNED STORES.

From the returns thus far examined the stores condemned and sold in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899, are shown to have been as follows:

	Subsistence stores condemned.
Original cost	$211,164.17
Amounts realized from sales	120,556.37
Loss	90,607.80

This very large increase from previous year in stores condemned was due to the incidents and accidents of service during the war with Spain.

From sales of condemned subsistence property there was realized the sum of $224.50.

SALES ON CREDIT TO OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN.

Sales on credit to officers, both in the Regular and Volunteer Army, in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899, as shown by the accounts thus far received, amount to $4,468.75, and the amounts thus far reported as collected on pay accounts amount to $2,659.50, leaving the sum of $1,809.25 yet to be collected.

The sales on credit to enlisted men of both Regular and Volunteer Army amount to $14,253.09. The collections made by the Pay Department on muster and pay rolls, and on final statements, on account of credit in the current and previous fiscal years, amount, to June 30, 1899, to $10,778.13, leaving a balance yet to be collected of $3,474.96.

ISSUES TO INDIANS.

To whom made.	Value of issues.
Apache Indians at Fort Sill, Okla. (Army appropriation act, Mar. 15, 1898)	$11,285.44
Indian prisoners at Fort Grant, Ariz	60.07
Indians visiting military posts (Rev. Stat., 2110)	117.45
Total	11,462.96

Issues to Spanish prisoners of war were made to the value of $206,398.06.

Special issues have been made up to June 30, 1899, as follows:

Persons, etc., to whom issued.	Value.	Refunded.
United States Marines en route from San Francisco to Manila	$1,574.34	$1,574.34
United States Marines at San Juan, Porto Rico	1,319.61	1,137.27
Sufferers by overflow of Chattahoochee River	13,780.04	.....
Tidal-wave sufferers in Georgia	3,577.14	.....
Texas flood sufferers	430.96	.....
Porto Rican forces	537.83	.....
Destitute Porto Ricans	6,319.74	324.71
Cuban destitutes	1,417,554.07	52,285.15
Cuban army	36,654.08	.....
Cuban guards	485.15	.....
Cuban rural police	7,988.31	7,988.31
Insane asylum at Ferso, Cuba	681.42	681.42
Post-office clerks at Ponce and Utuado, Porto Rico	65.59	.....
Red Cross hospital at Ponce, Porto Rico	94.05	.....
Filipino insurgent prisoners of war at various stations in Manila	32,181.05	.....
Destitute Filipinos	1,161.71	.....
Destitute Macabebes	1,141.90	.....

COMMISSARY SERGEANTS.

The number of commissary sergeants in service at the beginning of the fiscal year was 108. During the year 67 were appointed, 3 were discharged, 1 failed to report, 1 declined reenlistment, and 11 were retired, leaving 159 in the service at the end of the year. The number should be increased so as to furnish one for each regiment in service and one for each garrisoned post.

CLERICAL WORK, OFFICE COMMISSARY-GENERAL OF SUBSISTENCE.

Statement of accounts current and returns on hand June 30, 1898, received and examined during fiscal year ending June 30, 1899, and on hand at close of same awaiting examination:

	Accounts current.	Returns of stores.	Returns of property.	Total.
On hand June 30, 1898	29	52	1	82
Received during fiscal year 1899	7,111	4,439	1,738	13,318
Total	7,140	4,491	1,739	13,470
Examined during the year	6,802	3,326	1,502	11,730
On hand June 30, 1899	338	1,165	237	1,740

The examination of the accounts current required the verification of 158,242 vouchers; the returns of subsistence stores, 40,923, and the returns of subsistence property, 4,828 vouchers.

In connection with the examinations 5,947 postal cards were used, and 8,150 letters and 6,188 indorsements were written and recorded.

Contracts for supplies, etc., to the number of 386 were received and acted on.

Certificates of services as acting commissary of subsistence were issued to the number of 607, and of non-indebtedness to the number of 6,156.

Number of claims on hand received and disposed of during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899:

	Claims for commutation of rations.		Total.
	While held as prisoner of war in rebel States.	While on furlough and miscellaneous claims.	
There were on hand June 30, 1898	32	357	389
Received during the fiscal year	320	5,320	5,640
Total	352	5,677	6,029
Disposed of during the year	284	4,020	4,304
On hand June 30, 1899	68	1,657	1,725

The number of letters, indorsements, and postal cards written during the year in connection with the above claims was 7,091.

MONTAUK POINT.

The camp at Montauk Point was discontinued as soon as practicable after the disbandment of the Fifth Army Corps, which took place October 3, 1898. The subsistence of the troops undergoing recuperation at this camp was furnished almost exclusively from the subsistence depot, under Col. C. A. Woodruff, assistant commissary general of subsistence, Army Building, New York City. The administration of subsistence affairs at the camp was in able hands, and the satisfactory manner in which these duties were discharged left nothing to be desired. Under the authority granted by the Secretary of War for furnishing articles other than those of the ration to the troops in this camp, it is doubtful whether any troops were ever so well subsisted as were these.

DEPOTS OF SUPPLIES.

Subsistence stores in vast quantities were accumulated at various points during the period of the war with Spain. The principal places at which these accumulations took place were Tampa, Savannah, Huntsville, Chickamauga Park, Atlanta, and Camp Meade. As soon as practicable after the removal of troops from the vicinity of these places, such of the stores as were in fit condition were distributed to other points where needed, and such as had undergone deterioration were disposed of by condemnation and sale. The leaving of these accumulations on hand was in large part due to the sudden termination of the war, and the consequent early dissolution of the Volunteer Army.

SERVICES OF THE SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES.

Maj. David L. Brainard, commissary of subsistence, was assigned in May, 1898, as chief commissary on the staff of the commanding general of the Eighth Army Corps, and on arrival of that corps in Manila, Philippine Islands, was made chief commissary of the Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, and has continued in the latter capacity until relieved, on account of impaired health, by Special Orders, No. 201, Headquarters of the Army, August 28, 1899. The number of regular and volunteer subsistence officers doing continuous duty in the Philippines, as division and brigade commissaries in the field and as purchasing and depot commissaries and assistants, has been about twelve, the duties of whom have been supervised by Major Brainard, under the direction of the commanding general. In addition to the large money accountability connected with the chief commissaryship, the supervision of the vast quantities of subsistence stores sent to the islands has in large part devolved on him; and from information which has reached this Office as to the manner in which the subsistence affairs of the Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps have been managed, it is a subject of congratulation that so able, zealous, and efficient an officer as Major Brainard was chosen for the duties which he has so satisfactorily performed. To the subsistence officers subordinate to him in the islands much praise is due for the efficiency that has given reputation to the Department in those far off lands. As one subsistence officer of the volunteers was wounded on the firing line at Santiago, so one of the volunteers from the regular establishment, Capt. M. G. Krayenbuhl, commissary of subsistence, United States

Volunteers, lost his life March 26, 1899, on the firing line in the Philippines. These incidents attest the efficiency of the Department at the critical points where the services of officers of the Department are at their maximum value.

SERVICES OF THE SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT IN CUBA.

Maj. A. L. Smith, commissary of subsistence, was assigned to duty in Havana, Cuba, as purchasing and depot commissary, in November, 1898. In December, 1898, he was appointed chief commissary of the Division of Cuba, entering upon his duties as such on December 27, 1898. He continued on this duty until August 29, 1899, when he was relieved by Maj. Oliver E. Wood, commissary of subsistence of volunteers. Concerning the subsistence affairs of the island, Major Smith, in his annual report, states as follows:

When the army of occupation arrived from the United States in December last, the troops brought with them thirty days' rations, except fresh beef and vegetables. Contracts were made for the delivery of these articles, and other stores were collected by the subsistence department in Havana before the arrival of troops.

The main depot in Havana comprised the large San Jose warehouse in the city, a warehouse for issues and sales room at camps of Seventh Army Corps, near Quemados, and a storehouse conveniently located at Concho Station where an unlimited supply of sales stores were available for troops from every direction. These storehouses in Havana and Quemados have been under the immediate supervision of the chief commissary of the division.

Besides this main depot in Havana, the Subsistence Department established, under officers specially selected for the purpose, supply depots at Matanzas, Cienfuegos, and Nuevitas, to which supplies were sent from the main depot in Havana, or direct from New York when there was sufficient time. The Department of Santiago had been organized some months previous to this, and the troops in that department were supplied from a main depot in Santiago, with subdepots at Manzanillo and Gibara.

After establishment of the Division of Cuba this Department of Santiago came under that control.

The supplies have been abundant in quantity and excellent in quality. They have been furnished from the United States, with the exception of some cigars, rice, sugar, and jelly, which could be obtained here to advantage.

Fresh beef has been supplied daily by contractor; refrigerated beef from the United States to troops in vicinity of Havana, Matanzas, and Santiago, when transportation for same on Government transport could be obtained. Beef from cattle locally slaughtered has been furnished at these places at other times, and always to troops at other points on the island. There are practically no native cattle in Cuba, and those used for United States troops were imported, with few exceptions, from the United States.

Fresh vegetables have been procured from contractor, ten days' supply at a time, the contractor obtaining his articles principally from the United States and Nova Scotia, but a small quantity being raised on the island.

Records show that the subsistence supplies were furnished to United States troops in following quantities from the depots specified:

Depot.	Number of rations issued.	Quantity of sales articles.	Quantity of supplies condemned and destroyed or sold at auction.
		Pounds.	*Pounds.*
Havana	5,002,801	2,372,263	35,833
Matanzas	551,660	326,792	10,707
Nuevitas	651,092	357,636	11,458
Cienfuegos	365,900	800,124	8,588
Total	6,571,453	3,856,815	66,586

The statement of condemned stores does not include those received from the Porto Rican campaign and that hard usage and exposure due to exigencies of the service rendered unfit for issue on arrival here. * * *

In March the volunteer troops were suddenly and rapidly withdrawn from the island. When they left the island they were furnished with ten days' field rations and from three to five days' travel rations; but under authority from the Commissary-General of Subsistence these rations were so combined that while on board the boat they would have soup, cooked fresh beef, corned beef, ham, cheese, fresh bread, hard bread, canned tomatoes, coffee, sugar, and molasses.

Arrangements were made for fresh beef and vegetables to be furnished as soon as they were located at camp in the United States. This relieved the monotony of the travel rations, and, with canned fruit bought from the company funds, proved very satisfactory. This also furnished a good supply of food sufficiently varied to provide for the troops en route while detained at quarantine and for the first day or so after reaching their destinations.

The arrangements made by the Subsistence Department for supply of beef and vegetables by contract, where the contractor, especially skilled and pecuniarily interested, kept down the losses, protected the Government as well as the troops; and the rapid purchase and shipment of stores by the purchasing commissary in New York in amounts sufficient for only one month at a time kept the depots stocked with fresh stores, against the quality of which not a just complaint was received. After the departure of the volunteers, plans were made by which the chief commissary of each department was, in addition to his other duties, given control of the depot at his station.

SERVICES OF THE SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT IN PORTO RICO.

Lieut. Col. H. G. Sharpe, assistant commissary-general of subsistence, was assigned to duty as chief commissary of United States forces in Porto Rico on September 15, 1898, and as chief commissary of the Department of Porto Rico on October 1, 1898. He was relieved from duty at San Juan on December 21, 1898, and was succeeded as chief commissary of the Department of Porto Rico on February 8, 1899, by Lieut.Col. F. E. Nye, assistant commissary-general of subsistence, under whose able management the affairs of the Subsistence Department in the island have been administered.

VOLUNTEER OFFICERS.

The volunteer officers continued in service under the fourteenth section of the act approved March 2, 1899, have discharged their duties with zeal and discretion.

Among the regular officers who have performed duty as volunteers in the Subsistence Department, Maj. Hugh J. Gallagher, Maj. Oliver E. Wood, Maj. George W. Ruthers, and Maj. James M. Arrasmith are each entitled to favorable mention for the promptness and efficiency with which their duties have been discharged.

PRINCIPAL PURCHASING DEPOTS OF THE SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT.

Col. C. A. Woodruff, assistant commissary-general of subsistence, was the purchasing and depot commissary at New York city during the entire fiscal year 1899. This was one of the principal purchasing stations of the Department, and it was due to the well-known ability of Colonel Woodruff that the purchase and shipment of the vast quantities of subsistence supplied from this point were so well conducted.

Maj. O. M. Smith, commissary of subsistence, was the purchasing and depot commisssary at Chicago, Ill., during the year. This station was next in importance to that of New York, and it is matter of con-

gratulation that the business of the depot was so ably and successfully conducted.

Maj. William H. Baldwin, commissary of subsistence, was the purchasing and depot commissary at San Francisco, Cal., during the year, and it was mainly through him that the subsistence supplies for the troops in Hawaii and the Philippines were shipped.

NEED OF ADDITIONAL OFFICERS IN THE SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT.

Congress at its last session (sec. 12, Act March 2, 1899, 30 Stat. L., 977,) authorized the President, in order to meet existing exigencies, to maintain the Regular Army at a strength not exceeding 65,000 enlisted men, and raise a force of not more than 35,000 volunteers, the increased regular and volunteer force to continue in service only during the necessity therefor, and not later than July 1, 1901. It authorized the increase of the regular *personnel* of the Subsistence Department by the addition of 6 volunteer commissaries of subsistence with the rank of major, and 12 volunteer assistant commissaries of subsistence with the rank of captain, all of whom were to be discharged on July 1, 1901, or sooner if their services were no longer required.

Under the operation of the above law an army of 63,000 men will be assembled in the Philippine Islands, making the equivalent of two army corps in the field. The number of subsistence officers necessary for officering a single corps is 13, consisting of 1 chief commissary of the army corps, 3 chief commissaries of divisions, and 9 commissaries of brigades. For two army corps the complement would be 26 subsistence officers for field service. To this number should be added 6 subsistence officers for purchasing and depot duties in the islands, thus making an aggregate of 32 officers needful for the proper administration of subsistence affairs at the theater of war in the Philippines. As the Subsistence Department, including the increase which is to terminate July 1, 1901, consists of but 40 officers (one of whom is under suspension of rank and duty, another is filling a civil office as collector of customs at Havana, Cuba, and a third is serving as colonel of a volunteer regiment), the impracticability of furnishing the full complement of subsistence officers needed in the Philippines is apparent. Prudence requires that this condition of affairs should be brought under the inspection of Congress, in order that the stress upon the Subsistence Department for officers for home service and for duty in Cuba and Porto Rico may be fully understood and appreciated.

OFFICERS OF THE SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT.

The subjoined list shows the officers of the Subsistence Department and their duties on October 1, 1899.

Respectfully submitted.

J. F. WESTON,
Acting Commissary-General of Subsistence.

The SECRETARY OF WAR.

* * * * * * *

REPORT OF THE SURGEON-GENERAL.

WAR DEPARTMENT, SURGEON-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, D. C., October 12, 1899.

SIR: I have the honor to submit a report of my administration of the duties of this office during the past fiscal year.

FINANCIAL STATEMENT, 1899.

Medical and hospital department, 1899.

Appropriated by act approved—		
March 15, 1898	$115,000.00	
January 5, 1899	2,300,000.00	
March 3, 1899	350,000.00	
		$2,765,000.00
Refunded during the year		108.72
Total to be accounted for		2,765,108.72
Disbursed during the year:		
Expenses of medical supply depots	268.66	
Medical supplies	1,047,065.11	
Medical attendance and medicines	40,186.24	
Medical expenses of recruiting	11,165.06	
Medical expenses of muster out	3,316.40	
Pay of nurses	102,221.87	
Pay of other employees	64,357.64	
Washing at hospitals	35,306.36	
Exchange on funds in foreign possessions	576.91	
Miscellaneous expenses	571.71	
Unclassified[1]	11,685.39	
		1,316,721.35
Balances on hand June 30, 1899:		
In United States Treasury	1,391,287.83	
In hands of disbursing officers—		
New York	24,680.12	
San Francisco	15,058.32	
Havana, Cuba	162.45	
Santiago, Cuba	3,071.39	
Puerto Principe, Cuba	130.71	
San Juan, P. R.	1,499.02	
Honolulu, H. I.	1,990.26	
Manilla, P. I.	7,232.95	
Hospital ship *Missouri*	1,256.58	
Hospital ship *Terry*	2,017.74	
		[2]1,448,387.37
Total accounted for		2,765,108.72

[1] Being the amount disbursed by the chief surgeon at Manila, P. I., in June, 1899, for which itemized accounts have not yet reached this office.
[2] It is estimated that about $500,000 of this will revert to the Treasury.

Medical and hospital department, 1898.

Balance on hand July 1, 1898, act of March 2, 1897		$10,836.34
Refunded during the year		384.15
Total to be accounted for		11,220.49
Disbursed during the year:		
Medical supplies	$10,563.75	
Medical attendance and medicines	215.70	
Medical expenses of recruiting	1.20	
Washing at hospitals	30.56	
Miscellaneous	43.10	
		10,854.31
Balances on hand June 30, 1899:		
In United States Treasury	346.43	
In hands of disbursing officer at New York	19.75	
		366.18
Total accounted for		11,220.49

Medical and hospital department, 1897.

Balance on hand July 1, 1898, act of March 6, 1896	$29,487.22
Transferred to surplus fund	29,487.22

Medical and hospital department, January 1, 1899.

Balance on hand July 1, 1898, acts of May 4, 1898, and June 8, 1898		$42,956.00
Appropriated by act approved July 7, 1898		504,000.00
		546,956.00
Refunded during the year		407.19
Total to be accounted for		547,363.19
Disbursed during the year:		
Expenses of medical supply depots	95.79	
Medical supplies	458,280.96	
Medical attendance and medicines	8,461.19	
Medical expenses of recruiting	22,747.75	
Pay of nurses	28,614.50	
Pay of other employees	17,721.34	
Washing at hospitals	6,517.00	
Miscellaneous expenses	6.00	
		542,444.53
Balances on hand June 30, 1899:		
In United States Treasury (net)	[1] 1,377.55	
In hands of disbursing officer, Philippine Islands	3,541.11	
		4,918.66
Total accounted for		547,363.19

Appropriation for national defense, act of March 9, 1898.

Allotment by the President, April 16, 1898:		
Balance on hand July 1, 1898		$35.61
Disbursed during the year	$30.10	
Balance on hand June 30, 1899	5.51	
		35.61

[1] Actual balance, as shown by the books of this office, $9,174.16, of which $7,796.61 was pledged to honor drafts made by the disbursing officer of the medical department in the Philippine Islands on the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, under a letter of credit issued in his favor. These drafts were paid by the bank and the proceeds thereof are accounted for by the disbursing officer, and in this statement, as disbursed by him during the year or in his possession June 30, 1899. The bank was reimbursed by the Treasury Department in August, 1899.

Reallotment by the President, September 8, 1898:		
Reallotment, September 8, 1898		$500,000.00
Refunded during the year		115.50
Total to be accounted for		500,115.50
Disbursed during the year:		
Expenses of medical supply depots	99.60	
Medical supplies	382,815.94	
Medical attendance and medicines	8,007.79	
Medical expenses of recruiting	9,440.87	
Pay of nurses	68,702.12	
Pay of other employees	12,680.94	
Washing at hospitals	16,481.46	
Exchange on funds in foreign possessions	100.00	
Miscellaneous expenses	107.00	
		498,435.72
Balances on hand June 30, 1899:		
In United States Treasury	1,679.66	
In hands of disbursing officer at San Juan, P. R	.12	
		1,679.78
Total accounted for		500,115.50
Allotment by the President October 6, 1898:		
Allotment October 6, 1898		500,000.00
Refunded during the year		141.00
Total to be accounted for		500,141.00
Disbursed during the year—		
Expenses of medical supply depots	7.40	
Medical supplies	326,313.98	
Medical attendance and medicines	31,296.10	
Medical expenses of recruiting	4,796.15	
Medical expenses of muster out	2,555.60	
Pay of nurses	54,909.20	
Pay of other employees	17,633.42	
Washing at hospitals	17,998.69	
Exchange on funds in foreign possessions	93.57	
Miscellaneous expenses	15.00	
		455,619.11
Balances on hand June 30, 1899—		
In United States Treasury	38,508.20	
In hands of disbursing officers—		
Atlanta, Ga	4,877.27	
Havana, Cuba	1,136.35	
San Juan, P. R	.07	
		44,521.89
Total accounted for		500,141.00
Allotment by the President November 22, 1898:		
Allotment November 22, 1898		500,000.00
Refunded during the year		32.00
Total to be accounted for		500,032.00
Disbursed during the year—		
Medical supplies	371,698.78	
Medical attendance and medicines	36,398.81	
Medical expenses of recruiting	15,835.66	
Medical expenses of muster out	4,262.42	
Pay of nurses	29,710.07	
Pay of other employees	8,309.54	
Washing at hospitals	7,580.42	
		473,795.70

Allotment by the President November 22, 1898—Continued.		
Balances on hand June 30, 1899—		
In United States Treasury	$22,022.77	
In hands of disbursing officer, hospital ship *Relief*	4,213.53	
		$26,236.30
Total accounted for		500,032.00

Artificial limbs, 1899.

Appropriated by act approved July 1, 1898	$125,575.00
Disbursed during the year	122,953.91
Balance on hand June 30, 1899	2,621.09

Artificial limbs, 1898 (act approved June 4, 1897).

Balance July 1, 1898	$23,224.73
Disbursed during the year	6,708.52
Balance on hand June 30, 1899	16,516.21

Artificial limbs, 1897 (act approved June 11, 1896).

Balance July 1, 1898		$10,089.44
Disbursed during the year	$421.38	
Transferred to surplus fund	9,127.90	
		9,549.28
Balance on hand June 30, 1899		540.16

Artificial limbs, certified claims, 1896 and prior years.

Appropriated by act approved July 7, 1898 1	$100.00
Disbursed during the year	100.00

Appliances for disabled soldiers, 1899.

Appropriated by act approved July 1, 1898	$2,000.00
Disbursed during the year	1,277.89
Balance on hand June 30, 1899	722.11

Appliances for disabled soldiers, 1898 (act approved June 4, 1897).

Balance July 1,1898	$717.79
Disbursed during the year	127.25
Balance on hand June 30, 1899	590.54

Appliances for disabled soldiers, 1897 (act approved June 11, 1896).

Balance July 1, 1898	$785.02
Transferred to surplus fund	500.00
Balance on hand June 30, 1899	285.02

Army Medical Museum, 1899.

Appropriated by act approved March 15, 1898	$5,000.00
Disbursed during the year	3,363.69
Balance on hand June 30, 1899	1,636.31

Army Medical Museum, 1898 (act approved March 2, 1897).

Balance July 1, 1898	$69.28
Disbursed during the year	69.28

Library, Surgeon-General's Office, 1899.

Appropriated by act approved March 15, 1898	$10,000.00
Disbursed during the year	9,726.64
Balance on hand June 30, 1899	273.36

Library, Surgeon-General's Office, 1898 (act approved March 2, 1897).

Balance July 1, 1898	$253.21
Disbursed during the year	253.21

Furnishing and fitting trusses for disabled soldiers (secs. 1176, 1178, R. S., act March 3, 1879).

Expended during the year	$5,003.00

Providence Hospital.

Appropriated by act approved July 1, 1898	$19,000.00
Expended during the year	19,000.00

ARTIFICIAL LIMBS AND THEIR COMMUTATION.

Under the provisions of law relating to artificial limbs there were furnished during the year ended June 30, 1899, 27 artificial legs, 4 arms, 1 foot, and 1 apparatus for exsection. Commutation certificates were issued for 105 cases of amputated leg, 70 of amputated arm, 12 of amputated foot, and for 1,934 cases of loss of the use of a limb. These cases involved an expenditure of $125,038.91 from the appropriations available.

These benefits to disabled soldiers recur under existing laws every three years, so that the cases which matured and were paid during the year ended June 30, 1898, will again come up for payment if the beneficiaries are alive during the year ending June 30, 1901. There were in the files of the office 3,580 cases which matured during the fiscal year 1898. The commutation value of these cases was $182,755. Allowing for deaths during the past three years, I estimate that there will be 3,400 claims presented during the year ending June 30, 1901, and that the sum of $173,000 will be required to settle them. Estimates have already been submitted for this sum.

APPLIANCES FOR DISABLED SOLDIERS.

During the past year the sum of $1,309.89 was expended for 149 appliances issued to disabled soldiers.

TRUSSES.

The number of trusses issued and fitted during the year was 1,088.

PROVIDENCE HOSPITAL.

The act of Congress approved July 1, 1898, appropriated $19,000 for the support and medical treatment of destitute patients in the city of Washington, D. C., under a contract to be made with this hospital by the Surgeon-General of the Army. The relief afforded under this appropriation was as follows:

Patients in hospital July 1, 1898	118
Admitted during the year	1,238
Total number treated	1,356
Average number admitted per month	113
Number remaining in hospital, June 30, 1899	112
Total number of days' treatment afforded	38,758
Average number of days' treatment per patient	30
Average number of patients treated per day	106
Longest term of treatment (days)	365
Shortest term of treatment (day)	1
Number of patients in hospital during the whole year	21

ARMY AND NAVY GENERAL HOSPITAL, HOT SPRINGS, ARK.

In the officers' division of this hospital 6 cases remained under treatment December 31, 1897, and 29 were admitted during the calendar year 1898, a total of 35. Two of these died, 6 remained under treatment December 31, 1898, and 27 were returned to duty or to their residences, if retired, after an average of thirty-seven days of treatment. The maximum treated at one time was 10. No officer was under treatment during July, 1898.

In the men's division there remained December 31, 1897, 22 cases, while during the year 1898 119 were admitted, a total of 141. Of these cases 106 were completed during the year—84 by return to duty, 20 by discharge as unfit for further military service, 1 by discharge by order of the Adjutant-General's Office, and 1 by expiration of service. Sixty-three of these completed cases were rheumatic, and of these 52 were returned to duty.

Under the conditions and regulations prescribed by me and approved by the Secretary of War (circular Surgeon-General's Office, May 8, 1897), ex-volunteers of the civil war were admitted to this hospital. On November 9, 1898, the benefits of the hospital were extended to ex-volunteers of the Spanish-American war. To December 31, 1898, 176 permits of admission were issued. Of these, 116 were granted during the year 1898. Ninety-six availed themselves of the permission and reported for treatment. The remaining 18 permits were either canceled by me, or the beneficiaries declined, for various reasons, to utilize them. The greater part of these 96 cases returned to their homes much benefited by the baths. Some of them on admission were recognized as beyond all help. They ranged in age from 55 to 80 years, and their complaints were all of a chronic character. Nevertheless, their sufferings were relieved and their remaining years made comfortable.

HOSPITALS, POST AND GENERAL.

New post hospitals were completed during the year at Fort Hancock, N. J.; Fort Snelling, Minn.; Fort Point, Tex.; Fort Morgan, Ala., and Tybee Island, Ga., and temporary hospitals at Fort Williams, Me.; Fort Greble, R. I.; Fort Mott, N. J.; Marrowstone Point and Battery Point, Del.; Fort Caswell, N. C., and Egmont Key, Fla. Additional wards were provided for the hospitals at Fort Thomas, Ky., and Fort Wayne, Mich., and new hospitals were authorized for Fort Slocum, N. Y.; Plum Island, N. Y., and the new post near Seattle, Wash. General hospitals, each with a capacity of 1,000 beds, were completed at Fort Monroe, Va., and Savannah, Ga., and pavilion wards were erected in connection with the post hospitals at Washington Barracks, D. C.; Jefferson Barracks, Mo.; Fort Columbus, Fort Hamilton, and

Fort Wadsworth, N. Y. Various repairs and improvements were made to the hospitals at a number of posts.

In addition to those mentioned, general hospitals have been organized at San Juan, Porto Rico, and at Havana, Pinar del Rio, Matanzas, and Santiago, Cuba, while in both islands hospitals have been constructed or improved at the many military posts that have been established. In Manila four hospitals have been outfitted (see page 452); in San Francisco, Cal., provision has been made for the care of the sick of commands going to or returning from the Philippines (see page 467), and in Honolulu, H. I., a hospital has been established for the care of serious cases taken from transports en route across the Pacific (see page 490).

The following report shows the conditions of the general hospitals, as communicated to this office September 23, 1899:

	Remaining from last week.	Admissions.			Total to be accounted for.	Returned to duty.	Died.	Discharged from service.	Furloughed.	Transferred to other hospitals.	Otherwise disposed of.	Remaining at end of week.	Number of vacant beds on last day of week.
		From command.	By transfer.	From other sources.									
Washington Barracks, D. C., general hospital	39	14	----	----	53	14	----	----	----	----	----	39	86
Josiah Simpson general hospital, Va	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	1,020
Camp Meade, Pa., general hospital	52	------	24	----	76	22	----	1	1	----	----	52	48
Presidio, San Francisco, Cal., general hospital	574	114	----	----	688	108	1	24	4	3	1	547	177
Military hospital, No. 1, Havana, Cuba	91	5	3	----	99	24	----	----	----	----	----	75	50
Provinces of Havana and Pinar del Rio, Cuba	361	272	----	2	635	313	----	----	----	----	----	332	94
Matanzas military hospital, Cuba	42	29	----	----	71	30	1	----	----	----	----	40	80
Santiago, Cuba, general hospital	29	------	7	3	39	8	----	----	----	19	----	12	63
San Juan, Porto Rico, general hospital	77	2	23	4	106	34	----	1	----	----	----	71	129
Manila (by cable)	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	1,655	83

MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL SUPPLIES.

The annual report of the Surgeon-General for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1898, rendered November 10, 1898, took up at considerable length the operations of the medical department in regard to furnishing medical and surgical supplies during the Spanish war, and it is deemed unnecessary to repeat what is therein stated.

The operations of the supply department, which were necessarily conducted under the pressure of the emergencies of war were gradually brought into more regular and methodical action.

No appliance or apparatus of moment has been devised or put into use since the publication of the last report, the energies of the office being devoted to obtaining medical supplies in sufficient quantity and to effecting their prompt distribution to the points at which they were needed.

The regular medical supply depots at New York, St. Louis, and San Francisco have been kept up. That at New York has supplied the troops in the northern and eastern portions of the United States and also Cuba and Porto Rico. Increased facilities were required to properly conduct the business of this depot and a special building

was hired for the purpose to the great advantage of the Government. The depot in St. Louis has supplied the troops and garrisons in camps in the Mississippi Valley and portions of the country most convenient to it.

Medical supplies for the Philippine Islands, with the exception of the large amount that was sent on the hospital ship *Relief*, which left New York March 2, 1899, have been furnished from the San Francisco depot. Medicines and most of these supplies were purchased on the Pacific coast, only articles of exclusively eastern manufacture being sent from New York and St. Louis. The uniform report from the Philippine Islands has been that medical supplies have been ample.

After the breaking up of Camp Thomas at Chickamauga and the establishment of camps in the Southern States, the supply depot at Camp Thomas was removed to Atlanta, Ga., and the troops and camps in the southern section of the United States were supplied from it. This depot has since been discontinued.

With the departure of the Second Corps from the United States to Cuba in December, 1898, the supply depot attached to that corps was retained at Savannah as a convenient place for shipping supplies and furnishing troops en route.

In addition to the depots already referred to, there is an important one in Manila for the immediate supply of troops in the Philippine Islands; one in Havana, Cuba, and one at San Juan, Porto Rico.

The depot for the preparation and refitting of medical and surgical chests has been maintained at the Army Medical Museum at Washington and has proved of great advantage.

In November, 1898, an outfit allowance for regimental hospitals was approved, the object being to provide for the treatment of emergency cases and of those requiring only slight treatment, without impairing the mobility of the regiment.

Three ice machines have been furnished for the use of the hospitals in the Philippine Islands; another is in process of erection at San Juan, Porto Rico. The machines that were presented to the Government at Ponce and Santiago have been kept in repair.

X-ray machines for the better diagnosis and treatment of wounds and injuries have been placed at all important posts and hospitals and on the hospital ships. Four have been sent to the Philippine Islands for use in the hospitals there.

Microscopes, to assist in the prompt recognition of disease, have been issued to hospitals, general and field, and also for the use of regimental surgeons.

It has been my endeavor that the sick and wounded of our Army should be supplied with every comfort and restorative and the surgeons with every appliance that modern science would suggest in the treatment of disease and injury.

Not only have supplies of all kinds allowed by the standard supply table been freely issued, but the individual preferences of surgeons have been indulged where there was reason to believe that benefit would arise from so doing.

As an indication of the extent of the operations of the supply department, I give below the quantities issued during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899, of a few of the more important articles:

Æther, in 4-ounce tins	tins	21,000
Antipyrinum, in 4-ounce bottles	bottles	5,234
Bismuthi subgallas, in half-pound bottles	do	5,500

Bismuthi subnitras, in 1-pound bottles	bottles	7,753
Chloroformum, in 4-ounce bottles	do	25,354
Magnesii sulphas	pounds	53,160
Morphinæ sulphas, in one-eighth ounce bottles	bottles	3,804
Morphinæ sulphas, tablets	number	686,000
Opii tinctura, in 1-pound bottles	bottles	4,702
Opii, tinctura camphorata, in 1-pound bottles	do	9,705
Phenacetinum, in 4-ounce bottles	do	6,600
Pilulæ camphoræ et opii	number	2,893,200
Pilulæ catharticæ compositæ	do	2,729,800
Quininæ sulphas, in 1-ounce bottles	bottles	44,156
Quininæ sulphas, pills	number	32,741,500
Salol, tablets	do	4,820,375
Strychninæ sulphas, tablets	do	4,584,000
Lime chloride	pounds	104,541
Beef extract, in 4-ounce tins	tins	62,429
Brandy, in 1-quart bottles	bottles	28,919
Milk, condensed, in 1-pound tins	tins	34,799
Malted milk, in 4-pound bottles	pounds	32,756
Whisky, in 1-quart bottles	bottles	40,747
Bandages	dozen	79,400
Cotton, absorbent, in 1-ounce packages	ounces	381,088
First-aid packets	number	359,241
Gauze, plain	yards	195,815
Syringes, hypodermic	number	1,772
Thermometers, clinical	do	14,321
Bedsteads and cots	do	32,380
Blankets	do	69,176
Mattresses	do	27,622
Mosquito bars	do	26,072
Pillows	do	45,994
Pillow cases	do	97,879
Sheets	do	138,016
Towels	dozen	18,145
Field operating cases	number	287
Mess chests	do	556
Pocket cases	do	1,114
Field desks	do	666
Litters	do	3,516
Litter-slings	do	6,233
Hospital corps pouches	do	5,216
Orderly pouches	do	829
Medical, surgical, and sterilizer chests	do	814
Vaccine virus, points, and tubes	do	170,000
Chairs, arm, folding	do	1,986
Chairs, small, folding	do	12,734
Tables, mess, folding	do	1,032
Tables, bedside, folding	do	11,940

THE ARMY MEDICAL MUSEUM.

The question of space for the better accommodation of the present holding of the museum and for the additions which experience shows are to be expected is already obtruding itself. Some special and valuable exhibits, such as surgical instruments, medical medals, photographs, and specimens of medical field equipments of our own and foreign military services, already suffer from insufficient or unsuitable presentation. The last is particularly worthy of completion and satisfactory display, but this cannot be effected while the rooms in the building are used for other purposes than those of the library and museum.

The immediate needs of the library will be met by the addition of six new stacks, for which estimates have been submitted for several years past. Were these stacks erected, the whole containing capacity

of the library hall would be utilized, for the space that would remain is necessary for the convenience of those who make use of the volumes. For the future extension of the library no space at present within my jurisdiction is available, although the large room immediately below the library hall, and of the same floor area, is exactly suitable for this purpose. This commodious room is now utilized as a record room for the Record and Pension Division of the War Department; but there is no doubt in my mind that it must sooner or later be assigned for library purposes if this subject is wisely considered. In fact, there is no avoiding the conclusion that the whole of the office rooms on the first floor of the building now occupied by the Record and Pension Division should pass into my control for the use of the growing library and museum, for which the whole building was originally constructed. No one who is well informed as to the needs of the library and museum, their value to the medical profession and to the public, and the means by which this value may be increased, will hesitate to state that the control of the whole building for the use of the library and museum is abundantly justified. I therefore earnestly recommend that provision be made elsewhere for the work of the Record and Pension Division of the War Department, and that justice may be done to the intent for which this building was constructed.

As the facilities afforded by the museum are frequently sought by investigators in particular lines of research, the preparation of a catalogue seems desirable, none having been printed since 1866, when the number of specimens was comparatively few and a different classification was followed. Such a catalogue would involve much labor, but if in existence and properly distributed would make the extensive collection of the museum widely known and correspondingly available for students.

The total number of specimens in the Army Medical Museum at the end of the fiscal year, June 30, 1899, was 35,039. The following statement shows in detail the additions and changes in the different sections:

Pathological section:		
In museum June 30, 1898		11,446
Returned to the contributor		1
		11,445
Received during the year		186
In museum June 30, 1899		11,631
Anatomical section:		
In museum June 30, 1898		1,518
Received during the year		11
In museum June 30, 1899		1,529
Section of comparative anatomy:		
In museum June 30, 1898		1,606
Discarded	32	
Transferred to other institutions	142	
		174
In museum June 30, 1899		1,432
Microscopical section:		
In museum June 30, 1898		12,750
In museum June 30, 1899		12,750

Miscellaneous section:	
In museum June 30, 1898	2,479
Discarded	87
	2,392
Received during the year	35
In museum June 30, 1899	2,427
Provisional pathological section:	
In museum June 30, 1898	2,065
Transferred to New York State Veterinary College	27
	2,038
Received during the year	25
In museum June 30, 1899	2,063
Provisional anatomical section:	
In museum June 30, 1898	895
In museum June 30, 1899	895
Photographic series:	
In museum June 30, 1898	2,266
Received during the year	46
In museum June 30, 1899	2,312

RECAPITULATION.

Specimens in the museum June 30, 1898	35,025
Discarded, transferred, etc	289
	34,736
Added during the year	303
Specimens in museum June 30, 1899	35,039

The following are some of the more interesting specimens received at the museum during the fiscal year:

11561. A white female fœtus at term, showing anencephalus and spina bifida. Contributed by Dr. William F. Walter, Washington, D. C.

11711. A duckling with but one eye; cyclops. Contributed by Mr. H. G. Johnson, Lambertville, N. J.

11559, 11560. Twin male human fœtuses, one at term and normal, the other about five months and shrunken. Contributed by Dr. G. R. L. Cole, Washington, D. C.

Perhaps the most interesting specimen of parasitic disease was:

11699. Mycetoma (fungous foot of India), consisting of the foot and part of leg of a male Mexican, living in Texas, age 45, who had been ailing twelve years; had never lived elsewhere; amputation and recovery. This is the second specimen of the kind received from Texas. The first was from Dr. Pope, U. S. A., in 1873. Only three similar specimens have been reported for the United States and Canada. Contributed by J. T. Arwine, acting assistant surgeon, United States Army.

11632. Ticks (ixodis bovis) which convey the Texas cattle fever.

11634, 11635. The spleen and kidneys from a case of chronic malarial poisoning in a man about 30 years old. The organs show marked pigmentary degeneration. Contributed by Dr. D. S. Lamb, Washington, D. C.

11620. Hemorrhage into the connective tissues of the leg of a horse; said to have been caused by an electric shock. Contributed by C. B. Robinson, veterinary surgeon, Washington, D. C.

11720. A dome-shaped skull (Thurmschädel), the shape being due to premature coössification of the sagittal and coronal sutures. From a child aged about 9 years.

11721. A very small adult skull, capacity only 900 c. c., showing also very long styloid processes.

11625. Shot fracture of skull (suicidal), Krag-Jörgensen rifle; comminution of almost every bone. Soldier. Contributed by Surg. Charles F. Mason, United States Volunteers.

11657. Shot fracture of cervical vertebræ, accidental; paralysis. A soldier. Death on second day. Contributed by Dr. J. H. Stone, assistant surgeon, United States Army.

11714. Comminuted shot fracture of bones of leg and foot, accidental; amputation. Recovery. Contributed by Brigade Surg. W. B. Banister, United States Volunteers.

11570. Comminuted fracture of sesamoid bones of horse; said to have been caused by intense spasmodic action. Contributed by Veterinary Surg. W. R. Pointon.

11659. Caries of petrosal bone, of long standing; from man about 50 years old, who had been deaf many years. In this case there was also a congenital cyst of cerebellum. Contributed by Dr. R. W. Baker, Washington, D. C.

11552, 11553. Punctured wound of heart. The heart, etc., of a boy, age 13.5 years, showing a ragged perforation in the right ventricle made by the point of a needle which had been accidentally pushed into the front of the thorax, through the thymus gland, and broken off. Death from intracardial hemorrhage on second day. Contributed by Dr. J. R. Francis, Washington, D. C.

11626, 11627. Heart, etc., showing old pericarditis and fibrous myocarditis with hemorrhage into the lungs. From a mulatto woman, age 35. Contributed by Dr. D. S. Lamb, Washington, D. C.

11568, 11569. Vegetative endocarditis with large embolic areas in spleen, some of which had become abscesses. From a colored woman, age 50. Contributed by Dr. D. S. Lamb, Washington, D. C.

11689 to 11691. Acute pericarditis, with secondary miliary abscesses in kidneys; intercurrent gastric ulcer. Cause not ascertained. From white man, age 65. Contributed by Dr. D. S. Lamb, Washington, D. C.

11704. Suppurating mesenteric gland opening by fistula into ascending colon; fatal peritonitis. From colored woman, age 20. Contributed by Dr. D. S. Lamb, Washington, D. C.

11716. Leukemic spleen; weight, 16 ounces. From colored girl, age 4 years. Contributed by Dr. C. H. Marshall, Washington, D. C.

11621. A meningocele from an infant which died on second day after birth. Contributed by Dr. S. M. Pierre, Washington, D. C.

11630, 11631. Hydrocephelas in a calf. Contributed by United States College of Veterinary Surgeons, Washington, D. C.

11658. Brain of a colored boy, 4 years old, showing a large porencephalic cavity extending into the ventricle. Contributed by Dr. G. N. Acker, Washington, D. C.

11571, 11572. Portions of brain of colored woman, age 49, showing an old apoplectic hemorrhage in the optic thalamus and a recent hemorrhage into frontal lobe and corpus striatum: an interval of seven months between lesions. Contributed by Dr. D. S. Lamb, Washington, D. C.

11682. Multiple gummata of pia mater and brain. From white man, age 48 years. Had syphilis about fifteen months. Contributed by Dr. J. F. Moran, Washington, D. C.

11696. Acute meningitis following chronic nasal catarrh. Contributed by Dr. J. H. Bryan, Washington, D. C.

Several cases of cerebro-spinal meningitis, which prevailed as an epidemic in Washington City; 11684, from colored man, age 45, who was sick six days, 19694. 11695, from colored man, age 40, who died on ninth day; 11701, from negro, age 50, lived five days. These specimens were contributed by Dr. Lamb, and one by Dr. G. N. Acker, 11700, from a child.

11706. Portion of spinal cord showing constriction from pressure of displac d vertebra. From child 11 years old. There was no power of motion in lower limbs. Contributed by Dr. G. N. Acker, Washington, D. C.

11676. Secondary cancer of pleura in a case of mammary cancer, in which the axillary glands were not involved. From mulatto woman, age 32. Contributed by Dr. D. S. Lamb, Washington, D. C.

A number of series of teeth showing anomalies and diseases were contributed, among them 11540 to 11551, by C. C. Stanley, D. D. S., Columbia, S. C.; 11576 to 11581, by Dr. Carl Klein, jr., Chicago, Ill.; 11594 to 11597, by J. F. Galentine, D. D. S., Cleveland, Ohio; 11598, 11599, by M. S. Towner,

D. D. S., New York City: 11601 to 11609, by E. M. Murlless, D. D. S., University Place, Nebr.; 11610 to 11615, by Dr. E. L. Jones, Waterville, Me.; and with models of denture, 11583 to 11592, by Henry H. Way, D. D. S., St. Thomas, Ontario.

Dental appliances were received from Dr. Charles Nevitte Gibbons, D. D. S., New Orleans, La., and Dr. Joseph Spyer, Mexico.

Among many cases of cancer of stomach one was particularly interesting, 11554, from a woman, age 70 years, in whom many years previously a cancerous cervix had been removed. Contributed by Dr. Mary Parsons, Washington, D. C.

11538. Bothriocephalus latus, the broad tape worm: from a woman who had lived all her life in Washington City. Contributed by Dr. L. A. Johnson, Washington, D. C.

11652. Operation for appendicitis and peritonitis: appendix removed. Soldier. Died. Contributed by E. R. Schreiner, assistant surgeon, United States Army.

11677. Shot perforation of jejunum, in a soldier: death nineteen hours after injury. Contributed by C. E. B. Flagg, assistant surgeon, United States Army.

11673. The small intestine containing the parasite called the Dochmius. From a dog which died of pernicious anæmia. Contributed by Cecil French, District veterinary surgeon, Washington, D. C.

Two cases of intestinal lesions in typhoid fever: one from a boy 6 years old. Contributed by Dr. S. S. Adams, Washington, D. C. The other from a soldier who died at the end of the fourth week: resolution had preceded: the patches were small and ulcers healing. Contributed by Surg. C. K. Winne, U. S. A.

11702. Cirrhosis of liver; weight, 31 ounces. From a man 55 years old. Contributed by Dr. J. Ryan Devereux, Washington, D. C.

11678. Multiple myxoma of peritoneum; viscera apparently not involved. From colored woman, age 47, who had been tapped several times for ascites: there was general peritonitis, both old and recent. Contributed by Dr. D. S. Lamb, Washington, D. C.

11682. Fused kidney, from a Russian, age 38. Contributed by Dr. D. P. Hickling, Washington, D. C.

11567. Congenital displacement of left kidney to right iliac fossa: common ureter: from an old man: no history of symptoms. Contributed by Dr. Mary Parsons, Washington, D. C.

Hydronephrosis and congenital cysts in young pigs, from Dr. George J. Lochboehler, Washington, D. C., and United States College of Veterinary Surgeons.

Two cases of pyonephrosis and calculus, 11650, and 11651, from woman, age 42 years. Contributed by Dr. R. J. S. Mauss, Washington, D. C., and 11653, from white woman, age 41, in which the kidney was removed, with recovery. Contributed by Dr. I. S. Stone, Washington, D. C.

11679. Rupture of bladder from a blow on abdomen: death three days after injury, from peritonitis despite coeliotomy. A soldier. Contributed by Surg. A. H. Appel, United States Army.

11692. Primary melanosarcoma of prostate gland, secondary growths in pelvic and lumbar glands. From colored man, age 60. Contributed by Dr. D. S. Lamb, Washington, D. C.

11563. Cancer of testicle: excision; recovery. From a soldier, said to have been caused by bicycle. Contributed by Surg. J. M. Banister, United States Army.

11565. Fibrosarcoma of mammary gland of colored girl, age 13 years. Apparently from a blow. Excision; recovery. Contributed by Dr. E. M. Hasbrouck, Salisbury, Md.

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PAYMASTER-GENERAL.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
PAYMASTER-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, October 14, 1899.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of this office for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1899:

On July 1, 1898, officers of the Pay Department were charged with public funds aggregating	$5,090,371.58
During the fiscal year 1899 these officers received—	
From the United States Treasury	84,148,099.76
From soldiers' deposits	1,496,762.31
From army paymasters' collections	1,220,311.10
Total balances and receipts	91,955,544.75
Accounted for as follows:	
Expended on account of pay of the Army	34,141,225.30
Expended on account of pay of the Army (United States Volunteers)	35,877,177.57
Expended on account of extra pay to Regular Army, war with Spain	202,592.92
Expended on account of extra pay to volunteers, war with Spain	1,443,932.66
Expended on account of mileage to officers	403,173.94
Expended on account of mileage to officers, National Defense	177,640.28
Expended on account of pay of Military Academy	283,362.09
Expended on account of volunteers, Treasury certificates	322,125.86
Expended on account of emergency fund, War Department, "to disband the Cuban army"	905,100.00
Surplus funds deposited to credit of United States Treasurer	7,296,776.59
Army paymasters' collections deposited to credit of United States Treasurer	1,220,311.10
Balances charged officers June 30, 1899	9,682,126.44
Total	91,955,544.75

A comparison of the expenditures of the last fiscal year with those of the preceding year shows a net increase of $56,721,723.33.

The Army called into service by the President under the acts of April 22 and May 11, 1898, aggregated, volunteers and regulars, over 280,000 men. These have been regularly paid, either monthly or bimonthly, during their term of service, and in addition the volunteers, excepting those on duty in the Philippines, have been mustered out of service and received their final pay.

SOLDIERS' DEPOSITS.

Recapitulation of soldiers' deposits.

Fiscal year.	Number of deposits.	Amount deposited.	Fiscal year.	Number of deposits.	Amount deposited.
1873		$209,850.38	1887	6,889	$436,574.98
1874		346,609.56	1888	7,409	386,944.10
1875		325,255.80	1889	7,892	383,798.34
1876		435,912.68	1890	7,634	395,128.82
1877	5,524	328,585.05	1891	6,790	403,173.15
1878	5,524	346,243.94	1892	5,570	334,404.70
1879	6,807	470,770.38	1893	5,870	282,248.04
1880	8,635	477,174.44	1894	5,914	361,830.76
1881	8,942	524,112.72	1895	6,284	318,270.73
1882	6,890	448,561.83	1896	8,778	420,338.87
1883	7,902	407,544.68	1897	17,878	535,392.64
1884	7,114	389,267.55	1898	21,856	613,513.51
1885	7,033	427,617.96	1899	37,842	1,496,762.31
1886	7,261	469,031.55			

The above table shows that the regular troops have continued to make large deposits, and that the volunteers also availed themselves of the privilege very extensively.

MILEAGE.

General Stanton said, in his report for the fiscal year 1898:

The question of mileage has been quite satisfactorily and equitably settled by the allowance of 7 cents per mile for transportation, and much labor and expense saved by this fixed allowance. There are, however, two recommendations that I would suggest:

(1) Under the present law it is almost impossible for paymasters to ascertain the cost of fare paid by the general public over bond-aided and land grant railroads, and it is suggested that a uniform rate of 3 cents per mile be adopted as the amount to be deducted by the paymaster for travel over any of the aided roads involved or when transportation has been furnished in kind by the Quartermaster's Department.

(2) Under the law the Pay Department is directed to make the payments for mileage for travel performed. The Army Regulations, paragraph 1170, provide that the Paymaster-General shall prepare (under direction of the Secretary of War) lists of distances, and in accordance therewith mileage will be computed, no matter by what route the travel may have been performed, etc.

In settling the mileage accounts of paymasters by the accounting officer of the Treasury, differences often occur in the matter of distances, occasioned by the Auditor computing the distance over different routes than those used in making up the tables by the Pay Department. I would recommend that as the tables of distances prepared by the Pay Department are the tables by which payments are made they should also be adopted as the authority for the settling of accounts and be so recognized by law.

Which meets with my cordial approval, and to which I wish to add that the Comptroller, by the interpretation of so-called "agreement roads" with the "bond aided free roads," etc., has caused a confusion in the calculation of mileage due officers, which the paymasters are unable to correct, leading to numerous suspensions which must ultimately be charged to them unless the accounting officers will return to their former rules. This but emphasizes what General Stanton has said in regard to the distance tables. I desire also to call attention to the recommendation for a uniform rate of 3 cents a mile where deductions are made over land-grant and bond-aided roads.

To illustrate the difficulties and injustice arising in the administration of the law under the present ruling of the Comptroller, I submit the following example:

The distance by the "shortest usually traveled route" between Atlanta, Ga., and San Francisco, Cal., is 2,750 miles, of which 940 miles is over bond-aided "free" or 50 per cent land-grant railroad. An officer traveling on official business and without troops from Atlanta, Ga., to San Francisco, Cal., would be required, if strictly complying with the mileage law, to purchase a ticket from Atlanta, Ga., to Birmingham, Ala. (167 miles); use Government transportation from Birmingham, Ala., to Jackson, Miss. (248 miles); purchase a ticket from Jackson, Miss., to Delta, La. (46 miles.); use Government transportation from Delta, La., to Waskom, Tex. (191 miles); purchase a ticket from Waskom, Tex., to Yuma, Ariz. (1,367 miles); use Government transportation from Yuma, Ariz., to Goshen, Cal. (490 miles); purchase a ticket from Goshen, Cal., to Lathrop, Cal. (147 miles); use Government transportation from Lathrop, Cal., to Tracy, Cal. (11 miles); and then purchase a ticket from Tracy to San Francisco, Cal. (83 miles). In making the reduction for the transportation furnished, the paymaster will be required to deduct full local rates of fare between the points furnished, while the railroads are settled with for the transportation furnished on

the basis of through rates only. For example: The through rate of fare from Kansas City, Mo., to San Diego, Cal., is a fraction over 2.6 cents a mile, but an officer traveling over the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad (a part of said route) is charged with 6 cents per mile for the land-grant portion, while the railroad company receives 50 per cent of 2.6 cents per mile (the through rate) or 1.3 cents per mile for the same transportation.

SYSTEM OF PAYMENT.

During the past year all payments to the Army have been made monthly, except to troops serving in the Philippines. Previous to the declaration of war these payments were made by check or in currency, by express. After the organization of the volunteer force it was found impracticable to pay by the above-mentioned method the forces in the field, and they have been paid by the paymasters in person.

The system of payment by sending money by express is approved whenever, in the judgment of the Chief Paymaster and the general commanding the department, it is applicable.

ADDITIONAL PAYMASTERS.

In compliance with the act of March 2, 1899, the force of additional paymasters has been reduced as rapidly as possible, in order to bring it within the number provided at the expiration of the six months allowed for the reduction.

The work of the additional paymasters has, on the whole, been performed with zeal and intelligence. Many of these gentlemen have been among the most valuable we have in the service; others, while evincing great zeal and intelligence, were too old to withstand the hardship of service.

Under no circumstances should men be appointed to this office who are more than 40 years of age, nor until they have passed an examination as to their physical, moral, and mental fitness for the position.

EXAMINATION OF ACCOUNTS.

By section 12, act of July 31, 1894, it is required that the accounts in this office shall be transmitted to the Auditor for the War Department within twenty days after their receipt. It has often been quite difficult, in the limited time, to comply with this provision and give the accounts the attention they require.

The difficulty in forwarding these accounts within the twenty days is now greatly increased, particularly when large numbers of accounts are received at the same time, as, for instance, from the Philippine Islands or from Cuba or Porto Rico, all having the same date, and I earnestly recommend that section 12 of the act approved July 31, 1894, be so amended that the Secretary of the Treasury be vested with the same authority in regard to relaxing the rules and regulations in regard to the rendition of accounts by the administrative departments beyond the limit of twenty to sixty days, the same as in the case of the rendition of accounts by the accounting officers.

The above recommendation of my predecessor is renewed, and the reenactment of the statute approved January 5, 1899, and published in General Orders, No. 11, of 1899, extending for another year the sixty days allowed for the examination and transmission of accounts to the Auditor for the War Department, is requested.

INCREASE IN THE REGULAR FORCE OF THE PAY CORPS.

The increase in the regular force of the Pay Corps, and its reorganization, will be made the subject of a separate report, to be submitted later.

PERSONNEL.

Maj. Allan H. Jackson retired October 29, 1898, and this vacancy was filled by the appointment of William W. Gilbert the 3d of November, 1898.

Gen. T. H. Stanton, Paymaster-General, retired January 30, 1899, by operation of law (sec. 1, act of June 30, 1882).

Col. A. B. Carey appointed Paymaster-General, to date February 1, 1899, vice Stanton, retired.

Colonel Carey's appointment promoted Lieut. Col. F. M. Coxe to colonel and assistant paymaster general; Maj. A. S. Towar to lieutenant-colonel and deputy paymaster-general; and made one vacancy in the list of majors, which was filled by the appointment of Theodore Mosher. Major Mosher retired March 2, 1899, and Harry L. Rees was appointed to fill the vacancy March 3, 1899.

Col. George E. Glenn, assistant paymaster-general, died March 31, 1899, promoting Lieut. Col. A. E. Bates to colonel and assistant paymaster general, and Maj. C. C. Sniffen to lieutenant colonel and deputy paymaster general. The vacancy caused by this promotion was filled by the appointment of Webster Vinson as major and paymaster April 3, 1899.

PAYMASTERS' CLERKS.

In his annual report for 1898 the Paymaster-General says:

There is no class of employees in the service of the Government who are so poorly paid in proportion to their services as the paymasters' clerks. Their business requires a thorough knowledge of bookkeeping and of stating and rendering accounts. They must be conversant with the Army regulations and all orders and decisions governing the payment of accounts. They are subject to change of location, with the attendant expenses. At present the salary is $1,400 per year, with no prospect of advancement.

I would therefore again recommend to Congress that legislation be had increasing the pay of paymasters' clerks 10 per cent for every five years of service, the salary not to exceed $1,800.

I wish to renew the recommendations made in this report, that Congress be urged to increase the pay now received by paymasters' clerks 10 per cent for every five years of service, the salary not to exceed $1,800 per annum.

I also recommend legislation authorizing the retirement of clerks on half pay after thirty years' continuous service.

CLERICAL FORCE.

Too much can not be said regarding the zeal and intelligence of the regular trained force of clerks in this office. No enlisted men or commissioned officers of the Army have shown more patriotic zeal for the accomplishment of the duties imposed upon them than these old tried servants of the Government. The work of these men is such that only trained clerks are of great value, and I earnestly recommend that the rules of the civil service be applied to the clerks in the Paymaster-General's office, and that they be strictly adhered to. Changes in the clerical force for any reason except to increase efficiency, and that upon the recommendation of the Paymaster-General, should never be made.

EMERGENCY FUND.

January 5, 1899, Congress appropriated $3,000,000 emergency fund, to be used at the discretion of the President in connection with the

disbandment of the Cuban army. This appropriation was turned over to the Pay Department, and on the 11th of March the Paymaster-General, in person, with one assistant, took the money to Havana, where it was turned over to the chief paymaster of that division, and the distribution of it has been going on continuously up to this date, June 30.

MONTHLY, BIMONTHLY, AND MUSTER-OUT PAYMENTS.

The work of the Pay Department, from the commencement of the Spanish-American war to its close and during the continuance of hostilities in the Philippines in suppression of insurrection, has been phenomenally laborious and exacting, but the officers of this department have met every requirement of duty with zeal and promptitude and to the satisfaction of the Army.

A state of war has not been permitted to interfere with the regularity of monthly payments, except in the Philippines, where bimonthly payments have been preferred.

It is gratifying to this department to be able to state that the peculiar difficulties, best known to the mustering officer and the paymaster, attendant upon the muster out (between September 5, 1898, and the 22d of June, 1899) of over 200,000 volunteer troops have been overcome with surprising facility and the day of their discharge has been the day of their payment.

Very respectfully,

A. E. BATES,
Paymaster-General, U. S. Army.

The SECRETARY OF WAR.

NOTE.—Attention is invited to the exhibits which are appended, showing in detail the accounts with the several appropriations and the receipts and expenditures of the individual officers of the Pay Department.

It was impossible to present a table of approved and suspended disbursements this year, as is usually done, owing to the fact that many of the accounts received from distant stations had not been examined and analyzed at the date of making up this report.

The analysis of mileage disbursements was also omitted, as the press of business during the past year would not admit of the time necessary to make up the record.

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REPORT OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER.

WAR DEPARTMENT, SIGNAL OFFICE,
Washington, September 30, 1899.

SIR: I have the honor to submit herewith my annual report covering the operations of the Signal Corps of the Army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899.

While this report covers the entire fiscal year, yet the story of the Spanish-American war, so far as the Signal Corps of the Army is concerned in Cuba and Porto Rico, was included in detail in the last annual report to September 30, 1898, and is not reproduced.

Extensive as were the augmentations and operations of other corps of the Army in the Spanish-American war, yet none were increased to such an extent as the Signal Corps, which was enlarged more than

twentyfold—from sixty officers and men to over thirteen hundred. This increase, astounding as it may seem, was scarcely sufficient, even with the most remarkable energy and application of its officers and men, to meet the incessant demands made by military commanders for communication by telegraphy and telephone.

Despite constant warnings and the development of an electrical age, the Signal Corps had been left by Congress as a skeleton organization, and was even more restricted in the amount of its annual appropriations than in the number of its officers and men. Simultaneously with the adjournment of Congress a problem of great difficulty confronted the Chief Signal Officer of the Army. It involved the discharge of the entire volunteer force and all of the regular establishment except about one hundred men, and their replacement by Signal Corps men belonging to the regular establishment. The law of March 2, 1899, required this to be done in a strictly limited time, while the public interests demanded its completion without interfering with the speedy transaction of telegraphic work on military lines in the United States, without closing a telegraph office in Cuba or Porto Rico, and without withdrawing a Signal-Corps soldier from duty with troops in active campaign in the Philippines. At times it seemed as though the Signal Corps would fail at one point or another, but by persistence, tact, and zeal on the part of the officers of the Signal Corps, assisted by cooperation of recruiting officers of the Army, this task has been completed.

The Volunteer Signal Corps, which at first operated the lines in Cuba and Porto Rico and stretched the flying lines up to the Filipino trenches, are now replaced by soldiers of the regular Signal Corps, and the volunteers (save two companies en route home from Manila) have now returned to their normal condition of patriotic citizens.

There are now in the regular Signal Corps nearly six hundred men, who, although seven-eighths recruits, promise through their intelligence, ability, and good conduct to rival the successful work of the Signal Corps during the late war. The utmost care has been exercised in the selection of these recruits, who have been invariably required to furnish certificates of good character and as to their professional ability.

With the signing of the peace protocol, the disintegration of the Volunteer Army commenced, but the discharge and muster out of the Volunteer Signal Corps could not progress with the same rapidity as was the case with other corps. While the military work of other arms of the service steadily decreased, paradoxical as it may seem, the work of the Signal Corps steadily increased. Not only was it necessary to continue in operation the telephone exchanges and systems in the great interior camps of the United States, but the demands upon the corps for foreign service were phenomenally increased. This arose from the fact that the telegraph lines of Porto Rico and Cuba constituted a part of the official functions of the Kingdom of Spain. Upon the evacuation of Porto Rico in September, 1898, and the gradual occupation of Cuba between August, 1898, and January, 1899, the operation, repair, and maintenance of such lines devolved on the United States Signal Corps. If these lines had been left by Spain in good condition, their operation and maintenance would not have been a serious tax on the capabilities of the corps. As a result of prolonged war conditions practically all the lines in Cuba were unserviceable, and many of them had passed totally out of existence. Even in Porto Rico a few weeks of active operations had sadly impaired the condition of lines that had never been maintained in good working order. In consequence all these lines have had to be reconstructed by the Signal Corps.

MILITARY TELEGRAPH CABLES.

The system of electrical intercommunication between adjacent coast fortifications successfully established in 1898 has been maintained throughout the year. Appendix No. 4 gives in detail the location of these cables, with other data of interest. The only post cables of importance laid during the year have been those in the harbor of San Francisco, connecting the military posts of Alcatraz Island, Angel Island, Lime Point, and the Presidio, and on the Columbia River, where a cable has been laid, connecting Fort Stevens with Chinook Point.

The difficulties under which cables are maintained in the navigable waters of the United States are much greater than would appear possible. This condition arises largely from an absolute disregard shown by private individuals to the rights of the people at large as represented by the United States Government. To illustrate, the repairs rendered necessary on the cable between Fort Hancock, Sandy Hook, N. J., and Fort Hamilton, N. Y., have aggregated $1,105.05. On one occasion no less than eleven breaks were discovered in this cable, of which three were made with an ax or other sharp instrument. Whenever shipping of any kind ventures on the cable ground, contrary to the tenor of prominent cable signs, it is liable to have its anchor caught. Instead of pulling up the cable and disentangling the anchor, the individual almost invariably disregards his duty to the United States, promptly severs the cable, and thus saves fifteen or twenty minutes work. It may be added that our National Government has shown in such matters an indifference unprecedented, although Congress has enacted a law making it an offense punishable by fine and imprisonment to interfere with a military telegraph line.

DIVISION OF CUBA.

On the signing of the peace protocol it appeared as though the most important duties connected with foreign service for the Signal Corps would be in Cuba, and as its proper representative the senior officer, Col. H. H. C. Dunwoody, was assigned to this important duty, he reaching Havana December 21, 1898. In view of the importance and novelty of his duties the Chief Signal Officer gave him instructions, somewhat in detail, as will appear in his report, Appendix No. 1. He was directed to assume charge and administer all government telegraph and telephone lines of Cuba, which, having been the property of Spain, passed into the hands of the United States for preservation and operation. He was especially charged to see that the operation of these lines was performed with efficiency and economy, and to install and operate such additional lines as might be necessary for military administration and authorized by his proper superiors. He was counseled as far as possible to continue in service the ablest and most reliable officials already connected with these lines. Telegraph and telephone lines operated by private corporations were to be examined with a view to determining their legal standing and authority for the operation of such lines, whether land lines or cables, for collection of revenues thereon. A liberal and conciliatory policy was counseled throughout, and directions were given to continue commercial business at reasonable and proper rates, which were neither to be so high as to be prohibitory of commercial business nor so low as to entail serious loss to the Government, but they should be fixed with the combined view of stimulating business and producing revenue. Recognizing the diffi-

culties attendant upon these lines, it was directed that while messages could be sent in all languages the official language should be English as far as possible and that the telegraph signals should be the American Morse.

The system of money accountability and reports was to conform to that in use on other military telegraph lines in the United States. Through the courtesy of the Acting Captain-General, Castellanos, on request of Maj. Gen. James F. Wade, Colonel Dunwoody was accorded access to the Spanish telegraph offices for the purpose of familiarizing himself with the details of the system, which formally came into Colonel Dunwoody's charge January 1, 1899. Simultaneously with Colonel Dunwoody's operation a Signal Corps detachment, under Lieut. Col. Joseph E. Maxfield, chief signal officer, Seventh Army Corps, went into camp near Buena Vista station, where a complete and efficient system of intercommunication between the various military commands in and around Havana was promptly established, there being in operation on May 1 nine telegraph and thirty telephone stations on 97 miles of line.

Under Spanish methods the postal and telegraph service were combined in a single bureau, but the separation was rapidly made on lines agreed upon by Colonel Dunwoody and Maj. E. G. Rathbone, the director-general of posts, with results beneficial both to the mail and telegraph service, which are more promptly executed than under Spanish administration. Cordial relations have been invariably maintained between the Signal Corps of the Army and the postal service, efforts being made in both services to facilitate the work of the other, whether in Cuba, Porto Rico, or the Philippines.

Every requisition of Colonel Dunwoody for supplies and stores necessary in his extended work were made almost invariably by telegraph, and through the efficient work of Capt. Eugene O. Fechet, disbursing officer, he almost invariably succeeded in turning over the stores to the quartermaster's department in forty eight hours, save in exceptional cases where the articles desired had to be manufactured to order. Material for the construction of 500 miles of telegraph lines had been previously accumulated in the Signal Corps depot at Savannah for an emergency, so that this material and 5,000 poles were promptly landed at desired points on the island. This preliminary work, as Colonel Dunwoody says, "greatly facilitated construction during the early occupation after January 1. In fact, otherwise it would not have been possible to have completed the overland telegraph line from Havana to Santiago on April 1."

The task of constructing a telegraph system from one end of the Island of Cuba to the other seemed hopeless in the few months remaining of the dry season. The officers and men of the Signal Corps worked, however, with an energy and success which secured phenomenal results. Colonel Dunwoody had forecasted the construction of the through line by April 10, but to the surprise of everyone the system was completed by April 1, which fact was announced by the Chief Signal Officer of the Army, then on an inspection tour in Cuba, in the following dispatch to the War Department:

The overland military telegraph line to Santiago completed at 10.50 this morning. The system of military lines is practically perfected, there being now in operation nine lines crossing the island from north to south and one trunk line running through the center of the island from Pinar del Rio, at extreme western end, through Havana and Santiago to Baracoa, at extreme eastern end. General Brooke can now reach, over his own lines, every military command and every town of

importance in Cuba. The operation and reorganization of these lines is due to Colonel Dunwoody's executive ability and constant application to the work. Have Colonel Montgomery present this dispatch to the President.

In addition to the through trunk land line, which runs from one end of the Island of Cuba to the other, every extension of old lines or construction of new lines desired by any department commander has been promptly complied with, and at the close of the fiscal year the Signal Corps has in operation in the Island of Cuba no less than 2,500 miles, of which 600 miles were absolutely new lines and the balance largely reconstruted. It is not claimed that the lines thus constructed are of the best character. The only wonder is that they were built at all prior to the month of April. If there had been any dilatoriness in the work of the Signal Corps these lines could not have been completed until the winter of 1899–1900, for imperative orders necessitated the relief and muster out of all volunteer men in the Signal Corps in Cuba in compliance with the act of Congress reorganizing the Army. The importance of this work was recognized by Brig. Gen. J. C. Breckenridge, Inspector-General of the Army, who, in his report on Cuba and Porto Rico, says:

The good work of the Signal Corps in the two islands was everywhere in evidence, and the completion of the overland line from Pinar del Rio to Santiago de Cuba and on to Baracoa will materially expedite Government business.

Scarcely was the line up before complaints were circulated as to interruptions and delays. In part, interruptions occurred through malicious injury to the lines by lawless and dissatisfied individuals, interruptions which the Chief Signal Officer of the Army is glad to report have almost totally ceased. Other interruptions came from the destruction of poles by frequent and extensive fires, which happily terminated with the beginning of the wet season. Still other delays, the most infrequent, resulted from the poor construction of the line.

It should not be understood that the work on the line ceased with its construction, but every effort was made to put it in a complete state of repair, which, under the tremendous energy and fine professional skill of Capt. Samuel Reber, Signal Corps, has been carried out with a degree of success that was thought impossible during the rainy season.

This is shown by the fact that the latest line reports available for the first twenty-four days of August, 1899, show that the through line from Havana to Santiago was working completely on twenty three days and was seriously interrupted only on one day. Better work can not be expected from a line 600 miles long, traversing mountainous and forest countries where for miles and miles no habitation of man is visible.

The muster out of the Volunteer Signal Corps in Cuba caused the greatest possible embarrassment to Colonel Dunwoody, as scarcely 5 per cent of the Volunteer Signal Corps men were willing to reenlist. Advantage was taken of the situation by certain civilian operators, who threatened a telegraphic strike unless an increase, impossible for the service to meet, was granted them. Unusual efforts, however, secured the enlistment of a sufficient number of operators to place the Cuban telegraph system on a firm basis and completely under military control.

In accordance with his instructions Colonel Dunwoody has used every endeavor to secure the services of native operators and linemen. He says in many cases he has—

employed men of limited skill with the hope that by experience they might improve and be able to maintain the service after the return of the Signal Corps to the United States. As an evidence of my efforts in this direction, I would say that there are employed in connection with the telegraph lines in Cuba 179 natives, 54

Americans, and 80 enlisted men of the Signal Corps, showing that more than one-half of the employees of the telegraph service in Cuba are natives. It is my purpose to increase this number, and I have given every facility to the native operators to improve and acquire the Morse system of operating by opening a school of instruction and giving the free use of instruments to improve all those who might apply and gave evidence of capacity to improve. A number of Cuban operators who have practiced for some time have been given employment in the service, with a view of utilizing their knowledge of the Spanish language at the stations to which they have been assigned.

It was not to be expected that the adoption of modern methods could be brought about in Cuba without causing a certain degree of dissatisfaction. The necessity of adopting modern methods in vogue in the United States should be apparent to every thoughtful person in view of the fact that these are military telegraph lines operated primarily in the interests of the Army of the United States. Criticisms on the efficiency of the Signal Corps operations have been conclusively refuted, as official reports show that the most serious errors in the transmission of dispatches have been made by Cuban operators sending messages in the Spanish language.

Many of the complaints in Cuba have emanated from persons desiring employment as telegraph operators, but who refused to demonstrate their ability to operate, the desire being evidently to continue the defects of the Spanish system, which involved the employment of many managers and operators whose duty consisted mainly in drawing their monthly salaries. Conciliation has been the order of the day, whether with reference to Cuban operators or to railway telegraph systems.

After mature consideration of the question commercial rates were established as follows:

Twenty cents for ten words, address and signature included, for messages passing through parts of not more than three provinces, including that in which the message originates, and an additional charge of 1 cent per word for each additional province.

Special press dispatches are transmitted throughout the island at 1 cent per word.

The free use of telegraph lines in Cuba have been extended not only to all departments of the Government of the United States, but to all civil departments of the Island of Cuba under the restrictions set forth by Circular No. 93, Headquarters Division of Cuba.

In connection with repairs every facility has been offered by railway officials to maintain telegraphic communication. Colonel Dunwoody has established with railway officials such relations as will result beneficially both to the Government and the railway. Railways are permitted to use the telegraph on a certain class of commercial messages.

It is needless to state that the remarkably efficient work performed under Colonel Dunwoody's orders would not have been possible without the hearty cooperation and support of Major General Brooke, Commanding General, Division of Cuba. General Brooke's knowledge and appreciation of the importance of military telegraph lines insured his active support in this work.

It is too early to state what will be the annual telegraph receipts of the island. For the five months ending June 30, 1899, they aggregated $13,261.28.

It should be added that there has been spent in the reorganization and operation of the telegraph service in the Island of Cuba during the six months ending June 30, 1899, $64,314.48.

Colonel Dunwoody merits special commendation for the successful manner in which he has worked out many difficult problems. It should

be realized that the Army of the United States was occupying, in a foreign country, a territory of 800 miles in length, two-thirds of which was without telegraphic or telephonic communication. Colonel Dunwoody gives proper credit for much of his success to the Volunteer Signal Corps, of which he says:

> The personnel of the corps was of high type, having been selected in compliance with the law; a large percentage of the force were either skilled electricians or telegraph operators, and the officers were skilled in the very important duty which they were to perform in their military capacity. They were all, both officers and men, anxious to be assigned to the field of duty, and the most difficult assignment was the most sought after. Every man, with scarcely an exception, performed his duty honestly and faithfully, and with the full measure of his capacity. The work of construction assigned to the various companies was performed successfully and with such rapidity as surprised those most familiar with telegraph construction.

Operations in Cuba have been conducted, as a rule, without detriment to the health of a Signal Corps command save in the province of Santiago. Second Lieut. James B. McLaughlin, one of the most valuable and promising officers of the semipermanent force, died of yellow fever, and Second Lieut. Frank W. Dunn, was killed by accident in the line of his duty near Baracoa, having lately received his commission which enlarged his sphere of usefulness.

DEPARTMENTS OF HAVANA AND MATANZAS.

The important departments of Havana and Matanzas have been in charge, respectively, of Maj. George P. Scriven and Capt. Samuel Reber as signal officers. These officers have labored with very great difficulty in reorganizing telegraphic, telephonic, and other kindred matters which have fallen within their respective domain. Their work has not been alone confined to the limit of their respective departments, but has entailed cooperative work in connection with the signal officer, Division of Cuba, in the labors of establishing and maintaining telegraphic communication throughout the island of Cuba. Major Scriven's report forms Appendix No. 2 and Captain Reber's Appendix No. 3 of this report.

In addition to other special duties not pertaining to his department, Major Scriven acted as signal officer, Division of Cuba, during the temporary absence on detached duty of Col. H. H. C. Dunwoody, from May 19 to June 24, performing the duties with which he was suddenly charged with a degree of efficiency and success in keeping with his previous high reputation as an officer.

Captain Reber has also acted at times as general superintendent and inspector of all the telegraph lines of the island. He brought to this work a wealth of practical knowledge and professional ability, which, conjoined to his wonderful activity, wrought phenomenal results. The fact that the reconstructed Cuban telegraph lines have not only worked through the entire wet season, but continued to improve, is the strongest evidence of the character of the work done by him. It must be understood that affairs in the Department of Havana as elsewhere were very unsettled when first occupied by the Signal Corps. Captain Reber has also compiled a brief but valuable summary of information relating to the organization by Spain of the telegraph lines of the island of Cuba, which is attached to this report.

The Chief Signal Officer of the Army, realizing the difficulties which would environ the military forces occupying the Department of Havana, made arrangements for the early dispatch to that point of an officer of the Signal Corps, Captain Martin L. Hellings, who reached Havana

December 6, 1898, and made arrangements for receiving on the part of the United States the Government telegraph lines in Cuba which the Signal Corps was to hold in trust. On December 14, 1898, Lieut. Col. Joseph E. Maxfield, with several companies of the Volunteer Signal Corps, took station at Camp Columbia, near the village of Buena Vista, 7 miles from Havana. He carried with him a full complement of Signal Corps supplies and used them with such dispatch that within twenty-four hours Camp Columbia was in telegraphic communication with the city of Havana. Under his direction a complete system of military telegraph and telephone lines was built, almost entirely under the personal supervision of Captain L. D. Wildman, Volunteer Signal Corps. The military telephone exchange at Camp Columbia, which was set up and operated entirely by the enlisted men of the Volunteer Signal Corps, was the center of ten separate lines, aggregating 200 miles in length. The greater part of these lines was operated by telephone, there being forty-four separate stations, while the rest was by telegraph, of which there were nine stations. Through this military system, which was constructed under many difficulties in the briefest possible time, intercommunication was had with every important official or office, among others the commanding general of the division and the two departments, post office, collector of customs, chief quartermaster, chief commissary, medical headquarters, sanitary officers, the hospitals, fortifications of Cabanas and Morro, and others eastward to Vedado, at which point the commanding general of the division had taken quarters. In addition ten separate lines were constructed and put in operation in the city of Havana, bringing every military headquarters or civil office or important point in communication with and under the supervision of the commanding general.

In illustration of the difficulties under which the American lines were originally maintained, the official reports show that the Cabanas cable in Havana Harbor was cut no less than eleven times within two weeks. The intervention of the police, offering of rewards, posting of warnings, and establishment of guard have materially reduced the frequency of these operations, and no injuries of the kind have occurred for several months. Similar malicious interferences with military land lines were sources of grave annoyance in Havana (and other cities, it may be added) for a considerable period. Doubtless many interruptions were due to accident or ignorance, the greatest difficulty resulting from the immense number of wires covering the city. Many of these are dead, while others swinging loose are alive and harmful, especially those of the Spanish American Light and Power Company, which are old and weather worn to such a degree that these high voltage wires are, in many places, without any insulation whatever.

CUBAN TELEPHONE CONCESSIONS.

In Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines the telephone, equally with the telegraph, is a function of the Government. Most fortunately, under Spanish law telephone concessions are for a limited period. The concession is sold at public auction to the highest bidder, and the property reverts finally to the State.

Under the Spanish royal decree and order of May 12, 1888, a private corporation, the Red Telephone Company, purchased at public auction, through one Fermie Verdie, at Madrid in September, 1889, the telephone concession for Havana, the price paid to be 22 per cent of the gross receipts of the company, while 5 per cent of its instruments were

to be furnished gratuitously for Government service. There was a further proviso that the company shall be exempt from taxation and that its concession should expire in 1909, at which date the entire plant, instruments, lines, etc., should pass without compensation into the possession of the Government. This concession was transferred in April, 1890, to Señor Zorilla, who organized, on July 16, 1890, the present company. The legal rights of this company and its obligations to the Government have been duly considered, and under existing orders Maj. George P. Scriven, United States Volunteer Signal Corps, signal officer, Department of Havana, is the designated inspector of the Red Telephone Company, of Havana, with power to require, on the part of the officials of the company, a strict compliance with the terms of the concession under which the company was organized and to make a monthly report thereon to headquarters Division of Cuba. Under the orders of the assistant secretary of finance, dated April 12, 1899, taxes collected from this company are transferred to the municipality of Havana. It was decided later that the telephone tax should be collected by the General Government to April 20, 1899, and thereafter by the municipality of Havana. The quarterly statement of the Red Telephone Company for the three months ending March 1, 1899, showing its receipts, list of subscribers, and various other matters, forms a part of Major Scriven's report. While the construction is generally substantial, the wire used, No. 14 galvanized iron, deteriorates rapidly. The telephones in most general use are a combination of the Ader transmitter, French make, carbon type, and for short distances answer well enough with a single metallic circuit. There are two exchanges—a main office and a branch. The former is fitted with an old-fashioned switch board with 1,000 drops, while the branch office has 700 drops. Improvements, however, are being gradually made. On July 1, 1899, there were in use 1,435 telephones, of which 49 were gratuitously furnished to the Government. The city police have 4 telephones, for which an annual charge of $72 each is made. The telephone charges against the fire department are simply enormous, amounting annually to $16,776, which, deducting Government charges, would represent 6 per cent interest on a capital of $218,000. Among these charges is one of 133 telephones used by Bomberos del Comercio, a private company, for which, on grounds not made quite clear, the Government pays a tax of $9,576. It should be said to the credit of the telephone company that its officials have shown a desire to meet the Government requirements, and have spent over $600 in stringing special wires for the use and convenience of the present Government.

Similar telephone concessions exist in the cities of Matanzas and Santiago.

CUBAN CABLE CONCESSIONS.

Concessions of various provisions are connected with every cable landing on the island of Cuba. These companies are—

First. The International Ocean Telegraph Company, with cables between Havana and Florida, two landing at Punta Rassa, on the west coast, through Key West, and a third at Miami, running via Key West.

Second. Cuba Submarine Telegraph Company, which has three cables on the south coast of Cuba, two extending from Batabano to Cienfuegos and thence direct to Santiago, while the third extends along the south coast, touching at Trinidad, Tunas, Jucaro, Santa Cruz, and Manzanillo.

Third. The West India and Panama Company, which has two cables connecting Santiago and Jamaica.

Fourth. The French Telegraphic Cables Company, with a cable connecting Mole St. Nicolas, Hayti, with Guantanamo; thence partly by land line and partly by cable to Santiago.

Questions involving the rights and privileges of these companies have been repeatedly raised, both in Cuba and the United States, and have been the subject of consideration by the Secretary of War and the Attorney-General of the United States.

A demand made by the Cuba Submarine Company upon the United States for payment of the annual subsidy granted it by Spain has been unfavorably reported upon by the Chief Signal Officer of the Army. The Peace Commission declined to protect the interests of this company. The suggestion that the United States should pay this subsidy because of the military occupation of Cuba seems unreasonable. It is a matter which should receive the decision of the highest courts of Cuba as to whether that island should pay the obligations contracted by Spain, or whether this subsidy remains in a manner part of the Cuban debt of Spanish obligations. Spain laid, through the intermediation of the Cuba Submarine Telegraph Company, a cable about 5 miles in length across the harbor of Cienfuegos in May, 1898, and the company, failing to receive pay from the Spanish Government, now claims this cable as returned to them by Spain in payment of Spanish obligations.

By direction of the Secretary of War, the chief signal officer of the department has been ordered to take possession of this cable in the name of the United States, and hold it until a legal decision shall have been rendered in connection therewith.

DEPARTMENT OF PORTO RICO.

Since the occupation of Porto Rico the operations of the Signal Corps have been under the charge of Lieut. Col. (now Maj.) W. A. Glassford, United States Volunteers, a captain of the regular corps. Under the Spanish law the telegraph and telephone appertained to governmental functions, save in rare cases where privileges for a limited period were sold at auction. Under the law all the telegraph lines were operated by the Kingdom of Spain, but telegraph exchanges in San Juan and Ponce were operated by corporations under a concession.

The cession of Porto Rico to the United States necessarily devolved the operation of the telegraph lines upon some governmental bureau of the United States. Under orders these duties devolved upon the Signal Corps of the Army, which by law was charged with the operation and maintenance of the military telegraph lines, with a view to their being exercised until Congress should enact legislatively on this subject. The details connected with the reconstruction and operation of these lines appear in the report of Maj. W. A. Glassford, Appendix No. 5, accompanied by a map.

These lines, when they came into the hands of the Signal Corps of the Army, were in a dilapidated and unsatisfactory condition. The code was the Continental (European Morse). The closed-circuit system was used. All messages were recorded upon registers and were read by the eye. The telegraph lines were so located that their operation was seriously affected by growing vegetation. The character of the service is evidenced by a statement made personally to the Chief Signal Officer of the Army by a prominent business man, who has long resided in San Juan, who declares that while using the telegraph lines freely for years he had never known a message to be sent and an answer

received in the same day between the two most important cities of the island—San Juan and Ponce, about 85 miles apart.

Every effort was made by Major Glassford, who received the cordial support of the commanding generals, Guy V. Henry and George W. Davis, to bring the Porto Rican lines into good condition, and for this purpose the Chief Signal Officer of the Army furnished all possible blanks, material, instruments, and supplies. Scarcely had the lines been brought to a fair degree of efficiency when Major Glassford had the misfortune to see the arduous labor of himself and officers and men of the Signal Corps brought to naught by the violent hurricane of August, which brought to the ground every mile of telegraph or telephone wire on the whole island, over 1,200 miles in length. As this report is being made Major Glassford is reconstructing the entire system, taking advantage of the general destruction to rectify errors of location and faults of arrangement, which otherwise would have been permitted to continue for years. Major Glassford is entitled to great credit for the efficient manner in which the telegraphic work of the island of Porto Rico has been managed. An undue amount of labor fell upon him personally, owing to the necessity of reducing his commissioned force to one officer—a course necessitated by urgent demands for officers of the Signal Corps in the Philippines.

PORTO RICAN CABLES.

The only cables reaching this island are those of the West India and Panama Company, which connects Ponce, on the south coast, and San Juan, on the north, with St. Thomas and Jamaica. It is understood that the concession of this company expires about 1909.

The Chief Signal Officer of the Army renews his recommendations, as a matter of national importance, toward securing direct telegraphic communication between Porto Rico and the United States by a cable operated by the United States or by an American corporation. At present the island is reached only over the cables of the West India and Panama Cable Company, an English corporation which has certain concessionary rights.

Inasmuch as the relations of Cuba and Porto Rico must become more and more intimate and important, it is recommended that the United States system of land lines in these two islands, which have been built and are now operated by the Signal Corps of the Army, be connected by deep-sea cable extending from the island of Porto Rico to Santiago de Cuba. By this means all communications between Porto Rico and the United States would pass over strictly American lines.

It is estimated that the cost of a cable between the points named will not exceed $600,000. The rates to the present time have been excessive and are a burden to commercial and other interests.

PHILIPPINE CABLES.

The question of cable communication in the Philippines early assumed a serious phase. Only a few days prior to the opening of the Spanish-American war the Eastern Extension, Australasia and China Telegraph Company, under an emergency contract, doubtless stimulated by the approach of hostilities, extended the Hongkong cable, which previously landed on the northern coast of Luzon, to the city of Manila. This cable was cut, as has been reported, by Admiral Dewey, who endeavored in vain to obtain a neutralization of the cable, it being understood

that the Spanish reports would be allowed to pass over it if the United States could also utilize it. This Spain, through its officers, refused to permit, despite every effort on the part of the Chief Signal Officer of the Army to secure the reopening of this cable.

In obedience, as it was understood, to the demands of the Government of Spain, from whom this company was receiving a subsidy, the cable was officially sealed at Hongkong, and remained dead during the entire war. The Chief Signal Officer of the Army immediately took steps to furnish cable communication, and through the efforts of Lieut. Col. Richard E. Thompson, Signal Corps, a cable was laid between Manila and Cavite—a most fortunate action, since during a period of ten months following communication to Cavite by land telegraph lines was interrupted and business could be transacted direct only over the Signal Corps cable. In addition, arrangements were made as speedily as possible for the manufacture in the United States of deep-sea cable sufficient in quantity to provide for military operations in the Philippines. As soon as this was learned the Eastern Extension Telegraph Company immediately questioned the right of the United States Army to lay cables in the Philippines—a remarkable position, inasmuch as this company not only refused to open its own cables, but coupled with it a claim for absolute cable rights, and a demand that the United States Government should wait for cable facilities until the Philippines came into its possession by treaty of peace.

It is needless to say that the Government sustained the Chief Signal Officer of the Army in his view that the United States Army had a right to lay, for war purposes, cables in any part of the Philippine archipelago that might be within its control.

After consultation with the commanding general Department of the Pacific through Lieut. Col. Richard E. Thompson, the Chief Signal Officer of the Army undertook to provide sufficient submarine cable and lay it between such points in the islands of Luzon, Leyte, Cebu, Negros, Panay, Masbate, etc., as might be selected by the Major-General Commanding and occupied by United States troops. The intention was to supplement these series of cables by short land lines.

Despite the attitude of the Eastern Extension Telegraph Company the plan contemplated did not look to interference with existing lines, but simply provided cable communication between Manila and Cebu and the Visayan Islands by an absolutely different route from that formerly occupied by the Eastern Extension Telegraph Company.

It should be noted at this time that the Eastern Extension Telegraph Company abandoned with the Spanish troops the cable stations occupied in the Visayan Islands in December, 1898, and that the entire system of Visayan cables, from Manila south through the islands of Panay and Negros to Cebu, was interrupted and cable communication impossible. This resulted from the abandonment of these stations by the Eastern Extension Telegraph Company, which was coupled with the announcement, as reported, that they were unwilling to occupy these stations until the United States was able to protect their officers and property. This was commercially prudent, but diplomatically it could not fail to place the United States in the position of being unable to control the territory which it was to acquire by a treaty of peace then awaiting action of Congress.

The action of the Eastern Extension Telegraph Company, a British corporation, in abandoning its stations at Iloilo and elsewhere broke up the system of lines south effectually. If they had continued to occupy these offices, it seems probable that as a neutral corporation they could

have secured the continuous operation of the Spanish land lines, which were necessary for the completion of the system. Cable interruption was followed, however, by the operation of the land lines by insurgents hostile to the United States, so that these important connecting links were not only temporarily lost to the United States, but absolutely passed into possession of hostile forces.

Later the Eastern Extension Telegraph Company brought up the question of its concessions, and from that time on has lost no opportunity or effort to wrest from the United States Government an acknowledgment of the legality and continuance of such concessions, that provide for the payment of heavy subsidies and exemption from taxation of the property and lines of a foreign corporation, which grant a cable monopoly in the Philippines for the next forty-one years.

The Chief Signal Officer of the Army recommended unfavorable action on all of these applications and was eventually supported by the Administration, the Attorney-General having decided that the present was not an opportune moment for passing upon concessions or privileges in the islands of Cuba, Porto Rico, or the Philippines.

It is proper for the Chief Signal Officer of the Army to state briefly the reasons for his opposition to the definite recognition of these concessions:

First, it is a judicial matter which should be passed upon by the highest courts in the Philippines and eventually in the United States.

Second, the treaty convention at Paris declined to recognize or provide for any of the telegraph concessions brought before it.

It may be suggested that the subsidies for cable operations in the Philippines formed an obligation against the Government of Spain, which entered into a contract for absolute rights, a contract apparently contrary to the policy of Congress for the past hundred years: moreover these pecuniary obligations might possibly be considered as forming a part of the Philippine debt.

There are certainly provisions in the late Spanish concessions to this cable company which plainly can not be acceded to by the United States, especially the absolute cable rights for an indefinite period, not only in the Philippine Archipelago, but in all Spanish possessions in the Pacific. As has been pointed out, the United States adheres to its right to lay war cables, and it is questioned whether Germany, in its newly acquired Caroline Islands, acknowledges the absolute right of the British company to lay cables in that portion of the former Spanish possessions.

The final adjustment of these matters is without the scope of duties pertaining to the Chief Signal Officer of the Army, who deems it important to simply present to the Secretary of War the questions raised during the past year and the methods and reasons involved in their treatment.

Passing to the efforts of the Chief Signal Officer of the Army to secure sufficient and suitable submarine cable for the Philippines, the opinion was advanced that this work could not be done promptly or satisfactorily in the United States. This office, however, having a different opinion, invited proposals, and was successful in securing the construction and transportation to Manila of 212 miles of deep-sea cable, which reached the Philippines in good condition despite the unfavorable conditions for transportation through the Indian Ocean and Red Sea at the worst time in the year, during extreme heat which endangers submarine cable.

It is true that the facilities of the Safety and the Kerite Cable com-

panies which furnished this cable were limited, but they had the 212 miles of cable ready for transportation in as short a time as was necessary for the Quartermaster's Department to provide a suitable cable ship. The Quartermaster General of the Army and his assistants, Colonels Bird and Jones, used every effort to facilitate the important work of fitting out a cable ship. The transport selected, the *Hooker*, formerly the *Panama*, was in such condition that it was properly determined to thoroughly overhaul her prior to sending her to Manila, especially as she was contemplated for dispatch and other service in the Philippines after laying the submarine cable. The technical part of outfitting consisted in providing proper tanks and paying-out machinery, which was undertaken by the Signal Corps and progressed most satisfactorily with the work of repairs, so that the *Hooker* sailed without twenty-four hours' delay from the Signal Corps after she was pronounced ready by the Quartermaster's Department. In accordance with the regulations the ship was manned and controlled by an acting assistant quartermaster, under the directions of the Quartermaster General. The authority of the commanding officer of the Signal Corps detachment which sailed therein was limited to indicating the ports which it was necessary for Signal Corps purposes to enter, which in this case consisted only of Gibraltar. It was further understood, however, that in case of attacks by pirates or other hostile actions that the Signal Corps officer should command the troops and be responsible for the fighting of the ship, which was fitted out with rapid-firing guns by the Ordnance Department. The *Hooker* sailed for Manila May 1, 1899, and took on board at Gibraltar certain equipments for submarine telegraphy which could not be speedily obtained in the United States, and reached Manila June 26, 1899, the Signal Corps detachment being in command of Maj. Joseph E. Maxfield.

This work of constructing cable of a proper type and of organizing a party competent for cable operations, with the providing of suitable cable and gear, was novel to the Signal Corps, and indeed to any officer either of the Army or Navy in the United States. To Col. James Allen, Volunteer Signal Corps, was assigned the duty of planning the cable gear machinery, which is of the finest and most improved type, and of also determining the specifications for the construction of the cable, thus being of indispensable assistance to Major Maxfield, Signal Corps, who was officially charged with the entire work, and who devoted himself to it with an energy, intelligence, and zeal that are deserving of the highest commendation. The entire method of manufacture of the cable was closely followed, the most thorough tests being applied to it in its course of construction, and every other detail of importance bearing on the completeness of the cable were subjects of his careful and personal attention. In addition, Major Maxfield was obliged not only to watch and perfect the construction of complete cable laying and repairing machinery, but also to arrange all the paraphernalia and gear necesary for the landing of shore ends, the laying of the main cable and surveying of the route which the cable was to follow. The loading of the cable was a matter of special difficulty, owing to the fact that the cable was constructed in 5-mile lengths, that being the longest piece which could be transported from the factories to the lighters. It thus became necessary in loading and splicing the cable to test most carefully and thoroughly every joint. The work, however, was thoroughly and satisfactorily done, and the main cable was stored in good condition on the *Hooker* in three cable tanks.

It was a source of satisfaction that a cable of American make of

such length was constructed, transported, and delivered more than half way around the world, under most unfavorable climatic conditions, in first-class condition. It is another evidence of the energy and ability of the American manufacturer and the resourcefulness and adaptability of the American officer.

It is understood that plans for laying the Philippine cables have been modified by the commanding general of that department, to whom final action and complete control were properly given. It is also understood, although the Chief Signal Officer of the Army has no official information of the fact, that the *Hooker* was totally wrecked and lost on Corregidor Reef, in Manila Bay, but that the cable and other Signal Corps property were saved. The fitting out of another cable ship is doubtless being done by the commanding general, Department of the Pacific, and no trouble should be experienced in attaching thereto the cable machinery and laying cable at such time and place as may be directed. The Chief Signal Officer of the Army has full confidence that Major Maxfield, acting under the general instructions of the commanding general and the special orders of his superior, Maj. Richard E. Thompson, will be equal to any demands made upon him in connection with this important work.

It appears unquestioned that a considerable amount of additional cable will be necessary for military purposes in the Philippines. To insure successful military administration and guard against the effect of misunderstandings, which must arise from time to time in the next few years, a proper cable system is absolutely necessary. With such a system public order can be maintained or restored with a military force which would be totally inadequate without the advantages of instant communication. Cable communication between Luzon, Masbate, Samar, Leyte, Bohol, and Cebu has already been provided for. It will be of equal importance that one of the Visayan Islands should be connected with the Sulu Archipelago via Mindanao, and that Palawan be connected with either Luzon or Mindoro via the Calamian group.

It is only a matter of time when Luzon shall be connected with Formosa (whence cables now run to Japan and China) by an international cable, which would not be much over 200 nautical miles in length. This will insure an independent connection between the Philippine Islands, Japan, and the Asiatic mainland, which is now only available telegraphically over a short cable of about 600 miles of the Eastern Company, where the charges are three times as great as between the United States and Europe, being 75 cents per word.

PACIFIC CABLE.

In order to join closer together the United States and its Pacific colonies, it is essential to span the Pacific by a submarine cable, as recommended by the President to Congress in his special message of February 10, 1899.

The great value of such a cable is not alone for military purposes, but more especially for the fostering of industrial interests in the new colonies and in order to facilitate commercial operations.

In connection with cable operations in Cuba and the Philippines the Signal Corps has had practical experience in the construction, handling, and operation of cables as has never been enjoyed by any other body of officers and men outside of the few experts of the great cable corporations of the world. In addition three officers of the Signal Corps, Major

James Allen, Major Joseph E. Maxfield, and Captain George O. Squier, have especially applied themselves to acquire knowledge regarding the electrical and other physical constants of submarine cables or best methods of operation, the lines along which invention is advancing cable operations, and other data relative to this subject. The successful efforts of these officers, especially the efforts of Captain Squier, have enabled the Chief Signal Officer of the Army to bring together a collection of data that must be of great value and importance to such officers of the Government as may be charged either with the construction, laying, and operation of such cables, or the supervision of the work if done by contract.

INTERNATIONAL CABLE REGULATIONS.

In connection with the proposed American-Pacific cable, it is desirable to call attention to the fact that the whole subject of the rights, privileges, and immunities of submarine cable property in time of war has been brought to notice during the Spanish-American war, and should properly be a matter of consideration for an international cable conference. Such a conference for the protection of submarine cables was held at Paris in 1884, and its proceedings transmitted to Congress by a message of the President under date of January 9, 1899, and was subscribed to by the United States in conjunction with twenty-five other principal nations of the world.

Article XV of this conference, however, specifically states that "The stipulations of this convention shall in no wise affect the liberty of belligerents," which article leaves this important property in time of war without adequate laws to meet the complicated cases which are certain to arise.

In view of the present enormous projected extension of submarine-cable service throughout the world, aggregating in the British Empire alone an estimated cost of $30,000,000, such a conference as above referred to could properly consider other international cable matters which cable progress now demands. Among them is the entire revision and adoption of an international cable code, with a view to establishing a standard, uniform, and efficient method of cable communication to replace the large number of separate and individual codes now in use throughout the world. A single code language thoroughly classified, carefully selected with reference to the avoidance of telegraphic errors, in transcription and in transmission, whether in American Morse or continental, should be formulated and adopted by the leading nations of the world. Such a code would prove of great benefit, and its use would materially increase the efficiency of submarine cables.

WAR DEPARTMENT TELEGRAPHIC CODE.

Under the provisions of General Orders, No. 9, Adjutant-General's Office, January 16, 1899, the Chief Signal Officer of the Army has undertaken the preparation of a suitable telegraphic code for the official use of the Army. The extraordinary telegraphic expenses to which the War Department has been lately subjected made this a matter of great importance. Unfortunately the conditions were such that the preparation of this work devolved upon the Chief Signal Officer of the Army personally, this resulting from the fact that a satisfactory performance of this work required a practical knowledge of telegraphy, a thor-

ough familiarity with the necessities of the service and of the special vocabularies to be used; also a knowledge of working methods in vogue and regulations in force on the various cable lines of the world. It was evident that a perfected work of this kind could not be completed except after many months of labor, but on the other hand, it was important that tentative and temporary steps should be taken to reduce the enormous cable expenses then devolving upon the Department. The first act was to adopt, temporarily, such commercial code as might be best suited to the uses of the Army, which proved to be a new code known as the "Western Union Telegraphic Code."

By assiduous personal application the Chief Signal Officer of the Army succeeded in constructing within sixteen days after the date of order a publication for emergent use, which, known under the title of "Preliminary War Department Telegraphic Code," has been printed and distributed to the Army. This code contains general and special instructions concerning the preparations of ordinary messages, as well as those in code and in cipher, and also points out to officers concerned the most important features for Army use of the "Western Union Telegraphic Code." The "Preliminary War Department Telegraphic Code" contains, alphabetically arranged, nearly 4,000 sentences that are of more or less frequent use in military correspondence. It is believed that the savings made to the United States by this code for the eight months ending September 30, 1899, exceeded the sum of $50,000. In one case a single cipher word conveys a sentence of twenty four words, a phrase frequently telegraphed. On an average each cipher word represents about seven words in plain text.

The Chief Signal Officer still continues, as rapidly as is possible, his personal labors on a perfected code, which, it is hoped, will be available for distribution by December 31, 1899. As a saving to the Government this code will utilize as supplementary the main body of the "Western Union Telegraphic Code."

In the preparation of the permanent War Department Telegraphic Code very great care has been taken to omit words which, either in the Continental Code or American Morse, are of such character as to lead to errors, whether in the transmission of the cipher message or from defective transcription.

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REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE RECORD AND PENSION OFFICE.

RECORD AND PENSION OFFICE,
War Department, October 1, 1899.

SIR: As briefly stated in a former annual report, the work of the Record and Pension Office then consisted in the transaction of the business of the War Department relating to the volunteer forces in the service of the United States during the several wars in which the country has been engaged, including the Revolutionary war, the war of 1812, the various Indian wars, the war with Mexico, and the war of the rebellion. To this is now added the business of the Department relating to the volunteer forces in service during the recent war with Spain.

The number of cases received and disposed of during the fiscal year ended June 30, 1899, was as follows:

From the Pension Office	116,584
From the Auditor for the War Department	35,202
Remuster cases	3,605
Desertion cases	2,627
All other cases, miscellaneous	25,000
Total	183,018
On hand June 30, 1899	None.

The current work of the office was materially increased toward the latter part of the fiscal year by reason of the receipt of the records of the disbanded volunteer organizations in service during the war with Spain, but the total receipts of current cases for the year were somewhat smaller than for the corresponding period immediately preceding. This falling off during the earlier part of the year of the current work of the Department relating to the old wars was probably due to the active military operations then in progress and is not regarded as an indication of a permanent reduction of the business of the office in connection with the wars preceding the war with Spain.

As usual during the existence of the Record and Pension Office, the public business has been promptly dispatched, more than 96 per cent of the cases received during the fiscal year having been disposed of within twenty-four hours from the time they reached the office, and at the close of business hours on the 30th of June not one case remained unacted upon.

REMUSTER.

The term "remuster cases," as used in the foregoing table, is applied to the class of cases arising under the act of Congress approved February 24, 1897, "to provide for the relief of certain officers and enlisted men of the volunteer forces." This act is the last of a series of enactments, begun in 1866, to provide payment to commissioned officers of volunteers in service during the civil war for services rendered by them under certain conditions or which they were prevented from rendering by reason of the casualties of the service. As defined in a former report from this office, the legislation on this subject appears to have been enacted upon the principle that persons who, without the formality of muster into the United States service, actually performed the duties of commissioned officers under commissions regularly issued for them, or who, being so commissioned and not mustered, and having been prevented from performing the duties of the grades named in their commissions by reason of being held as prisoners in the hands of the enemy or by reason of disabilities incurred in service and in line of duty, were entitled to be recognized and paid as officers in the military service of the United States for the periods during which they performed duty as such officers, or were held as prisoners, or were disabled, provided there were vacancies for them at the time; and provided further, that after June 20, 1863, their commands were not below the minimum number required by then existing laws and regulations. Besides the recognition of the rank conferred by their commissions and the title to the pay and allowances involved in such recognition, the law gives to its beneficiaries the pensionable status accruing from service in the grades for which recognition is extended.

No record has been kept from which the total number of applica-

tions for relief under the remuster acts can be ascertained, but it is estimated that, including applications for the reconsideration of rejected claims, upward of 100,000 such applications have been received. There is reason to suppose that a large majority of the more meritorious claims have already been received and adjudicated, but the receipts during the last fiscal year, though smaller than those for the preceding year, were but little less than the average receipts for the ten years of the existence of the Record and Pension Office, during which period an accurate record has been kept of the number of cases received and adjudicated.

The remuster act of February 24, 1897, the only law now in force authorizing an amendment of the records of the muster in of volunteer officers, limits such amendment exclusively to the records of officers in service "during the war of the rebellion." The law does not therefore apply to the cases of officers in service during the war with Spain, and there appears to be no necessity for such legislation for their relief, their pay having been fixed by law upon a basis not dependent upon the dates of their muster into the service of the United States.

REMOVAL OF CHARGES OF DESERTION.

The legislation for removal of charges of desertion is applicable only to soldiers of the Mexican war and the war of the rebellion. The act of March 2, 1889, as amended by subsequent enactments, is the only law now in force under which an application for removal of the charge of desertion can be considered. This law provides "for the relief of certain volunteer and regular soldiers of the late war [war of the rebellion] and the war with Mexico." It was evidently intended to authorize the removal of existing charges of desertion only in cases in which the offense charged was merely a technical violation of military law, or in cases of soldiers who, having served faithfully at least six months, abandoned the service after the war was practically ended.

The 2,627 "desertion cases" mentioned in the statistical table include only the formal applications for relief under the act cited received during the fiscal year and the renewal of applications previously denied. The latter class constitutes a large proportion of the applications received, many of which are entirely without merit but are nevertheless persistently urged and frequently renewed, one attorney being repeatedly substituted for another, evidently in the hope that one may be secured who will succeed where his predecessors have failed.

In addition to the cases adjudicated upon the application of the persons in interest, a much larger number is considered without a formal application therefor. These cases arise in the preparation of military histories of ex-soldiers for the Commissioner of Pensions and the accounting officers of the Treasury, the charge of desertion, when thus discovered, being removed under the act when found to be clearly within its provisions. The cases thus acted upon during the past year numbered 5,344, making a total of 7,971 desertion cases considered under the act of March 2, 1889, during the fiscal year ended June 30, 1899. This number is considerably below the number of similar cases received and adjudicated during the preceding fiscal year.

It may be remarked that the number of desertion cases considered is very largely in excess of the number found to be within the provisions of the law, and that in the adjudication of the claims presented

careful administrative action is required, in order that while full justice is done to deserving claimants the public interests shall also be protected.

CERTIFICATES IN LIEU OF LOST DISCHARGES.

The consideration of applications for certificates in lieu of lost discharges under the act of Congress approved March 3, 1873, is a feature of the work of the office deserving mention in this report. The act referred to authorizes the Secretary of War to furnish duplicate certificates of discharge to such noncommissioned officers and privates in service during the war of the rebellion as have lost their original discharge certificates. It has been found impossible to literally comply with the provisions of this act, as an exact duplicate of a lost original discharge certificate can not be furnished, original discharge certificates not having been copied or recorded in full at the time of their issue. But a form of certificate of service and discharge has been adopted which is a near approach to the form of discharge certificate in use during the civil war, and the issue of this certificate in lieu of a lost discharge is a practical compliance with the requirements of the law. The number of applications for this certificate is very large, nearly 5,000 such applications having been received during the last fiscal year.

CERTIFICATES OF DISCHARGE IN TRUE NAME.

By an act of Congress approved April 14, 1890, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy were "authorized and required to issue certificates of discharge or orders of acceptance of resignation, upon application and proof of identity, in the true name of such persons as enlisted or served under assumed names, while minors or otherwise, in the Army and Navy during the war of the rebellion and were honorably discharged therefrom," with the condition that no such certificate or order should be issued where a name was assumed to cover a crime or to avoid its consequences.

It is estimated that more than 2,000 applications for such certificates of discharge have been filed in this office, but the number of applications received during the last fiscal year was comparatively small and it is probable that a majority of the persons for whose benefit the law was enacted have applied for the relief it was intended to afford.

CERTIFICATES OF HONORABLE SERVICE IN THE MILITARY TELEGRAPH CORPS.

By an act approved January 26, 1897, the Secretary of War was "authorized and directed to prepare a roll of all persons who served not less than ninety days in the operation of military telegraph lines during the late civil war, and to issue to each, upon application, unless it appears that his service was not creditably performed, or to the representatives of those who are dead, suitable certificates of honorable service in the military telegraph corps of the Army of the United States, stating the service rendered, the length of such service, and the dates, as near as may be, between which such service was performed." It was provided "that this law shall not be construed to entitle the persons herein mentioned to any pay, pension, bounty, or rights not herein specifically provided for."

Thirty-eight certificates of honorable service were issued under the

act cited during the fiscal year 1899, making, in addition to the certificates previously issued, a total of 166 since the enactment of the law.

The form of certificate adopted is of attractive appearance, and it is believed has given entire satisfaction to those by whom it has been received.

WAR WITH SPAIN.

By the act of Congress approved May 9, 1892, establishing the Record and Pension Office as a bureau of the War Department, the chief of that office was charged with the custody, under the Secretary of War, of the military and hospital records of the volunteer armies and the transaction of the business of the War Department connected therewith.

It was also provided by the act of April 22, 1898, under which the Volunteer Army in service during the war with Spain was created, that upon the disbandment of the volunteer and militia organizations, the records pertaining to them, together with the reports of medical officers serving with the volunteer troops and the records kept by such officers, should be filed in the Record and Pension Office. Section 8 of the act referred to reads as follows:

SEC. 8. That all returns and muster rolls of organizations of the Volunteer Army and of militia organizations while in the service of the United States shall be rendered to the Adjutant-General of the Army, and upon the disbandment of such organizations the records pertaining to them shall be transferred to and filed in the Record and Pension Office of the War Department. And regimental and all other medical officers serving with volunteer troops, in the field or elsewhere, shall keep a daily record of all soldiers reported sick or wounded, as shown by the morning calls or reports, and shall deposit such reports with other reports provided for in this section with the Record and Pension Office as provided herein for other reports, returns, and muster rolls.

No statistics of the war with Spain have been prepared by this office, but from schedules published by the Adjutant-General of the Army it appears that 227 organizations of volunteer troops, consisting of regiments, battalions, and independent companies, were called into service during that war, and that all of them have either been mustered out of service or are under orders for muster out and disbandment.

The muster out of the Volunteer Army was begun in September, 1898, the first medical records were received in December, 1898, and the transfer to this office of the military records of the disbanded organizations was begun in January, 1899. At the date of this report the records of all but twenty of the organizations constituting the Volunteer Army during the war with Spain have been received, besides large quantities of the medical records of that war. As the records are received they are at once placed in such order that they can be readily searched for the information required in the disposition of current cases, and are as speedily as possible prepared for reproduction by the index-record card system.

Prior to the date of the transfer of the records of the disbanded organizations, calls from the various auditing and adjudicating officers for statements of military service were answered by the Adjutant-General of the Army. Calls received since the transfer have been answered by this office. From January, 1899, up to the close of the fiscal year, 11,394 such calls were received from the Auditor for the War Department, and 4,144 from the Commissioner of Pensions.

Until about the 1st of June, 1899, the general correspondence and

office action relative to the disbanded organizations and the individual officers and enlisted men composing such organizations were under the direction of the Adjutant-General. Since that date all such correspondence has been conducted, and administrative action taken, by this office.

The demands made upon the office by the increased volume of correspondence and the larger number of calls for statements of military service have been so promptly and successfully met that the current work has been very little delayed, and long before the close of the fiscal year the accumulation due to the transfer of records and cases for action had been entirely disposed of.

INDEX-RECORD CARD WORK.

The work of reproducing the individual military and medical records of the officers and enlisted men of the volunteer forces has been fully described in previous reports, but it is believed that its importance justifies the insertion here of a synopsis of former reports on the subject, for the information of those who are not familiar with the system adopted.

The object of the work when undertaken was to preserve the dilapidated and rapidly decaying records of the war of the rebellion from destruction, and to reproduce their contents in such form that the information they contain might be easily accessible, and that the most comprehensive and satisfactory reports might be made therefrom with the least possible expenditure of time and labor. The system finally adopted, after some experimentation, was the one now known as the index-record card system.

This system, which is believed to have had its origin in the experiments referred to, at least in so far as the system has been applied to the records of a public office, consists in the reproduction on a separate index-record card of every item of information found of record in regard to any individual officer or enlisted man in any one of the official records, and the filing of the cards in an individual envelope, or card jacket, in proper logical and chronological order, thus bringing together in one place the complete military history of each officer and enlisted man in small compass and in such form that it can readily and with little labor be reproduced in the preparation of reports to the public officials by whom the record is required in the settlement of claims, or for any other proper purpose for which the record may be desired.

The card jackets being filed together in dictionary alphabetical order, by regimental organizations, the jacket of any individual is readily discovered and his record easily reproduced, with the certainty that it embraces every material item of information that the archives afford relative to his military career, wherever those items of information may have been originally recorded and however obscure or incidental the original record may have been.

This, in brief, is the index-record card system. It will be at once perceived that it permits the filing away of the original mutilated records, to be referred to only in the very rare cases in which a reference to them is required, thus securing them from the total destruction with which they were threatened.

The carding of the medical records of the civil war was begun in 1887 and was practically completed in 1890, when the work of carding the military records of the same war was begun, with the result that

by the close of the fiscal year ended June 30, 1894, all of the volunteer organization rolls of the war of the rebellion had been carded, besides numerous miscellaneous records, thus placing the original records of service in that war beyond the danger of destruction.

The success of the system adopted was such that it was extended to the records of the Mexican and the various Indian wars, and by Congressional enactments it was provided that the military records "relating to the personnel or the operations of the armies of the Revolutionary war and the war of 1812," filed in any of the Executive Departments, should be transferred to the War Department "to be preserved, indexed, and prepared for publication."

This extension of the work beyond its original limits has delayed its completion, but the extra time and labor expended have been amply compensated for by the accomplished results. The work of carding the records of the Revolutionary war and of all wars in which the country has been engaged down to the beginning of the war with Spain is now practically complete, and the office is prepared to promptly furnish, for any legitimate purpose, the full military and medical record of any volunteer officer or enlisted man in service during any of those wars, or to state with certainty that such record does not exist in the War Department. But of greater importance is the fact that the original records thus reproduced and made available have been placed beyond the danger of destruction to which they were imminently exposed by constant handling before the adoption of the index-record card system.

During the last fiscal year, until interrupted by the receipt of the records of the war with Spain, the clerical force available for the purpose was employed in carding the miscellaneous records of personal military service pertaining to the various wars, and some of this work still remains to be done.

Preparations for carding the records of the Spanish-American war were begun as soon as practicable after the first installment of such records had been received. The work of carding the medical records was begun on the 24th of March, and the work of reproducing the military records was begun on the 14th of June, 1899. This work has been retarded to some extent by the large number of cases requiring a search of the records, but up to the end of the fiscal year 273,173 medical and 17,326 military cards had been prepared.

The index-record card work for the fiscal year included the preparation of 440,525 military cards (399,863 of this number were a consolidation of 1,830,565 cards made from monthly returns) and 277,208 medical cards, making with the number prepared in previous years a total of 40,656,439 of the former and 7,247,871 of the latter class, aggregating 47,904,310 index-record cards prepared up to and including June 30, 1899. In addition to these, 228,529 reference index cards have been made from miscellaneous and fragmentary records of the Revolutionay war and 103,727 from similar records of the war of 1812. These records are of such a character that they can not well be reproduced in the ordinary form of index-record cards, but, when fully indexed, any name, however incidentally appearing thereon, can be readily referred to.

It is proper to add that the collection of Revolutionary war records filed in this office is far from complete, and that there is no complete collection of such records in existence anywhere. It is hoped that the War Department collection will be largely augmented by the loan of such records as are in the possession of the authorities of the several

States and of historical societies, in order that they may be copied and included in the general system of index-record cards.

The question of the publication of the records of the Revolutionary war and the war of 1812, apparently contemplated by the enactments directing their transfer to this Department, must necessarily remain in abeyance until the collection of such records is as nearly complete as it is possible to make it. In any event the work of publication can not be entered upon without further legislation by Congress.

ASSISTANT CHIEF, RECORD AND PENSION OFFICE.

The need, which had long existed, of an officer to assist the chief of the office and to perform his duties when absent was provided for at the last session of Congress by legislation authorizing the appointment of an assistant chief, and to the place thus created the President appointed John Tweedale, who had been chief clerk of the War Department for many years. Major Tweedale's experience in the Department and as a soldier in the civil war rendered him peculiarly well qualified for the discharge of the duties of the office.

CLERICAL FORCE.

By the reproduction of the records of individual military service by the index-record card system, the application of that system to the current correspondence, and the adoption of other improved methods, the business of the office has been greatly expedited, and it has been possible to materially reduce the clerical force. On the recommendation of the Chief of the Record and Pension Office a reduction of 300 was made in the clerical force in 1894, a further reduction of 50 was made in 1895, and a still further reduction of 25 in 1897, and in the estimate submitted by this office for the coming fiscal year a still further reduction of 32 is provided for, making a total reduction of 407 clerks, representing a permanent saving of over $465,000 annually in the appropriations for the clerical force of the office. Adding to this the saving effected in contingent and other expenses, it is found that the cost of maintaining the office has been permanently reduced by fully $500,000 per annum.

In all of the reductions that have been made in the clerical force of the office the selections for discharge have been based strictly upon the efficiency records of the clerks, a liberal allowance being made in the ratings on account of honorable military or naval service.

Very respectfully,

F. C. AINSWORTH,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army,
Chief, Record and Pension Office.

The SECRETARY OF WAR.

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ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, D. C., October 17, 1899.

SIR: I have the honor to submit herewith the reports of Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, U. S. A., commanding Department of the East; Maj. Gen. John R. Brooke, U. S. A., commanding Division of Cuba, and of the latter's department commanders, Brig. Gen. James H. Wilson, U. S. V., commanding Department of Matanzas and Santa Clara; Brig. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee, U. S. V., commanding Department of the Province of Havana and Pinar del Rio; Brig. Gen. William Ludlow, U. S. V., commanding Department of Havana, and Brig. Gen. Leonard Wood, U. S. V., commanding Department of Santiago; also the reports of Maj. Gen. William R. Shafter, U. S. V., commanding Department of California and Department of the Columbia; Brig. Gen. James F. Wade, U. S. A., commanding Department of Dakota; Brig. Gen. Henry C. Merriam, U. S. A., commanding Department of the Colorado and Department of the Missouri; Brig. Gen. Thomas M. Anderson, U. S. A., commanding Department of the Lakes; Brig. Gen. George W. Davis, U. S. V., commanding Department of Porto Rico; Col. Royal T. Frank, First Artillery, commanding Department of the Gulf; Col. Chambers McKibbin, Twelfth Infantry, commanding Department of Texas; and also the reports of the Adjutant-General, United States Army, and the Inspector-General, United States Army.

The report of Major-General Otis, U. S. V., commanding Department of the Pacific, has not yet been received.

At the time of my last annual report the strength of the Army was 9,453 officers and 215,922 men, of which 2,326 officers and 58,310 men belonged to the Regular Army, and 7,127 officers and 157,612 men comprised the Volunteer Army. Subsequent to that time a large number of troops were moved to Cuba, but the majority of them were returned to the United States during the following winter and spring months. The following statement shows the number of troops present in Cuba on the dates specified:

Date.	Officers.	Men.
August 31, 1898	335	7,342
September 30, 1898	337	7,257
October 31, 1898	364	7,963
November 30, 1898	355	7,945
December 31, 1898	364	7,833
January 31, 1899	1,802	41,357
February 28, 1899	1,858	40,873
March 31, 1899	1,209	25,197
April 30, 1899	647	14,114
May 31, 1899	567	12,424
June 30, 1899	568	12,184

At the present time there are 391 officers and 10,796 men in Cuba.

In Porto Rico there are 108 officers and 3,255 men, which includes a battalion of native troops recently organized and consisting of 400 men.

On October 1 there were in the Philippine Islands 971 officers and

31,514 men, while there were en route to those islands at that time 546 officers and 16,553 men.

In Alaska there is now a force of 15 officers and 484 men, and in the Hawaiian Islands there are 12 officers and 453 men.

All of the volunteer troops first sent to the Philippine Islands have been returned to the United States and mustered out, or are under orders to return and be mustered out of service.

Since my last report there have been mustered out of service the following regiments of volunteers, on the dates specified.

Troops mustered out since November 5, 1898.

Organization.	Date.
Seventh Ohio Infantry	Nov. 6, 1898.
First Colorado Battery	Nov. 7, 1898.
Third Missouri Infantry	Do.
Fifth Pennsylvania Infantry	Do.
First Vermont Infantry	Do.
Second Texas Infantry	Nov. 9, 1898.
First South Carolina Infantry	Nov. 10, 1898.
Fifth Missouri Infantry	Nov. 9, 1898.
Batteries A, B, and C, Louisiana Light Artillery	Nov. 12, 1898.
First Massachusetts Artillery	Nov. 14, 1898.
First Texas Cavalry	Do.
Ninth New York Infantry	Nov. 15, 1898.
Seventy-first New York Infantry	Do.
Second Pennsylvania Infantry	Do.
Second Wisconsin Infantry	Do.
First Delaware Infantry	Nov. 16, 1898.
Fourth Pennsylvania Infantry	Do.
Sheridan Troop, Pennsylvania Cavalry	Do.
First Illinois Infantry	Nov. 17, 1898.
Second New Jersey Infantry	Do.
First Georgia Infantry	Nov. 18, 1898.
Fourteenth Minnesota Infantry	Do.
Sixty-fifth New York Infantry	Nov. 19, 1898.
Battery A, Pennsylvania Light Artillery	Do.
First District of Columbia Infantry	Nov. 20, 1898.
Eighth Ohio Infantry	Nov. 21, 1898.
Philadelphia City Cavalry	Do.
Governor's Troop, Pennsylvania Cavalry	Do.
One hundred and fifty-ninth Indiana Infantry	Nov. 23, 1898.
Twenty-second New York Infantry	Do.
Sixth Illinois Infantry	Nov. 25, 1898.
Battery A, Illinois Light Artillery	Do.
Twenty-seventh Indiana Battery	Do.
Troop C, New York Cavalry	Do.
Second North Carolina Infantry	Do.
Ninth Massachusetts Infantry	Nov. 26, 1898.
Thirty-fourth Michigan Infantry	Do.
Light Battery B, Pennsylvania Artillery	Nov. 27, 1898.
Light Battery C, Pennsylvania Artillery	Nov. 28, 1898.
Troop A, New York Cavalry	Do.
Second Georgia Infantry	Nov. 30, 1898.
Fiftieth Iowa Infantry	Do.
Light Battery A, Missouri Artillery	Do.
Third New York Infantry	Do.
Seventh New York Light Battery	Do.
Seventh California Infantry	Dec. 2, 1898.
First Florida Infantry (eight companies)	Dec. 3, 1898.
Twenty-first Kansas Infantry	Dec. 10, 1898.
Sixth California Infantry	Dec. 15, 1898.
Second Virginia Infantry	Dec. 16, 1898.
Heavy Battery B, Connecticut Artillery	Dec. 20, 1898.
First Mississippi Infantry	Do.
Second Mississippi Infantry	Do.
Light Battery C, Utah Artillery	Dec. 21, 1898.
First Utah Cavalry	Dec. 23, 1898.
Sixteenth Pennsylvania Infantry	Dec. 29, 1898.
Thirty-third Michigan Infantry	Dec. 31, 1898.
Third Wisconsin Infantry	Jan. 17, 1899.
Companies A and B, First Indiana (colored) Infantry	Jan. 20, 1899.
Fourth Ohio Infantry	Do.
Sixth Massachusetts Infantry	Jan. 21, 1899.
Third Illinois Infantry	Jan. 24, 1899.
First United States Volunteer Engineers	Jan. 25, 1899.
First Florida Infantry (four companies)	Jan. 27, 1899.
Ninth Ohio Battalion (colored) Infantry	Jan. 28, 1899.
Sixth Virginia (colored) Infantry	Do.
Battery B, California Artillery	Jan. 30, 1899
Sixty-ninth New York Infantry	Jan. 31, 1899.

Troops mustered out since November 5, 1898—Continued.

Organization.	Date.
Fifteenth Pennsylvania Infantry	Jan. 31, 1899.
Third Tennessee Infantry	Do.
Battery C, California Artillery	Feb. 3, 1899.
Heavy Battery, South Carolina Artillery	Feb. 4, 1899.
First West Virginia Infantry	Do.
Eighth California Infantry	Feb. 6, 1899.
Second Tennessee Infantry	Feb. 8, 1899.
Third North Carolina (colored) Infantry	Do.
Fourth Missouri Infantry	Feb. 10, 1899.
Second Ohio Infantry	Do.
Third New Jersey Infantry	Feb. 11, 1899.
Fourth Kentucky Infantry	Feb. 12, 1899.
Territorial Regiment, United States Volunteer Infantry	Feb. 15, 1899.
First New York Infantry	Feb. 20, 1899.
Third Texas Infantry	Feb. 22, 1899.
First Kentucky Infantry	Feb. 24, 1899.
Second Arkansas Infantry	Feb. 25, 1899.
First Maryland Infantry	Feb. 28, 1899.
Fourteenth Pennsylvania Infantry	Do.
Fourth Wisconsin Infantry	Do.
Seventh United States Volunteer (colored) Infantry	Do.
Second Missouri Infantry	Mar. 3, 1899.
Eighth United States Volunteer (colored) Infantry	Mar. 6, 1899.
Eighth Pennsylvania Infantry	Mar. 7, 1899.
Tenth United States Volunteer (colored) Infantry	Mar. 8, 1899.
Fourth Texas Infantry	Mar. 10, 1899.
Thirteenth Pennsylvania Infantry	Mar. 11, 1899.
Sixth United States Volunteer Infantry	Mar. 15, 1899.
Third Mississippi Infantry	Mar. 17, 1899.
Third Connecticut Infantry	Mar. 20, 1899.
Third Alabama (colored) Infantry	Do.
Tenth Ohio Infantry	Mar. 23, 1899.
Two hundred and third New York Infantry	Mar. 25, 1899.
Fifteenth Minnesota Infantry	Mar. 27, 1899.
First Rhode Island Infantry	Mar 30, 1899.
Batteries A, B, C, and D, Maine Heavy Artillery	Mar. 31, 1899.
Fifth Massachusetts Infantry	Do.
Thirty-fifth Michigan Infantry	Do.
Forty-seventh New York Infantry	Do.
Eighth Illinois (colored) Infantry	Apr. 3, 1899.
Two hundred and first New York Infantry	Do.
Fourth New Jersey Infantry	Apr. 6, 1899.
Twenty-third Kansas (colored) Infantry	Apr. 10, 1899.
Second West Virginia Infantry	Do.
Two hundred and second New York Infantry	Apr. 15, 1899.
Second Louisiana Infantry	Apr. 18, 1899.
First Texas Infantry	Do.
Second South Carolina Infantry	Apr. 19, 1899.
Twelfth New York Infantry	Apr. 20, 1899.
Third Georgia Infantry	Apr. 22, 1899.
First North Carolina Infantry	Do.
One hundred and sixtieth Indiana Infantry	Apr. 25, 1899.
Second Illinois Infantry	Apr. 26, 1899.
Fourth Virginia Infantry	Apr. 27, 1899.
Eighth Massachusetts Infantry	Apr. 28, 1899.
One hundred and sixty-first Indiana Infantry	Apr. 30, 1899.
Fourth Illinois Infantry	May 2, 1899.
Third United States Volunteer Infantry	Do.
Fourth Tennessee Infantry	May 6, 1899.
Sixth Missouri Infantry	May 10, 1899.
Third Nebraska Infantry	May 11, 1899.
Forty-ninth Iowa Infantry	May 13, 1899.
Third Kentucky Infantry	May 16, 1899.
Second United States Volunteer Engineers	Do.
Thirty-first Michigan Infantry	May 17, 1899.
Third United States Volunteer Engineers	Do.
Ninth Illinois Infantry	May 20, 1899.
Sixth Ohio Infantry	May 24, 1899.
Ninth United States Volunteer (colored) Infantry	May 25, 1899.
Fifth United States Volunteer Infantry	May 31, 1899.
Fourth United States Volunteer Infantry	June 8, 1899.
Second United States Volunteer Infantry	June 22, 1899.
Second Oregon Infantry	Aug. 7, 1899.
Light Battery A, Utah Artillery	Aug. 16, 1899.
Light Battery B, Utah Artillery	Do.
Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry	Aug. 22, 1899.
First Nebraska Infantry	Aug. 23, 1899.
First Colorado Infantry	Sept. 8, 1899.
First California Infantry	Sept. 21, 1899.
Batteries A and D, California Artillery	Do.
First Wyoming Infantry	Sept. 23, 1899.
First Idaho Infantry	Sept. 25, 1899.
First North Dakota Infantry	Do.

Of the 25 United States volunteer regiments (the Twenty-sixth to the Forty-ninth Infantry, inclusive, and Eleventh Cavalry) some are already in the Philippines, others are en route, and the balance are being rapidly organized for service in those islands.

The demand for troops for foreign service has been unusual, and has been somewhat severe upon them, especially those of the Regular Army. Within the last eighteen months several regiments have been required to leave their stations in the extreme North, move to the islands of the West Indies, there engage in a campaign in summer, return to northern stations in the autumn and winter, and move again to tropical islands in the Pacific and engage in campaigns under the most difficult circumstances. Rarely in any service have troops experienced such unusual changes in climate as those above indicated, yet under all circumstances and at all times the utmost loyalty, fortitude, and faithful performance of duty have been manifested on the part of the troops. In nearly all engagements where the troops have been brought into contact with the enemy they have invariably acted on the offensive, and in not a single instance have they suffered defeat. The intelligence, discipline, and fidelity of both officers and men have been most commendable.

Owing to the additional and extraordinary expense placed upon officers while serving in the Philippine Islands, Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Hawaiian Islands, it is recommended that they be allowed the same percentage of the increase of pay that is now provided by law for the enlisted men.

It is also recommended that officers of the Army with a creditable record who served during the civil war shall be granted the same consideration concerning rank and pay as has been accorded officers of the Navy by section 11, act approved March 3, 1899.

As far as organization is concerned, the Army is in a transition state. From 1874 to 1898 it was confined to a minimum strength of 25,000 men. By the act approved March 8, 1898, two regiments of artillery were added, which increased the enlisted strength of the Army to 26,610. When the war with Spain broke out, Congress, by the act approved April 26, 1898, authorized an increase in the strength of the Army to 62,579 men. Under the act approved March 2, 1899, it was recruited to 65,000 men, which was approximately 1 soldier to every 1,000 of the population, according to the last census. Under the last mentioned act authority was also given to organize an auxiliary force of 35,000 volunteers, and under that provision the 25 regiments of volunteers above mentioned have been organized.

It is believed that this force will be ample for the service required of it up to the time authorized, viz, July 1, 1901. It is gratifying to note that the Government has authorized a military force which seems commensurate with its requirements, magnitude, and institutions. I have for years recommended the adoption of a standard in proportion to the population, viz, not to exceed 1 soldier to every 1,000 of the population, and I believe that the establishment of such a standard would be safe and judicious in every respect.

During the past few years rapid progress has been made in the equipment of the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts with modern defenses, and if the general plan is carried out it is hoped that in a short time our coast will be in a proper condition of defense.

Some very important discoveries have been made in relation to ordnance, projectiles, and high explosives, and after careful, thorough, and exhaustive tests appliances have been adopted which will greatly increase the efficiency of our armament.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

NELSON A. MILES,
Major-General Commanding.

The SECRETARY OF WAR.

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REPORT OF BRIG. GEN. WILLIAM LUDLOW, COMMANDING DEPARTMENT OF HAVANA AND MILITARY GOVERNOR OF THE CITY OF HAVANA, CUBA.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF HAVANA, *August 1, 1899.*

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report for such portion of the fiscal year ended June 30, 1899, as relates to my present command.

In preparing this paper my first duty is to express my profound and enduring sense of obligation to the several members of my staff—some of whom have been with me from the beginning, and all of whom, with unfaltering zeal and loyalty, have given their earnest and utmost efforts to carrying forward work of great labor and responsibility and which was practically unfamiliar to all of us.

In such circumstances official relations may be severed or suspended from time to time, but personal ties are formed and mutual respect and friendships created that continue to the end.

For greater conciseness and convenience the report is made under subheads, as follows:

General remarks.
General situation in Havana in December, 1898.
The taking over of Havana.
Subsequent operations.
Cuban relief service.
Care of troops in tropical countries.
Organization of the police.
Organization of the civil government.
The sanitation of Havana.

To which are the following appendices:

General orders,
Civil orders,
Letter to the Junta Patriotica,
Letter to the civil governor and mayor embodying principles of administration,
List of the more important recommendations made by the department commander to the division commander,
Memorandum of special recommendations as to matters requiring administrative or legislative remedy,
Letter to the mayor of Havana relative to the police force.

In addition there are also herewith reports as follows:

The adjutant-general of the department,
The inspector-general of the department,

The judge-advocate of the department,
The chief quartermaster of the department,
The chief commissary of the department,
The chief surgeon of the department,
The chief sanitary officer of the department,
The chief engineer of the department,
The chief signal officer of the department,
The Havana finance commission,
Cuban relief work,
The civil governor of Havana,
The mayor of Havana.

Your obedient servant,

WILLIAM LUDLOW,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers,
Commanding Department of Havana.

GENERAL REMARKS.

Pursuant to telegraphic instructions from the Adjutant-General United States Army, I transferred the command of the Second Division of the First Army Corps, at Columbus, Ga., to Brigadier-General Sanger, and on December 10, 1898, left for Washington, where I was informed by the Secretary of War that I was to proceed to Havana as military governor.

Pursuant to this instruction, General Orders, No. 184, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, December 13, 1898, was issued, creating the Military Division of Cuba, and containing the following:

By direction of the President * * * Maj. Gen. William Ludlow, U. S. Volunteers, is designated as the military governor of the city of Havana, and will report direct to the division commander. He is charged with all that relates to collection and disbursement of revenues of the port and city, and its police, sanitation, and general government, under such regulations as may be prescribed by the President.

R. A. ALGER, *Secretary of War.*

These orders were modified by official telegram of December 19, which I found at Havana, so as to relieve me of the responsibility for the collection and disbursement of the customs revenues of the port, but leaving all matters relating to the levying of taxes and collection of revenue within the city proper still under my control.

Accompanied by my aid-de-camp, Capt. J. C. R. Peabody, I left New York December 17, on the Ward Line steamer *City of Washington*, and arrived in Havana 1 p. m., December 21, at once establishing my headquarters at the Inglaterra Hotel and putting myself in communication with Major General Greene, who transferred to me his records and instructions, also three members of his staff, viz, Major Mott and Captain Greble, assistant adjutants general, and Surgeon Major Davis, in charge of sanitary work. Captain Geary, of the Second Volunteer Engineers, who was superintending street cleaning, was also continued on that duty. Major Mott was assigned as my adjutant-general and Captain Greble put in charge specially of military movements and, at the same time, of arrangements for the relief and care of the starving and destitute.

The services of these officers were inestimable at the time and later and I was especially fortunate in having been preceded in Havana by General Greene, who, with his accustomed energy and ability, had

already explored the local situation and in part inaugurated the necessary measures for the rehabilitation of the city.

On the same day I inspected the city with General Greene and called upon the evacuation commission, at the Hotel Trotcha, in the Vedado suburb of Havana, to report my arrival to the president, Major-General Wade, and discuss the situation with him.

As the Spanish forces were then concentrating preparatory to the abandonment of the city, I represented to General Wade the immediate need of troops, to be at my disposition, to replace them and maintain order, and, at General Wade's instance, General Lee, commanding the troops in the province, ordered in the Eighth and Tenth United States Infantry to report to me.

On the 22d I accompanied General Greene to General Lee's headquarters, in the camps of the Seventh Corps, near Quemados, and, after inspecting the camps and conferring with General Lee, returned to Havana.

On the 23d the Eighth and Tenth United States Infantry arrived, and General Greene sailed for New York.

On the 26th Major-General Chaffee, chief of the division staff, arrived, with Captains Treat and Johnston, who had orders to report to me as assistant adjutant-general and acting judge-advocate, respectively. These officers were immediately assigned to duty, Captain Treat on the same duty as Captain Greble.

On the 27th General Brooke arrived with his staff, and, making his headquarters also at the Inglaterra Hotel, took command of the division on the 28th.

December 30, in General Orders, No. 191, War Department, Adjutant-General's Office, by direction of the President, the Department of Havana was established, bounded by the Almendares and Cojimar rivers and their tributaries on the west, south, and east, respectively, of Havana, and including the cities of Havana and Regla, with the towns of Guanabacoa, Santa Maria del Rosario, and numerous other smaller communities, aggregating a population of about 250,000 people, in an area of about 55 square miles.

Between the 23d of December and the 1st of January the Spanish forces were gradually drawn in, abandoning successive belts of territory and concentrating toward the water front, the United States troops following up and guarding the areas left exposed by the departure of the Spanish soldiers.

Sunday, January 1, 1899, the final evacuation of Havana by the Spanish forces was effected, and at noon the Spanish sovereignty was transferred by Captain-General Castellanos to the division commander at the palace of the Governor-General, with due forms and ceremonies, under the general direction of the evacuation commission, which had thus brought its arduous and difficult labors to a fortunate conclusion.

On the same day six batteries of the Second Artillery arrived; on the 2d of January Lieutenant-Colonel Black, chief engineer; and on the 3d a battalion of the Second Volunteer Engineers, all with orders to report to me.

The subsequent dispositions and movements of troops and the several changes made from time to time in the personnel of the department staff and service are given in the report of the adjutant-general.

There are herewith detailed reports as follows, in which the operations of the several branches of the department and governmental

service are more specifically set forth, and reference is made to them for fuller information: Reports of adjutant-general, inspector-general, judge-advocate, chief quartermaster, chief commissary, chief surgeon, chief sanitary officer, chief engineer, chief signal officer, finance commission, relief work, civil governor, mayor of Havana.

As the conditions existing in December, 1898, were quite exceptional and exceedingly complex, and as the work taken in hand involved the necessity of immediate dispositions in several fields simultaneously, requiring incessant labor and discussion day and night, and the continual intermingling of consultations and instructions on nearly every possible subject, the several matters, for greater conciseness and intelligibility, will be treated under separate heads, with the object of depicting as well as may be the succession of events, the conduct of affairs, and the dispositions made during an exceedingly interesting historical period. I can not hope to do justice to this, but will endeavor to indicate at least the principal features.

THE GENERAL SITUATION IN HAVANA IN DECEMBER, 1898.

With the exception of the province of Santiago, the island was still in possession of the Spaniards, who continued their rule, civil and military, while making their preparations for departure. In and about the city of Havana large numbers of Spanish troops, some 17,000 and more, were quartered, and held the streets, plazas, and public buildings as guards and military police.

The large Spanish population of the city, the importers, bankers, shopkeepers, clerks, and business class generally, inhabiting for the most part the old city between the Prado and the bay, was silent and apprehensive, fearful of what might be in store for them when their flag should finally be lowered, but, with the 20,000 rifles belonging to the disbanded volunteers secreted in their houses, prepared to defend themselves in case of an uprising beyond the control of the Americans.

The Cuban population, boiling with exultation and triumph and eager to see an end to Spanish domination and enjoy the fruition of their hopes and struggles, filled the air with shouts of "Cuba Libre!" and taunts of their late antagonists. Minor affrays were frequent, and there were alarming explosions and outcries. Day or night there was no rest or quiet, and as, zone by zone, beginning at the outskirts of the city, the Spaniards abandoned successive areas, the thronging Cubans surged behind them, hung out innumerable flags, Cuban and American, and made pandemonium with processions, outcries, bands, and fireworks. But the interposing fringe of guards and the street patrols of the Eighth and Tenth Infantry prevented all possibility of hostile contact and serious disorder, notwithstanding that, as the Spanish soldiers withdrew, the Spanish police disappeared, fearful of their lives, and hunted cover as would rats if their shelter were unroofed. Meanwhile my officers, staff and line, quietly and vigilantly scouted the city at all hours and in every locality, watching the guards, instructing them as to their duties, and modifying their disposition, as circumstances required.

The newspapers can not properly be omitted from this general sketch of temporary strain and confusion. After their manner, the correspondents thronged the streets and cafés, industriously gathering up current items, largely imaginary, of riots, frays, and bloodshed, exaggerating and sensationalizing every occurrence, however trivial, so that a

barroom row was a battle and a meeting of Cubans a revolutionary rising. Even the Cuban army, under General Menocal, was reported ready to revolt and take the field and fight for the possession of Havana; this when we were actually arranging the details for the organization of the Cuban police, mainly from the Cuban army itself. It was represented to the people of the United States that the very lives of the Americans were in danger; whereas, in fact, at every point and at every moment the situation was thoroughly in hand, and no revolt or serious encounter could have lasted for five minutes. As usual, the sensational publications only made the task of the responsible authorities the heavier and created false impressions at home.

Meanwhile the Spanish officials were industriously and secretly gutting the public buildings and offices, which were still under their control, including hospitals and asylums, stripping them bare of records, apparatus, and belongings, ripping out everything that could be torn loose and selling everything, even infected clothing and bedding from hospitals, that would bring a centen or a peseta in cash. The city was full of plunder of this kind—furniture, fixtures, gas and water pipe, tanks, chandeliers, water-closets, bath tubs, washstands, instruments, and utensils of every description.

With the single exception of the governor-general's palace, occupied by General Castellanos as residence and offices, and which he turned over to General Brooke, partially equipped, every public building was robbed of everything removable, so that when the Americans took possession everything had to be repurchased, and in many cases the identical articles that had been removed.

The physical condition of the city could only be described as frightful. There were several thousand reconcentrados in and about, who had been herding like swine and perishing like flies. They were found dead in the streets and in their noisome quarters, where disease and starvation were rampant. Other thousands were lacking food, clothing, and medicines.

The regular service of the city was practically paralyzed: street-cleaning, at best a farce, suspended, and the houses of assistance and hospitals destitute of resources, even food. No sanitary measures or rules were in force, and the thronging population—soldiers, reconcentrados, natives, and citizens—used the streets or any open place for deposit of refuse and filth of all kinds. A woman killed by a railway train lay on a principal street (Carlos III) for eight hours because an ambulance and the proper officials could not be found to remove her. It was nearly the same with all other branches of the city administration. Officials, clerks, and employees had been unpaid for many months, and the public offices were practically abandoned.

General Lee had his headquarters and part of the Second Division of the Seventh Army Corps across the Almendares River, about 7 miles west from the center of Havana, and General Menocal, with his division of the Cuban army, lay beyond at Marianao. The Cubans patrolled the outlying rural districts and General Lee's troops guarded the outer limits of Havana.

In these circumstances General Greene had his headquarters at the Inglaterra Hotel, and, with his few officers, had endeavored to organize at least a partial sanitary service by the aid of an allotment of $50,000, which had been given him for the purpose. With this the street-cleaning contractor was reemployed and his limited force put in opera-

tion under Captain Geary, while Dr. Davis explored the condition of the hospitals and other relief buildings with a view to their restoration to some measure of efficiency and the making of necessary reparations. Until American possession was had, however, no radical measures could be enforced, and little more could be done than the preparation of plans for future work. This naturally included also the organization of a police force, provision for which General Greene was engaged in making by employing expert assistance and arranging for the service in part of United States officers.

THE TAKING OVER OF HAVANA.

December 22 General Wade sent me word that the western suburb of Havana, known as Vedado, would be evacuated on the next day by the Spanish forces, and desired me to be at the Trocha by 9 the next morning.

Certain camp sites in this suburb had already been selected by General Greene as suitable for the purpose when troops should enter. After an inspection these sites were adopted, and a battalion of the Tenth Infantry, under Captain Van Vliet, and another of the Eighth Infantry, under Captain Pitcher, crossing the Almendares at 10.30 a. m., December 23, and relieving the Spanish guards at the pontoon bridge near its mouth, were put in camp with instructions for patrolling the Vedado district and guarding the three coast batteries that were included in it. These batteries were found in fairly good and habitable condition, with the exception that the vicinity was greatly defiled by the Spanish soldiers. Any question of occupation therefore, by our troops was deferred until thorough sanitation could be effected.

That evening, at my headquarters at the Inglaterra, I sent for Generals Menocal and Montalvo, of the Cuban army, and began arrangements for the organization of a rural guard, to be composed of mounted troops of the Cuban army, in number not to exceed 350 in all, for the protection of the outlying areas between the city and the rivers bounding the department, which, unless adequately guarded, would be the refuge of criminals and disorderly persons, where foot soldiers would be unable to hunt or control them.

As elsewhere stated, this rural police service was set in full operation January 6, and has continued to do excellent service since that time, and the Department of Havana, although comprising a concentrated fifth of the population of the island, with the criminal elements incident to a large city, has been free from disorder from that time to the present.

The general instructions made with reference to the troops were that as the Spanish gradually withdrew our lines were to follow them up, step by step, maintaining a fringe or screen in contact with them and occupying the abandoned areas with soldiers acting as police, distributed through designated districts, with regular beats, reliefs, and patrols. These arrangements were specially intrusted at first to Captain Greble, with Captain Treat later to assist him, who performed the service most admirably, and were going night and day while the movements were in progress.

The soldiers of the Eighth and Tenth Infantry labored under several

disadvantages in the performance of this difficult duty, but must be credited with having preserved order and practically fulfilled their purpose. They were mainly recruits, were in a strange city, and knew not a word of Spanish; furthermore, the temptations of the numerous cafés and drinking places were often irresistible, and falls from grace were frequent, requiring severe restrictions and disciplinary measures. But the officers had their regular training, knew their duty, and could be trusted to perform it.

The difficulties were greatly enhanced by the large number of volunteer troops of the Seventh Corps who thronged into the city from the camps, with and without passes, and the large accessions destined for other points, which were arriving by sea and disembarking in the city at the San José wharves, near the head of the bay, a locality with an evil repute for health and in the worst part of the town in all respects. The result was that they gave an immense amount of trouble, and at least four out of every five cases of disorder and arrest were due to Americans, military or civil.

December 25 a company of the Eighth Infantry was bivouacked in the Campo de Marte, near the head of Egido street, leading to the San José district, and set to patrolling the Arsenal district, adjoining it to the westward.

December 26 Captain Greble reported that the Spaniards had without notice suddenly withdrawn from the western portion of Havana and from the Jesús del Monte and Luyanó suburbs lying south of the city. Three companies of the Eighth Infantry were immediately detailed to cover this territory with guards and patrols, but it was several hours before the final distribution could be effected. No disturbance occurred, but representations were made to General Castellanos that the omission to give notification ought not to happen again.

December 27 orders were given that, in all the territory within the control of our troops, public houses of all kinds should be closed at 11 p. m., gambling houses entirely suppressed, no weapons of any kind be carried except by troops on duty, on penalty of arrest and forfeiture, and that deposits or stores of arms should be seized when discovered.

A list of the places to be transferred from the Spanish occupation was furnished me by the evacuation commission, and these with others were guarded, including the Fortress Principe, the Pirotecnia, the Santa Clara and Reina batteries, on the western borders of the city proper, and the Belascoain and Dragones barracks, well within the limits. Lieutenant-Colonel Ellis, commanding the Eighth Infantry, was directed to furnish two companies of his regiment as guards for these points.

Toward evening a column of Spanish troops, coming in from the western batteries and under escort of Captain Blunt of my staff, was fired upon from the roof of a house and a soldier in the rear of the column shot in the groin. Immediate search was made for the would-be assassin, but without result. I happened to be behind the column at the time and was struck with the good conduct and discipline of the Spanish soldiers. At a word they halted, opened ranks, each rank occupying opposite sidewalks and facing across the street with guns at the ready, should a shot come again. It was clever work and showed the training the men had had, as indeed did their habitual orderly and quiet demeanor when on or off duty in the city.

December 28. Upon inspection, the forts, batteries, and barracks

vacated by the Spanish troops were found in a frightfully unsanitary condition, lacking almost every requisite for cleanliness or drainage, and orders were given to take means, by thorough cleaning and disinfecting, putting in sewer pipes, closets, and baths, to make them habitable, whether for troops, hospitals, or other purposes. All movables of any kind or value whatever had been remorselessly ripped out, and even the drains leading to the cesspools had been choked with débris.

December 29 it was ordered to prohibit large gatherings of persons on the streets and noisy parades of any kind, day and night; furthermore, that any place found selling or giving liquor to soldiers would be closed and the proprietor arrested.

The excitement was rising among the Cubans as January 1 drew near, and their restlessness and eagerness to see the finish were increasing.

The criminal classes also were active and ready for any mischief, while the sole resource for the maintenance of order and the prevention of disturbances, that might at any moment become serious, was the ill-trained and but half-responsible soldiers, themselves in need of regulation and control. In these circumstances the conduct of the citizens in general was nothing less than admirable.

An elaborate programme of festivities had been arranged for a full week following January 1, including mass meetings, fireworks, parades, processions, the Cuban army to march in and be entertained, and a number of other events, banquets, balls, and races. It seemed a cruel thing to deny the people their wish, but, after serious and repeated consultations with the best representative Cubans, they assented to my decision that, in the circumstances, it could not be agreed to; that there had already been too much excitement; there were too many hostile and conflicting elements in the city; too many armed men who had been recently at war with each other; too many hot-headed and irresponsible persons; too many criminals at liberty, and insufficient means for protecting persons and property. It was a bitter disappointment to them, but the leaders and responsible men assented that the decision was just and justifiable. A younger element wished to insist on having their festival with or without authority, but the elders kept them in check, and the result was in the highest degree creditable to the Cubans, as establishing their ability to exercise self-control when appeal is made to their reason and judgment, with sympathy and firmness. A copy of my letter on this subject is appended.

December 30 the main body of the two regiments was brought into the city and camped along the line of the Prado, across the city, with the headquarters of the Tenth Infantry, under Colonel Pearson as provisional brigade commander, at the Campo de Marte and the headquarters of the Eighth Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Ellis, in the Plaza near the Punta.

All were camped in the plazas and streets and made comfortable, with sufficient space and hospital tents and a good supply of city water always available. It was objectionable to have them thus publicly quartered, particularly as the opportunities for getting out of camp surreptitiously and procuring drink were by no means neglected; and the court-martial service was arduous, but it could not be avoided, as the military and public quarters were at that time in no sense fit or safe for occupancy by our people, and in any case the nature of their service as police taxed the resources of the command and required

them to occupy central positions in the vicinity of their patrol stations and districts.

The Spanish troops were thus narrowed down to the old city proper and gradually contracting toward the Governor-General's palace, as shipload after shipload left and others were taken by rail to Cienfuegos for the final departure.

December 31. Careful and detailed instructions were made for the following day and the thorough protection of the situation. The responsibility during the preceding week, with the incessant labor and long hours, had been sufficiently wearing upon all concerned, and it was always possible that something untoward might occur up to the last moment.

January 1. The Governor-General's palace was surrounded on all sides with lines of troops, a battalion each of the Eighth and Tenth Infantry, all traffic stopped, neighboring streets guarded, and shops and stores fronting on the Plaza de Armas closed. No one but those living in the houses was permitted to occupy a window, and every precaution was taken to prevent the possibility of disturbance or an individual act of insult or hostility to the departing Spanish commander.

Happily, all passed off well, and it was with an immense sense of relief that I saw General Castellanos finally stepping into his boat at the Caballería wharf to be pulled off to his ship.

At noon the Spanish flag was saluted from Cabaña, the Eighth Infantry band in the Plaza de Armas in front of the palace playing the Spanish national air.

The American ensign was then hoisted on the palace flagstaff, as well as at Morro and Cabaña and the public buildings generally, the national salute was fired and the national air played, troops saluting and the people uncovering.

Inside the palace the occasion was one of a quiet dignity, which was in fact profoundly pathetic, as Spain, in the person of her representative, surrendered forever the sovereignity that had been hers through four centuries, and abandoned all future title to a foothold on the Western Continent.

As an historical datum, it may be stated that on February 6 General Castellanos, with the residue of the Spanish army, sailed from Cienfuegos in the steamship *Catalina*, thus completing the Spanish evacuation of Cuba.

SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS.

The succeeding days of January and subsequent months were quite as fully occupied as those of December, though without the special harassments of that critical period. The several heads are separately discussed elsewhere, and need not be more than referred to in this résumé.

With three regiments of troops in the department the service of the men was lightened and they had three or four nights in bed instead of one or two.

When the police had been organized it became practicable to reduce the number of soldiers in the department, and recommendation was made that one entire regiment could be dispensed with, and one battalion from each of the others be sent to the States to serve as a depot for recruiting and instruction, with the view of exchanging at periods of six months, giving six months' service in the United States and

twelve months in Cuba. The Tenth Infantry was ordered to Matanzas, leaving the Eighth Infantry and Second Artillery in my command; but the home-battalion recommendation has not yet been adopted.

On January 2 a battalion of the Second Volunteer Engineers, asked for by me, arrived from the States and reported for duty, thereafter performing extremely useful service in connection with engineering work, under the direction of the chief engineer, Colonel Black. Since the muster out of the regiment several of the officers have remained as civilian engineers, and are now in charge of important branches of the department work.

Meanwhile, in view of the ensuing rainy season, the cleansing, disinfecting, repairing, and equipping of the several forts, batteries, and military stations were begun and pushed with all energy, in order as rapidly as possible to get the troops off the streets and into regular garrison quarters, where privacy, shade and proper shelter, baths and water-closets could be provided. In these respects I was convinced that if thorough disinfection and sanitation of these Spanish stations were effected the men would be vastly better off than in any merely temporary cantonments in the open country, where malarial influences would have greater effect and bathing and the like conveniences be limited or lacking. At the same time, under the plans and direction of the division authorities, arrangements were making for the construction of wooden quarters at Quemados and another set in the country east of Cabaña Fortress.

The headquarters of the department at the hotel were hopelessly crowded and inconvenient, and the hotel service abominable, so that it was a great relief when, on January 28, we were enabled to move into No. 1 Tacon street, on the water front, which had been occupied as the headquarters of the Spanish engineers. The lower floor gave accommodation for the general offices and the five rooms of the second floor were occupied by the department commander as an office and living rooms.

The sanitation and sanitary census of the city, with the gradual expansion of the engineering work and organization, continued as from the first with unremitting energy and labor, including the procurement of sanitary carts and excavators and garbage scows and the construction of a crematory for disposal of refuse, either by burning or dumping at sea.

The police was finally organized and turned over to the mayor on the 1st day of March. The civil government was completed, after ample discussion and consultation with the best and most judicious advisers, on January 14, and has since performed admirable service.

The finance commission was organized at the same time and made most important and valuable investigations and reports. The organization of the system of relief was effected, at first with soldiers only, later with a combination of civilian agencies and army officers in charge, and now with a Cuban organization under a civilian superintendent. The number of people fed was at first enormous—some 20,000—which is now reduced to 6,000 or 7,000, but the original 20,000 by no means represented all those who were in need of assistance. There remained the sick, the aged, the orphan children, the permanently enfeebled, the hopelessly dependent class, who could not work, and most of whom required care and shelter and medical treatment, the facilities for which were not forthcoming. The city had and has but

two hospitals, and these were in terrible condition and crowded with an indiscriminate mass of patients with nearly every disease known, infectious and otherwise, including mental aberration. Some 2,000 or 3,000 more were needing hospital service that could not be given. I sought to get possession of the Alphonso XIII Hospital on Principe Hill, a Spanish construction of 60 or 70 separate pavilions, with a capacity for 2,500 or 3,000 patients, but this was taken as a general military hospital for the division. Another Spanish hospital of some 1,500 capacity had been taken for a quartermaster storehouse, and while I was making efforts to get possession the building was set on fire and burned. There remained only the old military hospital, San Ambrosio, built near the littoral at the head of the bay, but this had such an evil repute of 60 per cent of mortality under the Spanish administration that a board of Cuban physicians declined to recommend it, even for the immune natives. Recourse was finally had in part to distributing the most urgent cases among private establishments of various kinds and paying a monthly stipend for their maintenance, and using the houses of assistance as centers for the distribution of medicines and diet foods.

There was serious difficulty in securing the organization of a department staff—especially a medical staff—and for a long time I was unable to procure a chief medical officer, quartermaster, or commissary. Dr. Gorgas was promised to me in Washington before I left for Havana, but when he came down his orders put him in charge of the division general hospital, and orders to report to me were not made until January 13, and he was not enabled to report to me until a month later. Meanwhile an enormous burden of work and responsibility was thrown on Dr. Davis, who, as sanitary officer, had all that he could attend to. A regular quartermaster was not furnished, notwithstanding official and personal representations, until April 28, nor an experienced commissary until March 29. It will be understood how these deficiencies added to the labor and responsibility of the department commander, who had enough of his own to attend to. Another serious drawback was the frequent changes in officers, due to promotions, the raising of additional regiments, and the military operation in the Philippines; but these were temporary disabilities, incident to the service, and were all in turn accepted as inevitable, and the best made of it.

A more serious disadvantage was the method prescribed for obtaining funds from the customs revenues upon monthly requisitions and minutely detailed estimates, for sanitary and relief purposes, which made it impracticable to estimate or plan for more work than could be specified item by item during the ensuing month, and hence was prohibitory of any extended projects or expenditures.

There was no general allowance or proportionate distribution of surplus customs funds among the departments according to their special needs, so that each department has been constrained to appear, month by month, as an applicant for a donation of funds, the amount of which or the specific items of which would or would not be authorized—could not be determined or ascertained in advance. This system had the advantage of enabling the division commander to maintain a close scrutiny over all expenditures, large and small, throughout the island, but to a great extent prevented the department commanders from exercising their best judgment and discretion in the application of funds to the special purposes of their respective commands.

On June 1, after several months' trial of this system, the department commanders, officially convened at Havana for the consideration of this subject, unanimously recommended its material modification and that an equitable apportionment of surplus customs be made among the departments, the specified amounts to be applied according to such general purposes as should be deemed by the department commanders best adapted to their special needs, upon projects submitted to and approved by the division commander. This recommendation has not been favorably acted upon, and matters in this respect remain in statu quo.

The text of the department commanders' resolution is embodied in the list of the more important recommendations made, appended to this report.

CUBAN RELIEF SERVICE.

As has been stated elsewhere, the relief of the starving and destitute thousands in and about the city demanded instant attention. Reconcentrados and other homeless and hopeless creatures thronged in such spaces and premises as could give them partial shelter, and were dying in the streets and alleys. Captain Greble, of my staff, was put in charge of the relief work, and performed his duties with great intelligence and sympathy and unwearying industry. As rapidly as possible exact data were obtained and all the reconcentrado quarters visited, as well as the charitable institutions, public and private. At the same time General Menocal was asked by means of his mounted Cuban troops to make a rapid examination of the outlying regions and get a rough census of the destitute in the rural districts, including Guanabacoa and other centers. By these means and others it became possible to organize a service, the details of which are given in the accompanying report by Lieutenant Rice, Seventh Cavalry, who relieved Captain Greble when the latter was promoted to the command of his light battery, which took him out of my command.

The earliest means of relief was from information given by the guards and patrols, and the food was furnished from army emergency supplies. Later Cuban rations were issued upon requisition by the department commander, and the city was divided into districts, with an army officer in charge of each, and still later, as the officers and detailed enlisted men could no longer be spared from their commands, an entirely civilian service was organized.

At the outset the issues were made to between 20,000 and 25,000 people, but these were reduced by degrees. As the men were nourished into ability to work, employment was furnished by the organization of the street cleaning and other sanitary work, and in the end by the refusal to issue food to any but those who were incapable of obtaining it otherwise. At the present time about 6,000 persons are receiving relief, of whom 75 per cent are invalids, aged, or young children who are unable to assimilate ordinary food, and receive a modified convalescent issue instead.

The houses of assistance were also reorganized by Dr. Davis and made centers for the issue of medicines, which were furnished likewise to the hospitals that needed supplies of this kind.

The pitiful nature of this problem may best be illustrated by the fact that, owing to the waste of war and the mortality among male adults,

the existing residuum of dependents is now principally women and children incapable of earning a livelihood, and remaining as a continuing charge upon public charity for some time to come.

CARE OF TROOPS IN TROPICAL COUNTRIES.

The concurrent and conclusive evidence, gathered both from our own limited experience in Cuba and from the prolonged occupation of tropical regions by other nations, is to the effect that for the due care and conservation of the health of troops so situated, material modifications should be made in respect of the three prime necessities of food, clothing, and shelter. Other adaptations are likewise indicated.

In the matter of food, it is important that the flesh or heat making components of the ration be reduced from that regularly used in northern climates, and a much larger proportion of the lighter foods—fish, fowls, fruits, and cereals—be furnished instead. In this respect it should be noted that the men themselves are not authorities upon these points. Company and regimental commanders, asked for their recommendations, are apt to ascertain the wishes and preferences of their men and be guided thereby in suggesting what is required. This is manifestly an erroneous method of proceeding, for the reason that it substitutes for an enlightened and intelligent judgment the personal preferences of the men themselves. The entire subject should be carefully considered by a competent board and conclusions reached as to the necessary modifications of the ration issue in Cuba.

So in the matter of clothing. It is indispensable that the garments of the men comply with two main conditions: First, that they should be serviceable, and, second, that they should meet the conditions of the climate. Heavy clothing of any kind is inadmissible. The shirts and underwear should be light in weight and texture and the outer clothing at once seemly, cool, and serviceable. For these purposes I am of opinion that a bluish-grey serge would be found the best in all respects as possessing excellent wearing qualities in connection with light weight. Next to this white or grey duck or linen drill would best answer the purpose, with helmets of the same material and straw hats permissible. The khaki uniforms furnished by the quartermaster's department are objectionable in every respect. The material is poor and the clothing ill-fitting, badly made, and the original diversities of color are multiplied with every washing. The material shrinks, soaks, and thickens with sweat, and is fit neither for campaign nor garrison purposes. The campaign suits, of whatever material, with campaign hats and leggings, should be reserved by companies for service in the field and not used in garrison.

In the matter of quarters, two things are of prime importance: First, that the floors upon which the men sleep should be raised as high as possible above the ground, in order to protect them from the emanations of the soil and keep a high, open, dry, and well ventilated area beneath them. In the Tropics, the three enemies are the sun, the earth, and the night air. Exposure to the sun between 11 a. m. and 3 p. m. is carefully avoided by the natives, whose experience in this respect has taught them caution. Ample shade and shelter, especially during these hours, is essential in any barrack or cantonment, and this can best be effected by the use of a double roof to the quarters, with broadly projecting eaves shading the interior and furnishing porches

or verandas 10 or 12 feet in width on all sides. With quarters of this description, raised well above the ground, with ample bathing facilities (very important to the maintenance of health particularly in the Tropics), the care of the troops in the open would be reasonably provided for. Thoroughly dry, well-constructed, and well-ventilated stone or concrete structures, such as properly built casemates and the like, are preferable to wooden buildings, as securing greater protection from the glare and heat, and less liable to infection in case of disease.

The night is recognized as the period of the twenty-four hours during which the greatest danger of infection from malaria or other diseases, particularly yellow fever, is incurred. The orders made in this department provide that the hours of fatigue and drill be restricted to prior to 11 o'clock in the morning and after 3 o'clock in the afternoon, and the men are required to be in their quarters, unless in some special case, by 9 p. m. Any man lying out of his quarters, or absent at night without authority, upon his return is quarantined for three days, until the safety of his intermingling with the command can be reasonably ascertained.

Another important point. It is a matter of general recognition that the use of alcohol or intoxicating drinks of any kind in the Tropics conduces effectively to attack from disease. The practice of the natives in this respect can again be considered with advantage. They are as a rule extremely temperate, if not entirely abstemious, using the smallest possible amount of wine or intoxicant and avoiding heavy feeding. This should be carried out thoroughly with American troops in Cuba. In this department thus far endeavor has been made to make the prohibition absolute, and, while it is perhaps not possible to enforce this with entire thoroughness, the weight of authority and precept is thrown against the use of intoxicants, and the men are in every way discouraged from its use. It is believed that these measures are practically imperative. They were found necessary by General Kitchener in conducting his campaign in Egypt, and the continued health and efficiency of his command were doubtless, to a great extent, due to this fact. In almost every case of yellow fever thus far developed in this department it has been found, as well as the facts could be ascertained, that the patient had been in the habit of drinking. It is particularly important where a large proportion of the troops are recruits that nothing be officially done to create in them any habit of using intoxicants; and this, it is believed, would be the result if, as has been deemed desirable in some portions of the United States, canteens be established in the posts, where light wines and beer are regularly furnished. In such circumstances, the temptations of sociability and companionship are practically irresistible, and the habit of drinking is readily acquired.

Experience has also shown that it is not advisable to maintain men of northern races continuously on service in the Tropics. Not only are the losses from disease severe, but the entire body of men becomes greatly deteriorated from climatic and other effects. It is believed that if garrisons of American troops are to be maintained in the Tropics, these facts should be taken into account, and permanent dispositions made with reference to their exchange between home and foreign stations. For the military service of India, England constitutes its regiments of two battalions, which are interchanged from time to time. With our three-battalion organization, a convenient

provision of this kind could be made by retaining one battalion in the States to act both as training school and recruiting station for the regiment, where the men would receive their preliminary drill and instruction before proceeding to duty abroad. This would leave two battalions out of the regiment on foreign station, and the exchange might advantageously be made every six months, bringing home that battalion which had been longest abroad and simultaneously moving the home battalion to take its place. With the army transports now maintained in service this would not be a costly affair, as all the camp and garrison equipage and other belongings of the battalion, with the exception of the personal effects of the men, could be exchanged and the trouble of transporting them avoided. This would leave each battalion six months at home and one year abroad, and this period is believed to be as extended as in the general interest of the service would be found expedient. Official recommendations to this effect have heretofore been submitted.

ORGANIZATION OF THE POLICE.

As elsewhere stated, the departure of the Spanish troops in and about Havana was attended by the total disappearance of the municipal and other police. Under the Spanish rule, the police forces were in effect four, viz: The orden publico, and the guardia civil, both military or semimilitary forces, and under direction of state officials, and the guardia municipal and policia municipal, more under direction of local officials, but which could continue only under the protection of the Spanish forces; so that the American occupation found the city incapable of protection except by the use of the United States troops. It was of importance, therefore, with the least delay to organize both a rural police, for the protection of the outlying districts between the city and the boundaries of the department, and a municipal police in the city proper, including its important suburbs, Vedado, Cerro, and Jesus del Monte. The rural guard would also have charge of the eastern portion of the department outside of the municipality of Havana, including the municipalities of Regla, Guanabacoa, Santa Maria del Rosario, and their vicinity.

Upon taking charge of the department one of the first endeavors was toward the creation of a rural police, for which purpose the Cuban army, a division of which, under General Menocal, was in camp at Marianao, offered excellent material. Arrangements to this effect were made, and on the 6th of January completed. A force of about 350 mounted men, including selected officers and noncommissioned officers, organized in squads, was established throughout the rural districts. For convenience of organization the department was divided into two districts by a line running south from Havana, and an inspector put in charge of each district, all subject to the immediate direction of the chief of police in Havana. The pay of the men was at first on the basis of the Indian scouts—receiving cavalry pay with an extra allowance for the use of their horses and arms—forage and rations being furnished. This organization has answered its purposes admirably, as there has been practically no criminality or brigandage within the limits of the department from the time of its establishment; and within the last two months it has been found practicable to reduce the force nearly

one-half and transfer a large body of them to the Department of the Province of Havana and Pinar del Rio. To avoid the trouble of supplying rations and forage, the pay of the men has been increased, and the organization now provides its own allowances.

A more serious undertaking was the organization of the municipal police. Before my arrival General Greene had made preliminary arrangements for this by engaging the services of ex-Superintendent J. B. McCullough, of New York, whose services until the work was finally accomplished were of the greatest value. The original plan was to detail officers from the United States forces both as chief of police and as the principal police officers, but upon full consideration I determined to modify this project by constituting the police entirely of native material, as the permanent continuance of United States officers, whether volunteer or regular, would be impracticable, and it was for many reasons preferable to avoid as far as possible the incorporation of foreign elements.

General Menocal, an officer of high rank in the Cuban army, speaking English fluently, and with an American education as an engineer, was invited to take the position of chief of police, and accepted it. Other Cuban officers were selected to take the higher positions—inspectors, captains, lieutenants, and the like—and for the main body of the force applications were invited from all quarters, the purpose being to form a body of about 1,000 men. The applicants, numbering some 3,800, were carefully sifted, both as to physical and mental conditions, and were required to be able to read and write and conform to a standard of height and weight. The composition of the force likewise called for the constitution of a detective bureau, under its own chief, but subject to the orders of the chief of police.

Much time was consumed in all this, as well as in the procuring of uniforms and equipment, the drilling of the men, the division of the city into districts and precincts, the securing of station houses, and the establishment of a headquarters, so that it was not until March 1 that the fully organized force was finally paraded on the Prado and formally turned over to the mayor and placed under his immediate direction, although in several of the precincts portions of the force had already been established, since it was desirable to relieve the soldiers from police duty as rapidly as possible. My letter making this transfer is appended.

The results have been very satisfactory. For the first time in the history of the island a purely Cuban police was organized; and naturally none could be found who were experienced or in any sense trained for police duty. The officers and a large number of the patrolmen had the advantage of such drilling and discipline as prevailed in the Cuban army, constituting an excellent foundation, so far as it went, but prolonged instruction and drill as well as the practical exercise of police duty were necessary before the force could be regarded as in all respects trustworthy.

The Cubans are of an excitable temperament, and the police at the outset failed of that calmness and effectiveness which were essential. Pistols were too freely drawn and used, and the shooting was not very straight, but these defects were eliminated by degrees, and the men rapidly improved in steadiness and efficiency.

The Cuban population had been in the habit of looking upon the police as the immediate instruments of the tyranny and oppression

from which they had suffered, and naturally regarded a policeman as a public enemy, to be at once feared and hated. Their disposition toward the new police at first took on this same coloring, but this impression changed, particularly after a severe battle of the police with some criminals and disorderly persons who undertook to resist arrest and opened fire with fatal results. The riot was quelled, although at the expense of losses to the police. But the outcome was the conviction in the public mind that the present police, constituted of their own people, were their protectors and guardians, and were to be regarded as friends and not as enemies, and since that time there has been no trouble of this kind. In the earlier stages, too, there were from time to time conflicts between the police and the rawer element among the American soldiers, who undertook to bully every native and refuse obedience to his orders. This disposition was quelled by stringent orders and the application of severe disciplinary measures to all soldiers who, in lieu of aiding the constituted authorities, chose to put themselves in a position of opposition to them; so that at this time the relations are entirely harmonious and respectful.

The detective bureau was organized under the immediate direction of ex-Sergeant Crowley of the New York police, who was brought down for that purpose and performed useful services. As in the case of the police generally, the detective police at the outset was in several material respects lacking in efficiency, but by weeding out and substitution of better material, and in particular the appointment of an efficient head, it is now a very capable and useful branch of the service.

In connection with the organization generally it was of the first importance to prepare a carefully drafted set of rules and regulations. This was done mainly by Mr. McCullough, upon the basis of the New York regulations. The main principles embodied were careful examination of qualifications upon admission, and continuance in office so long as found capable and satisfactory, and no man to be dispossessed of his place except upon formal charges tried under the direction of the chief of police, while at the same time the chief was given full power and authority to suspend and discipline otherwise, by fine or penalty, any misconduct. These regulations when fairly drafted were approved by me and stand as the basis of the organization, subject to such changes from time to time as may be made by the city council at the instance of the chief of police and the mayor.

While the police force of Havana can not be said at this time to be of an ideal composition or efficiency, it will bear favorable comparison with almost any other and gives excellent promise for the future. The principles of promotion by seniority or selection from lower grade is not one that has been followed in the Spanish administration, where a high vacancy occurring was generally filled by the appointment of some outside person having the requisite influence. An insistence upon the contrary practice in the case of the police has been made, and that appointments to vacancies should be made from the force itself and not from outside, as an essential principle upon which to construct a thoroughly competent and reliable force. If the prospect of the promotion be eliminated, there is no incentive for those occupying the lower stations to do more than satisfy the routine requirements of their positions and avoid losing them. On the other hand, the possibility and expectation of rising by earning a reputation for capacity and efficiency will per-

meate the force and inspire it throughout with an esprit de corps important to its maintenance and satisfactory service.

To this end, however, the cooperation of an auxiliary force, independent of the police organization itself, is absolutely essential, reference being made to the municipal courts, before whom the police cases must come for trial, for the enforcement of the provisions of law and the city ordinances, the punishment of offenders, and the discharge of the innocent. It matters not what be the vigilance, the activity, and the efficiency of the police in the detection of crime and offenses and the arrest of evil doers, all their endeavors are rendered futile and nugatory unless the conduct of the courts is such as to further the ends of justice and administer the requisite punishment when the evidence justifies conviction. In this respect the existing conditions in Havana leaves much to be desired. There are no city magistrates or police magistrates proper in the Spanish organization, all the courts being directly under the appointment and supervision of the state officials and responsible alone to them.

The Spanish methods both in criminal and equity cases are marked with a deliberation and insecurity of issue which experience has shown here in Havana to be incompatible with any successful administration of the law or enforcement of penalties upon offenders, as the rules of criminal procedure have been apparently devised to enable the magistrates, in secret and without possibility of challenge, to effect their own disposition of cases, independent of the needs of the public service. The result is often the escape of the guilty, and in any case, as a general rule, delays impossible of comprehension in the trial of cases, involving the prolonged imprisonment of an alleged offender and the detention of witnesses who have testimony to offer in the case. The preliminary evidence is taken in secret, the record is made by the magistrate himself or his clerks and secretaries, and it is, in any given case, quite impracticable of ascertainment whether the final adjudication is or is not in accordance with the facts of the case.

There is a well-founded belief that material improvements could be made both in the personnel of the local magistracy and the methods employed by them in their procedures, which have remained unchanged since the American occupation. Meanwhile, as a practical fact, it was found early in the year that numerous arrests had either to be treated by court-martial, which was for many reasons inexpedient, if not entirely impracticable, or remitted to the indeterminate purview of a magistrate's court, with the result of an immense accumulation of cases, for which it was impossible to provide either in respect to living accommodations or other necessary supplies.

For these reasons, and as an administrative and executive measure, a provisional trial police court was established, early in January, for the investigation of cases of arrest for disorders or minor offenses, and for this and other purposes an officer of my staff was detailed as supervisor of police. Experience has shown that this tribunal, or, rather, one regularly constituted to take its place, is essential to the prompt disposal of police cases, either by acquittal or punishment. The system, though new to Spanish jurisprudence, has so well approved itself to those having cognizance of the facts that a police court will doubtless be constituted in some form. For this purpose recommendation has been made by me to the division commander, with a draft, for consideration, of a decree to constitute and prescribe the duties of the court.

Organization of the Civil Government.

In anticipation of the duty of organizing the civil government in Havana and assuming responsibility for its administration, as prescribed in the President's orders, I took occasion in Washington and in New York, prior to leaving for Havana, to obtain lists of the leading and best informed Cubans of all shades of political affiliation, with whom I proposed to confer as to the personnel and composition of the government to be established. Consultations with these and others of like standing were begun immediately upon my arrival, and in the intervals of other occupations, continued, until a list was finally agreed upon practically by all concerned, of names for the several positions to be filled, composed of citizens of the highest standing and personal character and commanding the fullest respect and consideration of the community. The means taken to accomplish this result were simple and effective. Certain individuals, as well as the representatives of certain political organizations, were invited to write in the lists of offices the names of the persons whom they would recommend to fill them. These lists when presented showed certain names as predominating, which were then selected. Where greater diversity was indicated, further consultations were had and in the end the list as finally made up represented practically the collective judgment of all concerned. This method, in fact, was analogous to the procedure of the old fashioned selectmen of a village, and represented an election by majority vote, with the voters limited to the most serious and best informed members of the community. In the case of the mayor and some others, for example, the choice was practically unanimous. The selection of some one to represent the Spanish element in the community and one to represent the colored element were also carefully considered and adopted.

These proceedings, besides securing the best individual results, had two conspicuous advantages, in that the selections were made by the Cubans themselves, and the arbitrary authority of the military governor, which in the absence of other means was needed to set the machinery in motion, was practically limited to that, and to accepting and confirming the choice of the people.

It may be said at once that nothing could have given better results and that the disinterestedness, integrity, and patriotism of those consulted and those installed, effected the organization of a government that has continued to the present with entire satisfaction and the most useful and beneficial results.

Similar principles have been pursued by me in the subsequent conduct of affairs. The officials have been left entirely at liberty to direct local matters as should seem best to them, and my interposition has been limited, first to suggestions and advice, and second, to the doing of things that the local authorities, while desiring or approving, had not the power or authority to execute. There has not been from the beginning a conflict of any kind between the two authorities, and the military authority has in no case been exercised in matters affecting local government, without full consultation and understanding with the local officials.

It seems desirable to state these facts somewhat fully, since the organization of a civil government in a foreign country, through the instrumentality of a military commander holding warrant from the

executive authority only and independently of other than military law, is a new experience in our history, and the means employed, as well as the outcome reached, are particulars of the utmost interest.

Pending the installation of the new government the Spanish officials, provincial and municipal, were requested to continue in the occupancy of their offices and carry on the routine duties intrusted to them, but it was prescribed that no expenditure be made without previous authority, nor any material modifications of orders or methods.

At noon of January 14 the first Cuban administration of Havana was formally installed by the swearing in of the new officials and the retirement of the old. At the same time I made a letter, a copy of which is attached, addressed respectively to the civil governor and to the mayor, embodying certain principles of action and suggestions of certain practical measures according to which it was expected the conduct of affairs would be guided.

Careful attention is invited to the clear and intelligent résumé of the proceedings of the city government, as set forth in the concise report from the mayor, which is attached to this report. And I desire in this place to express my sincere recognition of the public services rendered by the mayor and his colleagues, and in particular for the unvarying support and assistance I have had from them all, both personally and officially.

At the same time the new civil governor, Mr. Federico Mora, and the secretary of the civil government, Colonel Torriente, were inducted and the former Spanish officials relieved. The civil governor is in fact an officer of the province, holding certain administrative relations to and supervision of the provincial ayuntamientos—some 38 in number—and in addition exercising certain special functions of administration in the city of Havana, which to that extent constitutes him a city official.

It was the Spanish method to have a Spanish official in control of all fields of authority, large and small, which, even under an elective system for city officers, kept everything within the purview and control of the central authority. The civil governor, for example, had direct charge of the seccion de hygiene, a technical phrase meaning the supervision and taxation of public women and the establishments of like nature. From these a large revenue was derived, legitimately and otherwise, which was in the personal control of the civil governor, who had not to account for a dollar of it. This service has been transferred to the ayuntamiento, and the accounts regularly kept. The civil governor also issued authority for balls, for parades, for theatrical performances, and had charge of all matters inside of theaters and public buildings, and many other like intimate civic functions, with a special police at his orders independently of the city authorities. In like manner the city was divided into barrios or wards—39 in number—with a subalcalde and clerks in charge of each, who collected fees, and cost the city collectively some $40,000 per annum. These were abolished. There was also in existence in each province what was known as the deputacion provincial, a body of officials and employees supposed to exercise certain somewhat vague and ill-defined functions, most of which had fallen into desuetude, with the exception of drawing salaries, which constituted a formidable total. Upon my recommendation, these deputaciones were abolished by the military governor of the island.

Both Mr. Mora and Mr. Torriente have been transferred to other

fields, the former appointed fiscal to the supreme court, equivalent to attorney-general, and the latter to a magistrate's seat in Santa Clara. I desire here to make my acknowledgments to both for the effective and highly creditable manner in which their duties were discharged, always in the utmost harmony with the city government and with myself.

Having in view the necessity for a reorganization and improved administration of the city finances, it was important at once to make a thorough investigation of the facts in these particulars, for which purpose a finance commission was appointed, with duties and powers as stated in the civil order No. 3, a copy of which is herewith. The finance commission has performed notable service in the execution of the trust imposed upon it, numerous and valuable reports having been prepared with great care, ability, and labor, under the direction of its very able president, Mr. Conant, aided especially by the valuable services of Messrs. Casanova and Cancio, of the commission, and by special assistance of Lieutenant Powelson, of the Navy, and Capt. Osgood Smith, late of the Twelfth New York. A general review of the work of the commission is shown in the accompanying report from it, which, however, falls far short of the full exhibit of its valuable service. Pursuant to the reports of the commission, two typical cases were dealt with in civil orders 4 and 10, namely, the abolition of the ancient emoluments of an office long since extinct, known as the O'Reilly privilege, the compensation of which, by purchase and inheritance, had been continued to the present day as a charge on the city treasury, without consideration to the city from the beneficiaries. In the other case a contract with a firm for the supplying of water to the citizens of the Vedado and Carmelo suburbs was abrogated, as by its terms it involved practically a payment by the contractors to the city of $1,000 or $2,000 per annum, while the firm itself was in the receipt of annual sums collected from the citizens of $10,000 or $15,000. These are examples of the methods commonly pursued by the Spanish administration in the granting of valuable concessions to private individuals at the expense of the public.

During the continuance of the present administration all city matters have proceeded in a remarkably efficient and satisfactory manner, notable reductions being effected in the cost of the city administration and notable betterments in the direction of increased collections by the elimination of corrupt or incompetent agents. The public service in every respect has been improved and, so far as possible, put upon a basis of modern directness and efficiency. Very much remains to be done in these respects, and means are taking to revise the entire system of bookkeeping and accounting in the city, to be rid of the cumbrous and dilatory methods heretofore in vogue, and to substitute an intelligible and direct accountability and responsibility.

With the paralysis of all values and industries, due to the war, the income of the city proper has from the beginning been insufficient for its maintenance, and the deficit was furnished by the military governor of the island from the customs revenues, upon the application of the military governor of Havana. The deficit, however, was rapidly diminishing, from over $100,000 in January to $16,000 in April, when the change made in the rates of taxation and the abolition of the meat tax threw the city again into bankruptcy, and for the ensuing months the deficit again reached the figures of January. The cutting off of the meat tax in particular was a genuine misfortune. The revenues from

this source amounted to as much as $700,000 per annum, which was a total loss to the city, while the expected benefit in the diminution of the cost of meat to the public was not realized. On the contrary, the price of meat advanced, and the people have not in any sense profited by the decree.

It may be observed that the taxes in Havana are extremely small, averaging not to exceed one-half or one-third of those in similar cities in the United States. The taxes, therefore, could easily be doubled without undue hardship, and this will be necessary in the immediate future if provision is to be made for expenditures which are imperative. The present debt of the city of Havana is, in round numbers, $9,500,000 of bonded debt under two mortgages, with a floating debt of about $3,000,000 more, made up of outstanding obligations, dues to public institutions, unpaid accounts to public creditors, and salaries of city and other officials left unpaid for from six to eighteen months by the Spanish Government. This makes a total of about $12,500,000 of present debt. To meet the immediate needs of the future there will be required sums approximating, for sewers, paving, and water, about $14,500,000, and for the construction and equipment of a thorough system of schools and public instruction, say $3,000,000 more, making an aggregate required of about $17,500,000. This, added to the existing debt, would make a total of about $30,000,000, and it is proposed in the near future to prepare a financial scheme for the issuance of city obligations to this amount for the purpose of funding the floating debt, converting the bonded debt, and the securing of funds necessary for the constructions indicated. The city of Havana can well afford, even at this time, to carry an indebtedness to this amount, and in any case it is imperative that it should do so, if the future prosperity and welfare of the city are to be secured. This total sum required will be greatly reduced by an equitable distribution of the surplus customs collections, which amount to a sum greatly in excess of the current general expenditures, leaving a large residue, which might properly and equitably be apportioned among the several provinces of the island in accordance with their needs. The prosperity of Havana, as the capital and metropolis of the island, is of the first consequence, and practically one-fifth of the population is concentrated within the city and its immediate vicinity.

With respect to my individual relation to the government of the city, it is incumbent upon me to state: First, That I have sought in every respect to do as little "governing" as possible. Gentlemen of character and responsibility were put in office and the practical administration intrusted to them. Unfamiliar with work of this kind, but with an earnest purpose and conscientiousness to fulfill their obligations to their people, they have labored unceasingly and successfully to conduct the civil affairs with economy and efficiency. I have in these, as in all other matters which have pertained to my duties in Havana, to acknowledge my profound obligation to the loyalty and integrity of the Cuban officials and the people whom they represent. In lieu of hostility, of suspicion, and of opposition, they have evinced nothing but the kindliest purposes and given me the most cordial and unquestioning support and confidence. Without this, my own labor would have been unavailing in the endeavor to create in the capital of the island an effective and self-governing administration.

In all these respects, it should be observed that the local press, as is

not an unknown fact elsewhere, fails to represent the community in which it subsists, and much of the misapprehension that exists in the United States and elsewhere with reference to the attitude of the Cubans toward the American authorities is due to the misleading statements and carping tendencies of the newspaper writers, who have their own purposes to serve, the principal one being the income to be derived from the sale of their publications.

At the present time, in a single respect only, aside from the financial question, are the governmental conditions in Havana unsatisfactory. This is in the matter of public schools. The city has never had any charge or responsibility for the school system, although it was required to pay the rentals of the schoolhouses and the salaries of the teachers. Earnest representations have been made with regard to this matter, and it is hoped that a transfer of at least the primary-school system will be made to the charge of the local authorities, who, through their administrative machinery, can maintain a close supervision and secure a reasonable measure of efficiency. There are at the present time probably 25,000 children of school age in and about Havana, of whom it may be computed that 15,000 to 18,000 would represent the average attendance if adequate provision were made. Of this number not over one-third is at present receiving instruction, even in the most elementary sense, and the remainder of the children are going almost without instruction or discipline. This matter is of such vital importance to the future of the island that it calls for immediate and radical betterments, and steps are taking to procure from the state officials means and authority to begin the establishment of an adequate and effective school organization, with proper schoolhouses and equipment.

As soon as it was possible to give them the requisite attention, the ayuntamientos of Guanabacoa, Regla, and Santa Maria del Rosario were constituted and carefully selected officials put in charge. The main point was to secure a competent and reliable alcalde, and to a great extent leave to him and his coadjutors the selection of the other officials. For Guanabacoa, Mr. Geo. W. Hyatt was appointed on February 6; for Regla, Dr. José A. Clark y Mascaró, on February 1; and for Santa Maria del Rosario, Gen. Bernabé Boza, on June 10. All of these gentlemen have proved to be active and reliable men, doing valuable work and securing important results with a very moderate outlay of funds. Regla, as a compact city organization on the harbor front, with railroad and warehouses, had certain sources of income not enjoyed by the other communities and has been nearly self-sustaining, although the engineer department has aided the street cleaning and repairs, and Havana has contributed a detachment of police.

Guanabacoa, however, an extensive municipal jurisdiction, covering a large rural area beyond the limits of the department, has been a beneficiary from the beginning, as the town was bankrupt and a large number of persons had to be classed among the entirely destitute and relieved by distributions of food. Mr. Hyatt was by degrees getting the finances somewhat in order and was preparing for necessary repairs to public buildings, establishment of an asylum and hospital and the like, when the abolition of the tax on meat took away nearly all the income there was and rendered the town practically helpless. At present some engineer funds for street cleaning employ some of the able-bodied destitute, and efforts are making otherwise in the direction of betterments.

Santa María del Rosario is likewise a dependency. It draws its quota of relief supplies, but has some possibility of revenue after a while from its sulphur baths, which have a high repute, were formerly much frequented, and are in process of reparation.

For all of these populations, aggregating some 30,000, there is at present little more than subsistence from hand labor, with a large number of helpless dependents in the form of women and children and ailing, for whom employment is almost impossible.

The solution is to employ all who are fit for the purpose on public works, such as street cleaning and repairs, and in road building, an urgent need, which the island revenues could provide for, and for the entirely helpless class provide institutions for their care, maintenance, and instruction.

For the current deficiencies in all these communities funds were obtained by requisitions on the division authority for allotments from customs.

The several mayors were requested to submit carefully-prepared statements of receipts and expenditures to the department commander, and these data were again carefully revised in consultation between the department commander and the city officials, with the purpose of meeting the actual necessities and making such disposition of the small sums allotted as circumstances indicated.

In all cases the sanitary and relief work were given preference, and the employment of the destitute the second place.

THE SANITATION OF HAVANA.

For a century Havana has been permitted to exist as a focus of yellow fever and a continuing menace to the rest of the world—in particular to the southern coasts of the United States—as a possible source of infection from epidemic disease involving enormous losses in lives and commercial interests.

One of the most important results hoped for from the occupation of the island by the American forces was therefore the sanitation of the city, both as a measure of safety to those who would be required to live in it, and as a mitigation of the dangers attendant upon the frequent interchange of shipments and passengers between Havana and other ports; and it was doubtless with this object in view that the President's order appointing a military governor for Havana imposed, among other serious requirements, the special duty and responsibility of its sanitation.

Geographically and topographically Havana possesses some conspicuous natural advantages. It is built partly upon the Gulf coast and partly upon the shores of the bay, which is of moderate extent and daily swept by the tides. It occupies for the most part sites of sufficient elevation and variation of contour to furnish good drainage, natural and artificial, and there is an almost constant movement of free air to and from the Gulf, producing an equable and, in the main, a delightful climate. The range of temperature is moderate, not exceeding 40° or 50°, and both frosts and the excessive summer heats that prevail at times in the United States are practically unknown. Properly ordered, there is no reason why Havana should not be as healthy a city as any in Southern latitudes.

Unfortunately the Spaniards knew, or at any rate practiced, almost

nothing of sanitation or hygiene, and wherever their dominion has extended they have existed in and left behind them sanitary conditions that to an American require ocular demonstration for the realization of the circumstances in which they permitted themselves to live.

Havana is practically without a sewer system or modern street pavements. There are several main sewers which discharge into the bay or Gulf, and numerous drains connect with these, but all are of crude construction, and, being subject to obstruction and their care neglected, they are sources rather of danger than of security. The general reliance for house waste is the pozo negro or black pit, which is the receptacle for all domestic foulness, and sometimes has an overflow drain for liquid surplus into a sewer, itself little more than an elongated cesspool. It is true that many cities in the United States, that should know better, nourish similar constructions; but in Havana the privy pits were subject to little supervision, and in any case the absence of frost makes needful measures of disinfection that may with less danger be omitted in higher latitudes.

The street pavements, where they exist—that is, in the older portions of the city where traffic is heavy—are of large stone blocks, deeply scored at the joints. The greater portion of the city is unpaved, with roadways made of native soft limestone macadam, readily resolving into dust and mud, and, in the absence of frequent repairs, generally full of holes. The street surfaces are made with almost no reference to adjustment of grades to a general plan, and many of them will not drain by natural flow, while no underground drains exist to remedy the difficulty. Much of the soil therefore is saturated, partly by seepage from the leaking cesspools and partly from surface drainage, until, in course of time and in many localities, the ground has become loaded with disease germs and a permanent source of infection. This is particularly the case along the water front, toward which both surface drainage and ground seepage naturally tend.

The obvious remedies are the accurate establishment of grades, the construction of a complete sewer system, and the laying of smooth and impermeable pavements, and until these works shall have been completed it is useless to expect the favorable health conditions which, from natural advantages, Havana is entitled to enjoy.

The redeeming feature of the city engineering is the water supply, which, intercepting a portion of the flow of a magnificent spring on the bank of the Almendares River at Vento, 8 miles south and west of Havana, brings into the city through a subterranean masonry conduit a supply of clear and wholesome water, almost pure organically, though hard from limestone in solution. Here again, however, the faults of Spanish administration appear. The distributing water system is seriously defective. The aqueduct delivers into an uncovered reservoir, with a capacity of less than one day's consumption, and the pipe system is of defective material and method, and is frequently giving out. These matters will require serious attention in the near future. At the present time there is a common shortage of water throughout the city generally; but this, as is the case with other cities, is due not to inadequacy of supply, but to an enormous waste, as the quantity of water actually delivered if properly used would suffice for a city of double the population.

In addition to the engineering and sanitation of the city proper and the innocuous disposal of its refuse, there will remain the general treat-

ment of the bay, which, except at the entrance, has low shores and in the upper part is largely occupied by mud flats. It will be necessary to rectify the shore lines, construct sea walls and bulkheads, leaving no exposed beach for accumulation of refuse, and to dispose of the mud flats, either by dredging them away or by inclosing and filling them with clean earth from the neighboring hills. The regulation of the small streams entering the bay must also be effected, building up the banks and filling in the adjacent marshes.

These are all items in the large bill of particulars that can not be neglected if the final sanitation of Havana is to be accomplished, and these works include the entire littoral of the harbor, including Casa Blanca and Regla.

During the war and the period of reconcentration, and particularly during the blockade, in the summer of 1898, the sanitary conditions became something frightful, and the result is shown in the death curves from disease and starvation during the years 1896, 1897, and 1898. The Spanish soldiery was swarming in and about the city and suburbs, the reconcentrados and other destitutes were remorselessly herded and left to shift for themselves, and the asylums were emptied of orphans and ailing, and appropriated for barracks. With agriculture suspended, food material destroyed and importations prevented, a general condition of actual or semistarvation ensued, and in the absence of all sanitation the circumstances were desperate. These were the conditions under which in a greater or lesser degree the population of Havana has suffered for three years past and which the American authorities found on arrival.

The remedial measures were obvious and immediately put in operation. Under General Greene's direction, prior to my arrival, the street cleaning and disposal of refuse were in part resumed, and investigations begun as to the sanitary conditions of the more important buildings, including hospitals and charitable institutions.

With the arrival on January 2 of Colonel Black, of the Engineers, an officer of recognized executive ability and extended experience, the expansion of the sanitary work and the organization of the city engineering in all fields were fully entered upon, making provision for thorough street cleaning and repair, collection of house refuse, examination, repair, and cleaning of sewers, emptying and disinfection of privies, disposal of refuse, reparation of public buildings, repairing of wharves, harbor dredging, and the removal of the foul accumulations near the head of the bay, due to the Spanish custom of getting rid of the slaughterhouse refuse by discharging it into the Matadero Creek.

On the medical sanitary side, under Brigade Surgeon Davis, was the urgent necessity for the thorough overhauling and sanitation of all quarters and public buildings to be used by the American officials and troops, and a thorough exploration of the sanitary conditions existing in the hospitals, asylums, dwellings, and other premises of the city.

There was also to be provided a special hospital where such of the troops as should be attacked by yellow fever could be received and cared for. An excellent site was found for this at Las Animas, a locality off the Calzada de la Infanta, practically in the open country, but conveniently accessible, where the Spanish artillery had had its headquarters. The earlier arrangements were made by Dr. Davis, and later carried to completion under Surgeon-Major Ducker, who was placed in charge and executed the work of alteration, adaptation, and

equipment in the most satisfactory and creditable manner. There is not an institution in the department in more efficient and complete condition.

In order that these vital measures should be effectively prosecuted they were retained under my immediate charge, for which reason, in constituting the city government in January, the two places of city engineer and city sanitary officer were in a sense reserved, and these employments vested in the chief engineer and the chief sanitary officer of the department. These arrangements continue until the present, resulting in the execution of an immense amount of work with very satisfactory results, as shown in the reports of these officers and in the vital statistics accompanying them.

It is distinctly recognized that, for the future welfare of the city, the adoption, after full study and investigation, of a complete sewer system, the rectification and adjustment of street grades, and the paving of the city with smooth and impermeable pavements are imperative, but pending the practicability of inaugurating these measures, it was of interest to determine to what extent the general health and death rate of the city could be favorably modified by the thorough cleansing and disinfection of every accessible portion, public or private. The deep-seated sources of infection may not be reached by these means, and the habitat of yellow fever and the conditions of its communication are still too little known to enable a final opinion to be given as to the measures necessary to its complete extermination. The experience of the last six months has proved, however, that very valuable results can be attained by sheer force of a thorough and persistent cleansing of accessible surfaces and localities, and this demonstration is worth a hundred times the cost of making it.

The large sums needed for the sanitary service, engineer and medical, have been drawn from the customs revenues of the port upon my requisitions submitted to the division commander month by month. These requisitions were required to be in minute detail, specifying item by item the particular purposes, large or small, for which the money was estimated. This system, which has been continued to the present time, has involved the necessity for elaborate and extended explanations of items, and in many cases their suspension after they had been carefully gone over and considered by the chief engineer and myself in connection with other requirements and the necessities of the case. There has been also the more general disadvantage that no more work could be planned for or estimated than could be covered by the allotment made for the next ensuing month, as there was no security as to what might or might not be granted for subsequent months. This reduced the dispositions to be made to a sort of hand-to-mouth programme, and prohibited engaging in any general project for work or improvements.

The engineer department.—For the details of the work of this department attention is invited to the accompanying full report of Lieutenant-Colonel Black.

The engineer branch of the city government was found to be badly organized, without a proper division of responsibility and work among its employees; with a small personnel, who had not been fully paid for past services; without funds, instruments, or tools, and practically without records. Its reorganization was begun at once and at this time there is a municipal engineer service in Havana modeled after

similar departments in the United States. Native labor is employed, and the higher officials are Cubans, so far as Cuban engineers possessing the requisite qualifications and trained in modern municipal work and methods could be discovered.

It was found that extensive surveys, requiring much time and study, would be required before a solution of the graver problems of the city engineering could be reached, and that when the plans should be made a large sum of money, not then available, would be required to execute the various works. At first the only funds available came from an allotment of $50,000 by the Secretary of War, a large proportion of which was taken for other purposes than those for which it was intended. Later, in the absence of city revenues, allotments were obtained from the customs of the island.

After consideration it was decided that the chronic and excessive uncleanliness of the city and suburbs was sufficient to account in a large part for the high rate of mortality in Havana, without seeking for occult causes beneath the bay or in the geological formation of the land.

The records of the marine hospital show that vessels lying in the harbor away from the shores, and whose crews were kept on board, were practically safe from yellow fever. Other medical records show that the number of deaths has been greatest in the portions of the city bordering the low land of the littoral. In these portions is deposited the filth brought by surface wash from the higher ground, and along the shore lines the deposits from the sewers are alternately exposed to the sun and air by the wave and tidal movements.

In any case it was evident that a thorough cleaning of the streets, lots, and houses was the immediate necessity.

After January 1 the systematic cleaning of the city was begun, and later Regla, Casa Blanca, and Guanabacoa were taken in hand. The work at the last place has been from the outset in the immediate charge of Mr. George W. Hyatt, an energetic and public-spirited citizen who was made alcalde of Guanabacoa, and who has obtained great results in cleaning and repairing the streets and in giving work and food to the starving reconcentrados.

The cleaning and repair of the public buildings, the repair of the water-supply system, street repairs, the cleaning of the sewers, the shore lines of the bay and sea fronts, the repair of the wharves and dredging of shoals, the installation of modern domestic plumbing, cleaning of cesspools, removal of garbage, and the many other minor works of municipal engineering were successively taken in hand and are being prosecuted vigorously. Details relating to these works are to be found in the report of the chief engineer.

Projects for the municipal improvements required are in course of preparation for sewerage, better water-supply system, street grading and paving, etc. All of these projects require a careful consideration of the particular conditions prevailing in Havana—conditions which are a function of the latitude, situation and surroundings of currents and tidal movements in bay and Gulf, of peculiarities of city plan and arrangement, and of the habits and customs of the people.

Years of misrule have produced a crop of concessions for various important public rights and privileges, all of which require investigation, modification, and in some cases entire abolition.

The permanent municipal improvements have not yet been begun,

but the surveys, investigations, and studies are in progress. The work of the past months has been confined to the pressing immediate needs of cleaning and sanitation. The work has been pushed with energy in the face of many obstacles, and the results obtained in the suppression of contagion, saving of lives, and increased comfort of the citizens, are important.

One material fact is to be noted, whatever may have been the defective sanitation in Havana, so far as it was due to carelessness and untidy habits of the people, there is good reason to believe these susceptible of immediate improvement. The Spaniards taught no sanitation and enforced none, but when the Havana population found the Americans insistent and determined to have cleanliness, and compelling it by work and thoroughness, they began to cooperate at once, and it was but a few weeks before the collection of garbage and waste matter was doubled from the same area. This increase has continued, showing that the people were no longer disposing of refuse by distributing it anywhere, but were gathering and depositing it in the garbage receptacles in readiness for removal. In this respect, therefore, the inhabitants have given willing aid to the authorities and can be depended upon to do so in like cases when informed of the necessity and shown what to do.

Sanitary and medical department.—The municipal sanitary service, placed under the charge of the chief sanitary officer, included the care of the public hospitals and asylums, houses of assistance, laboratories, vaccine establishments, disinfecting and ambulance service. Later, on May 1, the hospitals and asylums were placed in charge of the chief surgeon of the department, in addition to his other duties, and are reported upon by him. It will be seen from his report that there are numerous private and semiprivate institutions which are making provision for a large number of sick and ailing, and that in particular there are several Spanish societies which, at their own expense, care for the sick and destitute of their nationality and association. These constitute no charge on the public funds. In other cases payments are made of $7.50 to $10 per month for orphans and other destitute and helpless people, by means of which the lack of city hospitals, asylums, and almshouses is, in part at least offset.

Dr. Gorgas and his assistant, Dr. Furbush, have done admirable work in the reorganization of these institutions and are laying the foundation for more valuable work in future.

At the time of the occupation by the American forces, to the unsanitary conditions existing in Havana in time of peace, owing to the crowding of the population, the habits of the lower classes, the absence of proper appliances for domestic and municipal sanitation, and the notorious endemic persistence of yellow fever, there were added the dangers resulting from the wide distribution of disease germs by the Spanish army, and from the presence of the large number of sick and starving reconcentrados and others, many of whom were unprovided with shelter or sustenance of any kind.

The first work undertaken was that of disinfecting the offices, barracks, and hospitals, in measure as they were cleaned by the engineer department, in order to provide shelter and office room for the American forces. These buildings were naturally regarded with much suspicion, as being possible sources of infection, but the work of cleansing and disinfection was thoroughly done and there has not been a single

case of infectious disease in the command up to the present which can be traced to the buildings, or any in the department from which there has been any spread of the disease.

The public municipal buildings are also disinfected and also private dwellings which were open to suspicion or in which a case of infectious disease was found. Sulphur fumes were used for fumigation, and the walls, ceilings, and floors were drenched with disinfectants, a powerful solution of bichloride of mercury being the main reliance.

A general sanitary inspection of the city was begun on January 16 and completed March 15. Later a reinspection was ordered, which is still in progress. Reports were made of all houses requiring work of sanitation of any kind, particularly where cesspools and drains were found in bad condition, and the house owners were ordered to perform the necessary work. If, on reinspection, the work was not done, fines were imposed by the municipal alcalde and a second order sent. If the owners remained recalcitrant or were unable through poverty to have the work done, the engineer department was called upon to do the work, the expenses being made a charge on the property, in addition to any fines imposed. This work is in progress, but is necessarily slow on account of its volume and the very scant supply of trained artisans and sanitary material in the city.

The sanitary inspection gave incidentally a rough census of the population, which is appended. The total population of Havana is 216,730, of which 62,091 are children.

Inspections have been made of the bakeries, markets, dairies, cigar factories, etc., and many abuses corrected. Improvements have been made in the handling of cattle and in the arrangements for preparing and supplying meats. The two municipal hospitals, Aldecoa and Los Angeles, have been greatly improved. At the former place extensive repairs and new constructions are in progress. At both the equipment has been materially increased. The four city houses of assistance (casas de socorro), have been repaired and supplied with modern instruments, proper accommodations, and medicines for affording first aid to the sick or injured. The city laboratory, for chemical, biological, and microscopic investigations, has been equipped throughout. The vaccine establishment and the veterinary department have also been equipped for service and have done much good work. To inaugurate and carry on this work incessant personal effort has been required of the chief sanitary officer, who in his duties has displayed untiring energy and fidelity, and has incurred dangers equal to those of battle.

While the work of the engineer and sanitary departments has been of great value, it has not been of a permanent character, unless as a concrete example of what can be done and how to do it. The work must be continued with thoroughness over a long period of time before the city can be made secure from the infectious diseases which have in the past rendered it a dangerous locality to visit.

The net result of all the work of sanitation done since the American occupation, including the work of poor relief and the individual work of the officers and men of the American forces, and of the people of Havana interested in the welfare of the city, is shown in part by the accompanying charts of death curves.

Chart No. 1 is an exhibit of the total number of deaths in Havana by months and years for the decade beginning with 1890. It is com-

piled from the records of the Marine-Hospital Service, from all medical and municipal records, and from the cemetery returns. It does not show the death rate because of the absence of reliable data as to population.

The three shocking curves for 1896–1897 and 1897–1898 are abnormal, showing the effects of the overcrowding by soldiers and reconcentrados, and the misery and starvation of the people, during the three years of war and the blockade. These were the conditions when the Americans took charge. The period 1890–1895, represents more normal conditions and the data for these years has been compiled into an average which is indicated on the chart by dots and circles, ⊙ The drop in July, 1892, is doubtless an error, due to a deficiency in the returns for one or more districts for that month, as the marked tendency of all these curves is to a maximum in July, as well as a minimum in February. Judging from the June and August, 1892, data, compared with the other curves, the July, 1892, should lie between July, 1893, and July, 1895, and this would raise the average July for the whole period to about the same as July, 1893.

In considering the 1899 curve so far as it goes, there will be noted at once the rapid fall from January to nearly the normal average for May, and that for both June and July the 1899 curve has fallen considerably below the average of these months. It can not be doubted that this favorable exhibit must in great part be credited; first, to the feeding and care of the destitute, sick, and ailing, and second, to the thorough cleaning of, and the sanitary means taken to disinfect the town; these particulars being still more evident in the yellow fever chart No. 2. It is true that the Spanish soldiers are no longer here, and that a large proportion of the reconcentrados have also disappeared—for the most part off the face of the earth—but it still remains that about 3,000 American soldiers, and probably not less than a thousand or two more American citizens have taken their place in Havana, with a considerable number of Spaniards, and other foreigners in addition. Furthermore, and still more important, the present population of Havana represents the survivors of the three years of pestilence and famine, when even the well-to-do found themselves impoverished and short of food, and when the poorer classes suffered from prolonged semistarvation that depleted their vitality, and left them without posaibility of full recuperation. The death statistics of 1899 are therefore materially modified by these facts, and the bills of mortality still show the effect of past privations, as the appearance of the children and other inmates of the charitable institutions tell only too plainly the story of their sufferings and destitution, from the effects of which many will never recover.

The conditions therefore at this time, August, 1899, are still far from normal, and the deaths for the year thus far have doubtless been augmented by the experiences of 1896–1898, and are likely so to continue for some time to come.

Chart No. 2, showing mortality from yellow fever for the same period, 1890–1899, is even more striking an exhibit. Eighteen hundred and ninety-five, 1896, and 1897 were the years of heavy importations of Spanish soldiers, and the curves of these years tell the story of the ignorance and recklessness with which the Spanish officials—practicing neither isolation of yellow-fever cases nor disinfection of their bedding and quarters—fed the raw material to the fatal epidemic.

That for 1896 is particularly instructive, as the disease, having attained its maximum in August and falling rapidly, was given fresh life with fresh importations of troops, and the fearful mortality for October and November was the result. The 1898 curve again shows that the fuel had been mainly burned up, and the curve is low, no new material having been brought in during the year.

Taking, as in the other case, the period 1890–1895 as representing more nearly normal conditions, we find 3 maxima in July, 1 in August, and 2 in September, with an average maximum in August and the minimum in March.

The curve, or rather line, for 1899 is really phenomenal. It not only far overlies the average, but is at every point the lowest of which the record is given, and, as has been stated, this has not been for lack of nonimmune material from which the yellow fever could gather its accustomed harvest. It is probable that during the current year there have been quite as many, if not more, unacclimated persons in Havana than during the normal conditions prevailing in 1890–1895.

To what, then, is this extraordinary reduction in the mortality from an endemic infectious disease to be attributed? The seeds of the disease are here beyond question. The number of cases that have occurred and their distribution establish this fact, which is otherwise a mere matter of history and record. The only points of difference to which the present comparative exemption can be credited are three, (1) the general and thorough cleansing to which the superficies of the city have been subjected; (2) to the very numerous and thorough disinfections that have been made both in public and private buildings, and (3) the practice of a complete isolation of the patient and the disinfection or, as in many cases, the complete destruction of his effects.

The second has no doubt diminished the number of original cases, and the third has prevented the spread of infection. The results of 2 and 3 may be assumed as to be anticipated, but how should the mere street and surface cleaning, however thorough, tend to reduce infection from a subtle disease whose habitat, cycle of existence, and modes of propagation are still mysteries, which all the acuteness of investigators and the enormous incentives to discovery have been unavailing to solve. These are questions still to be answered.

Meanwhile, the facts indicate that the results thus far attained, though in no sense conclusive, are still immensely encouraging. An epidemic of yellow fever in Havana is still by no means an impossibility, but at least an extraordinary record has been made, and having passed through one of the most dangerous months, with every day that elapses a greater measure of security is attained, though the sense of growing confidence is but made the incentive to an increased vigilance and industry.

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REPORT OF BRIG. GEN. LEONARD WOOD, U. S. VOLUNTEERS COMMANDING DEPARTMENT OF SANTIAGO.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF
SANTIAGO AND PUERTO PRINCIPE,
Cristo, Cuba, August 9, 1899.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Division of Cuba, Havana, Cuba.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report relating to the Department of Santiago for the year ending June 30, 1899:

The department was established by General Orders, No. 118, Adjutant-General's Office, August 10, 1898, and included all that portion of the island of Cuba and adjacent keys which at that time were in the possession of the United States, and also all that portion which might afterwards come into their possession. This order was afterwards modified by General Orders, No. 12, Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, January 17, 1899, by which the limits of the department were defined as coincident with those of the Province of Santiago. Maj. Gen. H. W. Lawton, U. S. Volunteers, was in command of the department from August 10, 1898, to October 12, 1898.

At the time of the formation of the Department of Santiago there was present in the department that portion of the Fifth Army Corps not yet removed from the island of Cuba; also the Second U. S. Volunteer Infantry (immunes), under command of Col. Duncan N. Hood, sent as the first regiment of the garrison. This regiment was placed in camp in the city and was employed in the preservation of order and protection of life and property.

On August 12, 1898, the Fifth U. S. Volunteer Infantry (immunes), Col. H. H. Sargent, commanding, arrived and reported for duty. This regiment was placed in camp just south of the city, on high hills, and acted in conjunction with the Second U. S. Volunteer Infantry in preserving order during the withdrawal of the Fifth Army Corps.

On August 16, 1898, the Eighth Illinois Volunteer Infantry (colored), Col. John R. Marshall commanding, arrived and was placed in camp near San Luis, about 25 miles from the city.

On August 17, 1898, the Third U. S. Volunteer Infantry (immunes), Col. P. H. Ray commanding, reported and was placed in camp just north of the city.

On August 22, 1898, the Ninth U. S. Volunteer Infantry (colored), Col. C. J. Crane commanding, reported and was placed in camp at San Juan Hill, just east of the city.

On August 25 and 28, 1898, two battalions of the Fifth U. S. Infantry, under command of Lieut. Col. H. B. Freeman and Capt. H. K. Bailey, respectively, arrived, and the latter battalion, having four cases of yellow fever, was placed in quarantine.

Their arrival was followed on August 31, 1898, by that of the Twenty-third Kansas Volunteer Infantry (colored), under command of Lieut. Col. James Beck. This regiment was sent at once to camp near San Luis.

On October 17, 1898, the Fourth U. S. Volunteer Infantry (immunes), Col. J. S. Pettit commanding, reported and was sent direct to Manzanillo, Cuba, garrisoning Manzanillo, Campechuela, Niquero, and Bayamo.

During the period between August 10, the date of formation of the

department, and August 25, the date of sailing of the last of the Fifth Army Corps, the conditions existing in and about the city of Santiago were serious in the extreme. The prostrating effects of the siege were showing themselves plainly on the population, who were dying at the rate of 180 per day. The city was full of sick people, there being hardly a house which did not contain one or more persons suffering from disease. There was a large number of the Fifth Army Corps sick, and field hospitals practically surrounded the city. The water main, which had been partially destroyed during the siege, had not been placed in complete repair and there was a great shortage of water. In addition to our own troops and civilians, there were some 12,000 Spanish prisoners, who had nearly 4,000 sick. All these conditions rendered the service of the new troops extremely arduous, and the difficulties of supplying and taking care of them became very great.

As soon as possible, the three colored regiments were assembled in camp near San Luis and placed under command of Brig. Gen. Ezra P. Ewers.

Garrisons were established at Baracoa, September 5, 1898; Sagua de Tanamo, September 6, 1898; Guantanamo, August 21, 1898, and Manzanillo, October 8, 1898. These garrisons were composed of details of troops from the Third U. S. Volunteer Infantry. The garrison at Manzanillo was established under command of Col. P. H. Ray, Third U. S. Volunteer Infantry, on the evacuation of the city by the Spanish troops. This regiment remained there until the arrival of the Fourth U. S. Volunteer Infantry on October 17, 1898, when it was withdrawn and transferred to Guantanamo.

In September the Second U. S. Volunteer Infantry was removed to Cristo and Songo; in October headquarters and six companies marched to Holguin, and in December the remainder of the regiment went to the north coast to garrison Holguin, Gibara, and other towns in that vicinity. At the time this regiment was sent to Holguin a great epidemic of smallpox was raging in and about that city, and the work they were called upon to perform was arduous and dangerous. Military quarantine and isolation hospitals were established. These and other measures, under the intelligent supervision of Colonel Hood, assisted by Dr. R. S. Woodson and Dr. Felipe Veranes, quickly and effectually checked the epidemic, and in a short time resulted in its entire subsidence. In connection with this it may be interesting to state, as an illustration of the efficiency of vaccination, that this regiment was sent into a district reported to have 9,000 cases of smallpox, 3,000 of which were of a virulent type. The men had all been twice vaccinated and they went safely through the epidemic without a single case occurring in the regiment, although, in the performance of their duties, they were thrown in constant contact with the people of the infected villages. So complete was the infection that many of the houses had to be burned. The exact loss of life among the natives will never be known, but it must have amounted to a thousand or more, as in some instances entire villages were depopulated. The men and officers of this regiment, together with the medical officers and their assistants, deserve great credit for their work performed in this emergency.

For convenience of administration the province outside of Santiago city was divided into four districts, known as the districts of Manzanillo, Holguin, Guantanamo, and Mayari. These districts were made

as nearly as possible coincident with the judicial districts of similar name under the Spanish régime, and each district commander received a general letter of instructions and was placed in charge of the military and civil affairs of his district. The city of Santiago and its vicinity I retained under my immediate personal control. This system resulted in a prompt and efficient performance of public business, and was most satisfactory in its general working. Funds were allotted to each district commander to pay the monthly civil and other expenses, very much on the general plan now in vogue throughout the island.

The Cuban army in the Province of Santiago at the time of the surrender numbered about 11,000, of whom some 5,000 were in the vicinity of the city of Santiago. No difficulty was ever experienced with these troops, and they disbanded during the months of September and October. At the end of October there were no Cuban soldiers under arms anywhere in the province.

Indigent rations were distributed at the seacoast towns in quantities sufficient to relieve suffering, and from these points they were sent to the interior by pack trains in charge of competent officers, who were instructed to use their own judgment in issuing these rations, giving only to those who absolutely needed them. Every effort was made to remove the idle element from the seaport towns and get them back to their farms in the interior. With this end in view, efforts were made to place supplies of rations at several points in the interior of the province, so that the people going back to their farms could obtain supplies of food during the period necessary to cultivate and grow the first crop.

There was very little friction between our troops and the natives, and, generally speaking, the relations which prevailed were of a very pleasant character. A great deal of tact and ability were displayed by our officers in dealing with the situation. Especially was this true of the work done by General Ewers and Colonels Pettit, Hood, Sargent, and Lieutenant-Colonels Wylly and Grubbs.

There have been numerous statements in the press reporting extensive brigandage in the department of Santiago. These reports have been very largely exaggerations.

There has been, however, some brigandage in the different parts of the province, due to no particular cause other than idleness and viciousness. Most of the men engaged in this work were old hands at it, and have returned to it naturally since the end of the war. The rural guard has done excellent work in running these men down. A number of them have been killed in resisting attempts to arrest them. The condition of the department at present, so far as brigandage is concerned, is entirely satisfactory, all sections of the country being reported quiet and practically free from these lawbreakers.

Such public works as there were funds for were started throughout the province. This work was principally road building, bridge repairing, and sanitary improvements in the larger towns. The people have always displayed the greatest willingness and readiness to work, and there has never been any difficulty experienced in procuring labor for public works.

All the courts in the province were reestablished and schools opened in nearly all of the towns; in the city of Santiago 3,000 children have been in constant attendance and proportionately large numbers in the other large towns.

Every effort was made to improve the sanitary condition of the province, and the result was a very great decrease in the death rate and the general improvement of the public health.

A rural police force of some 300 members was organized and placed upon an efficient basis. This force has performed excellent service since its organization.

The general plan in exercising control of civil affairs has been to act always, if possible, through the duly constituted civil authorities. The end of the year 1898 found the province peaceful and the people, generally speaking, at work. A very friendly feeling exists between the inhabitants of this portion of the island and the American troops.

The Twenty-third Kansas Volunteer Infantry was relieved from duty in this department February 28, 1899; the Eighth Illinois Volunteer Infantry on March 10, 1899; the Third U. S. Volunteer Infantry on March 28, 1899; the Ninth U. S. Volunteer Infantry on April 26, 1899; the Fifth U. S. Volunteer Infantry on May 2, 1899; the Fourth U. S. Volunteer Infantry on May 11, 1899, and the Second U. S. Volunteer Infantry on May 25, 1899.

Six troops of the Tenth U. S. Cavalry, under Col. S. M. Whitside, arrived at Manzanillo on May 7, 1899, relieving Colonel Pettit; the remaining six troops of the regiment, under Captain Ayres, arrived at Gibara May 21, 1899, relieving the Second U. S. Volunteer Infantry. The duty required of the Fifth U. S. Infantry during this period of changing garrisons was very arduous, as both men and officers were called upon for unusually hard service all over the department.

The conduct of civil affairs in the various districts of the province has been taken up very ably by the new commanding officers, and, so far as I know, their personal relations with the people are, on the whole, friendly and cordial. I believe that the best and most trustworthy element of the population is entirely friendly and in thorough accord with the military authorities. The only element causing friction has been the unscrupulous political element, composed of certain unprincipled agitators.

I submit the following recommendations in regard to the garrison of the department:

The people being extremely friendly and quiet, the garrison may safely be reduced to the lowest point consistent with efficiency. This, I think, would be accomplished by having in the province two squadrons of cavalry and two battalions of infantry. In other words, I recommend the withdrawal, in the near future, of one squadron of the Tenth U. S. Cavalry and one battalion of the Fifth U. S. Infantry; these to be sent to the United States as home or depot battalions of the regiments serving in this department. All recruits should be sent to these battalions to receive thorough instruction before joining their regiment in Cuba. I also recommend that officers unfitted physically or otherwise for duty in the island be assigned to these home squadrons and battalions. Officers best suited for subordinate commands here are men under 50 years of age who are capable of withstanding the effects of the climate to a much greater extent than are older men. The squadrons and battalions of the regiments in Cuba should be kept at the maximum strength. Recruits and officers should be sent to them only during the months of November and December and early in January, in order that they may have five or six months in which to become somewhat acclimated before the hot season. Only thor-

oughly instructed soldiers should be sent to the island, as it is no place in which to break in or instruct recruits. These home battalions should also serve as rendezvous for invalided soldiers and officers. Regiments on duty in Cuba should be retained here for a number of years, as all troops coming to Cuba must undergo the acclimating fevers before they are thoroughly serviceable. With the exception of a few troops stationed near the larger towns, all troops, even infantry, should be mounted. One mounted soldier here is worth several on foot, the heavy character of the roads and the intense heat in the rainy season rendering infantry of little value for other than strictly garrison duty.

During the months of March and April one hundred and fifty men of each of the following regiments were mounted and armed with the .30-caliber Army carbine: Fifth U. S. Regular Infantry, Fifth U. S. Volunteer Infantry, Fourth U. S. Volunteer Infantry, Second U. S. Volunteer Infantry, and Ninth U. S. Volunteer Infantry. Upon withdrawal of the volunteer regiments their horses and horse equipment were turned over to the Fifth U. S. Infantry, eight companies of this regiment being by this means mounted.

TRANSPORTATION.

This department is well supplied with transportation, both wagon and pack train. Many mules strayed during the war; these have been gathered up. Under recent orders the wagon transportation has been reduced and the surplus mules sold. The allowance remaining, however, is ample. Much of the work in the interior is necessarily done by pack train on account of the entire absence of roads and the destruction of bridges on such roads as are still passable. It is essential that both wagon and pack-train transportation be maintained on the present basis, as it is practically impossible to hire extra transportation from the natives when required.

PERMANENT IMPROVEMENTS.

Since the military occupation of the province by the United States, commencing the 17th of July, 1898, certain improvements have been made in the towns of Santiago, Guantanamo, Manzanillo, Baracoa, Holguin, Gibara, San Luis, Mayari, and other small towns occupied by American troops.

In Santiago we have doubled the water supply, reduced the death rate, in comparison with former years, fully 50 per cent, and 5 miles of first-class asphalt streets have been built and curbed with either concrete or blue-stone curbing. The same amount of macadam streets have been constructed, and in all that portion of these streets constructed in the city proper a thoroughly modern sewerage and water system has been laid, so that, when means are available to complete and put in operation this system throughout the entire city, it will not be necessary to tear up these newly constructed pavements.

Extensive and complete surveys have been and are being made in view of submitting a plan for greatly increasing the present water supply, which, although double what it formerly was, is barely a fifth of what is needed, and until this supply is procured we can not put into successful operation a modern sewerage system, nor shall we have water for flushing and cleaning the streets. An almost unlimited

water supply, so far as the needs of this city are concerned, can be developed, but it is going to be expensive work.

Thorough repairs are being made on the old Government wharf, and an addition of 150 feet, a warehouse, etc., are being constructed.

A sea wall has been built along a large section of the water front, and the old sewerage flats have been dredged out and the material carried into deep water outside of Morro.

A complete sanitary department has been organized and equipped with modern appliances. The work done by this department has been excellent and has resulted in a great saving of life.

Extensive fillings have been made in the low swampy lands in and near the city.

An emergency hospital has been established and equipped. The jail has been thoroughly repaired and renovated, concrete floors put in, etc. The city market and slaughterhouse have been placed in thorough repair. The civil hospital has been supplied with a modern sewerage system and modern plumbing. Cement floors have been built in a number of wards and modern hospital beds and appliances supplied. The military hospital has been entirely renovated and new cement floors have been laid in most of the wards. The military barracks have also been put in thorough repair and rendered sanitary. An ice plant of about 18 tons capacity has been built and has been in successful operation for the last six months. The orphans' asylum has been extensively repaired and new buildings erected.

The general appearance of Santiago has changed very considerably, and while it is still an old Spanish town yet it presents some marks of modern civilization.

An extensive intercepting sewer will soon be commenced and disinfecting and settling basins constructed. This will enable us to completely free the harbor from present sewers and contamination. Throughout the province we have attempted to spend a limited amount of money on the smaller towns and to impress upon the people the necessity of good sanitary conditions, good streets, etc. The bulk of the money has been spent and will continue to be spent in the seaport towns, because it is in these that we find the greatest source of danger from old yellow fever infection, and until they are rendered sanitary and healthy business interests tending to develop the province will not be established.

What has been done in Santiago has been done to a lesser extent in Manzanillo, where Colonel Pettit did a great deal to improve the sanitary condition of the town. He repaired the streets and established drainage in the lower parts of town. His faithful and intelligent work has been rewarded by a great improvement in the health of the people and a marked diminution of the death rate. The same is true of the work of Colonels Hood and Grubbs at Holguin, of Colonel Wylly and Captain Chatfield at Baracoa, and of Colonels Ray, Sargent, and Hooton at Guantanamo. In fact, wherever American troops have been stationed the policy has been to have their occupation marked by improvements such as mentioned above.

The light-house at Santiago has been thoroughly repaired and put in working order, and a new light-house has been erected at Guantanamo. Important harbors on the north and south coast have been buoyed. In short, improvements, limited only by the means which have been available, have been either commenced or completed at all points of the province where we have had garrisons.

ROADS AND RAILROADS.

The roads throughout the province are wretched. In fact, it might almost be said that we have, with very few exceptions, no roads. The entire eastern portion of the island east of Santiago is mountainous and precipitous. The wagon roads which formerly existed were cut out of the face of the mountains and have been for years without repair, the result being that they are at present barely passable for pack animals. Efforts have been made to repair these roads as rapidly and systematically as possible, not less than 200 miles of road having been made passable for wagons. In the western portion of the province the question of road building and repair is, perhaps, more difficult even than in the eastern portion, as the roads pass through great level valleys, with rich adobe soil absolutely devoid of stones or gravel. These roads are passable in dry weather, but with the establishment of the rainy season all wheel transportation ceases.

The railroads of the province of Santiago are limited to the Sabanilla and Maroto line, running from Santiago to San Luis, with a branch from Cristo to the towns of Songo and Socorro.

There is also a narrow-gauge line running from the city of Santiago to the Juragua Iron Mines, passing through Siboney and Aguadores.

Guantanamo has a broad-gauge line running from the seaport of Caimanera through Guantanamo and on to Jamaica and the sugar estates belonging to the Brooks estate.

There is also the ruins of a narrow-gauge railroad running from Santiago to the Cobre mines, distant some 12 miles.

On the north coast there is a standard-gauge road at Banes, running out to the large banana plantations of the local fruit companies.

At Santa Lucia there is also a standard-gauge road running through the different sections of the great Santa Lucia sugar estate, bringing sugar and other products to the water at the bay of Vita.

There is also a railroad running from Gibara to Holguin. This is a narrow-gauge road, and in fairly good repair.

On the south coast there is the remnant of a standard-gauge road, running several miles out of Manzanillo toward Bayamo. This railroad should, if possible, be completed, as it would open up to development and settlement what is probably one of the richest if not the richest valley in all Cuba.

NAVIGABLE RIVERS.

The river Cauto, which is navigable for 60 miles for light-draft boats, not to exceed 5½ feet. It is by this route that most of the supplies reach Bayamo and Jiguani during the rainy season.

On the north coast the Mayari River is navigable for boats drawing not over 6 feet for about 6 miles from the bay of Nipe. Above that, boats drawing not over 3 feet of water can be taken some 6 miles farther to the town of Mayari.

BARRACKS AND QUARTERS.

I recommend that all troops be withdrawn from seacoast towns known to be infected with yellow fever and quartered in light, airy barracks of wood, raised well off the ground, with double roof and wide verandas. These buildings should be cheaply constructed and

placed at points, if possible, at least 1,000 feet above the sea, although I do not believe this elevation to be absolutely necessary. Our experience with yellow fever in Cuba has been that of all nations who have dealt with it intelligently, i. e., we have found it to be a disease of the towns, developing in damp masonry buildings with earthen and masonry floors; that the points of infection are in the towns themselves, and that any amount of precaution will not prevent infection of barracks and hospitals which are situated in these old towns. We have found also that it is a disease which can be most readily checked by isolation, sanitation, sunshine, and plenty of fresh air.

The inference is that we should send all troops away from towns known to be or to have been infected and put them in light, well-ventilated barracks, on the most elevated ground available. Under such circumstances, we can deal with the disease under conditions most advantageous to ourselves and with the best prospect of success. If our barracks do become seriously infected, they can be burned and rebuilt for less than it costs to disinfect and rehabilitate the masonry structures turned over to us by the Spaniards. Hospitals should be constructed on the same plan and located at points hitherto uninfected. The buildings should be small, numerous, well separated from each other, and well raised above the ground. By following this plan, if a building becomes infected, it is only a small one and can be easily dealt with or destroyed, if necessary, without great loss. There are no towns in this department near which suitable locations can not be found; locations which are both safe, from a sanitary standpoint, and suitable, from a military one. If we can avoid yellow fever, we shall have no difficulty in maintaining our troops here in good health.

In regard to the uniform, I recommend that khaki of a uniform color be supplied to all troops. The present variegated appearance of a regiment, due to khaki of almost every known shade, is absolutely destructive of all uniformity and does not result in our soldiers presenting a creditable military appearance. With khaki clothing, canvas leggings of similar color and fair leather shoes should also be furnished. The helmet should be covered with khaki and should have a brim a trifle wider than that of the present helmet, especially behind, in order to protect the back of the neck from the direct rays of the sun. The white helmet is entirely unsuited for field use here, as the pipe clay washes off constantly, and among the green foliage a man wearing a white helmet can be distinguished at a great distance. In addition to the helmet I recommend the present campaign hat. I would also recommend, for full-dress purposes, a forage-cap frame with detachable white duck-covers, to be worn with blue blouse and white-duck trousers. All other varieties of head gear should be done away with, as they only tend to produce lack of harmony and unmilitary effect in the appearance of the men.

I also recommend the present cambric drawers, light undershirts of mixed cotton and wool, and overshirts of blue flannel and chambray. There are altogether too many varieties of uniform in use at present, ranging all the way from white duck to mixtures of khaki and blue, combined with almost every known type of head gear. Woolen serges of almost exactly the same shade as khaki are available for officers if they prefer wool to khaki.

All mounted troops should be furnished with the pommel slickers now issued by the Quartermaster's Department. These furnish a com-

plete protection while on the march in rainy weather, and are very valuable in preserving health under the conditions existing here during the rainy season.

The present ration appears to be ample. If we are to be guided by the experience of the British in the West Indies, the men should have a comparatively light breakfast and supper, with a substantial midday meal. Overeating is to be carefully avoided and abstinence from spirituous liquors must be insisted on. The refrigerated beef furnished at the present time in this department has been most satisfactory and is much to be preferred to any native beef which we have been able to get.

In view of the numerous changes in the composition of the garrison of this department, as well as in the departmental staff, it has been extremely difficult to get as full and complete reports as are desired. I submit herewith the reports of the adjutant-general, inspector-general, judge-advocate, chief quartermaster, chief commissary, chief surgeon, chief paymaster, acting engineer officer, acting ordnance officer, and acting signal officer.

I desire to express my personal appreciation of the very valuable and efficient services of Lieut. Col. John H. Beacom, adjutant-general; Maj. George Andrews, adjutant-general; Maj. Valery Havard, chief surgeon; Maj. John T. Knight, chief quartermaster; Maj. Eugene T. Wilson, chief commissary; Maj. Robert S. Smith, chief paymaster; also of Capt. W. S. Scott, assistant quartermaster, for his arduous and continuous service in charge of ocean transportation; to Capt. John C. Gilmore, jr., for efficient service in the civil department; to First Lieut. R. L. Hamilton, Fifth Infantry, for exceedingly creditable work as engineer officer in charge of public works; and especially to my personal aides, First Lieut. E. C. Brooks, Sixth Cavalry, and Second Lieut. M. E. Hanna, Second Cavalry, who were here throughout the campaign and have remained here ever since, performing the most varied and difficult duties with great credit to themselves and the Army and to the great benefit of the people of the province.

Very respectfully,

LEONARD WOOD,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

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REPORT OF BRIG. GEN. GEORGE W. DAVIS, U. S. VOLUNTEERS, COMMANDING DEPARTMENT OF PORTO RICO.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF PORTO RICO,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL,
San Juan, August 15, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have the honor to report that I arrived at San Juan, P. R., on May 8, 1899, and in compliance with paragraph 70, Special Orders, No. 99, Adjutant-General's Office, 1899, assumed command of this department, relieving Maj. Gen. Guy V. Henry, U. S. Volunteers.

The Department of Porto Rico was established by General Orders, No. 158, Adjutant-General's Office, 1898, and in compliance therewith

Maj. Gen. John R. Brooke assumed command on October 18, 1898, with headquarters at San Juan, where they have remained. In accordance with these general orders, the officers of the general staff departments, then serving with General Brooke, were temporarily assigned to like duties at these headquarters.

For the convenience of military and civil administration, the Department of Porto Rico was divided into two geographical districts—that of Ponce, the limits of which included the jurisdictions of Arecibo, Bayamon, Humacao, and adjacent islands. Brig. Gen. Guy V. Henry, U. S. Volunteers, was assigned to the command of the district of Ponce, and Brig. Gen. F. D. Grant, U. S. Volunteers, that of San Juan, with headquarters at Ponce and San Juan, respectively.

On October 18, 1898, when this department was established, the command consisted of certain organizations, which were gradually relieved and sent to the United States and replaced by others until the present force formed the military establishment.

TROOPS SERVING IN PORTO RICO ON OCTOBER 18, 1898.

Regulars.—Detachments of the Hospital and Signal corps; Troop A, Fifth Cavalry; Troop B, Second Cavalry; Troop H, Sixth Cavalry; Batteries B, G, and D, Fifth Artillery; Batteries C and F, Third Artillery; Battery B, Fourth Artillery; Batteries C and M, Seventh Artillery; Company F, Eighth Infantry; Eleventh Infantry; Nineteenth Infantry.

Volunteers.—Signal Corps detachment; Forty-seventh New York Volunteer Infantry; Sixth U. S. Volunteer Infantry; nine companies First Volunteer Engineers; First Kentucky Volunteer Infantry; Sixth Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry; Third Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry, and Fourth Ohio Volunteer Infantry, the last three under orders to proceed to United States.

Dates on which organizations left for the United States.—October 21, 1898, Sixth Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry; October 22, 1898, Third Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry; October 29, 1898, Fourth Ohio Volunteer Infantry; November 4, 1898, Third Illinois Volunteer Infantry; November 18, 1898, nine companies First Volunteer Engineers; November 26, 1898, C and F, Third Artillery; B, Fourth Artillery; D, Fifth Artillery; B, Second Cavalry; H, Sixth Cavalry; F, Eighth Infantry; December 5, 1898, First Kentucky Volunteer Infantry; February 10, 1899, Sixth U. S. Volunteer Infantry; March 3, 1899, Forty-seventh New York Volunteer Infantry; May 15, 1899, Nineteenth Infantry; June 2, 1899, C and M, Seventh Artillery, and B, Fifth Artillery.

Reenforcements arrived in Porto Rico as follows: November 14, 1898, headquarters and Troops B, D, E, G, K, L, Fifth Cavalry; February 9, 1899, Troops C, F, H, I, M, Fifth Cavalry; March 6, 1899, Battery E, Fifth Artillery.

On December 6, 1898, Maj. Gen. Guy V. Henry, U. S. Volunteers, assumed command of the department, having relieved Maj. Gen. John R. Brooke, who proceeded to Washington, December 5, 1898, in compliance with instructions of the Secretary of War. General Henry was succeeded in command of the district of Ponce by Lieut. Col. Daniel W. Burke, Eleventh Infantry, who was succeeded by Lieut. Col. C. C. Hood, Nineteenth Infantry, on January 19, 1899. This district was discontinued on March 23, 1899.

On March 24, 1899, compliance with War Department Circular No. 6, 1899, recruiting for the Porto Rico Battalion was commenced, and proceeded satisfactorily at different points of the island until its organization was completed. It has been noticed that recruiting for this battalion was impeded by the difficulty in obtaining men of physical standard requirements. A great many men were poorly developed and some had disabilities which excluded them from enlistment. Few of the applicants spoke any English and it was difficult to instruct them; but the appointment of officers who understand the Spanish language, and the transfer of a few soldiers who also speak the native tongue, has largely removed this difficulty.

On April 6 the department was visited by the Secretary of War. A week later Brig. Gen. F. D. Grant was relieved and the district of San Juan was discontinued.

Upon the establishment of the department the commanding general was required to exercise the functions of military governor of the island, and all civil affairs came under his supervision and direction. As such governor he also had oversight of all matters that affected the welfare of the people. If existing laws were found to be detrimental to the public welfare, he was empowered to change or repeal them and to institute new courts.

From the very dilatory and unsatisfactory manner in which the local courts conducted the numerous criminal cases which came before them, it was evident that in order to facilitate the administration of justice and punishment of crime it was necessary to modify the judicial system, and the military commission was established of necessity; but such trials ceased upon the signing of the treaty of peace. The effect was to reduce the number of untried criminal cases and to rid the jails of a large number of persons awaiting trial.

Under the Spanish Government the civil affairs of the island were administered through a governor-general and an "insular cabinet" of four members. This was maintained until February 6, 1899, when it became evident that the management of affairs by a cabinet was unsatisfactory, and, further, that its existence was unnecessary. It was dissolved by General Henry, and the departments of state, justice, finance, and interior, with chiefs or secretaries at their head, were constituted, each reporting directly to the military governor, but they did not act as a cabinet council. This system was continued and is at present in existence, except that the office of secretary of justice was some time since discontinued, and the department of state, treasury, and finance will be discontinued on the 15th instant.

The police force of the island was maintained as under Spanish rule until February 21, 1899, when it was supplanted by the "insular police," composed exclusively of natives. This organization, the municipal police in towns, and the Army maintain law and order either directly or through the instrumentality of the courts.

This insular police force has a chief, an assistant chief, and such captains, first lieutenants, second lieutenants, corporals, and privates as are necessary, and now consists of 16 officers and 400 men. The cost to insular funds is about $165,000 per annum.

In compliance with the Executive order of the President of May 8, 1899, the system and methods of accounting for insular revenues was promulgated by General Orders, No. 87, Headquarters Department of Porto Rico. A clear and concise method of accounting for the

revenues and of rendering accounts was stated and a treasurer for the island appointed. To him all accounts are now rendered, and he makes all disbursements for the island either directly or through advances to disbursing agents.

Pursuant to authority from the President, a provincial court was appointed by General Orders, No. 88, Headquarters Department of Porto Rico, with jurisdiction in cases of infraction of the laws of the United States. This court has but recently been created, and its usefulness can but be apparent when consideration is taken of the large number of cases that have and will come within its jurisdiction and which could not be tried by the local courts.

The health of the troops has been excellent, considering that they are in a tropical climate, in which all classes of fevers and diseases have at different times prevailed. The report of the chief surgeon will supply full information respecting health. The sanitation of the island is a very difficult problem, owing to the character of the houses, the habits of the people, and from the fact that the streets of most of the towns are very narrow and irregular and permanent waterworks and sewers are almost unknown. The natives seem to be wedded to their manner of living, which is not surprising, but are willing to learn, and much has been done for them, and the sanitary conditions of the larger places are being improved under military supervision. Boards of health are established in the more important towns where troops are posted, and under directions of these boards sanitary measures are carried out.

Owing to the almost entire absence of any records at these headquarters of the operations previous to the establishment of the department, it is impossible to particularize the events which took place before that date. The occupation of the island commenced with the landing at Guanica, on July 25, 1898, of the troops commanded by Major-General Miles. All reports of field operations were made to the Major-General Commanding and to the other general officers. These reports were directly forwarded to the War Department by the superior officers serving with the troops. It is therefore unnecessary to mention these operations.

MEANS OF COMMUNICATION.

An excellent military road crosses the central range of mountains and connects Ponce with San Juan, distance 112 kilos. Other roads in the island are well constructed, but are of less importance than that from San Juan to Ponce.

A road extends from Ponce via Yauco, San German, Mayaguez, Aguadilla, and Arecibo, thence to San Juan. Another joins Guayama and the same with Caguas, and thence to San Juan; and still another extends from San Juan via Rio Piedras by the military road to Rio Grande on the east. These roads are the most important, and were availed of by the American forces in the Porto Rican campaign.

There are other roads connecting the more important towns, some of which are in fair condition, while others are impassable except by pack animals.

The Spanish Government gave to a French company a franchise for a railroad to encircle the island, located generally near the coast. Only about one-third of this road has been constructed and the company has not completed the road in the time specified in the franchise. That

part of the road at present completed extends from San Juan to Camuy on the north, from Aguadilla to Hormigueros on the west, and from Yauco to Ponce on the south, total mileage ----- kilos, gauge 1 meter.

The only good harbor in the island is that of San Juan; Ponce and Mayaguez have fair harbors, but seagoing vessels can not lie at wharves and can only be discharged by lighters.

SPANISH EVACUATION.

The evacuation of the island by the Spanish troops proceeded with all satisfaction desired, and from the 13th of August, the date of the signing of the peace protocol, until the 18th of October the embarking of troops was carried on, and in little more than two months all of the Spanish soldiers left for Spain. The last troops to leave were under the command of General Ortega, and with his departure the control of the island by the United States Army commenced.

CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

My period of command has been just three months, long enough only to permit me to learn something of condition of the inhabitants, their manners, customs, laws, and institutions. The measures I have instituted as the military representative of the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy are embraced in the general orders that have been published from time to time.

A circular issued on this date, copy herewith, will serve to give a general idea of the policy I have pursued and am still pursuing with respect to the administration of the civil government.

In this circular, which has been distributed here, I have attempted to sketch a system of government such as in the history of the United States has been many times established in newly acquired territory, and closely resembles the military governments which existed in the Southern States during the period of reconstruction following the civil war.

In this circular I have been very careful to abstain from any statement that could be construed as a promise or declaration that the expected Congressional action would be had at any particular time or would take any specified definite form. I have, however, referred in a general way to the historical precedents, when conquered territory passed first to the control of the military, then came under the United States courts, later was given Territorial autonomy, and finally full statehood. In doing this I felt that I was but giving effect to the spirit of the general instructions contained in Executive orders.

I do not feel able now to indicate any date or time when Territorial autonomy may be implanted and the people left to regulate their own affairs. Experience only can be relied on for the data to warrant an opinion.

There are many changes in methods of administration and in judicial procedure that must be made and reforms matured before the inhabitants of Porto Rico should be vested with the powers and responsibilities of self-government.

Now but a small part of the inhabitants can read and write; some estimate the ratio as low as from 10 to 15 per cent. As respects illiteracy the proportion here can not be materially different to what it

was among the native New Mexicans when that Territory was annexed to the United States in 1847. Although half a century has elapsed since General Kearny promulgated a civil code for New Mexico, and a Territorial government was authorized in 1850, this Territory has not yet secured from Congress a recognition of its capacity for State government.

How much more rapid progress toward a realization of their aspirations the Porto Ricans may demonstrate than that of the New Mexicans time only can determine. Immediate Territorial autonomy for Porto Rico I do not expect, and it would, I think, be disastrous to the best interests of the island.

My policy has been determined by the knowledge that a military government for any part of the national domain can be but temporary, and that the military measures executed for maintaining law and order have for their ultimate object the preparation of the people for autonomical civil government, which when authorized by Congress could be implanted with the least possible friction or change.

I am happy to say that so far the people of the island have given me, as they have my predecessors, their most cordial support and cooperation, and although the task is of necessity a difficult one, to implant an American growth upon a stock of most ancient origin, the progress effected in the year of American occupancy encourages the hope and the belief that the final result will be successful.

I have been most ably assisted by the military staff of the department. To the intelligent and earnest efforts of the officers and troops in the execution of orders in this dense population, whose manners, customs, and laws are so different from ours, I am greatly indebted.

THE HURRICANE OF 1899.

At the moment of closing this report a hurricane of unprecedented violence has just swept over the island. The destruction of life and property has been enormous, and data is not yet at hand for any accurate computation. Enough is known, however, to show that tens of thousands of families have been left wholly destitute and are without any semblance of shelter, and as soon as the fruits gathered from the débris of the storm are consumed they will be wholly without food.

The prompt response of the Department to my calls for food to relieve the suffering will have a most excellent effect, and will much simplify my task, for without such aid it would have been impossible to avert a famine.

I respectfully invite attention to the reports of staff officers herewith, and a "Résumé and discussion of the Government of Porto Rico," by Maj. W. A. Glassford, U. S. Volunteers.

With the reports are several photographs of military posts and features, which I think will be found to be of considerable interest.

Very respectfully,

GEO. W. DAVIS,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.

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SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS CONNECTED WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

Apr. 21, 1898.—Act of Congress declares a state of war with Spain to exist.
23, 1898.—President issues proclamation calling for 125,000 volunteers.
United States consul at Manila is given his passports and leaves for Hongkong.
25, 1898.—Asiatic Squadron leaves Hongkong for Mirs Bay, China.
26, 1898.—War with Spain formally declared. Regular Army increased to 63,106 men.
27, 1898.—United States consul reaches Hongkong from Manila and joins the Asiatic Squadron at Mirs Bay.
The American squadron sails for the Philippines.

May 1, 1898.—The Asiatic Squadron, U. S. N., under command of Commodore Dewey, engages and destroys the Spanish squadron under command of Admiral Montojo in the bay of Manila.
2, 1898.—Landing party of sailors and marines destroys several magazines in the vicinity of Cavite.
3, 1898.—The Cavite arsenal is abandoned by the Spanish and occupied by forces from the squadron.
16, 1898.—Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, U. S. A., assigned to command of the Department of the Pacific.
25, 1898.—President issues proclamation calling for an additional 75,000 volunteers.
First expedition sails for Manila from San Francisco, Cal., under command of Brig. Gen. T. M. Anderson, U. S. V. This expedition comprised the First California Volunteer Infantry, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, 5 companies of the Fourteenth U. S. Infantry and a detachment of California Volunteer Artillery.
30, 1898.—General Merritt arrives at San Francisco and assumes direction of the expeditionary forces.

June 15, 1898.—Second expedition sails for Manila under command of Brig. Gen. F. V. Greene, U. S. V. This expedition comprised the First Colorado Volunteer Infantry, First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry, Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, 4 companies Eighteenth and 4 companies Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, 2 battalions Utah Volunteer Artillery, and detachment of U. S. Engineers.
18, 1898.—Aguinaldo, by proclamation, establishes an interior civil government at points captured from or abandoned by Spanish authority.
21, 1898.—Formal surrender of the island of Guam, Ladrone group, to the commanding officer U. S. S. *Charleston*.
23, 1898.—Aguinaldo proclaims himself military dictator and president of the Philippine revolution and outlines a system of general government.

June 27, 1898.—Third expedition sails for Manila under command of Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, U. S. A., and Brig. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, U. S. V. This expedition comprised 4 companies of the Eighteenth and 4 companies of the Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, 4 batteries of the Third U. S. Artillery, 1 company U. S. Engineers, First Idaho Volunteer Infantry, First Wyoming Volunteer Infantry, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, Astor Battery, and detachments Hospital and Signal Corps.

30, 1898.—First expedition, under command of Brig. Gen. T. M. Anderson, U. S. V., arrives off Manila.

July 1, 1898.—Disembarkation of expeditionary forces begun and landing made at Cavite.

7, 1898.—The navy takes Isla Grande and garrison of 1,300 without resistance.

15, 1898.—Fourth expedition sails for Manila, under command of Maj. Gen. E. S. Otis, U. S. V. This expedition comprised 6 troops Fourth U. S. Cavalry, 2 batteries Sixth U. S. Artillery, 5 companies Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, and a detachment of recruits.

One battalion of the First California Volunteer Infantry encamps at Malate on the outskirts of the city of Manila.

19, 1898.—Fifth expedition sails for Manila with First Montana Volunteer Infantry and detachment of recruits, under command of Col. H. C. Kessler, First Montana Volunteers.

23, 1898.—Sixth expedition sails for Manila with 8 companies of the First South Dakota Volunteer Infantry and detachments, under command of Brig. Gen. H. G. Otis, U. S. V.

25, 1898.—General Merritt arrives at Manila.

29, 1898.—Seventh expedition sails for Manila with 4 companies of the First South Dakota Volunteer Infantry and detachment of recruits, under command of Lieut. Col. Lee Stover, First South Dakota Volunteers.

31, 1898.—Night attack on United States forces by Spanish troops in trenches around the city of Manila.

Aug. 1, 1898.—Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, organized under command of Brig. Gen. T. M. Anderson, and Brigadier-Generals MacArthur and Greene assigned to command brigades therein.

During the night Spanish field artillery shelled the trenches occupied by United States troops.

2, 1898.—Spanish open fire at 5 a. m. and 9.45 p. m. on the trenches occupied by United States troops, continuing in each instance for a period of less than an hour.

5, 1898.—Spanish open vigorous fire with artillery and infantry on the troops in trenches.

7, 1898.—Joint demand made by General Merritt and Admiral Dewey on the Captain-General for the removal of noncombatants from the city of Manila, and notice given of intention to bombard the city.

Camp Dewey established on the outskirts of the city.

9, 1898.—In reply to statement of inability on part of Spanish authorities to remove noncombatants from city on account of the presence of insurgent troops, joint formal demand is made for the surrender of the city of Manila and its defenses.

Foreign war vessels leave their anchorage in front of city and American fleet clears for action.

Aug. 12, 1898.—Protocol with Spain signed at Washington, D. C., by Hon. William Day, Secretary of State, and M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador to the United States.

13, 1898.—Spanish intrenchments about the city of Manila bombarded by the Navy and stormed and carried by the troops; the city entered and a commission appointed to draw articles of capitulation.

14, 1898.—General Merritt issues his first proclamation to the Filipino people.

15, 1898.—Orders issued for the assumption of civil government by the United States military authorities in the city of Manila and district of Cavite and officers assigned to duty thereunder.

16, 1898.—General Merritt receives cablegram from the President announcing cessation of hostilities.

21, 1898.—Transport *Arizona* sails for Manila with 4 companies of the Eighteenth U. S. Infantry, and detachments First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry, Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, and First Colorado Volunteer Infantry, under command of Brig. Gen. Charles King, U. S. V.

22, 1898.—Disembarkation of Light Battery D, Sixth U. S. Artillery, headquarters and 5 companies Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, detachments of Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, Third Artillery, First California, First Wyoming, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, and 2 batteries Utah Volunteer Light Artillery, from transports *Peru*, *City of Puebla*, and *City of Rio de Janeiro*, begins at Manila.

25, 1898.—First division, Eighth Army Corps, organized. Brig. Gen. T. M. Anderson, commanding.

28, 1898.—General Merritt assumes duties as military governor and transfers command of the Eighth Army Corps to Maj. Gen. E. S. Otis, U. S. V.

Brig. Gen. Arthur MacArthur relieves General Anderson in command of Second Division.

Disembarkation of Light Battery, Sixth U. S. Artillery, 6 troops Fourth U. S. Cavalry, First Montana and First South Dakota Volunteer Infantry, from transports *Peru*, *Pennsylvania*, and *City of Rio de Janeiro*, begins at Cavite.

29, 1898.—Maj. Gen. E. S. Otis, U. S. V., relieves Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, U. S. A., in command of the Department of the Pacific and as military governor of the Philippine Islands.

30, 1898.—Brig. Gen. H. G. Otis, U. S. V., assigned to command of First Brigade, First Division.

Sept. 2, 1898.—First Battalion First South Dakota Volunteer Infantry disembarks at Manila.

8, 1898.—General Otis demands the withdrawal of insurgent forces from the entire city of Manila, its suburbs, and defenses.

13, 1898.—Commission appointed by Aguinaldo confers with General Otis in regard to his demand of September 8, 1898.

15, 1898.—Insurgents withdraw from limits of the city of Manila, as established by General Otis, with the exception of the districts of Paco and Pandacan, south of the Pasig River.

Oct. 7, 1898.—Civil courts as constituted by the laws of Spain are allowed to resume their jurisdiction and regular functions, subject to supervision of the military government in its policy of occupation.

Oct. 9, 1898.—General Anderson and staff while proceeding up the Pasig River in a steam launch are ordered to return to the city by Filipino guard.

10, 1898.—General Otis makes formal demand for the retirement of Filipino forces from Paco, Pandacan, and other points established by survey to be within the city limits.

14, 1898.—Eighth Army Corps reorganized.

17, 1898.—Transport *Senator* sails for Manila with a battalion of Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, battery of California Volunteer Artillery, and detachment of recruits for Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, under command of Maj. G. A. Goodale, Twenty-third U. S. Infantry.

19, 1898.—Transport *Valencia* sails for Manila with Companies F, G, I, and L, First Washington Volunteer Infantry, and detachment of battalion California Artillery, under command of Lieut. Col. W. J. Fife, First Washington Volunteer Infantry.

25, 1898.—Filipino forces retire from points indicated by General Otis in his demand of October 10.

27, 1898.—Transport *Indiana* sails for Manila with headquarters and band, Companies C, D, E, G, H, I, K, and M, Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry, under command of Col. F. Funston, Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry.

28, 1898.—Transport *Ohio* sails for Manila with Companies A, B, C, D, E, H, K, and M, First Washington Volunteer Infantry, and detachment California Artillery, under command of Col. J. H. Wholley, First Washington Volunteer Infantry.

30, 1898.—Transport *Zealandia* sails for Manila with the headquarters, Companies A, B, C, E, F, L, and M, First Tennessee Volunteer Infantry, under command of Col. W. C. Smith, First Tennessee Volunteer Infantry.

Nov. 3, 1898.—Transport *Pennsylvania* sails for Manila with the Fifty-first Iowa Volunteer Infantry, under command of Col. J. C. Loper, Fifty-first Iowa Volunteer Infantry.

6, 1898.—Transport *City of Puebla* sails for Manila with Companies D, G, H, I, and K, First Tennessee Volunteer Infantry, detachment California Artillery, and First Troop Nevada Volunteer Cavalry, under command of Lieut. Col. Gracey Childers, First Tennessee Volunteer Infantry.

9, 1898.—Transport *Newport* sails for Manila with Companies A, B, F, and L, Twentieth Kansas, and Wyoming Battery, under command of Brig. Gen. M. P. Miller, U. S. V.

10, 1898.—Transport *Arizona* sails from Honolulu, H. I., for Manila, with battalion of Eighteenth U. S. Infantry, recruits for First Nebraska, Tenth Pennsylvania, and First Colorado Volunteer Infantry, and a detachment of Hospital Corps men.

21, 1898. Expedition under command of Maj. G. A. Goodale, Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, arrives at Manila. Left San Francisco October 17, 1898.

22, 1898.—Expedition under command of Lieut. Col. W. J. Fife, First Washington Volunteer Infantry, arrives at Manila. Left San Francisco October 19, 1898.

24, 1898. Expedition under command of Maj. G. A. Goodale, Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, disembarks. Arrived at Manila November 21, 1898.

Expedition under command of Lieut. Col. W. J. Fife, First Washington Volunteer Infantry, disembarks. Arrived November 22, 1898.

Nov. 25, 1898.—Transport *Arizona* arrives at Manila from Honolulu with battalion of Eighteenth U. S. Infantry and detachment of recruits and Hospital Corps men. Sailed November 10, 1898.

26, 1898.—Expedition under command of Col. J. H. Wholley, First Washington Volunteer Infantry, arrives at Manila. Left San Francisco October 28, 1898.

Detachment of California Heavy Artillery disembarks at Manila.

28, 1898.—Expedition under command of Col. W. C. Smith, First Tennessee Volunteer Infantry, arrives at Manila. Left San Francisco October 30, 1898.

30, 1898.—Expedition under command of Col. F. Funston, Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry, arrives at Manila. Left San Francisco October 27, 1898.

Troops on transport *Arizona* arrived November 25, disembark and join regiments.

Companies A and B, Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, assigned to duty at Corregidor Island.

Dec. 5, 1898.—Troops of First Tennessee Volunteer Infantry, arriving on transport *Zealandia* November 28, 1898, disembark and are assigned to duty with the provost guard.

6, 1898.—Expedition under command of Lieut. Col. Gracey Childers, First Tennessee Volunteer Infantry, arrives at Manila. Left San Francisco November 6, 1898.

First Washington Volunteer Infantry disembarks from transports *Valencia* and *Ohio*.

7, 1898.—Expeditions under command of Brig. Gen. M. P. Miller and Col. J. C. Loper arrive at Manila. Sailed from San Francisco November 9 and 3, respectively.

9, 1898.—Troops of Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry, on transport *Indiana*, arrived November 30, 1898, disembark.

10, 1898.—Treaty of peace signed at Paris between the United States and Spain.

Light Battery, Wyoming Volunteer Artillery, and Troop A, Nevada Cavalry, disembark from transports *Newport* and *City of Puebla*, respectively, and join garrison at Cavite.

11, 1898.—Battalion of Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry, arriving on transport *Newport* December 7, 1898, disembark and join regiment.

Detachment of California Heavy Artillery disembarks from transport *City of Puebla* and joins garrison at Cavite.

13, 1898.—General Otis receives a petition signed by business men and firms on Iloilo asking for American occupation and protection.

Troops of First Tennessee Volunteer Infantry, arriving on transport *City of Puebla* December 6, 1898, disembark and join regiment on provost duty.

15, 1898.—Astor Battery sails from Manila en route to San Francisco, Cal.

23, 1898.—President orders the relief of the Spanish garrison at Iloilo by United States forces.

24, 1898.—Spanish garrison at Iloilo evacuate the city and insurgents take possession.

First separate brigade organized under command of Brig. Gen. M. P. Miller and ordered to proceed to Iloilo.

26, 1898.—Expedition sails for Iloilo from Manila.

28. 1898.—Expeditionary forces arrive in harbor at Iloilo and open communication with the insurgents in possession of the city with a view to its occupation by United States forces.

Dec. 29, 1898. Insurgents ask for time to receive instructions from revolutionary government as to the occupation of Iloilo.

30, 1898.—Insurgent leaders at Iloilo refuse consent to the landing of United States troops at that place.

31, 1898.—Merchants and foreign residents petition General Miller to postpone landing of troops and avoid firing of the city by the insurgents in occupation.

Jan. 19, 1899.—Transport *Grant* sails from New York for Manila with the Fourth U. S. Infantry and Companies B, G, I, and M, Seventeenth U. S. Infantry, under command of Maj. Gen. H. W. Lawton, U. S. V.

22, 1899.—Company I, First Tennessee Volunteer Infantry, under command of Captain Givens, escorts a battalion of Spanish prisoners to the southern islands of the Archipelago.

26, 1899.—Transports *Scandia* and *Morgan City* sail for Manila with Twentieth U. S. Infantry, under command of Brig. Gen. Loyd Wheaton, U. S. V.

29, 1899.—Expedition under command of Capt. N. N. Givens left Manila January 22, 1899, on escort duty, returns to station.

Fifty-first Iowa Volunteer Infantry leaves Iloilo for Cavite in order that troops may land for exercise.

31, 1899.—Transport *Pennsylvania* arrives at Manila.

Feb. 1, 1899.—Transports *Ohio* and *Senator* sail for Manila with the Twenty-second U. S. Infantry, under command of Col. H. C. Egbert, Twenty-second U. S. Infantry.

2, 1899.—Astor Battery mustered out at New York City.

3, 1899.—Transport *Sherman* sails from New York for Manila with Third U. S. Infantry, and Companies D, H, K, and L, Seventeenth U. S. Infantry, under command of Col. J. H. Page, Third U. S. Infantry.

4, 1899.—Picket line opposite San Juan del Monte fired on by insurgents, and a general engagement is precipitated.

Street disturbances in the city of Manila controlled by provost guard.

Attack upon United States troops at Manila by insurgent forces under Aguinaldo.

5, 1899.—Advance made against insurgent lines results in their retreat to positions beyond the foothills, and the capture of Santa Ana, San Pedro Macati, Pasig, and other villages in the immediate vicinity of the city of Manila.

Provost patrol disperses a party of armed natives within the city.

6, 1899.—Earthworks and blockhouses constructed and occupied by insurgents, and the city waterworks, on the Mariquina River, east of Deposito, captured.

7, 1899.—Sharp and decisive skirmishes on the Mariquina road.

8, 1899.—General Miller directed to take the city of Iloilo.

10, 1899.—A general advance is made on the enemy's position in and about Caloocan.

First Tennessee Volunteer Infantry arrives in the harbor of Iloilo.

11, 1899.—City of Iloilo is fired and abandoned by the insurgents, being immediately occupied by the United States forces.

12, 1899.—Line of First Separate Brigade extended toward Jaro and Molo, driving the insurgents before it.

13, 1899.—Eighteenth U. S. Infantry encounters insurgents at the main bridge over the Jaro River.

Feb. 14, 1899.—A detachment of 500 insurgents is defeated in the vicinity of Santa Barbara.

15, 1899.—United States troops occupy Molo.

19, 1899.—United States troops occupy Aravelo.

Transport *Sheridan* sails from New York for Manila with the Twelfth U. S. Infantry and headquarters and Companies A, C, E, and F, Seventh U. S. Infantry.

20, 1899.—East Paco is fired by incendiaries.

22, 1899.—Incendiary fires in the city of Manila.

23, 1899.—Insurgent outbreak in the Tondo district.

Tenth Pennsylvania and First South Dakota Volunteer Infantry engaged by the enemy.

Twentieth U. S. Infantry arrives at Manila and is assigned to provost duty in the city.

24, 1899.—First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry defeats a party of insurgents north of the Mariquina road.

25, 1899.—Minor engagement in the vicinity of Mandurriao, in which insurgents are driven off.

Mar. 1, 1899.—Insurgents make an attack in force on outposts of First and Second Battalions, Eighteenth U. S. Infantry, at Iloilo, Island of Panay. Insurgents shelled from trenches by Battery G, Sixth U. S. Artillery, and attacked and routed by the Eighteenth U. S. Infantry.

Visayan military district established.

2, 1899.—Congress authorizes enlistment of 35,000 volunteers and increase of the Regular Army to 65,000 men.

3, 1899.—Tennessee Volunteer Infantry and Light Battery G, Sixth U. S. Artillery, make a reconnaissance on the Savannah, southeast of La Paz.

4, 1899.—Transport *Senator*, with portion of Twenty-second U. S. Infantry, arrives at Manila. Sailed from San Francisco February 1, 1899.

5, 1899.—Transport *Ohio*, with portion of the Twenty-second U. S. Infantry, arrives at Manila. Sailed from San Francisco February 1, 1899.

Insurgents intrenched across Mariquina road, northeast of Deposito, are routed and driven off.

Cable communication with Iloilo established.

6, 1899.—First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry engages the enemy on the north and south of pumping station on the Mariquina road, driving them off.

7, 1899.—Entire district lying between the Pasig River, the Mariquina River, and the Deposito pumping-station road is cleared of insurgent forces.

8, 1899.—The Twelfth U. S. Infantry, en route to Manila, lands at Malta and is received with courtesies by the British garrison at that point.

10, 1899.—Expedition under command of Maj. Gen. H. W. Lawton arrives at Manila. Sailed from New York City via Suez Canal.

11, 1899.—A provisional brigade for temporary service, composed of the Twentieth and Twenty-second U. S. Infantry; Companies C, D, E, G, H, K, L, and M, First Washington Volunteer Infantry; Companies A, B, D, E, I, L, and M, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry; Troops E, I, and K, Fourth U. S. Cavalry, and one section of Light Battery D, Sixth U. S. Artillery, under command of Maj. Gen. H. W. Lawton, engage the insurgents at Guadalupe, Pasig, Pateros, and Cayenta, March 11 to 17.

Mar. 16, 1899. First Separate Brigade engages the insurgents at the Jaro bridge and at Mandariao.

Two companies of the First Colorado Volunteer Infantry attack body of insurgents retreating from Canita and drive them through the town of Mariquina.

17, 1899.—Gen. H. W. Lawton relieves Gen. T. M. Anderson in command of the First Division.

21, 1899.—Companies F, G, L, and M, First California Volunteer Infantry, sail from Manila en route to Bacolod, island of Negros.

22, 1899.—Expedition under command of Col. J. H. Page, Third U. S. Infantry, arrives at Manila. Sailed from New York City February 3, 1899, via Suez Canal.

24, 1899.—Transport *City of Puebla* sails for Manila with headquarters and Companies A, F, G, I, L, and M, Ninth U. S. Infantry, under command of Capt. James Regan, Ninth U. S. Infantry.

25, 1899.—General engagement at Caloocan, participated in by Twenty-second U. S. Infantry, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, and the Second Battalion Third U. S. Infantry; enemy driven across the river in front of Malinto.

26, 1899.—Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry cross the Talishan River east of Malabon and drive the insurgents by successive charges from trenches occupied by them along the line of road leading to Balacon.

Twenty-second U. S. Infantry captures Malinto under heavy insurgent fire.

27, 1899.—Brig. Gen. M. P. Miller retires and is succeeded in command of the Visayan military district by Colonel Van Valzah, U. S. A.

28, 1899.—Transport *Zealandia* sails for Manila with six companies of the Ninth U. S. Infantry, under command of Capt. C. M. Rockfeller, Ninth U. S. Infantry.

31, 1899.—The insurgent capital at Malolos stormed and occupied by United States troops.

Battalion Twenty-third Infantry engages insurgents about 4 miles from Mariquina.

Apr. 8, 1899.—Expedition comprising Troops C, G, and L, Fourth Cavalry; Companies A, C, D, E, G, I, K, and L, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry; Companies A, C, D, and F, First Idaho Volunteer Infantry; Companies C, D, I, and K, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry; 2 mountain guns from the separate mountain battery, and 4 companies of sharpshooters concentrate at San Pedro Macati and embark on cascoes up the Pasig River for Laguna de Bay.

9, 1899.—Attack on and occupation of the city of Santa Cruz by the Laguna de Bay expedition.

10, 1899.—Towns of Pagsanjan, Longos, and Paete occupied by the expeditionary forces.

12, 1899.—Treaty of peace signed by the President.

13, 1899. Outposts at Malolos attacked by insurgents, who are driven off.

14, 1899.—Expedition under command of Lieut. Col. J. H. Smith, Twelfth U. S. Infantry, arrives at Manila. Sailed from New York via Suez Canal February 19, 1899.

15, 1899.—Engagement with insurgents near Quingua.

17, 1899.—Expeditionary forces return to San Pedro Macati.

18, 1899.—Transport *Hancock* sails for Manila with Twenty-first U. S. Infantry and Light Battery E, First U. S. Artillery, under command of Col. J. Kline, Twenty-first U. S. Infantry.

Apr. 20, 1899.—Transport *Newport* sails for Manila with Light Battery F, Fourth, and Light Battery F, Fifth U. S. Artillery, under command of Maj. J. L. Tiernon, First U. S. Artillery.

Transport *Warren* sails for Manila with headquarters and eight batteries of the Sixth U. S. Artillery and detachment of recruits, under command of Brig. Gen. E. B. Williston.

Insurgent forces repulsed in the vicinity of Taguig.

21, 1899.—First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry; Twenty-second U. S. Infantry; Companies A, C, F, G, H, K, L, and M, Third U. S. Infantry; Troops C, G, and L, Fourth U. S. Cavalry; Hawthorne's Separate Mountain Battery; Second Platoon Light Artillery D, Sixth U. S. Artillery; section Utah Light Artillery, and detachment Nineteenth Company Volunteer Signal Corps, concentrate at La Loma Church and move northward.

22, 1899.—Troops of the northern expedition successfully assault and occupy the city of Novaliches.

23, 1899.—Expedition under command of Capt. James Regan, Ninth U. S. Infantry, arrives at Manila. Sailed from San Francisco March 24, 1899.

24, 1899—San Jose occupied by the main column of the northern expedition and the city of Narzagaray is assaulted and captured by the Bocaue column of the expedition.

Troops of the Second Division force passage of the Quingua River and advance on Pulilan.

25, 1899.—The main column of the northern expedition joins the Bocaue column at Narzagaray.

Troops of the Second Division advance along the north bank of the Quingua River toward Calumpit, where they ford the Calumpit River and clear the town of insurgents.

First Montana Volunteer Infantry and Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry move against insurgents on the Bag Bag River and capture their position on the banks of that river.

26, 1899.—The northern expedition encamps at Angat and Marunco.

27, 1899.—Expedition under command of Capt. C. M. Rockefeller, Ninth U. S. Infantry, arrived at Manila. Sailed from San Francisco March 28, 1899.

28, 1899.—Transport *Ohio* sails for Manila with six companies of Thirteenth U. S. Infantry, under command of Capt. J. H. H. Peshine, Thirteenth U. S. Infantry.

Transport *Senator* sails for Manila with headquarters and six companies Thirteenth U. S. Infantry, under command of Col. A. T. Smith, Thirteenth U. S. Infantry.

Troops of the Second Division force the passage of the Calumpit River and defeat the insurgent forces under the personal command of General Luna.

29, 1899.—The northern expedition moves along both banks of the Rio Grande de la Bulacan, and after engaging the enemy and driving them down the river, take the town of San Rafael and then returns to Angat.

May 3, 1899.—Brig. Gen. J. F. Smith assumes command of the Visayan military district.

4, 1899.—A brigade of the northern expedition engages the insurgents near Maasin and occupies that town.

Sharp engagement at the Santo Tomas River.

May 7, 1899.—River gunboats, under command of Captain Grant, Utah Volunteer Artillery, shell insurgents from their trenches along the Guagua River.

10, 1899.—Gunboats engage the enemy at San Luis.

11, 1899.—Insurgents driven out of San Ildefonso.

13, 1899.—Commissioners from the insurgents ask for conference with General Lawton at Baliuag.

Northern expedition takes the city of San Miguel de Mayumo.

15, 1899.—General Lawton routs the enemy near San Isidro and marches from thence on San Miguel.

16, 1899.—San Isidro, the third city occupied by the insurgents as a capital, is seized by the forces under General Lawton.

17, 1899.—Aguinaldo and his revolutionary government retire to Cabanatuan.

19, 1899.—Spanish garrison at Jolo relieved by United States troops.

22, 1899.—Transport *Sherman* sails for Manila with Sixth U. S. Infantry and recruits, under command of Brig. Gen. J. C. Bates.

24, 1899.—Insurgents engaged in harassing outposts at San Fernando are driven off with heavy loss.

27, 1899.—Northern expedition returns to Manila.

30, 1899.—Transport *Grant* sails for Manila with Sixteenth U. S. Infantry and recruits, under command of Lieut. Col. W. F. Spurgin, Sixteenth U. S. Infantry.

A detachment Twenty-third U. S. Infantry engages and defeats outlaw band on the island of Negros.

June 3, 1899.—Advance is made upon Antipolo against insurgent forces under General Pilar.

4, 1899.—Brig. Gen. R. P. Hughes assumes command of the Visayan military district.

5, 1899.—Morong occupied by United States troops after a decisive engagement.

10, 1899.—Generals Ovenshine and Wheaton's columns defeat insurgents at Paranaque and Los Pinas.

13, 1899.—Insurgents intrenched along the Zapote in the vicinity of Los Pinas are defeated with considerable loss.

14, 1899.—Transports *Ohio* and *Senator* sail from Manila with Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, under command of Col. Owen Summers.

15, 1899.—Imus voluntarily surrenders to General Lawton and invites occupation of the city by his command.

16, 1899.—Town of San Nicholas occupied by United States troops.

Demonstration made against San Fernando by the insurgents.

19, 1899.—Insurgents ambush reconnoitering party on the Dasmarinas road and are routed by the main column.

22, 1899.—Transport *Zealandia* sails for Manila with Companies C, E, G, and I, Twenty-fourth U. S. Infantry, under command of Maj. J. M. Thompson, Twenty-fourth U. S. Infantry.

24, 1899.—Transport *Sheridan* sails for Manila with Troops A and F, Fourth U. S. Cavalry, Companies B and H, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, and detachment of recruits, under command of Brig. Gen. S. B. M. Young.

26, 1899.—Town of El Pardo occupied by United States troops.

28, 1899.—Transport *Valencia* sails for Manila with Headquarters and Troops B and M, Fourth U. S. Cavalry, and Companies E and H, Twenty-fifth U. S. Infantry, under command of Maj. Charles Morton, Fourth U. S. Cavalry.

July 1, 1899.—Transport *Pennsylvania* sails for Manila with headquarters and six companies Twenty-fifth U. S. Infantry, under command of Col. A. S. Burt, Twenty-fifth U. S. Infantry.

Transport *Hancock* sails from Manila with First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry and Batteries A and B, Utah Volunteer Artillery, under command of Col. H. B. Mulford.

Transport *Senator* sails from Manila with Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, under command of Lieut. Col. J. E. Barnett.

Mayors for the cities of Paranaque, Los Pinas, Bacoor, and Imus elected by natives under military protection.

2, 1899.—Transport *Sherman* arrives at Bacolod with Sixth U. S. Infantry.

5, 1899.—The President authorizes organization of ten volunteer regiments authorized under act of March 2, 1899 (Twenty-sixth to Thirty-fifth, inclusive).

11, 1899.—Transport *Conemaugh* sails for Manila with detachment of Fourth U. S. Cavalry and 275 horses, under command of First Lieut. E. B. Winans, jr., Fourth U. S. Cavalry.

13, 1899.—Transport *City of Para* sails for Manila with Troops D and H, Fourth U. S. Cavalry, headquarters, and Companies A, F, H, and K, Twenty-fourth U. S. Infantry, and Company B, Engineer Battalion, under command of Brig. Gen. Theodore Schwan, U. S. V.

17, 1899.—Transport *Warren* sails for Manila with First Colorado Volunteer Infantry, under command of Col. H. B. McCoy.

18, 1899.—President authorizes organization of two additional regiments of volunteers (Thirty-sixth and Thirty-seventh), to be recruited in the Philippine Islands.

19, 1899.—Capt. B. A. Byrne and Lieutenant Nesbitt, with a force of 70 men, surprised a superior force of the enemy, and in a hand-to-hand engagement killed 150 insurgents, with a loss of 1 killed and 1 wounded.

20, 1899.—Detachment of Sixth U. S. Infantry defeats a robber band near Tolon.

22, 1899.—Civil government established at Negros.

24, 1899.—Company K, Twenty-third Infantry, defeats insurgents in the Acan Valley, Cebu.

25, 1899.—Transport *Tartar* sails for Manila with headquarters and Companies B, D, F, G, H, I, K, and M, Nineteenth U. S. Infantry, under command of Col. S. Snyder, Nineteenth U. S. Infantry.

26, 1899.—Transport *Ohio* sails for Manila with two companies Nineteenth U. S. Infantry and detachment of recruits, under command of Maj. O. J. Sweet, Twenty-third U. S. Infantry.

Transport *Newport* sails for Manila with two companies Nineteenth U. S. Infantry and detachment of recruits, under command of Capt. F. H. French, Nineteenth U. S. Infantry.

Transport *Tacoma* sails for Manila with detachment of Fourth U. S. Cavalry and 200 horses, under command of Capt. G. O. Cress, Fourth U. S. Cavalry.

Transport *Sheridan* sails from Manila with First California Volunteer Infantry and Batteries A and D, California Volunteer Light Artillery, under command of Col. V. D. Duboce.

Calamba captured after a sharp skirmish.

28, 1899.—Detachment Sixth Infantry encounters insurgent force near Valdez, in the Visayan district.

July 29, 1899.—Company L, Twenty-third Infantry, takes station at Kolo, P. I.

31, 1899.—Transport *Grant* sails from Manila with First Wyoming Volunteer Infantry, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, First Idaho Volunteer Infantry, and Wyoming Battery Volunteer Light Artillery, under command of Lieut. Col. M. C. Trenmann.

Los Banos occupied by United States troops.

Aug. 2, 1899.—Transport *Indiana* sails for Manila with detachment of recruits and casuals, under command of Col. C. C. Hood, Sixteenth U. S. Infantry.

Company H, Twenty-first Infantry, and platoon of Battery E, First U. S. Artillery, proceed in cascoes from Calamba to Los Banos.

Insurgents make feint on Calamba during night.

7, 1899.—Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry mustered out at San Francisco, Cal.

9, 1899.—Troops of the Second Division make a general advance toward the north and west and capture towns of Bacolor, Calulut, and Suidalon.

10, 1899.—Transport *Morgan City* sails for Manila with detachment of recruits under command of Maj. W. Wittich, Twenty-first U. S. Infantry.

Expedition under command of Brig. Gen. Theodore Schwan arrives at Manila. Sailed from San Francisco, July 13, 1899.

President authorizes organization of a volunteer cavalry regiment to be known as the Eleventh Regiment of Cavalry, U. S. V.

11, 1899.—Transport *Sheridan* sails from Manila with the Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry and First South Dakota Volunteer Infantry, under command of Col. A. S. Frost.

12, 1899.—Troops Second Division occupy towns of Angeles and Dolores.

A reconnoissance in force up the San Mateo Valley disperses the insurgents and occupies the town of San Mateo.

15, 1899.—Transport *Senator* sails for Manila with detachment of recruits, under command of Lieut. Col. E. M. Hayes, Fourth U. S. Cavalry.

16, 1899.—Batteries A and B, Utah Volunteer Light Artillery, mustered out at San Francisco, Cal.

17, 1899.—President authorizes organization of ten additional regiments of volunteers, Thirty-eighth to Forty-seventh, inclusive.

18, 1899.—Transport *Conemaugh* arrives at Manila. Sailed from San Francisco July 11, 1899.

Transport *City of Sydney* sails for Manila with a detachment of recruits, under command of Capt. F. H. Albright, Twenty-fifth U. S. Infantry.

20, 1899.—Transport *Garrone* sails for Manila with detachment of Third U. S. Cavalry and 389 horses, under command of First Lieut. E. M. Suplee, Third U. S. Cavalry.

21, 1899.—Expedition under command of Col. S. Snyder, Nineteenth U. S. Infantry, arrives at Manila. Sailed from San Francisco July 25, 1899.

22, 1899.—Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry mustered out at San Francisco, Cal.

23, 1899.—First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry mustered out at San Francisco, Cal.

Aug. 23, 1899.—Transports *Valencia* and *Zealandia* sail from Manila with First Montana Volunteer Infantry, under command of Col. H. C. Kessler.

24, 1899.—Command of Maj. O. J. Sweet arrives at Manila. Sailed from San Francisco July 26, 1899.

25, 1899.—Transport *Athenian* sails for Manila with Troop D, Third U. S. Cavalry, under command of Capt. G. F. Chase, Third U. S. Cavalry.

Transport *St. Paul* sails for Manila with Troops A, C, E, F, K, L, and M, Third U. S. Cavalry, under command of Lieut. Col. H. W. Wessells, jr., Third U. S. Cavalry.

29, 1899.—Transport *City of Puebla* sails for Manila with detachment of recruits, under command of Capt. B. D. Devore, Twenty-third U. S. Infantry.

ANNUAL REPORT OF MAJ. GEN. E. S. OTIS, U. S. V., COMMANDING DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
AND OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
Manila, P. I., August 31, 1899.

THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have received instructions from the Major-General Commanding the Army to submit an annual report of the military operations of the troops of this command, also from the War Department to furnish a report of the affairs of this military government. The matters connected with each of these subjects are so closely related as to make the rendition of separate and independent reports very difficult without producing in each much which the other must contain. I have, therefore, concluded to embrace in a single narration with comment, as necessary explanation may appear to me to demand, the conditions which have presented themselves, both military, civil, or political, and the means which have been adopted to meet them. In doing this only the general features of the more important events can be touched upon, as an attempt to detail causes, effects, and the action which has been applied by the military authorities would involve a very extended recounting of facts and a lengthy discussion of theories.

The time which I am directed to cover in these reports may properly be divided into two periods—the first extending from June 30, 1898, to February 4, 1899, the date upon which the then rebellious subjects of Spain attacked at Manila, without cause, the forces of the United States, which, under the protocol of August 12, 1898, and likewise the articles of capitulation of the following day, were lawfully in possession of the city, bay, and harbor of Manila. The second period extends from February 4, 1899 (when these open and declared hostilities were inaugurated), to the present date. The events of a portion of the first period, in so far as the concentration of troops at San Francisco and the transportation of those sent out to the Philippines, to and including July 15, 1898, are concerned, together with all action of troops preliminary to, and attendant upon, the capture of Manila on August 13, 1898, and thereafter to the end of that month, have been ably reported by my predecessor, Major-General Merritt. But a brief reference to the preparations made by the Government, as solely affecting the Army, in its efforts to meet existing or anticipated conditions in the Philippines resulting from, or likely to arise in, the war with Spain, is pertinent here in order to present intelligently the services of troops in these islands.

The Philippine problem, so unexpectedly and suddenly thrown upon the Government for solution by the destruction of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Manila on May 1, 1898, when the concentration of all its troops and military stores was being hastily made on the southern

Atlantic coast, received the prompt attention which its importance demanded. At once the enlistment of volunteers in the Pacific Slope and adjacent States was accelerated and their places of assembling changed to San Francisco. Under War Department instructions to proceed to that point for duty, I arrived there on May 17, where already Major-General Merriam, commanding the Department of California, had placed in camp an infantry regiment and a heavy artillery detachment of California volunteers, an infantry battalion of Oregon troops, and five companies of the Fourteenth United States Infantry. Within the next ten days the Nebraska, Colorado, Minnesota, Wyoming, Idaho, Utah, North Dakota, and Montana volunteers arrived, also the two remaining battalions of the Oregon regiment and a volunteer regiment from Pennsylvania. On May 29 the Eighteenth and Twenty-third United States Infantry and a company of the United States Engineers reported, and during the month of June the volunteer organizations of South Dakota, Iowa, Tennessee, the Astor Battery, of New York, 4 foot batteries of the Third and 2 light batteries of the Sixth U. S. Artillery, and 6 troops of the Fourth Cavalry were placed in camp, also 2 volunteer signal companies and large Hospital Corps detachments. On May 30 General Merritt arrived from New York and relieved me from command of all these so-called expeditionary forces, remaining there until the 29th of the following month, when he departed for the Philippines.

The proper equipment of these troops was attended with great difficulty. Suddenly called to meet an expected emergency in a far distant portion of the world, no preparations had been made to receive them. The supply departments, not anticipating any concentration of forces on the Pacific coast, had made no provisions for furnishing arms, ammunition, clothing, subsistence, or other war material with which an army about to operate 7,000 miles from its base must necessarily be supplied. Indeed, at the time these troops arrived at San Francisco such property, usually kept in moderate quantities on the Pacific coast, had been sent to the East for the army destined to invade Cuba and Porto Rico. The volunteer organizations were supposed to report equipped and uniformed, but a large majority of the arms they presented were worthless, and in some instances entire organizations had to be rearmed. Their clothing had evidently been in use for a long time in State service, was worn out, and many of the men were dressed as civilians. In spite of all of these embarrassments, the celerity with which these troops were equipped and made ready for the field, and with which great quantities of necessary supplies and war materials were placed in San Francisco and loaded on transports, furnishes very satisfactory evidence of the efficiency of the staff departments of the Army. Fortunately, San Francisco is a great market, and much that was needed could be obtained there through contract and purchase. The facilities thus offered were taken advantage of, and assisted very materially in the work of preparation. The shipping on the Pacific coast was found to be very limited, and vessels in anywise suited (even after they were overhauled and repaired) to transport troops to the Tropics were few, and most of them were at the time absent, engaged in foreign or domestic trade. This want was the principal cause of delay in dispatching troops, but the persistent efforts of the War Department, assisted by the army supply officers in San Francisco, accomplished the desired results very quickly, considering the embarrassments with which it had to contend. The time required for these preparations, however, was most advantageously

employed. General officers, as soon as they reported for duty, were placed in charge of brigade organizations and labored assiduously in giving proper instructions to their commands, so that when these troops sailed for the Philippines they could be considered moderately efficient for service.

Upon reporting at San Francisco on May 17, I learned that General Merriam had received orders to ship to Manila Bay the California regiment and a battalion of the Fourteenth U. S. Infantry by a transport that was then being loaded in the harbor with naval stores for Admiral Dewey's squadron. Thereafter being instructed to obtain sufficient transportation to forward also the Oregon regiment, two small transports were secured, and on May 25 the three vessels sailed in company, carrying the troops above mentioned, under the command of Brig. Gen. T. M. Anderson, U. S. V., and entered the harbor of Manila on the 30th day of June. Pursuant to the instructions of General Merritt 4 companies of the Eighteenth and 4 of the Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, a detachment of engineers, the Colorado, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, and Utah Volunteers, and a detachment of the Hospital Corps—all under the command of Brig. Gen. F. V. Greene, U. S. V.—sailed for Manila on June 15. On June 27, under instructions from the same source, 4 companies of the Eighteenth and 4 of the Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, detachments of Engineer and Signal Corps, the Idaho, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Wyoming Volunteers, departed on five transports, and on June 29 General Merritt, in person, accompanied by his staff, sailed on steamer *Newport* for the same destination, having on board 2 foot batteries of the Third U. S. Artillery and the Astor Light Battery. The troops of which these three expeditionary forces were composed numbered 470 officers and 10,437 enlisted men. Subsequently, and between the 15th and 25th days of July, the fourth expedition left San Francisco, transported by five vessels, and made up of 2 batteries of the Third U. S. Artillery, 5 companies of the Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, 6 troops of the Fourth U. S. Cavalry, the Montana and South Dakota Volunteers, with Signal and Hospital Corps detachments, numbering in all, 172 officers and 4,610 enlisted men. Before this last expedition reached Manila that city had capitulated, and the United States troops were in possession. No additional troops were dispatched from the United States until the latter part of October. Then, and in the following month, were sent the Washington, Kansas, Tennessee, and Iowa regiments of volunteers, the Nevada troop of cavalry, the Wyoming Light Artillery, and 2 foot batteries of California troops, numbering, collectively, 186 officers and 4,466 enlisted men. There were no further arrivals during the first of the two periods which it is intended that this report shall cover, and subsequent troop additions will not be mentioned until later.

With the officers of my staff I accompanied the fourth expedition and arrived in the harbor of Manila on August 21, where we first learned of the operations of the 10,000 men who had preceded or accompanied Major-General Merritt, and which had resulted in the surrender of Manila and its occupation by the United States forces on the 13th of that month. Reporting to General Merritt, I was placed in command of the Eighth Army Corps by General Orders, No. 10, Headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, of August 23, 1898, which were issued under War Department General Orders, No. 73, of that year. Upon August 29, 1898, in accordance with General Orders, No. 3, Headquarters Department of the Pacific, of that date, I relieved Major-General Merritt of the command of the

Department of the Pacific and as Military Governor of the Philippine Islands. At this time the military situation was as follows:

Under the articles of capitulation, United States occupation was confined to the harbor, city, and bay of Manila. Admiral Dewey, with his fleet, held the bay, also the naval establishment at Cavite, which had been captured in May. The insurgent forces, commanded by General Aguinaldo, entered the city with our troops on August 13, and actively held joint occupation with them over a considerable part of the southern portion of the same, declining to vacate on the plea, first, that they had served as allies with our troops, during the operations which had preceded the taking of the city, and therefore had the right to participate in the victory; and, secondly, that they wished to maintain all advantageous positions secured in order to resist successfully the troops of Spain, should that Government be permitted to resume its former power in the islands. Brigadier-Generals Anderson and MacArthur were exercising immediate command of the troops—the former at Cavite and vicinity, where a small contingent was stationed, and the latter at Manila, where the great majority had been judiciously placed in barracks and other available buildings. General MacArthur, also, as provost-marshal-general, had charge of the police of that city and supervision of about 13,000 prisoners—Spanish and native—who had been surrendered by the Spanish authorities. These had been collected in the walled portion of the city and occupied, for the most part, its churches and convents. Outwardly peace reigned, but the insurgents, disappointed because not permitted to enjoy the spoils of war, in accordance with medieval customs, and to exercise with the United States authorities joint control of municipal affairs, were not friendly disposed and endeavored to obtain their asserted rights and privileges through controversy and negotiations and a stubborn holding of the positions taken by their troops. This manifestation caused General Merritt to cable the authorities at Washington, on August 14, as follows:

> Since occupation of town and suburbs the insurgents on outside are pressing demand for joint occupation of the city. Inform me at once how far I shall proceed in enforcing obedience of insurgents in this matter and others that may arise, etc.

To which he received reply—dated August 18—that there must be no joint occupation of the city, bay, and harbor with the insurgents; that they and all others must recognize the military occupation and authority of the United States and the cessation of hostilities proclaimed by the President. Some correspondence between General Merritt and Aguinaldo preceded and followed this dispatch, and I believe also two or three discussions of the subject between the representatives of Aguinaldo and General Merritt's subordinate officers, all of which have been reported. Upon leaving the island, General Merritt's chief of staff turned over to me a communication from General Aguinaldo, and in letter transmitting it said:

> Enclosed you will find a letter from General Aguinaldo and a blue print of Manila. The letter was brought by his aid two days ago, and was informed that a reply would be sent within four days. The matter should have immediate attention, as General Merritt has not been able to take it up, owing to his hurried departure. The letters referred to by Aguinaldo, by General Merritt, will be found in the press copy-book at the Department Headquarters and here.
>
> The demand now made by Aguinaldo is to retain his people just outside of the interior black pencil mark on the map. The outside pencil marks indicate the position that General Merritt desired to have the insurgents withdraw to. I

inferred from what the aid said that what Aguinaldo particularly desires is that in case his requests are not granted that reasons are to be given which he can use to satisfy his people. The trouble with him seems to be that he does not think it prudent to give positive orders for his people to withdraw from the city.

The communication turned over read as follows:

REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES.

Presidencia Bakoor, August 27, 1898.

Gen. WESLEY MERRITT, *Manila.*

MY DEAR SIR: Knowing the contents of your letter of the 26th instant, I can not do less than manifest my surprise at knowing that you had formed the idea that my commissioners compromised themselves, in the conference of the 15th, to retire my troops outside of the line that you would designate.

I understood, and still understand, as well as the commissioners, that the evacuation by my troops of the posts that they occupy to-day on the outskirts of the city, would take place when the proposed conditions were accepted by you, among which figured the condition that the agreement (treaty) should be in writing to be valid; for which reason, not having yet accepted some of the propositions made at that time, nor those that were substituted in my previous communication, I do not think that up to the present time I have contracted said obligation.

If I have permitted the use of the waters before the promulgation of the treaty it was more to demonstrate that I am disposed to sacrifice to friendship everything that does not prejudice too much the rights of the Philippines. I comprehend, as well as yourself, the inconvenience of a dual occupation of the city of Manila and its suburbs, given in the conditions stipulated in the capitulation with the Spaniards; but you ought to understand that without the long siege sustained by my forces you might have obtained possession of the ruins of the city, but never the rendition of the Spanish forces, who could have retired to the interior towns.

I do not complain of the disowning of our help in the mentioned capitulation, although justice resents it greatly and I have to bear the well-founded blame of my people. I do not insist on the retention of all the positions conquered by my forces within the city limits, at the cost of much blood, of indescribable fatigues, and much money. I promise to retire, then, to the following line:

In Malate, the continuation of the calzada of Singalon to the bridge that joins said road; from this bridge in straight line to that of Paco; from this last bridge, following the creek Paco, and leaving outside the suburb Tandue, to the river Pasig; following this river and entering by the creek that goes to the bridge of Aviles; from this bridge, following the road (calzada) of the same name and that of Santa Mesa, that are the dividing lines between Sampaloc and the village of Pandacan, to the jurisdictional limit of the suburbs of Sampaloc, Trozo, and Tondo.

But before I retire to this line, I pray you to reclaim from Admiral Dewey the protection of our ships for free navigation, and permit me to insist, if you will, upon the restitution of the positions that we now are going to leave, if in the treaty of peace to be celebrated between Spain and the United States they acknowledge the dominion of Spain in the Philippines. I expect as well that you order the American forces outside of above line to retire within the city, as already agreed to.

I do not believe that the acceptation of the conditions proposed will prejudice the smallest right of your people, as it signifies nothing more than the acknowledgment of a part of the rights of a friendly people.

I am compelled to insist on the said conditions to quiet the complaints of my chiefs and soldiers, who have exposed their lives and abandoned their interests during the siege of Manila.

I hope that this time you will manifest the spirit of justice that pertains to such a free and admirably constituted Government as that of the United States of America.

Yours, very respectfully, EMILIO AGUINALDO.

Aguinaldo's letter was considered the following day, when it became evident that time would be required to prepare an answer, as prior to doing so it was important to gain a knowledge of the contents of past communications on the subject, and to ascertain what other steps had been taken to adjust the difficulty, of which I was ignorant. I there-

upon telegraphed to General Aguinaldo at Bacoor, Cavite province, his then headquarters, as follows:

MANILA, *August 31, 1898.*

General AGUINALDO, *Bacoor:*

Referring to promise made by General Merritt to reply to your letter of August 27 within four days, I desire to state that he was unexpectedly ordered away and had not opportunity to reply. Being unacquainted with the situation, I must take time to inform myself before answering, which I will do at the earliest opportunity.

OTIS.

To this telegram he replied on the same day as follows:

General OTIS,
Commanding United States Forces, Manila.

GENERAL: By your telegram of this date I understood that your excellency substitutes General Merritt in his absence, for which I beg you will kindly accept my cordial salutation and my most sincere congratulations.

I shall have much pleasure in continuing with your excellency the friendly relations which ought to exist between us.

The bearer is one of my aids, who will acquaint you of some reserved affairs.

Hoping you will give your attention as the welfare of both countries require,

Very respectfully, yours,

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

BACOOR, *August 31, 1898.*

A communication, of which the following is a copy, was thereupon prepared and sent to General Aguinaldo, at Malolos, Luzon, to which point he had removed his headquarters and established his so-called capital, viz:

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., September 8, 1898.

The COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE FORCES.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 27th ultimo, addressed to General Merritt, my predecessor, and by him transferred to me on the eve of his departure from Manila. By telegram of the 31st ultimo I informed you of General Merritt's hurried departure, in obedience to the orders of my Government; that his necessarily hurried preparations did not permit him to make reply to your communication; that such duty devolved upon me, and that I would perform it at the earliest opportunity and as soon as I could acquaint myself with the condition of affairs, of which I, having but recently arrived, had slight knowledge. To my telegram you made a most courteous response, and now, having carefully considered the situation, I have the honor to make reply as follows:

And first, in your note of the 27th ultimo you are pleased to manifest surprise that the late United States military governor should have reached an erroneous conclusion as to the result of a conference with your commissioners on August 15, as apparently manifested by his letter to you of August 24. I do not know the extent of any conversation which may have been indulged in at that conference, nor the nature of the impression which may have been conveyed. Referring to written memoranda in my possession which purport to contain the substance of propositions discussed, I find that certain concessions were made by the commissioners in expected return for specific privileges to be conferred, and, as there has not been a mutual agreement in these matters between the interested parties, I do not understand that any obligations have arisen by reason of that conference.

Second. I note with pleasure your allusion to your very friendly disposition toward my Government, as manifested by your prompt attendance to our request for a supply of water; also your expression as to the inconvenience of the dual occupation of the city of Manila, and I do not forget that the revolutionary forces under your command have made many sacrifices in the interests of civil liberty and for the welfare of your people, and to this I will be pleased to allude hereafter.

Third. In connection with your remark as to the injustice of the United States in not properly appreciating your assistance in the capture of Manila, I beg a full consideration, on your part, of the mandatory conditions which accompany occupation, which I am sure you fully appreciate, but to which I will respectfully invite your attention in a subsequent portion of this reply.

Fourth. You designate certain lines within the suburbs of the city of Manila,

to which you promise to retire your troops, and name as conditions precedent: First, protection to your shipping by the United States Navy, and the free navigation of your vessels within the waters in United States occupation; second, restitution to your forces of all positions which are now occupied by your troops, in the event that treaty stipulations between the United States and Spain surrender to the last-named Government the territory occupied by the former; and thirdly, that United States troops now occupying positions beyond the lines you name shall retire within the same.

A discussion of your proposition to hold, jointly, with the United States Government, the city of Manila, involves consideration of some of the other concessions you desired to be made, and to that I will at once refer. I wish to present the matter, in the first instance, in its legal aspect, although, from remarks contained in former correspondence, I am of the opinion that you are fully aware how untenable the proposition is. The United States and Spain were and are belligerent parties to a war, and were so recognized by the civilized world. In the course of events the entire city of Manila, then in full possession of Spanish forces, was surrendered to the first-named belligerent power. The articles of agreement and capitulation gave the United States Government full occupancy of the city and defenses of Manila, and that Government obligated itself to insure the safety of the lives and property of the inhabitants of the city to the best of its ability. By all the laws of war and all international precedents, United States authority over Manila and its defenses is full and supreme, and it can not escape the obligations which it has assumed.

By the able representatives who have charge of the Philippine revolutionary forces this conclusion will be admitted to be incontrovertible, and argument on the point is unnecessary. Can they who seek civil and religious liberty and invite the approval and assistance of the civilized world afford to enter upon a course of action which the law of nations must condemn?

But conceding, as you do, the strictly legal right of my Government to hold and administer the affairs of the city of Manila and its suburbs (I thus conclude from expressions contained in former correspondence and from my appreciation of your intellectual attainments), you base your proposition—a joint occupation—upon supposed equitable grounds, referring to the sacrifices your troops have made and the assistance they have rendered the American forces in the capture of Manila. It is well known they have made personal sacrifices, endured great hardships, and have rendered aid. But is it forgotten that my Government has swept the Spanish navy from the seas of both hemispheres; sent back to Spain the Spanish army and navy forces, recently embarked for your destruction, and the secure holding of the Philippine possessions; that since May 1 last its navy has held the city of Manila at its mercy, but out of consideration of humanity refused to bombard it, preferring to send troops to demand surrender, and thereby preserve the lives and property of the inhabitants? Is it forgotten that the destruction of the Spanish navy and the retention of Spanish armed men in its European possessions has opened up to you the ports of the island of Luzon and held Spain helpless to meet its refractory subjects?

As between my Government and the revolutionary forces of the Philippines, I fail to discover on what principle of common justice a joint occupation of Manila can be maintained. Equity, in a legal acceptance of the term, would most assuredly condemn it. A sense of justice should, in my opinion, have prompted the revolutionary forces to aid those of my country in every way possible in return for the great assistance they have received. You remark, in substance, that had you not prevented the Spanish forces from retreating from the city the United States would have received naught but its ruined streets and buildings. Possibly; but had all Spanish subjects, elsewhere and here, been the contented subjects of Spain war between it and my Government would not have been waged. It was undertaken by the United States for humanity's sake, and not for its aggrandizement or for any national profit it expected to receive, and it has expended millions of treasure and hundreds of the lives of its citizens in the interests of the Spanish suffering colonists.

Apart from all legal and equitable considerations, and those having their origin in personally conceived ideas of justice, I wish respectfully to call your attention to the impracticability of maintaining a joint occupation of Manila and its suburbs, and in this I know that I shall have the approval of your excellent judgment. It would be extremely difficult to prevent friction between our respective forces, which might result in unfortunate consequences, labor as we may for continued harmonious relations. Located in close proximity, irresponsible members of our organizations, by careless or impertinent action, might be the means of inciting grave disturbances; and in this connection I call to your attention the recent shoot-

ing affair at Cavite, which still requires investigation. There might also arise conflict of authority between our subordinate officers. Even now, within precincts in entire actual possession of our troops, I find that permits are given to citizens, who are styled local presidents, to make arrests, to carry arms, etc., in violation of our instructions and authority, and that several cases of kidnaping have taken place. In pursuance of our obligations to maintain, in so far as we can, domestic tranquillity, our officers have arrested suspected parties, and they have asserted (with what element of truth I know not) that the insurgent forces are the offenders. I have declined to accept their statements, as I prefer to believe the contrary, although it would appear that officers connected with those forces have issued the permits to which I allude. Such interference with our administration of civil affairs must eventually result in conflict.

Again (reverting to a legal aspect of the subject), the affairs of the entire city corporation must be administered from a common center. The trust accepted by my Government from those who surrendered actual possession confers a *discretionary* power, which can neither be shared nor delegated. The validity of this conclusion will be readily understood by yourself and associates as a well-established legal proposition, and does not require argument. And here permit me to remark upon a view of the subject you have advocated in support of the plea for dual occupation of the city's suburbs. Your forces, you say in substance, should have a share in the *booty* resulting from the conquest of the city, on account of hardships endured and assistance rendered. The facts on which you base your conclusion granted, your conclusion, under the rules of war which are binding on my Government, does not follow, for it has never recognized the existence of spoils of war, denominated "booty," as have many European governments. No enemy's property of any kind, public or private, can be seized, claimed by, or awarded to, any of its officers or men, and should they attempt to appropriate any of it for their individual benefit, they would be very severely punished through military tribunals, on which have been conferred by law very sweeping jurisdiction. The enemy's money and property (all that is not necessary to be expended in administering local affairs in the enemy's territory) must be preserved for final arbitrament or settlement by and between the supreme authorities of the nations concerned. My troops can not acquire booty nor any individual benefit by reason of the capture of an enemy's territory. I make this comment, believing that you hold erroneous opinions in respect to individual advantages which occupation bestows.

I request your indulgence while I briefly consider the concessions you ask us to make as conditions precedent to the retirement of your forces to the lines indicated by your note of the 27th ultimo.

The first is: Protection to your shipping and free navigation to your vessels. Neither the extent of protection nor the limit of free navigation you request is understood. Certainly you could not mean protection on the high seas, or in the ports not in the rightful possession of the United States. That, as you are fully aware, could only be effected by treaty, or guarantee, following international recognition of the belligerent rights of the Philippine revolutionary government. While the existing armistice continues, the United States are in rightful possession, in so far as the navigable waters of the Philippine Islands are concerned, only of the bay of Manila and its navigable tributaries. Within the same all vessels of trade and commerce and the war vessels of recognized national powers sail freely as long as the sovereignty of my Government is not assailed nor the peace of the locality threatened. In this respect, whatever concessions are extended by way of relaxation of trade restrictions, incident to war, to the citizens of these islands will be extended to all alike, and discrimination in this regard is neither intended nor permitted. Admiral Dewey exercises supervision over all naval matters, and they are in no way related to the duties conferred upon me by law. Nor would it avail should I seek his consent for greater latitude of action, for even if disposed to grant special concessions he could not do so, and I doubt if the supreme authority of my Government could now, under the prevailing truce with Spain, invest him with the requisite powers to do so and at the same time preserve its international obligations.

The second concession named by you is restitution of positions in the city of Manila to your forces, in case the treaty of peace remands to Spain the territory surrendered under the late capitulatory articles; and the third and last is a promise to retire our troops within the lines indicated by you, as the lines on which you desire your troops to remain permanently. These propositions having a kindred nature, may be considered together, and, indeed, have already been impliedly answered. From previous statements of facts and logical conclusions made and stated in this communication, concerning the nature of the obligations resting on the United States with regard to the territory to which they have the legal right of possession under contracting articles with Spain, it is evident that neither in

law or morals can the concessions be made. I would be powerless to grant them in any aspect of the case, being nothing more than an agent to carry out the instructions of the executive head of my Government and not being vested with discretionary power to determine matters of such moment. In the present instance I am not only powerless to accede to your request, but have been strictly enjoined by my Government, mindful of its international promises and national honor, which it has never broken nor sacrificed, not to accede joint occupation of the city and suburbs of Manila, and am directed specially to preserve the peace and protect persons and property within the territory surrendered under the terms of the Spanish capitulation. These mandates must be obeyed.

Thus have I endeavored with all candor and sincerity, holding nothing in reserve, to place before you the situation as understood by me, and I doubt not by the Republic which I represent. I have not been instructed as to what policy the United States intends to pursue in regard to its legitimate holdings here, and hence I am unable to give you any information on the subject. That it will have a care and labor conscientiously for the welfare of your people I sincerely believe. It remains for you, beneficiaries of its sacrifices, to adopt a course of action which will manifest your good intentions and show to the world the principles which actuate your proceedings.

You and your associates could not regret more than I any conflict between our forces, which would tend to excite the citizens of my country, who are always a unit in action whenever its sovereignty is attacked or its rights to fulfill its international obligations is called into question. Then they never count cost, and, as you are fully aware, its resources are abundant. Rather than see the ships of the navy of the United States controlling the navigable waters of these islands and its army devastating their territory, I would greatly prefer to advise my Government that there is no longer need to send more of its troops to this section of the country, and that those whom its holds waiting on its Pacific slope can be remanded to their homes or employed elsewhere, as it may determine.

It only remains for me to respectfully notify you that I am compelled by my instructions to direct that your armed forces evacuate the entire city of Manila, including its suburbs and defenses, and that I shall be obliged to take action with that end in view within a very short space of time should you decline to comply with my Government's demands; and I hereby serve notice on you that unless your troops are withdrawn beyond the line of the city's defenses before Thursday, the 15th instant, I shall be obliged to resort to forcible action, and that my Government will hold you responsible for any unfortunate consequences which may ensue.

Permit me to believe that my confidence in the sound judgment and patriotism of yourself and associates is not misplaced.

You will please pardon me for my apparent unnecessary delay in replying to your communication of the 27th ultimo, but press of the duties connected with the administration of the affairs of this city is my excuse.

In conclusion, I beg to inform you that I have conferred freely with Admiral Dewey upon the contents of this communication and am delegated by him to state that he fully approves of the same in all respects; that the commands of our Government compel us to act as herein indicated, and that between our respective forces there will be unanimity and complete concert of action.

I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant.

E. S. Otis,
Major-General U. S. V.,
United States Military Governor in the Philippines.

On September 13, a commission sent by Aguinaldo and consisting of three members, one of whom was the treasurer and another the attorney-general of the insurgent government, called for the purpose of discussing the subject of my letter of the 8th. They asked me to withdraw it and simply request in writing that the insurgent troops retire to the line designated by General Merritt, which I refused to do, stating that unless they withdrew as directed we would be obliged to resort to force. They then asked that I withdraw the letter and issue a request unaccompanied by any threat to use force, as Aguinaldo was fearful that he would be unable to remove his troops upon a demand. To which I replied that the letter of the 8th instant would stand. They then said that as the demands of that letter must remain unchanged, the insurgents would withdraw as directed therein, but

that if I would express in writing a simple request to Aguinaldo to withdraw to the lines which I designated—something which he could show to the troops and induce them to think that he was simply acting upon a request from these headquarters—he would probably be able to retire his men without much difficulty; that, of course, they themselves understood the direction to withdraw, which would be obeyed, and thereupon repeated their desire to obtain a note of request, whereupon I furnished them with the following:

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., September 13, 1898.

The COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE FORCES.

SIR: Referring to my communication of September 8, I have the honor to inform you that I have had a most agreeable conversation with certain gentlemen who are in the interests of your revolutionary government upon the mattters therein contained. We have discussed at length the complications now existing, which will exist, and will doubtless increase, while our troops continue to occupy jointly certain districts of the city of Manila. I have urged upon them the necessity of the withdrawal of your troops in order that the friendly relations which have always been maintained by and between them and the forces of the United States Government may be perpetuated. I am sure that the gentlemen fully appreciate my sentiments and will clearly report them to you. May I ask you to patiently listen to their report of our conversation?

It is my desire that our friendly intercourse and mutual amicable relations be continued; that they be not jeopardized if we can by consistent action avoid it, and such, I am certain, is the desire of yourself and associates.

May I ask, therefore, that you withdraw your troops from Manila?

Permit me to add in conclusion that I have that confidence in your ability and patriotism which will lead you to accede to this request.

I am, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V.,
United States Military Governor in the Philippines.

In reply to which, on the 16th, the following was received:

MALOLOS, BULACAN, *September 16, 1898.*

The COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE AMERICAN FORCES.

MY DEAR SIR: Referring to your esteemed communication, dated the 13th instant, I have the honor to inform you that I have given appropriate orders that my troops should abandon their most advanced positions within some of the suburbs, and that they should retire to points where contact with yours would be more difficult, in order to avoid all occasion for conflict.

I hope that by these presents you will be fully convinced of my constant desire to preserve amicable relations with the American forces, even at the risk of sacrificing a part of the confidence placed in my government by the Philippine people.

A consideration of my many occupations will serve to excuse me for not having answered with the promptness desired.

Your very respectful servant,

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

On the evening of the 15th the armed insurgent organizations withdrew from the city and all of its suburbs, as acknowledged by their leaders, excepting from one small outlying district. This, certain agents of Aguinaldo asked on the previous day to be permitted to retain for a short time, on the plea that the general officer in command would not obey instructions, and they proposed to remove his men gradually by organizations and thereafter to punish him for his disobedience. The withdrawal was effected adroitly, as the insurgents marched out in excellent spirits, cheering the American troops.

During the progress of these negotiations the tactical organization of troops was being effected. General Merritt, on August 23, had formed the corps into two divisions, the first at Cavite, composed of troops recently arrived and expected to arrive later, with certain

exceptions; the second, of those stationed in Manila. Early in September orders were issued announcing the staff officers of the corps and department; also announcing to the command the promotions of Brigadier-Generals Anderson, MacArthur, and Greene to major-generals U. S. V., and of Colonels Ovenshine and Hale and Lieutenant-Colonel Whittier to the grade of brigadier-generals of volunteers; also the composition of divisions, which were organized as follows: The first, comprising all troops in the district of Cavite, Major-General Anderson to command, and consisting of one brigade to be commanded by Brig. Gen. H. G. Otis; the second, under command of Major-General MacArthur, consisting of two brigades, to be commanded, respectively, by Brigadier-Generals Ovenshine and Hale. Measures were taken to promptly meet any difficulties which might arise under the demand to withdraw from the city which had been served upon the insurgents. Brig. Gen. R. P. Hughes, U. S. V., relieved General MacArthur as provost-marshal of Manila, and was placed in command of a separate brigade to constitute the provost guard, consisting of the Twenty-third Infantry, the Second Oregon, and First Montana regiments of volunteers.

In General Merritt's orders of August 15 and 16, wherein he prescribed regulations for the government of Manila, he announced as follows:

In addition to his duties as brigade commander, Brig. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, U. S. V., is hereby appointed military commandant of the walled city of Manila, and provost-marshal-general of the city of Manila, including all outlying districts within the municipal jurisdiction. * * * He will relieve the civil governor of his functions, and take possession of the offices, clerks, and all the machinery of administration of that office, retaining and employing the present subordinate officers of civil administration until in his judgment it is desirable to replace them by other appointments. * * * In paragraphs 3 and 4 of the terms of capitulation, full lists of public property and stores and returns in duplicate of the men by organizations are to be rendered to the United States within ten days, and public property of all kinds is to be turned over to the staff officers of the United States designated to receive them. Under these paragraphs the chief of artillery at these headquarters and the chiefs of the staff departments will take possession of the public property turned over as above, pertaining to their respective departments. The returns of prisoners will be submitted to the military commandant of the city, who will assign the men, for quarters, in such public buildings and barracks as are not required for the use of United States troops. * * * The chief paymaster at these headquarters will turn over such portions of the Spanish public funds received by him, by virtue of this order, to the military commandant above designated, as may be necessary for the administration of his office. All removals and appointments of subordinate officers of civil administration and transfers of funds authorized by the order must receive the approval of the commanding general before action is taken.

In addition to the command of his brigade, Brig. Gen. F. V. Greene, U. S. V., will perform the duties hitherto performed by the intendente-general de hacienda, and will have charge, subject to instructions of the major-general commanding, of all fiscal affairs of the government of Manila.

Col. C. A. Whittier, U. S. V., is appointed collector of customs, and the chief paymaster, Department of the Pacific, will designate a bonded officer of the Pay Department as custodian of all public funds. Both of these officers will report to Brigadier-General Greene for instructions.

Under this last paragraph, Maj. Charles H. Whipple, paymaster, U. S. A., was directed to receive the Spanish public funds. Maj. R. E. C. Bement, U. S. Volunteer Engineers, had already been appointed the collector of internal revenue, and by request of General Merritt and consent of Admiral Dewey, Capt. Henry Glass, U. S. N., was designated as captain of the port.

On August 22 military commissions and provost courts were provided for and their jurisdiction defined. In the proclamation issued

at the time of the surrender of the city, it was ordered that the municipal laws "should be considered as continuing in force in so far as compatible with the purposes of military government," and should "be administered through the ordinary tribunals substantially as before occupation, but by officers appointed by the government of occupation."

By department orders, issued on the eve of his departure, General Merritt, under instructions from Washington, relieved General Greene and personal staff from duty, directing their return to the United States, and appointed Lieut. Col. C. A. Whittier, inspector-general of the corps (and shortly afterwards announced as brigadier-general of volunteers), intendente de hacienda, which gave him charge of all fiscal matters in the territory of occupation, and continued him as collector of customs.

Such were the chief measures announced and the means adopted to continue in part and establish in part a temporary government to administer the affairs of the city of Manila. Unfortunately, the Spanish civil authorities abandoned most of their civil offices without making transfer of the public records and property. The officers of the Spanish army never made satisfactory returns of their troops, by organization or otherwise, and did not render lists of property to the United States within the period of ten days, as promised in the capitulatory articles, nor have they ever rendered such lists. The civil court justices vacated their positions and gradually sailed for Spain without giving notice of their intention to depart, nor taking the necessary measures to render secure the property and especially the records of their courts, many of which could never be found, and which, presumably, they took with them. To be sure, they had not been authorized to exercise their functions as judges by the government of occupation, as provided for in the articles of capitulation, until October 4, 1898, and then only in a limited degree, as the granting of such authority, in the then prevailing condition of public feeling, would have been politically disastrous, or at least most injurious, to United States interests. Indeed, in two or three instances when, without appointment or authority, they attempted to judicially determine questions in litigation and pending at the time of the surrender of the city, indignant protests were submitted by inhabitants, both native and foreign, and instructions to suspend action on the ground of unauthorized proceedings were issued from the office of the military governor.

Finally, upon October 7, to meet the needs of the citizens for tribunals to pass upon questions of a strictly civil character, the following order was issued:

> Until otherwise directed from these headquarters, the civil courts, as composed and constituted by the laws of Spain, which were held and administered prior to August 13, 1898, within Philippine territory now subject to United States military occupation and control, are permitted to resume at once the exercise of the civil jurisdiction conferred by Spanish laws within the limits of that territory, subject, however, to such supervision by the military government of the United States here instituted as in its judgment the interests of that Government may demand. This privilege does not extend to or embrace permission to institute criminal proceedings or to exercise criminal jurisdiction of any nature or character whatsoever.
>
> The provisions of orders heretofore issued by the authority of the United States in the Philippine Islands inconsistent with the foregoing instructions and directions are hereby revoked.

The difficulties and perplexities which confronted all officers appointed to conduct civil affairs were therefore very great. The

prisons were full to overflowing with convicted criminals and persons charged with crimes. Immediate attempts were made to relieve this congestion, and applications of the friends of those incarcerated, for their release, were constant. In the jail deliveries which followed, although conducted after search of records obtainable at the time, a few of the most notorious criminals escaped. Subsequently greater care was exercised and each individual case was made the subject of investigation, and even then, when pardon accompanied by release was granted, it was frequently followed by application for the return of embargoed estates, which presented very perplexing questions for determination, involving a study of many Spanish war-measure decrees.

The city government which was in operation at the time of surrender and the revenue measures practiced for its support were the results of national, colonial, and local decrees, orders, and approved recommendations, more or less complicated, with amendatory features, uncodified, and running over a period of many years, presenting a system so complex that after the study of months it is not yet fully understood and certainly not appreciated. The monthly expenditures for the city have been double the amount of its receipts, but as all collections of whatever nature made in the islands are deposited with the general fund in the Treasury and money is drawn therefrom on warrants as demands arise, no difficulty has been experienced.

The chiefs of the supply departments and staff corps of the Army, who had been directed to receive and receipt for the Spanish military stores when the prescribed lists should be presented, were obliged to rely solely upon their own efforts to discover this property, as no assistance was tendered by the officers of Spain. They were, it is believed, fairly successful in their persistent searches, took up and accounted for the property found, considerable of which, such as clothing, subsistence, and medicines, were expended in the care of Spanish prisoners of war. The inventories which they made were very advantageous in the final settlement of United States and Spanish claims in regard to this class of property. General Merritt's orders and those which closely followed were based on the articles of capitulation by which it was transferred to the United States, as information concerning the peace protocol of August 12, which held in abeyance all questions of property rights pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, had not been received. The fifth article of the Paris treaty of December 10 returned to Spain all these army stores and property, and the inventories which our officers had taken constituted the basis of intelligent settlement with the representatives of that government under treaty stipulations, and in many instances enabled those representatives to formulate their demands.

For three and one-half months Admiral Dewey with his squadron and the insurgents on land had kept Manila tightly bottled. All commerce had been interdicted, internal trade paralyzed, and food supplies were nearly exhausted. Upon the opening of the port merchants were clamoring for the reestablishment of inter-island commerce.

They had advanced large amounts of money on their harvested crops of tobacco, hemp, and sugar which awaited, at many points of the various islands, shipment to Manila. No present relief could be furnished by the military authorities. The harbor was filled with Spanish shipping and that of other European countries. The United States was not represented by merchantmen of any character. Spain owned and was entitled to possession of all Philippine territory, except temporary

occupancy of the bay, harbor, and city of Manila, although the insurgents had forcibly seized upon many cities and ports. The insurrection had to spread to, and was active in, all the islands with the exception of the Sulu Archipelago, and there the hereditary antagonism of the Moros was only comparatively dormant. Spain was concentrating her scattered forces in the south at the central Visayan Islands and at Zamboanga, and the Spanish general who was in immediate charge of Spanish military affairs (General Rios) had made his headquarters at Iloilo. Through negotiations with General Rios, conducted under War Department permission, an arrangement was effected whereby vessels carrying either the Spanish or American flag might engage in trade at a number of the inter-island ports, the Spanish laws to be applied to shipment and commercial privileges. But a grave difficulty still presented itself. Vessels flying the Spanish flag could not safely enter any ports which had been seized by the insurgents, nor could inter-island commerce be opened to foreign governments as it was free and undutiable in all respects. The merchants formerly employing the flag of Spain resorted to sale and transfer of their ships to American residents, technical doubtless in many instances, but upon furnishing due written proof of a full compliance with United States consular regulations in these particulars, provisional American registration was granted. Many of these vessels were thereupon released and trade became quite active. Still another difficulty was encountered and materially affected the public revenue. The customs tariffs and regulations which has been prescribed for application were faulty in many respects and required amendment before they could be intelligently applied. It was, therefore, ordered on September 29 that "the enforcement of these regulations be postponed until the 10th day of November next, and that the tariffs and duties at present imposed be continued to be applied in the port of Manila until that date, with this exception, viz, that all goods and merchandise secured, or purchased, within the dominions of Spain (the Philippine Islands excepted) since April 25, last, the date of formal declaration of war by the United States Government between that country and the Kingdom of Spain, shall be received into this port upon the same conditions as to payment of tariffs and duties as the goods and merchandise of strictly neutral nations."

Upon October 3 Capt. J. F. Evans, of the volunteer subsistence department, who had been sent to the Philippines to assist in revenue matters, was assigned to duty at the custom-house, his services to be temporarily "confined to a careful consideration of trade conditions and an exhaustive study of the United States customs and tariff regulations prescribed for application, with a view of suggesting amendments and modifications therein, in order to render them as practicable as possible to existing circumstances." The entire labor of revision was imposed upon him and he performed it in a most satisfactory manner. His revision was adopted and put in force at the announced date (November 10), has given satisfaction to all parties concerned, and has worked smoothly, only a few minor amendments having been made since it became operative.

There were also other complications which arose from Spanish action or a misunderstanding on the part of the United States authorities of Spanish expressed intention as to the particular measures which must be adopted to secure the entrance of American vessels to Spanish ports—such as sailing under Spanish captains and the obtaining, under certain conditions, from General Rios himself, at Iloilo, of a special permit

to visit certain trading points. Occasionally a vessel was turned back on her course by Spanish officers or denied entrance to a port after arrival there. Of this the merchants complained and the complaints became the subject of considerable official correspondence and controversy. The insurgents, too, whose government had taken firm root at Malolos, were, through the medium of president, cabinet, and congress, reeling off decrees and constitutional provisions at a rapid rate. Their army was continually successful against the small Spanish garrisons scattered throughout the islands, and they were beginning to acquire the belief that they were invincible. Revenue was their need and desire, and this they began to derive quite largely from imposing export duties on all products shipped to Manila from any shipping point in their possession, compelling the merchants to pay on their property some 10 per cent ad valorem upon removal. These many obstacles so impeded commerce that trade languished and the customs revenues were greatly impaired.

With the entrance of the United States troops into Manila and the opening up of that port immigration became active. Business men from our own and other countries, studying the situation, were quite numerous. Members of the criminal classes, who always follow the wake of a conquering army, came from the American and Asiatic seacoasts in large numbers. The native population of the city rapidly increased and was augmented by a considerable Chinese influx, most of which presented cedulas or certificates of personal identity, issued by the late Spanish Government, in order to prove former residence in the islands, as the United States Chinese exclusion law was directed to be applied. Aguinaldo's army of observation, on the outskirts of the city, contained many natives or residents of Manila, who, with all others of his soldiers, were accorded if unarmed, though uniformed, full liberty to enter any portion of the same. All these heterogeneous elements, with the 14,000 United States troops quartered here, filled the city to repletion and gave the provost-marshal-general and his guards ample occupation. The outside country was not yet shut to trade and the port was open to all foreign ships. Hence subsistence was abundant and the minor business industries were well employed.

In a former portion of this report I stated the fact that the insurgent authorities had received permission to continue in occupancy of certain suburbs of the city for a short time when they, on September 15, withdrew their troops from its interior portions. They did not subsequently remove their troops in accordance with agreement, but appeared to be determined to retain Paco and Pandacan, as they believed them to be advantageous military positions, south of the Pasig River. The assertion was made, and became current, that these suburbs were not within the jurisdiction of Manila, and it became advisable to make search and survey to gain desired information on that point. These were made by Lieutenant-Colonel Potter, chief engineer of the corps.

The survey showed that the city had never been correctly mapped, especially as concerned the trend of the Pasig River and the lines of outlying districts. The best opinion did not consider the suburbs, still occupied by the insurgent troops, beyond city limits, but no decree could be found which fixed their political status. These troops had given great annoyance. Their officers had extorted contributions from the citizens of Manila, some of whom they had kidnaped and carried away. They had placed guards upon the river bank and in

many instances refused to permit our officers to pass their lines, although a mutual agreement had been made which permitted the individual members of both armies, when unarmed, to pass and repass all military lines without hindrance. A number of reports were submitted of insurgent interference in this respect. General Anderson called at my quarters on October 9, and complained of the indignity he had received at the hands of the insurgents, in not being permitted to proceed up the river through the insurgent lines, and was thereupon informed that, as soon as a certain map of survey could be completed, General Aguinaldo would be directed to remove his troops from Paco. On the following day he submitted the following official complaint:

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISIÓN, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Cavite Arsenal, P. I., October 10, 1898.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to report that yesterday, the 9th instant, while proceeding up the Pasig River, on the steam launch *Canacao*, with three officers of my staff, the American flag flying over the boat, I was stopped by an armed Filipino guard and informed that we could go no farther. Explaining that we were an unarmed party of American officers out upon an excursion, we were informed that, by orders given two days before, no Americans, armed or unarmed, were allowed to pass up the Pasig River without a special permit from President Aguinaldo.

I demanded to see the written order, and it was brought and shown me. It was an official letter signed by Pio del Pilar, division general, written in Tagalo and stamped with what appeared to be an official seal. It purported to be issued by the authority of the president of the revolutionary government, and forbade Americans, either armed or unarmed, from passing up the Pasig River. It was signed by Pilar himself.

As this is a distinctly hostile act, I beg leave to ask how far we are to submit to this kind of interference.

It is respectfully submitted that whether this act of Pilar was authorized or not by the assumed insurgent government, it should, in any event, be resented.

Very respectfully,

THOMAS H. ANDERSON,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding Division.

As soon as the completed map of survey of the city could be blue printed a communication was prepared and taken by one of my aids to Malolos. An allusion was made therein to General Aguinaldo's letter of September 16, in which he informed me of his action of the previous day in withdrawing troops in consonance with my former request and which did not at the time require reply. The communication was as follows:

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNOR,
Manila, P. I., October 14, 1898.

GEN. EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding Philippine Revolutionary Forces, Malolos, P. I.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your favor of the 16th ultimo, and beg to apologize for the late official recognition of the same, presenting as a reason for my delay the necessity of obtaining certain information in order to arrive at conclusions in matters materially affecting the substance of our late correspondence, the securing of which has been attended with great difficulty.

I fully appreciate the friendly spirit manifested toward my Government in your expressions of regard, which your action in retiring your troops has confirmed, but I believe there has existed and still exists some misunderstanding as to the limits of territory which that Government is compelled to occupy and administer under its international obligations with Spain, the responsibility for which it can not escape.

The articles of capitulation transferred the city of Manila, with suburbs and all defenses, as I had the honor to inform you in my letter of September 8. It was found impossible to determine definitely, on any existing map, either the limits of

the city or the lines of its defenses. The latter had been variously placed, at some points retired and at others thrust out beyond the conceded city limits. I therefore directed my chief engineer, by a careful search of the municipal records and an actual survey, to ascertain the lines within which occupation by United States troops was obligatory by reason of the terms of the surrender. He has finally concluded these directed labors, and has presented a map, of which the inclosed blue print is a copy, on which is traced in white the lines determined upon. By reference to this print and a comparison of the same with all former existing maps of the city and suburbs, it will be perceived that the latter vary materially from it, especially as to the trend of the Pasig River and the location of the Spanish defenses. The lines of circumvallation on the print begin at the Bocana de Vitas and thence they follow Maypajo Creek until they reach the line of the Lico road produced, thence proceed along said line and road to Lico, thence to the junction of the two roads in front of the Chinese hospital, thence along the road in front of said hospital to the north corner of the hospital wall, thence to Blockhouse No. 4, thence by Blockhouses Nos. 5, 6, and 7 to San Juan del Monte Creek at the aqueduct, thence down said creek and up the Rio Pasig to the mouth of Concordia Creek, thence by Concordia and Tripa de Gallinas creeks to a point opposite the place where the road from Cingalon to Pandacan Pasaig turns sharply to the right, thence by road to Maitubig, and thence to the mouth of the Malate Creek. This map is believed to be correct, as the surveying and platting were executed with the greatest care and with a desire for accuracy. The lines do not include all of the territory which the late Spanish chief engineer of this city has described as lying within its suburbs and a larger proportion of them are drawn within the lines of the city's defenses; but they are practical, and include all portions of the suburbs which my Government, under its promises to Spain, could be expected to hold possession of under any demands which Spain might present.

In your withdrawal of troops I note that to the north they retired to the line described on the map furnished by my predecessor, General Merritt, while to the east and south his request was not observed. As far as Paco is concerned, it was understood that the troops in that section would be withdrawn within a short period of time, and I have now the honor to represent that the retention of that mutually conceded suburb has been a source of great annoyance to the American authorities, and, as I fully believe, to yourself, while the revolutionary forces along the Cingalon and connecting roads have been the cause of complaint from the inhabitants of that section.

I am therefore compelled by reason of my instructions, which direct me to execute faithfully the articles of the Spanish capitulation, because of the interests of my Government and, as I sincerely believe, the welfare of your own forces, to ask that you withdraw all your troops beyond the lines marked on the accompanying blue print which are above described, and I must request such withdrawal on or before the 20th instant, else I shall be forced into some action looking to that end.

Permit me, in conclusion, General, to bring to your attention facts of which you are doubtless ignorant, and which all connected with the American authorities, especially that vast majority who have entertained a decided and pronounced friendly interest in the Philippine people, have viewed with more or less indignation. In a number of instances kidnaping and robbery have been committed recently within the city by parties who claimed to be connected with your forces, some of whom stated that they were acting under your instructions. This I can not believe; but the high-handed offenses committed by these persons show how important it is, for the interests of all concerned, to withdraw your troops as herein requested. In numerous instances my officers have submitted complaints to me that they have been arrested and been compelled to turn back to the city, though journeying as unarmed and peaceful citizens merely with the intent to seek health and recreation; and on Sunday last a funeral party from the British war ship *Powerful*, now lying within this harbor, was so delayed by the insurgent forces at Paco, when proceeding to its English cemetery, that it was obliged to return to its vessel and repeat the journey on the following day. I fail to see how such proceedings can be justified before enlightened public opinion, and it is a matter of profound surprise to me that people seeking relief from the control of a government, by which, in the pronounced judgment of a large portion of the civilized world, it has been oppressed for centuries, should permit its armed authorities to so conduct themselves as to arouse the indignation of friendly and assistant nations. The indignities which my Government has suffered from the revolutionary forces still illegally maintained at Paco (few of them are cited herein) can not be tolerated in future. Resistance to the high-handed proceedings there committed is not merely considered a duty from which there is no escape, but would be esteemed a virtue by any civilized government cognizant of

the facts. I do not for a moment permit myself to entertain the impression that either you, or the able advisers by whom you are surrounded, have authorized these insults to my Government, but I must bring them to the notice of the authorities which maintain these troops, and upon which rests the legal responsibility for their conduct.

There is another matter which I beg respectfully to present to your distinguished consideration. There are a great number of United States soldiers within this city and a large accession, primarily intended and equipped by my Government for use against the armed forces of Spain, is en route for this port. The continued unhealthfulness of the city, notwithstanding the strenuous efforts we are making for a thorough police of the same, may make it necessary to temporarily encamp such troops as are suffering from diseases contracted here on some point of land which promises favorable sanitary conditions for restoration to health.

Should the emergency become imminent, the dictates of humanity and the overwhelming demands of my Government would oblige me to establish a convalescent camp in this locality, to which troops could be sent for recuperation, and to relieve the congested situation which must attend the presence of so large a body of armed men within a thickly populated city. I have in mind for this possible camp the grounds on the shore of the bay formerly occupied by United States troops and designated Camp Dewey, or the high ground to the east of the city. It is my desire to place it at a locality which would not inconvenience any organizations connected with your forces or the surrounding inhabitants, and to the emergency of this anticipated proceeding I respectfully invite your consideration and ask your assistance should execution become necessary. Should action of this character be decided upon, I beg of you to rest firmly in my unqualified assurances that it will be undertaken in a spirit of the greatest friendliness and with the sincere desire to neither compromise nor affect in the slightest degree your interests and those of the people whom you represent, but, on the contrary, to enhance them.

Permit me to subscribe myself, General, with the highest respect,

Your most obedient servant,

E. S. Otis,
Major-General, U. S. V.,
United States Military Governor in the Philippines.

On the 18th of October three accredited representatives from Aguinaldo called, and the chairman, Dr. Tavera, a member of the Malolos cabinet, presented a note, of which the following is a copy:

Manila, *October 18, 1899.*

His Excellency Major-General Otis,
Military Governor of the United States Forces in the Philippines.

General: I have the honor to place in your hands this note, which I bring personally, in which I make known the object of the mission confided to me by President Aguinaldo and which I will reiterate verbally. The letter dated the 14th of this month, which you directed to General Aguinaldo, reached his hands, and desirous of complying with your desires he called in council all of his generals and made known to them the desires which you expressed in your letter.

Highly appreciating the spirit of friendship and good feeling which is constantly noted in your honorable letters and which reflects the sentiments of Americans and of their policy toward us, the generals of Mr. Aguinaldo cheerfully accede to that which you ask.

But the idea of the possibility that Spain may return to this territory and occupy Manila as the result of the decision of the Americo-Spanish conference now in session in Paris, has caused said generals to try and obtain a modification of the demands which you make in your letter of the 14th.

Having verbally explained, for your consideration, the reasons which influence the manner of thought of the Philippine generals, I shall make also the following propositions, made by President Aguinaldo:

First. The Filipinos will retire beyond the line of demarcation indicated in the blue print, as you desire.

Second. The Filipinos will retain Pandacan under their jurisdiction.

Third. The Filipinos consider it of the greatest importance to occupy the blockhouses, with their forces of the line, in view of the possible return of the Spanish, promising not to pass with arms.

Fourth. General Aguinaldo asks of you an extension of the time indicated for evacuation of his troops.

I repeat, sir, with the greatest consideration and respect.

T. H. Pardo de Tavera.

Considerable discussion followed and Tavera, a man of excellent scientific and professional attainments, long a resident of Paris and educated there, and who had advocated openly the establishment of American sovereignty in the islands as necessary to the welfare of the inhabitants, ably represented his chief, strongly urging the concessions requested in his communication. It developed that my letter of the 14th had aroused fierce opposition; that Aguinaldo had indignantly disclaimed any knowledge of the promise to gradually withdraw the troops from Paco and Pandacan, and that opinion on the question to withdraw or fight, which the insurgent leaders had discussed, was well-nigh equally divided. All the concessions requested were denied. Then an extension of the date fixed in my letter upon which the insurgent troops must be retired to October 25 was asked for and granted. In the course of our conversation Dr. Tavera and his associates strongly urged permission to retain all the Spanish blockhouses, but were informed that we could not yield in this matter, as some of them were within the lines beyond which they must withdraw. They then reverted to the blockhouses northeast of the city which were on those lines, saying that they had no shelter for their troops if they were taken from them, and I remarked casually that I did not consider them of any importance, as we did not intend to occupy them, but that I was unable to concede the point. It seems, however, that I was misunderstood in this matter, and the committee reported to Aguinaldo that these blockhouses would remain in his possession. When, six days later, after I had corrected this mistaken impression, Dr. Tavera called upon me in person and explained the most unfortunate position in which he had been placed by reason of this misunderstanding, I informed him that I would not take immediate action even if the insurgents did not vacate these houses on the date announced. All this appears in subsequent correspondence.

On October 20 it was reported that insurgent troops were moving southward by railway from Malolos and other points and were being concentrated near the north line of the city. On calling the attention of the insurgent authorities to this threatening demonstration the concentration ceased and many of the troops were removed.

On October 23 the following was received:

REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Presidency, Malolos, October 22, 1898.

General E. S. OTIS,
Commander in Chief of the American Forces, Manila, P. I.

GENERAL: In view of your favor of the 14th instant, I consulted the opinions of my generals and advisory council, and I have appointed Dr. Pardo de Tavera in order that he might place before you the wishes of all, as he did on the 18th. Said commissioners, upon giving me an account of your wishes, told me that you had consented to postpone the ultimatum for the withdrawal of our troops until the 25th and the retention by our forces of the blockhouses situated on the line shown on the blue map which you sent me with said letter, but had not acceded to the desires of the Philippine people that my forces continue to occupy Pandacan. Relative to the latter point, I take the liberty of telling you that your predecessor, General Merritt, understood that the American forces only ought to occupy, according to the terms of the capitulation of Manila, the city and its environs, i. e., Binondo, Tondo, Santa Cruz, Quiapo, Sampaloc, San Miguel, Concepcion, Ermita, Malate, and Paco, or San Fernando de Dilao, and thus he clearly puts it in his letter of August 20 last. The town of Pandacan has always been considered outside of the old municipal limits of Manila, which the general himself mentions in said letter, and I hope your high sense of judgment will see it thus.

Nevertheless, I understand that your forces are already occupying the Uli-Uli, Nactahan, and Santa Mesa districts, which, although belonging to the jurisdiction of Pandacan, they can continue to do, in order to prevent the continual encounters with mine which cause disagreeable incidents.

I take pleasure in manifesting to you that it is not lack of confidence and much less animosity, that prompts me to write in this manner. To-day, more than ever, the Filipinos desire to live in peace and perfect harmony with the Americans, because they will take care that the Philippines do not return under the odious Spanish dominion.

When it is possible for a formal convention to pacify and harmonize the interests of the two peoples, then the suspicions of my people—which I can not completely quiet with my prestige and authority, no matter what good desires move me—will disappear.

I beg of you not to consider as an insult to your flag a bad interpretation of my orders, which I will severely punish according to the gravity of the offense. You, with your keen perception, will understand that a people agitated by a revolution return gradually, not suddenly, to their normal life, no matter how educated they are supposed to be. It becomes necessary for me to act with much tact in order to give no cause for internal dissensions.

And this consideration is what obliges me to ask you about the form and conditions with which you wish to establish a sanitarium within my lines; because I wish, at all cost, to prevent the possibility of your complaints being renewed concerning acts emanating from the continual contact of our forces. I understand that you have considered it necessary to demand the withdrawal of our forces, notwithstanding the friendship which binds us, in order to prevent friction. On this account, although I highly appreciate the humane sentiments which prompt you, I do not dare allow it, without previous explanations, for the very reason that I wish to preserve the friendship that constitutes the welfare of both peoples.

I hope you will pardon me, as the necessity of consulting various advisers has obliged me to delay my answer.

I am, General, with the greatest consideration, your obedient servant,

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

The representatives of Aguinaldo who presented this communication came prepared to argue its merits, and after considerable conversation I sent the oral reply that the subject had been exhaustively discussed and that General Aguinaldo must withdraw his troops from the lines designated on or before the date announced, remarking at the time that I would make formal reply later to certain points which he had presented in his note.

The insurgent troops were withdrawn on the afternoon and evening of October 25, as promised, and on October 27 the following letter was sent to Malolos, and brought out those of November 4 and 16, which hereinafter appear. These terminated all official correspondence upon the subjects therein discussed:

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., October 27, 1898.

Gen. EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding Revolutionary Forces, Malolos, P. I.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 22d instant, and have awaited the result of correspondence and conferences upon the subject of which you treat.

Concerning the conference of the 18th instant with your representative, Dr. Pardo de Tavera, it resulted in an honest misunderstanding between us in one slight particular only. The doctor very ably, by letter, submitted your wishes — one of which was the retention of the blockhouses on the designated line. In regard to this matter, I said I was powerless to make any concessions, and in the conversation which followed remarked, in substance, through the interpreter, that we did not wish to occupy them, as we did not consider them of any importance. The doctor, I can conceive, very naturally misunderstood my meaning—in fact the interpreter might have done so—and when, on the 24th instant, the doctor again called and forcibly expressed his construction of my language, I was so impressed with his earnestness and honesty of purpose and convictions, I remarked that, although the law would not permit a concession, I would not raise any objection, unless hereafter compelled to do so by my superior authority, if your forces continued to occupy the blockhouses to the north of the Pasig River.

I have referred to General Merritt's letter of August 20, which you mention, and find that it is as you state. Unfortunately, I am bound by the terms of capitulation, which recite "the city and defenses of Manila and its suburbs," Pandacan

is certainly far within the line of defense and, from information obtained from two weighty sources, I have been led to believe that it has, of late, been considered one of the city's suburbs, although we have been unable to find any Spanish decree which fixes its status with definiteness.

In regard to the establishment of a convalescent camp for the restoration to health of members of my command, it was my intention to consult you and arrive at an understanding in the matter before attempting anything of the kind. I knew you would not offer objections if it could be so placed as not to give your people annoyance, since it could not be in any way a menace, but, on the contrary, would place our sick within your power and to a certain extent under your protection. I have that confidence in your humane sentiments and in the kindly impulses of your people as to believe that you would surely consent to a measure of this character, and I think the poorer classes of surrounding communities would be pecuniarily benefited by the small trade that it would give rise to, as hospitals make many purchases of edible products which your people would be glad to furnish. Should necessity arise under which I would be forced to take action, it will be my pleasure to confer with you before proceeding in the matter, and I am fully convinced that you will give assent and assistance.

Permit me, General, to assure you that I fully appreciate the difficulties under which you labor in your endeavors to carry out the desires and demands of your people. As I have already expressed myself in former communications, I am fully convinced of your wish to maintain harmonious relations with the United States forces and government of Manila, and that you deplore, with me, any proceeding which may disturb that harmony and friendly feeling. I have been fully aware that all unpleasant incidents which have occurred, and to which I alluded in my former letter, were due entirely to irresponsible and unwarranted action of subordinates, and I am constantly called upon to correct misconceptions entertained by my troops and to punish offenses which they have wantonly committed.

I am gratified with the success, both as concerns the interests of the Filipino people and the United States troops, which has attended our mutual efforts for the amicable adjustment of affairs, and sincerely hope that the manifested good will which now exists by and between our forces may be long continued.

I am, General, most sincerely, your obedient servant.

E. S. Otis,
Major-General, U. S. V.,
United States Military Governor in the Philippines.

Revolutionary Government of the Philippines,
Presidency, Malolos, November 4, 1898.

Maj. Gen. E. S. Otis,
Commander in Chief of the American Forces of Occupation of Manila.

General: In having the honor of answering your letter of the 27th of October last, I shall make no mention of the first paragraphs of the same, because I see, with pleasure, that the matter referred to in them has had a solution adjusted to your desires.

I shall limit myself only to the last paragraphs that speak of the establishment of a camp for convalescents. Concerning this paragraph, I ought to observe that from the moment when a concession is made of a part of the territory occupied by our forces and a hospital is built in it, you will have to place there a force in charge to look after the interests there created, unless it depends for security solely and exclusively upon the guaranty offered by the laws dictated by our government.

You, yourself, General, have always impressed me more than once with the fact of the impossibility of a dual occupation of Manila, because the continual contact of your forces and mine might give place to innumerable disagreeable incidents, if not serious and grave conflicts, which may disturb the harmony that exists between us. I am fully aware of the humanity you invoke in favor of the sick, but on the strength of this consideration it is my sacred duty to look after millions of souls whose security and interests would be compromised if a conflict between us should ensue. The only solution possible is to completely cede you the use of this encampment, and this, as you will understand, requires some fixed basis of arrangement more concrete than can result from a verbal one made in a conference. Besides it is my duty to submit these conditions to the representatives of the people.

It is not lack of confidence which obliges me to proceed in this manner; it is necessity. These bases, if in the meanwhile a friendly convention between your

Government and mine is not realized, will constitute the provisional rules that will serve as the form for the solution of the claims that might occur.

And, above all, these bases will contribute very much to perpetuate the friendship that exists between us, because my people will take great care not to break them.

I am, with the greatest consideration, your attentive and obedient servant,

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P. I., November 10, 1898.

Gen. EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding Revolutionary Forces, Malolos, P. I.

GENERAL: I received with pleasure your note of the 4th instant, and have the honor to reply to the point you present in regard to the establishment of a convalescent camp beyond the present line of actual occupation by the United States troops, as follows:

I am not convinced that such establishment will be at all necessary, and, in fact, from present indications it would appear that we shall be able to care for our sick within the line and defenses of Manila.

With regard to right of occupancy of territory, so many international questions arise under the articles of capitulation with Spain, which the United States is in honor bound to strictly construe and obey in all matters affecting its action, that I do not intend to present them for determination if it can be consistently avoided, especially not those which might demand argument and decision, such, for instance, as might arise regarding shore lines, which rightful occupation by the United States of the bay and harbor of Manila, with conceded rights of use for commercial purposes, might involve.

I am, General, with great respect, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V.,
United States Military Governor in the Philippines.

During the latter part of October instructions were received from Washington directing that effort be made to secure the release of members of the Spanish clergy and religious orders who were held by the insurgent government as prisoners of war. Correspondence ensued and is here given to serve as a basis for comment in a later portion of this report. Four communications passed, of which the following are copies:

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., November 2, 1898.

Gen. EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding Philippine Revolutionary Forces, Malolos, P. I.

GENERAL: By direction of my Government, I have the honor to present for your distinguished consideration a subject which is causing much comment and a great deal of severe criticism of the Filipino people throughout Europe and among the very large class of Catholic citizens of my own country, and that is the retention, as prisoners of war, of the Spanish Catholic clergy and nuns. I believe that a vast majority of the reports of great cruelty and barbarous treatment practiced by the Filipinos toward these individuals which have been put in general circulation are untrue. Indeed, I have forbidden cablegrams prepared on this subject, which I had good reason to suppose could not be substantiated, to be sent to other countries, and I have informed the United States authorities that many rumors of this nature in circulation throughout the civilized world were greatly exaggerated. Still, however, the facts stand out prominently that these individuals have suffered privations and hardships and are still held in captivity, and fabrications charging most cruel and inhuman treatment resulting in loss of life will continue to be spread abroad to the great detriment of the interest and welfare of the Filipino people. I do not consider that I sacrificed in any particular the confidence reposed in me by my Government in communicating to you that it has been requested by the Vatican at Rome and by many distinguished men high in the councils of nations to employ its good offices in efforts to secure the liberty of the Spanish clergy and of all individuals connected with religious orders now held in durance, among whom are especially mentioned the Bishop of New Segovia and the nuns in the northwestern part of the island of Luzon.

It is, of course, needless for me to present to you or the able counselors by whom

you are surrounded, and, indeed, it may be considered a presumption on my part to invite your attention to the fact that this clergy, and, indeed, the civil functionaries of the Spanish Government, can not under a strict interpretation of the rules of international law be deemed prisoners of war except in certain very aggravated cases. It would require most decided action on the part of members of religious orders to place them in that category, and the seizure and retention of nuns or interference with them in the practice of what they consider their duties under their sacred religious vows is invariably looked upon with marked disfavor by all nations claiming to practice civilized warfare. All this is well known to you, and I only allude to it to account, in a measure, for the erroneous impressions which publicly prevail regarding the humane sentiments and good intentions cherished by the Filipinos, and which are so damaging to them in securing a position as a people which they seek to invoke. You will please pardon me for this allusion, but the matter is so important to the best interests of the Filipinos that I have taken the liberty, uninvited, to present it.

Confident that you seek the welfare of your people, may I in that confidence ask you to use your conceded influence to correct this condition of affairs and to act with me in efforts to place these prisoners in a position which will put an end to the acrimonious criticisms which now so widely prevail. I would be pleased to receive them here at Manila and care for them while they make preparations to leave the country, as I am informed many of them desire to do; and more particularly does it appear to me as most essential that prompt action be taken with regard to the nuns. Any traveling expense or cost of food required to effect their removal to this point I would be glad to meet should you desire it.

I am, General, with great respect, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V.,
United States Military Governor in the Philippines.

REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Presidency, Malolos, November 3, 1898.

Maj. Gen. E. S. OTIS,
Commander in Chief of American Forces of Occupation in the Philippines.

GENERAL: I take pleasure in acknowledging the receipt of your kind communication of yesterday's date, and I ought to tell you that your observations, far from displeasing me, are very useful to me, as they are dictated by the enlightenment acquired in the atmosphere of a free country.

I ought also to inform you, especially, that we do not make prisoners of women and children, and much less of the nuns. If some woman or child is found among our prisoners, it is because they are part of the family of one from whom they do not wish to be separated, requiring us to support them at the expense of the Philippine treasury. This detail is not foreseen in international law, but the Filipinos observe this custom, prompted by humane sentiments.

I am glad to hear you say that the Spanish clergy and civil officials can not be prisoners of war according to international law. Before answering this point allow me to observe that we have only taken as prisoners the priests (sacerdotes religiosos) belonging to the Spanish clergy, and not those who live the life of monks; and permit me to make this point clear in order that the explanation which I have the pleasure of giving you may be more intelligible, and so, also, that foreign public opinion may not be mistaken. It is true that international law declares in general that the clergy and civil officials can not be prisoners of war, but the spirit of these very laws exclude the Spanish priests (sacerdotes religiosos) and civil officials in the Philippines, because they (Spaniards) alone possess the certain class of persons known by that name.

Beginning with the Spanish civil officials, I take the liberty of pointing out to you that at the beginning of the declaration of war between the United States and Spain they were obliged by General Augustin to bear arms, without distinction as to class, and even before, during the first stages of the Philippine revolution, Spanish civil officials were already formed into armed volunteer corps who, if they did not frequently go into the field in company with the regular soldiers, shot and arrested defenseless and pacific inhabitants in order to imprison them and submit them to indescribable torture. Besides, I ought also to say that in the Spanish penal prisons and penitentiaries groan even hundreds of prisoners and deported Filipinos who were torn away from their homes on account of the suspicions of the old Spanish Government, and thanks to the arts and malicious customs of the priests (sacerdotes religiosos) called ministers of peace.

Relative to the priests, or rather Spanish "sacerdotes religiosos," I take the liberty of laying before you the following points:

A. The religious corporations of the Philippines have acquired large agricultural colonies by means of fraud. In olden times the Filipinos, prompted by their religion, gave away a part of the products of their lands to the old priests (sacerdotes religiosos) for their support. But in the course of time that which was prompted by spiritual motive they made obligatory, taking possession of the lands, in order to better secure it, and making the proprietors dependents or colonists who could not refuse paying, because of the vengeance of the Spanish authorities, whom the said sacerdotes had in their favor, through bribery.

B. According to the canons of the Roman Church, these priests or religious sacerdotes can not claim the privilege of absolving, which is solely reserved to the secular clergy to which the Filipino priests belong. Nevertheless, the ecclesiastics, in order to be able to exercise the duties of parochial priests (cura parroco) in the Philippine towns, have been cheating the Vatican and foreign public opinion, picturing these towns as savage ranches, which require the care of Spanish religious missionaries that the natives may not return to their ancient idolatry. The Filipino priests who have tried to rectify this false opinion of the Vatican relative to the religious state of the country, in order to be obedient to the canons of the church, died martyrs, accused by the ecclesiastics of being disturbers.

C. The same priests (sacerdotes religiosos) tried also to cheat the Spanish Government, making it believe that they were the only upholders of Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines, and although the Spanish authorities recognized the fraud, they did not want to admit anything, as they were influenced by the gold of the religious corporations. These priests, exercising the right of absolving in the Philippine towns, have been for a long time the absolute masters of the life, honor, and property of the Filipinos. For this reason, it is a widely known and notorious fact, recognized by all the foreigners who have studied Philippine affairs, that the primary causes of the Philippine revolution were the ecclesiastical corporations which, taking advantage of the corrupt Spanish Government, have robbed the country, preventing progress and liberty.

With these antecedents, General, you will understand that, owing to the influence and interests of the religious corporations in the Philippines, it is neither just nor politic to set at liberty the priests (sacerdotes religiosos). The archbishop, as well as the Spanish bishops in the Philippines, belong to the regular Spanish clergy, and it is not prudent to allow them to continue ruling in these islands, as they can incite a counter revolution, assisted by their gold and some fanatic Filipinos, who still obey their commands.

When the Filipino priests, unjustly spurned by the Vatican, have obtained the right to appointment to the duties of bishops and parochial priests, then there will be no danger to the public tranquillity in setting at liberty the ecclesiastics. The Spanish Government and the Pope have proven themselves ignorant of law or justice, when one deals with their interests. For that reason the Filipinos wish to hold the civil officials in order to obtain the liberty of the prisoners and deported Filipinos; and the priests in order to obtain from the Vatican the recognition of the Philippine clergy.

As a representative of the Government of the United States, I beg of you, General, with the greatest kindness, to notify it that neither vengeance nor hate influence the Filipinos when they hold the civil officials and Spanish ecclesiastics, but that public interests and the peace of the Philippine people demand these measures. International law will have to give way before the just cause of a country of millions of souls, because this cause is one of humanity, civilization, and progress. My people exact these measures and I can not but comply with their will. If you, General, can interpret the sentiments of the people to your Government and foreign public opinion, and by this means correct the erroneous ideas emanating from the ignorance of the true condition of the country, you will make yourself a creditor to the gratitude of the Filipino people and the civilized world.

I am, with the greatest consideration, your most obedient servant,

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

OFFICE UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNOR
IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., November 10, 1898.

Gen. EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding Philippine Revolutionary Forces, Malolos, P. I.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your cordial communication of the 3d instant, for which permit me to thank you, and to which my manifold duties have denied me the pleasure of replying as promptly as I wished.

I highly appreciate your expressed desire to act for the public interests, the peace of the Filipinos and in accordance with the dictates of humanity, but you will pardon my candid confession that I am unable to comprehend the force of your remark to the effect that international law must give way before the just cause of a country of millions of souls because it is one of humanity. I fail to understand how the principles of that law can be antagonistic in any particular to the welfare of a people, founded, as they are, on the best interpretation of the law of nature, which the acknowledged wisdom of ages of human progress has been able to bestow. Every independent nation claiming advanced enlightenment professes to be bound by these obligations of that law and certainly would be held responsible by the civilized world should it openly violate them.

My previous letter contained the request of my Government for the release of the clergy and members of religious orders, including nuns of a certain locality reported to be held by you as prisoners of war. Your reply informs me that you hold as such prisoners the Spanish priests and former civil officials, but not women and children, "much less nuns." In regard to the latter, I must have been misinformed, for I received the impression that they sought return of their personal effects, of which they had been deprived, with permission to join their friends in this city. Your letter, however, assures me that they have not been despoiled and possess full liberty of action to journey whersoever they please. This information I will gladly convey to my Government and to persons immediately interested in their welfare who have expressed concern for their safety as regards health, life, and individual property.

In respect to the Spanish officials whom you hold as prisoners of war, you are pleased to remark that during the first stages of the Filipino revolution they were formed into an armed volunteer corps, were subsequently obliged to bear arms without distinction as to class, and that if they did not frequently take the field with the army of the enemy, nevertheless shot and arrested peaceable and defenseless inhabitants. These you desire to retain until opportunity offers to exchange them for Filipino prisoners now in the hands of Spain. I am not conversant with the facts you narrate, and am not therefore competent to arrive at any conclusion. It is, however, a well-established principle of law that the chief officers of a hostile government, such as its diplomatic agents and those who are of particular importance and use to it, become, upon capture, prisoners of war, but I do not think that its minor officials are classed in that category, unless armed or attached in some capacity to a hostile army for the purpose of rendering active aid.

As regards the members of the Spanish clergy I understand you to state, in substance, that they are held as prisoners of war on account of the grave offenses committed by them while Luzon was under the practical domination of Spain; that they were the primary and principal cause of the revolution which has been in progress for the past two years; that it is not prudent to set them at liberty, as they are disposed, and might be able, if released, to incite a counter revolution in Spanish interests, and that they are retained in prison not only for such reasons, but also to compel the Vatican to recognize the conceded rights of the Filipino clergy, which has heretofore been denied it.

Accepting these as established facts (my knowledge is not to the contrary), the conclusion does not appear to follow that these members of the clergy can be considered prisoners of war, and I can not conceive how, under the laws of war or any international right arising from the state of belligerency existing between the Filipinos and Spain, they can be so denominated. Nor do I understand your suggestion that the spirit of these laws, if not their context, excludes these people from the protection which strict interpretation bestows, whatever may have been their previous crimes. Even if these priests belonged to religious corporations, against which the Filipinos had well-grounded complaint for past offenses, and indeed for cruelties received at their hands; even if they exhorted the communities in which they resided to resist the revolutionists, and might still do so if released; even if they persecuted the Spanish subjects among whom they lived, they could not be considered as prisoners of war in any sense of that term unless captured while making armed resistance or giving active armed aid to the enemy.

The law of nations allows every sovereign government to make war upon another, and concedes the right of revolution to a people greatly oppressed, but it does not admit a violation of the rules of regular warfare regarding the status of persons arrested or captured or in the treatment of prisoners of war, although they may belong to the forces of an unjust assailant or a formerly tyrannical master.

The expressed intention of holding these Spanish priests as prisoners of war in order to force the Vatican of Rome into certain acknowledgments with appropriate action I can not conceive to be well founded in law, custom, or precedent, and am convinced that such a position is untenable.

In this somewhat hasty letter, General, I have accepted all your facts for the sake of argument, and am unable to reach your conclusion, viz, that the members of the religious orders are rightfully kept imprisoned, and that the interests of the Filipino people demand their retention. I do not think that the views you advance would receive favorable general acceptance, and believe therefore, in all sincerity, that the good name, reputation, and welfare of that people would be greatly enhanced by relieving those men from the captivity which they have so long endured.

I can only ask in conclusion that the wishes of my Government may receive more favorable consideration than your most friendly letter indicates.

I am, General, with great respect, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General U. S. V.,
United States Military Governor in the Philippines.

PRESIDENCY REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES,
MALOLOS, *November 18, 1898.*

To Maj. Gen. E. S. OTIS,
General in Chief of the American forces of Occupation in Manila.

GENERAL: Allow me to inform you that I have received your kind letter of the 10th instant; begging you to pardon the tardiness with which I answer, because of my many occupations.

I highly appreciate your desire to intercede for the liberty of the Spanish civil officials and the priests, and be assured that if well-founded reasons did not exist in order to retain them, always attentive to the laws of humanity and agreeing with the principles that regulate the relations of independent states, I would not have given you occasion to make in their favor the petition that elevates you so much.

In my last letter I have advanced the reasons which I have convinced myself justifies me in considering as prisoners of war said employees and ecclesiastics. Nevertheless, you attempt to depreciate the force of my arguments, relative to which I beg of you to kindly favor me by listening to my answer.

You say in your letter that in virtue of the principles of a right well established the chief employees of a hostile government, as well as diplomatic agents and those that render services of a particular importance, can be considered as prisoners of war; but that you do not think mere employees can be classified in said category unless they are armed or in some way attached to a hostile army for the purpose of lending their active aid. And in view of this assertion, coming from a person so competent, I can not do less than congratulate myself, for in that statement you recognize as justified the principal reasons that I uphold in retaining as prisoners the civil employees as well as the priests.

Admitting that principle, it must be confessed that it is strictly in conformity with my conduct if it is admitted (an undeniable fact) that the civil employees, as well as the regular priests (parrocos), not only supported in an active way those who combated against the Filipino revolutionists, but also personally took up arms in order to fight against them.

I have already said in my last letter that the decree of General Augustin of the 23d of last April obliged not only the employees of the state and municipality to take up arms but also the Spaniards born here, and that in the first epoch of the Filipino revolution they formed armed volunteer corps which, while guarding the towns, made arrests, tortured the prisoners, executed defenseless citizens, or joined the regular soldiers to fight against the revolutionists. General, read carefully the local papers from the time the revolution began and you will see there the proof of what I say. The pages of said papers are indisputable evidence of the military services rendered by the civil employees of the Spanish Government and the compensation received by them as a premium for their services. With these antecedents is there room for the least argument that the Spanish civil employees should not be held as prisoners of war?

The same, if not worse, can be said of the priests. The latter, degrading their office, transformed from servants of the Lord to feudal lords and supported by the Spanish Government, were absolute masters of the lives, lands, and honor of the Filipinos.

At the beginning of the revolution they did not discharge the duties of ministers of peace or preach gentleness or Christian charity, but, profaning their sacred mission, they made themselves the police of the Spanish Government, false denouncers of innocent citizens.

It seems incredible that those who should raise their prayers to stop so much cruelty and infamy committed by the Spanish Government, those who should give themselves over to reclusion and mortification and penance for so much crime, were precisely those who took part in the affairs, and with base insinuations, with infamous accusations and ideas of vengeance, increased more and more the pyre of the dead, and the defamatory charges through which were sacrificed precious and innocent lives and the honor of many citizens.

Again, vengeance does not move me in treating these ecclesiastics as prisoners of war. I conform to the principles of international law advanced by yourself, for, apart from the abuses committed by the priests, to which I have referred in my last letter, and the facts that I add in my present one, you are informed that they have taken up arms against the revolutionists, for example, the priests (parrocos) of the town of Lipa, province of Batangas, who made themselves leaders of volunteer corps. In Manila, during the siege of the town by your forces, all the ecclesiastics, organized and uniformed, formed a part of the municipal armed guard, and all of them you may be sure have lent their directive and effective cooperation to the forces that fought against the Filipinos, not only maintaining at their expense armed bodies, but accompanying them in their expeditions as well as inciting them to battle.

The convents have been the most impregnable defenses where the Spanish combatants, together with the priests, shielded themselves in order to attack the revolutionists, and this government preserves quite a number of muskets taken from the ecclesiastics. Therefore, the principle which you mention can be applied to them, and it follows in consequence that they should be treated as prisoners of war—the more so if all their civil attributes are taken into consideration. There is reason, therefore, to class them in the category of chief employees or those rendering service of special importance.

The principles of international law sustained by the most noted authors were taken into account by me when I treated as prisoners of war civil employees and the priests. Jiore, Martens, Bluntschli, and others, hold that all persons, though not forming a part of the army, but who follow it to perform their pacific functions, can be held as prisoners of war. I only exempt the hospital personnel, according to the Geneva convention, provided that they take no active part in the war; and the Spanish-American encyclopedia says: "All those who form part of the enemy's forces, whether they are regular troops or militia, all those who accompany armies on their expeditions, the newspaper correspondents, providers, even the civil officials, can be made prisoners."

Besides, retort (represalias) is a right admitted by the most cultured nations as a penal power to be exercised by one of the belligerents with respect to the other when the latter violates the rules or laws generally accepted; or as a sanction in the sense that by it the represalia can require the enemy to fulfill his duties.

In virtue of the right of retort, during the war of North American independence, the great Washington, to avenge the shooting of an American colonel, a prisoner in the hands of the English, deemed beyond the rules of war the English Colonel Argyll, a prisoner held by the Americans. Thanks to the intervention of the Queen of France, the order was not executed. In virtue of the same right, the German generals in the war of 1870 ordered the houses in which their soldiers had been treacherously attacked to be fired and destroyed.

If there were then no international rules to justify the retention of the civil officials and priests as prisoners of war, could not we Filipinos, not even considered belligerents by the other nations, invoke the right of retort in order to secure measures obliging the Spanish Government to grant the liberty of many Filipinos (prisoners for political reasons) and check their barbarous methods of torturing and shooting the lovers of liberty and independence of their country?

This is the reason why, in my last letter, I said that international law would have to give way before the just cause of a country of millions of souls, because this cause is one of humanity, civilization, and progress.

It is far from my intention, in making this assertion, to show you that in retaining as prisoners the persons in whose liberty you are interested, I cite international law only when attending to the desires of my people, because I have well demonstrated that in taking this determination I have really been guided by those laws, at least when they do not greatly prejudice the welfare of my people. I have only wanted to say that in many cases the principles of international law, generally observed by the most cultured of nations, must conform to existing circumstances in the interest of a people who bewail the violation of those laws. For this reason it is understood that the most civilized nations recognize the right of retort. Thus also, General, when I tell you that the Filipino people desire to hold as prisoners the civil officials in order to obtain the release of the deported Filipinos and their priests, and in order to obtain from the Vatican the rights of the

Philippine clergy, I have not wished to defend the measures adopted on that ground alone, when other well-founded principles justify my conduct. I have only wished to indicate that at the opportune moment, notwithstanding the motives previously advanced, liberty can be granted to these prisoners without the displeasure of the people.

I should like to see that moment arrive as soon as possible, to demonstrate to you my liveliest sympathy for the fulfillment of your desires, which to-day I am impeded from meeting for well-understood reasons.

The Philippine people, who aspire to a life of liberty and independence, have not deserved from the civilized nations, not even the United States, at least until the present time, the recognition of their rights in their war against Spain. They have the glory of having complied with the rules required to be observed by belligerent powers and nothing can be said to the contrary. I have no doubt, General, that having given your noble impulses and cultured judgment and sympathy to my country you will know how to interpret the sentiments of this letter before your Government and the civilized world and to justify my conduct in holding as prisoners of war the civil officials and the priests.

I close this letter, begging you to pardon the trouble that its perusal will cause you.

I remain, your most respectful servant,

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

The last reply, and possibly the first, was drawn by Aguinaldo's attorney-general, a person of excellent legal attainments, who is now serving as one of the United States judges in the court of the audiencia, and was considered unanswerable by the Malolos government. It received newspaper publication at Malolos and here in Manila. An answer was drafted in part, but never delivered. It recited the fact that the discussion of the subject had reached proportions never contemplated; that I was not authorized to intercede for the release of the civil officials, and that my requests had been limited to priests or members of religious orders, and further remarked as follows:

A reference to the correspondence will show that my expressed desires are limited strictly to requests of that character, and in reference to them you have been good enough to inform me that of the classes of persons named you hold as prisoners of war only the Spanish clergy, permitting full freedom of action to all female members of religious institutions.

The announcement of that portion of your policy which affects nuns, or women who are devoting their services to the interest of church and benevolent societies, was received with satisfaction and has disarmed, to a certain extent, the hostile critics who have proclaimed that the revolutionary forces were imposing barbarous treatment on inhabitants in Luzon whom they retained in captivity. Appreciating this sentiment, I was pleased to assure one of the good ladies of the church, Dona Sista del Rosario of the Dominicans, who called for an expression of my opinion as to whether she could make a contemplated journey to the province of Cagayan for the relief of certain nuns, that she would not experience any difficulty in so doing, as their movements were entirely optional with themselves and would not be interfered with.

Returning now to the subject of my Government's request, viz, that which concerns priests. You are pleased to quote from my letter of November 10, not, however, the language employed, but as understood by you, doubtless, and to apply it in aid of your argument for their retention. The meaning of my language is very different from that which you believed it to convey. My remark referred strictly to civil officials, was only a passing brief attention given to one which your former letter contained and had nothing whatever to do with any other class of individuals. I said that it was "a well-established principle of law that the *chief officers* of a hostile government, such as its diplomatic agents and those who were of *particular* importance and use to it, became, upon capture, prisoners of war," not its minor officials, unless armed or attached in some capacity to a hostile army, etc. I had not then, nor have I now, the impression that the priests could be classed as important civil officials of the Spanish Government, nor as minor civil officers armed as soldiers or attached to the Spanish hostile army warring against the insurgent forces in the field.

Formerly, as you are aware, a lawful prisoner of war was an active combatant secured by capture or through surrender. In these later times the class has been greatly enlarged, and embraces members of the sovereign family, ministers and

diplomatic agents of a government, and persons of importance at particular moments, though separate from the mass of combatants. This extension is due to the fact that no great hardships should now attend the lot of a prisoner of war, while his detention may help to defeat the military operations of the enemy or assist those of the army making the arrest.

With an army in the field pursuing active hostilities, the laws of war permit civilians accompanying it to be taken and held as prisoners temporarily and while their services may be of benefit to that army. The termination of hostilities should put an end to the period of imprisonment. So with the priests. If their confinement as prisoners of war was ever lawful, further detention can hardly be justified on the ground that it will assist your revolutionary government, or that release will injure it, unless, possibly, you apprehend determined hostility thereto, manifesting itself in dangerous demonstrations on the part of the people who may be governed by their prejudices or spirit of revenge, for it is understood to be the desire of the priests to return to Spain and not linger in these islands longer than is absolutely necessary; and it is conceded, I presume, that, removed from the country, they will be powerless to aid Spain in its further efforts to crush what it is pleased to denominate a formidable rebellion. The plea that you hold them to effect an exchange for priests of Philippine nativity and to compel certain recognition of principles by the Vatican at Rome is not well founded. The imprisoned native priests were probably state prisoners when Spain held acknowledged control of the islands and before rebellion had raised its front. The pacification, too, which terminated in the agreement or so-called treaty of Biacna-bato may have set at rest all questions arising in the cases of prisoners captured during the rebellion of 1896. For an army to seize members of the clergy and hold them as prisoners of war for the purposes of effecting the release and return of certain civilians, placed in captivity long before that army or the government to which it belongs had an existence, must be considered a novel proceeding. To seize Spanish citizens, whatever their offenses, and hold them as prisoners of war to compel certain action by the Vatican of Rome is most assuredly indefensible under any circumstances.

The war doctrine of "retort" which you introduce in your argument can not be applied, and you certainly do not wish to be understood as contending that you would be justified in shooting friars, whom you hold as prisoners of war, simply because Spanish subjects tried and convicted under the forms of law were executed, etc.

As stated, this answer was not served, as I had been reliably informed that Aguinaldo contemplated, or had promised influential Filipinos to release the minor civil officials, but that the temper of the people was such that he could not let go the members of the religious orders held in captivity. I also had an impression that he would not keep his reported promise with regard to the Spanish officials, but intended to hold them for certain purposes, the chiefest of which were to secure large money considerations and European action tending to the recognition of his government. I therefore informed the War Department that efforts to obtain the release of the Spanish clergy were unavailing. The course which has since been pursued by the insurgent authorities has confirmed the correctness of the impressions which were received at that time.

The general allusions made in former portions of this report to the action taken by the United States authorities which the private rights of or the former privileges and obligations enjoyed by or imposed upon the inhabitants while under Spanish administration, do not show the true significance of that action in many essential particulars.

Manila is the capital of territory having seven or eight millions of people. The different islands and in some instances the different provinces of the same island are dependent upon each other for the necessaries of life. Certain sections of the country confine their industries for the most part to the cultivation of rice, others to tobacco, or to hemp or sugar, or the raising of live stock, and exchanging these products in a great degree for articles of consumption or other necessaries, which are conveyed in light-draft vessels to the numerous

towns and villages which are situated on the 5,000 miles or more of island coast. The hemp, sugar, and tobacco districts must have rice, and that in kind becomes the medium of exchange for their products. Little money is used or needed. The merchants of these towns and villages receive the principal product of the district for the merchandise sold to the inhabitants and barter the products of other districts for it. The great center of the island trade is Manila, and trade is controlled and conducted mostly by Europeans—the Chinamen, however, looking carefully after its retail features. The closing of the port of Manila, or a radical change in the restrictions or regulations under which this trade is carried on, would seriously affect the inhabitants of the islands, and the business interests of the large merchants who are also the exporters of the native products.

Under present social conditions as affected by the special industries of particular sections, it is possible, by completely interdicting interisland commerce, to reduce to great individual suffering the mass of the inhabitants, as well as to seriously impair the large European or foreign business capital which has been invested here for commercial purposes. As has been stated, the surrender of Manila threw into the possession of the United States for control, not only the municipal affairs of the city, but the commerce, the shipping, and a large share of the trade revenues of the Philippines, with power to modify at its pleasure the regulations by which that trade has been conducted. The orders of the President wisely directed in effect a continuance of late prevailing customs duties, with very slight modifications, and the public interests demand that relief should be extended to the people of the islands through the resumption of trade. These modifications, however, slight as they were and unavoidable under the circumstances, were the sources of grievances on the part of individual merchants, which they presented through the consuls of their governments or in person. The least change in the former tariff schedule affected those who were stocked or those who wished to import merchandise, and gave competitors unfair advantages. Many had bought goods in Spain at high market rates for the purpose of securing the Spanish trade privileges on home products, and were unable to have delivery made in Manila on account of the war. They therefore asked to have the Spanish trade privileges extended to these special goods to avoid the great pecuniary loss which they must otherwise suffer. Repeated requests of this character occasioned a great deal of correspondence, and the concession of September 29 was thereupon granted, which was to the effect that all such goods as might be entered prior to November 10, the date which the amended tariff regulations were to go into effect, might, upon due proof of facts, be admitted under the old Spanish customs rules. Even this concession did not meet the merchants' demands, and they contended for a longer time in which to present their goods, but had to be denied after fruitless argument by both parties in interest.

The United States had not only assumed charge of the customs regulations of the islands, but also of all fiscal matters. General Greene, and subsequently General Whittier, was appointed to the position of intendente general de hacienda, which was really the office of the colonial minister of finance, and although their duties were limited in orders to "the supervision of the fiscal affairs of the government of Manila," they were obliged to consider those of a general character quite extensively, such as importation and internal revenue. The colonial treasury had been surrendered, and its administration

involved questions of local and general import. The funds of both the city, the island, the peninsular government, the money deposits of private individuals guaranteeing faithful performance of local and other contracts were merged beyond possibility of segregation. The laws, however, could not be considered to impose obligations upon any of the inhabitants of the islands living outside of territory in the rightful possession of the United States, however they might be applied to residents of Manila. There was a dual occupation of this office of intendente general, as Spanish officials still considered those fiscal matters which related to the business of the islands in which Manila was not concerned. To avoid unnecessary complications and also to simplify administration, the office was placed in temporary suspension and all fiscal matters supervised from the office of the military governor. The bureau of internal revenue, like the customs, as soon as taken possession of by the United States officers, presented perplexing questions. The sources of revenue and the proper administration of funds depended upon numerous Spanish decrees extending over a long period of years. It received moneys which belonged to the funds of the city, executed the stamp laws, the industrial tax regulations, and looked after the issuing of personal cedulas to the inhabitants of the islands, etc. As soon as the office was established the residents of the city began to tender the periodical payments. The question as to what character of taxes should be collected by the United States came up for consideration. Back taxes were paid in and refundments or credits on prior payments requested. In answer to questions submitted by the collector of internal revenue, the following specific instructions were given and show the nature of the difficulties presented.

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY SECRETARY,
Manila, P. I., September 15, 1898.

Maj. R. B. C. BEMENT, U. S. V.,
Collector of Internal Revenue, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I am directed by the military governor to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of September 14, with inclosed exhibit of cash received by you since the 26th ultimo. He directs me to say, in answer to your question as to whether you shall receive the railroad tax or not, that he is not convinced that the United States Government has the right to collect it. It was a tax imposed by the general Spanish Philippine Government for services performed in the island of Luzon.

The United States have rightful occupation of the city of Manila and its defenses only. Under the prevailing armistice they have no right to impose taxes for services performed in any other part of the world. This tax, being a provincial or colonial tax, makes it doubtful if it comes within the taxes which can be paid to the present authorities of the city of Manila. The Spanish governor stationed at Iloilo, who has jurisdiction over all portions of the Philippine Islands not in the actual rightful possession of the United States, might be able to raise a good legal point should we accept this railroad tax. Further consideration will be given to the question.

The military governor directs me further to say that as regards our right to issue the old personal cedula he is also in doubt, as he is not aware what privileges it conferred upon the person to whom it was granted; that he has been told that it was in the nature of a passport, permitting the holder to journey in all portions of the islands. Such authority the United States can not give, so that any cedula issued by us would not be of value to the party to whom issued. It would merely be evidence of personal identification giving the right to remain in and travel about the city of Manila or through the territory over which the United States holds sway. If he is incorrect in his impressions please inform him.

For these and other reasons (one of which is the dislike exhibited by the inhabitants to the cedula tax) he has not thought it consistent with good policy to issue the cedula.

Very respectfully,

HENRY C. CABELL,
Military Secretary.

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY SECRETARY,
Manila, P. I., September 21, 1898.

Maj. R. B. C. BEMENT, U. S. V.,
Collector of Customs and Internal Revenue, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 19th instant with inclosures (the inclosures I herewith return), and to state in reply that the only policy which can be pursued under the present American administration of this city is to refuse to consider all claims which were pending, treating them as claims against the Spanish Government, in which we are not interested. As a consequence of this policy we must, to be consistent, ignore all debts due to the Spanish Government prior to occupancy, whether in the nature of taxes or otherwise. We retain all moneys and securities found in the Spanish treasury at the inception of occupation as the property of the public enemy and do not acknowledge the validity of any liens which the former subjects of Spain (whose status is at present that of Spanish citizens with citizenship held in abeyance) may submit for requested adjustment. In pursuance of that policy the answer to the first question submitted by you must be, "Yes; only received taxes which have accrued since August 13."

The answer to the second question is, "Yes; refund taxes for the portion of the quarters prior to August 13 and retain taxes which have accrued since that date."

To the third question the answer is, "No." Parties who have paid taxes to the Spanish Government may possibly have a claim against the Spanish Government, but certainly not against the United States Government. Money in the treasury at the time it was surrendered to the United States is public money and can not be returned in liquidation of Spanish indebtedness, whatever the nature of that indebtedness.

You will not make any refundments in any instance except from money actually received by you.

To the fourth question the answer is contained in answers already made.

The fifth query is met in the second answer.

To be plain, the collector of internal revenue should refund only from money received by him. Money covered into the Spanish treasury by Spanish officials for whatever purpose, or from whatever source, must remain there.

By command of Major-General Otis:

HENRY C. CABELL, *Military Secretary.*

Inquiries were continually being presented from this department of public affairs, which necessitated the labor of discovering and translating a great many Spanish decrees by which the department was affected. The question of issuing the cedula, from which an annual revenue amounting to $4,000,000 had been received, and which was one of the chief grievances presented by the Filipinos against the Spanish Government because of its cost, was long considered, and was finally requested by the inhabitants, as it furnished the simplest means of personal identification, provided it could be given for a money consideration not burdensome. It was therefore issued to applicants, numbering over 60,000, at a rate sufficient to pay all the expenses connected with the issuing of the same. It was eagerly sought by the people and was a source of great satisfaction. This department, too, was so closely connected with the administration of strictly municipal affairs (since it collected a considerable share of the city revenue) as to present complications. The city revenue came from more than twenty different sources, including urban taxes collected at the office of internal revenue, 10 per cent of the amounts collected for port, harbor, and light dues, etc.

Until 1894 the municipality, strictly speaking, consisted of the walled town, and was then extended to embrace the adjacent surrounding villages, such as Ermita, Malate, Binondo, and others, which had previously been granted a certain abridged independent control of its public affairs. The royal decree of January, 1894, under which this change was brought about, pretended to recognize to a certain extent the clannish or tribal, or rather family, hereditary customs which enter into the public affairs of all Filipino village communities, but

had little weight in the formation of the new government. The entire city was divided into eleven districts, and a considerable number of the city officers were made elective under stringent ballot regulations.

The Governor-General, however, appointed to the most responsible positions, and had the power of absolute veto on all actions of the municipal council, so that in fact the city continued to be, as formerly, under quasi-military administration. Should the prescribed sources of revenue fail to furnish the necessary public funds, the council might seek others from which to draw, and upon approval of its recommendations by the Governor-General that certain new features of taxation be introduced, they were at once applied. A reestablishment of this so-called city government by the United States was an impossibility, even if the spirit of the inhabitants had made it prudent. Therefore complete control of not only the police of the city, but of all its municipal affairs was entrusted to the provost-marshal-general. He was directed to deposit in the general treasury, as was also the officer of internal revenue, all funds received from any source whatsoever and to draw on the public treasury for moneys to cover the necessary city expenditures. The accompanying reports of the provost-marshal-general and the collector of internal revenue explain the constitution and workings of these respective departments.

The subject of Chinese immigration had to be considered very soon after occupation. Many of this class of inhabitants had retired to China during the three years of political agitation which had preceded the surrender of Manila. Now, when the United States took possession and a more stable government was predicted, they sought to return. Large numbers, too, who had never resided in the Philippines endeavored to enter, in order to take advantage of the reviving trade facilities anticipated. Notwithstanding the many thousands who had permanently settled in the islands, who, as residents, were conducting large business enterprises, a great share of the retail trade in the larger cities, the minor exchanges in merchandise carried on between the outlying towns and villages, and who were extensively employed to perform the more arduous and exhausting kinds of manual labor; notwithstanding the very marked strain of Chinese blood noticeable in a fair proportion of the native inhabitants, showing considerable consanguineous relationships, the old hereditary race prejudice was still active and continually manifested itself in illegal and oftentimes bloody demonstrations.

The Filipino is by nature an agriculturist; the Chinaman a trader not burdened by a troublesome conscience when seeking the profits of traffic. The former is more or less indolent in normal conditions. The latter is ever on the alert for individual pecuniary gain, is more than a match for the Filipino when any business relationship is established between them and is apt to pay for the advantages he acquires by subsequent robbery and oftentimes murder. Pursuing his avocation through the country as an insignificant trader carrying his pack of goods, he is considered by the more unruly classes of Filipinos as a desirable object for sequestration and often disappears forever by some means unknown to relatives and friends. Still, he persistently confronts all these personal dangers, obedient to his mastering desire to acquire money. Under Spanish rule the Chinese residents controlled the opium trade, secured the greater share of the profits from legalized gambling which was extensively prosecuted throughout the islands, were the winners in lawful raffling, and were close seconds to the Filipinos in the business enterprises attending the licensed occupation of cockfighting.

Not only was this active race enmity and the unfortunate existing conditions which were more or less its consequences giving trouble, but the Chinamen themselves were divided into warring factions. By the larger faction the acting Chinese consul was accused of taking advantage of his consular powers by exacting payments of money for his individual profit. The consul thereupon asked permission to discipline his refractory countrymen and to deport in his discretion those whom he might discover to belong to the criminal classes.

After due consideration of the perplexing questions which presented themselves upon the opening of the port of Manila in this matter of Chinese immigration, the conclusion was reached that the application of the United States statutes controlling such immigration to United States territory furnished the best solution, and therefore within the month succeeding our occupation the following instructions were issued:

The laws of the United States, which prohibit the entrance of Chinese, will be enforced here.

The exceptions are:

Chinese laborers, skilled or unskilled, formerly resident in Manila and temporarily absent therefrom, will be allowed to return upon proper proof of such previous residence, which may be made by presentation of a Spanish cedula or certificate of the American consul, of the port from which the returning Chinese have sailed.

The closest scrutiny of such cedulas and certificates is enjoined, and in doubtful cases the collector of this port will require them to be supported by additional proof, and no Chinaman, of whatever nationality, will be permitted by him to land except upon conclusive proof of previous residence.

There will be exempted from the above restrictions the parties named in article 3 of the convention between the United States of America and the Empire of China, published in supplement to the Revised Statutes of the United States, volume 2, pages 153–7, to wit: Chinese officials, teachers, students, merchants, or travelers for curiosity or pleasure. The coming of these classes of Chinese will be permitted upon the production of a certificate from their Government or the government where they last resided, vised by the diplomatic or consular representative of the United States in the country or port whence they depart, supplemented by such further proof as is required in section 6 of an act of Congress, approved July 5, 1884.

All Chinese entering this port shall register at the office of the Chinese consul or consular agent.

It is also directed that the following regulations shall govern the return to this port of Chinese laborers, skilled or unskilled, residents of Manila, who leave this port after this date.

Every such Chinese laborer will, before his departure from this port, report to the collector of customs or his deputy, who will enter in a registry, to be kept for that purpose, the name of such laborer, his age, occupation, physical marks or peculiarities, and such other facts as may be deemed necessary for the purpose of identification.

Said collector or his deputy will furnish to every such departing Chinese laborer a certificate to be signed by said collector or his deputy, which certificate shall set forth all the facts shown by the registry book above mentioned, corresponding with said registry in all particulars.

The certificate herein provided for shall entitle such Chinese laborer to whom the same is issued to return and reenter this port upon producing and delivering the same to the collector of customs of said port, and said certificate shall be the only evidence permissible to establish his right to reentry, but said certificate may be controverted and the facts therein disproved by the United States authorities. Upon delivering such certificate by such Chinese laborer to the collector of customs at the time of reentry into this port said collector shall cause the same to be filed in the custom-house and duly canceled.

These instructions are still practiced substantially—the only modifications made consisting in methods of application—and the orders which have been issued by the War Department since their date have confirmed them. The action taken by the United States and Chinese governments in changing the consular representative of the latter has

resulted in quieting very materially the complaints of the resident Chinese against each other, although an occasional one is submitted. The conditions of these residents and their evident interest in a stable government to enable them to practice their natural trading propensities, also the utter absence of any patriotic sentiment by which they could possibly be animated, renders the conduct of many of them anomalous. Within our military lines they are ardent friends of the Americans, and, beyond, a good many are apparently active insurgents. They fill subordinate positions in the insurgent army, and one of the ablest insurgent general officers is a Chinaman, but his chief occupation appears to be to look carefully after the finances within the territory of his sphere of action. They have performed a great deal of the vast amount of manual labor expended in the construction of the insurgent intrenchments which are encountered by our army wherever it is called upon to operate, but under impressment, doubtless, as they seize every opportunity to escape insurgent domination, provided they are not restrained by their individual property interests.

Allusion is made in a former portion of this report to the difficulties encountered in reestablishing satisfactory civil tribunals. It is there asserted that "the civil court justices vacated their positions and gradually sailed for Spain without giving notice of their intention to depart." Before this happened there had been a few interesting incidents connected with the opening of the courts by the Spanish judges without previous consultation with the military authorities, which excited the inhabitants of the city, who submitted strong protests. The provost-marshal-general therefore was directed to close the minor civil tribunals and the court of the first instance—a court with jurisdiction coextensive with the territorial limits of a province. There was also in session the court of the audiencia, or the supreme court of the islands, having appellate jurisdiction exclusively. The chief justice, whose court was empowered by Spanish decree to sit in the city of Manila only, claimed the right to hold court and to at least administer upon cases affecting inhabitants not resident in the city, independent of United States authority, and also argued its right to determine cases, both civil and criminal, which were pending on appeal prior to United States occupation. In submitting his request or demand, he asked for a personal interview, and the following reply was returned:

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY GOVERNOR,
Manila, P. I., September 25, 1898.

HON. SERVANDO F. VICTORIA,
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 21st instant, a translation of which is now before me. Replying thereto, I beg to inform your honor that so much of your communication as is devoted to the discussion of the question of continuance under military government, such as has been established in the city of Manila by the United States, of the local courts of the country and of the civil laws (municipal), has received the consideration which its importance merits, and to say further that the views expressed by you in the main have my concurrence.

But while it is true, as pointed out by your honor, that under the conditions noted the generally accepted rule under international law is that all civil law continues to take its usual course in places and territory under military government, and is usually administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as before the establishment of the military government; it is likewise true, and I am sure will be admitted by your honor, that these laws continue in force and the local courts continue in the exercise of their jurisdiction only with the sanction of the occupying belligerent, which may, for cause deemed sufficient by it, suspend the same or wholly supersede them. Upon the establishment of military government at this place, it was decreed by my predecessor that "municipal laws (the term 'munici-

pal laws' being used in its broader sense and in contradistinction to the term 'international law'), such as affect private rights of persons and property, regulate local institutions, and provide for the punishment of crime, shall be considered as continuing in force so far as compatible with the purposes of military government, and that they be administered through the ordinary tribunals substantially as before occupation, but by officers appointed by the government of occupation." (See paragraph 3 of proclamation dated August 14, 1898.)

The effect of this provision was to suspend operation of your court, and other courts of subordinate jurisdiction sitting at Manila, until reorganized in accordance with its requirements, and it is not understood how this unequivocal language could be misunderstood.

I am informed that the provision of the proclamation above quoted was inserted after mature deliberation, and that there was understood to exist a necessity for the restriction placed upon the exercise of jurisdiction by your honor's court, and by the subordinate courts heretofore referred to, in the then condition of the public mind toward these tribunals.

Whether it is now necessary to continue the restrictions heretofore placed upon the operations of the courts named is a question which I have at present under consideration. The assurance contained in your letter to the effect that the supreme court presided over by you and the subordinate courts "considered themselves obliged to cooperate with their continual functions to the better realization of a service which the army of occupation of your excellency's command took charge of," is a most important consideration in relieving me of such doubts as have arisen. I am very desirous that the judiciary shall resume its customary jurisdiction, provided that adequate assurance can be had that the exercise of such jurisdiction shall not in any way tend to defeat or obstruct the operations of the established government and will not result in a widespread discontent and dissatisfaction among the great majority of the people subject to the military government, thereby creating greater difficulties and hardships than those pointed out in your communication, and which it is your desire as well as my own to mitigate.

I beg to assure you that the questions raised by you shall have my earnest attention, and to the end that a complete understanding may be brought about and the purpose we both have in view may be advanced as rapidly as possible, I shall be pleased to appoint an interview with you in my office when informed of the time that will be most convenient for your honor to respond to such an invitation.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V., Military Governor.

Several conferences followed, also interviews with leading Filipino lawyers, and the result was the order of October 7, set out in a former portion of this report, by which the courts were permitted to resume the exercise of all civil jurisdiction conferred by Spanish laws, but not criminal jurisdiction of any nature. The permitted use of these abridged functions was not satisfactory to the Spanish judges, and their courts were gradually closed, depriving citizens of temporary legal process in their business transactions, which in a few instances was desired, except in so far as they obtained remedy through the military governor's office.

All citizens charged with crimes and misdemeanors were in the meantime brought before military commissions and provost courts, which were occasionally instructed, in order that they might meet varying conditions as occasion demanded. These military tribunals have worked very satisfactorily and have been acceptable to the inhabitants because of conceded just administration and celerity of action. Even now since the reestablishment of the civil courts they transact a large amount of business, as civil jurisdiction does "not extend to and include crimes and offenses committed by citizens of or persons sojourning within the Philippine Islands, which are prejudicial to military administration and discipline, except by authority specially conferred by the military governor."

The surrendered Spanish treasury, in which the deposit safes and

vaults had been carefully examined and contents correctly inventoried by a board of officers appointed for that purpose, the members of which returned thereto all former contents and securely sealed the same to await the determination of the question of rightful possession of contents, gave a good deal of annoyance on account of the numerous applications of private individuals for the return to them of money, bonds, or other securities which they had deposited voluntarily as investments or in exchange for Spanish bonds never received, or to guarantee the specific performance of contracts which they had entered into with the city and provisional governments. The treasury books showed many special individual deposits in money and many special deposits of bonds, some of which were properly designated when placed in the Spanish vaults, so that ownership could be readily determined. The money which individuals claimed that they had deposited, if received and retained, had been merged into the general fund, and together with the claimed bonds would have exceeded in amount probably all the money and paper securities which the treasury contained. The correspondence between these individuals and the military authorities was voluminous. The conclusions reached are shown in the following communications:

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., October 6, 1898.

Mr. JOSE DE GURENA,
Attorney for Dr. Francisco Sainz, Manila, P. I.

SIR: The military governor directs me to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of a few days since (which is apparently without date), in which you request the return to your client of certain moneys deposited by him in the Spanish treasury at Manila, etc., which were to be held in trust by the Spanish Government as security for the specific performance of certain contracts which he had entered into with the Government of that country.

In reply, I am directed to return the copies of contracts submitted by you and to state that your client appears to have a claim against the Spanish Government for moneys deposited, but none against the Government of the United States.

All funds which came into the possession of the United States upon the surrender of the city of Manila and its defenses on August 13 last, were surrendered as public funds, and were turned over to the United States under articles of capitulation requiring that "all funds in the Spanish treasury and all public funds shall be turned over to the authorities of the United States." As you are evidently aware, there is no requirement of international law to the effect that funds, the title of which is vested in the United States by capture, shall be distributed among such persons as have pecuniary claims against the country from which the funds were captured. The contracts made by and between your client and the Spanish Government evidently rest in suspension by reason of "the act of the public enemy," and may be revived in full force upon the cessation of United States military occupation and return of the territory occupied to Spain. The military government holds as a legal proposition that a Spanish subject (with citizenship in temporary abeyance) can not have, either in equity or law, a lien upon moneys surrendered by the Spanish Government as its public funds. They came into the possession of the United States wholly unincumbered and title passed to my Government with possession.

Very respectfully,

HENRY C. CABELL,
Military Secretary.

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., September 19, 1899.

Messrs. R. AENLLE & Co.,
46 Magallanes street, Manila.

GENTLEMEN: In reply to your communication of the 9th instant, the military governor directs me to state that investigation shows that the bonds you mention in the communication are in the possession of the present custodian of the Spanish

public funds, and that they can not be delivered at the present time for the following reasons, viz:

That they concern a contract entered into by Spanish authorities and a subject of Spain; that all obligations of such a nature, and all rights under them, are suspended during the existence of war between the dominion of Spain and the United States Government, and remain in suspension until the final declaration of peace between those two countries.

That the military government of the United States established in Manila is not under any obligations to recognize in any way formerly existing regulations between Spain and its subjects, whether arising under contract or otherwise.

That it is not the duty of that government, and it might be said its right, to attempt to adjust claims of such a character. They remain in abeyance, and are revived upon the declaration of peace.

Very respectfully, yours,

HENRY C. CABELL,
Military Secretary.

In answer to individual requests for the return of voluntary bond deposits, which could be identified and ownership established by marks and designations accompanying these special deposits, applicants were informed that they must await the unsealing of the safes, which could not be done until some settlement of American and Spanish interests should be arrived at. The result has been that the money deposits merged into the general fund have not been recognized as creating any obligation against the United States Government, which received this entire fund as the public money of Spain; that the recognized special deposits have been returned to the individual owners, under the supervision of the United States and Spanish boards of liquidation, which were appointed several months since to settle the respective interests of those Governments under the provisions of the late Paris treaty.

There was another class of cases which for a brief period constantly obtruded themselves and which involved long-continued study and careful consideration. They arose upon the applications of individuals for the return to them of their estates embargoed by the Spanish authorities during the recent rebellion. The estates of many Filipinos who were charged with treason were taken possession of and administered upon by Spanish officials. After the United States had taken Manila, present and returning residents who had suffered from this cause sought the restoration of their properties. The case of the Cortes Filipino family, which had taken refuge in Hongkong, was pushed for determination before the Manila military authorities with all the vigor of demonstration of which the members of that family and the United States consuls at Hongkong and Manila were capable. These embargoes affected individual real properties, a portion of which might be situated in the city, a part in some other locality under Spanish domination, and such was the condition of the Cortes estate. A conclusion was finally reached on the facts presented and rendered in the following expressed opinion, of date November 25:

That the present United States military occupation of a portion of the Philippine Islands, under and by virtue of the armistice existing between the Governments of the United States and Spain, is of a temporary character and does not place upon the former any obligations to redress or even inquire into alleged grievances imposed by the latter while dominant here upon its subjects, especially if such allegations are submitted by those subjects and concern only their individual property rights; that the United States, under its temporary occupancy and the conditions which prevail, would not be justified in setting aside the laws of Spain and the decisions of its courts when individual property rights are alone concerned, not even in matters arising under its war decrees promulgated for the correction, or the punishment it may be, of its refractory subjects participating in a formidable rebellion with intention to destroy its sovereign power; that the

relief asked for by the petitioners is civil in its nature and should be sought in the civil courts of the conquered, which have been continued and are permitted to exercise their formerly conferred civil jurisdiction in all matters not involving arrests of persons and criminal prosecution, and therefore the case does not concern the military administration, specially constituted for other purposes; that the case involves a question of United States revenue, since the petitioners demand a return to them as Spanish subjects of the public property of Spain as declared by its authorities to which the United States has succeeded and which it has the legal right to receive and enjoy, for I ascertain by reference to the Spanish military code that the effect of the declared embargo of the property of the petitioners and the proceedings taken under it was to vest the uses and profits of the embargoed estates in the Spanish Government while the embargo continued—title to the same remaining in the individual owners from whom possession was taken.

The active continuance of the embargo was made to depend upon pardon or the result of trial by the Spanish courts upon the charge of treason, rebellion, or sedition, confiscation attending conviction and sentence and restoration following acquittal. During the existence of the embargo the real property affected was apparently held in trust by the Spanish Government for its sole use and benefit, with remainder vested in parties formerly holding the unqualified fee, and dependent upon a contingency involving due conviction of the crime of disloyalty to that government. These conclusions are supported by explanatory provisions contained in a decree issued by the governor-general on January 19, 1897, wherein it was declared that in the case "of an absent culprit presenting himself and being acquitted by the court, he will only have a right to claim a return of the property not alienated and to the rents and profits which have not been applied." Finally, it is concluded that the United States Government during its occupancy under its truce with Spain, which provides only for a temporary cessation of hostilities, would be recreant to its trust should it knowingly divert, without just cause arising under the laws of war, properties the uses of which would again inure to the dominion of Spain upon a return of Spanish sovereignty. Declared permanent possession by the United States would modify conditions and present the entire question in a different aspect, for then the rights of all concerned, whether dependent upon treaty obligations or otherwise, would be defined or become easy of interpretation.

It was therefore ordered that the provost-marshal-general seize all funds of the Cortez estate on deposit in the local banks, take forcible possession of all the real properties belonging to that estate which were situated in the city of Manila, and administer the same for the use and benefit of the United States Government. These conclusions arrived at, which were fully justified by the facts, enabled the United States authorities to take legal possession, temporarily at least, of not only the realty but also the personalty of the estate which Spain held, and which belonged to the public properties she had promised to surrender under the articles of capitulation. The provost-marshal-general took possession of the estate as directed, accounted for the proceeds received while he held possession, and finally, under the instructions of the War Department, turned estate, with all proceeds, over to the owners. This case served as a precedent for future proceedings upon questions of embargo, although in cases of minor importance embargoed property was at once turned over to the claimant upon due proof of right to receive it.

Until October 14 the United States troops in the Philippines remained stationed at Manila and Cavite, as provided in General Merritt's orders of August 23, with very slight exceptions, Major-General Anderson retaining supervision of the district of Cavite and Major-General MacArthur of the troops stationed in Manila, the three organizations composing the provost guard continuing, however, under the control of Brigadier-General Hughes.

They were most bountifully supplied with subsistence and medicines, but light clothing suited to the climate and facilities necessary

for occupying and messing in barracks were needed. These were soon obtained through contract and purchase from the merchants of Hongkong and Manila and by shipment from the United States. The troops received tactical instructions daily, but the weather was too hot for much physical exertion, and time hung heavily upon them. They entertained the impression that the Spanish war had terminated, and the volunteers appeared to believe that they should be recalled to the United States at once and regular troops sent out to perform the monotonous garrison duties which were about to follow the victory of Manila. Many became ill from too free indulgence in the fruits and manufactured drinks of the country, and indifference to that care and attention of person which a tropical climate makes necessary. Homesickness alone produced illness in numerous cases, so that early in September the hospitals began to be rapidly filled. This led to the adoption of judicious precautionary measures. Aguinaldo was faithfully executing his agreement made with General Merritt with regard to water privileges and the city waterworks, which was to permit us to use the pumping station situated 8 miles from the walled city, provided we would pay the men of his selection for running it and defray all the necessary expenditures. This we were faithfully doing, but the water secured was not of desired quality and boiling and distilling were resorted to. Circular instructions prepared by the Medical Department, warning men of the results of injudicious action, were issued from headquarters, and all sanitary measures possible were adopted.

The sick rate, however, increased. On September 4 one hundred and thirteen sick soldiers were shipped to the United States, as their restoration to health in this climate was extremely improbable, and more followed. The percent of sickness to numerical strength in some organizations rose to 20, and in two or three organizations to 30, while in others it did not exceed 6 or 8, although the latter were no better housed nor provided for than the former; but the men of the latter were, without doubt, better supervised and watched over by their officers and were measurably contented with conditions. As long as the practice of sending sick men home continued there was no improvement in the sick rate, but as soon as the convalescent hospital was established on Corregidor Island (an island at the entrance of Manila Bay) and the sick sent there for treatment a marked change for the better was apparent. In November improvement was noticeable, and in January the health of this army would compare favorably with those of any concentrated army of like proportions in existence. To be sure the men had become by this time fairly acclimatized, and new troops arriving here will be obliged to pass through this period of acclimatization before they become properly efficient for prolonged service in the field.

During my first weeks of duty here I was impressed with the spirit of suspicion and the partially concealed unfriendly feeling manifested by the Tagalos toward the American forces. That they either had very little confidence in our promises or were then forming conclusions to oppose any establishment of United States authority in Luzon was apparent, however loudly they might disclaim hostile intent or declare as an excuse for their attitude fear of the return of Spain. I saw, however, with satisfaction, their ablest men by education and mental equipment taking part in their authorative deliberations, and I had considerable confidence in the efficacy of their suggestions and advice. Still, after carefully weighing conditions, I was unable to

arrive at any satisfactory conclusions. To a cable received on September 16, I replied on the next day as follows:

ADJUTANT-GENERAL ARMY, *Washington:*

Referring to telegram yesterday, now think prudence dictates increased force—this after deliberation on situation appearing to-day and possible developments. Force sufficient for present purposes, but contingencies may arise difficult to meet. Parties plotting constantly to convey erroneous impressions and excite insurgents. Demands of city government and sick list draw heavily on armed organizations. An additional 1,500 men could be used to supply losses and give greater confidence. Battalions of Eighteenth and Twenty-third Infantry, still in San Francisco, should join at once.

Measures were being applied constantly to improve the sanitary condition of the city, to increase the efficiency of the troops, and to meet any emergency which might develop from an uprising of the inhabitants, or from hasty action by any portion of our or the insurgent forces, which, though maintaining amicable intercourse, were, in fact, in an attitude of resistance and hostility upon all questions involving the right of armed occupation of the suburbs and defenses of Manila. The insurgent soldiers had looted extensively the portions of the city to which they gained access, and were greatly disappointed that this privilege over other parts of the same was not accorded them. Their enforced withdrawal to outer lines was the cause of discontent, and augmented any desire which they may have formerly entertained to resist or attack the American troops. This growing discontent was observable among the lower classes of the city's inhabitants, from whom a considerable share of Aguinaldo's army was drawn, and was undoubtedly increased by the reprehensible conduct and illegal actions of some of our own men, who were severely punished for their misdeeds when detected. Outwardly, however, relations of the most friendly character were maintained. The officers and enlisted men of the two armies mingled in friendly social intercourse. To the casual observer the only discordant element in this dense complex population, made up of every nation and tongue in existence, were the hated Spanish prisoners, whom the Filipinos still longed to persecute and kill, and who were obliged to keep within the walls of Old Manila for safety.

Repeated conferences were held with influential insurgents, whose chief aim appeared to be to obtain some authoritative expression on the intent of the United States with regard to the Philippines, and complained that they were unable to discover anyone who could speak ex cathedra. They asserted that their Malolos arrangement was a government de facto, which had the right to ask an expression of intent from the United States Government.

To increase and better organize the force in Manila, the following orders were issued on October 14:

The troops comprising this command, with the exception of the Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, Thirteenth Minnesota, and Second Oregon Regiments of volunteer infantry, which will continue to constitute the guard and police force of the provost marshal-general of the city, the Eighteenth U. S. Infantry, and the detachment of California Volunteer Heavy Artillery, which will compose the permanent garrison of Cavite, are organized into two divisions, designated as First and Second Divisions of the Eighth Army Corps, each to consist of two brigades.

The following designated troops, now quartered and to be quartered in the city south of the Pasig River, will form the First Division:

Six troops of the Fourth U. S. Cavalry.
Light Batteries D and G, Sixth U. S. Artillery.
The Astor Battery.
Fourteenth U. S. Infantry.
First California Volunteer Infantry.
First Idaho Volunteer Infantry.
First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.
Battalion First Wyoming Volunteer Infantry.

The following organizations north of the Pasig River will compose the Second Division:

Company A, Battalion of Engineers.
Four batteries Third U. S. Artillery.
Batteries A and B, Utah Volunteer Light Artillery.
First Colorado Volunteer Infantry.
First Montana Volunteer Infantry.
First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry.
Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry.
First South Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

Troops expected to arrive from San Francisco soon will be assigned to these divisions when numerical strength and facilities for quartering will be considered.

For the purpose of enforcing discipline through general court-martial proceedings, together with appropriate action to be taken to that end, the First and Eighteenth Companies, Volunteer Signal Corps, are attached to the First, and the Hospital Corps, U. S. A., to the Second Division.

Maj. Gen. T. M. Anderson, U. S. V., is assigned to the command of the First Division, and Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, U. S. V., to the command of the Second. They will submit as soon as practicable the proposed organization of brigades of their commands.

Brig. Gen. Charles King and Samuel Ovenshine, U. S. V., are assigned for duty with the First Division, and Brig. Gen. H. G. Otis and Irving Hale, U. S. V., to the Second Division. They will report in person to the commanding generals of their respective divisions for assignment to brigade commands (General King, expected to arrive soon, so reporting upon arrival).

Officers now serving on the staffs of general officers under proper orders will continue on such service. The chief quartermaster and chief commissary of the command will nominate officers of their respective departments for assignment as division and brigade quartermasters and commissaries, being mindful of assignments in those capacities which have already been made. The chief surgeon of the command will nominate officers of the Medical Department for assignment as chief surgeons of divisions.

The organized divisions had little exacting duty to perform, as the provost-marshal-general with his guard of three regiments was held responsible for the preservation of order within the more thickly populated portions of the city. Division commanders looked carefully after the health, practical instruction and personal conduct of their men, prescribed drills and practiced ceremonies, and watched by means of small outposts the armed insurgents to the number of six or eight thousand, who maintained a warlike attitude on the outer lines. The Army Regulations, appropriate to peace conditions, were enforced in matters of examinations, courts, boards, returns, reports, and correspondence. Barracks, quarters, messing facilities, and sanitary surroundings were improved, and in so far as strictly military operations were concerned the passing period was devoid of excitement or apparent importance. In answer to request to make a statement in regard to the welfare of the troops, I remarked, on November 19, that since August none had arrived except absent members of and recruits for organizations which had preceded them; that the fifth expedition left San Francisco between the 19th of October and the 8th of November and its advance was expected daily, and continued as follows:

The medical department of the corps has always been well supplied with medical stores. There has been a shortage of medical officers which has been fairly well met through contract physicians. Now we are abundantly supplied with medical stores and hospital buildings, though medical officers have been overworked. The sick report to-day is about 12 per cent of the command; that of the British army in this latitude is about 10 per cent. The most of our sickness is of a mild type, and the health of the troops is now markedly improved. The total number of deaths of the command since leaving San Francisco is 161, or a little more than 1 per cent. Of these deaths 54 were due to typhoid fever, 25 to wounds received in battle, 7 to accident, 13 to dysentery, and 13 to smallpox. This number of deaths among 15,000 men, covering a period of several months, is surprisingly light.

In the matter of subsistence the troops have never suffered. They have been supplied with abundant rations, better even than any body of men I ever had association with. There is to-day well stored in this city subsistence for 17,000 men for

four months. Also large supplies for sale to officers and men, all of which are in excellent condition. In addition to the regular issues 30 cents per day is given to each organization for every man reported ill with which to buy delicacies needed by the sick. Doubtless troops have suffered somewhat because of their lack of knowledge to properly prepare their food, but all with former experience such as our Regular regiments are acquiring additional regimental funds. The command is now fairly well supplied with all needful quartermaster's articles excepting wagon transportation. The volunteers are still armed with the old Springfield rifle, but steps have been taken to supply the most reliable of them with the Krag-Jorgensen and smokeless ammunition.

No one can tell what duties these troops may be called upon to perform. It is more than probable, should the islands be retained by the United States, that they will be kept exceedingly busy establishing United States authority and maintaining a fair degree of order. In casting over all the difficulties which have been met in transporting these soldiers, composed mostly of raw material, over 7,000 miles of water and placing them here in good condition and well supplied, results must be considered as quite satisfactory. Nothing of the kind had ever before been attempted and no previous preparation had been made.

On November 21 and 25 the absent battalions of the Eighteenth and Twenty-third Infantry arrived.

Throughout that month, and a good portion of December, the troops remained quiet, their health steadily improving. On December 2 I cabled the Adjutant-General of the Army that the percentage of sick of the command, as reported on November 30, was 10, as against 14 for October 31; that the number of deaths was 20 as against 45 for October; that the sick rate was about the same as that among troops of other governments serving in tropical climates; that one-third of the sick were suffering from typhoid and malarial fevers; one-sixth from intestinal troubles, and that the remaining half of all ailments were slight in character. The only matters in which troops took special interest grew out of their speculations on the attitude and probable intentions of the insurgents.

On December 1 the United States transport *Indiana*, with headquarters and 2 battalions of the Kansas Volunteers arrived, followed on the 7th of that month by the transports *Newport* and *Pennsylvania* with other volunteer organizations. The volunteers, however, had grown weary of their service and many applied for their discharge on the plea that the Spanish war had terminated. They were firmly impressed with the belief that the future occupation of the United States Army in the islands would be confined to garrison duty, a belief that was shared by the older European residents and the aborigines of Manila, and they considered that such duty should be performed by regulars. My own confidence at this time in a satisfactory solution of the difficulties which confronted us may be gathered from a dispatch sent to Washington on December 7, wherein I stated that conditions were improving and that there were signs of revolutionary disintegration; that I had conferred with a number of the members of the revolutionary government and thought that the most of them would favor peaceful submission to United States authority. I had strong reasons for this expressed confidence from assurances made to me by some of the ablest Filipinos who had occupied positions of importance in the insurgent government and had signified their intention to withdraw from it. Had the volunteers then supposed that their services would soon be demanded to maintain the honor and integrity of their country they would willingly have awaited the emergency. But all official proceedings tended to give them the contrary impression. Returning transports were carrying back to San Francisco numbers of specially discharged men. On December 13 the Astor Battery was relieved from duty and directed to proceed to New York City. Its departure on the

16th of the month was followed soon by the sailing for home of one-third of the Nebraska regiment. Individual applications for discharge became numerous, and on December 15 I forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army the following communication:

I have the honor to forward herewith 427 applications from enlisted men of this command for their discharge from the service, some on specially stated grounds which require consideration, but for the most part on the plea that War Department orders entitle them to it. They refer to paragraph 2, General Orders No. 40, current series, and think that the present cessation of active hostilities between the United States and Spain is the "close of the war" within the meaning of that paragraph; hence these numerous individual applications which they consider the paragraph invited them to make.

Doubtless the end of the war awaits the proclamation of peace, and in these islands that day may be somewhat deferred.

The number of these applications indicates the desire of the enlisted men of the command to escape the country, and shows how difficult it is to hold them in conditions of contented discipline. Much of this desire to escape their military obligations at a time when their services are especially demanded arises from homesickness, and that fact accounts largely for the heavy percentum of sickness with which we have been afflicted.

Under present exigencies I am obliged to disapprove all of these applications.

But notwithstanding the desire to hold the volunteers as above expressed (and it was necessary to hold them or no army would remain), I continued to believe that we might overcome difficulties without resort to force, for, on December 22, in answer to an inquiry as to the truth of certain newspaper statements of that date which charged us with the commission of grave offenses, I cabled that Manila was never more quiet; that order prevailed and that the native population of the city had been greatly augmented within three months; that the criminal class was large, and that representatives of the same were arriving from the United States and Asiatic coasts, who were closely watched; that the conduct of the troops was good, to a degree in fact that it was subject of favorable comment by the citizens, and that disorders were promptly punished, as the business transacted by the courts would show. I further asserted that the disparaging statements which appeared in the United States, Hongkong, and Singapore newspapers were without an element of truth, and that military rule was firm as circumstances demanded, since outbreaks were likely to occur. Still I continued to have confidence in the peaceful solution of affairs, although it was apparent that the radical element in the insurgent councils (consisting of men without property and of little character, by whom the passions of the more ignorant natives were being inflamed and who were then organizing within the city clubs for legitimate improvement and amusement, as they claimed, but really for revolutionary purposes), might precipitate hostilities without giving us much warning. Aguinaldo, too, aided by his more intimate associates, was constantly levying and collecting war contributions and exciting the people with the cry for independence. He was in constant communication with a business firm of American membership mostly, having headquarters in Hongkong (one of whose members, individually present in Manila, had been appointed chief of ordnance of the insurgent army), and was secretly negotiating for a large supply of arms and ammunition, all of which was well known to me at the time.

During this period of quiet, in so far as strictly military affairs were concerned, the labors of civil administration were very exacting, and necessitated a mass of correspondence too voluminous to be embodied in this report. A few extracts will be submitted to show the character of the questions which were constantly presenting themselves for official determination. Already many individual claims against the United

States for damages to or loss of property, caused for the most part by the insurgent soldiers who had been in occupation of a portion of the city, were being received.

Great difficulties attended the efforts to administer on business principles the city revenues; to ascertain all former sources of that revenue; to put the proper machinery in operation to collect that portion of it the payment of which was considered appropriate and just, and to detect the constantly perpetrated frauds made easy under practices of long standing, and bring guilty officials or city employees to punishment.

The merchants were importunate. Those of foreign citizenship complained to the resident consuls of their respective governments, by whom their protests were officially submitted. This action appeared to threaten international complications, and had to be promptly and judiciously met. On October 31 the following reply was sent to one of these representatives of a foreign power, from whom a protest signed by nearly all the resident business men of his government was received:

DEAR SIR: I have the honor to acknowlege the receipt of your communication of the 29th instant, with attached copy of declaration and petition of certain resident merchants of Manila, inclosed.

Had this protest been presented to the military governor of Manila by the protestants, the matter complained of might possibly have readily received some satisfactory adjustment, but as it has been submitted direct to the goverment of * * * as a declaration and protest against the action of the United States authorities, and received as such by that government, it becomes a matter requiring mature deliberation. I have therefore the honor to invite your attention to the statement of facts contained in this declaration, the conclusions which protestants have drawn therefrom, and the presentation of facts as understood by the United States authorities here stationed, with their legal conclusions briefly submitted.

The protestants correctly recite the publication of the official circular from the office of the United States military governor on the 26th instant, but the alleged facts, viz, "that with the exception of a few, and some of them insignificant, ports (and that under certain restrictions which greatly embarrass trade), the interisland trade of the Philippines is prohibited," are not warranted. Still, it is possible that this narration was merely intended to be a conclusive summary of facts set up in the indicated circular, and if so, it is only fair to treat them as such, and they may be considered in connection with the remaining conclusions which the protest contains and which are "That the principal hemp-producing districts, such as Albay, Sorsogon, Leyte, and Samar, are closed by this circular against Manila trade, involving incalulable loss to * * * interest in the Philippines;" "that the arbitrary enforcement of vessels engaged, being obliged to carry Spanish officers only, is a measure almost impossible to fulfill, as vessels are unable to comply therewith in view of the danger the Spanish officers would be exposed to from the native crews which they carry and the insufficiency of qualified Spaniard to man the vessels," and further "that if this arbitrary order is enforced it will entail the complete ruin of Manila trade."

The above, independent of the allegations regarding the business interests of the protestants, comprises, it is believed, all the facts and conclusions which the protest contains.

For reply to these several criticisms (although unaccompanied by any expressed opinion upon the right to demand remedial action) I beg to invite your attention to a brief summary of the endeavors made by the United States authorities for the interests of Manila merchants in the matter of coasting trade, and thereafter to give correct interpretation of the circular which appears to be the object of complaint.

Shortly after United States authority had been established in the city of Manila, to wit, August 29, the Spanish governor-general of the Philippines was approached with a proposition for the reestablishment of interisland commerce in products of the country. To this that officer responded with a cablegram, of which the inclosed exhibit marked A, is a certified copy. This cablegram was interpreted as follows: "As soon as the port of Manila is open to Spanish ships flying their flag I will order that all the ports in the territories under my command shall immediately admit American ships flying the American flag," etc.

Thereafter, upon receiving information from merchants that coasting vessels from this port were not permitted to land at certain of the ports in the Visayas, the attention of the Spanish governor-general was called to the fact and he replied, on October 14, that he would send his chief of staff to Manila for conference. At the first meeting with that staff officer, upon being invited to explain the action of his chief

in arresting the progress of trade sought to be carried on in accordance with an existing agreement, he replied that his government had executed the agreement, which only extended to the ports of Iloilo, Cebu, and Zamboanga. Upon being shown the original dispatch from Iloilo, of which Exhibit A is a copy, he replied that the Spanish word "puertos," used therein, embraced only ports of entry, of which the three above named are all the southern islands contain, and that such was the understanding of the Spanish Government when the cablegram was sent. To the question why vessels dispatched on or about September 1 were permitted to trade at other ports, he replied in substance that they were not interfered with as it was believed that they were not committing injury.

The explanation as to the true signification of the word "puertos" and the expressed intent of the Spanish Government was received in good faith, and endeavors were then made to secure an extension of coasting privileges. As a result, this representative of the Spanish governor-general agreed that all ports of the islands at which the authority of Spain was maintained or which were occupied by Spanish troops would be considered as open to all vessels engaged in legitimate commerce and flying either the Spanish or American flag, provided officers in charge of vessels were of Spanish birth or nationality (they could not trust Filipino crews because of their sympathies with the insurgents), and provided the United States military governor would vouch by cablegram at the time of sailing of vessels from Manila that they contained nothing objectionable. Upon pressing the representative for further latitude of trade in Spanish possessions he agreed, on behalf of his principal, to add the ports of Iligan, Dumaguete, and Surigao on like conditions, but with the further proviso that application and consent for vessels to enter them should be previously made and obtained. He was then pressed to include the ports of Calbayog and Carrigarra, but replied that his government had no troops there—only Indian officials—and that it could not guarantee protection or safety to vessels entering the same. Asked, Spanish authority having ceased there, if he would consider that the vessels then had the right to enter, he replied that the ports were in the same condition as those in the island of Luzon, in the possession of the revolutionary forces, and that the Spanish Government could not be held responsible for any damage to entering vessels which might result. No further concessions were obtainable, as it was said the governor-general, under present conditions, was powerless to grant them. Inquiry was made by this office if Spaniards to take charge of vessels could be secured to carry on this trade, and reply was received that they could be secured without any difficulty. Thereupon the circular inclosed, marked B, was issued for the information of all parties concerned, it being considered to contain the best terms in furtherance of the interests of Manila merchants which could be secured at this time. It was drawn up and ratified by the Spanish governor-general's representative in order that the Spanish Government might be held to a faithful performance of its obligations.

The circular is not understood to be of the nature expressed in the protest. It is viewed as a concession and in no wise as a prohibition on the part of the Spanish Government, which is at liberty to close its ports to outside commerce and influences if it elects to do so. A government almost in extremis mortis, as certainly the Spanish Government in the central Philippine Islands must be considered to be at present, has the lawful right to shut temporarily all of its ports, whether declared of entry or otherwise, and whatever the business interests of outside merchants, be they foreigners or citizens of its domain. This is a declared international right fully accepted.

I can not perceive, therefore, that any present action can be adopted to further the interests of the protestants, and accepting in good faith the action of the Spanish authorities in all previous negotiations, as vouched for by them, and as it is necessary to do in the absence of proof to the contrary, I can not see that there exists just cause for complaint against the United States authorities. I am still in correspondence in regard to all these matters and may be able to secure more advantageous conditions, although a disinterested party might casually conclude that this vigorous attack on the policy or intention, or possibly the integrity of constituted authority, on the part of resident merchants might tend to diminish future persistent efforts for their welfare.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. S. Otis,
Major-General U. S. V.,
United States Military Governor in the Philippines.

The correspondence was brought to a satisfactory conclusion upon November 8 by the following communication:

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 4th instant wherein you inform this office that the action of certain protestants (* * * subjects residing and doing business here) should not be considered in any wise as the action of the official representative of their government in this city

further than his notarial functions are concerned. I am pleased to accept this construction, and shall give the matter no further consideration.

As regards the parties protestant whose joint and very satisfactory communication you inclosed and is appreciated, I am certain that they will soon be firmly convinced that the United States authorities have not omitted to make continued effort to advance their business interests in every way possible. It appears to me, however, that they have not a full appreciation of the difficulties which the government of the United States established here have been obliged to contend with.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V., United States Military Governor.

The clearance of vessels continued to give annoyance, as the political conditions in the southern islands were constantly changing, and the coasting trade agreement between the Spanish and American officials could not be satisfactorily executed, as correspondence, of which the following communications are copies, clearly indicates:

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., November 12, 1898.

CAPTAIN OF THE PORT, *Manila, P. I.*

SIR: I am directed to inform you that the military governor has just received a cablegram from Iloilo, dated the 8th instant, and cabled from Capiz on the 11th instant, of which the following is a translation:

"ILOILO, *November 8, 1898.*

"GOVERNOR-GENERAL TO GENERAL OTIS,
"*Military Governor, Manila:*

"Your telegram of present date received. I order consul, Kongkong, not to send cargo whatever in consideration of what your excellency indicates. I spoke of the affair to the commander of the *Charleston*."

This in response to a telegram from this office, dated November 1, 1898, of which the following is a copy:

"GOVERNOR-GENERAL, *Iloilo:*

"Spanish consul, Hongkong, cleared vessel flying British flag on coasting trade to southern ports, Luzon, thence to Manila. Vessel arrived from Legaspi and has been permitted to enter under protest. This clearance viewed as in violation of agreement.

"OTIS,
"*United States Military Governor in the Philippines.*"

Very respectfully,

C. H. MURRAY,
Captain, Fourth U. S. Cavalry, Aid.

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., November 25, 1898.

CAPTAIN OF THE PORT, *Manila, P. I.*

SIR: I am directed to return to you the inclosed letter of Messrs. Smith, Bell & Co., and to say in reply that, as is well known, a circular was issued from this office on October 26, 1898, announcing that under a mutual agreement between the United States and Spanish authorities vessels flying either the American or Spanish flag could be dispatched for Tacloban and other southern ports named, provided due notice by cable was given the governor-general at Iloilo that they were engaged in legitimate commerce.

In the case of the vessel of the Compania Maritima, the *Salvadora*, which had a like experience with the vessel *Cebu*, the military governor telegraphed the governor-general at Cebu, on the 16th, stating that the vessel had cleared from this port October 28 for Iloilo, Cebu, and Tacloban; that the vessel was turned back from Cebu and not permitted to proceed to Tacloban to the great loss of merchants, as the Cebu authorities reported that they could not permit vessel to enter any ports excepting those styled ports of entry. To this cablegram General Rios replied as follows:

"Regret what has occurred with steamer *Salvadora* in Cebu. Attribute it to interruption of telegraph lines that exists, making my notice, which I repeat by mail, arrive late. Begging your excellency that hereafter, at the same time, to notify me and the governor-general in Cebu when vessel does not previously touch at Iloilo."

It would seem, from the above dispatch of the 19th, that either the Spanish authorities in the southern islands are not keeping faith (which is not charged nor believed) or that they have neglected to inform officers at the various ports of the agreements which have been entered into. Under present conditions it is not possible to comply with General Rios's late request, as there are no opportunities to cable either Iloilo or Cebu, since the cable company's staff at Cebu has been removed on account of threatened danger from insurgents. Conditions therefore seem to be such that the Spanish authorities are not able to keep their agreement because of the action of the public enemy, and might plead excuse for any seeming violation of the same. Vessels hereafter clearing for the southern ports, named in the notice with which you have been furnished, will be obliged to clear assuming all attendant risks.

Further action will be taken in the matter of the *Cebu* to ascertain what remedies can be applied in instances of such a character.

Very respectfully,

C. H. MURRAY,
Captain, Fourth U. S. Cavalry, Aid.

The requests of certain merchants for permission to pass their merchandise through the customs as Spanish goods under former Spanish tariff rates, on the plea of purchase in Spain before declaration of war and inability to present it sooner, continued throughout the year. They were presented, many by them individually, and some through their consuls. Every case was based upon a slightly different statement of facts, which was fully considered in replies. Applications made through the consul for Germany show the character of this correspondence:

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., October 5, 1898.

Hon. Dr. FR. KRUGER,
Consul for Germany at the port of Manila.

SIR: Referring to your note of the 1st instant, I have the honor to state that the reason for deferring the application of the United States customs tariff and regulations from October 1 to November 10 was to gain sufficient time to make modifications therein in certain particulars in order to better adapt them to existing conditions. It was discovered that errors had been committed in the preparation or compilation of these regulations, and it was with the desire to make the necessary corrections that the postponement was ordered.

A slight concession was granted to the merchants of Manila, which was thought would not prejudice United States interests, and it was considered that sufficient notice was given to place them on their guard and allow them opportunity to protect themselves. The interests of the Manila merchants are so conflicting that no rule of general action could be adopted which would be satisfactory to all, and the requests submitted by the merchants in whose behalf you write have received greater consideration than those of merchants of the United States do when a change of tariff duties are made. There a tariff law takes effect as soon as enacted, and the rule of caveat emptor applies.

The proof which will be required to show that merchandise from Spanish ports prior to April 25, 1898, will be, in lependent of the accustomed manifests of cargo, bills of lading, and the usual consular certificates, a certificate from the United States consular agent at the Spanish port of shipment to the effect that the goods were purchased prior to April 25, and in case there is no United States consular agent at such port then a certificate of a consular agent of Great Britain at such port as the goods were so purchased.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS, *Military Governor.*

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., December 21, 1898.

Hon. Dr. FR. KRUGER,
German Consul, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 19th instant, with inclosure, which refers to merchandise shipped from Spain and recently received in this port. Concerning such goods you refer to an order issued from this office on September 29, last, in which directions were given that goods secured or purchased in Spain prior to April 25, last, would be received at this port until November 10 under the former Spanish tariff regulations.

That order clearly indicates that such merchandise received here after the last-named date would be subject to the same duties as the goods of all other neutral nations, the United States included.

Notwithstanding the instructions contained in this order, goods purchased in Spain by Manila merchants which arrived here as late as the present month have been admitted under the conditions expressed in that order, the merchants showing satisfactorily that delay in making shipments was beyond their control.

In respect to the entry of these goods you say that certain proofs of purchase in Spain, as regards time and circumstances, which were presented by the merchants, have not been accepted by the collector of customs. On this point you quote my letter of October 5, indicating the proofs it will be necessary for the merchants to furnish, among which was included the following:

"A certificate from the United States consular agent at the Spanish port of shipment to the effect that the goods were purchased prior to April 25, and in case there is no United States consular agent at such port then the certificate of the consular agent of Great Britain at such port that the goods were so purchased."

You state that the merchants interested gave the best proofs they could under the circumstances, and that it was impossible to secure the certificate of the British consul at Barcelona (acting for the United States) as to shipment; that under the proof the merchandise has not been admitted as desired.

Undoubtedly the customs authorities have acted within the instructions received from this office in demanding a consular certificate, and the subject now becomes a matter for further deliberation and further instructions. Your request is that the collector of customs be authorized to return the guaranties which the merchants had given in order to have the goods passed, and that their affidavits, made before the British consul at Barcelona, be accepted in lieu of the consular certificate which orders have prescribed.

The request will receive attention, and you will be informed soon of conclusions reached.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. S. Otis, *Military Governor.*

After full investigation this application was denied, as were all others of like import which were submitted about that time. In arriving at conclusions, the possibility of purchasing goods in Spain under a continuing contract for purchase, or placing orders for them under an agreement for delivery at some future distant date, was considered, as well as the conflicting interests of merchants who were stocked or had recently purchased elsewhere than in Spain, and who antagonized favorable action on the applications.

The Spanish prisoners gave annoyance and were a menace to public tranquillity and the health of the city. Requests for permission to expatriate them were preferred on several occasions, but such action could not be taken without the consent of both Spain and the United States, since the disposition of the Philippine Islands awaited the result of treaty stipulation. These prisoners might yet be needed in the islands by Spain for military service. When Manila capitulated, many of them were ill and required careful attention and special treatment. All the necessary articles and appliances were furnished the Spanish officers with which to bestow the needed care. The prisoners soon commenced to improve in physical condition, but, having no employment, indulged too frequently in reprehensible conduct, and were an object of suspicion by our officers, who thought that they would require close restraint should hostilities with the Filipinos ensue. The old antipathy between insurgent and Spanish soldiers, which in the first few weeks of our occupation of the city was intense, and which manifested itself in slight rioting, followed in one instance by the murder of an insurgent officer near one of the gates of the walled city, was gradually disappearing, and Spanish officers and enlisted men began to mingle in friendly intercourse with insurgent troops.

No accurate lists of numbers had been made, nor could one be prepared from the rolls of organizations obtainable. Finally, on October 1, the provost-marshal-general was directed to make an accurate count of all present. For this purpose he caused the various organizations to form, at the same hour, at the places where they were severally quartered,

and had one of his officers with each of the organizations to verify numbers by actual count. This method of verification was repeated on subsequent occasions.

Under the terms of the capitulation the Spanish officers, though prisoners of war, were permitted to immediately supervise the affairs of the organizations to which they belonged. In the demoralization which followed the condition of prisoners of war, their authority was greatly diminished; and the general who was nominally in command of these Spanish forces made formal request to impose, through adequate punishments, a more efficient discipline. This was denied in the following letter:

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., November 28, 1898.

Gen. FRANCISCO RIZZO,
Commanding Spanish Forces, Manila, P. I.

GENERAL: Referring to the request made by you a few days since, that officers of the Spanish Army be permitted and assisted to enforce against their men, now prisoners of war, the disciplinary measures of the Spanish military code, I have the honor to reply that after mature deliberation on the special points contained in the request submitted the conclusion has been reached that conditions do not permit the American authorities to grant all that has been asked. They will endeavor to do what they can consistently to preserve good conduct on the part of the prisoners, and with that end in view instructions have been given to retain them within the walled city after 5 o'clock in the evening, and to compel them to retire to their respective barracks after the hour of 8.

The American authorities are responsible for the care of these prisoners, and must see that they receive humane treatment in accordance with the dictates and spirit of their own military code, and therefore no promises can be given as to the methods they will apply in exercising supervision. It is our desire to do all we can to carry out the wishes of the Spanish officers who are looking after the welfare of their men, but it will readily occur to you that under prevailing conditions we can not enter into any agreements which fetter in any wise a free latitude of action in the special cases which may arise.

I am, General, with great respect, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS, *Military Governor.*

Early in October certain Spanish officers, prisoners of war, asked for permission to depart for Spain on account of illness, and their requests were favorably indorsed by General Rizzo. Applying to the War Department for instructions in these cases, I was directed, on October 7, to grant, in my discretion, requests of this character. Whereupon, on application in writing, accompanied by the proper disability certificate of a Spanish surgeon and the approval of the general officer present and supervising Spanish affairs, passports with permission to return to Spain were given. A considerable number took advantage of this privilege before the general authority to send home the prisoners was received. On December 14 the Spanish authorities served upon me notice of the contemplated discharge of the native troops held in Manila as prisoners. Although it was known that a good many of the 3,000 of these prisoners had deserted to the insurgents, it was deemed important to weigh the probable results of this contemplated communicated action, and the following letters were prepared and delivered:

Captain-General RIZZO,
General of Division of the Spanish Army, Manila, P. I.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this morning, in which you inform me you are about to discharge from the Spanish service the Spanish native troops held as United States prisoners of war in this city.

I beg that you defer your contemplated action in this matter of discharge until I may be able to make inquiry as to the condition, intent, and former places of domicile of these troops, that I may act understandingly with regard to them. As prisoners of war, under the articles of capitulation, they should remain under guard within the city and under the immediate supervision of their officers until instructions as to their final disposition are received from Madrid and Washington.

You will therefore please suspend all action relating to their discharge until I may be able to communicate further with you.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V., United States Military Governor in the Philippines.

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., December 17, 1898.

Division General FRANCISCO RIZZO,
Commanding Spanish Forces, Manila, P. I.

GENERAL: In further response to your letter of the 14th instant, regarding your contemplated action in the matter of discharging Spanish native troops held in this city as prisoners of war, I have the honor to inform you that exhaustive inquiry has been made as to their permanent homes and possible conduct should they be discharged at this time. It has been ascertained that a very large number of them came from the southern islands, and that some of these, though of Luzon, would be afraid to return to their homes, even if discharged. Those living in the southern islands should be sent there; those of Luzon who are afraid to return to their homes should be kept here in Manila. There are others of these natives who might give trouble in the city if discharged, and they should be kept under restraint.

All the native troops, therefore, will be continued in their present status as prisoners of war, to remain in restraint under the immediate supervision of their officers until the chief authorities of the dominion of Spain and the United States give final directions as to their disposition. This is in conformity with the articles of capitulation of August 14, last.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V., United States Military Governor in the Philippines.

These natives were subsequently discharged in Manila. Some were taken to a western Luzon province and released, and others were permitted to go from the city in any direction they wished, or to remain in it if they desired. It was subsequently a noticeable fact that they became the most formidable troops in Aguinaldo's army, fought splendidly at Caloocan, where they lost in casualties a large portion of their numbers.

About this date Spanish officers, with their families, were arriving in the city from the southern islands. Some of them had been exercising command of native troops, which were disbanded there or had deserted to the enemy, or they were not desired in the Spanish military organizations still retained at the south. They came ostensibly to secure transportation to Spain by vessels plying between Manila and Barcelona. Lingering with us a considerable period, and not knowing their numbers, request was made upon the Spanish authorities for their names and intention, and the further request was made that the United States authorities be notified in future of the fact of the arrival of any Spanish officers from southern ports.

The United States authorities, after entering Manila, had continued in place the Spanish officers who had exercised charge of the large city prisons, where about 2,000 suspects and convicts were confined. General Hughes, the provost marshal general, who had supervision of these prisons, detected, while inspecting the August and September prison accounts, fraudulent transactions in which these officers were concerned. He thereupon placed them in arrest and submitted the charges of "conspiracy to embezzle public funds in violation of the laws of war," and "embezzlement in violation of the laws of war," when they were brought before a military commission for trial. The result of the court's long and patient investigation, during which the accused officers had the benefit of the best American and Spanish legal advice obtainable, and of their own selection, was the conviction

of two of them, and the acquittal of the third upon an admittedly proven alibi. The two who were convicted were each sentenced to pay a fine in "the sum of $2,500 in gold coin of the United States, and to be confined at hard labor in such place of confinement as may be designated by the reviewing authority for a period of three years." The review of the case is in language as follows:

In the foregoing case of Carlos Aymerich, Branlio Zorita, and Jose Ruiz, jointly tried by a military commission for conspiracy to embezzle, and the embezzlement of, public funds, the commission has adjudged a finding of acquittal as to Carlos Aymerich, evidently considering certain evidence submitted to it and tending to establish an alibi as to this accused, as having an important bearing upon the case, to the extent, at least, of raising a reasonable doubt as to his participation in the offenses alleged. In this view the reviewing authority does not concur, believing that the evidence of record conclusively establishes the criminal responsibility of the said Aymerich jointly with the other accused under both charges, and is, therefore, unable to concur in the finding of acquittal in his case. Orders have already been issued for his release from confinement.

The findings and sentences adjudged the other two accused, to wit, Branlio Zorita and Jose Ruiz, are approved. In view of the confinement already served by them and the circumstances surrounding this case, deemed in certain respects to justify the extension of clemency, the confinement at hard labor for three years awarded each of these accused is reduced to six months. As mitigated, the sentences will be duly executed and so much thereof as relates to confinement, at Bilibid Prison.

The commission took up the trial of these cases on November 22 last, and gave a long and patient hearing to the voluminous testimony introduced and the lengthy arguments of the prosecuting officers and defendants' counsel. The funds which it was charged that the parties had misappropriated accrued previous to the date of United States occupation, but were subsequently covered as expended in the payment of fraudulent vouchers manufactured in August and September for services rendered and property delivered for the benefit of the prisons prior to that date. They therefore belonged to the United States by capture, or promised surrender under the capitulatory articles. The Spanish authorities labored in the interests of the accused, and the date on which they were brought before the military commission the chief of staff of the Spanish general, who subsequently acted as assistant counsel for one and submitted an able closing argument on the merits, sent in a written application asking that they be remanded to the Spanish authorities for trial, representing that the honor of Spain was involved. He was informed, however, that the United States tribunal, which had been directed to judicially determine the question of their guilt or innocence, had not been ordered until after an exhaustive investigation had been made and the justness and expediency of the step carefully considered. The cases were not published until March 13, after the offenders had been in arrest for six months. Some time thereafter, and on April 19, a petition was presented, headed by his grace the archbishop of Manila and signed by its leading inhabitants, Spanish and foreign mostly, praying for the release of Zorita, though acknowledging the justness of his sentence. He was released on the payment of $2,500, gold, his time of confinement having nearly virtually expired. Ruiz still remains in confinement. No decided effort by friends for the commutation of his sentence has been made. It would be matter for satisfaction if the same action could be applied in his case as in that of Zorita.

Another case, that of a Spanish newspaper editor, one Antonio Hidalgo, charged with "publishing and circulating seditious newspaper articles in violation of the laws of war," was brought before a military commission in November last. The accused was found guilty and sentenced "to pay a fine of $500 in United States gold coin to, and for the

use and benefit of, the United States; that he be placed and kept outside of the lines of the territory now occupied by, and within and under the jurisdiction of, the military forces of the United States, and that the press, type, furniture, material, and all appurtenances of the printing office of La Voz Española be confiscated and sold for the use and benefit of the United States.

The review is as follows:

In the foregoing case of Antonio Hidalgo the record discloses that the accused was accorded an impartial trial, his rights having been protected at every stage thereof. The findings are in accord with the evidence, and the sentence, in amount and character of punishment awarded, shows that the commission correctly estimated the criminality which, under the conditions existing at the time of their commission, was involved in the offenses of which the accused stands convicted. Such a sentence the reviewing authority is reluctant to modify.

It appears, however, from facts elicited since the conclusion of the trial that the accused fully appreciates the gravity of the offenses committed by him and regrets their commission. He has furnished satisfactory proof of previous good character and reputable standing in this community, and has directly and through influential citizens petitioned for clemency. In view of these facts, and in the belief that the example furnished by this trial and conviction constitutes sufficient warning that the military government here established possesses and will exercise the power necessary to protect itself against libelous and seditious publications designed to aspersе its character and weaken its authority, the reviewing authority is pleased to remit so much of the sentence as relates to confiscation of property and to the deportation of the accused beyond the lines now occupied by the military forces of the United States.

The fine imposed is reduced to $250, gold coin of the United States, the accused to stand committed until such fine is paid; the confinement under this sentence not to exceed three months.

As mitigated, the sentence will be duly executed.

The fine was paid and Hidalgo released. The trial produced a good deal of excitement, both on account of the standing of the accused in the community, his numerous friends among the better citizens, and the novel proceeding. The case was prosecuted for the sake of example and to give warning to the proprietors of other newspapers of the penalties which might be imposed upon them if they continued to indulge in abuse and calumny. It has had beneficial effects.

This period was one of plotting in the interests of the insurgent cause and men of every nationality appeared to be engaged in questionable enterprises promising individual gain. Rumors of the purchase and introduction of arms and ammunition at various ports on the Luzon coast were incessant. Admiral Dewey had seized a vessel at Batangas engaged in this contraband trade, but the cargo had entered the interior. It was an understood fact that money in considerable quantities was being sent to the insurgent junta at Hongkong, which was then presided over, or at least advised, by an American citizen and a British subject. Insurgent delegations departed for Japan and the cities on the Asiatic coast. All this occasioned a mass of correspondence with United States representatives stationed in these countries. Smuggling and illicit trade of a varied character was being actively conducted, and the cunning of the Filipino and the Chinese was difficult to contend with. Insurgent newspapers had been established in our midst and often indulged in criticisms of the manner in which affairs were being conducted, but were generally busy insinuating that the United States offered nothing advantageous to the Filipinos, who had expended so much blood and treasure for their independence. The formerly expressed fear that Spain would return had given way to the statement that it was the intention of the United States to replace her in the odious domination which she had exercised for centuries. The better class of Filipinos recommended the suppression of these Filipino newspapers, and to my question whether the people believed

the statements found in them, replied that they did and were greatly impressed. The editors were warned and became more temperate in their denunciations, even asking assistance to place before the people the true condition of affairs. Able articles were prepared and furnished, at my request, by the well-known scientist, Dr. Becker, upon the true theory of government and the probable intention of the United States in Luzon and other islands. They were generally used by these editors as targets for such unfriendly criticisms as their supple and peculiar minds could invent. A sanguinary and venomous article would be followed for three or four successive days by temperate productions favoring United States protection on lines which they were powerless to explain or understand.

Questions of grave import were being constantly thrust upon the United States authorities, some having decided international significance demanding prompt attention. The acting American consul was busy with political and commercial problems, among which were those relating to the acquisition of citizenship or the participation by foreign vessels in interisland trade. On December 9 he was informed of a decision which had shortly before been rendered and expressed in the following terms:

> The effect of section 8, article 1, of the Constitution of the United States, and legislation by Congress thereunder, is to vest the exclusive power of conferring citizenship by naturalization in Congress. This power is not shared by State or Territorial governments, nor by military governments established by the United States in the exercise of its war power.
>
> In establishing rules on the subject, Congress has provided among other conditions upon which citizenship will be conferred upon aliens, excepting those having service in the Army or Navy, a previous residence of five years within the territorial limits of the United States. It is very clear that this condition has not been complied with by the within-named applicant.
>
> United States citizenship may also result from (1) completed conquest and incorporation of territory, and (2) from treaty. No act of the individual in the former case is necessary other than election to become a citizen, usually manifested by continued domicile within the territory conquered and incorporated. In the latter case it is necessary only for the individual to comply with the conditions that the treaty may establish. Until negotiations have proceeded further it is impossible to determine whether the within applicant can avail himself of either of these methods.
>
> Applications for citizenship can not be acted upon at the present time; they could merely be received and filed.

To his inquiry with regard to coasting trade privileges he was informed by communication as follows:

> In reply to your note of yesterday with inclosure, I am directed to state that the inclosure granting the permission of the Spanish Government to do certain acts as therein explained was given July 5, last, prior to United States' occupation of the city and harbor of Manila, and under conditions, both in this respect and in so far as the outside ports of Luzon are concerned, which have materially changed.
>
> Since that time certain agreements have been entered into between the representatives of the United States and Spain which the action contemplated in the inclosure would violate, and hence can not now be carried into execution. Vessels can not be cleared from this port for interisland ports, under the Norwegian flag.
>
> As regards the tobacco now in the upper country, it can be brought to this port by vessels of the Maritime Company, sailing under the American flag. That company has two vessels engaged in this trade which will be able to bring in all the tobacco grown in the upper provinces, and at uniform transportation rates to all owners concerned. The *Venus*, now due here, will sail in about four days for Aparri, and the *Saturnus*, now en voyage for that port, will soon be here, and as soon as she can unload will return. Information has been obtained that the whole tobacco crop can be moved by these two vessels and in sufficient time to prevent injury to the crops.
>
> Your inclosure is herewith returned.

The sphere of United States action in the Philippines was now about to be enlarged. During the last interview with General Rios's staff

officer on the subject of interisland trade, alluded to in a former portion of this report, he submitted a proposition for the relief of the Spanish garrison at Iloilo by our troops, saying that General Rios would be pleased to turn that city over to the United States authorities and withdraw to Zamboanga. The proposition was discussed, but immediate action was not considered practicable, and he was requested to convey to the general our appreciation of his offer and to report that permission would be sought to accept it as soon as the Paris treaty negotiations indicated unmistakably that the United States would succeed to the government of the islands. About December 13 a petition was received, signed by the business men and firms of Iloilo, asking for American protection there. On December 14 I cabled to Washington the following:

Bankers and merchants with business houses at Iloilo petition American protection at Iloilo. Spanish authorities are still holding out, but will receive United States troops. Insurgents reported favorable to American annexation. Can send troops. Shall any action be taken?

No response was received until the 19th of that month, when I was informed that the President and Secretary were absent from Washington, and that a consideration of my question would await their return, which would be shortly. Appreciating the great desirability of securing possession of this city, the second of the Philippines in importance, I was anxious to receive an affirmative answer to my cable question of the 14th instant. It was reported that the Spanish troops were hard pressed by the insurgents, who had made an attack a few days previous, declaring that they would capture the town before the arrival of the Americans. It was also stated that the attack had been repulsed, with a loss to the insurgents of 300 men.

The petition for protection which had been submitted by the business men appeared to me to furnish sufficient ground upon which to base intervention in their behalf, independent of specific instructions from Washington, and I therefore, in conference with Admiral Dewey, asked that one of his war vessels convoy troops which I meditated sending to Iloilo at once. This the Admiral thought it not wise to do, as we were awaiting authority which had already been sought, and furthermore that he was of the opinion General Rios would hold out. I shared with him this latter conviction and awaited directions. On December 23 the following dispatch was received:

WASHINGTON, *December 23, 1898.*

OTIS, *Manila:*

Answering your message, December 14, the President directs that you send necessary troops to Iloilo, to preserve the peace and protect life and property. It is most important that there should be no conflict with the insurgents. Be conciliatory, but firm.

By order of the Secretary of War.

These instructions were conveyed to Admiral Dewey and I cabled the following:

MANILA, *December 23, 1898.*

General RIOS,

Governor-General Philippine Islands, Iloilo, Panay:

A considerable United States force, Army and Navy, will leave Manila in two or three days, and its commanding general is ordered to confer with you at Iloilo.

OTIS,
United States Military Governor.

This message was sent to Capiz, a northern point of the island of Panay, then the terminus of the cable, whence messages were telegraphed overland to Iloilo before the insurgents had destroyed the land

lines. Cable messages were sent subsequently by special gunboats which reported for them at short intervals. The next morning the superintendent of the cable company surprised me with the information that two gunboats arrived at Capiz the day before, collected all telegrams, and left for Iloilo at 5.35 p. m.; that my dispatch did not reach the cable office there till 5.50 p. m.; that the cable operator reported that General Rios would leave Iloilo with all Spaniards for Lambagan the afternoon of the 24th, and would go to Manila by the end of the month. Efforts were immediately made to communicate by other means with General Rios before he could evacuate the city. A coasting vessel was secured, with which Lieutenant-Colonel Potter, of the Engineer Corps, was directed to proceed, and if possible communicate in person with General Rios, requesting that he continue in possession of the city until the arrival of our troops. Colonel Potter departed on his mission that night and nothing was heard from him until the morning of the 28th, when he returned. He reported that General Rios had evacuated on the evening of the 24th, thirty-nine hours before his arrival; that he found the insurgents in possession of the city; that he had landed and held an interview with the consul for Great Britain, and that the town was quiet, Aguinaldo's flag flying, and that he could not reach any conclusions as to the probable results of General Miller's arrival; that he saw the latter on the evening of the 27th and reported to him fully the situation as he had found it. On the morning of the 27th I telegraphed Admiral Dewey, at Cavite, as follows:

Nothing from Colonel Potter. Capiz reports having seen vesssel offshore last evening and thinks that possibly insurgent authorities there would not permit landing. If Potter remains at Ilolio, Rios still holds out. Should he arrive here within the next twelve hours, Rios has evacuated.

I thereafter telegraphed Admiral Dewey the substance of two dispatches as soon as delivered, which were as follows:

ILOILO, *December 24.*

Treaty of Paris signed; my Government orders me to go to Manila, where I shall arrive at end of month, and in accordance with your excellency will hasten repatriation.

General RIOS.

Also,

Steamer which arrived yesterday at Capiz is Spanish gunboat *Elcano*. Iloilo evacuated on the 24th.

This last message was received from the cable company. I also telegraphed the Admiral that "Colonel Potter not having reported, I am inclined to think that Spaniards still hold Iloilo." I then cabled the following:

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington:*

Iloilo expedition left last night. Reported that Spanish forces evacuated 24th instant. Report not confirmed. General Miller fully instructed as to action whether Spanish forces there or not. Action to accord fully with President's directions. Will cable results as soon as possible. Expedition should reach Iloilo to-morrow morning.

As soon as Colonel Porter had received instructions to proceed, as above indicated, the following was issued:

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 39. HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, *Manila, P. I., December 24, 1898.*

I.—Brig. Gen. Marcus P. Miller, U. S. V., is assigned to the command of the following named troops, viz:

Light Battery G, Sixth U. S. Artillery.
Eighteenth U. S. Infantry.
Fifty-first Iowa Infantry.

And will proceed with them to Iloilo, island of Panay, by transports *Newport, Arizona*, and *Pennsylvania*, under such naval escort as the rear-admiral commanding the Asiatic Squadron may furnish him, and there execute the special instructions he will receive from these headquarters.

The troops will constitute a separate brigade within the meaning of the Seventy-third Article of War, to be known and designated as the First Separate Brigade of the Eighth Army Corps. They will be equipped and supplied as orders already and hereafter to be issued indicate.

The following-named officers will constitute the staff of the First Separate Brigade of the Eighth Army Corps:

First Lieut. C. G. Woodward, Third U. S. Artillery, aid, acting assistant adjutant-general.

Capt. John B. Jefferey, U. S. V., quartermaster.

Capt. C. R. Krauthoff, commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., commissary.

Maj. E. R. Morris, brigade surgeon, U. S. V., chief surgeon.

By command of Major General Otis:

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

General Miller and the Iowa regiment of volunteers had recently arrived. The regiment remained on the transport prepared for departure. Light Battery G, Sixth Regiment U. S. Artillery and the Eighteenth Infantry had been directed to hold themselves in readiness for this expected service. Carefully prepared instructions were then issued, of which the following is a copy:

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR,
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., December 24, 1898.

Brig. Gen. MARCUS P. MILLER, U. S. V.,
Commanding First Separate Brigade, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: In obedience to the instructions of the President of the United States, dated the 25d instant, directing that troops be sent to Iloilo, island of Panay, there "to preserve the peace and protect life and property," your command has been selected for this duty and has been ordered to depart therefor on Monday next, the 26th instant.

Those instructions contain the following cautionary language:

"It is most important that there should be no conflict with the insurgents. Be conciliatory, but firm."

When they were given it was supposed that the Spanish forces in Iloilo and in conflict with the insurgent inhabitants of the island would retain their hold of the city until the arrival of United States troops, when they would transfer all authority to the latter and peaceably evacuate. From cable dispatches received this morning from northern Panay, it is feared that the Spanish troops may surrender the city to the insurgents before your arrival, in which event your duties will become more complicated and will require delicate and skillful action for successful prosecution. However, every possible precautionary measure has been taken to retain the Spanish forces there. Yesterday a cablegram was sent to northern Panay, the limit of telegraphic communication with Iloilo, advising the commanding general of those forces of your early departure for that port, and this evening a fast vessel will be dispatched carrying the same information, but it is possible that these measures may fail to accomplish desired results.

In the event of your arrival at Iloilo prior to the departure of the Spanish troops therefrom, you will communicate with their commanding general, inviting him, in accordance with an existing mutual understanding, to then remove his forces, to permit you to take formal possession of the city and thereupon with his consent you will proceed to occupy the same with your command. If, on the contrary, you find the city to be in the possession of the insurgents, you will proceed with great caution, avoiding all manifestation of meditated forcible action and undue display of force. You will place yourself in communication with the insurgent authorities through the representative men of Iloilo, whom you will take from Manila with you on your voyage, and who will use their best endeavors to bring to a successful determination any difficulties which may present themselves. You will make known to the inhabitants the purpose of the United States, which, having succeeded to all the rights of Spain in the Philippine Islands, under treaty stipulations following conquest in the Eastern and Western hemispheres, intends to establish among them an efficient and most stable form of government which shall fully protect them in all their private interests and liberties, in which they shall have representation, and which will secure for them increasing and abundant prosperity. As a slight proof of your declared intention, you will release unto them the Spanish native soldiers sent here by the Spanish Government, who, through the efforts of the United States

authorities, will be returned to their homes in Panay, who will accompany you and who are grateful for the supervision which those authorities have exercised over them. You will find the representative people of Iloilo a superior class and amenable to reason, and it is believed that they will place confidence in the faith and good intentions of the United States and will accord you a most favorable reception. No undue haste will be made and the rights of your Government will be fully made known and insisted upon. Conflict between troops will be avoided unless it becomes necessary for defense. Should you be able to effect a landing as a result of your negotiations you will disembark only a sufficient portion of your command to subserve present purposes—the remainder being held on transports awaiting further instructions. Should you not be able to effect a landing without conflict, you will hold your forces on your transports in the vicinity of Iloilo and await further directions from these headquarters. But in all these matters you must be governed to a great extent by your own good judgment after a careful deliberation upon conditions, having in view the instructions of the President of the United States to avoid armed repression.

The government which you are called upon to establish at Iloilo will be one of military occupation. Upon taking possession it will be your duty to issue an order proclaiming such a government within the territory occupied or controlled by the United States forces under your command. The municipal laws of the territory occupied, such as affect private rights of persons and property and provide for the punishment of crime, are to be considered as continuing in force so far as compatible with the new order of things, unless suspended or superseded by proper military authority. The judges and other officials connected with the administration of these laws may, if they accept the authority of the United States, continue to administer the ordinary law of the land as between man and man, but under the supervision of the said military authorities. The local courts thus continued in power shall not, however, exercise jurisdiction over any crime or offense committed by any person belonging to the Army of the United States, or any retainer of the Army, or person serving with it, or any person furnishing or transporting army supplies, nor over any crime or offense committed on either of the same by any inhabitant or temporary resident of said territory. In such cases, except when courts-martial have cognizance, jurisdiction to try and punish is vested in military commissions and provost courts which will be convened (by you) from time to time as occasion may require.

For the purpose of providing for the prompt punishment of crime in cases where the civil courts may fail, from whatever cause, the military commissions and provost courts will, in addition to the exercise of powers above indicated, be vested with jurisdiction concurrent with the civil courts to hear and determine all crimes and offenses committed by inhabitants or temporary residents within the limits of United States occupation. Of these crimes and offenses, those which are capital and such others as you may desire to refer to it will be brought to trial before a military commission, and those which are not capital, which may be adequately punished within the punishing powers of provost courts, may be referred to them for trial. Trials by civil courts, however, will be preferred where there is satisfactory reason to believe that justice will be done.

In all sentences imposed by military commissions and provost courts the punishments awarded shall conform, as far as possible, in character and degree to the laws of the United States, or of either of the States, or to the customs of war. The proceedings of military commissions after being acted upon by you will be forwarded to these headquarters for the action of the commanding general. The punishment awarded by provost courts shall not exceed confinement, with or without hard labor, for a period of one year or a fine of $1,000 or both. The sentences of these courts do not require approval, but may be mitigated or remitted by you. Copies of orders on these subjects, the provisions of which control the action of the military courts established in this city, will be furnished you for your information and guidance and for application under conditions similar to those prevailing here.

It will be necessary for you to create a government for the determination of city affairs under the direct supervision of a provost-marshal, to appoint officers and assistants for the collection and care of revenue, and to conduct postal affairs. The customs regulations in force here will be applied by you at Iloilo, and an officer connected therewith has been directed to report to you for appointment as collector of customs, who will be provided with copies of all customs regulations and the necessary blank forms. You will be furnished with the requisite assistants, thoroughly supplied, to establish upon your arrival all necessary mail facilities, and you will apply in this department the postal laws of the United States Government.

Iloilo is an important point of entry, and to secure competent aid for duty in connection with the port you will consult Captain Dyer of the Navy, commanding officer of the *Baltimore*, which escorts your transports, who has a thorough practical acquaintance with such matters.

In establishing your administration you will consult various orders and regulations governing all these subjects at this port—making your actions conform thereto in all essential particulars. No further instructions can be given you. Much must depend upon your tact and discretion and your ability to meet varying circumstances as they arise. However, should you fail to secure a peaceable entry into the city, you will report fully your proceedings to these headquarters and request further instructions.

By command of Major-General Otis:

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

On the evening of General Miller's departure the following was also furnished him:

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., December 26, 1898.

Brig. Gen. M. P. MILLER, U. S. V.,
Commanding First Separate Brigade, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I am directed by the major-general commanding to furnish you with the following instructions:

In case the Spanish forces have evacuated Iloilo, you will, on approaching that city, keep your transports *Arizona* and *Pennsylvania* well to the rear and beyond the view of the inhabitants of Iloilo, and you will take into the Iloilo waters your naval escorts, the *Baltimore* and *Callao*, and the transport vessel *Union*, on which are the native Spanish troops, with your vessel, the *Newport*. You will make known to the insurgent authorities the object of bringing the large force with you, which is, viz: To take possession of other ports in the islands, if conditions and circumstances are favorable, but that it may be necessary to keep troops at Iloilo until definite instructions concerning other ports of the islands are received from Washington.

Very respectfully,

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

General Miller, in command, escorted by the U. S. S. *Baltimore*, sailed on the evening of the 26th, and as Colonel Potter did not return until the morning of the 28th, we were without any information for thirty-six hours. In the meantime reports were brought that Aguinaldo had expressed satisfaction with the situation, as fighting would certainly commence at Iloilo upon the landing of our troops, which would excite the natives in Luzon to active hostilities. He had issued orders, it was intimated, to oppose landing, but feared that a considerable force of Tagalos sent there would not be in time to participate. It was afterwards learned that these special insurgent troops did not reach Panay until December 29.

In the foregoing instructions mention is made of representative men of Iloilo and Spanish native soldiers, whom General Miller was directed to take with him, the first to assist in making the object of the United States known and the latter in proof of good intentions. The soldiers referred to were sent by General Rios to Manila for discharge from the Spanish military service, without permission or warning. They were about 200 of a lot numbering 600 or 700, and were Visayans belonging mostly to Panay, while the remainder were Tagalos. They were discharged upon arrival in the harbor, though not paid off, as the Spanish authorities pleaded lack of sufficient public funds, and request was submitted to permit them to land in the city. After much deliberation, it was decided to land such of them as desired to remain in Luzon on the northern shore of Manila Bay, and to send to Panay those who desired to go south. The 200, who were accompanied by their families, elected to go south. They were placed upon a Government transport, rationed, each given a small amount of money from the public funds, and departed for their homes with General Miller's command. The representative business men had come up from Iloilo a short time before for the purpose, as they asserted, of arranging matters with the Americans so that

there might be a peaceful solution of affairs. They were introduced by some of the native citizens in whom confidence was placed, and expressed themselves as desirous of having the United States troops go to Iloilo, and to accompany them in order that they might prevail upon the people to receive them without opposition. These men were intelligent and apparently very much in earnest, and General Miller, who was present at the last conference, shared fully my opinion as to their honesty. He took them with him on his own transport and gave the best accommodations the vessel offered, free of charge. Upon arrival at Iloilo, he sent them into the city to prepare the way for him and they were seen no more. He landed the discharged native soldiers on the Panay coast, and it is believed that they joined the insurgent ranks without taking much time for consideration. It was subsequently ascertained that while temporarily sojourning in Manila one of these representative men quietly visited Malolos, and received Aguinaldo's orders, which he carried with him to his people.

Lieutenant-Colonel Potter, when returning from Iloilo, had met the command of General Miller and had reported the situation to him when some distance north, off the Panay coast. Upon receiving his report, and being ignorant of General Miller's movements, I returned him at once with the following instructions:

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., December 28, 1898.

Brig. Gen. MARCUS P. MILLER, U. S. V.,
Commanding First Separate Brigade, Eighth Army Corps, Iloilo, P. I.

SIR: Lieutenant-Colonel Potter has just arrived and reported the situation at Iloilo. He reports the evacuation of the city by the Spanish forces, and that the insurgents are in full possession; he further reports that those authorities were anticipating your arrival, and that there was a widely prevailing sentiment in the city in favor of receiving your forces without resistance. All of this, Colonel Potter informed me, he made known to you when he consulted you yesterday on his return trip.

To meet this state of affairs your instructions need modification, although it is believed that you will grasp the situation as presented and be governed by conditions. Your instructions bid you to be conciliatory but firm, and, further, that you will not make any great display of force, but seek to gain possession of the city through peaceable negotiations, not exercising undue haste; that should you fail to secure a peaceable entry into the city you will report fully your proceedings to these headquarters and request further instructions.

By firmness and conciliatory action it is believed that you will be able to land your force without conflict, but you will make as strong a display of the same as possible, landing them and taking possession of the city forcibly, if more pacific measures are without avail. It is, of course, necessary now, in this stage of the proceedings, to occupy Iloilo, and the manner of doing so must be left to your discretion, avoiding conflict if possible, but accepting it if necessary to accomplish the object.

Information received here is to the effect that the insurgent forces are weak in strength even when united—that they are not united, but are divided in their sentiments toward the United States Government, the majority being friendly disposed.

No further instructions can be given you, and there is no disposition to limit your discretionary action. Conduct affairs in accordance with the demands of the situation, having in view always the necessity of occupying the city with your troops.

Colonel Potter will return as soon as you report to him the situation, unless you wish to retain him for a short time to acquaint him with results of action already taken or action which you meditate.

Very respectfully,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

LATER.

Since writing the above I am in receipt of information from the Malolos government, which was gathered yesterday. Its former cabinet resigned a few days ago because of its inability to agree with Aguinaldo and his confidential advisers. A new provisional cabinet has been appointed, consisting of men hostile to American annexation, among whom are a number of army officers. These men are closely watching the results of your expedition and greatly hope that you will be obliged

to use force to gain Iloilo. They think that conflict there would inspire the people here to take up arms against the Americans. It is therefore still quite necessary to avoid force if you can do so and still succeed.

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, etc.

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., December 28, 1898.

Lieut. Col. C. L. POTTER,
Chief Engineer Officer, Department Pacific and Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: Since delivering to you instructions for General Miller, I am in receipt of a dispatch from Admiral Dewey saying it is not practicable to send the *Callao* to Iloilo, and he further thinks the proper thing now to do is to recall the expedition, as the insurgents are in full possession and will probably not give up without a fight. This expression of view on the part of the Admiral only confirms my view that you should use every possible means of conciliation, and still I am not of the belief that the expedition can be returned. Better that we leave the war vessel and a small force to confront Iloilo and scatter the force to other ports in the southern islands, where troops are very much needed at the present time. You will therefore inform General Miller to be governed by these views as nearly as possible. I will try and send further information in regard to the condition of the islands to-morrow or next day. Notwithstanding all this, I still hold to my view that Iloilo must be taken.

Very respectfully,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

Lieutenant-Colonel Potter sailed as soon as he had received these instructions. I then cabled to the Adjutant-General of the Army such information as I had obtained from Iloilo, adding in my dispatch that I could not arrive at conclusions as to results, and would not hear from there for four days, as cable communication had been destroyed; that the Spanish forces had evacuated all stations in the southern islands, except Zamboanga, by orders, as they asserted, from Madrid. On December 30 I cabled Washington that—

All military stations outside of Luzon, with the exception of Zamboanga, turned over by Spaniards to inhabitants, who may be denominated insurgents with more or less hostility to the United States. Some points we can take without friction, and could have taken nearly all outside of Luzon peaceably before the 23d and 24th of the month, when Spain withdrew her forces without our knowledge. Am waiting to hear results from Iloilo, and am meditating action in islands of Leyte, Samar, and Cebu, in all of which Luzon insurgents have been at work for several months. Conditions here at Manila and character of inhabitants not understood in the United States. Large number of insurgent troops still in the field, scattered throughout Luzon provinces, and about 6,000 outside this city, which contains large number of sympathizers, who have threatened uprising. Former insurgent cabinet disrupted, provisional one formed, consisting mostly of irresponsible men who demand complete independence and war with United States. The situation requires delicate manipulation, and our troops here can not be widely scattered at present. Great majority of men of property desire annexation, others seek personal advancement and plunder, promises of which hold insurgents together, but already much dissatisfaction in ranks and conflicts with inhabitants in middle provinces. Will report further in a few days. Am in consultation with Admiral Dewey, now engaged in efforts to stop shipment of insurgent arms from China and Japan through meditated seizure. We will probably send another force south within a short time.

General Miller's first report was received at these headquarters on the morning of December 30, and was as follows:

HDQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT,
Iloilo Harbor, P. I., December 28, 1898—3 p. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to report that my command arrived in the harbor of Iloilo about 10 a. m. to day. The *Arizona* and *Pennsylvania* were left at Point Luzaron, 30 miles away. The *Baltimore* and *Newport* anchored off the city.

An aid of the commanding general, Martin Delgado, immediately reported aboard my ship. I gave him an interview. He reported that the commanding general desired to know "if we had anything against them—were we going to interfere with them?" I informed him that I had written a letter stating to his commanding officer and the people of Iloilo the object of my visit, and would send the letter over. Accordingly, Lieut. M. K. Barroll, Third Artillery, and two volunteer aids and the commission went to visit the commanding general. They were met by a subcommittee, of the committee of which R. Lopez was president, General Delgado being present. My aids gave them my letter (a copy inclosed). They wanted to know of Lieutenant Barroll almost at the very first whether he had any instructions for them from Aguinaldo. He answered no: but that the instructions were from Major-General Otis, commanding the Philippine Islands United States forces. After reading the letter they claimed that they had no power to act in cases affecting their federal government, but promised to meet me on my ship to-morrow afternoon.

When we entered their flag was flying from two places in the city. At 3 p. m. to-day it was not flying. I presume this was because my letter claimed the authority of the Spanish Government over Iloilo, as it was abandoned by the Spanish troops.

They were polite, but I think them determined not to give us control, except we use force, when they will yield without much fighting. They have taken charge of the custom-house and post-office. They know that our troop ships are off Point Luzaron, therefore I ordered them in to-night—not nearer than 6 miles.

The city is quiet, but the white citizens, especially Americans, are afraid. Their force is estimated at 800 well-armed men, 1,000 badly armed men, and 1,000 men with guns, pikes, etc.; ammunition not supposed to be abundant.

I am told now that the members of the commission are afraid to express an opinion in our favor. The fact that their people are in possession of the city has changed the views of the many wavering ones. The longer they remain in possession collecting customs, running post-offices, the more they will be confirmed in the idea that they can do it. I should recommend that force be used at once, in which case I desire the *Callao*, or some other light-draft boat, and the California heavy artillery battalion sent down till the place is taken. With the forces now here and that in addition I would not expect to fire a single shot, as the native troops would move out. I will keep you informed.

Very respectfully,

M. P. MILLER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding First Separate Brigade.

The following is a copy of the inclosure referred to in the above communication:

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT,
Iloilo Harbor, P. I., December 28, 1898.

COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE TROOPS AT ILOILO, ISLAND OF PANAY,
AND THE PEOPLE OF ILOILO AND THE ISLAND OF PANAY:

The troops under my command appeared here under an order of the President of the United States of America promulgated by Major-General Otis, commanding all of the troops of the United States in the Philippine Islands. It is accompanied by the United States naval ship *Baltimore*, sent by Admiral Dewey, commanding the United States squadron in these Asiatic waters.

When these orders were communicated to me it was supposed that the troops of Spain were still in possession at Iloilo, and that the transfer of possession and governmental authority would be by them to representatives of the Government of the United States, which has succeeded, by virtue of conquest supplemented by treaty stipulations, to all the rights heretofore exercised by Spain in these islands. Upon arrival I find that the city of Iloilo is in the reported possession of native troops. The intention of this letter is to place myself in communication with those now exercising authority at Iloilo, with the view to the accomplishment of my mission to this place as above indicated.

This communication will be handed you by my aid, Lieut. M. K. Barroll, Third Artillery, who is accompanied by four gentlemen, former residents of Iloilo, who will make known to you more in detail the purposes of the presence of my command at this place.

There accompanies my command on the steamship *Union* certain Spanish soldiers, natives of the island of Pana, whom it is my purpose, at a later date, to release with the privilege of returning to their homes, an act which it is hoped will be interpreted as an evidence of the good will of the major-general commanding in the Philippines, under whose orders I am acting.

I shall be pleased to receive a call from representatives of those to whom this communication is addressed on board the transport *Newport* at as early an hour as your convenience will allow.

Very respectfully,

M. P. MILLER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V.,
Commanding First Separate Brigade, Eighth Army Corps.

General Miller's second report, dated December 30, and forwarded by a merchant vessel, is as follows:

HEADQUARTERS FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE,
ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT,
Iloilo Harbor, P. I., December 30, 1898.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.

SIR: I want to report that a committee of people having civil control of the city of Iloilo, and claiming also control of the island, met me here yesterday at 6 p. m., and again claimed that they could not turn over the control of Iloilo to my command without consulting Aguinaldo. Should they agree to do it their lives and property would be in danger. After a long talk, setting forth the intention of our Government, explaining the kind of government, and reading to them extracts of your letter of instructions in reference to the same matter, I told them there was no time to consult Aguinaldo and my demand was that the President of the United States, as successor to the rights of Spain in these islands, required them to turn over the control of the city of Iloilo. I then asked them directly: "Should we land would you meet us with armed resistance?" They could not answer that question. I asked them if they would not have their troops march out of the city and permit us, their friends, to move in without resistance to-morrow, the 31st instant. They requested time to consult with the committee that they represented, promising to return with a definite reply at noon, December 30 (to-day).

Lieutenant-Colonel Potter, corps engineer, arrived here yesterday evening with a letter of instructions from you to me. It is my intention to land troops in twenty-four hours, after having served notice on the foreign consuls of the city and the people to that effect.

The estimate of armed native troops to-day is 3,500, who are said to be massed in the city and at Jaro and Molo, and six or seven thousand from the mountains armed with bolos, who are massed at the same places.

I think I should have the Twentieth Kansas Regiment sent to me as soon as possible; 20,000 rounds of .45 caliber ammunition for Gatling guns should be supplied. Two field mortars (3.6 inches), with equipments and supply of ammunition, should be sent to me at once.

I forward this communication by the steamer *Union*.

M. P. MILLER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding Brigade.

General Miller's next report is dated December 31, and was received on January 2. It is as follows:

HEADQUARTERS SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Iloilo Harbor, P. I., December 30, 1898.

COMMANDING GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have just concluded second conference with commission representing the native government at Iloilo. They submitted a communication, copy inclosed herewith.

This communication was supplemented by verbal statements that if we insisted on landing our troops, but without arms and as friends, they could not answer for the attitude of the people, but that the army would endeavor to restrain the people. If we landed in force they would not answer for attitude of either army or people. This means, plainly, armed resistance to our landing.

A large number of native troops have been brought to the city within the past thirty six hours. Best estimate 12,000, 2,500 of which are armed with rifles, the remainder being armed with bolos only. Their ammunition supply reported limited.

The situation is further complicated by petition of Iloilo merchants, representing the larger part of mercantile interests there, copy of which find herewith.

I understand, General, that it was at the request of many of the parties signing this petition for protection of life and property at Iloilo that this expedition was organized and dispatched to this point; that their request was largely its justification. Their present attitude contradicts their previous petition in a measure, and

as the situation, if forced by me by a landing of United States troops, promises great loss of life among noncombatants and destruction of private property at Iloilo, I have deemed it best to delay compliance with my orders for a sufficient time to communicate the above information to you and receive your instructions. I am further influenced to this delay because of the fact that before making the formidable attack upon Iloilo now necessary, it would be incumbent upon me to give the usual notice looking to the removal of noncombatants to points of safety.

I entertain no doubt of my ability to take and hold Iloilo with my present force, but in view of excitement prevailing among inhabitants of the city and island as reported to me, and the large number of people assembled in the city, it might be prudent to send an additional regiment to this point.

Two steam launches suitable for towing rowboats for use in landing troops are much needed.

Very respectfully,

M. P. MILLER,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

The inclosure reads:

[Translation of the letter from President Lopez, of the federal government of Bisayas, to General Miller.]

GENERAL: Upon the return of your commissioners last night we determined and discussed in a definite manner the situation and the attitude of this reason of Bisayas, in regard to its relations and dependence upon the central government of Luzon; and in view of what these commissioners have manifested, I have the honor to notify you that, in conjunction with the people, the army, and committee, we insist upon our pretension not to consent, in our present situation, to any foreign interference without express orders from the central government of Luzon, upon which we state once more that we depend, and with which we are one in ideas, as we have been until now in sacrifices.

Therefore, if you insist on your side upon disembarking your forces, this is our final attitude.

May God give you, etc.

Iloilo, December 30, 1898.

R. LOPEZ,
President.

———— ————,
Vice Secretary.

To General MILLER.

The petition of merchants bore the signatures of the leading business men of Iloilo, was of date December 29, and read as follows:

General MILLER,
Commanding United States Forces, Iloilo Bay:

We, the undersigned merchants of Iloilo, beg you to take into consideration our large interests and the probable result of a conflict with the natives, which in our belief would seriously prejudice and harm the trade of these islands for years to come. We ask you to consider the orders they have received from their chief, Aguinaldo, of Malolos.

General Miller further reported on same date (probably a later hour of the day) that the situation remained unchanged, except it was rumored that 200 armed men arrived at Iloilo from Negros. He continued:

I this morning requested the commanding officer of the *Baltimore*, if compatible with his instructions, to take such measures as he deemed necessary to prevent the entrance of vessels carrying armed men into the Iloilo River. He happened in after I got my letter written, and I brought the subject up. Orally he informed me that he had no right to do this; that under his instructions he does not feel authorized to commence the attack, and acts in defense of our expedition only.

The insurgents have occupied an old star fort at the point of the peninsula, the site of Iloilo, the fire of which sweeps beaches on which we propose to land. My troops have got to commence the attack; I therefore shall put a mountain and gatling gun in boats and open fire on their fort and a storehouse near it filled with troops, at 2,500 yards, thus inviting the captain of the *Baltimore* to help defend us by attacking the enemy to the best effect.

We are aware that on the successful accomplishment of this contest depends the future speedy yielding of insurrectionary movements in the islands. The insurgents

raised their flag over the fort this morning. The action as above entitled will be contingent on future instructions to be received from the department commander.

Very respectfully,

M. P. MILLER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V.

The excitement in Manila and Malolos over this Iloilo affair became rapidly more intense and manifested itself in unmistakable signs of danger to the still languishing peace should an attack be made by our troops upon that city. Aguinaldo's government was now in full possession of very radical men, the majority of whom desired war in any event, and it was in a great measure dominated by his army. These men desired some immediate action on the part of the United States by which they might be able to arouse the opposition of the inhabitants against its troops, and anticipated hostilities at Iloilo appeared to them to offer the desired material.

I had also incidentally heard from Iloilo that General Miller would probably meet with insurgent opposition should he attempt to make a landing there. Knowing the great desire of the United States Government to maintain peace by all honorable means, maturely considering the situation in Luzon which had been so quickly developed, meditating the transfer later of more troops to Iloilo when the unnatural excitement should be allayed, and an opportunity presenting itself to communicate with General Miller by a British man-of-war, whose captain courteously offered to take any message I might desire to send, I sent on the evening of December 29 the following hastily prepared communication:

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., December 29, 1898.

Brig. Gen. MARCUS P. MILLER, U. S. V.,
Commanding First Separate Brigade, Eighth Army Corps, Iloilo, Panay.

SIR: This will be delivered to you by Captain Montgomery, of the British navy, who leaves for Iloilo in the morning. I inclose copy of our translation of a cablegram received to-day in cipher, from which you will understand the position and policy of our Government toward these islands.

Do not be in haste with your negotiations for the surrender of the city. Should there be strong and very decided opposition to your entry, backed by considerable force, do not be in haste. It will not do to bombard the city, nor will it do to let the natives loot and burn it. Foreigners have large possessions there and a great deal of money in the banks. You can remain in the harbor with your force. If you meet with decided or strong opposition, await there further instructions, and if necessary I can direct a portion of your force to other ports in the southern islands, where you will not meet much, if any, opposition. I trust in your discretion.

Very truly, yours,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

I contemplated at the time the sending of the First California Volunteers to the southern waters as soon as conditions at Manila would justify the weakening of the military force here, and immediately directed that regiment to be put in readiness for embarkation. It was placed on board five small merchant vessels preparatory to sailing at any directed moment, was retained thereon for several days, when Luzon affairs indicating that it might be required for use in Manila in a short time it was returned to its former barracks.

The cablegram referred to in the above letter to General Miller was the proclamation of the President received in cipher. The translation was completed about an hour before the letter was written, and was transmitted to General Miller to inform him of the policy which the Government intended to pursue. Neither its contents nor feasibility of immediate issue had been carefully considered. No direction for its publication had been given and it was not supposed that it would be

proclaimed at Iloilo. The general, however, under the impression that it had been transmitted for publication, issued it very soon after it was received, and in his letter of January 6 informed me as follows:

Three days ago I sent to the governing committee (R. Lopez, president) a copy of the letter of instructions of the President and asked that they permit the entry of my troops. No answer has been received and I expect none. I had copies of the President's instructions translated into Spanish and distributed to the people in various ways, and am informed that the people laugh at it. The insurgents call us cowards and are fortifying the old fort at the point of the peninsula, and are mounting old smooth-bore guns left by the Spaniards. They are intrenching everywhere, are bent on having one fight, and are confident of victory. As I informed you in my letter of yesterday, I believe that we can now capture the city with the force now present and with the assistance of the Navy without the loss of much life and without much destruction of property, and should we destroy it all I believe it would be of advantage to the city, as a newer city would be built up soon. The character of the natives, having been under the subjugation of Spain so long, is such that once well punished they will submit to fate. The people are superstitious and believe in fate, and now believe that fate will give them victory.

His letter of the previous day, January 5, is as follows:

HDQRS. FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT,
Iloilo Harb r, P. I., January 5, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.

SIR: I have the honor to report the situation as quite serious. The native troops now number over 4,000 well-armed men. There are more than 12,000 armed with bolos and miscellaneous weapons. They are constantly intrenching about the fort and at the mouth of the Iloilo River. I do not allow anyone on shore, as the insurgent commander sent me word that he would not be responsible for our unarmed men in town. * * *

Last evening about 6.40 o'clock, just at dark, while at supper, the captain of the water boat went toward the rear of the boat, where the guard was stationed, and suddenly sprang at the guard with a knife, cut the head of one of the guard through the skull, and the other one on the arm and jaw; the latter was knocked overboard and then struck by the native on the head with an oar. One native then jumped overboard and escaped; the two others were secured. A boat from the ship was lowered and picked up the soldier in the water, who is not badly hurt. The soldier cut on the head is likely to die, but there is a slight hope of his recovery.

I think the longer we wait before attack the harder it will be to put down the insurrection.

The city is entirely at the mercy of the *Baltimore*, and with her assistance, advancing under her guns and Captain Bridgman's battery, I have no doubt we can drive the insurgents out of the city, but their army will confront us outside. That situation would be intolerable, even if firing ceases. I would therefore recommend that a force sufficient to beat them badly in the open field should be prepared ready to send down, if required, after the city is taken. Let no one convince you that peaceful measures can settle the difficulty here, unless you first settle matters peacefully in Manila and Luzon Island.

* * * * * * *

The English and German war ships and all other large vessels in the harbor have daily received refugees from the city. Many of the city people with their effects are leaving on small coasting steamers for neighboring islands.

Order appears to be maintained in the city, except for Americans who feel humiliated and want to get at them.

Very respectfully,

M. P. MILLER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

After fully considering the President's proclamation and the temper of the Tagalos with whom I was daily discussing political problems and the friendly intentions of the United States Government toward them, I concluded that there were certain words and expressions therein, such as "sovereignty," "right of cession," and those which directed immediate occupation, etc., though most admirably employed and tersely expressive of actual conditions, might be advantageously used by the Tagalo war party to incite widespread hostilities among the natives. The ignorant classes had been taught to believe that certain

words, as "sovereignty," "protection," etc., had peculiar meaning disastrous to their welfare and significant of future political domination, like that from which they had recently been freed. It was my opinion, therefore, that I would be justified in so amending the paper that the beneficent object of the United States Government would be brought clearly within the comprehension of the people, and this conclusion was the more readily reached because of the radical change of the past few days in the constitution of Aguinaldo's government, which could not have been understood at Washington at the time the proclamation was prepared. It was also believed that the proclamation had been induced partially by the suggestions of the naval authorities here, which three weeks previous, and while affairs were in a specific and comparatively quiet state, had recommended "that the President issue a proclamation defining the policy of the United States Government in the Philippine Islands and assuring the inhabitants that it is our intention to interfere as little as possible in the internal affairs of the islands. That as soon as they developed their capability for self-government their powers and privileges will be increased. That will allay the spirit of unrest." These authorities at that time recommended the government of the islands as a territory with a civilian as a governor, to be followed later by a naval and military commission to determine questions of a naval and military character.

The amended proclamation was thereupon prepared, and fearing that General Miller would give publicity to the former, copies of which, if issued, would be circulated soon in Luzon, I again dispatched Lieutenant-Colonel Potter to Iloilo, both to ascertain the course of events there and to advise the commanding general of the dangers threatening in Luzon, and which might be augmented if any action was taken which the insurgents could make use of in furtherance of their unfriendly designs. General Miller thought his action in making publication of the proclamation on January 3 correct, as he had not been instructed to the contrary, and his opinion, he contended, was confirmed by a War Department dispatch which I had directed Colonel Potter to deliver to him, and which he had received on January 6. He was satisfied that the use he had made of the proclamation was that contemplated by the War Department authorities, but it was not long before it was delivered at Malolos and was the object of venomous attack.

Nothing further of great moment transpired at Iloilo for several successive days, and we return to the narrative of Manila events. General Miller, however, remained eager for battle, and with his command restive under the taunts of the natives and criticisms of foreign citizens, he repeatedly asked for permission to attack the city. Complications of a civil nature were also arising as shown in his communication of January 8, of which the following is a copy:

HDQRS. FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT,
Iloilo Harbor, P. I., Sunday, January 8, 1899—2 p.m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.

SIR: I have the honor to report, for the information of the major-general commanding, that the situation here is not improving since my last report. I have not landed the Fifty-first Iowa on the island opposite to Iloilo, as two boat crews of troops of the Fifty-first Iowa landed on the 5th instant, and were met by over 75 to 100 natives armed with various weapons, rifles, shotguns, and knives, who asked them their business and warned them off with threats of bringing out more troops if they did not go away. The men of the regiment are well, and the colonel does not desire to land under such circumstances of hostility. The insurgents are still at work fortifying; last night they sunk four mud scows at the mouth of the Iloilo River to prevent passage of our Navy. This did not annoy us, as the *Petrel's* place for action, if we

have one, is undisturbed. The city is so completely under the control of the warships of the Navy that we are indifferent as to what the insurgents do. When the time comes nothing can save insurgents in the city but flight. The subject most disturbing to our American minds is the fact that a Dutch ship is loading with sugar; who shall collect the duty is a question. Captain Evans and I discussed the question last evening without conclusion. The duties will amount to $5,000, quite a snug sum, with which the insurgents will be able to buy machine guns, etc., if we leave them alone. Other ships arriving will add more and more to their revenues.

The port ought to be closed if it is a practicable thing, after due notice to foreign governments. We need here two good steam launches capable of towing a line of rowboats rapidly for landing purposes. We can not get them here without seizing them, and the good ones are under the protection of foreign flags.

As to the insurgents yielding to the order of the President and allowing occupation, it will not be done unless the central government at Malolos directs them to do so. If we have to fight at Manila and here, I should think it better to strike the first blow here, as, with the assistance of the Navy, result in our favor can scarcely be doubted.

Very respectfully,

M. P. MILLER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

Full official Iloilo correspondence which was carried on about this date, together with reported interviews on the situation, will be found in the accompanying report of Brigadier-General Hughes, U. S. V., now commanding there. They are of interest and of considerable importance in showing the then existing attitude of Spanish civil officials toward our Government.

The amended proclamation of January 4 appeared in the English, Spanish, and Tagalo languages, and was published in Manila through newspapers and posters. The English text is as follows:

PROCLAMATION.

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY GOVERNOR OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., January 4, 1899.

To the People of the Philippine Islands:

Instructions of His Excellency the President of the United States relative to the administration of affairs in the Philippine Islands have been transmitted to me by direction of the honorable the Secretary of War, under date of December 28, 1898. They direct me to publish and proclaim, in the most public manner, to the inhabitants of these islands that in the war against Spain the United States forces came here to destroy the power of that nation and to give the blessings of peace and individual freedom to the Philippine people; that we are here as friends of the Filipinos; to protect them in their homes, their employments, their individual and religious liberty, and that all persons who, either by active aid or honest endeavor, cooperate with the Government of the United States to give effect to these beneficent purposes, will receive the reward of its support and protection.

The President of the United States has assumed that the municipal laws of the country in respect to private rights and property and the repression of crime are to be considered as continuing in force in so far as they be applicable to a free people, and should be administered by the ordinary tribunals of justice, presided over by representatives of the people and those in thorough sympathy with them in their desires for good government; that the functions and duties connected with civil and municipal administration are to be performed by such officers as wish to accept the assistance of the United States, chosen in so far as it may be practicable from the inhabitants of the islands; that while the management of public property and revenues and the use of all public means of transportation are to be conducted under the military authorities, until such authorities can be replaced by civil administration, all private property, whether of individuals or corporations, must be respected and protected. If private property be taken for military uses it shall be paid for at a fair valuation in cash if possible, and when payment in cash is not practicable at the time, receipts therefor will be given to be taken up and liquidated as soon as cash becomes available. The ports of the Philippine Islands shall be open to the commerce of all foreign nations, and goods and merchandise not prohibited for military reasons by the military authorities shall be admitted upon payment of such duties and charges as shall be in force at the time of importation.

The President concludes his instructions in the following language:

"Finally, it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the Administration to

win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by insuring to them in every possible way the full measure of individual rights and liberty which is the heritage of a free people, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of beneficent assimilation, which will substitute the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule. In the fulfillment of this high mission, while upholding the temporary administration of affairs for the greatest good of the governed, there will be sedulously maintained the strong arm of authority to repress disturbance, and to overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of the blessings of good and stable government upon the people of the Philippine Islands."

From the tenor and substance of the above instructions of the President, I am fully of the opinion that it is the intention of the United States Government, while directing affairs generally, to appoint the representative men now forming the controlling element of the Filipinos to civil positions of trust and responsibility, and it will be my aim to appoint thereto such Filipinos as may be acceptable to the supreme authorities at Washington.

It is also my belief that it is the intention of the United States Government to draw from the Filipino people so much of the military force of the islands as is possible and consistent with a free and well-constituted government of the country, and it is my desire to inaugurate a policy of that character. I am also convinced that it is the intention of the United States Government to seek the establishment of a most liberal government for the islands, in which the people themselves shall have as full representation as the maintenance of law and order will permit, and which shall be susceptible of development, on lines of increased representation and the bestowal of increased powers, into a government as free and independent as is enjoyed by the most favored provinces of the world.

It will be my constant endeavor to cooperate with the Filipino people, seeking the good of the country, and I invite their full confidence and aid.

E. S. Otis,
Major-General, U. S. V., Military Governor.

Before publication of this proclamation I endeavored to obtain from able Filipino residents of the city an expression of opinion as to its probable effect upon the population, but was not much encouraged. A few days thereafter they declared the publication to have been a mistake, although the foreign residents appeared to believe the proclamation most excellent in tone and moderation, offered everything that the most hostile of the insurgents could expect, and undoubtedly would have a beneficial influence. It was received by the better classes of natives with satisfaction, as it was the first authoritative announcement of the attitude which the United States assumed toward the islands and declared the policy which it intended to pursue, and because the declared policy was one which, in their opinion, conditions imperatively demanded should be imposed for the interests of the Filipino people who were incapable of self-government. The publication separated more widely the friendly and war factions of the inhabitants and was the cause of exciting discussion.

The ablest of insurgent newspapers, which was now issued at Malolos and edited by the uncompromising Luna, he who had been an openly declared enemy of the United States from the time Manila capitulated, subsequently commanded an insurgent army and was assassinated while exercising chief military command of the insurgent forces, attacked the policy of the United States as declared in the proclamation, and its assumption of sovereignty over the islands, with all the vigor of which he was capable. He went further and contended that the policy as declared was merely a subterfuge to temporarily quiet the people until measures could be inaugurated and applied to put in practice all the odious features of government which Spain had employed. Everything tended simply to a change of masters for the Filipino people without amelioration of condition. This paper was published in Tagalo, had a considerable circulation, and was assisted by other Tagalo publications. No statement reflecting upon the United States Government and its

troops in Manila was too base, untruthful, or improbable for newspaper circulation, and unfortunately received credit by the more ignorant of the natives, although the subject of ridicule or indignant comment by the abler Filipinos. Aguinaldo met the proclamation by a counter one in which he indignantly protested against the claim of sovereignty by the United States in the islands, which really had been conquered from the Spaniards through the blood and treasure of his countrymen, and abused me for my assumption of the title of military governor. Even the women of Cavite province, in a document numerously signed by them, gave me to understand that after all the men were killed off they were prepared to shed their patriotic blood for the liberty and independence of their country. The efforts made by Aguinaldo and his assisants made a decided impression on the inhabitants of Luzon outside of Manila, who acquired an unfavorable opinion, to say the least, of an American citizen, whom of course few of them had ever seen. The insurgent army was especially affected by this tirade of abuse of Americans, but agreeably so, as it had met and conquered the soldiers of Spain and only awaited an opportunity to demonstrate its invincibility in war with the United States troops cooped up in Manila and whom it had commenced to insult and charge with cowardice. Shortly before this time the insurgents had commenced the organization of clubs in the city, membership in which now, I was informed, amounted to 10,000. The chief organizer was a shrewd mestizo, a former close companion of Aguinaldo, by whom he had been commissioned to perform this work. He was a friend and associate of some of our officers; was engaged in organizing the clubs only, as he stated, to give the poorer classes amusement and education; held public entertainments in athletics to which our officers were invited, and in which our soldiers were asked to participate. Gradually arms were being secretly introduced and bolos were being manufactured and distributed. The arms were kept concealed in buildings, and many of them were subsequently captured. The Chinamen were carrying on a lucrative business in bolo making, but the provost-marshal had cruelly seized considerable of their stock. These clubs had received military organization and were commanded by cunning Filipino officers regularly appointed by the Malolos government. The chief organizer departed after organization had been perfected and thereafter became a confidential adviser in Malolos affairs. This organization was the subject of grave apprehension, as it was composed of the worst social element of the city, and was kept under police supervision as closely as possible. It was also dreaded by the better class of Filipino inhabitants, many of whom believed themselves selected for assassination on account of their expressed desires for American protection. The streets of the city were thronged with unarmed insurgent officers and enlisted men from the numerically increasing insurgent line on the outskirts, proud of their uniforms and exhibiting matchless conceit, amusing to our men, who were apparently unconcerned observers, but who were quick to take in the rapidly changing conditions.

In the midst of this suppressed excitement the city was comparatively quiet, crime well suppressed, and business interests were flourishing. The merchants were active to take advantages of all avenues of trade possible. Vessels were sent to the China coasts for products to supply the southern ports, entered and cleared at the port of Iloilo against the protest of General Miller, and paid the accustomed charges on dutiable goods and products to the insurgents, who had installed themselves there. United States consuls at Singapore and Hongkong asked the

perplexing question whether vessels could be cleared for Iloilo and Cebu, and could be answered evasively only, as follows:

MANILA, P. I., *January 9, 1899.*

United States Consul-General WILDMAN, *Hongkong:*

United States not yet administering civil affairs at either Iloilo or Cebu. No new consular action as to these ports should be inaugurated at present.

OTIS.

The Manila Chamber of Commerce took this matter up for investigation and saw that the rights of merchants in ports virtually at war with the United States were denied. I was called upon for an explanation and addressed its secretary as follows:

SIR: I am in receipt of the communication of the Manila Chamber of Commerce of yesterday, the 12th instant, in which I am informed that "the American consul at Hongkong declines to dispatch steamers or vessels for Cebu and Iloilo; also, that American authorities here will not allow a steamer to come here with permission to proceed to Cebu, and request information as to the course to be pursued in the immediate future by the American authorities with regard to the above-named ports."

In reply, I have the honor to inform you that the United States consul at Hongkong having, on the 6th instant, made inquiry in the matter of clearing vessels at Hongkong for Iloilo and Cebu, was answered on the 9th instant, by cable, as follows:

"The United States not yet administering civil affairs at either Iloilo or Cebu. No new consular action as to these ports should be inaugurated at present."

This message to the American consul is not considered authoritative by any means, as we have no authority to give him directions, and the matter of clearing vessels at Hongkong rests entirely within his discretion.

To the categorical questions which you submit I am pleased to return answer as follows:

To the first question my answer is: Not by any act of the United States authorities at Manila.

To the second question I reply that: Trade can be conducted, in so far as the United States authorities now in occupancy of these islands are concerned, the same as formerly. Vessels will be cleared from this port for ports of the islands until instructions received from my Government indicate a contrary course of action.

To the third question I can only answer that: All the instructions thus far received from my Government are embodied in the proclamation issued from this office on the 4th instant, which I inclose and to which I respectfully refer.

The consul for Great Britain wished to know why a British steamer had been suspiciously dealt with and was replied to as follows:

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, and to say in reply that the matter referred to therein will be investigated. It is reported that the steamer *Zaccena* arrived from Singapore with a general cargo, a part of which it appears is destined for Iloilo by same vessel. From reports received and declarations made it was believed that she had on board contraband of war. The reports received justified the action which has been taken in so far as search was concerned.

And again inquiring concerning seizure at Manila of a small steamer, in which a British subject claimed to be interested, he received the following reply:

MANILA, P. I., *January 2, 1899.*

Hon. H. A. RAMSDEN,
H. B. M. Consul, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 31st ultimo, inclosing copies of correspondence between yourself and Messrs. Holliday, Wise & Co., in the matter of the seizure by the United States authorities of the steamer *Laguna de Bay* in the Pasig River.

The seizure of this vessel became necessary for Government purposes, and before it was made the owner of the same had been consulted. Later, Mr. Ashton, in your company, called upon me at this office, when I assured him that the Government would not allow the steamer to engage in private trade on the Pasig River, and that it was prepared to make good to parties concerned any loss which Government action would entail. At the time of this conference I was under the impression that the

captain of the port had given permission for this boat to navigate the Pasig River, but have been informed to the contrary. It is hoped that this matter can be satisfactorily adjusted in a few days.

Very sincerely, yours,

E. S. OTIS,
United States Military Governor.

In the meantime the local Spanish authorities were present and desired to close up the pending international business. As early as December 28, I was informed by the superior Spanish officer present that the treaty of peace had been concluded and that he wished to take up the settlement of affairs. I replied that I had not received any information or instructions in the matter, but as soon as received would cooperate with him in every way possible. On the following day he applied for permission to leave the islands. He was a prisoner of war, in fact, supervising the affairs of the Spanish prisoners present in Manila. A high-toned gentleman, a most courteous and accomplished officer, our official relations had always been pleasant and agreeable. I replied to his application in the following terms:

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNOR,
Manila, P. I., December 29, 1898.

Division General FRANCISCO RIZZO,
Commanding Spanish Forces, Manila, P. I.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this instant requesting passport to return to Spain next month, and in reply thereto I hasten to inform you that you are free to leave at any time you may desire, and that it will give me great pleasure to render you every assistance that you may need in making the necessary preparations for your departure on so long a voyage.

I am, General, with much esteem, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V., United States Military Governor.

Shortly thereafter General Rios, general of division of the Spanish army, who had been commanding in the south, arrived in Manila. He had been directed by his Government to supervise, as acting governor-general, Spanish interests in the islands, and at once addressed himself vigorously to the settlement of affairs and the shipment of Spanish prisoners, for which I had received authority. In personal conferences, through numerous communications and written requests, he occupied considerable of the time of the United States authorities, although it was as yet impossible to consider many of the matters which he presented, since the Paris treaty had not received ratification. A few responses to the letters he submitted indicate the variety of the subjects which he wished promptly attended to and the difficulties of compliance. They are as follows:

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., January 9, 1899.

His Excellency DIEGO DE LOS RIOS Y NICALAU,
General of Division, Spanish Army, Manila, P. I.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this instant, referring to embarkation of Spanish troops, prisoners of war, on the 11th instant, and to say in reply that there is no objection on the part of the United States Government, and that I will give appropriate instructions to the officials having charge of such business to have your excellency's desires consummated.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V.,
United States Military Governor in the Philippines.

JANUARY 10, 1899.

GENERAL: In a hurried communication of last evening, sent in response to your letter of yesterday, in which you inform me that you must discharge in Mindanao, about

2,000 troops who were taken there from the Visayan and Luzon islands, and further say that it is impossible to scatter them to their several homes. I suggested that the Visayans might be taken to Iloilo and I will see that the necessary orders are given to the United States authorities there to permit them to land upon arrival. The Luzon men will probably give great trouble if they are brought into the harbor of Manila at the present time. Many of those already received here escaped from the authorities, and with the convicts sent by you have fixed themselves in Manila, where they give a good deal of annoyance. We can not receive any more of these troops in the city at present, and I wish you would delay sending them to this island. After a short period we may be able to take them and send them to their respective homes. I am very desirous of giving this matter full consideration before arriving at further conclusions.

I would like to be informed of the approximate number of Visayans, and also the number of Luzon men you intend to bring north, stating each class separately.

JANUARY 12, 1899.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 10th instant, in which you request me to direct my officers to hand over to the chiefs of the several departments of the Spanish hacienda certain public documents belonging to the Spanish Government, etc.

In reply permit me to state that since our late conversation on this subject I telegraphed my Government of your desire in this particular and I have not yet received any response.

Being, as I am, entirely ignorant, in so far as official information is concerned, of the relations existing between Spain and the United States at the present time, I do not think that I have the power to act favorably upon your request until the instructions of my Government are received.

JANUARY 14, 1899.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 21st instant, referring to your wish to appoint a Spanish clerk in the Manila post-office, and in reply would say that I am unable to grant your request, as the appointment of all postal clerks is under the exclusive control of the Post-Office Department of the United States.

JANUARY 16, 1899.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th instant just received, referring to the embarkation of about 400 Spanish troops, prisoners of war, on the steamship *Monserrat*, and to say in reply that there is no objection on the part of the United States. Appropriate instructions will be given to the officials having charge of such business in order that your excellency's desires may be consummated.

JANUARY 20, 1899.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of yesterday received this morning, in which you inform me that there are about 650 native troops here belonging to the Visayas.

As soon as you desire to assemble the men and turn them over, I can send them to Iloilo under proper guard. Concerning the Luzon men, we will be glad to send them to some point nearer Manila than Albay.

I have instructed General Hughes to make all necessary arrangements for the shipment of the Visayans and he will confer with any officer you may be pleased to name in regard to the matter.

JANUARY 24, 1899.

GENERAL: I have given instructions to the custodian and treasurer of public funds to permit any committee whom you may appoint to examine the books and records of that office for the period of time previous to American occupation of Manila.

The treasurer will be pleased to show you exhibits of the contents of the safes of the Treasury as reported by board of officers appointed under authority from these headquarters. The safes were sealed after this board had inventoried the contents and have not since been opened.

JANUARY 25, 1899.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 24th instant, and in reply to say that I have directed the captain of the port to permit the ladies, children, and Mr. Ricardi Fernandez and his assistant, now on the *General Alva*, to land. I have also directed him to permit the officers upon that vessel to visit you on official business, and to permit a small party to land daily for the purpose of purchasing supplies.

JANUARY 26, 1899.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter requesting that the regimental records, books, and documents belonging to the Spanish troops formerly occupying certain barracks of this city be returned to you. In accordance with your request I will instruct the provost-marshal-general to turn over to any officer whom you may name to receive the same, all records belonging to Spanish regiments which are in the possession of the United States authorities.

It should be remembered that at the time United States occupation of the city commenced a great deal of public property was abandoned by the Spanish officials, never having been turned over under the terms of the capitulation. The United States authorities have collected and preserved all such property in so far as it was possible for them to do so.

MANILA, P. I., *January 26, 1899.*

Brig. Gen. VICENTE ARIZMENDIZ,
Spanish Army, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I am directed by the military governor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 24th instant, referring to a commission of the Spanish army of which you had been appointed president by his excellency General Diego de los Rios, Spanish army, and in reply to say that he has not yet received any information as to the terms of the treaty of peace between the Governments of Spain and the United States, now awaiting ratification, and that he is not therefore at this time prepared to enter upon the subject of the final disposition of Spanish troops, records, funds, and property under the control of the United States forces in the Philippine Islands.

Very respectfully,

C. H. MURRAY,
Captain, Fourth U. S. Cavalry, Aid.

MANILA, *January 29, 1899.*

His Excellency DIEGO DE LOS RIOS Y NICALAU,
Division General, Spanish Army, Manila, P. I.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of yesterday, and beg to reply that instructions have been given to the United States officer who was placed in supervisory charge of the building containing the mint to give the necessary orders to enable you to carry out your expressed wish.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V., U. S. Military Governor.

JANUARY 31, 1899.

GENERAL: Replying further to your communication of the 17th instant, to that portion of the same which asks that "permission be given for the withdrawal of everything concerning the settlement in hand and which does not affect the treasury of the establishment, properly speaking," I have the honor to state that I have received as yet no instructions from the United States Government concerning these matters, and am ignorant of the terms of the pending treaty between Spain and the United States, now awaiting ratification. I am, therefore, powerless to act understandingly until I receive information and directions from Washington, which will doubtless be furnished me as soon as the proposed treaty receives validity.

In the meantime I shall be glad to further your desires in every way in so far as I am able, and it will be possible for me to adopt some preliminary measures, subject to future confirmation. * * *

The inference may be drawn from the tenor of the foregoing replies to the written application of General Rios, that time was sought to

properly meet his demands. Time was required to consider fully what specific action was necessary to guard United States interests and its rights under the treaty, which was not yet of validity, not having received ratification. But it was also deemed inexpedient to enter upon any course of proceedings which would embarrass the United States Government in case the proposed treaty should ultimately fail of confirmation. Not until January 31 were the preliminaries of any decided course determined upon, except in so far as the repatriation of prisoners and the surrender of strictly military property and records were concerned. Then a board of officers was appointed for the purposes shown in Department orders of that date, which read as follows:

4. A board of officers, to consist of Maj. Charles McClure, chief paymaster of the department; Maj. C. U. Gantenbein, Second Oregon, U. S. V., and Second Lieut. M. A. Hildreth, First North Dakota, U. S. V., is hereby appointed to meet and confer with a committee named by his excellency Division General Diego de los Rios y Nicolau, Spanish Army, for the purpose, as stated, "of clearing the accounts of the Spanish Government in the Philippines." The board will determine upon some definite course of procedure by which the Spanish committee can have access to all records and documents now in possession of the United States authorities which it may desire to consult, and will arrange therefor. No property or records can be delivered until the proposed treaty receives validity through ratification, and the board will continue its sessions anticipating that event, when definite instructions looking to a settlement of public affairs, judicial and executive, can be conveyed. The board will ascertain fully the desires of the committee as to the nature and full extent of its desired action and give it every possible facility consistent with the present status of affairs.

On January 31 201 commissioned officers and 2,541 enlisted men, prisoners of war, and about 200 sick officers, also prisoners, who departed individually under privileges specially granted, had sailed for Spain. Several thousand remained within the walled town, whose probable conduct in the event of serious disturbances within the city was the subject of much speculative discussion.

From August, 1898, to the time the treaty of Paris came from the representatives of the contracting Governments, the insurgents had maintained their military lines around Manila on the plea that they desired to be prepared to meet the soldiers of Spain, should she return to her late possessions. As soon as the result of the treaty negotiations became known, the dishonesty of that plea became fully apparent. Then the crisis in the insurgent government was at hand. Aguinaldo and his able adviser, Mabini, the man who had furnished the brains for the radical element and who, in fact, was the government, proposed to transfer the declaration of open hostilities from Spain to the United States. This the conservative members of the cabinet and congress would not countenance, and the result was their withdrawal. Mabini was able to form a new cabinet with himself as dictator, and to dominate the remaining members of congress. Independence was the cry and the extermination of the Americans the determination. They then sought an excuse to inaugurate hostilities, but the United States had kept strictly within its legal rights and had simply performed its international obligations. Repeated efforts were made to secure some mark of recognition for their government from the American authorities, some of which appeared to be quite cunningly devised. I was addressed by so-called ministers of state on diplomatic subjects, and was visited by accredited members of the Malolos government. The various foreign consuls resident in Manila were officially informed by this government of its proceedings and furnished with copies of its so-called decrees. Never since the time Aguinaldo returned to Cavite in May of 1898 and placed himself under the masterful spirit of Mabini had he the slight-

est intention to accept the kind offices and assistance of the United States, except as they might be employed to hold Spain throttled while he worked the scheme of self-aggrandizement. His success was not in the least astonishing, as after the various islands had driven out the few remaining and discouraged soldiers of their openly declared enemy, they naturally turned to Luzon for some form of central government, the islands of the south being well aware of their inability to maintain successful separate and distinct political establishments. The crude one in process of formation in central Luzon offered itself through its visiting agents and was accepted in part (notwithstanding race animosities and divergent business interests) and very probably because no other alternative was offered. The eight months of opportunity given the ambitious Tagalo by the hold on Spain which the United States maintained was sufficient also for him to send his troops and designing men into the distant provinces and hold the unarmed natives in subjection while he imposed military authority, and thus in December, 1898, we find in northern and southeastern Luzon, in Mindoro, Samar, Leyte, Panay, and even on the coast of Mindanao and in some of the smaller islands, the aggressive Tagalo, present in person, and whether civilian or soldier, supreme in authority. The success which attended the political efforts of Aguinaldo and his close associates, and gave them such sudden and unexpected power was not calculated to induce them to accept subordinate positions in a reestablished government, and the original premeditated intention to control supremely at least a portion of the Filipino people had become firmly fixed. The cry for liberty and independence (really license and despotism under their governing methods) and the vile aspersions of the motives of the United States, which they have widely circulated, have served them to stir up distrust and fear of the American among the people to a considerable extent, especially those of Tagalo origin. The charge which they continually brought, until December last, that the United States administration in power intended to restore the islands to Spain, which until then was the chief cause of discontent and excitement, and in the asserted truth and circulation of which they were greatly assisted by the Spanish resident and representative, fell flat when the result of the labors of the Paris treaty commissions became known. Then the pretext that the United States was about to substitute itself for Spain, continuing all her former governing abuses, including the imposed authority of the hated friar, was resorted to and had its effect on the ignorant masses. Whatever action the United States might now take, except to immediately withdraw its authority and subject the people to anarchy and the European vast property interests in these islands to destruction, could be so tortured as to support this pretext. It was eagerly waited for by the now irresponsible band of conspirators at Malolos, few of whom had anything to lose and everything to gain by inciting hostility. The United States proclamation issued on the 4th of January offered them the first opportunity and was the opportunity which they desired. No sooner was it published than it brought out a virtual declaration of war from, in this instance at least, the wretchedly advised President Aguinaldo, who, on January 5, issued the following:

The government of the Philippines has considered it its duty to set forth to the civilized powers the facts determining the rupture of its amicable relations with the army of the United States of America in these islands, to the end that they may thereby reach the conviction that I, for my part, have done everything possible to avoid it, although at the cost of many rights uselessly sacrificed.

After the naval combat, which occurred on May 1 of last year, between the Spanish squadron and that of America, the commander of the latter consented to

my return from Hongkong to this beloved soil, and he distributed among the Filipinos some rifles found in the arsenal at Cavite, doubtless with the intention of reestablishing the revolution, somewhat quieted by the convention of Biac-na-bato, in order to have the Filipinos on his side.

The people, influenced by the declaration of war between the United States and Spain, understood the necessity of fighting for their liberty, feeling sure that Spain would be destroyed and rendered incapable of leading them along the road to prosperity and progress. The Filipinos hailed my advent with joy, and I had the honor of being proclaimed leader on account of the services which I had rendered in the former revolution.

Then all the Filipinos without distinction of classes took arms, and every province hastened to expel from its frontiers the Spanish forces. This is the explanation of the fact that, after the lapse of so short a period of time, my government rules the whole of Luzon, the Visaya Islands, and a part of Mindanao.

Although the North Americans took no part in these military operations, which cost no little blood and gold, my government does not disavow the fact that the destruction of the Spanish squadron and the gift of some rifles from the arsenal to my people influenced the progress of our arms to some extent. It was also taken for granted that the American forces would necessarily sympathize with the revolution which they had managed to encourage, and which had saved them much blood and great hardships; and, above all, we entertained absolute confidence in the history and traditions of a people which fought for its independence and for the abolition of slavery, which posed as the champion liberator of oppressed peoples; we felt ourselves under the safeguard of a free people.

The Americans, seeing the friendly disposition of the Filipino people, disembarked forces at the town of Paranaque and took up positions all along the line occupied by my troops, as far as Mayrubig, taking possession of many trenches constructed by my people, by the employment of astuteness, not unaccompanied by violence. They forced a capitulation on the garrison of Manila, which, inasmuch as it was invested by my troops, was compelled to surrender at the first attack. In this I took a very active part, although I was not notified, my forces reaching as far as the suburbs of Malate, Ermita, Paco, Sampaloc, and Tondo.

Notwithstanding these services, and although the Spaniards would not have surrendered but for the fact that my troops had closed every avenue of escape to the towns of the interior, the American generals not only ignored me entirely in the stipulations for capitulation, but also requested that my forces should retire from the port of Cavite and the suburbs of Manila.

I represented to the American generals the injustice done me, and requested in friendly terms that they should at least expressly recognize my cooperation, but they utterly declined to do so. Nevertheless, being always desirous of showing friendliness and good feeling toward those who called themselves liberators of the the Philippine people, I ordered my troops to evacuate the port of Cavite and the suburbs of Ermita, Malate, Sampaloc, and Tondo retaining only a portion of the suburb of Paco.

In spite of these concessions, not many days passed before Admiral Dewey, without any reason whatever, arrested our steam launches, which had been plying in the bay of Manila with his express consent. Almost at the same time I received a letter from General Otis, commander of the American army of occupation, demanding that I should withdraw my forces beyond the lines marked on a map which he also sent me, and which showed within the lines the town of Pandacan and the hamlet of Singalong, which never have belonged to the municipal area of Manila and its suburbs.

In view of this unjustifiable attitude of both American leaders, I summoned a council of my generals and asked the advice of my cabinet, and in conformity with the opinion of both bodies I named commissioners, who placed themselves in communication with these Americans. Although Admiral Dewey received in an insolent manner and with aggressive phrases my commissioners, whom he did not permit to speak, I yielded to the friendly suggestions of General Otis, withdrawing my forces to the desired line for the purpose of avoiding contact with his troops. This gave rise to many misunderstandings, but I hoped that once the Paris conference was at an end my people would obtain the independence promised them by the consul-general in Singapore, Mr. Pratt, and that the friendship formerly assured and proclaimed in manifestoes and speeches would be established by the American generals who have reached these shores.

But it did not turn out thus. The said generals accepted my concessions in favor of peace and friendship as indications of weakness. Thus it is that, with rising ambition, they ordered forces to Iloilo on December 26, with the purpose of acquiring for themselves the title of conquerors of that portion of the Philippine Islands occupied by my government.

Such procedures, so foreign to the dictates of culture and the usages observed by civilized nations, gave me the right to act without observing the usual rules of

intercourse. Nevertheless, in order to be correct to the end, I sent to General Otis commissioners charged to solicit him to desist from his rash enterprise, but they were not listened to.

My government can not remain indifferent in view of such a violent and aggressive seizure of a portion of its territory by a nation which has arrogated to itself the title, champion of oppressed nations. Thus it is that my government is disposed to open hostilities if the American troops attempt to take forcible possession of the Visaya Islands. I denounce these acts before the world, in order that the conscience of mankind may pronounce its infallible verdict as to who are the true oppressors of nations and the tormentors of human kind.

Upon their heads be all the blood which may be shed.

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

MALOLOS, *January 5, 1899.*

A number of copies of this unfortunate declaration were speedily sent out for circulation among the people, when an effort was made to recall them and substitute an amended edition, but a few had found their way to Manila and were eagerly sought after by the citizens. That evening the insurgent newspaper entitled "The Herald of the Revolution" published a supplement in which the following appeared:

OFFICIAL MANIFESTO OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT!

To my brothers, the Filipinos, and to all the respectable consuls and other foreigners:

A proclamation of Mr. E. S. Otis, major-general of the United States Volunteers, appeared in Manila papers yesterday, compelled me to issue the present, with a view to expose to all who read and understand the present document my most solemn protest against the whole contents of the said proclamation, the duties of my conscience toward God, my political compromises toward my beloved people, and my private and official relationship with the United States nation, all of which forced me to do so.

The General Otis called himself in the said proclamation military governor of the Philippine Islands. I protest one and a thousand times, with all the energy of my soul, against such authority.

I solemnly declare that neither at Singapore, Hongkong, nor here in the Philippines did I ever agree, by word or in writing, to recognize the sovereignty of America in this our lovely country. On the contrary, I declare that I returned to these islands, transported by the United States man-of-war, on the 19th of May last, with the decided and firm intention to fight the Spaniards in order to reconquer our liberty and independence. I have thus declared in my official proclamation dated May 24, and I have likewise published in a manifest addressed to the Filipino people on the 12th of June last, when, in my native village of Kawit, I exhibited for the first time our holy national flag as a sacred emblem of that sublime aspiration, and finally, so it was confirmed by the American general, Mr. Merritt, antecessor of Mr. E. S. Otis, in the manifest which he addressed to the Filipino people days before he *intimated* the Spanish general, Mr. Jaudenes, the surrender of the city of Manila, in which manifest he clearly and positively said that the army and navy of the United States came here to give us our liberty and destroy the bad rule of the Spanish Government. To say all at a time, nationals and foreigners are witnesses that the army and navy of the United States stationed here have acknowledged the fact of the belligerency of the Filipinos, whose flag has triumphantly crossed our seas before the eyes of the foreign nations here represented by their respective consuls.

As in General Otis's proclamation he alluded to some instructions edited by His Excellency the President of the United States, referring to the administration of the matters in the Philippine Islands, I in the name of God, the root and fountain of all justice, and that of all the right which has been visibly granted to me to direct my dear brothers in the difficult work of our regeneration, protest most solemnly against this intrusion of the United States Government on the sovereignty of these islands.

I equally protest in the name of the Filipino people against the said intrusion, because as they have granted their vote of confidence appointing me president of the nation, although I don't consider that I deserve such, therefore I consider it my duty to defend to death its liberty and independence.

Finally, I protest against such an unexpected act of sovereignty of the United States in these islands, in the name of all the proceedings which I have in my possession with regard to my relationship with the United States authorities, which unmistakably prove that the United States did not take me from Hongkong to fight

the Spaniards for their benefit, but for the benefit of our liberty and independence, for which purpose the said authorities verbally promised me their most decided assistance and efficacious cooperation; and so should you all my dear brothers understand, in order that we may united act according to the idea of our liberty and independence, which were our most noble desires, and assist with your work to obtain our aim with the strength which our old conviction may afford and must not go back in the way of glory which we have obtained.

The unmistakable intention of Aguinaldo, as shown in these proclamations, taken in connection with the well known fact that what remains of his congress was subservient to Mabini's dictation, was ample notice to the troops to prepare for hostile demonstrations on the part of the insurgent army. Greater precautionary measures were directed and taken in the way of redistributing organizations throughout the city, in advancing and strengthening (though still far within our own mutually conceded military lines, our posts of observation, and for the quick response of the men if summoned for defensive action. Otherwise no change in the conduct, condition, or temper of the troops was observable. So quietly were these precautions effected that Filipino citizens, noticing the apparent indifference of our men, warned me repeatedly of the danger to be apprehended from a sudden simultaneous attack of the insurgents within and without the city, and were quietly informed that we did not anticipate any great difficulty. Another very noticeable proof of premeditated intent on the part of the insurgents was perceived in the excitement manifested by the natives and their removal in large numbers from the city. All avenues of exit were filled with vehicles transporting families and household effects to surrounding villages. The railway properties were taxed to their utmost capacity in carrying the fleeing inhabitants to the north within the protection of the established insurgent military lines. Aguinaldo, by written communications and messages, invited his old-time friends to send their families to Malolos, where their safety was assured, but Hongkong was considered a more secure retreat and was taken advantage of. A carefully prepared estimate showed that 40,000 of the inhabitants of the city departed within the period of fifteen days.

Early in the month I had cabled the authorities at Washington that open hostilities at Iloilo meant war throughout the islands, and that I had cautioned General Miller and the troops at Iloilo Harbor; and on the 9th instant I received a joint dispatch signed by the Secretaries of the Army and Navy and addressed to Admiral Dewey and myself, conveying the instructions and suggestions of the President, which were in part as follows:

Am most desirous that conflict be avoided. Your statement that a conflict at Iloilo or at any other southern ports means war in all the islands increases that desire. Such conflict would be most unfortunate considering the present, and might have results unfavorably affecting the future. Glad you did not permit Miller to bring on hostilities. Time given the insurgents can not injure us, and must weaken and discourage them. They will see our benevolent purposes and recognize that before we can give them good government our sovereignty must be conceded and unquestioned. Tact and kindness most essential at this time. * * * We accepted the Philippines from high duty in the interests of their inhabitants and for humanity and civilization. Our sacrifices were made with this humane motive. We desire to improve the condition of the inhabitants, seeking their peace, liberty, and pursuit of their highest good. * * * Will send commissioners if you think desirable to cooperate with you both in your delicate task. They can not leave here for two weeks or reach Manila for two months. * * * If possible to hasten repatriation of Spanish soldiers before the treaty is ratified it will be done. * * * Hope good counsel will prevail among the inhabitants and that you will find means to avoid bloodshed and restore tranquillity to that unhappy island. How is the health of Miller's command?

When this dispatch was shown Admiral Dewey he immediately remarked that he had recommended a commission, and desiring to be in accord with him I cabled as follows:

MANILA, P. I., *January 10, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington*:

Have conferred with Admiral Dewey. We think commissioners of tact and discretion could do excellent work here. Great difficulty is that leaders can not control ignorant classes. Health of Miller's command good.

I also cabled:

Our troops well in hand and confident that we can meet emergencies. Long conference last night and concessions asked, but insurgents have no definite idea of what they want. Further conference to be held. If peace kept for few days more immediate danger will have passed.

The injunctions of His Excellency the President of the United States to exert ourselves to preserve the peace had an excellent effect upon the command. Officers and men, confident of their ability to successfully meet the declared enemy, were restless under the restraints which had been imposed and were eager to avenge the insults received. Now they submit very quietly to the taunts and aggressive demonstrations of members of the insurgent army who continue to throng the streets of the business portions of the city.

Subsequent to January 5, and before the President's message had been received, I was approached by influential Filipino gentlemen (through an agent, an American citizen, they fearing that their individual safety would be endangered should they call in person) who expressed a strong desire for continued peace and an harmonious settlement of difficulties. They asked me to appoint a commission which could confer with one to be appointed by the Malolos government, with a view to working out a plan for the adjustment of the conflicting political interests of the parties concerned. Reply was made that the so-called Malolos government could not be officially recognized by word or act, but that I would gladly call a board of officers to confer with one which General Aguinaldo might appoint. The gentlemen made two or three hurried trips to Malolos, and on January 9 I received the following communication:

MALOLOS, *January 9, 1899.*

Maj. Gen. E. S. OTIS,
General of the American Forces of Occupation in Manila.

GENERAL: I have been informed after the interview between the commissioners of my government and Mr. Carman that there will be no inconvenience on your part in naming, as commanding general, representatives that will confer with those whom I will name for the same object.

Although it not being explained to me the reason why you could not treat with the commissioners of my government, I have the faculty for doing the same with those of the commanding general, "who can not be recognized." Nevertheless, for the sake of peace, I have considered it advisable to name, as "commanding general," a commission composed of the following gentlemen: Mr. Florentino Flores, Eufrasio Flores, and Manuel Arguelles, that they may together represent me and arrive at an accord with those whom you will name, with the object of using such methods as will normalize the actual situation created by the attitude of your Government and troops.

If you will deign to attend to said commissioners and through these methods come to some understanding, "if only temporary," that will insure the peace and harmony among ourselves, the Filipino public would reach a grateful glory.

I am, yours, General, with the highest consideration, your most respected servant.

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

Reply was at once made to Aguinaldo's peculiar letter, and was expressed in the following terms:

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.
Manila, P. I., January 9, 1899.

General EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding Revolutionary Forces, Malolos, P. I.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of to-day, and am much pleased at the action you have taken. I greatly regret that you have not a clear understanding of my position and motives, and trust that my explanation, assisted by the conference I have invited, will make them clear to you.

In my official capacity I am merely the agent of the United States Government to conduct its affairs under the limits which its constitution, laws, precedents, and specific instructions prescribe. I have not the authority to recognize any national or civil power not already formally recognized by my Government, unless specially authorized to do so by the instructions of the Executive of the United States. For this reason I was unable to receive officially the representatives of the revolutionary government, and endeavored to make that inability clear to the distinguished gentlemen with whom I had the pleasure to converse a few evenings since. You will bear witness that my course throughout my entire official connection with affairs here has been consistent, and it has pained me that I have not been able to receive and answer communications of the cabinet officers of the government at Malolos, fearing that I might be erroneously charged with lack of courtesy.

Permit me now briefly, General, to speak of the serious misunderstanding which exists between the Filipino people and the representatives of the United States Government, and which I hope that our commissioners, by a thorough discussion, may be able to dispel. I sincerely believe that all desire peace and harmony, and yet by the machinations of evil-disposed persons we have been influenced to think that we occupy the position of adversaries. The Filipinos appear to be of opinion that we meditate attack, while I am under the strict orders of the President of the United States to avoid conflict in every way possible. My troops, witnessing the earnestness, the comparatively disturbed and unfriendly attitude of the revolutionary troops, and many of the citizens of Manila, conclude that active hostilities have been determined upon, although it must be clearly within the comprehension of unprejudiced and reflecting minds that the welfare and happiness of the Filipino people depends upon the friendly protection of the United States. The hand of Spain was forced, and she has acknowledged before the whole world that all her claimed rights in this country have departed by due process of law. This treaty acknowledgment, with the conditions which accompany it, awaits ratification by the Senate of the United States; and the action of its Congress must also be secured before the Executive of that Government can proclaim a definite policy. That policy must conform to the will of the people of the United States expressed through its representatives in Congress. For that action the Filipino people should wait, at least, before severing the existing friendly relations. I am governed by a desire to further the interests of the Filipino people and shall continue to labor with that end in view. There shall be no conflict of forces if I am able to avoid it; and still I shall endeavor to maintain a position to meet all emergencies that may arise.

Permit me to subscribe myself, General, with the highest respect, your most obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

The following order calling a board was thereupon issued, and the president of the same was directed to arrange for a meeting with the commission appointed by Aguinaldo as soon as practicable:

SPECIAL ORDERS, No. 9. HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., January 9, 1899.

[Extract.]

8. Brig. Gen. R. P. Hughes, U. S. V., Col. James F. Smith, First California Volunteers, Lieut. Col. E. H. Crowder, judge advocate, U. S. Volunteers, are hereby appointed a commission to meet a commission of like number appointed by General Aguinaldo, and to confer with regard to the situation of affairs and to arrive at a mutual understanding of the intent, purposes, aim, and desires of the Filipino people and the people of the United States, that peace and harmonious relations between these respective peoples may be continued.

By command of Major-General Otis:

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

The representative boards engaged in joint conference on the evening of the day the order was issued, and had repeated and prolonged evening sessions, sometimes extending far into the night. Minutes of proceedings were kept and submitted, and the various extended arguments indulged in were duly reported to me after the adjournment of each special session. The board representing the insurgent interests could not give any satisfactory explanation of the qualified sovereignty, measure of protection, or specific autonomy which it thought should be vested in or enjoyed by the respective governments, nor present any practical plan for the solution of the vexed political problems which constantly arose in the progress of the discussion. It conceded the fact that the protection of the United States was essential to the integrity and welfare of the islands, but could not determine how that protection should be applied; certainly not to the extent of interference with internal affairs further than the collection of customs, possibly, from which source the United States might receive a compensation for the protection furnished. They begged for some tangible concessions from the United States Government—one which they could present to the people and which might serve to allay the excitement. Nothing could be accomplished without the sacrifice of some of the attributes of sovereignty, and certainly that could not be done by any existing authority.

Finally, the conferences became the object of insurgent suspicion, and of amusement to those who did not wish beneficial results. The newspapers announced that a peace commission was about to be sent from the United States, and it was observed that the volunteers were not being sent home as the newspapers announced had been ordered. What was the meaning of this commission when one was in session already and why were the regular regiments being dispatched from the United States? The United States authorities were merely endeavoring to gain time to place themselves in position to impose slavery on the Filipinos.

The members of the insurgent board inquired of our officers as to these matters. Upon the report of facts by General Hughes I informed him that I would address him an explanatory letter which he could present, if he chose, at the next and last conference, and accordingly sent him the following communication:

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., January 25, 1899.

Brigadier-General HUGHES,

Chairman of committee appointed to meet a committee appointed by General Aguinaldo to confer with regard to the situation of affairs and to arrive at a mutual understanding of the intent, purposes, aim, and desires of the Filipino people and the people of the United States.

SIR: I am informed that the Filipino people do not place confidence in our good intentions which they are seeking from this conference. The fact that the President has appointed a commission seems to have confirmed them in their impressions. It might be well, therefore, to give you a brief history of events having relation to these commissioners. They are as follows:

Early in December Admiral Dewey and myself received instructions from Washington to report the condition of affairs and offer suggestions. Upon December 7 Admiral Dewey telegraphed as follows:

"It is strongly urged that the President issue a proclamation defining the policy of the United States Government in the Philippine Islands and showing the inhabitants that it is our intention to interfere in the internal affairs of the Philippines as little as possible; that as they develop their capabilities of government their powers and privileges will be increased. That will allay the spirit of unrest. The Spanish soldiers should be expatriated as soon as possible; they are a source of discord and danger."

And the Admiral goes on to say that a force of several regiments raised from among the best insurgent troops and officered by the best of their leaders would do much to disarm opposition.

Upon this suggestion I think the proclamation was issued. Later Admiral Dewey cabled (I think sometime about the 1st of January, I am not aware of the date) that he thought the appointment of a commission by the President would be an excellent thing. On January 9 I was asked by the Washington authorities what I thought of the appointment of a commission to confer with the revolutionary authorities, and I replied that I thought it might do excellent work here. Before this date, early in January, I had been requested by prominent Filipinos to appoint a committee from my own command to meet a like committee to be appointed by General Aguinaldo. This was done on January 9, one day before receiving the Washington dispatch asking if I thought the appointment of a commission by the President would be advantageous. Hence, what might be styled the two commissions have no relationship whatever. The one of which you are president, sitting to ascertain the desires of the Filipinos and having no authority to grant concessions except by permission of the Washington authorities; the other commission, appointed from Washington, comes with full instructions from the President of the United States and empowered to act for him.

On January 16 I telegraphed to Washington as follows:

"Conditions improving; confidence of citizens returning; business active. Conference held Saturday; insurgents presented following statement, asking that it be cabled: 'Undersigned commissioners commander in chief of revolutionary army of these islands state to commissioners of General Otis that aspiration Filipino people is independence, with restrictions resulting from conditions which its government agree with American when latter agree to officially recognize the former.' No conclusion reached; another conference to-morrow evening. I understand insurgents wish qualified independence under United States protection."

To this dispatch no reply has been received.

Upon another matter, viz, the sending of regular troops here, the purpose of which has been greatly misunderstood, you may communicate the following dispatch, received on December 7:

"General Otis, *Manila:*

"The Secretary of War directs you to send Astor Battery home on first returning transport. If you can spare volunteers to take first returning ships, send them in the order of their arrival. Six regular regiments are in course of preparation to report to you. It is probable that part of them will sail direct from this coast by way of canal—thus to give you good transports available for service from San Francisco."

The meaning and intent of this dispatch was to return the volunteer troops as soon as possible and to send part back by the transports then in the harbor, if practicable. The Astor Battery was sent home, but I declined to send other volunteer troops at that time, as the revolutionary government had assumed a threatening attitude, notwithstanding our great desire for peace and harmony. The orders from Washington have not changed. I still have authority to return the volunteer troops, so that they can be discharged in the United States, by any returning vessels available, but I decline to return them as long as we are threatened with active hostilities. Under the articles of capitulation still prevailing with Spain, as there has been no ratification as yet of a treaty, I am obliged to hold Manila and its defenses, but no hostile act will be inaugurated by the United States troops.

Very sincerely yours,

E. S. Otis,
Major-General, U. S. V., United States Military Governor.

The commissioners held their final joint conference, I think, on January 25. With the insurgent representatives it was one continued plea for some concession which would satisfy the people. One of them was a man of excellent legal ability, who had occupied an important judicial position at Cebu under the Spanish Government for a number of years. He had recently arrived in Manila, and on the invitation of Aguinaldo had visited Malolos. He was animated with a desire to restore harmonious relations, or at least to effect a temporary peace until the existing excitement could be allayed, when the people might listen to reason. He secured the appointment of Aguinaldo's board and was named thereon as the most important member, but he was so circumscribed by specific instructions that he could not accomplish anything. I charged him with playing a false part, basing the charge on a knowledge of his legal acquirements. He confessed that he was fully aware of the untenable position he occupied, and was powerless under

the circumstances. He was an adept at legal fiction and could discover pregnants both negative and positive in every international postulate. The appointment of the President's commission had caused so much speculation, both as to membership and object, that I desired to correct mistaken impressions and to take away further opportunity for deliberate falsehood, and knowing that this gentleman still held friendly relations with the Malolos authorities and desired to know the truth in the matter, I sent him the following unofficial letter:

MANILA, P. I., *February 3, 1899.*

Hon. FLORENTINE TORRES, *Manila, P. I.*

MY DEAR SIR: I am in receipt of a Washington dispatch dated the 1st instant, which informs me that the gentlemen who expect to serve on the proposed commission on the part of the United States will reach Hongkong on the 21st of the month. They will probably arrive here about the 25th.

So many inaccuracies have been spread abroad concerning the identity of the gentlemen of the commission that I desire to make explanation. They are Messrs. Denby, Schurman, and Worcester. Respecting the first, he is doubtless well known as the late United States minister to China; the second is the president of Cornell University, one of the leading institutions of learning of the United States; the third is Professor Worcester, of the University of Michigan, also one of our leading educators and who has a personal acquaintance with the Philippines, he having spent some time here. He is a friend of Dr. Bourns, of our health board, who formerly made a tour of the Philippine Islands in the interest of science.

I am sure the reputation of these gentlemen will commend them to the Filipino people as men of probity, ability, and most humane sentiments, having at heart the interest of that people. Admiral Dewey and myself have also been placed on this commission—the Government following the policy pursued with reference to Cuba and Porto Rico. My own inclinations and desire are not to serve thereon, being simply a soldier, but I must obey the commands of my Government.

It is quite important that friendly relations be maintained in every way among all of us, and I am doing my utmost to that end. A great deal of friction has been caused by the action of troops, resulting, I am certain, from a misunderstanding of conditions. Our soldiers are frequently insulted and threatened within our own lines, but thus far have quietly submitted, obeying their instructions. If, however, these threatening demonstrations should proceed so far as to endanger life, I might not be able to hold them in check. I trust that the revolutionary authorities will exercise every endeavor to put a stop to demonstrations similar to those witnessed during the past two days.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS.

A few days before the above letter was written and on January 26, I was surprised by the receipt of a letter from Aguinaldo because of the boldness with which he therein indicated his purpose to continue his assumptions and establish their correctness by the arbitrament of war. I cabled it in cipher to Washington in accordance with his request, as it contained such suggestive announcements of the course of conduct he was likely to pursue. The cablegram and my reply to the communication are as follows:

MANILA, P. I., *January 27, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington:*

The following received:

"PHILIPPINE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT,
"*Office of Secretary of Foreign Affairs.*

"Maj. Gen. E. S. OTIS,
"*Commander in Chief of the American Forces of Occupation in Manila:*

"My government has promulgated the political constitution of the Philippine Republic, which is to-day enthusiastically proclaimed by the people, because of its conviction that its duty is to interpret faithfully the aspirations of that people—a people making superhuman efforts to revindicate their sovereignty and their nationality before the civilized powers.

"To this end, of the governments to-day recognized and observed among cultured nations they have adopted the form of government most compatible with their aspirations, endeavoring to adjust their actions to the dictates of reason and of right, in order to demonstrate their aptitude for civil life.

"And, taking the liberty to notify your excellency, I confidently hope that, doing justice to the Philippine people, you will be pleased to inform the Government of your nation that the desire of mine, upon being accorded official recognition, is to contribute to the best of its scanty ability to the establishment of a general peace.

"May God keep your excellency many years.

"EMILIO AGUINALDO.

[Seal of the revolutionary government of the Philippines.]

"A. MABINI.

"MALOLOS, *January 23, 1899.*"

OTIS.

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
MANILA, P. I., *January 27, 1899.*

Gen. EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding Philippine Revolutionary Forces, Malolos, P. I.

GENERAL: I have the honor to inform you that I received yesterday a communication dated the 23d instant, signed by you and purporting to be issued from the office of the secretary of foreign affairs of the "Philippine national government."

I am pleased to further inform you that a translation of that communication into the English language, as shown in the accompanying paper, has been cabled in full to the United States authorities at Washington.

I am, General, with great respect, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

In the meantime General Miller's command was retained in the harbor of Iloilo. It continued to be greatly dissatisfied because it was not allowed to seize the city. The Fifty first Iowa Volunteers had remained on its transport since leaving San Francisco, a period of more than seventy days. It was very necessary to disembark it for sanitary reasons, and any attempt to do so on the Panay coast or the adjacent small islands would have resulted in conflict with natives. It was directed to return to this harbor, where upon arrival it was placed at Cavite, relieving the Tennessee regiment, which was brought to this city. On January 20 General Miller wrote that it would be his aim "to maintain the existing conditions of friendly relations with these people," and continued:

The people here will follow the conditions in Luzon and will permit our military occupation of Iloilo as soon as ordered from the central government. Outwardly the best terms of friendship exist personally between us. I have informed them verbally that they could go on with their usual occupations, afloat and ashore, without interference from us; that seizures we made were necessities merely to enable us to get along from day to day and that nothing would be taken otherwise. They are satisfied apparently, believe me most implicitly, and everything is pleasant.

There were two or three matters outside of the enforced policy of nonmilitary action which greatly troubled General Miller. He had gone from Manila prepared to establish civil government and had with him his officers of the port and of customs. The merchant vessels entering and leaving Iloilo with subsistence and merchandise and plying their trade between that point, Manila, Singapore, and the Chinese coast, paying duty to the Iloilo insurgents in defiance of protest, became objects of suspicion, and their transaction enabled the avowed enemy to obtain food and reap revenue much to the detriment of our interests. The Spanish native military organizations which had been performing service in the south continued to be brought to Manila in spite of our repeated objections, on the plea that Spain could do nothing else with them, and it was difficult to see how she could. Those of them who were native of the central islands were sent to Panay, and those having former homes in Luzon were scattered

there, although we entertained the belief that they would be gathered to attack us.

To General Miller's complaint concerning the transactions of merchants and his request to be permitted to close the Iloilo port, or compel all traders to pay accustomed duties to his proper officers, he was instructed in communications of January 16 and 21 as follows:

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., January 16, 1899.

The COMMANDING GENERAL,
First Separate Brigade, Eighth Army Corps,
Iloilo, Island of Panay.

SIR: Replying to the letter of Captain Evans of January 13, forwarded by you on same date, I am directed to state that the case is well put by Captain Evans under the President's recent proclamation, except the President directs in that proclamation that all the ports in the actual possession of the land and naval forces of the United States will be open to the commerce of the world. The port of Iloilo is not in the actual possession of the United States forces, as they merely occupy the harbor.

The objections which present themselves to the course recommended by Captain Evans are:

1. Until the ratification of the treaty of peace the United States has not the legal right to occupy the port of Iloilo, except by the consent of Spain. Spanish authority over the southern islands of the Philippines remains intact until the treaty is ratified. If, however, Spain had turned over the port of Iloilo to the United States, then the question of legal right as between the United States and Spain would have been settled and the United States would then have succeeded to the rights of Spain in so far as the collection of duties is concerned. Spain did not turn it over to the United States authorities. Her action, viewed in the mildest light, was that of simple abandonment, for which she is responsible. As far as the United States are concerned, Spain, under a strict interpretation of international law, has still the right to enter that port and collect duties until that right is terminated by treaty ratification.

2. The closing of the port and the collection of duties on merchandise taken from the island would be an acknowledgment on our part that the self-constituted authorities at Iloilo stand in the position of belligerents or enemies of the United States, which position we do not recognize. They are Spanish subjects really until the ratification of the treaty recognized as a friendly community with whom we are at peace.

3. Should foreign vessels accept clearance papers from the Iloilo captain of the port, it would be difficult to understand the position in which they would place themselves. Undoubtedly such action would give rise to grave questions, possibly involving international complication; and should they seek to clear through your authorities after having acknowledged the insurgents at Iloilo by paying duties to them, then they would recognize either Spanish or insurgent authority at Iloilo and that of the United States in the harbor.

They probably would do everything that both the insurgent and United States authorities would demand of them and make under protest any payment which might be demanded. Conditions are so complicated that these headquarters do not feel at liberty to give positive instructions for your guidance, and they will be sought from Washington, which as soon as received will be transmitted to you.

In the meantime you will not make any demands on the merchants nor interfere by any overt act of force with the commerce of the port. It might be well to assert United States right to conduct the commerce of the port, but you can state that you have represented the case to the proper authorities and are waiting instructions. Any forcible act of detention or seizure might produce most unsatisfactory results.

I inclose your prepared communication intended for the British vice-consul. It is unobjectionable and should be sent to him.

Since writing the above I understand from Captain Montgomery, of the British navy, who has just returned from Iloilo, that he discussed all these matters with the Iloilo merchants, endeavoring to come to some arrangement which would be satisfactory to the United States. He reports that he advised the merchants and the English consul to give a promise in writing to pay duties in the future upon all goods now taken out to whomsoever they might be due after affairs had become adjusted.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., January 21, 1899.

The COMMANDING GENERAL,
First Separate Brigade, Eighth Army Corps, Iloilo, Panay.

SIR: I am directed to inform you that there will be sent out to-day by steamer *St. Paul* to Iloilo a number of discharged native-Spanish troops, to wit, to the number of about 600. These discharged soldiers live in the southern islands, and it is thought that they will give less trouble if landed at Iloilo than if landed at other points. You will therefore please receive them at Iloilo or in the vicinity. The vessel transporting them, with its guard—a company of the First Tennessee Volunteers—will be directed by you to return immediately to this port.

In regard to the collection of duties on merchandise at Iloilo, you were informed that your suggestions on that subject, received through Colonel Potter, would be submitted to Washington for decision. They were so submitted, and the following cablegram has been received in response:

"WASHINGTON, *January 19.*

"OTIS, *Manila:*

"The President desires no forcible measures to be used for the present in collecting customs duties at Iloilo.

"CORBIN."

You will therefore be guided by these instructions, which are in line with those sent you from these headquarters. Matters here remain in a very excited condition, and conflict with the insurgent troops is avoided only by the skillful supervision of officers. Please report the condition of affairs at Iloilo.

Very respectfully, yours,

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Still General Miller was greatly dissatisfied with his surroundings. He could not perform military service, nor could he conduct business affairs. He was kept watching and waiting under very unpleasant circumstances, which grew more irksome every passing day. On February 3, the day previous to the opening of actual hostilities at Manila, he wrote:

HDQRS. FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT,
Iloilo Harbor, P. I., February 3, 1899.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Department of the Pacific, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to report the military situation here unchanged. The insurgents are reported to be placing another gun in position. This is outside and near the entrance to the fort, bearing on our ships.

The insurgents in town are to-day having a little trouble. Two companies in the main barracks demanded some pay and better food, and threatened to take up their arms and go back into the country if they were not paid. The row is not yet settled. Some $15,000—export and import duty—have been received in the collector's office, and I presume the troops want a part of that.

Reports from the southern islands, Negros and Cebu, are to the effect that those people realize that they can not succeed with an independent government and want us to take possession.

I still feel that this place—Iloilo—ought to be captured. Such a step would deprive the insurgents of large receipts from customs, cripple their means to pay the soldiers, and arouse the people favorable to us in the southern islands to express more freely their true sentiments. I am well satisfied that a great proportion of the inhabitants of Panay, Negros, and Cebu are favorable to our occupation at once.

A large proportion of the supplies for the Iloilo people come from the American steamers from Manila, a trade which is carried on through the collector of the port of Manila with the insurgents at Iloilo. Is there no way to stop this trade? Cutting off supplies in this way will help to bring these people to terms. I can't understand how such a business can be carried on against the best good of our country.

Very respectfully,

M. P. MILLER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

During this period rapidly succeeding significant events were fast approaching a state of war and strongly indicated the fixed determination of the insurgent government to drive the United States from

Luzon as soon as it could gather its armed men in sufficient numbers. It had appropriated the railway, every engine, and most of its rolling stock. It was perfecting its intrenchments around us, planting its guns, concentrating its troops, and bringing up its army supplies, though still publicly asserting its desire for peace. With the cunning which it had always attempted to practice in its amateur diplomacy it endeavored to force the United States to commit the first physical act of hostility in the way of musketry fire, in order to appeal to the sympathies of the foreign public for a seemingly oppressed people, which it falsely claimed to represent. In this it signally failed. The knifing and attempted shooting of our picket sentries brought no hostile response, except the killing, by the intended victim, of the assassin who had so dexterously used the knife upon him. The excitement within the city was very noticeable, and the cruelty of the "Americano" was the theme. No one seemed to be possessed of any fixed determination but the Tagalo. All others were watching for new demonstrations and waiting for developments. Manila is unparalleled for diversity of race and babel of tongues; also for its grade of enlightenment from barbaric ignorance to the highest civilized stage. Rumors innumerable and of the most varied character filled the atmosphere. To-day attack was imminent, and to-morrow friendly councils were about to prevail. One fairly well acquainted with the scheming in progress and the trend of events could not reach any satisfactory conclusions on the probabilities of war, and to one unacquainted therewith sane conclusions were impossible. I endeavored to inform Admiral Dewey of the actual situation from day to day, and a few extracts from hastily dictated letters of that time will show how hard it was to formulate opinion. These brief extracts are also an index to swiftly recurring events. The following are furnished:

MANILA, P. I., *January 16, 1899.*

I have been too busy to write, but had there been anything special to communicate should have done so. The city is now very quiet and people are again appearing on the streets, seemingly confident that no immediate disturbances are likely to ensue. * * *

Our conferences with General Aguinaldo's commissioners are still in progress. The commissioners had a long session on Saturday evening and meet again to-morrow evening. The conferences seem to have quieted the atmosphere very much. The Malolos congress on Saturday, I understand, disposed of some radical questions by vote. Indications are that the United States Government received favorable consideration. I do not look for anything to develop in the next few days, but we are obliged to keep up constant vigilance.

JANUARY 19, 1899.

* * * Everything remains quiet in the city. It is rumored this morning that insurgents say we are only trying to prolong our conference until we can receive more troops, and that the commission appointed, or to be appointed, by the President is only another ruse to gain time. Their army seems to be more or less excited and is considering the matter whether it would not be policy to destroy us all at once, before we can get any more soldiers. All this may be called street rumor, but it is very actively circulated. The insurgent army is becoming very tired of doing nothing and demands blood. Business is being transacted as usual; a good many people on the streets and quite a number returning again to town.

JANUARY 21, 1899.

I was very sorry when I learned yesterday that you had withdrawn the *Monterey* and *Concord*. I said last night that there was no immediate prospect of trouble. By that expression I meant that there would be no outbreak for a day or two. From my information this morning I am convinced that the insurgents intend to try their hand in a very short time—how soon I can not tell. They will not now permit us to cross their lines and have been very insulting to our officers, calling to them that very shortly that they would give us battle. My best information is that they have fully determined to attack both outside and within the city before our additional

troops arrive, and the least spark may start a conflagration. Your war vessels placed as formerly will not incite them to an attack, but will add to their fears of success in case they begin it. They are no longer amenable to reason; the lower elements have gained control and their congress is powerless to manage them. The best Filipinos in the city say that they are going to attack the city, and that they will do it very soon, entertaining the insane idea that they can drive us out. Should they attack, the fight will be over before your vessels can reach the points where they were formerly placed.

I am sending out to-day to Iloilo a transport with 666 discharged native Spanish soldiers who live in the southern islands, and am trying to get rid of about 1,500 of these native troops whose homes are in Luzon. They are all insurgents now and give us trouble in the city.

JANUARY 23, 1899.

* * * No exciting developments this morning. Another conference was held yesterday between Aguinaldo's and our representatives, resulting in very little. It was adjourned until next Wednesday. Aguinaldo is insisting upon the recognition of independence and the return of the *Abbie* and the launches. I understand that the Malolos congress passed the proposed constitution with the clause inserted which Mabini insisted on, viz, "Placing the power in the hands of Aguinaldo to declare war."

The city is very quiet. Yesterday we got rid of 276 of the discharged Spanish-native troops, sending them down the bay. We have still remaining 315 of the Macabebes who are afraid to go out of Manila, and about 300 other natives who want to stay here.

I had a long talk with General Rios yesterday. He says that there are 24 officers, with servants, on his vessel, and considerable money, which he would like to have remain there, and 71 passengers, besides the soldiers and crew; that the officers belong to organizations which have been disbanded, and that they came here with their families and property with the intention of going back to Spain by first available transport at their own expense, and he does not want the soldiers or troops to land. I have directed the captain of the port to land the officers and passengers and to keep the vessel in the harbor. * * * Nothing this morning from Washington. The dispatch of yesterday directed me to make strenuous efforts to have insurgents release Spanish prisoners whom they hold. I replied that my influence was not great at present, and that I had made such an effort to release the Spanish priests that I was now accused of being in partnership with the archbishop.

JANUARY 24, 1899.

Things look a little ominous to-day. You have undoubtedly seen in the papers an account of yesterday's affairs at Malolos, viz: The proclaiming of the constitution, the proclaiming of Aguinaldo as president, captain-general, and everything else, and the speech delivered by Paterno, in which he announced that they would drive the invader from the soil. Everything points to their determination to attack us, if they can persuade themselves that they can do so successfully, before the regular regiments arrive. This is confirmed in a great many ways and I am sure it is the policy on which they are at present proceeding. They may succeed in burning a portion of the town, but little else, I imagine.

JANUARY 25, 1899.

I am in receipt of your letter of this morning. I do not consider that the war is over for the present. The insurgents would attack at once if they could be convinced that their efforts would meet with success. The leading Filipinos of the city are afraid to come near me and are in a very excited condition. They know the dangers of an outbreak at any moment, and we are holding all troops well in hand constantly. The business men of all nationalities are intently watching developments. The revolutionary government seems to be in the ascendancy, and our former Filipino friends who favored annexation a short time ago are, for personal safety, giving a sort of adherence to the Malolos government. All this I fully know, and a great deal more which I can tell you first opportunity, but which it would not be prudent to write.

The Cavite Filipinos went out to join the insurgent ranks during the inspection and review in that zone by their secretary of war—at least so I think—and they can quickly go back to the ranks at any time they may be called upon to do so.

FEBRUARY 3, 1899.

One of the * * * launches arrived yesterday, cleared from Hongkong; she is one of the three of which * * * wrote, and concerning which I reported that from information received here that I was quite certain was about to bring arms. Upon arrival here her cargo tallied with her manifest and she was apparently all right. * * *

The officer in charge explained that she was about two days late in arriving, owing to bad weather, which compelled her to lie off the coast. These two days gave her time to run to the coast and discharge. * * *

Yesterday afternoon General MacArthur, whose troops north of the Pasig have experienced trouble with the insurgents who have passed over his lines, sent Major Strong, his adjutant-general, out to the officer in command to demand an explanation. Strong, on passing our lines, was placed under a strong insurgent guard and taken to Mandaloyan, a point on the Pasig across the San Juan River. There he found the officer in charge and quite a considerable insurgent force taking from several boxes a quantity of new revolvers and Mauser rifles which had just been received. Spanish prisoners were there (the Spanish prisoners whom the insurgents hold) putting the parts of the rifles together and making them ready for distribution. * * *

There has been a great deal of friction along the lines the past two days, and we will be unable to tamely submit to the insulting conduct and threatening demonstrations of these insurgents much longer. I am informed, however, that the chief men of the insurgent government desire to avoid any conflict at present; possibly for the reason that they are expecting to receive arms very soon, possibly because they fear they may not be successful at the present time, and possibly because they may have a belief that they can secure what they desire without conflict. They are constantly asking me to make concessions, that they may be able to control their troops. They have seized a number of our men, and some, I think, inside our lines. Yesterday I sent Lieutenant Haan, of the Engineer Corps, to Malolos to secure the release of the men; he did not return last evening, but telegraphed me from Malolos that he would explain his delay on his return, which he intimated would be to-day.

The city is quiet, though there is a vast amount of underlying excitement. We are constantly losing our employees. Yesterday seven of our men at our Malacanan quarters left us suddenly to join the insurgents, so we are now very shorthanded. They stole and took with them whatever they could find of value, one of them driving out of the lines Colonel Barry's carriage, which we consider lost property.

Notwithstanding these ominous signs, unremitting exertions were continually being made for a satisfactory solution of affairs. On the 11th of January I had sent my adjutant-general, Colonel Barry, to Malolos, directing him to bear a written message to Aguinaldo, procure a personal interview with him if possible, acquaint him fully with the efforts we were making to preserve the peace, and impress upon him the necessity for more conservative action on the part of his troops. At this time a visit by an officer at the insurgent capital was not considered an agreeable pastime, as he was liable to receive gross insults. Colonel Barry, however, met with little difficulty, presented himself at Aguinaldo's headquarters, and requested of his secretary permission to pay his respects in person, stating that he was the bearer of an important communication concerning which General Otis desired him to confer with the general. Aguinaldo's secretary received the letter, stating that he would present it and make known General Otis's request. Soon after he returned, conveying General Aguinaldo's regrets that press of business did not permit him to accord the personal interview requested, and the colonel was referred to President Mabini, of the cabinet. Mabini received him graciously, and quite a lengthy interview followed. Mabini assured him, in substance, that the insurgent government had exerted itself to maintain friendly relations with the Americans; had thus far succeeded; that it would continue to make exertion to this end, but that it could not control its people beyond a certain point, as they were greatly excited; that his government would do all in its power to effect an amicable adjustment of pending difficulties. The communication which Colonel Barry presented was the one of January 9, in response to Aguinaldo's letter of that date, in which he announced the appointment of the insurgent commission and which appears on a former page.

I will now quote from my report to the Adjutant-General of the Army of April 6, in which I submitted a statement of the services of our

troops during February, and endeavored to present succinctly the more important actions with resulting causes from which war ensued:

During the latter part of January the insurgents along their established lines and within the city exhibited increased aggressiveness, assuming a defiant attitude, so much so that our troops were gathered well in hand to meet any demonstrations which might be attempted. Insurgent armed parties entered far within our lines and defied our troops to resist their approaches. To arrest these proceedings, our officers, and citizens of Manila connected with the insurgent government, were sent to insurgent general officers at various places along their lines to request that they keep their men in check, which the latter invariably promised to do, paying, however, little heed to their promises. On February 1 a small detachment belonging to our engineer company was arrested within our territory and sent to Malolos. This act brought on the following correspondence:

"HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
"*Manila, P. I., February 2, 1899.*

"General EMILIO AGUINALDO,
"*Commanding Filipino Revolutionary Forces, Malolos.*

"GENERAL: I have the honor to inform you that a small party of engineers, consisting of a sergeant and four privates, who are engaged in making surveys for the completion of the map of Manila, which the Engineer Corps is now busy in perfecting, has been missing for two or three days and is reported to be confined in Malolos. The detachment was sent out to do work within the city, with directions to confine itself to the city and suburban lines. Why they were arrested I do not understand, nor can I imagine for what reason they are held at Malolos. I am also informed that a citizen connected with Harper's Weekly, newspaper, of New York, engaged in taking views for that paper, has also been arrested and held as a prisoner. I know nothing of this except from report, nor do I know who the man is. I am also informed that a private soldier who went beyond the lines without authority, and for what motive I do not know, is also held as a prisoner.

"I send my staff officer, Lieutenant Haan, of the Engineer Corps, to make inquiries and request your action in this matter.

"I am doing everything possible to preserve the peace and avoid all friction until the Filipino people can be made fully acquainted with the sentiments and intentions of the American Government, when I am confident they will appreciate the endeavors of the United States and will again look upon that country as their friend and protector. I also fully believe that the present unrest is the result of the machinations of evil-disposed persons.

"I am, General, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

"E. S. OTIS,
"*Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.*"

"MALOLOS, *February 4, 1899.*

"Major-General OTIS,
"*Chief of the Forces of Occupation of Manila and Cavite.*

"GENERAL: In reply to your letter of February 2, I have the honor to state that the sergeant and four American soldiers of the Engineer Corps, to-day liberated, were detained within our territory, beyond our advanced lines on Solis street, examining our intrenchments and defenses at a distance of less than 200 meters.

"The said individuals carried a revolver, knives, a compass, plans of Manila and its suburbs, a book with topographical notes, a measuring tape, a machete, two penknives, scales, etc.

"I deeply regret that these soldiers have been taken within our lines, according to the testimony of our officers' witnesses of our detention, inasmuch as there exists a decree, dated October 20, which prohibits all foreigners from approaching our defensive works, taking photographic views of the same, drawing plans, or entering our territory with arms, although free transit is permitted all who are unarmed.

"The correspondent of Harper's Weekly was arrested in San Juan del Monte taking photographic views, and the proof of this is that in care of Colonel Miguel he has been sent his camera and his horse.

"I must state that in consideration of the friendship of the Filipino people for the Americans the said soldiers have not been imprisoned, but detained in accordance with the spirit of the decree of October 20 last. They have been lodged in the Gobierno Militar and have been issued the daily rations of our officers. If they have been uncomfortable it is due to the excessive sobriety of our race and soldiers, who are accustomed to eat but little and sleep on the hard ground.

"With these explanations I believe, General, you will understand the motive for the detention of your soldiers to-day liberated and who have been treated with all due consideration.

"I therefore hope that your determination may be another motive on which to base our friendly relations with the great American Republic, and in consideration of this I also decree the liberty of the correspondent referred to.

"I am, General, as ever, your obedient servant,

"EMILIO AGUINALDO."

It will be observed that the insurgent government insisted that this engineer party was arrested outside of our small field of operations, which I am confident was not the fact, but the correspondence is given to show the efforts of the American authorities to sustain the peace. During all this time our officers and men were insulted and openly proclaimed to be cowards; our outposts were attacked at night, and the impression became general that the insurgents, notwithstanding our efforts, would indulge soon in open attack, in the belief apparently entertained by them that they would meet with feeble resistance. During the entire month of January they had labored incessantly to strongly intrench their lines and place their artillery in position, and boasted freely of their intentions to soon drive the American forces out of Manila. On the night of February 2 they sent in a strong detachment to draw the fire of our outposts, which took up a position immediately in front and within a few yards of the same. The outpost was strengthened by a few of our men, who silently bore their taunts and abuse the entire night. This was reported to me by General MacArthur, whom I directed to communicate with the officer in command of the insurgent troops concerned. His prepared letter was shown me and approved, and the reply received (both papers found in General MacArthur's accompanying report) was all that could be desired. However, the agreement was ignored by the insurgents, and on the evening of February 4 another demonstration was made on one of our small outposts, which occupied a retired position at least 150 yards within the line which had been mutually agreed upon—an insurgent approaching the picket and refusing to halt or answer when challenged. The result was that our picket discharged his piece, when the insurgent troops near Santa Mesa opened a spirited fire on our troops there stationed.

The insurgent had thus succeeded in drawing the fire of a small outpost, which they had evidently labored with all their ingenuity to accomplish, in order to justify in some way their premeditated attack. It is not believed that the chief insurgent leaders wished to open hostilities at this time, as they were not completely prepared to assume the initiative. They desired two or three days more to perfect their arrangements, but the zeal of their army brought on the crisis which anticipated their premeditated action. They could not have delayed long, however, for it was their object to force an issue before American troops, then en route, could arrive in Manila.

We now take up for review the more important affairs of the second period of the year which this directed report must present—the period extending from February 4, 1899, to the present date.

The returns of the United States troops rendered on January 31 gave a numerical strength present in the Philippines of 819 commissioned officers and 20,032 enlisted men. Of these, 77 officers and 2,338 enlisted men were absent in Cavite and at Iloilo Harbor. These numbers included all officers and enlisted men belonging to the line or attached to staff corps, a good many of whom had been detached for

service in the various branches of civil administration which had been inaugurated or reestablished. On February 2 I cabled to Washington that the deaths in all organizations since their arrival in the islands numbered 220, of which 41 were due to the casualties of battle and accident, that 64 had been caused by typhoid fever, 43 by smallpox, 22 by dysentery, 8 by malarial fevers, and the others were due to various diseases; that the prevalence of smallpox caused apprehension, but that the entire command had been vaccinated several times, and 12 physicians, mostly resident, had been engaged several weeks in vaccinating natives; that 9 per cent of the command was then reported sick, but that the great majority of all ailments were slight in character. Subtracting from the entire numerical strength of all troops present in the islands, those at Cavite and Iloilo, the sick, those serving in the civil departments, and those belonging strictly to and doing duty in the staff organizations, the effective men of the line, officers and soldiers, were about 14,000. Of these, 3,000 belonged to the provost guard and were expected to check the demonstrations of the natives and preserve order within Manila. The troops were occupying a great many buildings located in the various parts of the city, and it was the declared intention of the secret hostile organizations in our midst to burn them as soon as our troops should be called to the lines of defense determined upon in order to resist the insurgent attack from without, as well as to destroy by fire the more important business sections. For this purpose they had provided themselves with a considerable quantity of kerosene oil, some of which had previously been seized or confiscated. It was necessary, therefore, to detail an efficient permanent guard to protect each barrack building, which was made up partially of special duty men. And it might be remarked here that a curious feature of the insurgent plan of making war, which its soldiers invariably practiced for two months after active hostilities commenced, was to burn property indiscriminately, following Russia's example during Napoleon's advance on Moscow, of which they had heard, or Spain's practice in the islands when the natives were considered to deserve chastisement.

After estimating the necessities for the proper protection of the city, it was ascertained that we had about 10,000 men available with whom to meet Aguinaldo's concentrated army, variously estimated at from twenty to thirty thousand, but we had the interior of the circumscribed half circle which was occupied by his troops—his flanks resting on Manila Bay north and south of the city and about 5 miles distant from each other, and his center about 4 miles east of the walled town, cut by the Pasig River. The river was not fordable and there were no means of crossing it, except by small boats, hence insurgent troops of one wing could not give support to the other in order to meet any emergency of battle which might arise. We therefore had no fear for results in so far as the efforts of the encircling force were concerned. To a Washington dispatch of inquiry received about February 1, I replied that in case hostilities were forced upon us we could handle Aguinaldo's army, and only feared the burning of the city by the unfriendly partially organized portion of the inhabitants.

Several weeks previous to this date we had moved the Nebraska regiment from its barracks in the thickly-settled Binondo district to the high, unoccupied ground at Santa Mesa, the most eastern suburb of the city, where it was placed in camp. This change was made for sanitary reasons solely, as the regiment had been suffering from a very high rate of sickness caused by unhealthy locality. The new location

was within the view and the range of the Mauser rifles of the insurgents along the San Juan River portion of their line. During the latter part of January I was informed by good Filipino authority that the insurgents meditated an attack on these troops and was advised to remove them or, in their exposed place, the insurgents would kill them all. General MacArthur, who commanded north of the Pasig, warned Colonel Stotsenburg, who commanded that regiment and camp, and placed 2 guns of the Utah Artillery in position a short distance removed therefrom. It was expected that insurgents would make the initiative at this point and they acted strictly in accordance with our anticipations.

General Aguinaldo was now at the zenith of his power. He had recently repressed rebellion which had raised its head in central Luzon. He had assembled a pliant congress, many members of which had been appointed by him to represent far distant congressional districts, and which had voted him the dictator of the lives and fortunes of all the inhabitants of the Philippines. He dominated Manila, and when he ordered that the birthday of the martyred Rizal should be appropriately observed there, business was paralyzed and not a native dared to pursue his accustomed daily labors. Not a province had the courage to oppose his appointed governors, backed by their Tagalo guards, although a few of those governors had previously suffered martyrdom for the zeal exhibited in collecting money and sequestering private property. The southern islands were obedient. The appointed governor for one, and that one not eager for independence, wrote in January:

To the Honorable President of the Revolutionary Government of the Philippines

HONORABLE SIR: This government has received the respected communication from the presidency under your command, ordering that under no pretext whatever are American or other foreign troops to be permitted to land on this island, which order it will be my pleasant duty to comply with as far as the scanty forces under my command will permit. I have, under to-day's date, ordered the officials under my command in charge of the towns of this province to follow the same instructions, under pain of the most severe penalties.

I have the honor to reply as above to the communication before cited.

God guard you for many years for our liberty and independence.

He was hailed from Europe as the savior of his country and as first of "the generous and noble Tagalo people," and was assured of "the sympathy of all liberal and noble nations." He was called upon to take a prominent part in United States politics, and those extending the invitation said:

President AGUINALDO.

DEAR SIR: In the interest and welfare of the Filipino Republic, I take the liberty to write you regarding an educational work to be published in this country representing the views of the antiexpansion party, or the people who wish to see a free and independent Philippine republic.

The object of this work is to increase public sentiment against annexation of the Philippines. Therefore, believing that some facts from the pen of your honor would strengthen the cause, I am authorized to ask certain questions.

First. Will you kindly state the per cent of those who wish annexation to the United States, if such there be?

Second. Will the natives take constant interest in political affairs under self-government?

Third. Are they upon recognition ready to drop their arms and enter upon an enterprising industrial life?

After answering these questions, a short article regarding the Philippine feeling toward this country and their wished-for independence will be appreciated, and I am confident will very materially strengthen this cause in the election to decide the policy of our country.

Hoping your sincere love for your people will insure an immediate reply, I remain,

Very respectfully,

He was confident that the great majority of the people of the United States justified him in his rebellion, and as for its soldiers whom he had shut up in Manila, many sympathized with his people in their struggle for independence and would not fight him. To an unbeliever in this last conviction he said, "Go to the lines at Santa Ana and be convinced," and the man went and pretended to believe. The encouragements and friendly advice he received from foreign parts through newspapers and communications from admirers, absent delegates, and representatives assured him of an easy solution of the war problem before him if he could strike while only a few volunteers confronted him and before the regulars then en route could arrive. He therefore confidently concentrated his well armed and ammunitioned forces to man the holes his troops had been weeks in digging and where they would be secure from attack in any event, even if success did not attend his efforts to slaughter the Americans or drive them into the waters of the bay. These preparations consummated, he prepared the outlines of his declaration of war, the full text of which was published at Malolos on the evening and very shortly after his hostile shots were first responded to by our troops, and without considering cause or intent. The longed-for opportunity had arrived and he hastened to embrace it. The declaration was circulated in Manila the next morning, and read as follows:

GENERAL ORDER TO THE PHILIPPINE ARMY.

Nine o'clock p. m., this date, I received from Caloocan station a message communicated to me that the American forces, without prior notification or any just motive, attacked our camp at San Juan del Monte and our forces garrisoning the blockhouses around the outskirts of Manila, causing losses among our soldiers, who in view of this unexpected aggression and of the decided attack of the aggressors, were obliged to defend themselves until the firing became general all along the line.

No one can deplore more than I this rupture of hostilities. I have a clear conscience that I have endeavored to avoid it at all costs, using all my efforts to preserve friendship with the army of occupation, even at the cost of not a few humiliations and many sacrificed rights.

But it is my unavoidable duty to maintain the integrity of the national honor and that of the army so unjustly attacked by those who, posing as our friends and liberators, attempted to dominate us in place of the Spaniards, as is shown by the grievances enumerated in my manifest of January 8 last; such as the continued outrages and violent exactions committed against the people of Manila, the useless conferences, and all my frustrated efforts in favor of peace and concord.

Summoned by this unexpected provocation, urged by the duties imposed upon me by honor and patriotism and for the defense of the nation intrusted to me, calling on God as a witness of my good faith and the uprightness of my intentions—

I order and command:

1. Peace and friendly relations between the Philippine forces and the American forces of occupation are broken, and the latter will be treated as enemies, with the limits prescribed by the laws of war.

2. American soldiers who may be captured by the Philippine forces will be treated as prisoners of war.

3. This proclamation shall be communicated to the accredited consuls of Manila, and to congress, in order that it may accord the suspension of the constitutional guaranties and the resulting declaration of war.

Given at Malolos February 4, 1899.

EMILIO AGUINALDO,
General-in-Chief.

TO THE PHILIPPINE PEOPLE.

By my proclamation of yesterday I have published the outbreak of hostilities between the Philippine forces and the American forces of occupation in Manila, unjustly and unexpectedly provoked by the latter.

In my manifest of January 8 last I published the grievances suffered by the Philippine forces at the hands of the army of occupation. The constant outrages and taunts, which have caused the misery of the people of Manila, and, finally, the

useless conferences and the contempt shown the Philippine government prove the premeditated transgression of justice and liberty.

I know that war has always produced great losses; I know that the Philippine people have not yet recovered from past losses and are not in the condition to endure others. But I also know by experience how bitter is slavery, and by experience I know that we should sacrifice all on the altar of our honor and of the national integrity so unjustly attacked.

I have tried to avoid, as far as it has been possible for me to do so, armed conflict, in my endeavors to assure our independence by pacific means and to avoid more costly sacrifices. But all my efforts have been useless against the measureless pride of the American Government and of its representatives in these islands, who have treated me as a rebel because I defend the sacred interests of my country and do not make myself an instrument of their dastardly intentions.

Past campaigns will have convinced you that the people are strong when they wish to be so. Without arms we have driven from our beloved country our ancient masters, and without arms we can repulse the foreign invasion as long as we wish to do so. Providence always has means in reserve and prompt help for the weak in order that they may not be annihilated by the strong; that justice may be done and humanity progress.

Be not discouraged. Our independence has been watered by the generous blood of our martyrs. Blood which may be shed in the future will strengthen it. Nature has never despised generous sacrifices.

But remember that in order that our efforts may not be wasted, that our vows may be listened to, that our ends may be gained, it is indispensable that we adjust our actions to the rules of law and of right, learning to triumph over our enemies and to conquer our own evil passions.

EMILIO AGUINALDO,
President of the Philippine Republic.

MALOLOS, *February 5, 1899.*

The battle of Manila, which commenced at half past 8 o'clock on the evening of February 4, continued until 5 the next evening. Its details were fully reported on April 6 last, and it is not necessary to present them anew. I insert a short extract from that report to show the determination of the insurgents to provoke conflict:

During the entire month of January they had labored incessantly to strongly intrench their lines and place their artillery in position. * * * On the night of February 2 they sent in a strong detachment to draw the fire of our outpost, which took up a position immediately in front of and within a few yards of the same. The outpost was strengthened by a few men, who silently bore the detachment's taunts and abuse the entire night. This was reported to me by General MacArthur, whom I directed to communicate with the officer in command of the insurgent troops concerned. His prepared letter was shown me and approved, and the reply received (both papers found in General MacArthur's accompanying report) was all that could be desired. However, the agreement entered into was ignored by the insurgents, and on the evening of February 4 another demonstration was made on one of our small outposts, which occupied a retired position, at least 150 yards within the line which had been mutually agreed upon, an insurgent approaching the picket and refusing to halt or answer when challenged. The result was our picket discharged his piece, when the insurgent troops near Santa Mesa opened a spirited fire on our troops there stationed.

The engagement was one strictly defensive on the part of the insurgents and of vigorous attack by our forces, although during the night it was confined to an exchange of fire between the opposing lines on the north from the Pasig River to the Lico road, a distance of about 2 miles, with an occasional shot on the south in the vicinity of Paco, and a few straggling shots on the extreme left in the direction of Caloocan. Admiral Dewey had placed two vessels a short distance off shore to the north and one to the south of our flanks, where they rested on Manila Bay, and shortly after daybreak on the morning of the 5th I telegraphed him: "Heavy firing all along our north front at midnight and at 4 a. m. Casual firing at Paco. Several casualties in Tondo district. *Charleston* and *Callao* could give efficient aid in that vicinity," and at 6.50 a. m. I wired him that "firing continues; few casualties; a sharp raking fire of one-half hour just to north of blockhouse on Vitas

Pass would reach insurgent line and demoralize them." This was effected, and the *Monadnock* on the south was also doing good service. At midnight General Anderson, who commanded all troops south of the Pasig, consisting of King's and Ovenshine's brigades, was directed to hold them in readiness to receive a morning attack, but not to attack until further instructed. Our immediate interests lay to the northeast and comprised the pumping station and deposito of the waterworks, which it was necessary to secure, although we had provided for their loss, in so far as the army was concerned, by erecting a number of distilling plants along the river banks, by which good water could be obtained. Stotsenburg had attacked early in the morning, drove the enemy from the blockhouses in his front, and reported that he could capture the powder magazine and waterworks deposito meaning, though pumping station understood at the time) if desired. MacArthur had been pressing back the enemy in his entire front, inflicting heavy loss. He had called for troops to fill gap on Stotsenburg's left, and a battalion of the First Tennessee Regiment of the provost guard, under the command of its colonel, was sent him, and the following correspondence by telegraph ensued:

General MacArthur: Stotsenburg reports: "Have captured blockhouses 5 and 7; burned 6. Can capture powder magazine and waterworks if desired." Battalion First Tennessee has passed to report to you. Let Stotsenburg go ahead with aid of Tennessee, if conditions permit, and capture magazine. Waterworks must wait. Not prudent to advance small force so far out.

OTIS.

General Otis: Am making inquiries at various parts of line to determine expediency of moving Stotsenburg as you suggest, so as to extend entire line from Maraquina to Caloocan. Stotsenburg's success on right may have induced them to retire on the left. This I am now trying to ascertain. Do you approve of this movement if I find it expedient?

MACARTHUR.

General MacArthur: Do not think extension of our line from Maraquina to Caloocan prudent. Our flank would be greatly exposed at Maraquina. You had all your available troops under arms all night, and portion of them must have rest and sleep, so that you could not place more than 3,000 men on line permanently. I think Stotsenburg meant reservoir and not waterworks.

OTIS.

The Nebraska regiment and Tennessee battalion advanced rapidly during the morning and captured the powder house and deposito, and the South Dakota regiment on the left drove the enemy from all their intrenchments as far to the westward as the Lico road, and about noon the following telegram was sent to General MacArthur:

Reported that insurgent troops were arriving all night and this morning for service in your front. Think line you suggest from coast to Chinese Hospital your proper one, not permitting Stotsenburg to expose your right flank unnecessarily.

The insurgents had firm possession of the railway and all of its rolling stock, and were utilizing it to the best advantage in forwarding to Caloocan its troops from the north. To my dispatch General MacArthur replied as follows:

Have your dispatch. Will act accordingly and try and occupy Chinese Hospital and extend the line to the left from that point. We have everything now to include blockhouse 4, and I have no doubt when Colonel Kessler gets a gun, which I have sent to the front, we will demolish and occupy the hospital if it is still defended by the insurgents. At 11.20 a. m. Stotsenburg is crossing San Juan River at the bridge; have authorized him to proceed according to your advice, but to be prudent and not go too far, as the left of the insurgent line still holding on, or at all events not yet occupied by us.

This line was established during the afternoon, and General MacArthur had little to contend with for the remainder of the day, his chief difficulty thereafter coming from the rear, from which an occasional hostile shot was fired, and in the evening he telegraphed he had everything at the front with the exception of two companies of the Montana, and continued: "If you will look at the map you will see that my line extends from a point opposite San Pedro Macati to the bay. It will hardly be possible to bring anybody in to-night, as new demands may arise. I suggest, but do not request, that a battalion be sent here for an extraordinary reserve, to be placed along the Lico road to Calle Iris."

Two companies were borrowed from the provost guard and placed as requested.

The troops of General Anderson became eager to attack the enemy early on the morning of the 5th, and at 7.48 o'clock a. m. permission was granted, the general being cautioned: Do not advance too far, and look out for your flanks and the *Monadnock*."

General King had asked to swing his brigade, the left of which rested on the Pasig near Santa Ana, to the left, thereby driving the enemy in his front to the river, where he would have him at his mercy. This was authorized and the Californias, Washingtons, and Idahos responding with great vigor, the movement was attended with signal success. The insurgent casualties here were very heavy and many were drowned in the Pasig, having attempted to cross it to escape punishment. Meanwhile the right of Anderson's line, which was confronted by an almost impenetrable thicket, was meeting with serious difficulties. It had driven the insurgents from their intrenchments on the extreme right, but at the center in the jungle and swamp they held on with great tenacity. This position was pressed by a portion of the Fourteenth Infantry, under Captain Murphy, and Wheeler's troop of the Fourth Cavalry, which advanced slowly, shooting the insurgents in their formidable intrenchments, which they had constructed therein, as they refused to yield. At 11 o'clock a. m. I telegraphed General Anderson as follows:

Establish your final line from coast opposite Pasay to San Pedro Macati. This gives you a short line and command of all the roads leading to the north and a fairly open country. You can undertake it as soon as Murphy overcomes difficulty in his front. The North Dakotas can advance along coast of bay near Pasay. You can attend to all this as soon as you are sure of capturing San Pedro Macati.

And I thereupon telegraphed Admiral Dewey as follows:

Have directed Anderson to establish southern line between Pasay and San Pedro Macati on Pasig. He will move down as soon as he has full possession of San Pedro Macati, which will soon fall into his hands. Will you keep vessel to the front to assist advance down coast?

General Anderson seemed doubtful if his troops could obtain possession of the indicated line (the Pasay and San Pedro Macati road) that afternoon on account of the difficulty experienced at his center. He had telegraphed from Battery Knoll, right of Paco bridge, at 12.30 p. m.:

King has taken Santa Ana; 200 prisoners. Many Filipinos reported killed. Our loss unknown; believed not to be heavy. Ovenshine has cleared his front on his right, driving them back to our old intrenchments. Captain Murphy said to have advanced to blockhouse 14, but insurgents still hold flanking position on his right. Have sent down one gun which has opened on them, but do not know with what results. Firing still continues. Last seen of Smith (colonel of California regiment, meaning) was advancing on the right with two battalions and entering San Pedro Macati. Prevent insurgent reenforcements crossing river,

And later he telegraphed from Paco bridge as follows:

Major General Anderson presents his compliments and says that he has sent all available troops to rout insurgents on Captain Murphy's flank, but that present force is inadequate to accomplish this. He requests that he be reenforced with a battalion from General Hughes's command, and with these he is confident he can drive insurgents out.

Another battalion of the Tennessee regiment was borrowed from the provost-marshal and was conducted by my aid, Captain Sanders, to the center of this line, but did not arrive until the ground had been carried.

I had sent Lieutenant-Colonels Crowder and Potter to make known to General Anderson the particulars of the movement desired, and finally, fearing that some misunderstanding might result, explained to Lieutenant-Colonel Barry, my adjutant general, all particulars, making careful reference to the map, and dispatched him to confer with General Ovenshine. He went direct to that officer, whose troops on the right of the line had returned to the original position of the morning, fearing the shells from the guns of the *Monadnock*, which struck uncomfortably near. When Colonel Barry explained fully to him what was expected of his troops, he at once took up the advance, swinging a part of his line to the left, attacking the enemy in the flank—whom he soon routed and drove beyond the range of fire—and placed his entire line firmly on the Pasay road.

At 4.30 o'clock Colonel Barry telegraphed me as follows:

Have just returned from the fight in front of Murphy's position. Insurgents driven out in sharp fight when General Ovenshine advanced toward Pasay. Little loss to our forces, but insurgents badly handled. Many killed. Will see General Anderson, then return to Malacanan. Word has just been received that Ovenshine has taken Pasay without resistance. Anderson at San Pedro Macati. Will return to Malacanan.

At 4.45 I telegraphed General Anderson as follows:

First North Dakota, Fourteenth Infantry, and Fourth Cavalry on Pasay road. King must fall out and take position on that road to-night. That will be your permanent line. If you can spare Tennessee return it. May be trouble in Tondo and Binondo to-night. MacArthur's troops occupying position far in advance of this morning and all on the line.

During the night of February 4 and the following day the inhabitants of the city were greatly agitated, fearing for their personal safety. Streets were almost deserted, except by our troops. Two or three attempts were made to assemble by the secret military organizations, but were promptly checked by Brigadier General Hughes, the provost-marshal general, who had admirably placed and retained his force at the more important points. His action was quick and decisive. Early on the morning of the 5th his police companies so effectively delivered their fire upon these assembling organizations that they were dispersed and discouraged. Their loss in killed could not have exceeded 50 or 60, but they made no further very dangerous demonstrations until the night of February 23, when they suffered a severe experience for their temerity. At the close of the day on the 5th Admiral Dewey inquired concerning the situation, and was replied to as follows:

Situation satisfactory. On south we hold road from Pasay to San Pedro Macati. On the north we hold the water reservoir, San Juan del Monte, and all blockhouses. Country peaceful and city quiet. Troops fought magnificently. Insurgent dead between 500 and 1,000. Lots of prisoners and 2 Krupp guns captured. Insurgents demoralized. We owe you gratitude for your great aid.

Our casualties for the day in killed and wounded numbered about 250. Those of the insurgents will never be known. Our hospitals were filled with their wounded, our prisons with their captured, and

we buried 700 of them. Their loss was estimated at 3,000, and considering the number who died on the field of battle might be deemed conservative.

On February 6 it was ascertained that Colonel Smith, with his Californians, had not halted at San Pedro Macati, but had pursued the fleeing enemy up the Pasig River. No one seemed to know definitely his location, except that it was somewhere in the vicinity of the towns of Pasig, Pateros, or Taguig. He had gone on with 2 battalions of his regiment and occupied these villages, receiving the written surrender of the inhabitants. General Anderson was directed to withdraw him at once to the Pasay road, which he did not reach until the 8th of the month. The enemy took possession of the towns which he had evacuated upon his directed withdrawal and celebrated a victory. They had been collecting to the east of the town of Pasig and on the south, and there was danger that they would cut off Smith's retreat, in case he did not fall back without delay to his directed position.

A movement from the southern line was not considered advisable, as the bulk of insurgent troops were again concentrating on the north in the vicinity of Caloocan, and the short, admirable southern line which we had established was easily defended and could spare troops for any emergency at the north.

On the morning of the 6th our attention was given to the large number of partisans or bushwhackers, mostly in rear of our lines, who were continually firing from nipa huts or other places of concealment upon our passing transportation, messengers, and detachments. Nearly all the barrack guards had been forwarded to the front and the provost guard was widely dispersed on the outskirts of the city. In some instances it was necessary to resort to radical measures and destroy many of the nipa huts which, situated in the bamboo and banana thickets, gave protection to scattered insurgents who doubtless belonged to the interior organizations or city insurgent militia. The day was devoted to the removal of these dangerous and threatening obstacles and the burial of the dead. About noon Colonel Stotsenburg telegraphed from the Deposito, or water reservoir, the following:

General MacArthur instructs me to wire suggestions about waterworks. They should be taken and line of pipe occupied and guarded. I think I can do it from here and if necessary run the pumps, occupying the high ground in rear, and connecting with the left of the First Division at San Pedro Macati. My command consists of the First Nebraska, Tennessee battalion, the 2 companies of the Colorado regiment, and 4 pieces of artillery. There is no engineer at the waterworks and no coal. I do not think we shall find any difficulty between here and there.

Stotsenburg's command was augmented by a battalion of the Twenty-third Infantry from the provost guard, under command of Major Goodale, and he was directed to proceed and carry out his plan. Later that evening I sent for General Hale, who commanded the right brigade of MacArthur's line, informing him that I had just received information that a part of Stotsenburg's command was in difficulty, having been attacked by insurgents, and that it was short of ammunition and without water. Hale at once proceeded to the Deposito and wired me that Stotsenburg upon leaving the waterworks had ordered Goodale to take his battalion out the Maraquina road, extending his right to connect with his (Stotsenburg's) left, and continued:

Although I had not contemplated sending any troops to Maraquina, I did not consider it desirable to change orders and leave Stotsenburg's left flank without the protection he was anticipating, and as there was little resistance met through the district traveled and as we heard no firing on our left, there appeared to be no special danger in Goodale's position. We threw some shells in the direction of the headquarters at Maraquina to show them that they were covered by artillery fire and to deter them from any attack they might make on Goodale's command.

General Hale ascertained that the reports which I had received were greatly exaggerated and that no portion of Stotsenburg's command was in any immediate danger. He at once adopted measures to keep open communication with the pumping station, which Stotsenburg had successfully reached, by means of large detachments which patrolled the 4 miles of road between Deposito and the station, and the following morning I received this telegram from General MacArthur:

Stotsenburg just reports that he has found the missing pump machinery, that insurgents have abandoned Maraquina, and that 10 companies went toward Pasig. This command has been actively engaged since Friday and wants to rest to-day and to-morrow. I have authorized him to do so and not to make any further active movement of any kind without specific orders. Large band of insurgents, armed and equipped, moving toward Pasig. Recommend sending gunboat up river to prevent them crossing. Seem to be concentrating south of Pasig. Captain Randolph is now here and I can give him any orders you wish.

To which reply was made:

Order Captain Randolph to take the gunboat to San Pedro Macati and remain in that vicinity. Information will be forwarded to him at that point. Acknowledge and report action.

The gunboat referred to was a former Pasig River passenger steamboat known as the *Laguna de Bay*, which we had seized, though subsequently purchased, about two weeks before active hostilities commenced, for service on the upper Pasig, should occasion require. On her we had placed machine and 6-pounder guns and heavy sheet-iron protection, and detailed for duty with her 2 officers and 65 men. She was commanded by Captain Randolph, of the Third Artillery, and afterwards by Captain Grant, of the Utah Artillery, who was an experienced steamboat man, having been formerly engaged as a captain of a passenger vessel plying the northern United States lakes. She was a formidable and ugly-looking craft, drawing only 4 feet of water, gave the insurgents much uneasiness, and subsequently great fear whenever on the Pasig River, in the waters of the Laguna de Bay, or in the rivers of Bulacan province she chanced to appear. She was fearlessly handled and was considered to be equivalent to a regiment of men whenever engaged. Her repeated successes led us to purchase and put in defensive condition three other small light-draft river steamboats or launches, which, though inferior to the *Laguna de Bay* as fighting machines, have rendered excellent service.

The insurgent troops, which Colonel Stotsenburg reported as moving upon the town of Pasig, at the head of the river of that name, were those which, in connection with the insurgents in the south, it was believed were about to concentrate to resist Colonel Smith and his two lost battalions of the California regiment then in that vicinity, which on the 6th had been ordered to withdraw immediately to their intended position at San Pedro Macati.

On February 7 division commanders looked to the means of readily supplying their troops with ammunition, subsistence, and water, and whatever else might be needed. For this service we had only the primitive transportation of the country. A few days before the fighting commenced Major Devol, transportation quartermaster of the command, had been directed to assemble his hired carts at a certain locality in the city upon the first indication of active hostilities and to be prepared to seize and assemble there, also, all wheeled vehicles of which he could obtain possession. These instructions he carried out most effectively, and the firing line was at all times supplied with every essential requirement. Citizens who suffered losses thereby were instructed to submit their claims, which were promptly settled, and over $7,000 (Mexican) were paid to them on these particular accounts. A good many unauthorized

seizures were made by enlisted men going to and returning from the front, sent in many instances for ammunition and rations. This was checked under formal orders issued on the 7th instant, and all inhabitants were compensated who thereby suffered.

On the morning of the 7th Colonel Stotsenburg reported that he had found all missing parts of the pumping machinery. Steps were at once taken to put this machinery in order and in the course of two days the city was receiving an abundant water supply, which has continued since that date.

The demoralization of the insurgents, which the rough handling they had unexpectedly received from the American mode of conducting warfare hitherto unknown in these islands, and pronounced by them to be new and unsoldierly, continued for two or three days. The leaders, confessing that their men were overmatched by our troops, contended that they could overcome by numbers what was lacking in individual characteristics. They commenced at once a reconcentration of all their forces in every direction, hastening from the north by rail every available man whether armed with rifle or bolo. Still, they had lost a good many of their original soldiers, who, thoroughly satisfied with the results of their war for independence, had escaped to their homes in distant villages. There was no lack of ammunition or subsistence for the troops on the north, but those on the south had lost through capture all the rice and cartridges which they had stored near their original lines and could not be resupplied without difficulty. The bolo men of the city, who had remained quiet since the afternoon of the 5th, began to show again a turbulent disposition, and as early as February 8 became bold and defiant. It became necessary to make new combinations, for the insurgents still persisted in the intention to carry out their former preconceived plan of action, which was to be an attack on our front, assisted by an overwhelming uprising of the city insurgent militia.

Our southern line was short and secure. The northern line had a sharp protruding angle at the Chinese church, 1¼ miles southeast of Caloocan: thence it extended southeasterly toward the deposito; thence south to the Pasig River with a strong outpost at the pumping station, 4 miles east of the deposito. The left of this line was refused, running from the Chinese church to Vitas Pass in a southwesterly direction. Two battalions of the provost guard had been sent to the pumping station and other portions of it had been placed far out in the suburbs. The increased insurgent activity within the city obliged the return of all this guard for city service, and to effect it, the Wyoming battalion, three troops of the Fourth Cavalry, the North Dakota regiment, and two guns of Dyer's Light Battery were withdrawn from Anderson's front. The first organization relieved the Twenty-third battalion at the pumping station. The cavalry and artillery troops were sent to General MacArthur for use in the vicinity of the Chinese church, and the North Dakota regiment was placed in Malate (where an uprising was threatened) for temporary duty.

General MacArthur had requested permission to swing his left on the town of Caloocan thereby giving him an excellent continuous and direct line on good ground from that town to the deposito, but was requested to remain as quiet as possible for a couple of days until the enemy could effect complete concentration in his front, when another opportunity to punish him very severely would be presented. This he did, and on the 10th of the month (it having been reported that Luna had placed about 4,000 insurgents south of Caloocan in front of MacArthur's refused left) he was directed to rectify his alignment, which

be accomplished on the afternoon of the 10th, by a very spirited attack on the part of the Montana, Kansas, and Pennsylvania Volunteers, and the Third Artillery (brigade of Brig. Gen. H. G. Otis) swinging on the Chinese church as a pivot. The attack, preceded by a fire of thirty minutes from the guns of the Navy vessels on and in front of Caloocan, consisted of an impetuous charge which swept away every obstacle, inflicting great damage on the enemy, who fought stubbornly within his intrenchments for a time, but finally fled indiscriminately to the rear. Our troops pursued beyond the line which it was intended to establish, rushed on to and over the stone walls which surrounded the Caloocan cemetery, where the insurgents had placed a strong force, which they well-nigh destroyed. Darkness coming on the troops were quickly recalled, and the line, with the left resting on Caloocan was occupied—the extreme left being refused to guard against any movement from the direction of the town of Malabon.

During the afternoon of February 8 I received the following dispatch from Admiral Dewey:

> Have sent flag of truce to San Roque directing withdrawal of insurgent troops. If white flag is not flying at 9 a. m. to-morrow shall open with ships. Please direct colonel commanding to occupy San Roque after insurgent troops leave. This is most important in interest of navy.

San Roque was a thickly populated village connected with the naval station at Cavite by a causeway over a narrow intervening strip of water and was at the mercy of the guns of the navy. The insurgent troops formerly occupying Cavite had taken possession of this point, where they had been augmented by considerable accessions from the Cavite province. Our own troops, consisting of the Fifty-first Iowa Regiment, 2 California battalions of heavy artillery, the Wyoming Light Artillery, and the Nevada troop of dismounted cavalry, commanded by Colonel Loper, of the Fifty-first Iowa Regiment, occupied Cavite and guarded the causeway between the two towns. Upon receipt of the Admiral's telegram, Colonel Loper was properly instructed, and at 9 o'clock on the morning of the following day the insurgents, having kerosened San Roque, fired it and withdrew, crossing the neck which joins it to the mainland. Our troops at once took possession and by persistent efforts saved from destruction many of its best buildings. The inhabitants fled, preceding or accompanying the insurgents, and Colonel Loper stationed guards there and placed a force across the narrow neck of land at a point about a mile distant from Cavite, where he confronted the insurgent intrenchments on the main shore, where troops have since been maintained and from which point they have operated by reconnoissance as far as old Cavite and San Francisco de Malabon.

Affairs at the open ports of Iloilo and Cebu, for which foreign and domestic merchant vessels had persistently cleared, furnishing goods and paying tribute to the insurgent authorities, and foreign men-of-war were intently watching the progress of events, gave great annoyance. The questions presented bristled with conundrums of a political character, and the United States consuls on the Asiatic coast wanted positive information of condition and status. The territory was no longer Spain's, but we still hesitated to take decisive action for fear of provoking the insurgents, or really giving them the excuse to attack us which they desired. Now this last obstacle had been removed by their determined onslaughts on Manila, and it was very important for overmastering political reasons to take possession of these southern ports, through force or otherwise, as circumstances might demand. Notwithstanding our military strength at Manila was so limited that we could

not pursue into the interior the fleeing enemy, we knew our ability to worst him should he appear anywhere in our vicinity, and concluded that exigencies compelled us to clear up the field which we were confronting at Iloilo. On February 7 I asked authority to direct General Miller to take the place. This being received, the Tennessee regiment, which had been acting with the Manila provost guard, was forwarded to that point, sailing on the 9th instant. On the evening of the previous day I dispatched Lieutenant-Colonel Potter with the following instructions:

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., February 8, 1899.

Brigadier-General MILLER, U. S. V.,
Commanding First Separate Brigade, Eighth Army Corps, Iloilo, Panay.

SIR: The commanding general directs that you occupy Iloilo with your troops as soon as practicable, having a care for the lives and property of the inhabitants of that city and giving to citizens the necessary notice to withdraw therefrom in case resistance is anticipated.

The admiral commanding the United States naval forces on the Asiatic Station will direct the commanding officers of naval vessels in the harbor of Iloilo to support you in your operations.

Avoid destruction of property in so far as may be possible with successful operations, and endeavor to prevent destruction of same by native troops.

The First Tennessee regiment will sail for Iloilo to-morrow morning, the 9th instant, and upon its arrival you will be able to make your dispositions.

The commanding general trusts to your ability and discretion, and does not desire to give you more specific instructions, permitting full latitude of action on your part. These instructions will be handed to you by Lieutenant-Colonel Potter, who leaves this evening by steamer *Butuan*. He will remain with you until you are able to report the results of your action in executing these instructions, when you will dispatch him to these headquarters with report of same.

Very respectfully,

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Shortly after Lieutenant-Colonel Potter arrived with instructions, and on the morning of the 10th General Miller had a conference with the commanding officers of the United States war vessels in the harbor and with certain business men in Iloilo, when the time to be given the insurgents to surrender or evacuate and for the inhabitants to withdraw from the city was determined upon. With the navy commanders the plan of battle, in case it became necessary to forcibly take the place, was discussed, but not fully agreed upon. The results arrived at are given in the following communications:

HDQRS. FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT,
Iloilo Harbor, P. I., February 10, 1899.

COMMANDING GENERAL NATIVE FORCES, *Iloilo.*

SIR: In a communication from Gen. Roque Lopez, dated December 31, 1898, it was stated that armed resistance would be offered to the forces of the United States in case they attempted to occupy Iloilo without the consent of General Aguinaldo. This communication was referred, for instructions, to Major-General Otis, commanding the United States forces in the Philippine Islands. After a long delay orders have arrived, and I am now directed by him to occupy the city of Iloilo with my troops as soon as practicable. I therefore call on you to deliver up the city of Iloilo and adjacent territory, and to surrender the armed forces occupying the same before sunset Saturday, the 11th instant, or I shall proceed with my troops to occupy the city by force. It is requested that you give warning to all noncombatants in Iloilo, Jaro, and Molo that in case of resistance their city and villages will be exposed to bombardment. Any attempt on your part in the interim to close the Iloilo River or to throw up or improve any defensive works will at once be met by fire from the United States war ships and my troops. Free ingress and egress to boats going to and coming from Iloilo will be permitted until sunset Saturday, the 11th instant. After this time all communications must be under flag of truce.

Official communication has been received by the steamship *Butuan* of the complete defeat and scattering of the insurgent forces in the neighborhood of Manila.

Very respectfully,

M. P. MILLER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

HDQRS. FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT,
Iloilo Harbor, P. I., February 10, 1899.

To the British, German, and American Vice-Consulates:

In view of anticipated hostilities, notice is hereby given you to cause all persons who are under your protection to seek a place of safety before 5 a. m. Sunday, the 12th instant. Hostilities may commence at any time after that hour and date.

Very respectfully,

M. P. MILLER,
Brigadier General, U. S. V., Commanding.

Official copy also respectfully furnished commanding officers H. M. S. *Pigmy*, and U. S. S. *Boston*, and U. S. S. *Petrel*.

By command of Brigadier-General Miller.

CHAS. G. WOODWARD,
First Lieutenant, Third U. S. Artillery, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

The Tennessee regiment arrived at Iloilo on the night of February 10, and next morning about 9 o'clock four commissioners sent by the inhabitants boarded the *Newport*, General Miller's vessel, to discuss the situation. While in conference two shots were heard, which were fired from one of the war vessels as warning shots to the insurgents who were engaged in throwing up intrenchments at or near the fort located on the city's water line, against which proceeding they had been warned in the letter furnished them the previous day. To these shots the insurgents replied, and at 9.30 a. m. the fort and the war vessels (the *Baltimore* and *Petrel*) became actively engaged. The army not anticipating this action, had made very little preparation for landing its troops. The navy attack was followed by a landing of its men, the seizure of the fort, the hoisting of the United States flag over the same and the entrance of the men to the city—the insurgents retiring before landing was effected, and firing the town during their retreat. Lieutenant Colonel Potter, who was a witness and participant in the affair, made written report of the events which came under his observation. The vessels which he mentions, namely, the *Arizona*, *St. Paul*, and *Newport*, were troop transports; the *Boston* and *Petrel*, vessels of the Navy; the *Iloilo* and *Vicenti*, launches. Colonel Potter states as follows:

As we left the *Arizona* we saw the *Boston's* boats about halfway to the shore. The captain of the *St. Paul* wanted to move his vessel nearer shore and was allowed to do so. As she anchored, her starboard boats were full and we towed them in and landed them, while the *Iloilo*, which came up (having been relieved at the *Arizona* by the *Vicenti*, which has left the flatboat anchored) towed in the port boats a few minutes later. The exact time of this landing I did not note, but afterwards saw a recorded signal from the *Petrel* to the *Boston*, which said it was 12 o'clock. All of this took time, as the tide was running very strong. From our launch, as we preceded the *St. Paul* to her anchorage near shore, we saw the flag hauled down and ours go up, and soon after saw the navy forces advancing from the fort to the first warehouse, where they appeared to stop and come back. This afterwards proved to be only the *Petrel's* men, who landed on the other side of the fort, where we had not seen them, while the *Boston's* men under Lieutenant Niblack, had gone uptown. Not knowing this, I started up the road, where I was met by a signal man from the *Petrel*, who said they had received a message from the *Petrel* that we must be careful in advancing into town, as a great many insurgents were left in the buildings as well as in rifle pits which were dug on either side of the street. This caused us to wait for a sufficient force to occupy all side streets

and advance cautiously (at least half an hour being thus lost), when, to our surprise, on arriving at the custom-house, we found Lieutenant Niblack's force receiving a few shots from the enemy up river, but they had come to this point without seeing any insurgents or hearing a shot.

At the first shot from the *Boston* the insurgents began firing the town as they retreated up town along the main street, fire being applied to both sides of the street. I saw some places where they had failed to set fire, but where wood saturated with coal oil was piled against doors. Before the Navy was through with the bombardment fires had been set away up on Calle Real, and as a strong breeze was blowing there was little chance of saving anything to leeward of the fires.

A few troops with General Miller got through the fires just beyond the custom-house, but the rest of us were cut off from advancing for two hours. These few troops advanced with no resistance and took Jaro and Molo bridges. Fires were set along the road to the Jaro bridge before any possible landing could have saved them, and very little was burned except to leeward, where the smoke and flames were such as to drive back company after company trying to get to the few troops in front, who would be in great peril if attacked in force. But all attempts failed for a time. I saw two companies of Major Cheatham's battalion try to get around by wading on the beach, but they were driven back. It was a case which would have baffled professional firemen with a complete apparatus for fighting fire.

General Miller, in a report made February 20, remarks:

No arrangement or agreement with the senior officer of the Navy was made that he should open the attack without conferring with me, but it seemed he construed my letter to the insurgents in that light and commenced the attack. My command had been living on the rough bay ever since first arriving. With great difficulty we had gotten possession of two lighters and three steam launches to transfer coal barges, etc., from supply ships to permanent ships. At the time of the attack the *Samar* was endeavoring to tow the barge *Cartagena* to the *Newport* for the purpose of placing a light battery on it. The *Arizona* had a coaling ship alongside; the other launch was en route to the *St. Paul*. * * * The Navy landed their forces promptly, and found upon arrival at the plaza an almost impassable barrier of fire toward Jaro bridge. I think a quicker landing of my troops would have found the same conditions in front; as it was, I pushed through the flames with what force I could get through and saved several buildings beyond the plaza, near Jaro bridge, and along the banks of the Iloilo.

I now quote from the accompanying report of General Hughes, commanding at present in the Visayan Islands:

Upon receipt of this information ways and means were taken by the insurgents, then in occupation and control, for burning the city. Large quantities of petroleum were secured and stored in the ayuntamiento, Calle Rosario, Calle San Pedro, etc. In the early morning of February 11, before any shots had been fired or any immediate action was evident, these supplies of oil were distributed about the city and placed in dwellings, shops, stores, etc., so as to make the work of the incendiaries easy, swift, and sure. The statement is made that the local president and other officials in uniform assisted in the distribution of the petroleum, and the mayor of the city, Señor Leon, is said to have followed the example of the mayor of Moscow by setting fire to his own house before abandoning the city, which had been confided to his care.

On the morning of the 11th the insurgents were discovered putting guns in position on the beach for defense, and as this was in violation of the conditions specified by General Miller in granting time for noncombatants, etc., to make their dispositions for what might occur, the naval gunboat *Petrel* fired two warning shots, upon which the land battery being put in position opened fire on the *Petrel*, which opened an action that had not been contemplated or expected on the part of either the troops or their commanders until the following morning.

Firing having opened between the hostile forces, the incendiaries in the city immediately began their assigned work, and the city was soon in flames. Meanwhile the troops were being landed on the beach and the right bank of the river, and working their way through and around the fire succeeded in reaching and securing possession of the bridge across the Iloilo River leading to Jaro, and also the bridge across the estuary on the road to Molo. Possession of these points assured General Miller's possession of the city. In submitting the fact to the department commander General Miller remarks:

"It was not contemplated to make an attack before the hour named to the consuls, but the insurgent forces having begun acts of hostility, military necessity required that action should be taken and followed up. Such action certainly made no difference regarding the destruction of property, as it was a matter of common

report that every preparation had been made by the forces of the insurgents at Iloilo to set fire to the city at the first hostile shot."

In another letter, written by General Miller on the 21st of February, the following remark occurs:

"I have no doubt it is owing to the premature attack that any of the buildings are saved. The plan was one of total destruction by fire."

On the following day the suburb of Jaro was taken by Major Keller with a battalion of the Eighteenth Infantry and a battery of machine guns. General Miller reported as follows:

"HDQRS. FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
"Iloilo, P. I., February 12, 1899.

"ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPT. OF THE PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.

"SIR: I have the honor to report the military situation as very vexatious. We have captured Iloilo, as before reported, but the position of the insurgents has been such that all the time we are exposed to sharpshooters' fire with the Mauser rifle, and no one knows when he is safe. Jaro and Molo occupied would relieve us from this trouble, but I should have a battalion of four companies more to hold Molo. To-day at 2 p. m. I sent a reconnoissance to both Jaro and Molo—a battalion of the Tennessee to Molo and one of the Eighteenth Infantry to Jaro. At Molo no enemy was found; at Jaro the enemy was encountered and skirmishing commenced at once. The insurgents were about 1,000 strong. They threw an accurate and concentrated fire. They fought well, but finally retreated to Jaro and were driven beyond it. I reenforced the first battalion with the second, and we hold Jaro to-night. Second Lieut. F. C. Bolles, Eighteenth Infantry, attached to the machine battery, was wounded through the left leg below the knee and one private through the lung and another through the leg. Will send specific report as soon as possible. Our troops of the Eighteenth were under the command of Major Keller, and afterwards the two battalions were under the command of Colonel Van Valzah. Major Keller's battalion, assisted by the machine-gun battery, under Lieutenant Ostheim, did the work. Major Keller is an able, fearless, and brave officer; also Lieutenant Ostheim. I shall make recommendation about them later.

"Very respectfully,

"M. P. MILLER,
"Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding."

On the 14th of February Major Keller made a reconnoissance in the direction of Santa Barbara, and 4 miles from Jaro he encountered the enemy, about 500 strong, and drove them back some distance. He lost 1 noncommissioned officer killed and 1 wounded.

On the 19th of February a reconnoissance was made to Oton by a battalion of the First Tennessee Volunteers, but no enemy was found.

A battalion of the First Tennessee Volunteers made a reconnoissance in the direction of San Miguel via Mandurriao on the 25th of February. The enemy was found a short distance beyond Mandurriao and driven back without loss to our troops.

The military operations which have since taken place in Panay will be noted in a later portion of this report. As soon as Iloilo was occupied by our troops a government was established and has been successfully prosecuted.

The rapid changes in the spirit, demeanor, and demonstrations of the inhabitants of Manila of all classes between the 5th and 10th of February could be witnessed only in a community made up of the most heterogeneous elements. On the 6th the educated business classes, foreign and native born, were surprisingly hopeful that hostilities would soon end. The natives of the middle and working classes were sullen, though undetermined. The large Chinese laboring population rejoiced over the punishment of their race enemies and the opportunity offered it for looting the country from which the insurgent forces had been driven. These Chinese had followed quite closely our advancing lines and secured many minor articles of property which by them were considered of value. We had employed them, too, extensively to perform a good deal of the work connected with supplying the troops at the front, and they performed faithful service. On the 7th business became active again and the streets were thronged as usual. The night was the most exciting portion of the twenty-four hours, as the occa-

sional shots of our sentries, the burning of nipa buildings (the work of incendiaries), and the frequently detected interchange of signals between the insurgents within and those without the city lines gave constant warning of the dangers which threatened us. The means of supplying subsistence for this large motley population presented a problem for solution in which new conditions continually obtruded themselves. The great majority of the population never provides for the morrow and depends upon the numerous city markets for its daily supply of food, made up almost exclusively, rice excepted, of the products of the adjacent country. That source of supply had been virtually closed since the latter part of January, and interisland traffic had been arrested by the event of war. On February 8 it was officially reported that the insurgent troops to the east of the city had returned to the mountains and those to the south had disappeared, whereupon orders were issued to permit the resumption of trade along the Pasig River to the Laguna de Bay. This it was expected would give Manila the products of the lake country, from which source she had always obtained a large portion of articles for daily consumption. No sooner, however, was this traffic reopened than the insurgents seized the Upper Pasig country and threw a large force into the towns of Pasig, Pateros, and Taguig, which it advanced to Guadalupe, within rifle shot of San Pedro Macati, where the left of General Anderson's line rested. The bold resumption of the offensive at this point, the rapid concentration taking place at the north, and the restoration of communication between the northern and southern insurgent armies depressed the better social element of the city and correspondingly elevated the hopes of the hostile military organizations in our midst. Active demonstrations, in attacking troops on the streets, setting fires in thickly populated districts, with an occasional murder or assassination, were resumed, and rendered it again necessary to take every precautionary measure for the city's safety. Orders were given to the division commanders to confine the duties of their men within the city to the protection of their barracks, and not permit them to patrol the streets, as the provost-marshal-general was prepared to effectually repress any attempt on the part of the inhabitants to inflict serious damage.

On the evening of February 9 I wired General MacArthur at the Chinese church, the advanced angle of his line, the following:

Reported that the insurgents will attack at 3 o'clock in the morning. Their plan to attack your front in large force and at the same time to rise in your rear in Lico district. They have been entering through Vitas swamps all day and landing at intersection of Calle Sande and Calle de Lemery at bridge. Bolo men will form between Vitas district and Lico road.

About the same hour General MacArthur telegraphed:

It has been necessary to reinforce the blockhouse at the mouth of Vitas Creek on account of the threatening attitude of the surrounding population. Please have the situation examined and either authorize the abandonment of the blockhouse entirely or make it part of the provost duty of the city. The company there is from Kansas, and concentration in front of that regiment is reported as still in progress.

The general was directed to hold on to the position, it being considered of vital importance, and assistance was sent to the company occupying the point. Later the general was instructed in telegram as follows:

Not intended that you should keep 3 troops at Vitas Creek unless necessary to protect your rear from contemplated annoyance on part of inhabitants of section. You are far out and General Hughes can not efficiently reach you. The bolo men of Tondo are restless to-day.

The action of February 10, already hereinbefore reported, followed, but instead of having a quieting effect on the hostile portion of the inhabitants, appeared to incite them to greater energy. Rumors of meditated uprisings were constant and were only checked by the untiring watchfulness of the provost guard. Fires in different sections of the city, mostly in the outskirts, were of nightly occurrence.

On February 15 the provost marshal-general secured an order issued by the Malolos government through the responsible officer who had raised and organized the hostile inhabitants within the city and then departed for the insurgent capital, which directed a rising that evening, and which for barbarous intent is unequaled in these modern times of civilized warfare. A translation reads in part as follows:

First. You will so dispose that at 8 o'clock at night the individuals of the territorial militia at your order will be found united in all the streets of San Pedro armed with their "bolos" and revolvers and guns and ammunition, if convenient.

Second. Philippine families only will be respected. They should not be molested, but all other individuals, of whatever race they may be, will be exterminated without any compassion after the extermination of the army of occupation.

Third. The defenders of the Philippines in your command will attack the guard at Bilibid and liberate the prisoners and "presidarios," and, having accomplished this, they will be armed, saying to them, "Brothers, we must avenge ourselves on the Americans and exterminate them, that we may take our revenge for the infamies and treacheries which they have committed upon us. Have no compassion upon them; attack with vigor. All Filipinos 'en masse' will second you. Long live Filipino independence!"

* * * * * * *

Fifth. The order which will be followed in the attack will be as follows: The sharpshooters of Tondo and Santa Ana will begin the attack from without, and these shots will be the signal for the militia of Trozo, Binondo, Quiapo, and Sampaloc to go out into the street and do their duty. Those of Paco, Ermita and Malate, Santa Cruz and San Miguel will not start out until 12 o'clock unless they see their companions need assistance.

Sixth. The militia will start out at 3 o'clock in the morning. If all do their duty our revenge will be complete. Brothers, Europe contemplates us. We know how to die as men, shedding our blood in defense of the liberty of our country. Death to the tyrants, war without quarter to the false Americans, who have deceived us! Either independence or death!

Of course arrangements were made to immediately check this contemplated demonstration, but the order gave us our first positive assurance of the tactics which the insurgents intended to pursue and confirmed the rumors of intent which had been prevalent since the last week in January. This fortunate precaution served to keep very active the watchfulness of all officers charged with the safety of the city, and vigilance was rewarded on the night of February 22, when a directed rising was attempted and was successful in its inception and primary stages. Considerable numbers of armed insurgents, passing by water and through swamps around MacArthur's left, entered Tondo, the northern district of the city, about a mile to the rear of his line, and there concealed themselves, awaiting their opportunity. Shortly after dark in the evening a number of buildings, some of considerable importance, situated in the thickly settled portion of Binondo, were simultaneously fired, having been previously kerosened, and while the city fire department (a department the membership of which was confined to natives who had always proved loyal) was making great efforts to extinguish the fires, or at least hold them under control, the fire hose was repeatedly cut and musketry shooting commenced very near them at the north, on the Tondo and Binondo line. This General Hughes, present in person, soon checked with his troops, driving the attacking parties northward, when other fires broke out in the Binondo district near the river bank, which threatened our army supplies.

These were quickly extinguished and the armed insurgents again driven northward. Early the next morning General Hughes moved against this enemy secreted in Tondo, which may have numbered 1,000 or more, drove it northward toward General MacArthur's lines, although it resisted stoutly from its concealments in the bambo and rice paddies, and behind barricades which it had erected. The enemy's casualties numbered about 500, while General Hughes's loss, owing to the rapidity and fierceness of his attack, was very slight. This punishment put an end to the dangerous demonstrations within the city on the part of the insurgent inhabitants, and thereafter they failed to respond to the orders given them by the Malolos government, much to the latter's indignation, which charged them with a lack of patriotism. Since February 23, few shots of sentinels or patrols have been heard within the confines of Manila, and those in the nighttime, which were aimed generally at the towers of churches and convents from which responsive signals were being transmitted to the signals seen at prominent points occupied by the insurgent troops.

While these interesting events were passing in Manila, our outer lines were being placed in a condition of defense so that they might be securely held by fewer troops, thus giving us the men to operate with and initiate attack on the increasing forces of the enemy, who were becoming quite bold again. The length of our line north of the Pasig River was about 9 miles, and it was necessary to maintain it for the safety of the city and the protection of our water plant. Besides the force at the pumping station, we were obliged to keep a large detachment on the Maraquina road north of the station, and to patrol the road between it and the reservoir, a distance of about 4 miles. These detached troops, which were commanded by Colonel Stotsenburg, invited the attention of the insurgents. About the 12th instant they made a spirited attack on the Maraquina outpost, but were signally defeated and driven several miles northward through San Francisco del Monte toward Caloocan. On February 22 the First Nebraska and Wyoming Volunteers attacked and scattered a considerable body of insurgents between the reservoir, pumping station, and Pasig River, which had placed itself in that locality, and on February 24 a detachment of the Oregon regiment and a company of the Nebraska infantry attacked and defeated an insurgent force north of the Maraquina road. Similar actions occurred on the 25th and 27th of the month, when the persistent enemy was driven northward with considerable loss. Again, on March 5, 6, and 7, portions of the Nebraska, Oregon, and Utah troops were obliged to attack and drive off other bodies of insurgent troops which appeared near the pumping station and on the Maraquina road. These expeditions served to check their ardor in that direction, and they began to pay more attention to other portions of our lines, becoming very annoying in the vicinity of Caloocan and in front of San Pedro Macati. At these points the troops wanted to attack, but nothing substantial could be gained thereby and the city would be exposed needlessly. The line of the Pasig was considered as the first requisite to improve our military situation, and we were awaiting the arrival of troops, daily expected. The Twentieth Infantry reported February 23, and the Twenty-second Infantry March 4 and 5. This gave us sufficient additional force to take the initiative. We had lost the Tennessee Volunteers, sent to Iloilo, and received two additional regiments, and our enlisted strength for duty in and around Manila, the provost guard included, numbered nearly 15,000 men. A provisional brigade was formed consisting of the Twentieth and Twenty-second regiments of

infantry, 3 troops of the Fourth Cavalry, a section of Light Battery D, Sixth Artillery, 2 battalions of the Washington and 7 companies of the Oregon Volunteers, and Brig. Gen. Lloyd Wheaton, U. S. V., was placed in command. This brigade engaged the enemy at Guadalupe ridge, near San Pedro Macati, at Pasig, Pateros, Cainta, and Taguig, and drove him out and beyond these towns. The insurgents, however, concentrated near Taguig, and made a spirited attack on General Wheaton's troops there, inflicting a few casualties, but he collected his forces quickly and early the next morning made a counter attack, which the insurgents were unable to withstand, routed them and drove them 15 miles down the shore of the lake. Their losses in killed and wounded numbered more than 200, while General Wheaton's casualties in the entire six days engaged (between March 10 and 17 did not aggregate 30. The gunboat *Laguna de Bay*, Captain Grant, of the Utah Artillery, commanding, assisted greatly in these affairs, opened the river to the lake which she entered, dispersed the insurgents' shipping, which consisted of launches, cascoes, and innumerable small boats, considerable of which were captured. Garrisons were established at the towns of Pasig, Pateros and Taguig, with one gunboat in the lake and one in the river, when the remainder of the brigade was returned to the city and incorporated in other organizations. The line of the Pasig was thus established and the insurgent communication between their forces to the north and on the south was permanently interrupted.

In the meantime my native scouts were obtaining information at the north. Malolos had become a war depot; also Calumpit and Baliuag. It was reported that the former city contained a very large quantity of rifle ammunition; that the intervening country beyond Caloocan and along the line of the railroad was virtually covered with defensive works, intrenchments having been constructed every few hundred yards. Lieutenant-General Luna boasted of having available on the short line fronting General MacArthur's left 16,000 men, but my scouts numbered those between Caloocan and Malolos at from six to eight thousand and verified their estimates by personal observation. This concentrated insurgent force was then our true objective, and it was believed that it would stand and receive our attacks. Our troops were impatient to be let loose and were in excellent health and spirits.

The Fourth and Seventeenth Infantry, with Major-General Lawton and staff, arrived from New York City between the 10th and 22d of March. New military combinations were made on March 17, General Lawton relieving Major-General Anderson, who had been advanced to the position of brigadier general in the regular establishment and directed to proceed to the United States. Both this division and the second, that of General MacArthur, were given three brigades, those in the first commanded by Brigadier-Generals Ovenshine, King, and Wheaton, and those in the second by Brigadier-Generals Hale, Otis, and Hall. To secure sufficient force for the northern advance it was necessary to take all available organizations from both divisions, but Manila and the waterworks must remain covered. A separate column for General MacArthur was made up from his own immediate command, composed mostly of the volunteers, and consisting of the brigades of Brigadier-Generals Otis and Hale, the Colorado regiment being left to guard the deposito and pumping station. Brigadier-General Wheaton was directed to take command of the left of this line from La Loma to Caloocan, and the Kansans, Montanas, Pennsylvanians, and a battalion of the Third Artillery and nearly all the Utah Light Artillery were relieved therefrom by the Oregon Volunteers, the Third and Twenty-

second Infantry, a battalion of the Twenty-third Infantry of the provost guard subsequently reporting, and two or three days thereafter the Minnesota Volunteers, which had been relieved from the provost guard by the Twentieth Infantry. Brigadier-General Hall was assigned to the right of this line, having the Colorado and Wyoming troops, the Fourth and Seventeenth Infantry, and a platoon of the Utah Light Artillery. He was directed to make a demonstration to the north when General MacArthur should take up his advance, for which everything was in readiness on March 24. That night the troops intended to take part in this particular movement were withdrawn from the trenches and assembled behind La Loma and the Deposito and very early the next morning proceeded on their march. General MacArthur's instructions were to move in two columns in echelon from the right, the right brigade (Hale's) preceding the left (Otis's) by a considerable distance, so that the latter would cover the left and rear of the former and neutralize any attack from the insurgents in that direction, who were very strong from Caloocan to Balintauag on the Novaliches road. Wheaton, whose left rested at La Loma, and who was expected to swing to the left on Caloocan at the proper time, was directed not to move until specially directed, unless MacArthur's left column should become seriously engaged and need assistance. The advancing columns were to move on Novaliches—Hale's brigade to that point by San Francisco del Monte and Bagbag, and Otis's keeping to the left and retired was expected to strike the Novaliches road near and to the right of Balintauag. Crossing the Tulihan River, fordable at Novaliches, they were to turn to the westward and thence proceeding by the road which strikes the railway south of Polo were to place themselves on the left flank of the enemy while General Wheaton made a frontal attack. This matured plan failed in part, owing to the natural obstacles which were constantly met on the line of march. Hale's brigade moving by San Francisco del Monte encountered serious difficulties there and beyond, and was obliged to drive off detachments of the enemy, by which it was unavoidably detained, and the left brigade gained the advance. It was attacked by the insurgents, when Wheaton commenced his swinging movement to the left and diverted their attention. The brigade struck the Tulihan River some distance below Novaliches, crossed its artillery and transportation only by a great deal of labor, because of the high banks and the dense growth of brush, while the right brigade continued on to Novaliches and took the designated western route. This march was exhausting in the extreme, and the entire day was consumed when the right bank of the river was attained. Early the next morning both brigades marched toward the railway, but could not develop a line northward in the immediate vicinity of Polo, as intended, on account of the swamps, thick masses of brush, and tropical undergrowth through which the artillery and transportation could not be passed, not even the men.

While these brigades were executing this movement that of General Wheaton had engaged the enemy with great spirit. Some time before evening it had driven him from all of his intrenchments back and across the Tulihan River, which it was about to cross in pursuit when its advance was arrested to await developments on the enemy's left flank by the troops expected from Novaliches. The next morning, as soon as the head of that column had about gained the railway line, it was permitted to renew the attack, and, quickly passing the river at two points and aided by the flanking troops, completely routed the enemy and drove him northward and beyond Polo, where he made a determined

stand the following day, from which he was driven by General MacArthur's united troops with considerable loss. From that date to end of the month MacArthur pressed northward the enemy, who stubbornly contested every village and locality having defensive advantages and burned every town from which it was obliged to retreat. Our troops entered Malolos, the insurgent capital, March 31. That alleged government had removed all its records and property, and its army set fire to the city when it retreated on Calumpit and Quingua before our advance. The troops needed rest, and it was necessary to repair the railway over which the advance had been made in order to forward the necessary supplies. The line of communication, too, was long, considering the position of the enemy on our flank and the few troops which could be spared to protect it, and it was believed that a water base could be established at Malolos which would make available for the field an additional 1,500 men. Our casualties from the commencement of hostilities to April 1 were 12 officers and 127 enlisted men killed and 48 officers and 833 enlisted men wounded. The sick among these troops which had advanced to the north increased to 15 per cent, due mostly to their exhaustive labors and to heat prostrations.

Efforts to secure a water line of communication by Manila Bay and the Malolos estuary were made immediately and continued for more than two weeks. The proper mouth of the estuary was found with considerable difficulty. A bar had formed in front of it, making the entrance very tortuous. Up this two of our gunboats worked their way, but encountered well-driven piles and other obstructions which the insurgents had placed there and around which mud and sand had collected, making the water too shoal for navigation. Near the mouth of the stream a dredge was used and the gunboats removed a good many of the pile obstructions, but satisfactory results could not be obtained and the work was abandoned. A considerable detail of soldiers was made to put in sufficient repair for immediate use the railway from Manila to Malolos, and Chinese labor was hired. The track had been considerably damaged by the insurgents and a number of bridges partially destroyed, but Major Devol, of the Quartermaster's Department, overcame all difficulties, and, with the engines captured at Caloocan, gave Malolos daily railway train service.

While these preliminaries to a farther northern advance were being made General Lawton, commanding the First Division of the corps, was directed to proceed to the city of Santa Cruz, on the south shore of the Laguna de Bay, and secure a number of launches and a Spanish gunboat, which were reported to be concealed in a narrow stream passing along the eastern limit of that city. Returning, he was directed to seize Calamba, an important strategic point on account of its being at the intersection of important roads and telegraphic lines. For this purpose he was obliged to draw troops from the lines about Manila and along the Pasig River. He collected and concentrated parts of organizations, numbering all told 1,509 men, consisting of 3 dismounted troops of the Fourth Cavalry, 2 mountain guns, 8 companies of the Fourteenth Infantry, 4 companies of the Idaho and 4 of the North Dakota Volunteers, and an organization of 200 sharpshooters, largely drawn from the Washington regiment. With these troops, in several cascoes towed by three of our gunboats, he proceeded across the lake on April 9, captured on the following day Santa Cruz, which he found intrenched and strongly defended, drove the enemy several miles into the interior, and proceeded to secure the vessels for which he had been sent. The water of the lake had become very low and the boats could not be

passed over the bar at the river's mouth. Reporting this fact and the further fact that he could not make a landing at Calamba on account of shoal water, a dredge was sent him from Manila, and also instructions to return immediately to the city with his force as soon as he could secure possession of the vessels in the river, as his services were required here, and that the taking of Calamba was not imperative at this time. He returned on April 17, bringing six steam launches and two cascoes which the enemy had concealed near Santa Cruz. The Spanish gunboat was not found, and was subsequently captured at Calamba with machinery in good condition, but without her guns, which the insurgents had taken for land service.

The insurgents at the north were becoming very bold again. They had worked around in the swampy country to the westward and rear of Malolos, and down along the roads, paths, and villages to the eastward, from which they were making occasional nightly incursions on the railroad for the purpose of destroying it. We could not remain quiet, as we did not have sufficient troops to maintain the long lines we were holding if we permitted the enemy to concentrate and take the initiative. The total strength of the Eighth Corps present in the Philippines at this time was 967 officers and 25,036 enlisted men, of whom 5,000 were serving at Cavite and the Visayan islands. Of these 836 were of the Engineer, Signal, and Hospital Corps; 2,739 were sick and in confinement as prisoners, and some 1,500 were on special duty in the various staff departments or assisting in civil administration. The available fighting force in Luzon, Cavite excepted, numbered, therefore, about 16,500 men.

General MacArthur could not advance beyond Malolos with the troops at his disposal while the enemy so seriously threatened his flanks and line of communication. To assist him, the formation of an independent column, to consist of nearly 4,000 men, to be taken from the Manila lines and the railway guards, and to move to the north, on the flank of the enemy, was determined upon. The formation and movement of this column was intrusted to General Lawton, who entered upon this special service as soon as he returned from Santa Cruz. He concentrated near Caloocan the Twenty-second Infantry, which had been relieved from duty on the railroad a short time previous; 8 companies of the Third Infantry; the First North Dakota Volunteers; 4 troops of the Fourth Cavalry (one mounted); Hawthorne's battery of light guns, portion of Light Battery D, Sixth Artillery; and a detachment of the Signal Corps. He was furnished with such transportation of the country as could be secured, and was instructed to move these troops along the base of the mountains by Novaliches, San Jose, and Nozagaray, where the balance of his column, consisting of 8 companies of the Minnesota and 7 of the Oregon Volunteers, to be taken from the railway and to march from Bocaue by way of Santa Maria, would join him. The last-named troops were to escort ten days' supplies for his command by quartermaster's transportation, which had just been received from the United States and was then being put in readiness for the road. These movements commenced, and the railroad south of Bigaa being thereby rendered secure, it was intended that General MacArthur should move on Calumpit, leaving sufficient force between Bigaa and Malolos to guard his line. General Lawton, after concentration at Nozagaray, was directed to move on Baliuag, from which point, the swamps being dry, he could act on an enemy opposing MacArthur's advance. General Lawton started from near Caloocan on April 22; encountered some opposition from the enemy at Novaliches and en route from San Jose,

which did not impede his march; but soon after leaving Novaliches his road, a well defined and prominent one on all Spanish maps, became a trail, and subsequently a trail crossing or passing through rice patches, swampy country, and unbridged streams, over which his advance was conducted with the greatest difficulty. His troops proved equal to the occasion, and after he had lost many of his carrabaos, or water buffalo, from heat exhaustion, they cheerfully hauled the transportation, working one day the entire time for 3 miles progress. He in person reached Nozagaray on April 25 and met there the Bocaue column, which had arrived that morning, and there awaited the Bocaue transportation and supplies, which had been detained, and the rear of the Novaliches column.

General MacArthur took up his advance on the 24th. The Bagbag and Calumpit rivers, over which the railroad bridges had been partially destroyed, were in his front, and there were no means of crossing them. The country was low, swampy, and considerable of it covered with brush, rendering it very difficult for military operations, and the insurgents had constructed strong intrenchments along the rivers and thought themselves secure. General Hale with his brigade was sent to the eastward, up the Bagbag River, and crossed in the face of fierce opposition at the Quingua ford, about 4 miles from Malolos; thence swinging down the right bank of that river he took the enemy's intrenchments in reverse, inflicting heavy losses. Wheaton, who now commanded a brigade of the division, as soon as Hale's descent had somewhat cleared his front, succeeded in crossing his troops over the railway bridge, after slight repair, and that portion of Calumpit south of the river of that name was lost to the enemy the following day. Lieutenant-General Luna commanded in person the insurgent troops north of the river and had collected a considerable force, estimated at 4,000 men, to oppose the crossing, while 3,000 were held at Baliuag, to the east. To his right as far as Haganoy strong detachments were maintained, and also to his left connecting with Baliuag. In the face of this opposition MacArthur's men effected the crossing on April 28, under the accurate concentrated fire of the guns of the Utah Light Artillery, commanded by Major Young. This fire drove back the enemy from the river bank and the Kansas men, swimming the rapid river, were enabled to secure boat transportation on the northern shore. Crossing with this and on the railroad bridge (of which, though a span had been dropped, the outer rails remained) a foothold was secured and the enemy was soon after driven northward up the railroad track for a distance of 2 miles.

General Lawton, having concentrated his force at Nozagaray and Angat, drove the enemy to the north and westward in a number of spirited engagements and was directed to proceed to Baliuag. A short time thereafter I was informed that 2,000 armed insurgents were about to march north from San Mateo, a place 8 miles northeast of Manila, under the command of General Pilar; that it would pass on a mountain road with the intention of gaining the flank of Lawton, who was directed to keep his scouts well out to the eastward from Nozagaray, which he did without discovering the expected hostile column which, to the number of 1,000, had passed farther to the right and entered the country to the northeast of Baliuag. The latter place, with large stores of rice and sugar, was captured in a spirited attack after slight opposition, the enemy retreating northward, while General Lawton, maintaining great activity to his right and front, felt along the east bank of the Rio Grande in the vicinity of San Luis to ascertain if the enemy was

present. He was detained at Baliuag to await the delivery of rations for his command by way of Malolos and to enable General MacArthur to secure an advanced point in a more open country and discover the whereabouts of the retreating enemy. On May 5 he was instructed as follows:

GENERAL LAWTON, *Baliuag:*

Can not determine definite movement until MacArthur gets in position and is prepared for further action. His advance is at San Fernando. In the meantime hold present positions, observing any movements of insurgents to the north and east of you. MacArthur is confident insurgents retired up railroad instead of passing northeastward.

On the same day the following telegram was sent to General MacArthur:

You will arrest your advance at San Fernando. It is impossible to ascertain route taken by insurgents, who were not expected to make a stand at San Fernando. It is believed they will take the road to Arayat, in the direction of San Isidro. They have strong intrenchments at first-named place. Report fully conditions and casualties as soon as practicable. We congratulate your troops.

Gunboats will soon start to seek entrance of Rio Grande, but we can not obtain any encouraging information. The river from Calumpit north is navigable; the mouth very difficult of access.

Lawton holds Maasin, Baliuag, and Quingua. Had quite a sharp engagement capturing first-named place. Insurgents attacked Ovenshine's line last evening; quickly repulsed. They have appeared on the lake with cascoes and are very active.

On May 6 the following telegrams were sent, which show the situation as then understood:

Major KOBBE, *Third Artillery, Malolos:*

You will take command of all the troops on the railway between Calumpit and Marilao and so dispose them as to furnish the best protection to this line of communication. It is reported that a large force from the province of Morong is now moving to attack General Lawton's right by way of Nozagaray and Angat. It is possible that a portion of this force may appear at Santa Maria and attempt the destruction of the railroad in that vicinity. With General Lawton's force at Baliuag, a detachment at Quingua, and another at Bagbag Bridge, it would appear that only that portion of the line between Guiguinto and Marilao could be in danger. Bocaue and Bigaa should be made strong, having detachments well out toward Santa Maria. Acknowledge receipt.

MANILA, *May 6.*

General LAWTON, *Baliuag:*

Please report localities at which rice and sugar found and destroyed by your scouts were captured and what section of country your scouts are observing to-day.

MacArthur's success at Santo Tomas and San Fernando greater than at first reported. Enemy's loss was very severe, they leaving some 50 or 60 dead on the field and probably a couple of hundred rifles. * * * Enemy evidently thinks you are supplied by Angat. The insurgent force at San Mateo was ready to move last night. It is fairly well armed, has fair amount ammunition and plenty of rice. Subsistence and ammunition transported by extra men. Watch well by scouting parties country to the east of you. The reported line of enemy's march is Norzagaray, Angat, San Rafael and Bustos. Also rumored that a force may strike at Santa Maria. General Hall will send out detachments to watch road by Novaliches. Acknowledge receipt.

From all the information I was able to obtain, and from the fact that the inhabitants of the Tarlac province and to the north of the same were not strongly in sympathy with the rebellion, I was convinced that Luna's immediate army, which had confronted MacArthur's

troops, would retire by Arayat, a strong natural position and strongly intrenched, into the Tagalo province of Nueva Ecija covering San Isidro, where abundant supplies could be obtained. As soon as MacArthur, by scouting to his front, had definitely ascertained and reported that this army had retreated on the line of railroad the situation was understood. There was one objective army on the line of railroad and another covering the country in front of Baliuag and to the east of the Rio Grande River. General Lawton was detained at Baliuag scouting to his north and east for several successive days, taking, in the meantime, Maasin, which he occupied with his advance, and capturing at various places a considerable quantity of the enemy's food supplies, which had been stored in improvised granaries. General MacArthur was directed to take Bacolor and Guagua to his left and rear, and thus establish a water base at Guagua, as the railroad was not in operation beyond Bagbag, south of Calumpit, and could not be placed in condition for use as far as San Fernando in less time than ten days, at least, and the bridges not for two or three weeks. Fortunately an engine and a few cars had been captured near San Fernando and could do service north of Calumpit after a slight repair of the railway track.

On May 7 Captain Grant, of the Utah Artillery, with two gunboats, was instructed to proceed from Manila to Guagua with supplies for MacArthur's troops, with whom he was directed to communicate at that point. He found the entrance of the Guagua River without difficulty, proceeded upstream until Sexmoan was reached, when he was fired upon by some 500 of the enemy strongly intrenched on a projecting point of the river bank. He passed the point without responding, swung into the bank immediately after passing it and opened a deadly fire, striking the insurgents in flank behind their breastworks, and quickly scattered those who were able to retire. He met no further opposition until Guagua was reached. Then he boldly ran along the city's wharves and cleared the place of the few armed insurgents present, who set fire to several buildings and retreated. Landing his men, he pursued the enemy a short distance, then assisted the citizens to extinguish the fires, and retired to his boats. The San Fernando troops not appearing, he returned to Manila on the following day. Before Captain Grant was directed to proceed to Guagua General MacArthur had signified his ability to communicate with him there, but subsequently, and after Grant was beyond recall, he reported that his situation was such with regard to the enemy that he did not consider the movement on Bacolor and Guagua prudent. At the first-named place there was quite a force of the enemy intrenched, and he did not think that his force at that time was sufficient to drive it off and hold the Guagua line while maintaining also his line of communication by rail. As soon as Captain Grant reported at Manila he was directed to find the mouth of the Rio Grande and pass up that stream to Calumpit, which place he successfully reached without marked incident on May 10. He was then directed to proceed up the river and clear the banks of insurgents as far as Candaba, which he accomplished, having a sharp engagement at San Luis. These boats could navigate this river as far up as Arayat, a point some 12 miles northeast of San Fernando, and could keep that line open without much difficulty. It was determined, therefore, to move MacArthur's troops on Luna's flank, as a further immediate advance up the railroad was impracticable because of the impossibility of then taking supplies by that route; and after

we had secured the Rio Grande, on May 11, I telegraphed MacArthur as follows:

No intention to make San Fernando base for future operations. You say supply by water at that point impracticable and reconstruction of railway necessary. Several days yet required to reach Calumpit with railway, and probably several more necessary to reach San Fernando. Calumpit will be the base and troops supplied, for a time at least, by cascoes to be sent there at once. There are 6 feet of water in Rio Grande to Candaba, and it is practicable for light-draft boats to reach San Isidro. Your first objective is Candaba, where gunboats can meet you; thence probably by river road north. One-half light battery and your convalescents, of which 100 South Dakota men should go up to-day, will be sent you, and probably 2 battalions Seventeenth Infantry. This will carry your enlisted force to about 4,000 and should be ample to drive any force enemy can place in your front. General Lawton has a more difficult problem. The enemy has a large force at San Ildefonso and San Miguel, and it is now reported that Generals Pilar and Geronimo have reached latter point. Should Lawton be pressed hard it may be necessary for you to give assistance by way of Candaba, otherwise he will join you on river near San Isidro. It is believed that gunboats, cascoes, and launches can supply you on river, and it will not be necessary for your train to carry very much supply. One battalion Seventeenth Infantry will probably be sent you tomorrow afternoon. You will necessarily need sufficient supplies on starting to take you to Candaba. There is great necessity for celerity of movement, and it is desired that it be inaugurated as soon as practicable.

To this dispatch the General replied that he would act on the instructions contained therein at once, but considered the directed movement a very delicate one and that conditions should be carefully weighed before it was attempted; that his position at San Fernando was satisfactory, and that he thought the troops should remain to recuperate until the railway could be repaired to that point; that he had about 3,800 men, 2,600 of whom were continually on the fighting line, and that he desired to exchange regiments which were with him for some in rear, which were comparatively fresh; that Luna was in his immediate front with 2,500 men and had 1,000 at Mexico, on the Candaba road, and that there were possibly 10,000, between him and the Baliuag country. MacArthur's troops were at this time pretty well worn out, and a great many of them were on sick report. They had been fighting almost continually for three months in a tropical climate and over a swampy country through which wagon transportation could not be moved. There were no fresh troops to send to San Fernando. The withdrawal of the Spanish forces in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, where troops must be placed, the necessity of sending others to Cebu and to increase those in Negros—all of which was imperatively demanded at this time—rendered conditions somewhat critical. I had also been directed to return the volunteer organizations to the United States without delay, and in response I cabled, on May 11, to Washington as follows:

Volunteer organizations first to return now at Negros and 45 miles from Manila at front. Expected that transports now arriving will take returning volunteers. Volunteers understand they will begin to leave for United States latter part of month. Know importance of their presence here at this time, and accept sacrifices which United States interests make imperative. *Hancock* now entering harbor. Transports returning this week carry sick and wounded men. *Pennsylvania* and *St. Paul* not needed longer in southern waters where they have been retained, hence dispatched. Transports *Nelson* and *Cleveland* brought freight; return without cargo.

This I did after consulting with some of the most prominent volunteer officers, pointing out to them the delicate situation we were in, and they responded that the volunteers would willingly remain until it was cleared up or until more of the regular regiments then en route could arrive. We must now either advance at the north or retreat to

Calumpit, holding the railroad in our rear and await reenforcements with which to replace all volunteers, having in the meantime a large insurgent force in our immediate front and a continually increasing one south of Manila, which had become annoying and which now numbered 5,000 men. It was therefore determined to direct MacArthur to hold on to San Fernando with what force he had, operating against and holding Luna as best he could; to send a detached column up the Rio Grande, and to permit Lawton to advance. The Ninth and Seventeenth Infantry had reported by April 23, and the Twenty-first arrived on May 11. This gave us opportunity to forward more of the Manila troops. Major Kobbe, Third Artillery, then at Malolos, was directed to Calumpit, to which point 1 battalion of the Ninth Infantry, 3 of the Seventeenth, and Light Battery E, First Artillery were sent. He was ordered to proceed up the river with this force to Candaba, attended by the gunboats which were to haul cascoes loaded with 20,000 extra rations. This command left Calumpit May 16 and reached Candaba the following day, having encountered little opposition.

On May 13 General Lawton reported from Baliuag that a commission sent by General Aguinaldo had presented itself and desired to be sent to Manila to confer with the United States Peace Commission. He was instructed as follows:

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., May 13, 1899.

Maj. Gen. H. W. LAWTON, U. S. V.,
Commanding United States Forces, Baliuag, Luzon.

GENERAL: The commanding general of the United States forces in the Philippines directs me to inform you that you will reply to the communication addressed to you by Gen. Gregorio del Pilar, of the Philippine forces at your front, which communication was delivered to me by Captain Sewell, of your staff, and is herewith returned, that should General Aguinaldo desire to send representative men to confer with the United States commission now in session in this city, you are at liberty and will pass such body through your lines, promising them safe conduct to and from Manila and ample protection during their stay here. Railway transportation between Malolos and Manila is freely accorded.

Very respectfully,

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

This commission was received by me upon arrival and made known its mission, which was to take preliminary action toward the negotiation of terms of peace. It was quickly informed that cessation of hostilities depended entirely upon surrender of arms and the disbandment of their military organizations. Expressing then the desire to confer with the peace commission, it was afforded the opportunity. For lack of time I was not present at any of these conferences, which extended through two days. The commission was then sent north through our lines, having accomplished nothing in so far as my knowledge extended.

On May 14 General Lawton was given permission to advance on San Miguel as his objective. Leaving a battalion of troops at Baliuag he marched rapidly on Ildefonso, where he routed a strong force of the enemy by a dexterous flank movement to his right, and proceeding on San Miguel, where the enemy was strongly intrenched, accomplished the same result by similar tactics. On the evening of May 15 he was instructed as follows:

General LAWTON, *San Miguel:*

Your next objective is San Isidro, unless your progress so much impeded by enemy that your subsistence likely to give out, in which event you should seek road to Rio Grande and try to communicate with Kobbe's column and gunboats, where

you will find rations. Kobbe's column will be pushed up as rapidly as possible, but can not tell how far gunboats can ascend river. Believe they can ascend to Arayat, where enemy have heavy intrenchments. Watch well your right. It is reported that a large number of insurgents are at Biacnabato. Report not verified. No change in MacArthur's front. Still confronted by about 5,000 men.

Marching out of San Miguel the next morning, where he left a containing force, he struck the insurgents, whom he drove to the right and left, and bewildering them by his rapidity of movement, which rendered them unable to concentrate, he seized San Isidro, the third insurgent capital, on May 17, General Aguinaldo and cabinet, with troops, having retired to Cabanatuan, 14 miles to the north, on road leading into the mountains of northern Luzon. Late in the evening of that day General MacArthur reported as follows:

My information is not absolutely certain, but everything indicates that insurgents from my front and right retired along the railroad. A reconnoitering party reached the 67-kilometer post, and at that point discovered stragglers apparently in rear of a column moving in their front. We went out the road through Mexico to Santa Ana and found both points vacated, and was informed by natives that insurgent soldiers had gone to Angeles. Up to late hour this afternoon the line between here and Bacolor was still occupied by insurgents. To-morrow I hope to get definite information.

The following day it was ascertained that Luna had retreated on Tarlac with about 3,000 men, leaving a considerable force under General Mascardo on General MacArthur's left, with headquarters at Santa Rita or in that vicinity. It was believed that a considerable insurgent force would be found at the strong defensive position of Arayat, and to that point both General Lawton and Major Kobbe were sent, General Lawton being instructed at midnight May 17 as follows:

General LAWTON, *San Isidro:*

Your next objective, Arayat down Rio Grande, after troops have rested and peace restored at San Isidro. Arayat reported to be strongly intrenched. Kobbe and gunboats started up river this morning at 6. This early announcement, fearing telegraphic communication may be lost.

On the following morning the following information was sent him:

General LAWTON, *San Isidro:*

General MacArthur reports that from information almost positive he believes that 1,000 of Luna's men have retired to Florida Blanca and Porac, which are to his left; that Luna with 3,000 armed men is at Tarlac. He states that all his information is to the effect that Luna has not sent assistance to the east and is not likely to do so, as there is no cooperation between him and the force on the San Isidro line. He states that Major Bell is on reconnoissance and now at or near Angeles; that he will not probably hear from him until late this evening. MacArthur's information was obtained from inhabitants of the country and an Englishman, Mr. Sims, who left Tarlac last evening and has just entered his lines.

Should this information prove true, all of the force sent by you to San Miguel this morning should continue its journey to Baliuag. Troops at San Miguel can not be supplied during the season of heavy rains.

Lawton, descending the Rio Grande, and Kobbe, ascending the stream, struck the place on the same hour of the day; found only a small force there, which quickly retreated. It was now determined to operate on General Luna's left flank, Lawton, reenforced by Kobbe, to take the road to Tarlac, when it was ascertained that General Luna had removed his headquarters to Bayambang, only a few miles north of Dagupan, and that his troops were retiring north of Tarlac. The railway facilities which the insurgents possessed rendered a rapid retreat on their part very easy.

The rainy season had now come and the volunteer organizations

must be hastened homeward, and should a column be sent to Tarlac the enemy would retire, leaving us a destroyed or badly damaged railroad without the means to operate it, and we were seriously crippled for lack of wagon transportation. Our troops once at Tarlac could not be supplied, and all were needed at other points until we could consummate the difficult feat of exchanging the volunteers for organizations of the regular establishment. We must keep what we had gained, and could do that by establishing a line to the front, extending from San Fernando on the left to Baliuag on the right, from which it would be easy to resume operations. General Lawton was recalled, a sufficient force placed at Candaba, San Luis, Calumpit, and Baliuag to hold the country in rear, and steps were taken to return and ship the volunteers as rapidly as circumstances would permit. But the condition of General MacArthur's troops was not improving. The volunteers had again become very restless and desired to depart. On June 2 the surgeon of one of these regiments reported that of 873 officers and enlisted men 30 per cent were in the Manila hospitals sick and wounded, 30 per cent were sick at San Fernando, "and of the remainder there are not 8 men in each company who have the strength to endure one day's march." In respect to this report the chief surgeon of MacArthur's division remarked that he had made a careful examination of the men and that of the whole number in the regiment then present only 96 were fit for duty. The division commander remarked on May 22 and June 5, with regard to these and similar reports, as follows:

The duty required of the men of this brigade, in common with the other commands of the division, has been severe and continuous since the 4th of February of the current year. The sun, field rations, physical exertion, and the abnormal excitement arising from almost constant exposure to fire action have operated to bring about a general enervation from which the men do not seem to readily recover, although the present conditions are very favorable. The four regiments now present have an enlisted strength of 3,701. Of these 1,403 are sick and wounded, leaving an effective of 2,298, which, after deducting necessary details for special duty, yields only 2,307 for the firing line, many of whom could not march 5 miles under the conditions which obtained from Malolos to this place.

The physical condition of men in the organizations which originally commenced the campaign in this division and are still at the front has during the past month been a matter of great concern. The difficulties are progressive and without any apparent fluctuation are growing worse from day to day.

For four months these men have been continually under arms night and day, exposed in a relaxing climate to a scorching sun, almost as destructive and much harder to bear than the enemy's fire, until apparently the severe, unremitting, and almost unexampled strain has told upon whole organizations to such an extent that they are now completely worn out and broken in health.

Later the chief surgeon of the department stated, when commenting on the conditions presented:

I can add nothing to the careful and valuable report made by the chief surgeon of the division. The data must be accurate and the conclusion unimpeachable. These men and the men of the companion regiments have been overworked, are broken down, and will not be fit for duty as a regiment within any reasonable period. It is difficult to explain, except at a length that would be unacceptable, how these physiological factors operate, but the fact remains, and here is a striking illustration of it, that commands do become worn out precisely as the fifth indorsement states.

The weakened hearts and quickened pulses indicate a condition akin to that of typhoid fever convalescence, and restoration to physical efficiency will not take place in this climate within any reasonable period, and meanwhile such men display no vital resistance to acute disease.

This feature of the "soldier's irritable heart" was a condition well recognized during the severe strain of the civil war, but with these men there is the additional disability of general physical prostration.

These reports I forwarded to Washington on June 23, with the following indorsement:

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army. I have inquired carefully into the condition of health of these organizations, which is now improving. The cause of sickness may be attributed, I believe, to the great strain attendant upon constant fighting, with lack of needed rest, neglect of person during this period, because of which a peculiar disease, designated itch, was developed, and indiscriminate consumption of fruit, which was abundant in the country over which troops passed and are stationed, and the use of water not potable. The South Dakota regiment was brought to Manila two weeks ago and is rapidly improving. The Kansas regiment is en route and the Montana regiment will soon follow. I think, like the Oregon regiment, when orders to take passage to the United States are issued, that both the Montana and South Dakota troops will recover with astonishing rapidity. There are few cases of serious illness. San Fernando, the present station of these troops, is considered somewhat as a health resort by the Filipinos, and there seems to be no good reason why men should not improve as rapidly there as in Manila, except that there is in the vicinity of San Fernando a very active enemy, which must be constantly watched, necessitating a larger percentage of men on outpost duty than at some other points.

The headquarters and 10 companies of the Third Infantry, with a platoon of artillery and a mounted troop of the Fourth Cavalry, took station at Baliuag, and headquarters and 2 battalions of the Twenty-second Infantry were placed at Candaba and San Luis, to be assisted, in case of attack, by one of the gunboats which was left in the Rio Grande, and which was to be used also in forwarding supplies from Calumpit. The rains coming on and heavy storms having been predicted for that section of country, the troops at San Miguel, whose rations were about exhausted, were ordered to fall back at once on Baliuag. They were attacked while en route at Ildefonso and Maasin, and were obliged to halt twice and drive off the enemy, which they did effectively, but the enemy published and celebrated for a long time their signal victories at Ildefonso, San Miguel, and San Isidro.

During these Luzon military operations affairs in the central islands became more or less critical, demanded careful supervision, and occasionally an accession of troops. As early as February 3 General Miller had reported from Iloilo that the inhabitants of Negros and Cebu realized that they could not successfully establish an independent government and wished the United States to exercise control. After the capture of Iloilo the navy visited the city of Cebu and took quiet possession of the place—the commanding officer of the force assuming direction of the business of the captain of the port and collector of customs and entering into an arrangement with the more prominent citizens to permit them to conduct their own internal affairs. This was reported to me with the request that troops be sent to that point to assist the small navy force there in case of necessity. On receipt of this information, and on February 26, the following order was issued and executed:

A battalion of the Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, Maj. G. A. Goodale commanding, will proceed at once by transport *Pennsylvania* to the port of Cebu, Island of Cebu, for the purpose of furnishing immediate protection to the inhabitants and property of that locality. The battalion will be supplied with rations for thirty days and 300 rounds of ammunition per man.

This did not relieve the officers of the Navy of the administration of civil affairs, the management of which it was desirable to turn over to the Army, and they continued in control awaiting our action to take formal possession. Upon General Miller's report that he had held a conference with some of the principal citizens of the island of Negros

and that they had raised the United States flag, wished a few troops to protect them from the Tagalos, whom they had declined to receive in the island, and desired to be sent to Manila to present conditions and solicit aid, instructions were given for a compliance with their request, whereupon a committee of four gentlemen arrived here on the 21st of February. Several conferences followed. They had, they said, established a crude temporary government, appointing a governor who was one of their number; that if permitted to arm a small battalion of natives to be placed under the direction of the United States officers and to receive the assistance of a few United States troops, they were confident that the quiet of the island could be maintained and the Tagalo element successfully restrained. A great deal of conversation, consuming portions of several successive days, followed. They were eager to be informed of the purposes of the United States, and were informed that a military government with general supervision of their affairs must be erected and maintained until Congressional legislation prescribed the nature and measure of control which would be imposed; that no assurances could be given them except that the civil government to be finally established would be republican in character and would give them as much local representation as the intelligence and animus of the people permitted and as was in harmony with their own and the interests of the United States.

The troops asked for were provided, and the committee was advised to return, call their representative people together, and, acting with and under the advice of the military governor whom I would send, to formulate and submit a plan of government for the administration of strictly internal affairs, which upon receipt I would forward for the consideration of the United States supreme authorities. I selected for their governor Colonel Smith, of the First California Volunteers, now brigadier-general of volunteers, an excellent soldier and a lawyer of experience. He had several conferences with them and won their confidence and esteem, when they expressed a strong desire to have him and a few troops accompany them to Negros, which was favorably acted upon.

To meet the situation which was rapidly developing in Panay, Negros, and Cebu the following orders were issued:

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 8. } HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, *Manila, P. I., March 1, 1899.*

1. A military district, comprising the islands of Panay, Negros, and Cebu and such other Visayan Islands as may be hereafter designated, to be known as the Visayan military district, is hereby established and placed under the supervision of Brig. Gen. Marcus P. Miller, U. S. A., commanding First Separate Brigade, Eighth Army Corps, with headquarters at Iloilo. The troops already sent to Cebu and those about to embark for Negros will furnish all possible protection to those islands, maintaining peace and order while administering the civil affairs throughout the islands on lines prescribed by the military government.

2. Col. James F. Smith, First Regiment California Volunteer Infantry, is hereby detached from his regiment, and will proceed by U. S. transport *St. Paul* with the troops mentioned in paragraph 5 of this order to Bacolod, Negros, via Iloilo, reporting upon his arrival at the last-named point to Brig. Gen. M. P. Miller, U. S. A., commanding the Visayan military district, the specific instructions which he has received from these headquarters, and there to receive such additional instructions as General Miller may wish to give in furtherance of their execution.

3. Colonel Smith is assigned to the command of the subdistrict of the island of Negros, and will establish his headquarters at the capital of that island, furnishing protection to the inhabitants thereof, whom he will assist to develop civil administration over the affairs of that island in accordance with the specific instructions already received from these headquarters.

4. Col. James F. Smith, First California Volunteer Infantry, commanding subdistrict of the island of Negros, will upon his arrival there, as directed in paragraph 2 of this order, proceed to organize from the natives of the island a civil police of 200 men, placing the organization under military discipline and retaining entire supervision of it. The men will be employed by the Quartermaster's Department and will be reported monthly on the quartermaster's form of persons and articles hired, on which will be stated their nativity and age, in addition to periods of service. Their compensation will be fixed by the scale of wages prevailing on the island, and the funds to pay for the services will be furnished from these headquarters. Each employee will receive a fixed ration, in addition to his money compensation, which will correspond to the native ration issued in this city. The Ordnance Department will turn over the necessary ordnance to arm and equip these men.

5. The Third Battalion of the First California Volunteer Infantry will embark at once on the U. S. transport *St. Paul*, prepared to proceed to Bacolod, island of Negros. It will be provided with rations for thirty days and 150,000 rounds of rifle ammunition. The commanding officer of this battalion (Maj. H. T. Sime, First California Volunteer Infantry) will report to Col. James F. Smith, of that regiment, for more specific instructions.

* * * * * * *

By command of Major-General Otis:

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

General Smith, with the troops and commissioners, left Manila on March 2, and on arrival at Bacolod, the capital of Negros, he took station and successfully organized a battalion of 200 natives, which has been loyal and has performed good service for the United States to the present date. But certain of the inhabitants of Tagalo nativity and others who were disaffected, aided by their friends in Panay, both with advice and war material, and assisted by the robber bands of the mountains, created disturbances in the western, central, and southern portions of the island which culminated in active hostilities. Smith, with his troops, went in pursuit of their concentrated forces wherever they chanced to be and successfully routed them, but it was impossible to cover the country and prevent reconcentration. He thereupon called for another battalion of his regiment, which was sent him on March 22. With this increased command he visited all occupied points of the island, and especially held in check the people of Dumaguete and Bais, on the southeast coast, where the insurgent element for a time appeared to be in the ascendancy.

This force not proving sufficient to place troops at all necessary points, a call was made for the third battalion of the regiment, which was forwarded on May 21. In the meantime the population of occidental and oriental Negros chose delegates to represent their several political districts in a convention at Bacolod, where, after some two months labor under the direction and protection of General Smith, a constitution was prepared for submission to the President of the United States. This document, having been received here, was forwarded to Washington about July 20 with appropriate remark, and served as a basis for the following order:

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 30.

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., July 22, 1899.

The people of Negros, through duly accredited representatives, having freely acknowledged the sovereignty of the United States over that island, and having developed and forwarded to His Excellency the President of the United States, for the consideration and deliberation of Congress, a proposed constitution or body of fundamental laws, upon which they seek to have established for themselves a republican form of government, it is deemed essential, pending final

action by the President and the Congress of the United States thereon, and while military supervision of the affairs of the island must be maintained, that a provisional government to administer its civil matters be instituted, under which the people may enjoy the largest measure of civil liberty compatible with prevailing conditions and which shall conform to their desires as expressed in their proposed constitution.

It is therefore ordered that a government for that island be established as speedily as practicable in plan and scope as indicated in the following enumerated provisions, the same to remain in force until modified by constituted authority.

I. The government of the island of Negros shall consist of a military governor, appointed by the United States military governor of the Philippines, who shall command the United States troops stationed therein, a civil governor and advisory council elected by the people. The military governor shall appoint secretaries of the treasury, interior, agriculture, public instruction, an attorney-general, and an auditor, who shall act under his immediate instructions. The seat of government shall be established at Bacolod.

II. The military governor shall exercise the supreme executive power. He shall see that the laws are executed; shall appoint to office and fill all vacancies in office not herein otherwise provided for, and may, with the approval of the military governor of the Philippines, remove any officer from office. He shall perform such other functions as the duties of his position may require.

III. The civil governor: There shall be elected by the people a civil governor, who shall advise the military governor on all public civil questions, and who shall preside over the advisory council. He shall countersign all grants and commissions of a civil nature which are executed by the military governor; attend every session of the advisory council, and in case of a tie vote in said body he shall cast the deciding vote; shall receive all bills and resolutions of the advisory council; shall attest the official acts of the military governor in so far as strictly civil matters are concerned; shall affix the great seal with his own attestation to all civil commissions, pardons, and public instruments to which the official signature of the military governor is required, and perform such other duties as may be duly conferred upon him.

IV. The advisory council: An advisory council, to consist of 8 members, shall be elected by the people, and shall be selected within the following territorial limits: One from the island of Negros at large; three from Oriental Negros, and four from Occidental Negros. The times and places of electing these members, after the first election, shall be fixed by the advisory council on the approval of the military governor.

Occidental Negros shall have four members of the advisory council, representing four districts, constituted and designated as follows:

The cities and pueblos of San Carlos, Calatrava, Escalante, Sagay, Cadiz, Manapla, Victorias, and Saravia shall compose the first district.

The cities and pueblos of Estaquio Lopez, Guimbalaon, Silay, Talisay, Lacson, Granada, Murcia, Baco'od, Sumag, Kansilayan, and Abuanan shall compose the second district.

The cities and pueblos of Bago, Maao, Pulupandan, Valladolid, San Enrique, La Carlota, Pontevedra, La Castellana, and Magallon shall compose the third district.

The cities and pueblos of Ginigaran, Binalbagan, Soledad, Isabela, Jimamaylan, Suay, Kabankalan, Ilog, Dankalan, Guiljugan, Kanayan, and Isin shall compose the fourth district.

Oriental Negros shall have three members of the advisory council, representing three districts constituted and designated as follows:

The cities and pueblos of Dumaguete, Valencia, Bakon, Dauin, Zamboanguita, Siaton, Tolon, and Bayauan shall compose the First district.

The cities and pueblos of Sibulan, Ayukitan, Amblan, Tanjay, Bais, Manjuyod, Ayungon, Zayaran, Jimalalud, and Guijulugan shall compose the Second district.

The cities and pueblos of Siquijor, Kamoan, Maria, Lasy and San Juan shall compose the Third district.

V. Elections: The times and places of holding elections for the civil governor and for members of the advisory council shall be fixed by the military governor of the island.

VI. Qualifications of voters: In order to be qualified to vote at any election a person shall (1) be a made citizen of the island of Negros; (2) he shall have attained the age of 21 years; (3) he shall be able to speak, read, and write understandingly the English, Spanish, or Visayan language, or he must be the owner of real property worth $500 or pay a rental on real property of the value of $1,000; (4) he must have resided in the island not less than one year preceding and in the district in

which he offers to register as a voter not less than three months immediately preceding the time when he offers to register; (5) he shall, prior to each regular election, during the time prescribed by law for registration, have caused his name to be entered on the register of voters for his district; and (6) prior to such registration he shall have paid all taxes due by him to the government: *Provided*, That no insane person, or deaf-mute who can not read or write, shall be allowed to register or vote.

The military governor shall make suitable provisions for the registration of voters, for the preparation of ballots, and for the method of casting votes at the first election.

VII. The military governor of the island shall have the right to veto all bills or resolutions adopted by the advisory council, and his veto shall be final if not disapproved by the military governor of the Philippines.

VIII. The advisory council shall discharge all the ordinary duties of a legislature.

IX. The secretary of the treasury: It shall be the duty of the secretary of the treasury to receive and safely keep all the public funds not confided by law to the custody of other officers, to expend money only upon warrants drawn by the auditor attached to the vouchers upon which the warrants are drawn, to keep a careful account of all moneys received and expended by law, and once a month to report to the auditor an itemized statement of the warrants paid and the money balances on hand in the treasury. He shall perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law.

X. The secretary of the interior: It shall be the duty of the secretary of the interior to supervise public lands, forests, mines, surveys, public works, provide for the taking of the census, and to take appropriate measures for safeguarding the public health. He shall perform such other duties as may be duly committed to his charge.

XI. The secretary of agriculture: It shall be the duty of the secretary of agriculture to study the agricultural resources of the island with a view to increasing the wealth derived therefrom. He shall give special attention to the means of combating diseases or pests which attack animals or crops, to the study and recommendation of improved methods of cultivation, to the introduction of new products suited to the climate and soil, and shall perform such other duties as may be legally prescribed.

XII. The secretary of public instruction shall have charge of the establishment and maintenance of free public schools for primary instruction throughout the island, and of such other schools of higher instruction as may be required or suited to the needs and advancement of the people. He shall have general supervision of all matters relating to public instruction.

XIII. The attorney-general: It shall be the duty of the attorney-general to prosecute and defend all causes to which the Island of Negros or any one of its officers is a party, and to give legal advice to any officer of the civil departments whenever the same shall be required of him in his official capacity. He shall perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law.

XIV. The auditor: It shall be the duty of the auditor to report to the military governor, whenever so required, an itemized statement of the expenses of the government for past periods, and an itemized estimate of all expenses of the government for the ensuing fiscal year, accompanied by a report of the amount of money on hand in the treasury to meet such expenses, and the amount of revenue necessary to be raised for government purposes by taxation or otherwise. He shall also report such scheme as to him may seem proper to secure economy in the public service. He shall draw warrants on the secretary of the treasury for all sums of public money required and estimated for by officers of the government, after having satisfied himself of the legality and correctness of the proposed expenditures which the money asked for is to meet. He shall perform such other duties as shall be legally imposed.

XV. Municipal governments: Municipal governments shall be organized as soon as possible under the supervision of the military and civil governors and the advisory council. They shall have the usual powers and perform the usual duties of such bodies, subject to the direction of the military governor.

XVI. Officers of cities, towns, and municipalities in office at the time of the promulgation of this order shall continue to act in their official capacity until successors are elected, selected, or appointed and qualified.

XVII. The judiciary: The judicial power shall be vested in three judges, who shall be appointed by the military governor of the island. They shall severally hold court at such times and places as may be determined by the advisory council and the military and civil governors, and shall sit in banc, at a time and place to be fixed by that authority, in order to hear appeals. Their modes of procedure,

terms of office, and compensation shall be fixed by the advisory council, on the approval of the military governor. Appeal shall lie from the court in banc to the supreme court, at Manila, in all civil cases where the amount involved exceeds $500 (Mexican), and in all criminal cases amounting to felony.

XVIII. Inferior courts shall be provided for and established under the advice and recommendation of the civil governor and advisory council.

XIX. The jurisdiction of these courts shall not extend to nor include crimes and offenses committed by either citizens or persons sojourning within the Island of Negros which are prejudicial to military administration and discipline, except by authority specially conferred by the military governor. Jurisdiction to try and award punishment in these classes of cases remains vested in provost courts, courts-martial, or military commissions.

XX. All cases and actions pending at the time of the promulgation of this order are hereby transferred for trial and determination to the courts of appropriate jurisdiction provided for in the preceding paragraphs.

XXI. The style of all process shall be "The Judicial Department of Negros," and all prosecutions shall be carried on in the name of and by the authority of said judicial department.

XXII. Education: Free public schools shall be established throughout the populous districts of the island, in which the English language shall be taught, and this subject will receive the careful consideration of the advisory council.

XXIII. Revenue and taxation: The advisory council, presided over by the civil governor, is authorized to devise and adopt a system of taxation uniform in operation in order to raise revenue for the support of government and for all other necessary purposes. The burden of government must be equally and equitably distributed among the people.

XXIV. The military authorities will collect and receive the customs revenue, if any, will control postal matters and Philippine interisland trade and commerce.

XXV. The military governor shall, subject to the approval of the military governor of the Philippines, determine all questions not herein specifically mentioned and which do not come under the jurisdiction of the advisory council.

XXVI. The compensation of civil officers shall be as follows:

		Mexican currency.
Civil governor	per annum	$6,000.00
Secretary of the treasury	do	3,000.00
Secretary of the interior	do	3,000.00
Secretary of agriculture	do	3,000.00
Secretary of public instruction	do	3,000.00
Attorney-general	do	3,000.00
Auditor	do	3,000.00
Members of advisory council, for each day while in session	per day	8.00

And 50 cents for each kilometer of distances traveled between place of residence and place of meeting and return. The period of the regular session of the advisory council shall not exceed one hundred and twenty days during the year, but in case of necessity the civil governor, with the approval of the military governor, shall call extra sessions for such periods of time as shall be deemed proper and shall be designated in the call. Per diem and mileage at the rate fixed above shall be allowed the members of the advisory council for any extra session they may attend.

XXVII. The military governor of the island is empowered to take all necessary action to put in execution the foregoing directory provisions. Instructions prescribing methods and date of election of officers who are to be selected by ballot will be issued, and the election will be held at as early a day as practicable.

By command of Major-General Otis:

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

In the new field of politics, upon which these people entered with alacrity, there were many disagreements—the result of personal ambitions probably, as well as of antagonistic honest opinion, and complaints were heard and opposition was frequently offered to the civil officers of districts to whom they had intrusted the preservation of law and order. Those exercising the civil power, acquainted only with Spanish methods, sought to organize a military police force which was made responsible only to its founder and which executed his orders in a very arbitrary and oftentimes cruel manner. It was unreliable, and a portion of it served the Tagalo and robber element,

to which many deserted. Through all the turmoils and difficulties experienced by the advocates for United States Government General Smith retained the confidence of all factions and assisted to heal their differences. They desired an election of such classes of officers as might be permitted to direct local affairs under United States military supervision, and an opportunity to manifest their fitness for an abridged form of government has been given them. What the result will be can not as yet be forecast with any certainty, but it is to be hoped that they will meet the expectations of those desiring their ultimate welfare, both for the benefits they will receive thereby and also for the sake of example to the inhabitants of the other Philippine Islands, who are now distrustful of United States intentions and its expressed good will toward them. By this latter and very large class of Filipinos affairs in Negros are closely watched, and a successfully conducted government there—one which will protect individual rights and give a fair measure of individual liberty—will be a most important factor in the pacification labors of these islands.

The United States troops in Negros have performed severe service. The Californians have been replaced by the Sixth Infantry, which, like its predecessors, has responded promptly to every demand and shown itself well able to master the military situation. General Smith still exercises supervision, and to his unremitting efforts, tact, and ability is due the fact that serious obstacles have been surmounted. Robber bands have always existed in the mountains of Negros, and their recent accessions from without encouraged them to assume a defiant front, but the heavy chastisements which they have received at the hands of our troops has well-nigh destroyed them.

Arrangements were made early to take over the civil administration of affairs of the city of Cebu. Lieutenant-Colonel Hamer, of the Idaho Volunteers, a lawyer by profession, who had filled the position of judge of one of the Manila provost courts with great credit, was selected for that duty, and on March 14 the following order was issued:

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 13. HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, *Manila, P. I., March 14, 1899.*

1. The island of Cebu will constitute a subdistrict of the Visayan military district, with headquarters at the city of Cebu. Lieut. Col. Thomas R. Hamer, First Idaho Volunteer Infantry, is assigned to the command of the same and will proceed to that city by way of Iloilo, where he will report to the commanding general of the district for any directions the latter may desire to convey to enable him to execute the specific instructions which he will receive from these headquarters to guide him in the performance of his duties. Colonel Hamer will report to the commanding general of the department for conference and instructions and will take passage on transport *Indiana*, which has been directed to proceed to Iloilo as soon as necessary repairs to steamer can be made.

By command of Major-General Otis:

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

The battalion of the Twenty-third Infantry which was sent to Cebu the latter part of February had not taken any action in civil matters, but had preserved order in the community. The citizens had looked after their own local interests, and officers of the Navy had continued to conduct harbor and customs affairs, from which they were now relieved by army officers detailed to perform the duties of those positions. Shortly thereafter the dissensions between the friendly-disposed and hostile-intentioned natives became bitter and culminated in the assassination of one of the most prominent citizens simply because he advocated United States protection, and attempts were

made upon the lives of a number of others who favored United States occupation. The towns within a short radius of distance began to show the first war paint of rebellion, and the mountain peaks behind Cebu exhibited preparations for defense, or possibly attack, in newly constructed rifle intrenchments. Contraband trade along the coast of the island was active and gave the small gunboats manned by the natives considerable exciting occupation. Colonel Hamer called for additional force, and a battalion of the Tennessee regiment was sent him from Iloilo. Shortly before incursions into the interior were made by detached companies of the Twenty-third Infantry, at first without encountering much opposition, but afterwards by very decided opposition. It was apparent that the rebellion was growing stronger each succeeding day, and that increased force would be required to cope with it. The Cebu people possess great numbers of small sailing crafts, with which they are accustomed to conduct trade between their own and neighboring islands. With these they skirted other coasts and robbed the inhabitants. They impoverished and reduced to hunger the natives of the island of Bohol, and with the aid of the Tagalos and other emissaries introduced arms and ammunition among their own people. On April 6 Colonel Hamer wrote:

> Our present occupancy includes only the old town of Cebu, while the insurgents under Francisco Llamas occupy the adjoining town of San Nicholas, which, in fact, is a part of the city of Cebu. This man Llamas is an active and cunning fellow whom the natives fear to the extent of conceding to him supernatural power. I may say in this connection that the president seems to hold like views with the rest of the natives on this subject. The vice-president and treasurer deny that they fear him and say that if we had sufficient force to inspire the natives with confidence in our ability to protect them Llamas's standard would be deserted, as he is deeply hated as well as feared by the people, and they only await a safe opportunity to throw off his yoke. After carefully looking over the ground I have come to the conclusion that now is the time for us to perfect our occupation of the island. We can accomplish it now with the display of force, and, in my opinion, without the loss of a man. * * * The southern coast line of the island contains all the towns of any consequence. If you can send me two more battalions, I will undertake to occupy these towns and establish in each a government which will acknowledge the supremacy of the United States, and this, too, without the loss of a single man.

But there were no troops available, for Luzon demanded every armed man. We permitted Cebu to drift and foment opposition, careful to hold securely its principal city, an important trading point and one of the open ports of the Philippines. The insurgent leaders organized their forces as best they could, without much interruption on our part, until in their conceit they commenced to assemble a force 4 miles out of the city and on the overlooking mountains, with which to drive us off at the opportune time. It grew to 1,500 and then to 2,000, having several pieces of artillery in position and rifles and ammunition in considerable quantities. Its positions were believed to be impregnable, and now as I write I learn that Colonel Snyder, of the Nineteenth Infantry, who a short time since was sent there with a portion of his regiment to relieve the Tennessee battalion—having collected all troops at hand, consisting of that contingent of his own regiment present, two companies of the Sixth Infantry sent by General Hughes from Iloilo, the Twenty-third Infantry battalion, and the Tennessee Volunteers, who chanced that way on their homeward voyage and who offered their services—has cleared the neighboring mountains of all insurgents, excepting those who now lie buried there, and has gathered in their weapons of war.

The better class of the population of the island of Cebu greatly desire stable government, and this they know they can not obtain without American supremacy and protection. When the Tagalo is driven out and the ignorant element which now cries for independence, having no conception of the meaning of the term, is forced to betake itself to legitimate occupation instead of robbery, the island will be easily controlled, and at present it would appear that the time required to bring about that desirable condition of things would not extend far into the future.

About the middle of April I was requested by the Spanish authorities to relieve the troops of Spain in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. In the group of islands last named matters were represented from Singapore and other points as being in a very unsatisfactory state, and it was asserted that the Sultan and his datos were securing large supplies of arms and ammunition from the Asiatic and neighboring coasts. The inhabitants (Moros) had always given Spain trouble. They had always manifested toward Spain a feeling of subdued hostility when not actually at war with her, and she had been able to impose only a recognition of very much abridged sovereignty. The Spanish acting governor-general (General Rios), who for a long time had supervised Spanish affairs in the south, informed me that he had never succeeded in stopping there the trade in arms, and as for commerce, it could never be placed under proper restrictions. We felt therefore considerable hesitancy in dispatching to the archipelago the limited force which then could be sent from Manila, apprehending more or less difficulty in securely holding necessary positions should we garrison them. All the Spanish troops which were formerly stationed along the coast of the island of Mindanao had been concentrated at Zamboanga, its chief city. The Tagalos had taken possession of the northern and northeastern coast and, with their confederates, the country in the vicinity of the above-named place.

In March the Spanish authorities advertised for public sale at the naval station of Isabella, on Basilan Island, a short distance south of Zamboanga, 13 of their gunboats which had been formerly used on the island coasts. These boats were purchased by a syndicate composed of private individuals, with the understanding that it would deliver them to the United States authorities in the harbor of Manila.

The agent of the syndicate, who after purchasing was about to leave for Isabella to receive delivery of the boats and transport them north, was informed that if he could secure the armament belonging to the vessels the United States would receive it from him at cost price. Having been promised protection by the United States Navy while en route with the vessels to Manila, he sailed for Isabella by one of the coasting merchant vessels, taking with him crews for such of the boats as were serviceable, and received them there from the Spanish authorities with their armaments, which he bought under the agreement above stated. He steamed out of Isabella Harbor, and to protect him on his voyage, awaited near Zamboanga the coming of the United States war vessel which by some misunderstanding had been detained at a northern port. While awaiting the arrival of this war vessel, and less than twenty-four hours before it reported, his fleet was seized by Mindanao insurgents, and nearly one-half of his ordnance, consisting of artillery, rifles, and ammunition for same, was taken from him and landed about a mile from Zamboanga on the Mindanao coast. By this seizure the insurgents were supplied with a few pieces

of artillery, 11 quick-firing guns, 375 rifles, with considerable ammunition for all guns and pieces, and could therefore place themselves in fair condition for attack or defense. After they had captured and landed the arms complaint was made by the agent to the commanding officer of the Spanish troops at Zamboanga, who, it was understood, after having received the assurances of the insurgent chiefs that the arms would not be employed against his troops, did not concern himself further in the matter. The gunboats and what remained of the armament were convoyed to Manila by the naval authorities and turned over to the Army, which completed the purchase by payment from the accruing civil funds of the Philippines. They were subsequently transferred to the Navy for use, and under the direction of its commander in chief have ever since rendered most efficient service along the shallow coasts and harbors of the islands. The possession of these arms by the Mindanao insurgents rendered it inexpedient to land troops at Zamboanga and attempt to hold the place with any force which could be spared from Luzon. General Rios was therefore informed that we were not prepared to relieve his garrisons at either Zamboanga or in the Sulu Archipelago until organizations then en route should arrive; that the United States was entitled to a reasonable time to take over the places which Spain desired to surrender, and that since the ratification of the treaty such time had not intervened. Thus action was held in abeyance until May 13, when news of a surprising character was received, which is shown in the following explanatory communication:

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., May 14, 1899.

Admiral GEORGE DEWEY, U. S. N.,
Commanding United States Naval Force on Asiatic Station,
Flag Ship Olympia, Manila Harbor, P. I.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL: Yesterday I received a dispatch from Iloilo stating that the insurgents had made an attack upon the Spanish garrison at Zamboanga, using the arms and quick-firing guns which they had captured from the Spanish gunboats. They were repulsed, but the Spanish general in command and two of his officers were wounded, one enlisted man was killed and a few wounded. The insurgents have cut off their water supply and the Spanish garrison is left in rather a perilous condition.

Last evening a cablegram sent from Iloilo by the Spanish naval lieutenant, Cano, addressed to General Rios and sent in my care, was also received. This cited facts substantially as did the cablegram sent to me. General Rios telegraphed to Madrid and received directions to withdraw the Zamboanga and Jolo garrisons immediately. He called this morning and wished me to send troops down there at once. I made him no promise, but told him I would defer my answer until tomorrow. He asked me then if you would not send down a war vessel to cruise in those waters to give aid to the Spanish garrison in case it should be placed in extremity, to which I replied that I did not know, but would seek the information from you.

The situation here is as follows: We have no more troops at the present time than we need here in Luzon, especially if we carry out the campaign as projected. Lawton took San Miguel yesterday afternoon and will be far out in a day or two. Kobbe with 1,500 men accompanies the boats up the Rio Grande River from Calumpit and will start on Tuesday morning. MacArthur seems to have all he can do to cover the Pampanga province and give the inhabitants the protection from the insurgent troops which they demand. To the south of us the number of insurgents seem to be increasing, while to the east and north of the city they still maintain their hold.

We are still holding here the two Spanish vessels, the *Leon XIII* and the *Puerto Rico*, which General Rios desires to use to take his troops away from Zamboanga and Jolo. He said this morning that if these vessels could not be given him he must depend upon some of the merchant vessels in port to take his troops off or suffer the consequences of disobedience of his Government's orders.

Looking over the entire field, 2,000 men at least will be required to take and hold Zamboanga, its environments, and the water supply. The rebels there have a good deal of artillery, and, I think, are supplied with some 600 or 800 rifles, for which they have plenty of ammunition. Jolo can be occupied with about 600 men. I think, therefore, that it might be a good scheme to send the garrison to Jolo as soon as possible, or the Moros will destroy the fortifications and guns and turn them upon us when we appear. As for Zamboanga, I am afraid that we will have to permit the Spaniards to withdraw and take it later. * * *

Does it seem desirable to send a vessel down to southern waters, as Rios requests, or could you convoy our troops down south within two or three days?

One of our great needs here is light artillery. We have plenty on the transports coming, which, unfortunately, is not here now. The light battery which reported last week came off without its guns, and they are following it on the steamer *Leelanaw*, which left San Francisco on the 3d of the month. There are 20 companies of troops due here within the next two weeks; also quite a number of recruits. * * *

Yours, very truly,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V., Military Governor.

To this communication Admiral Dewey responded that he would convoy our troops and furnish General Rios with any assistance he desired, and I informed the general that, while regretting that we could not send troops to Zamboanga immediately, we would relieve his Sulu garrisons. The field was then carefully looked over, and as a battalion of the Twenty-third Infantry was already at Cebu it was determined to send the remainder of that regiment to the archipelago; whereupon the following orders were issued:

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 28. HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, *Manila, P. I., May 15, 1899.*

The Twenty-third United States Infantry is relieved from duty at this station and will proceed at once by transport to Jolo, island of Jolo, and relieve from duty there the troops of Spain now constituting the garrison at that place.

The quartermaster's department will furnish the necessary transportation, and the subsistence will supply rations for this command for thirty days.

By command of Major-General Otis:

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

General Rios, with two merchant vessels, sailed on May 17 for the south to place in readiness for departure his garrison at Zamboanga, with the understanding that our troops would arrive at Jolo on board the transport *Leon XIII* in sufficient season for his archipelago garrisons to take advantage of it, sail by way of Zamboango, when all of his command could embark, and proceed homeward. He promised to render useless all the Zamboanga guns and destroy all ammunition there which was not to be removed, and this it is believed that he did.

The headquarters and two battalions of the Twenty-third Infantry, upon reaching Jolo, found the Spanish soldiers well prepared to depart, although they did not expect to be relieved by our troops. A Spanish staff officer took passage on the vessel with instructions from General Rios to govern their movements. The small garrison maintained at Siassi, island of Siassi, had been withdrawn to Jolo and the former place turned over to the Sultan, who had in person gone there from Maibun, his capital, and taken formal possession. The exchange of troops was quietly effected, full military honors were accorded, and the flags of the respective nations participating were saluted by our war vessel in the harbor when the Spaniards were formed to march out of the post and embark.

The force sent to Jolo arrived on May 19, and consisted of 19 line officers, 2 assistant surgeons, a chaplain, and 733 enlisted men. It

relieved a garrison consisting of 21 officers and 800 enlisted men. The post or village is described as follows:

It is hardly more than a good-sized military post, beautifully laid out, with broad, clean streets, lined with flowering trees and gardens, and surrounded by a loop-holed wall about 8 feet high and 1 feet thick. The population is estimated at 400, mostly Chinamen, one German, no other Europeans. Four male Moros live within the walls. The public buildings are in a dilapidated condition. The governor's residence and office is one small building. There is one group of barracks (four buildings) which will accommodate one battalion. The theater will accommodate one company, and outlying blockhouses two companies. A commissary, post-office, schoolhouse, a hospital for about 100 beds, a market, and some few small structures compose the remainder of the public buildings.

The commanding officer of the United States troops reported the day after his arrival that—

The situation, in so far as determined from our limited experience, is as follows: Spain possesses the small walled town known as Jolo. The governor has complete control within the walls. There are no civil courts, no civil officers. Outside the walls the Sultan of Jolo and Borneo is the ruler. Spain pays him $200, Mexican, per month. At present he is not on the island, but is visiting one of the neighboring islands about 30 miles south. He has recently returned from Mecca, and now dresses in European costume. Spanish soldiers seldom go beyond the range of the outlying blockhouses. The relation between the natives (Moros) and Spain is not altogether harmonious.

Subsequent reports showed that the Spanish troops had received orders to prepare for withdrawal from the archipelago and expected to depart very soon, but had not been informed that they would be relieved by United States troops. The Spanish commandant and governor had therefore taken the Sultan to Siassi from Maibun and turned the place over to him, and intended to turn over Jolo also when his force should evacuate. Our arrival was most opportune, and a matter of surprise—unpleasantly so—to the Sultan, who expected to award his datos with this acquired possession. His datos on Jolo Island were not, however, on the most amicable terms with him, and seemed to be pleased to welcome the Americans. They called on Captain Pratt, who was in command of our troops, expressed friendly intentions, and gave adhesion to the United States.

The captain, with some of his officers, returned the call, were the first Europeans who had ever entered the house of the chief neighboring dato, and were hospitably entertained. The Sultan, disappointed, lingered at Siassi, where he had established a police and garrison, and did not respond to the invitation to call upon our officers. His mother, the Sultanese, however, who was at Maibun, sent the Sultan's secretary to welcome the Americans, when a return call was made upon her and she received our representatives most graciously and expressed gratification. Thus through the diplomacy of Captain Pratt and his subordinates a most satisfactory condition of affairs was attained upon which to base future negotiations, which were conducted by Brig. Gen. John C. Bates, U. S. V., during July and August.

Brigadier-General Hughes was relieved as provost-marshal-general at Manila and assigned to the command of the Visayan military district on May 25. He proceeded to his headquarters at Iloilo, Panay, early in June with instructions to carefully supervise matters in Negros and Cebu, but not to conduct any military operations in Panay further than was necessary to hold Iloilo and its outlying villages, then in our possession, as no additional troops could be given him and as the policy of nonaction in the island other than might be considered defense would result in dissensions between the Visayan and Tagalo, who, should we attack, would unite all factions for resistance. The

policy has worked excellently. Tagalo soldiers to the number of about 2,000 had been sent from Luzon. Their officers practically assumed the conduct of all Panay affairs, even if they did not do so ostensibly or expressly, and the Panay inhabitants have been made to suffer severe pecuniary losses and in some parts of the island great lack of provisions, while robbery and other crimes have prevailed. The manifested hostility between Visayan and Tagalo is now very pronounced. We have been invited by the former to take possession of northern and eastern Panay, with promises of assistance if we would consent to do so, and very recently the Tagalos assumed control in every particular, disarmed all the Visayans on the plea that they could not be relied upon for support, and are conducting a military government in accordance with their individual desires, the chief object of which is reported to be individual pecuniary profit.

While during the month of May the majority of our troops were operating to the north of Manila in central Luzon, the insurgents in the Cavite and Morong provinces, south and east of the city, were very active, and extreme watchfulness on the part of our thin lines of defense was necessary. Their numbers continued to increase until they had concentrated some 6,000 on the south and some 2,500 to the east. The former had been recently animated with some mysterious belief to the effect that the Americans were about to be given over to them for slaughter. Among them a battalion of boys of tender age appeared, whose mission was to throw stones at the enemy under the guidance of Providence; but one or two of the little fellows were wounded, and the desire for self-preservation being stronger than their religious enthusiasm, they were seen no more. This concentrated southern force made daily demonstrations of some character, and an occasional attack, when the loss of a few of their men cooled their ardor for two or three successive days. An advance to the south with the intention of permanent or temporary occupation was not desirable. Should it be made and towns or villages be taken, the inhabitants would pray for protection against the return of the insurgents, and this could not be given them from the troops available without seriously interfering with projected operations. Hence, on the south we had occasionally driven back the enemy a few miles when he became annoying and then returned the troops to the old lines. To the east and northeast reconnoissances were made frequently to locate the shifting foe, ascertain his intentions, and provide the necessary precautionary measures.

General Lawton was directed to disperse his troops at Candaba, turning over the Third, Seventeenth, and Twenty-second Infantry to the Second Division, to be established on the new line from San Fernando to Baliuag, with a station at Quingua, and to send back to Manila the most of the Fourth Cavalry, the North Dakota and Oregon Volunteers, placing the Minnesotans on the railroad between Bocave and Caloocan. He therefore gave orders for the troops at San Miguel to withdraw to Baliuag and left Candaba on May 23.

The withdrawal of these troops and the descent made on the Rio Grande River to Candaba excited the insurgents to great activity, they supposing that a retreat was intended. They forwarded their forces by rail to General MacArthur's front and concentrated near San Miguel. On the march to Baliuag our troops encountered them morning, noon, and evening, and suffered in casualties 2 men killed and 13 wounded, but the enemy left with them 16 killed, a considerable number of wounded, and a few prisoners, besides a small amount

of property. This movement placed the entire Third Infantry, a battalion of the Twenty-second Infantry, a troop of the Fourth Cavalry, mounted, and two guns at Baliuag, rendering the place too strong for attack, and the enemy withdrew to the north. Upon the following day, May 24, a force of the insurgents attacked an outpost on the right of San Fernando, when a collision occurred involving the South Dakota, Kansas, and Iowa volunteers and portions of the Seventeenth and Twenty-second Infantry, with the result that the enemy was badly handled and retreated, leaving 50 dead and 38 wounded on the field, and we captured 28 prisoners, 50 rifles, and other property; our casualties, 7 killed and 6 wounded, all of the South Dakota regiment. These minor affairs corrected the impressions of the enemy as to our intentions of retreating, and no action of importance took place at the north for some time.

During the month of May we had a large accession of regular troops, consisting of six organizations, the Thirteenth Infantry arriving on the 29th of that month. On the last day of May there were present in the Philippines 1,201 commissioned officers and 33,026 enlisted men, of whom 614 officers and 6,098 enlisted men were stationed in the southern islands and at the Cavite naval station. Deducting the 13 per cent of sick, special-duty men, and those undergoing court-martial sentences, there were for duty in all the islands 25,809 enlisted men, and in Luzon, the Cavite arsenal excepted, 20,965. This was a large force, sufficient to accomplish efficient work with celerity, but of the entire number present over 16,000 were volunteers or were awaiting discharge under War Department promises and less than 18,000 were regulars owing further service to the Government. These 16,000 men must be assembled, must be individually accounted for, placed in condition for departure, and shipped to the United States at the earliest date.

The great labor attending this shipment was entered upon on May 25, when specific orders to govern all particulars of procedure were issued. The volunteers had been somewhat careless in rendering returns for men and public property and were not familiar with legal requirements in these matters. Hence several days were necessary to straighten out rolls, returns, and discharge papers after the organizations were assembled. Under the War Department directions it was ordered that the departure of these troops should be permitted in accordance with priority of date of arrival. This brought the Oregon and California troops first, but the latter were scattered over the island of Negros. The Oregon troops were assembled in Manila on May 26 and directed to hasten the necessary paper work and the transfer of public property which was to be left behind. This was not accomplished until about June 10, and portions of the regiment in the meantime took part in the military operations in the vicinity of the city. It sailed on June 14, a delay of two or three days attending its decision on a question it was allowed to determine whether to sail for San Francisco or Portland, Oreg. A regular regiment must be secured to relieve the Californians in Negros, and the Sixth Infantry, then en route, was selected. It did not arrive until June 18, when it was sent south. But prevailing typhoons delayed relief, and the Californians did not leave Manila Harbor until July 26, after the Nebraska, Utah, Pennsylvania, and Colorado troops had taken their departure.

Troops were about to depart much more rapidly than they could be received, and the country we were covering must be held. It was not possible, therefore, to make extensive offensive demonstrations

until the Eighth Army Corps could pull itself together again. In the meantime the insurgents were making great exertions to worst us by attacking our lines of communication and our force in the province of Pampanga. But all of their efforts were futile and resulted in their repeated discomfiture.

The latter part of May it was reported that the inhabitants at Antipolo, Morong, and other near towns east of Manila were suffering heavily on account of the crimes committed by General Pilar's insurgent troops, and they called for protection. Pilar enjoys the reputation of being for years the bandit chief of that section of country. He stood high in the favor of Aguinaldo, either on account of the latter's fear of him or because he had the ability to keep together and direct troops drawn from the criminal classes. He had within his command about 2,500 men and formerly operated south of the Pasig, from which he had been driven, and subsequently commanded the province of Morong. As soon as General Lawton returned to Manila he was instructed to collect a force and cause these insurgent troops to be driven off. Assembling 2,500 men at the pumping station, under command of Brigadier-General Hall, he directed it on June 3 upon Antipolo, and at the same time moved 8 companies of the Washington Volunteers by lake to Morong, and the First North Dakota and a battalion of the Twelfth Infantry on Taguig from Pasig. The rough character of the country in the direction of Antipolo and the heat of the day caused Hall's column to move slowly. He met with slight resistance from a scattered force of 300 at the base of the mountains and entered that place the following morning. Morong and Taguig were taken, and the narrow strip of land extending into the Laguna de Bay from the north was explored without discovering the presence of the enemy, unless in the guise of the "amigo," with weapon carefully concealed, a character of partisan which prevails extensively in this country when first captured by our troops. The insurgents had scattered, and most of them at least had taken the trails into the mountains, where they could not be profitably pursued. On the march to Antipolo our casualties were 2 men killed and 9 wounded, and at Taytay 2 men killed. The enemy suffered a much greater loss and left 9 dead and a number of wounded on the Morong field alone, where our troops did not meet with any casualty. Morong was occupied for a time and from it reconnaissances were made into the interior and along the shore of the Laguna. Its garrison was removed across the lake to Calamba, when that point became a permanent station.

The enemy had become again boldly demonstrative at the south and it became necessary to throw him back once more. He had intrenched himself very strongly in the vicinity of Paranaque and near Taguig; also in front of San Pedro Macati, the center of our line. On June 7 General Lawton was instructed to concentrate a force of 4,000 men approximately in the vicinity of the last-named town, to be placed under the immediate supervision of Generals Wheaton and Ovenshine, move the same to the front and center in two columns, disperse the enemy in the immediate front, and then, swinging these columns to the right and left, place them in rear, if possible, of his strong positions on our flanks. Dispositions were completed on June 9, and early the next morning the command moved out. Six companies of the Colorados constituted the advance guard, took the direction of the intrenchments in the immediate front, which they attacked with great vigor. The enemy was soon driven and scattered. Wheaton, swinging to the left, soon routed the insurgents in that direction, who

made such rapid flight to the south that few of them were caught. Ovenshine took up his swinging movement to the right to place his troops on the Bacoor road south of Las Pinas, but, unfortunately, the day was one of the most enervating of the year. The sky was cloudless and no air stirring. The troops, which had recently arrived from the United States, began to be overcome with the heat before they had marched 2 miles. The colonel of the Thirteenth Infantry was prostrated from sunstroke, and nearly all of that regiment fell out on the line of march before it had proceeded as far south as Paranaque. General Lawton accompanied this column in person, and, quickly taking in the situation, directed Wheaton's column to join as soon as possible; but before this was accomplished the enemy, advancing from Paranaque, boldly attacked what remained of Ovenshine's men. He was repulsed after some active skirmishing, and, Wheaton joining, the march in the direction of Las Pinas was continued, and late in the afternoon General Lawton was obliged to halt a little south of east of Las Pinas, but could not secure the road by which it was believed the enemy would retreat. His men had suffered severely from the hard march, and especially from lack of water, for scarcely any that was potable could be found by them.

Fully 50 per cent had succumbed to the heat and fatigues of the day. The insurgents, too, had suffered from the same causes, and in addition had been signally defeated. They left on the battlefield a great number of dead, over 70 of whom were discovered and counted, while our casualties summed up at 1 enlisted man killed and 2 officers and 21 men wounded. That night the enemy escaped from Paranaque and Las Pinas by the Bacoor road and across the Zapote River, along which they had constructed formidable intrenchments, where they had, in 1896, gained a great victory over the Spaniards, and where they believed they would be invincible. In fact, a great number of them had made religious vows, assumed under superstitious rites, to overthrow the Americans there or die in the ditches.

The most conservative estimate of their numbers was 3,000, and to meet this condition of affairs new combinations must be made. The Thirteenth Infantry was brought into Manila and placed on the north line, relieving the Fourth Infantry and Wyoming Battalion, which were sent to General Lawton, who in the meantime had carefully reconnoitered the enemy's position and had concluded to attack at the Zapote River bridge of the Bacoor road. In reconnoitering near that point in person with two companies of the Twenty-first Infantry he was suddenly attacked on front and flanks by a large force of the enemy from its brush concealments, whereupon, retiring a short distance and hurrying up supports, he threw it back upon the river. His troops, having been resupplied with rations and ammunition, and his reenforcements forwarded, all by water transportation plying between Manila and Paranaque, he, on June 13, attacked the enemy in his intrenchments on the Zapote. The country was most uninviting for military operations, and he made his dispositions for a main attack on the river bridge, near which, after hard and persistent effort, he had secured a position which flanked a portion of the enemy's lines. The Navy had, in the meantime, at a point on the shore of the bay, landed from one of its vessels near Las Pinas 38 men and a quick-firing gun where it could do execution on the left flank of the insurgents should they attempt demonstrations in that direction. At 3 o'clock that afternoon General Lawton wired to headquarters in Manila that the battle was severe, and that the enemy was fighting in strong force and with determination. Twenty minutes later he

telegraphed, "We are having a beautiful battle. Hurry up ammunition; we will need it;" and at 4 o'clock: "We have bridge. It has cost us dearly. Battle not yet over. It is a battle, however. I can not approximate our loss. It will be 15 or 20, I think. Several are killed—2 or 3. I have not had time to ascertain." That evening he telegraphed as follows:

LAS PINAS, *June 13—6.07 p. m.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF PACIFIC:

Impossible to give many details of fight. We were engaged at close range this morning. Enemy came boldly into the open ground and advanced to 130 and 100 yards. This evening we assaulted trenches 25 feet thick, crossing river in their front. Many of enemy's dead lay in trenches. We now occupy south side of river. The report of wounded in engagement this a. m. was exaggerated. Many heat prostrations were reported wounded. The number will be about 7 or 8. The surgeon reports 20 wounded, now in hospital. I know there are several more to come and none of the dead are yet in. I believe some 40 will cover the killed and wounded for the day. The men and officers fought like Americans, and I will mention later several for most distinguished gallantry. Among them General Ovenshine; Captain Sage, Twenty-third Infantry; Lieutenants Donovan and Connolley, Twenty-first Infantry, the latter two wounded.

LAWTON, *Major-General, Volunteers.*

The enemy fled southward up the Zapote River to Imus and San Nicholas, a few westward along the shore of the bay, and our troops took possession of Bacoor, extending their outposts toward Old Cavite and Imus. The inhabitants gladly welcomed their arrival and offered to furnish every assistance in their power if the requisite protection could be given them. It was not desired nor was it the intention to pursue the enemy southward under any circumstances if it involved us with even temporary occupation of the country, as our strength did not justify such a scattering of our forces, and as every available man should be sent toward our true objective in the north. The Cavite and Batangas provinces, though the original hotbeds of all insurrections in these islands, were without military importance under the conditions then prevailing, and General Lawton, before moving out of Manila, was warned against taking possession of any southern country which looked to permanency. However, the inhabitants of this section were suffering for rice and those near the bay coast had not planted their crops. They importuned us for the continued presence of troops, that they might unmolested commence their planting and be assured that they would receive the reward of their labors. On the morning of June 15 General Lawton telegraphed as follows:

A representative of the civil government at Imus has just come, formally announcing the surrender of that place and inviting the Americans to enter. He states the insurgents all left yesterday afternoon in the direction of San Francisco de Malabon. He states the people of that section are frightened and tired of war and want peace, and welcome the Americans with pleasure. This man states in further explanation of the direction taken by the troops leaving Imus that they went in several directions, but generally toward Dasmarinas and Malabon; that the men were much demoralized, but were afraid of their generals; that they have little ammunition, one rapid-fire gun, and one muzzle loading gun. They commenced removing the cartridge factory three days since and that it was taken to Buena Vista, which lies between Malabon and Dasmarinas. The reconnoissance made yesterday did not find the enemy, although it went almost to Imus. The bridge below Bacoor is now in our possession and guarded. One hundred and twenty-five insurgents buried yesterday here. Sixteen men, including one captain, were buried at Imus yesterday. I think we should push the enemy a little more. This man states that the people do not wish war and that they look upon the Americans as friends and are glad to see them come, but that Aguinaldo and his cutthroats (this is his own expression) only desire war. The vicinity of our fight on the extreme right, where the reconnoissance was made this morning, has not yet been visited; many dead must be found there.

While General Lawton was operating in the vicinity of Las Pinas and the mouth of the Zapote River 300 men of the Cavite garrison, taken from the California Heavy Artillery and the Pennsylvania regiment, were sent southward on reconnoissance along the neck of land which connects that point and the main shore, against the town of Novaleta—this to create a diversion in our favor and ascertain what we could of the enemy's positions and intentions. These troops were engaged on this duty and incidental movements for three successive days. They penetrated the country to Old Cavite, San Francisco de Malabon and nearly to Rosario, and determined the fact that no great number of the insurgents could have retreated in that direction, although still in considerable force in that section. The following response, therefore, was sent to General Lawton's telegram, which is above set out:

Do not think that insurgents retreated to San Francisco de Malabon, except probably small detachments may have gone in that direction. Road from Imus to Malabon very bad, and all insurgents have retired from Noveleta. Their proper line of retreat would have been south. We do not wish to hold Imus, but you can send there a couple of battalions, with 2 guns for temporary purposes, utilizing for present dispositions all troops you have and the 3 battalions sent you this morning. My information is that many insurgents have received instructions from Baldamero Aguinaldo to return to their homes with their guns, and to secrete guns for future use. This may account for the unusual number of "amigos" at Paranaque. Rice and beef for distribution to the inhabitants will be sent to Las Pinas, also to Paranaque, in the morning.

That morning I had cabled to Washington the following:

MANILA, P. I., *June 15, 1899.*

AGWAR, *Washington:*

Success Lawton's troops Cavite Province greater than reported yesterday. Enemy numbering over 4,000 lost in killed, wounded, and captured more than one-third; remainder much scattered; have retreated south to Imus, their arsenal. Of 5 pieces of artillery, 3 captured. Navy aided greatly on shore of bay, landing forces occasionally. Inhabitants in that country rejoice at deliverance, and welcome with enthusiastic demonstrations arrival of our troops.

OTIS.

It subsequently appeared that the insurgent army, after retreating through Imus, divided, the larger portion continuing its retreat south to Dasmarinas, about 8 miles distant therefrom, the remainder proceeding westward to Malabon, where they were found in increased numbers on June 16 by the Cavite reconnoissance detachments. On that day General Wheaton was sent to Imus with the Fourth Infantry and a platoon of artillery.

On this date the military operations of the insurgents in the north, who were again becoming quite active, received a severe check, and once more comparative quiet in that section was restored. At noon we received a dispatch from General MacArthur, sent from San Fernando, as follows:

At about 4.30 this a. m. an extensive demonstration was made by insurgents against this place. They appeared on our entire front, on both sides of the river—that is to say, the town was entirely surrounded. The diameter of the line of insurgent operations was about 3 miles. As far as the town was concerned, the attack was reported at all points with considerable loss to insurgents. Our loss not yet ascertained, probably not large. Line went down immediately. * * *

Since writing have information of 50 feet of track being taken up in vicinity of Apalit station. Mallory takes material, and will repair break if possible. We have in neighborhood of 50 of enemy's dead in our possession and something like 25 wounded. Some 75 guns have been captured and are in our possession or destroyed. Our loss so far reported, 12 wounded; mostly slight. Further particulars as soon as ascertained.

In the afternoon the following was received:

SAN FERNANDO, *June 16—2.21 p. m.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL:

In reply to wire requesting report of particulars of attack this a. m., reference is respectfully made to my previous message in the premises; in addition to which it is further remarked that preparations inside the insurgent lines have been apparent for a number of days, and that the affair this a. m. was premeditated and intended to be on a very large scale, with a view to surrounding this command and severing communication between here and Calumpit. There is very little doubt now that Aguinaldo was present in person and that the number of troops employed numbered quite 5,000 armed men, many of whom have been recently brought from the north by train, and possibly even from the line east of the Pinag de Candana. This elaborate preparation resulted in complete failure at every point, although every position in our front was attacked. We have in our hands in the neighborhood of 100 dead and wounded insurgents, and their losses probably run well into the hundreds.

MACARTHUR, *Major-General.*

And later in the day General MacArthur telegraphed:

It is reported, with a considerable probability of being true, that Aguinaldo was present in command of troops here this morning, or in the immediate vicinity, supervising operations. The demonstration was on a very extensive scale, in which not less than 3,000 men were employed, and probably very many more. The movement has been in preparation for several days; the details were very elaborate. The Iowa regiment did some fine work immediately after appearance of enemy in their immediate vicinity. They made an extensive return in fine shape, and drove the insurgents back through their own works and out of sight, with heavy punishment of enemy, 15 of whose dead were left in their hands and 12 wounded. The Kansas regiment also made a handsome offensive return. The insurgent left 39 of their dead with them and quite a number of wounded.

After General Wheaton had reached Imus he endeavored to locate the enemy by reconnoissance, and, believing him to be in considerable force, he was strengthened by additional troops, so that he had with him the entire Fourth and a battalion of the Fourteenth Infantry, the Nevada Cavalry, and 4 pieces of artillery. On the morning of June 19 he sent Major Bubb, with his battalion of the Fourth Infantry and 1 gun, southward on the Dasmarinas road. Shortly before noon, when the reconnoitering party had advanced some 6 or 7 miles without encountering opposition and was about to return, the enemy, in strong force, concealed in the thick brush and the surrounding swampy undergrowth, suddenly made an attack on its front and flank. Bubb, fighting his men skillfully against heavy odds, slowly retreated, for four hours inflicting punishment on the enemy, until General Wheaton, learning of the affair and taking the 2 remaining battalions of the Fourth Infantry and 3 guns, joined him. Wheaton then quickly threw forward his entire force, routed the enemy, and drove him at rapid pace back on Dasmarinas, near which he bivouacked for the night. As soon as this movement was reported, a battalion of the Ninth Infantry was hastened from Bacoor to Imus for the purpose of strengthening the force left there, thus rendering the place secure against attack from the direction of either San Nicholas or Malabon, and to reenforce Wheaton, if necessary. Its position at Bacoor was taken by 200 men hastily moved across Manila Bay in cascoes from the Cavite Arsenal. On the evening of the following day this dispatch was received:

DASMARINAS, *June 20—6.40 p. m.*

Major-General OTIS;

Yesterday I sent Bubb's battalion, Fourth Infantry, and one 3.2-inch gun on reconnoissance on Dasmarinas road, from Imus. Seven miles out he met the enemy in force, advancing to attack on Imus. He engaged in combat with them until I, in person, reenforced him with 2 battalions and 3 guns. The enemy was com-

pletely routed, flying in the direction of Dasmarinas and San Francisco. His loss in killed was large—55 of his dead were brought to Dasmarinas church. The column bivouacked on the Dasmarinas road for the night. This morning I reenforced the column with 7 companies and advanced and occupied Dasmarinas, small bodies of the enemy resisting on the front and flanks. They had 6 killed and 2 wounded brought to Dasmarinas church. Our loss so far, only 3 wounded. Yesterday we had 1 killed and 20 wounded—all of the Fourth Infantry. The enemy's main body is now between here and San Francisco. Dasmarinas has but few houses, is surrounded by swamps, and is a long day's march from Imus. Road impracticable in bad weather. I will return to Imus with my command to-morrow, unless otherwise directed.

WHEATON.

He was directed to drive off or destroy the insurgents' moving arsenal or cartridge manufactory reported to be at Buena Vista, a near point, and thereupon return to Imus, as the roads had been rendered impracticable by heavy rains for any further operations in that section. Buena Vista could not be reached on account of intervening swamps, and the column returned to Imus, experiencing difficulty in moving the artillery over the wretched roads. Shortly thereafter all troops were retired from Imus, except the Fourth Infantry and a platoon of artillery. The Fourteenth Infantry and a troop of cavalry were left to garrison the towns of Bacoor, Las Pinas, and Paranaque. Local municipal governments of a primitive character were established, supervised by officers present in command of troops, and the people, apparently well satisfied, betook themselves to the planting of their rice and their formerly accustomed avocations.

We had thus, under circumstances which had been forced upon us by the determined opposition of the insurgents, enlarged our holdings in the south by a considerable acquisition of territory which was without strategic importance, although it made control of the waters of Manila Bay less difficult, as the coast was now in our possession from the province of Bataan to the Cavite Peninsula, excepting the slight portion between Bacoor and Noveleta on the south. But this occupation deprived us of the active aid of 2,500 men for field movements when their services at the north were important.

We were now busily engaged in discharging over 60 per cent of the enlisted men of the artillery and infantry regiments of the regular establishment, which had joined us previous to February, and in bringing into Manila and preparing for departure the volunteer organizations. We had still in the Visayas 6,200 men and in Luzon 26,000, of whom more than 20,000 were for duty, but the most of the volunteers were not considered available, except possibly to meet some unexpected emergency, and before the end of July more than 8,000 of them had been discharged or sailed for the United States, their places being in part taken by new arrivals.

The end of the month found us with 29,427 enlisted men, of whom 23,279 were reported for duty, and of whom 18,000 were in the island of Luzon. Active hostilities were maintained by a continued series of minor affairs, notwithstanding the unparalleled heavy rainfall of 46 inches in a single month, with an accompaniment of a number of severe typhoons. These affairs occurred mostly on our railway line of communication and at the north, and attended our endeavors to open the Laguna de Bay country for traffic with Manila, for which the inhabitants were particularly desirous. The latter efforts were not successful to any great extent because of insurgent bands which appeared at various points on the lake to secure the commercial advantages and the persistent labors of traders in Manila, either insurgent

sympathizers or seekers (who were of varied nationalities) for individual gain, whom pecuniary profit influenced more than conscience or fear of punishment. It was found to be impossible to hold in satisfactory check contraband trade, and as for the rice and other articles of subsistence sent out of the city, it was ascertained that the greater portion of it found its way to the insurgent troops. This trade was therefore again placed under restrictions, which are enforced still. The troops doing duty in the lake region were active. A dismounted squadron of the Fourth Cavalry, under the command of Captain McGrath, supplied with a launch and cascoes as transportation, visited many points on the lake and were received at times with white flags and the friendly demonstrations of the inhabitants and at times by the bullets of the insurgent troops, whom they invariably drove into the interior, but who returned after our men departed. On July 26 Calamba, which had been strongly intrenched and supposedly firmly held, was captured by General Lawton's troops, consisting of the Twenty-first Infantry, a squadron of the Fourth Cavalry, and a battalion drawn from the Washington regiment, all placed under the command of Brigadier-General Hall, with the loss in casualties of 3 men killed and 11 wounded. The insurgents stoutly resisted, but, as it has always happened in such cases, they experienced a costly discomfiture. Los Banos, the location of an expensive military hospital erected by Spain, was also taken, and the two places are still held by our troops, composed of a platoon of Light Battery F, Fifth Artillery, and the entire Twenty-first Infantry. Several attempts have been made to dislodge them by concentrated forces of the enemy, which have resulted in failure and severe punishment.

Our returns for August 31 showed a total Army force present in the Philippines of 30,963 officers and enlisted men, of whom more than 3,500 were volunteers awaiting shipment and men of the regular regiments about to be discharged, and hence could not be reckoned among the availables. Of this total, twelve and a fraction per cent were sick, leaving 27,189 officers and men for duty. Deducting therefrom the volunteers, there were left less than 24,000 officers and men for duty, of whom 4,145 were absent in Jolo, the Visayan Islands, and at Cavite Arsenal. Of the less than 20,000 remaining for duty in Luzon, 2,600 belonged to the provost guard of the city of Manila, 1,900 were on special duty, 345 were in confinement, and nearly 900 were members of the Hospital Corps. The force of active combatants outside of the city was therefore between 13,000 and 14,000 men, of whom 5,000 were required to hold the long line encircling the same. We received from the United States in August 133 officers and 4,247 enlisted men, consisting of an engineer company, the Nineteenth Infantry, 10 companies of the Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Infantry, 2 troops of Fourth Cavalry, and 1,195 recruits for the various regular organizations.

The casualties in killed and wounded among all United States troops in the Philippines from August 1, 1898, to August 31, 1899, number 1,900 and were, from the period from August 1 to February 4, which includes the capture of Manila from the Spaniards, 1 commissioned officer and 18 enlisted men killed or fatally wounded, 11 officers and 97 enlisted men wounded, but not fatally; and for the period from February 4, when the insurgents declared war against the United States, to August 31, 1899, 19 officers and 342 enlisted men killed or who died of wounds received in battle and 87 officers and 1,325 enlisted men wounded.

The majority of the wounded have recovered. Only 4 enlisted men have been reported as captured in action. One hundred and seventy-eight men dropped as deserters are still at large. Many of them escaped from the islands, but this desertion list includes men who absented themselves from their companies without permission and carelessly wandered beyond our lines into the enemy's country. These possibly aggregate 30 or 40. A few men who had been discovered as former deserters from the Army again deserted direct to the enemy, and some of them, it is rumored, hold commissions in Aguinaldo's forces. One officer, Captain Rockefeller, Ninth Infantry, is missing. While inspecting his picket posts near Manila on the night of April 29 he lost his bearings and wandered away from his command. Search was made for him for two days by a detachment of his regiment, but unsuccessfully, and no satisfactory information has been received concerning him, although repeated inquiries in various directions have been made. Deaths from accident for the thirteen months ending August 31, 1899, aggregate 5 officers and 91 enlisted men, of which 58 resulted from drowning and 11 suicide. Those drowned were mostly engaged in reconnoissance duty at the time and lost their lives in attempts to cross rivers swollen by heavy rainfalls. Deaths from disease number 12 officers and 426 enlisted men, of whom 90 died of variola, 120 of typhoid fever, and 72 of dysentery. Therefore the total loss by deaths from battle and disease of the Eighth Army Corps in the Philippines for the thirteen months ending August 31, 1899, was 37 commissioned officers and 879 enlisted men, and the total of deaths and casualties of every description, slight wounds included, numbered 144 among commissioned officers and 2,208 among enlisted men.

During the entire period covered by the foregoing general recital of the strictly military operations of the troops in these islands, the varied subjects arising in civil administration, the settlement of affairs between Spain and the United States, and the antagonistic individual interests connected with trade and commerce gave constant perplexity and required unremitting labor. When the armed insurgents had been driven away from the vicinity of Manila, the inhabitants of Manila asked for some sign of American expressed intention in inaugurating its Filipino government. We had control of nearly all of the province in which the city is situated, and it was believed for a time that we could with safety set up a provincial governor and revive, to a certain extent, the formerly enforced civil regulations with which the people were acquainted, amending them so that reported past abuses could not be practiced. The organization of a civil government for Manila was also taken under advisement, but conservative precaution indicated that such action might be attended with risk, especially as to property, for the population was becoming very dense, and much of it of a floating character, and needed close watching and a measurable degree of repression. Manila is now and for some time has been looked upon by the natives as the only safe refuge in Luzon, and unless those seeking it for an abiding place were restrained numbers would soon become too great to carry out necessary sanitary measures for the preservation of the public health and possibly to enforce the required public regulations for the public safety. No correct census of the city's population has ever been taken and none has been attempted for several years. Estimates vary widely. Conservative people place it under 400,000 and some educated and practical Filipino residents report it as high as 600,000. The majority

of this mass is irresponsible and easily excited. Insurgent agents, some with fair social standing, if not prominence, and holding appointments from Aguinaldo, are continually plotting in our midst, and Manila and every landed province under our control has its accredited insurgent governor. Under these prevailing conditions the introduction of a civil supervision of affairs by citizens, though under general military control, has been deferred. In the city a civil native police force has been organized, numbering 360, which is divided into four companies, each having its native captain and sergeants, and has worked admirably thus far in connection with the provost guard. These men, like our fire department, have thus far proved true, and are feared by the criminals and disloyal element of the population much more than our soldiers who patrol the streets, because they are known to and are closely watched by them. Other cities and towns in our possession were accorded local government under military supervisory restrictions, as shown in the following directory provisions of orders, viz:

1. In each town there will be a municipal council, composed of a president and as many representatives or headmen as there may be wards or barrios in the town, which shall be charged with the maintenance of public order and the regulation of municipal affairs in particulars hereinafter named. It will formulate rules to govern its sessions and order of business connected therewith, and by majority vote (to be determined by the president in case of a tie) will, through the adoption of ordinances or decrees, to be executed by the president, administer the municipal government; but no ordinance or decree shall be enforced until it receives the approval of the commanding officer of the troops there stationed.

2. The president shall be elected by a viva voce vote of residents of the town, approved by the commanding officer, and, together with the headmen or representatives of the council, shall hold office for one year. He shall be of native birth and parentage and a resident and property owner of the town. The headmen shall be elected by a viva voce vote of residents of their wards or barrios and shall reside and own property therein.

3. The president shall be the executive of the municipal council to execute its decrees issued for the following purposes, viz:

To establish a police force.

To collect taxes and license fees, to act as treasurer of public funds, and to make disbursements on warrants of the council.

To enforce regulations relating to traffic and the sale of spirits, to establish and regulate markets, to inspect live stock and record transfers and brands of the same.

To perform the duties formerly belonging to the lieutenant of the paddy fields.

To enforce sanitary measures.

To establish schools.

To provide for lighting the town.

4. The senior headman, or one designated by the council, shall be vice-president of the same, assistant to the president, and shall be ex officio lieutenant of police.

5. The headman of a ward is the delegate of the president for that ward; shall take measures to maintain order, and shall have power to appoint two assistants.

6. The council shall have no jurisdiction in civil cases, but on the application of parties in interest and their agreement in writing to accept the award of the council, it shall hear and decide cases involving property not exceeding in value $500.

7. In criminal matters the president, representing the council, shall make the preliminary examination and, according to the result, discharge the prisoner or transfer him immediately to the custody of the military authorities for trial by provost court.

8. The lieutenant of police may arrest or order the arrest of persons violating a city ordinance, disturbing the peace, or accused of crime; but no person shall be held in confinement longer than twenty-four hours without a preliminary examination, and no person shall be arrested for nonpayment of taxes or for debt.

9. The president shall render to the council during the first week of each month a certified account of collections under each tax, and of disbursements made during the preceding month. Said accounts, having been approved by the council, shall be forwarded, with vouchers, to the commanding officer of the troops, who shall make and retain a certified copy thereof.

10. Special appropriations shall require a unanimous vote of the council; regular disbursements may be made by ordinary decree on a majority vote.

11. Whenever the commanding officer of troops shall notify, in writing, the council that in his judgment a decree issued under subdivision 3 is inadequately executed, or shall make any other criticism or recommendation, the council will convene as soon thereafter as practicable to consider his communication and shall make written reply thereto, which reply, if he deem it insufficient, he shall forward, with his remarks, through military channels to these headquarters.

12. The foregoing provisions, tentative in character, are subject to amendment by enlargement or curtailment, as special conditions or development may make necessary.

In most instances these simple local establishments answer all purposes of a temporary nature and are drawn from former Spanish decrees and customs. In some cases the president has been discovered to be an ardent insurgent, engaged in forcing money collections in the interest of the enemy, but he is apt to desert his post and join his friends with his extortions before he can be arrested. One in whom confidence had been placed sold out for a general's commission and is now actively engaged in annoying our troops south of Manila. The lack of manifested surprise or indignation on the part of citizens by whom these criminals had been intrusted with the management of local affairs on discovering that they had been deceived and robbed presents an unfavorable commentary on the moral complexion of the native.

The Spanish civil courts, from which criminal jurisdiction had been taken, as shown on pages 59 and 60 of this report, had voluntarily closed their sessions in October and November, leaving the administration of justice by constituted tribunals to the provost courts of our creation. These provost courts could meet requirements in commercial matters, but the business of merchants and the property transactions of inhabitants necessitated judicial assistance of a strictly civil nature. The reestablishment of civil courts became the subject of mature deliberation. A number of conferences were held with Judge Arellano, a leading Filipino lawyer, who accepted the position of secretary of state in Aguinaldo's cabinet under popular pressure and from which he had withdrawn of his own volition shortly after acceptance, in the conviction that he could not thereby serve the interests of his people. After much hesitancy he promised to comply with my request to assist in the reestablishment of the supreme court of the islands and those of inferior jurisdiction for the city of Manila and suburbs. He advised strongly against a purely native judiciary, as the Asiatic consular court practice would result, since domiciled foreigners would not submit to the orders of a native court except under protest and appeal for relief to their own governments, and this would give rise to international difficulties. He advised that judges be selected from the most competent lawyers of the islands, and from United States officers versed in the law and acquainted with United States civil codes of procedure, to the end that simpler forms of practice might be substituted gradually for the cumbersome and dilatory methods hitherto pursued by Spain. The Spanish law, built upon royal prerogative, legislative enactments, and decrees of governing officers issued under conferred powers, extending over a period of centuries, has never been codified. In order to organize tribunals of justice, with membership other than Spanish and with modified powers and forms of procedure, in order to impose upon the inhabitants the laws of Spain intelligently amended in essential particulars, required

exhaustive research. This labor Judge Arellano undertook and carried to sufficient completion to enable us to make the necessary legal modifications and to organize the courts. His recommendation for the appointment of certain men to the bench who were drawn not only from Luzon but also from the Visayan Islands were approved and orders prepared by him and Lieutenant-Colonel Crowder, of the judge-advocate's department, were duly issued, as follows:

GENERAL ORDERS, }
No. 20. }

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., May 29, 1899.

I. Chapter 3, title 2, of the Organic Royal Decree of January 5, 1891, prescribing the qualifications of appointees to colonial judicial office, is, in its application to judicial appointments in the Philippine Islands, hereby suspended.

II. The supreme court of the Philippine Islands (audiencia territorial), heretofore administered in the city of Manila, the exercise of whose jurisdiction has been suspended as to criminal affairs since August 13, 1898, and as to civil affairs since January 30, 1899, is hereby reestablished and will exercise the jurisdiction, civil and criminal, which it possessed prior to August 13, 1898, in so far as compatible with the supremacy of the United States in said islands, and will administer the laws recognized as continuing in force by proclamation from these headquarters dated August 14, 1898, except in so far as they have been, or may hereafter be, modified by authority of the United States.

III. The following appointments are announced:

President (presidente), D. Cayetano Arellano.

CIVIL BRANCH (SALA DE LO CIVIL).

President (presidente), D. Manuel Araullo.

Associate justices (magistrados), D. Gregorio Araneta, Lieut. Col. E. H. Crowder, judge-advocate, U. S. V.

CRIMINAL BRANCH (SALA DE LO CRIMINAL).

President (presidente), D. Raymundo Melliza. Associate justices (magistrados), D. Ambrosio Rianzares, D. Julio Llorente, Maj. R. W. Young, Utah Volunteer Light Artillery, Capt. W. E. Birkhimer, Third U. S. Artillery.

ATTORNEYS (MINISTERIO FISCAL).

Attorney of the supreme court (fiscal de la audiencia territorial), D. Florentino Torres.

Assistant attorney (teniente fiscal), D. Dionisio Chanco.

The appointment of subordinate officials of this court will be announced later.

IV. The supreme court as above constituted will meet upon the call of its president at the earliest practical date for the purpose of organization and for the formulation of such recommendations relating to its procedure under United States authority as may be deemed by it advisable.

The officers herein named and all others who may be appointed hereafter to act in any capacity in connection with the administration of courts of justice in these islands will, before entering upon the discharge of their official duties, subscribe and take the following

OATH OF OFFICE.

I, ——— ———, having been appointed ——— in the Philippine Islands, recognize and accept the supreme authority of the United States of America. And I do solemnly swear that I will maintain good faith and fidelity to that Government; that I will obey the existing laws which rule in the Philippine Islands, as well as the legal orders and decrees of the duly constituted government therein; that I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, and will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office upon which I am about to enter. So help me God.

——— ———

The prescribed oath may be administered by the judge of the provost court of Manila, or by such other officers as may be designated for that purpose by proper authority.

By command of Major-General Otis:

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 20.

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., June 5, 1899.

The courts of first instance of the province of Manila and the courts of the peace heretofore held in the city of Manila, P. I., are hereby reestablished and will exercise the jurisdiction, civil and criminal, possessed by them prior to August 13, 1898, in so far as compatible with the supremacy of the United States in the Philippine Islands and the exercise of military government therein, and will administer the laws recognized as continuing in force by proclamation from these headquarters dated August 14, 1898, except in so far as these laws have been, or hereafter may be, modified by authority of the United States.

The division of the province of Manila into the four judicial districts of Binondo, Tondo, Quiapo, and Intramuros, as such districts existed prior to August 13, 1898, is continued. The territorial jurisdiction of the justice of the peace in each of these districts shall be coextensive with that of the court of first instance therein.

The following appointments are announced for courts of first instance:

DISTRICT OF BINONDO.

Judge, D. Antonio Majarreis; district attorney, D. Perfecto Gabriel.

DISTRICT OF TONDO.

Judge, D. Basilio Regalado Mapa; district attorney, D. Jose Ner.

DISTRICT OF QUIAPO.

Judge, D. Hipolito Magsalin; district attorney, D. Vicente Rodriguez.

DISTRICT OF INTRAMUROS.

Judge, D. Jose Baza Enriquez; district attorney, D. Lucio Villarreal.

The following for the justice courts:

DISTRICT OF BINONDO.

Justice of the peace, D. Jose M. Memije; substitute, D. Ramon Manalac Alberto.

DISTRICT OF TONDO.

Justice of the peace, D. Pedro Ricafort; substitute, D. Ignacio Ver de la Cruz.

DISTRICT OF QUIAPO.

Justice of the peace, D. Martiniano Veloso; substitute, D. Claudio Gabriel.

DISTRICT OF INTRAMUROS.

Justice of the peace, D. Jose Martinez Quintero; substitute, D. Jose del Castillo.

The following appointments in the supreme court of the Philippine Islands are hereby announced:

Secretary of civil branch, D. Roman Espiritu.

Secretary of criminal branch, D. Ramon Fernandez.

Assistant attorneys, D. Tomas G. Del Rosario, D. Antonio Constantino.

Secretary of the fiscalia, D. Bartolome Revilla.

The secretaries of the court above appointed shall receipt to Lieut. Col. E. H. Crowder, judge-advocate, U. S. V., for records and property pertaining to their respective branches of the court.

The division of the city and province of Manila into two districts for the purpose of registering titles to property, as such districts existed prior to August 13, 1898, is confirmed, and the following appointments of registrars for the same announced:

Registrar for the north district, D. Simplicio del Rosario.

Registrar for the south district, D. Francisco Ortigas.

By command of Major-General Otis:

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 22.

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., June 17, 1899.

I. The supreme court of the Philippine Islands and the courts of first instance and of the peace for the province of Manila, reestablished in General Orders Nos. 20 and 21, current series, this office, are announced as open and in the exercise of their jurisdiction, civil and criminal, on and after Wednesday, June 21, 1899. The sessions of the supreme court will be held in the building known as the "audiencia;" those of the courts of first instance and of the peace in the building known as the "Casa de la Moneda," Intramuros.

II. The jurisdiction of the courts specified in Paragraph I of this order, and of other civil courts which may hereafter be reestablished, shall not extend to and include crimes and offenses, committed by either citizens of or persons sojourning within the Philippine Islands, which are prejudicial to military administration and discipline, except by authority specially conferred by the military governor. Jurisdiction to try and award punishment in the class of cases designated remains vested in provost courts, courts-martial, or military commissions.

By command of Major-General Otis:

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

These orders were followed by others abolishing useless offices and methods of procedure, prescribing rules under which attorneys could be admitted to practice, in putting in force an amended notarial law, and announcing the appointment of notaries and other court officers. The court of the audencia took up at once unfinished business and the hearing and deciding of appeal civil causes. It has worked industriously and conscientiously under the able leadership of the president, and I doubt if any former Philippine tribunal has ever displayed equal legal ability. Some friction attended the running of the minor courts, which has been greatly reduced and has about ceased under special provisions of orders issued to meet varying conditions. The jurisdiction and punishing power of the superior provost court has been extended to meet cases of fraud involving the public revenue. All of these tribunals have succeeded in accomplishing the objects for which they were established beyond my expectation, and will, I am convinced, lay the foundation upon which to build an able and satisfactory judiciary for the islands when peace shall succeed war.

Two of the three civilian members of the so-called peace commission, which was appointed early in January, arrived on March 5, and the third, Colonel Denby, on April 2, two days after our troops had entered the insurgent capital of Malolos. The first meeting was held on March 20, when an organization was effected and its presiding officer, President Schurman, was requested to prepare an address to the Filipino people, to be issued as a proclamation, expressive of the desires and intentions of the United States Government in taking control of the islands. This he did, and the paper which he subsequently presented was pronounced excellent in tone and terms and most admirably indicative of the liberal and humane policy which it was understood by all that the United States intended to adopt. It was unanimously decided to print, publish, post, and disseminate as much as possible

among the inhabitants under insurgent domination this address, printing the same in the English, Spanish, and Tagalo languages. This was done, but scarcely had it been posted in Manila twenty-four hours before it was so torn and mutilated as to be unrecognizable. It suffered the same fate as the proclamation of January 4, set out in pages 113 and 114 of this report; but it produced a marked beneficial influence on the people, especially those outside our lines, as it carried with it a conviction of the United States' intentions, on account of the source from which it emanated, it being an expression from a committee of gentlemen specially appointed to proclaim the policy which the United States would pursue.

So pernicious to insurgent interests was its effect that Aguinaldo or his officers took measures to repress it wherever it was possible for them to do so. It is still the subject of discussion, and insurgents of influence have recently expressed a willingness to accept its terms and abide by its promises could they be assured that Congress would redeem them. This commission will probably very soon report its proceedings, investigations, conclusions, and recommendations, if it has not already done so. Though a member, I found it impossible to attend many of its sessions, and am ignorant of the scope or particulars of its labors. Its members, especially Colonel Denby and Professor Worcester, who remained here until their very recent recall, were of great assistance in strengthening the confidence of our native friends in the promises and good intentions of the United States with regard to the country, and aided me in many ways by counsel and by their investigations of practical subjects which were presented for determination.

The shipment of Spanish prisoners of war was taken up in earnest as soon as the ratification of the Paris treaty was officially communicated; also the settlement of property rights between Spain and the United States, upon which extended argument was indulged in as to the meaning of treaty provisions which must determine ownership. There were also involved the rights of many private citizens who had invested in undelivered Spanish bonds of a late issue, which had been retained in the treasury or who had deposited with the Spanish Government money or securities for the performance of obligations assumed. Under a mutual agreement boards of officers to consider all questions of disagreement or on which antagonistic opinion was held were appointed by the resident authorities of the two nations interested, Spain also appointing a special liquidation committee of its citizens to present her interests in matters of a strictly civil nature. The labors of these boards were very great and extended over a period of several months. The United States board was convoked in the following order:

A board of officers, to consist of Maj. Charles McClure, chief paymaster of the department; Maj. C. U. Gantenbein, Second Oregon, U. S. V., and Second Lieut. M. A. Hildreth, First North Dakota, U. S. V., is hereby appointed to meet and confer with a committee named by his excellency Division General Diego de los Rios y Nicalan, Spanish army, for the purpose, as stated, of clearing the accounts of the Spanish Government in the Philippines. The board will determine upon some definite course of procedure by which the Spanish committee can have access to all records and documents now in possession of the United States authorities which it may desire to consult, and will arrange therefor. No property or records can be delivered until the proposed treaty receives validity through ratification, and the board will continue its sessions anticipating that event when definite instructions looking to a settlement of public affairs, judicial and executive, can be conveyed. The board will ascertain fully the desires of the committee as to the nature and full extent of its desired action and give it every possible facility consistent with the present status of affairs.

Membership in this board was frequently changed, owing to emergencies of service. All of the original members were sooner or later relieved and substitution made, Lieutenant-Colonel Miley taking the place of Major McClure, and the former, an officer of very marked ability, who died in September, was succeeded by Lieutenant-Colonel Hull, of the judge-advocate's department, through resulting seniority. The duties of the board are approaching completion, and probably it can be dissolved soon. It was found necessary to give it broad latitude of action, and on April 22 it was empowered to administer oaths and take testimony in matters over which it was authorized to exercise jurisdiction, either by way of investigation or arbitrament. Questions of property rights upon which agreements could not be reached were referred for instructions. The more important of these were submitted to Washington for authoritative decision, and a construction of the meaning of the treaty provisions was obtained, which served as a rule for future guidance. The accompanying brief report of this board shows the character and general scope of its action, with its conclusions, but not the varied details of proceedings, which were exhaustive on all subjects presented for consideration.

At an early date there were presented claims of corporations which had obtained and were operating under Spanish concessions, for payment for public services, losses accruing for lack of protection as promised in those concessions, or for damages to property inflicted by both insurgents and United States representatives; also very many claims from business houses and private individuals for destruction, loss, damage, or retention of their property, whether occasioned by the insurgents or our troops. Minor ones of undoubted validity were adjusted and paid from public funds, but those in which doubtful questions of legal obligations arose have been held in abeyance. To give attention to all claims presented it was finally necessary to organize a board of claims, and the following order was issued:

SPECIAL ORDERS, No. 3.

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., April 18, 1899.

A board of officers is hereby appointed to consider and pass upon such claims against the United States Government, preferred by parties resident or otherwise in the Philippine Islands, and arising by reason of United States occupation, as may be submitted to it from this office for investigation and opinion. It will be guided in its decisions by the rules of interpretation adopted by this office in its past consideration of demands of this nature, in so far as they be applicable to circumstances and conditions. The board will meet to-morrow, the 19th instant, at 10 o'clock a. m., or as soon thereafter as practicable, at the office of the judge-advocate of the Department of the Pacific, for the purpose of organization and fixing upon methods of procedure to govern its deliberations; and thereafter it will hold its sessions at such times and places as the presiding officer may announce:

Detail for the board.—Lieut. Col. E. H. Crowder, judge-advocate, U. S. V.; Maj. C. U. Gantenbein, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry; Capt. H. A. Greene, Twentieth United States Infantry; Capt. J. G. Ballance, Twenty-second United States Infantry.

By command of Major-General Otis:

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Membership in this board has been changed occasionally as circumstances compelled, but the senior member is still serving thereon. It formulated and published rules to govern its proceedings and for the information of all persons who desired to submit claims and by which they were to be guided in the preparation and submission of the same.

Sixty-four claims, aggregating $605,000 (Mexican money), were received from residents of southern Luzon and for the most part Manila, and mostly involving the burning and looting of abandoned houses in the battles of February 5 and 22 at Manila. Few of this character appear to possess merit and are poorly sustained by proof of facts. Several asking for the return of property which was captured in the enemy's country or which was seized by our men for convenience of transportation have been adjusted without difficulty. The destruction of private property as a necessary incident of war in driving the insurgents from their defensive positions in the suburbs of Manila is the question involved in passing upon most of these demands. Twenty-five claims, aggregating $1,338,116 (Mexican), have been received from Iloilo. They are defectively and carelessly drawn and very indefinite as to details. Only in a few cases is proof of ownership of property submitted. All but two call for damages to property incident to the forcible occupation of the city by our troops on February 11 last, when the insurgents upon retiring burned a considerable portion of it. One of the two exceptions is a claim for $6,000 presented by a Spaniard through the consular office, because of the seizure of his printing establishment after abandonment, wherein was printed a scurrilous newspaper, violently incendiary and abusive of the United States while our troops occupied Iloilo Harbor, before the seizure of the city. The other is also a demand for $6,000 from a Spaniard for the destruction of his boat and cargo by the U. S. S. *Bennington* while believed to be engaged in illicit trade. Mostly all others of these claims are based on the alleged responsibility of the United States to pay damages to the several owners of property destroyed in the Iloilo fire set by the insurgents upon forced evacuation, because of the fact that the United States began the attack on the city before the expiration of time announced in the notice to residents that it would commence, thus depriving them of the opportunity to remove or place their property which was destroyed in better condition for preservation. The action of the Army and Navy, which constitutes the chief argument of the claimants for the legal validity of their demands, has been set out on pages 175–177 of this report. All but two of these claimants are subjects of foreign countries.

Under War Department instructions giving protection to the owners of patents and copyrights issued by the United States, the following directions were published:

I. The offices of patents, of copyrights, and of trade-marks, heretofore administered as separate bureau of the "Direccion-General de Administracion Civil," are hereby consolidated into a single office, to be known as the Office of Patents, Copyrights, and Trade-marks, and placed in charge of Capt. George P. Ahern, Ninth U. S. Infantry, who will receipt to the Spanish authorities for all records, documents, and property pertaining thereto.

II. The duties enjoined in Circular No. 12, division of customs and insular affairs, in reference to the filing here of patents and trade-marks issued in the United States and duly registered in the United States Patent Office, and all duties which, under the laws relating to patents, copyrights, and trade-marks applicable to the Philippines, pertained to the "Director-General de Administracion Civil" and his subordinates, are hereby devolved upon the officer in charge of the office of patents, copyrights, and trade-marks above designated; all matters of administration arising in that office which, under those laws, required the action of any higher authority than the "Director-General de Administracion Civil" will be forwarded for consideration and action to the office of the United States military governor in the Philippines.

III. So much of Article 27 of the royal decree of October 26, 1888, regulating the concession and use of trade-marks, as requires reference to the Real Sociedad

Economica of industrial marks, designs, or models presented for registration, for investigation and report as to whether such marks, designs, or models are already in use or are the property of third persons, is hereby suspended.

The business of this bureau has been active, requiring the work of an interpreter and two clerks under the constant supervision of Captain Ahern. It required him to collect and file all former Spanish records obtainable on this subject, some of which were kept in Spain, and now the office is running smoothly comparatively. Every mail from the United States brings many certified patents for file, and the exacted fee of $1 for filing more than pays the office expenses.

In Manila and a few other cities where our troops are stationed to give inhabitants protection schools have been established. Parents and children are eager for primary-school instruction and are very desirous to acquire a speaking knowledge of the English language. In the city of Manila more than 5,000 children are attending these schools, which are maintained at a cost of nearly 10,000 Mexican dollars a month. Instructors are drawn from the former Spanish and Filipino teachers, augmented by Americans, some of whom are discharged men from volunteer organizations and some from those who came to the islands on account of individual desire. The superintendent is a former soldier who had considerable experience in this profession in the United States. Many applications for positions as teachers are received through mailed communications and from persons who, if the references furnished can be relied on, would render valuable service here, but it will require time to firmly establish this educational plant. The higher education which the islands have hitherto enjoyed, as well as that of a minor character, has been entirely under the control of the religious orders and has centered in Manila. The Dominican order, rich in landed estates acquired through a series of years, inaugurating its educational policy under royal assistance, money contributions, and decrees when the educational field was entirely in the possession of the clergy, and seizing on by degrees to the educational institutions and scientific schools organized by the Jesuits under royal protection and conducted with funds from individual testators after that order had been driven from the islands, built up the University of Manila and gradually incorporated in it these Jesuit foundations. Great effort was made to sever them from Dominican authority by recent Spanish statesmen of advanced ideas, but without success, and now the leading Filipinos demand that severence and a return to State supervision. Much time and labor in historical research has been expended by Lieutenant-Colonel Crowder of the law department in the investigation of these matters, and his able reports of past and present conditions and legal conclusions derived therefrom has so presented the subject that radical action can be taken in some instances and has been determined upon. The Archbishop of Manila, who, I am informed, is a member of the Dominican order, has served parole notice that he will strenuously oppose such action and has been invited to submit his protest at an early date.

In our last allusion to the Sulu Archipelago it was stated (see page 222) that the occupation of Jolo by our troops on May 19 and the friendly relations established between them and the representative Moros placed affairs there in a very satisfactory condition for future negotiations, which were conducted by Brigadier-General Bates. The islands of the archipelago, that of Basilan, and those of Palauan and Balabac, were localities of concern. In Palauan, where Spain maintained a resident governor and to which she had transported some of

her state criminals, the Tagalo had succeeded. The Spanish governor had been murdered and all prisoners released. At Balabac a very important light-house had been established, which was necessary to to the safe navigation of those waters. At Basilan a naval station of some importance had been built up. Our Navy looked after all matters connected with the Palauan Islands in so far as keeping affairs there in check were concerned; reestablished the light at Balabac, where it had dispersed and driven off with loss an attacking party of natives and where it keeps a small detachment of men, and has closely watched Basilan and the near city of Zamboanga. Conditions may be inferred from instructions given on July 3 and 11 to General Bates, who was sent to the Sulu Archipelago to propose terms of agreement to the Moros, who had become very importunate to be informed of the meaning of our occupation of the islands, and to explain United States intentions. They are as follows:

OFFICE MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., July 3, 1899.

Gen. J. C. BATES, U. S. V.,
Manila, P. I.

GENERAL: In compliance with orders this day issued directing you to proceed to the Jolo Archipelago, there to execute specific instructions to be communicated by the department commander, you will proceed as soon as practicable to the United States military station of Jolo, on the island of that name, and there place yourself in communication with the Sultan of Jolo, who is believed to be at Siassi, where he was sojourning when the last information concerning him was received.

You are hereby appointed and constituted an agent on the part of the United States military authorities in the Philippines to discuss, enter into negotiations, and perfect, if possible, a written agreement of character and scope as hereinafter explained, with the Sultan, which upon approval at these headquarters and confirmation by the supreme executive authority of the United States, will prescribe and control the future relations, social and political, between the United States Government and the inhabitants of the archipelago. The written memoranda herewith furnished you, which mention cursorily and very briefly the past political status and recent history of those people in so far as their domestic and political relations with other nations are concerned; which present suggestions and recommendations, contained in the remarks and speculations of persons who have been personally acquainted with them, as to the proper policy of control or supervision which should be adopted by the United States in its dealings with their native authorities; which give the extent and results of contact and relationship with them thus far developed on the part of the United States through its military agency established in the port of Jolo, will enable you to understand the character and difficulties of the labor with which you are charged.

By reference to these memoranda you will perceive that in your discussions with the Sultan and his datos the question of sovereignty will be forced to the front, and they will undoubtedly request an expression of opinion thereon, as they seem to be impressed apparently with the belief that the recent Spanish authorities with whom they were in relationship have transferred full sovereignty of the islands to them. The question is one which admits of easy solution, legally considered, since by the terms of treaties or protocols between Spain and European powers (those referred to in the memoranda) Spanish sovereignty over the archipelago is conceded. Under the agreement between Spain and the Sultan and datos of July, 1878, the latter acknowledged Spanish sovereignty in the entire archipelago of Jolo and agreed to become loyal Spanish subjects, receiving in consideration certain specific payments in money. The sovereignty of Spain, thus established and acknowledged by all parties in interest, was transferred to the United States by the Paris treaty. The United States has succeeded to all the rights which Spain held in the archipelago, and its sovereignty over the same is an established fact. But the inquiry arises as to the extent to which that sovereignty can be applied under the agreement of 1878 with the Moros. Sovereignty, of course, implies full power of political control, but it is not incompatible with concessionary grants between sovereign and subject. The Moros acknowledged through their accepted chiefs Spanish sovereignty and their subjection thereto, and that nation in turn conferred upon their chiefs certain powers of supervision

over them and their affairs. The kingly prerogatives of Spain, thus abridged by solemn concession, have descended to the United States, and conditions existing at the time of transfer should remain. The Moros are entitled to enjoy the identical privileges which they possessed at the time of transfer, and to continue to enjoy them until abridged or modified by future mutual agreement between them and the United States, to which they owe loyalty, unless it becomes necessary to invoke the exercise of the supreme powers of sovereignty to meet emergencies. You will therefore acquaint yourself thoroughly with the terms of the agreement of 1878, and take them as a basis for your directed negotiations.

Possibly you will discover that the Sultan and datos are laboring under the mistaken impression that Spain, upon withdrawing recently her military forces from the islands, reconveyed sovereignty to them. This claim on their part is mentioned in the memorandum citing the action of the United States troops at Jolo, and may be seriously entertained by them, because of the reported Spanish action in placing them in possession of Siassi, accompanied by promises to likewise turn over Jolo. If they seriously entertain such an illusion, it will require tact and adroitness to dispel it, and a discussion of the United States benevolent intentions, and its wish to establish friendly relations with them in order to carry out those intentions, should precede any decided attempt at correction.

The territorial extent of the Jolo Archipelago, as authoritatively established, is set out in the accompanying memoranda in all essential particulars, except as to the island of Basilan, where Spain maintained an important naval station, which is still in existence, though not yet in United States actual possession. You will make inquiry with regard to this island and ascertain if the Sultan claims any authority over it, conceding nothing, however, on the point as to right of absolute control on the part of the United States. The naval station is closely connected with Zamboanga, over which and the adjacent country Spain exercised complete supervision. The Sultan and datos have exacted tribute from Cagayan-Jolo and Balabac, and, in fact, from southern Palauan; also, when possible, from other islands which Spain owned absolutely for more than three hundred years. Hence, the fact of taking tribute is not proof of a legal right to do so. Palauan and Balabac are not considered to be portions of the archipelago, though it may not be policy to attempt to determine with the Sultan, at present, any question of ownership which may arise in discussion. Spain maintained a governor in Palauan, and shore accessories, such as light-house, etc., with some form of supervisory government in Balabac. The United States demands with regard to these islands will be announced when the result of practical investigation now being pursued is ascertained. It may be well, therefore, to avoid presenting this matter to the Sultan or his representatives in these directed preliminary negotiations, and should he advance it, policy dictates that time should be requested to arrive at a knowledge of facts.

It is greatly desired by the United States for the sake of the individual improvement and social advancement of the Moros, and for the development of the trade and agriculture of the islands in their interests, also for the welfare of both the United States and Moros, that mutual friendly and well-defined relations be established. If the Sultan can be made to give credit to and fully understand the intentions of the United States, the desired result can be accomplished. The United States will accept the obligations of Spain under the agreement of 1878 in the matter of money annuities, and in proof of sincerity you will offer as a present to the Sultan and datos $10,000, Mexican, with which you will be supplied before leaving for Jolo—the same to be handed over to them, respectively, in amounts agreeing with the ratio of payments made to them by the Spanish Government for their declared services. From the 1st of September next, and thereafter, the United States will pay to them regularly the sums promised by Spain in its agreement of 1878, and in any subsequent promises of which proof can be furnished.

The United States will promise, in return for the concessions to be hereinafter mentioned, not to interfere with, but to protect the Moros in the free exercise of their religion and customs, social and domestic, and will respect the rights and dignities of the Sultan and his advisers. It promises not to interfere in their affairs of internal economy and political administration further than to respond to their requests for assistance or to render supervisory action through advice and instruction in those special features of administration connected with the development of trade and agricultural resources, and the methods of conducting and employing the same for the improvement and efficiency of government. It agrees to insure to the Sultan and his people the enjoyment of these rights and privileges against all foreign nations, and will declare all trade of the Sultan and his people with any portion of the Philippine Islands conducted under the American flag

free, unlimited, and undutiable. It demands, of course, the right to exercise control over the places within its actual occupation.

In return for the promised assurances the Sultan and his chiefs, acknowledging the sovereignty of the United States, should stipulate to permit that Government to occupy and control such points in the islands as the execution of the obligations which it assumes make necessary, whether for naval or military operations against foreign aggression or to disperse attempted piratical excursions. They will agree to accept and fly on all occasions, and continuously, the American flag as the emblem and proof of United States sovereignty. They should promise to give a loyal support to the United States to maintain the integrity and peace of the archipelago, not to permit acts of piracy by their people on its waters, and to assist the United States Government to suppress and abolish this crime by whomsoever attempts to commit it, whether American, inhabitant, or alien. They should agree to deliver to the United States authorities for trial and punishment all persons, other than those of their own people, whom they arrest on the charge of committing crimes or misdemeanors. They should stipulate to prohibit the purchase by or the delivery to their people of rifles or war materials, as the possession of them has a tendency to stir up strife among their separate communities and to destroy the peace of the islands, which, for the welfare of all parties concerned, should be maintained.

Should the Sultan and his datos request assistance by way of instruction, through competent American representatives, to improve port regulations and conveniences in the interest of commerce or to build up agriculture and increase merchantable products in the islands, or to instruct the rising generation of Moros in industrial and mechanical pursuits through the medium of schools or practical appliances, the United States will gladly respond. It will endeavor to select the proper individuals to go among and associate with them to impart constant valuable information in all such matters the necessities of which for the growth in riches and the well being of all inhabitants of the islands should be impressed upon the Sultan and his principal advisers.

All these and other subjects of minor significance, which will suggest themselves to you in the progress of the negotiations, when conditions will be better understood, are for your consideration and appropriate action.

Any agreement which you may be able to effect will be of force only upon approval and ratification by superior authority, and this must be distinctly understood and so stated in the instrument. The agreement will be subject to future modifications by the mutual consent of all parties in interest.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. S. Otis,
Major-General, U. S. V., Military Governor.

Office U. S. Military Governor in the Philippine Islands,
Manila, P. I., July 11, 1899.

Gen. J. C. Bates, U. S. V., *Manila, P. I.:*

General: Referring to instructions of the 3d instant in the matter of the directed conference having in view the execution of an agreement with the Sultan of Jolo, it is considered expedient to modify slightly, in certain particulars, those instructions and to state somewhat more specifically objects which it is desired to attain.

By an investigation of the records in the Manila archives to discover the meaning and extent of certain stipulations in the agreements made from time to time by and between the Spanish authorities and the Sultan, which establish conditions of trade in the Archipelago and announce the status of the Sultan, it is discovered that these conditions and status are very varying, and it can not be ascertained. In fact, it is a conclusion to be drawn from the records, that Spain never announced nor conceived a definite, fixed policy of control over the archipelago which looked to improvement and permanency. Its frequent recorded actions seem to have been the result of a desire to temporarily meet difficulties growing out of some strained relationship with the Moros existing at the time, accompanied by the evident fixed purpose to maintain a sufficient number of troops in the archipelago to show to Europe that occupation in fact which would demonstrate Spanish sovereignty.

By no other conclusion can the varying stipulations of executed agreements between Spain and the Moros be accounted for. They are not explained in any recorded correspondence, and conditions existing at the dates they were entered into warrant the belief at which we have arrived. It will be seen that the Sultan

and his datos are at one time given all the revenues: that Spain permits the Sultan to collect all revenues at ports in actual Spanish occupation, notwithstanding its treaties with European powers permit it to levy duties at such ports, and that Spain's entire action deprives it of money receipts, but imposes upon her continual heavy expenditures for only simple nominal occupation of a few ports. Neither has Spain ever attempted to lay the foundation for any reforms looking to the future collection of revenues to meet any of the outlay, whether by the development of trade or improvement of natural resources. The pursuit of such a policy, if policy it can be called, is suicidal to the interests of the supervising country and the interests of the people supervised. The United States should seek to adopt a policy which, if devoid of immediate national benefit, promises beneficial results both in the matter of revenue (that is, revenue to meet the necessary outlaying expenditures) and at the same time will be attended by the improvement of the educational and social conditions of the inhabitants and the development of their country in trade and agricultural resources—that is, a policy which will be mutually advantageous to all parties concerned.

It is therefore important to make somewhat more specific the former instructions and to modify them in certain particulars, as follows:

It is quite important that the United States shall occupy the principal distributing centers of trade, to build up and develop a revenue and to supervise that development. This the Spanish treaties with foreign powers permit. Siassi should be occupied by our troops at no distant day and two or three other important points. This necessity you will keep in view in your negotiations and will show the Sultan the blessings which would be conferred upon his people by intelligent establishment and development.

In declaring "all trade of the Sultan and his people with any portion of the Philippine Islands, conducted under the American flag, free, unlimited, and undutiable," care must be taken to guard against the possibility of the introduction of foreign commerce into the archipelago and thence into other Philippine ports without paying the prescribed duties. It is only the products of the archipelago which can have the benefits of interisland commerce.

While the Sultan might be supported and may receive revenue from certain avenues, pearl fisheries, etc., which he is now enjoying, there should be some understanding as to future revenues to be derived from a newly constructed and increasing trade in foreign products. Negotiations should look to the establishment of a financial and commercial system based upon modern methods, which, while not destructively antagonistic to present conditions, can be developed upon lines consistent with modern practices.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. S. Otis,
Major-General, U. S. V., Military Governor.

General Bates had a difficult task to perform and executed it with tact and ability. While a number of the principal datos were favorably inclined, the Sultan, not responding to invitations, kept aloof and was represented by his secretary, until finally, the general appearing at Maibung, the Moro capital, a personal interview was secured. He being also Sultan of North Borneo and receiving large annual payments from the North Borneo Trading Company, expected like returns from the United States, and seemed more anxious to obtain personal revenue than benefits for his people. Securing the port of Siassi from the Spaniards, establishing there his guards and police, he had received customs revenues from the Sandaken trade which he was loath to surrender. Negotiations continued well into August, and finally, after long conferences, an agreement was reached by which the United States secured much more liberal terms than the Spaniards were ever able to obtain. Full reports of the conferences have been duly forwarded, together with the agreement proposed for authoritative action. It is believed that if peace can be maintained a trade can be built up which will prove highly beneficial to both the United States and the Moro people and will be the means of opening avenues through which a more advanced civilization can be developed in these islands.

The population of the Sulu Archipelago is reckoned at 120,000, mostly domiciled in the island of Jolo, and numbers 20,000 fighting men. Hostilities would be unfortunate for all parties concerned, would be very expensive to the United States in men and money, and destructive of any advancement of the Moros for years to come. Spain's long struggle with these people and their dislike for the former dominant race in the Philippines, inherited, it would seem, by each rising generation during three centuries, furnishes an instructive lesson. Under the pending agreement General Bates, assisted by the officers of the Navy, quietly placed garrisons of one company each at Siassi and at Bongao, on the Tawai Tawai group of islands, where they were well received by the friendly natives. With the approval of the agreement, the only difficulty to a satisfactory settlement of the Sulu affairs will arise from discontent on the part of the Sultan personally because of a supposed decrease in anticipated revenues or the machinations of the insurgents of Mindanao, who are endeavoring to create a feeling of distrust and hostility among the natives against the United States troops.

The Sultan's government is one of perfect despotism, in form at least, as all political power is supposed to center in his person; but this does not prevent frequent outbreaks on the part of the datos, who frequently revolt, and are now, in two or three instances, in declared enmity. All Moros, however, profess the Mohammedan religion, introduced in the fourteenth century, and the sacredness of the person of the Sultan is therefore a tenet of faith. This fact would prevent any marked success by a dato in attempting to secure supreme power. Spain endeavored to supplant the Sultan with one of his most enterprising chiefs and signally failed. Peonage or a species of serfdom enters largely into the social and domestic arrangements and a dato's following or clan submits itself without protest to his arbitrary will. The Moro political fabric bears resemblance to the state of feudal times—the Sultan exercising supreme power by divine right, and his datos, like the feudal lords, supporting or opposing him at will, and by force of arms occasionally, but not to the extent of dethronement, as that would be too great a sacrilege for a Mohammedan people to seek to consummate. The United States must accept these people as they are, and endeavor to ameliorate their condition by degrees, and the best means to insure success appears to be through the cultivation of friendly sentiments and the introduction of trade and commerce upon approved business methods. To undertake forcible radical action for the amelioration of conditions or to so interfere with their domestic relations as to arouse their suspicions and distrust would be attended with unfortunate consequences.

The experience of the past year has conclusively demonstrated that the labors demanded to organize, supply, command, and exchange an army actively engaged in hostilities are small in comparison to those which are required to supervise the business, social and political interests, and the individual rights of several millions of people without established government or any existing rules of action excepting such as may be imposed by military control. In the Philippines chaos, in so far as a civil administration of public affairs is concerned, followed the overthrow of the despotism of Spain and was succeeded throughout the islands by the rule of the sword, which has recently been directed by a few unprincipled Tagalos, who have retained power thus far, although it is gradually passing from their grasp, by deceiving the ignorant masses with the assertion that the United States

intended to enslave and destroy them, and with the cry for independence and republican government. The experience of the people has taught them that the rule of Spain was mild in comparison with this substituted governing power, and the great majority of them—at least of those who are able to reflect or who have property at stake—desire its destruction. Many are held in subjection by the armed bodies in their midst, and their lives and property would pay the penalty of resistance should they attempt it either by word or act. During this political transition business interests and individual property rights have been in jeopardy. Incorporated companies holding valuable concessions granted by Spain, business houses which have made large money investments for the purpose of conducting trade and commerce in these islands, vested property interests, recently acquired estates by testament and descent and those encumbered by mortgage or embargo, are fruitful sources of continually recurring questions which require able civil administration and the assistance of courts of justice with their auxiliary appliances to properly adjust, but which have been thrust upon the military authorities for determination, together with all matters of a criminal nature involving alleged fraudulent transactions which demand speedy remedial action, as well as offenses of a more serious character. Fortunately the large property interests held by corporations and business houses belong for the most part to Europeans and are to a certain extent respected by the insurgent government through fear of incurring universal civilized condemnation should it destroy or openly appropriate them.

So, also, the foreign element of the population engaged in conducting trade are very largely citizens of strong European governments, whose persons are comparatively secure wherever in the islands they may wish to journey. Hence, it has been possible to carry on trade whenever the interests of the United States or the necessities of the large Philippine population dwelling within the country of our occupation has demanded it. Unfortunately, too, it might be said, this comparative security of person and property incites the commercial classes to business activity and a desire for insurgent trade incompatible with war conditions, even though contraband does not materially enter; has occasioned voluminous correspondence and incessant applications for trade permits, necessitated constant watchfulness on the part of the army, and especially of the navy, and has required at times needed unpleasant consequent action. The volume of trade, however, for the year ending August 31, has been quite large, and merchants have suffered much less than is generally supposed. Of the three staple articles of the islands, hemp, tobacco, and sugar, only the latter shows a very marked depreciation in amounts secured and exported. About the same quantity of hemp has been taken from the shipping ports during the past as in the preceding year, and large exportations of tobacco have been made. There still remains in the islands considerable quantities of both hemp and tobacco, but Aguinaldo a short time since issued what was called a decree, most injurious to his interests, forbidding his Tagalo guards to permit, at the ports where they were stationed, the entrance of any merchant vessel flying the American flag, and as all interisland commerce is carried on under that flag, his decree virtually terminated at all points where his troops are maintained, with the result that the inhabitants are deprived of rice and other necessary articles of food. The decree has caused discontent and suffering and has taken from the insurgents much of their revenue, while it has not affected United States interests nor the inhabitants

within our lines, as they are now well supplied and will soon reap an abundant harvest from their crops, which they have planted since United States protection has been given them.

So unpopular is this decree that the outside inhabitants declare that they will resist its execution should American vessels appear in their harbors, but our experience thus far is that a battalion of Tagalo guards can hold down many large communities of unarmed natives. Merchants, if permitted, would take all the risks of interisland trade notwithstanding this restrictive decree and solemnly contract to suffer all losses attendant upon their venture, which would sooner or later doubtless appear as claims from marine insurance companies; but a wise policy dictates that trade facilities should remain for the present in the condition which Aguinaldo by his decree intended to place them. He has acted under it in one instance only, and then in the case of a vessel anchored in a port of western Luzon and which had sailed before it was known that the decree had been issued. His troops seized the crew and cargo and when the navy went to its relief burned the vessel and fired upon the rescuing party. The return fire of the navy upon the intrenched insurgent troops has been publicly proclaimed from insurgent headquarters as an act of barbarous warfare which should be condemned by all civilized nations.

The customs receipts (a fair index of the volume of trade) for the year ending August 31 were $7,783,000, currency of the country—a larger amount than ever before received in an equal portion of time, and this while we held the port of Iloilo for only six and that of Cebu for but five months of the period.

In the matter of the public revenue, the United States has collected less than one-half of the greatest total amount which Spain has drawn from the islands in a corresponding length of time, for the reason that the extent of our occupation of territory has been very limited and because some of its former most prolific sources of taxation have been ignored. The largest yearly amount which Spain ever received was a little less than $17,500,000, of which a little more than one-third was derived from customs, one-quarter from the sale of "cedulas personales," or certificates of personal identity, which every inhabitant was obliged to purchase, and about $1,200,000 from lotteries and gambling and the opium and cock-fighting contractors. The $5,500,000 which Spain received from cedulas, licensed gambling, and contracts which the United States courts would hold void on grounds of public policy, would in any event, even if all the islands had been pacified and occupied, have been lost to us, as no attempts at collection would have been made.

However, the cedula tax might have yielded something, for although this is the most hated by the natives of all taxes formerly imposed upon them, they desire the cedula, as this simple means of identity is valuable to them in conducting business and when journeying through the islands. In response to the expressed desire of the inhabitants of Manila for this ticket, it was given on personal application at a nominal sum sufficient to defray the cost of issuance, and over sixty thousand of them were distributed in a short space of time from the Manila office of internal revenue. The annual revenue of nearly a million of dollars received by Spain from convict labor, exclusive taxes on Chinese residents, sales of public lands, profits of the mint, and local consumption tobacco taxes could not be collected by the United States. So, also, the internal-revenue collections on real estate, industries, and stamped paper have been confined to Manila

and Iloilo, and the yield therefrom has been but a fraction of the receipts which our control of all the islands would have insured. The internal-revenue receipts during a year of occupation of Manila, or from August 18, 1898, were $577,748. The grand total of all public money receipts from every source for the year ending August 19, 1899, one year from the date the United States took possession of the public offices in Manila (August, 1898, yielding very small returns), amounted to $8,239,435, of which $7,790,692 were from customs alone. Larger returns from legitimate sources might have been obtained, but it took time to adjust the machinery for collection, and long-existing fraudulent practices have been indulged in. Heavy punishments have been meted out when offenses have been detected, and the labor to improve the civil service is still being diligently prosecuted.

Spain's system of taxation was very ingeniously devised in order to obtain all revenue possible to cover the expenditures of administering the islands, but I believe that every annual budget showed a deficit. With the restoration of peace and active business conditions, the development of natural resources, the introduction of machinery and practical business enterprises, the construction of railroads and highways, and the encouragement of the people in profitable labor, I am convinced that trade and commerce would be greatly increased and the amount of revenue doubled in a short period of time, without imposing the burdens which were complained of during Spanish supremacy. Even in this season of war commerce has increased. For the five and one-half months ending with December last, 77 foreign and 260 coast vessels entered and 80 foreign and 251 coast vessels cleared from our ports, making a total of 668 vessels, with a total tonnage of 657,740 tons; while for the six months ending with June last, 155 foreign and 367 coast vessels entered and 163 foreign and 409 coast vessels cleared, making a total of 1,049 and having a tonnage of 133,935 tons.

The most of the revenue received has been expended, both for war and civil purposes, by a few selected disbursing officers, and every dollar has been accounted for. There remained on August 31 $1,364,085.39, nearly one-half of which stood pledged to pay for temporary barracks and hospitals for troops and for a large refrigerating plant to be erected in Manila. All results of action taken in connection with the collection and expenditure of the public revenue from the date of the capitulation of this city to June 30 last, the end of the fiscal year, are shown in the accompanying reports of the collecting and disbursing officers, to which attention is invited.

The present current money of the islands consists of the Filipino dollar, of which 6,000,000 were sent from Spain in 1897, about $10,000,000 in subsidiary coins, eight or ten millions of Mexican dollars, and $1,500,000 in bank notes of the Banco Espanol-Filipino.

The former standard money was gold, consisting of the Spanish "onzas" and the $1, $2, and $4 gold pieces minted in Manila. All of these have been driven out of circulation by the cheaper silver currency. The Banco Espanol-Filipino is the only bank which has the power to make paper issue. Under Spanish concession and in return for loans made to that Government, it was granted the privilege of issuing its notes amounting to three times its capital stock of $1,500,000, and its paper dollar is considered the equivalent of the Mexican silver dollar. The Spanish Government had representation in the management of this bank, and recently the bank invited the United States authorities here to avail itself of this privilege by the appoint-

ment of an accredited agent, which invitation has been declined, as such action might be construed to be an acknowledgment on the part of the United States of its obligation to recognize under treaty promises the validity of the Spanish concession. The War Department has paid out in Manila United States gold currency in considerable quantities, and it is believed that about $3,000,000 from these disbursements have been hoarded by the inhabitants. The money in circulation, therefore, in the Philippines is less than $30,000,000 of silver, or the equivalent—a very small sum to transact the volume of business; but then a large share of this trade depends upon credit and the exchange of the country's products, so that comparatively little money is required to conduct it. However, during the yearly periods of greatest exportation money to move the crops becomes very scarce and rates of exchange high. Exchange fluctuations were greater in Spanish times than at present, for in 1878 Spain prohibited by decree the importation of Mexican dollars of a mintage later than the date of the decree except under high duty payments and gave no substitute. This induced smuggling from the foreign Asiatic ports, and the smuggler was paid a handsome profit for the hazard he encountered. The enterprise was brisk until money became plentiful and exchange had again returned to a nominal figure.

When money was in great demand the price of the Mexican dollar was considerably above its Hongkong value in gold and sold in Manila for from 10 to 15 per cent more than its actual value. The currency of the country still fluctuates daily according to the price of silver in the great money markets of the world and has no stable value. This, however, appears to affect very little ordinary business unless purchases of merchandise and services must be paid for in gold, when these fluctuations enter largely into the calculations of profit and loss. The merchant who buys gold in Manila must pay not only the rate of exchange, but the estimated cost of transporting the metal, and if he wishes to convert gold into silver he must pay high exchange rates and the cost of shipment of the Mexican dollar. The public revenue is paid in the currency of the country, as is most expedient, else daily silver fluctuations would necessitate daily difficult calculations upon the gold value of the money offered at the various public offices; but as it is for the most part expended here for services and on local contract purchases the difficulties attending rates of exchange are not serious. The officers and enlisted men of the Army who are paid in gold have been the principal sufferers, as they are obliged to exchange their gold for silver to meet their local payments. The two established banks of the islands other than the Banco Español-Filipino, above mentioned, are branches of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and the Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China. These have been made depositories of the public civil funds and generally make the money exchanges for the Army. For a long time they allowed but two dollars silver for one in gold, but recently have arranged for receiving gold deposits from disbursing officers on account and to make payments thereon in gold. This entire question of the currency requires the mature deliberation of our most eminent monetary authorities.

Of the islands of the Philippines which contain large populations and which furnish valuable products for shipment to foreign marts, which engage largely in trade and in which business interests of importance have been established, the United States have not as yet taken possession of Samar, Leyte, and Mindanao, and none of Panay,

with the exception of its chief city and surroundings. The southern and northern coasts of Luzon, where hemp and tobacco are produced in large quantities, still remain subject to insurgent dictation. When United States occupation of these islands and provinces will be effected depends upon the arrival of troops in sufficient numbers to justify the establishment of permanent garrisons.

Little difficulty attends the act of taking possession of and temporarily holding any section of the country. A column of 3,000 men could march through and successfully contend with any force which the insurgents could place in its route, but they would close in behind it and again prey upon the inhabitants, persecuting without mercy those who had manifested any friendly feeling toward the American troops. The policy of the insurgent authorities has been to arm the bandits of the mountain sections and the natives who have formerly lived on the proceeds of crime. Many of these men have deserted the ranks, and now armed, plunder their countrymen who have property or money without discrimination. If communities could be protected against this source of danger and be assured of protection from the outrages which have been committed by the organized insurgent force, formidable opposition to American supremacy would cease. The inhabitants have confidence in the American troops. Even the insurgent leaders take advantage of the humane and charitable policy which the United States authorities have thus far pursued. They seek to place their families and property in Manila, where a number of the families of the most noted of their chiefs are now living in comfort and luxury, believing, notwithstanding their conduct and offenses, which, under approved rules of law, would subject their families to removal and all their property to confiscation, and which rules it may yet be to our interests to apply, that they can pursue rebellion as long as they desire and in the end escape all punishment. So confident are they of the nature and scope of American charity that their ill-gotten gains—acquired through robbery, in fact, but under the guise of a pretended government contending, they say, for liberty against oppression—are deposited in our banks or are invested in our trade. And still, while they manifest this absolute confidence by their individual acts, they publicly circulate the most malicious statements their active imaginations can invent regarding United States intention and the horrors of war which our troops indulge in. An active society in Hongkong, composed of their people and certain Europeans retained under high pay, and in which American membership is believed to exist, which feeds and fattens upon the corruption it is able to produce, fills the islands and the world with its invented published statements of abuse. While they fill the newspaper press with their false statements of atrocities committed by our troops, their chief, Aguinaldo, writes:

> We will never accept a treaty of peace dishonorable to the Filipino arms, and consequently disastrous to the future of the country, which is what our enemies desire. For this reason I advise all those who feel that they have not strength to make this sacrifice, and whose services are not indispenable to our government, to return to the capital or to the towns occupied by the enemy, reserving themselves in order to strengthen the organization of the government when independence is gained. They can then take the places of those who need rest after the fatigues of the struggle. I am not displeased that some of the Filipinos have accepted positions from Americans. On the contrary, I am glad of it, for in that manner they can better appreciate the true American character. I am still more glad because of the fact that our enemies, having had recourse to Filipinos for the discharge of the duties of high offices in the public administration, will demonstrate that they acknowledge the capacity of the people to govern themselves.

While the Tagalo newspapers publish to the portion of their people still dominated by the insurgents stories of insurgent prowess, and sum up American losses in battle to date at an even 26,000, Aguinaldo publishes his proclamations, exhorting the people to hold out until December, when the American Congress will surely grant them independence under his leadership, against which all good Filipinos, I am certain, would most assuredly protest. On this line one of the principal members of the Hongkong junta writes:

Do you think that the country should deliver itself completely to the promises made by those who call themselves representatives of that great Republic and great people when we well know by the Constitution of the country that they can not be trusted, because they are not authorized for that purpose and can not be except by the approval of Congress? If this be so, is it not true that it is better to wait for Congress first to determine the governmental régime to be established in our beloved country? On the other hand, it is certain that if that struggle is not kept up the parties will unite and we shall hereafter be treated as the negroes are. * * * And why not, then, my dear friend, support that other party, in order that we gain recognition of our rights, with all the necessary guaranties? Otis and company offer but little security that the autonomy or any other system of government which they establish there will be respected. I am informed that there is not a countryman of ours who does not want peace, but they want it on a basis of guaranties in favor of the people.

Even more; so just is our cause that, gaining sympathy, several European powers have made official offers to provide us with everything we require; but as we consider the war which is being sustained is not against America, because we know that 80 per cent of that great people, which on one occasion struggled for the independence which it now enjoys, is in favor of us, but only against McKinley and his party. Other offers made have not been accepted because we have complete assurance that very soon the imperialist party will come to reason and will concede us the guaranties, etc.

So deep an impression have statements of this character made upon able Filipinos who favor United States control and are conscientiously laboring for its complete establishment that I am importuned by them for information as to the trend of United States political affairs and to state if, in my opinion, they are finally to be surrendered to the mercies of their insurgent countrymen.

The islands are flooded with the abusive literature which has birth in Asiatic ports and is published in Spanish and native languages. What was ostensibly a private letter prepared by a European who has never visited these islands, and which was written in Hongkong, is circulated publicly by the Hongkong junta. Extracts therefrom read as follows:

You and the Filipinos who aspire to peace in the form of autonomy believe the hollow words of the Yankees. You write me: "We have no people to govern ourselves. That is the truth. We shall have them after ten years of American sovereignty."

I reply: We shall not have them in ten, twenty, or a hundred years, because the Yankees will never acknowledge the aptitude of an inferior race to govern the country, and, as you know, under the heading of inferior races they class the Spaniards themselves. Do not dream that when American sovereignty is implanted in the country the American officeholders will give up. Never! This is what will happen: During the first few years they will admit a few Filipinos, either because it is difficult for the Yankees to learn at once the administration of the country, so different from America, or in order to disarm for the moment the suspicion of the Americanist Filipinos. After those five or ten years of apprenticeship they will tear off the mask with which they now dissemble their true object of governing the country exclusively by Anglo-Saxons, as they have done with all countries which belonged, prior to Yankee domination, to the Spanish Empire. With that proud scorn which characterizes the Yankee in his political and social contact with colored people, they will close their ears to the complaints and aspirations of the sons of the country, and will laugh at those who helped to bring the country under the American yoke.

Yes, my friend, the Americans have no intention of leaving the Philippines, and once that sovereignty is recognized and the brave Filipino army disbanded they will send to the Philippines swarms of genuine officeholders, who will treat the noble sons of the country as they do the "colored gentlemen" in the United States. To the Yankees you are only a "nigger," who in the present circumstances, full of difficulties for the Yankees, is the object of a more or less perfectly simulated respect. But alas for you when the day arrives when the Yankees will no longer need your help and cooperation!

Do not look for the Americans to do anything to assist the national progress of the country. In America the Government takes no part in the education of the nation. All education is the work of private individuals or associations. The Yankees have absolutely no interest whatever in raising to a higher educational level the native masses, both because the Government will not interest itself in such an enterprise, and because such a policy would be contrary to the object of the American imperialist, which is to convert the archipelago into a field for exploitation by trusts and officeholders.

If the Filipinos accept American sovereignty with a halt and blind autonomy, if they permit the United States to seize the offices of the country and make these sacrifices in the hope that when they have fit men to govern the country the Americans will turn the government over to the native element, reducing the American personnel to the governor-general, then the Filipinos are going to sacrifice their liberty, their honor, their race, and, in short, everything which is included within the meaning of nationality, upon the altar of illusions. For if the Americans are the sovereigns, it depends upon them to say whether the Filipinos have sufficient men for the government of the country. They never will say it, because interests of purse, of race, and, in short, all the vital interests of Anglo-Saxonism will prevent it—American interests which prevent a real and sincere autonomy, which are the same which caused the Spanish friars to oppose the assimilation of the country and the secularization of the curacies."

The disaffected element of the population, or the emissaries of Aguinaldo's government, contend that the United States has given nothing substantial as yet in response to its administrative promises. The archbishop, they declare, still holds political sway, the friars have not been driven out nor killed, the Spaniards have been continued in office, the chief representative of United States authority here (who has never witnessed Roman Catholic ceremonies a dozen times in his life) is an ardent Romanist and draws inspirations from the droppings of the Roman Catholic sanctuary as set up in the Philippines. Remove these abominations, they say, and we will willingly accept United States protection and supremacy. Secretly these same critics and complainants assert that these friars and Spaniards render valuable aid to the insurgent cause in many ways, and the number of Spaniards now officering their troops is strong proof that their assertions are correct.

The insurgent armed forces are not to be feared except as they oppress their own people and delay returns to conditions of peace. The length of time they have been in the field and their conduct has given the practical lesson to the inhabitants that they can not expect security under Tagalo rule. The lesson is deeply impressed and required time to produce conviction. Had the rebellion been crushed immediately upon its open defiant demonstrations of last February it would soon have appeared in new form, for the mass of the people were intoxicated with the cry for independence and self-government which the reflecting classes now realize is impossible until true political education is more generally diffused. The political conditions which will follow armed resistance demand the most serious attention of our eminent statesmen, and Congressional action can not be too much accelerated. Now all executive functions of a civil character in these islands centers in a military command which is called upon to administer the law governing the various departmental offices of the executive branch of the United States Government and to set aside

Spanish decrees when such are in conflict therewith. The multitude of obtrusive and perplexing questions which arise for determination can only be appreciated by those who have confronted such a situation. I have been assisted in all duties of administration by a conscientious, hard-working, and able staff, who, with the officers ably exercising the command of troops, have given me their loyal support. I herewith transmit their several annual reports, which furnish valuable details on particular subjects which are only alluded to in a very general manner in the foregoing pages.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. S. Otis,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, and Military Governor in the Philippines.

Report of Major-General E. S. Otis, U. S. V., Commanding Department of the Pacific, covering correspondence with Insurgent leaders.

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., September 12, 1898.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose herewith copies of all correspondence by and between the United States military authorities and General Aguinaldo, commanding the insurgent forces of the Philippines, which are of record. I am of the impression that certain notes have passed between the parties of which no record was made, and I conclude thus from expressions in the letters of Aguinaldo, copies of which are inclosed. To my long communication, in which I make demands upon the insurgents to evacuate the city of Manila and its defenses by the 15th instant, I have not yet received any response. I am informed that Aguinaldo's advisers are quite evenly divided in sentiment—the one strongly advocating a compliance with the demands, the other urging refusal. I can not as yet reach any decided opinion as to which party will prevail. Should I promise them that in case of the return of the city to Spain, upon United States evacuation, their forces would be placed by us in positions which they now occupy, I thoroughly believe that they would evacuate at once. But, of course, under the international obligations resting upon us by reason of the articles of capitulation, no such promise can be given.

The insurgents are very strong, estimated by some to number 30,000 troops. They have been receiving a good many arms and much ammunition within the last few weeks, and, I am informed, have contracted with the Japanese Government for a considerable supply. I shall not yield to any of their requests or make any concessions which affect in any way our international obligations to Spain. Should war result, more troops will be required, for which I shall make request by telegraph. Admiral Dewey approves thoroughly of my action and heartily unites in the course which I am pursuing. I continue in the hope that hostilities can be avoided. It is reported to me that the best legal talent which the insurgents possess—and they have among them some able men—state that the argument used in my communication is unanswerable. But the difficulty lies in their inability to control their irresponsible military organizations. They want the argument coupled with requests, and not demands, so that Aguinaldo can make proclamations in his paper which will appeal to their sense.

I send these papers in care of Maj. W. A. Simpson, assistant adjutant-general, U. S. A., who has been directed to proceed to Washington by War Department orders.

Very respectfully,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, P. I., July 4, 1898.

Señor Don EMILIO AGUINALDO Y FAMY,
Commanding Philippine Forces, Cavite, Luzon.

GENERAL: I have the honor to inform you that the United States of America, whose land forces I have the honor to command in this vicinity, being at war with the Kingdom of Spain, has entire sympathy and most friendly sentiments for the native people of the Philippine Islands.

For these reasons I desire to have the most amicable relations with you, and to have you and your people cooperate with us in military operations against the Spanish forces.

In our operations it has become necessary for us to occupy the town of Cavite as a base of operations. In doing this I do not wish to interfere with your residence here and the exercise by yourself and other native citizens of all functions and privileges not inconsistent with military rule.

I would be pleased to be informed at once of any misconduct of soldiers under my command, as it is the intention of my Government to maintain order and to treat all citizens with justice, courtesy, and kindness.

I have therefore the honor to ask your excellency to instruct your officials not to interfere with my officers in the performance of their duties and not to assume that they can not visit Cavite without permission.

Assuring you again of my most friendly sentiment and distinguished consideration, I remain, with all respect,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

True copy:

J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

L. R. No. 34. Received July 5, 1898. From Aguinaldo, Emilio. No date or place.

Brief.—Expresses an interpretation of sentiments of the natives of the Philippine Islands toward the great North American nation and announces his agreeable relations with the United States military authorities, etc.

Action.—Forwarded to General Merritt, July 27, as an inclosure to L. S. 45.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, P. I., July 6, 1898.

Señor Don EMILIO AGUINALDO Y FAMY,
Commanding Philippine Forces.

GENERAL: I am encouraged by the friendly sentiment expressed by your excellency in your welcome letter received on the 5th instant to endeavor to come to a definite understanding, which I hope will be advantageous to both.

Very soon we expect a large addition to our forces, and it must be apparent to you as a military officer that we will require much more room to camp our soldiers, and also storeroom for our supplies. For this I would like to have your excellency's advice and cooperation, as you are best acquainted with the resources of this country.

It must be apparent to you that we do not intend to remain here inactive, but to move promptly against our common enemy. But for a short time we must organize and land supplies, and also retain a place for storing them near our fleet and transports.

I am solicitous to avoid any conflict of authority which may result from having two sets of military officers exercising command in the same place.

I am also anxious to avoid sickness by taking sanitary precaution. Your own medical officers have been making voluntary inspections with mine and fear epidemic diseases if the vicinity is not made clean.

Would it not be well to have prisoners work to this end under the advice of the surgeons?

I again renew my assurances of distinguished consideration.

I am, with great respect,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

True copy:

J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

[Extract.]

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, P. I., July 9, 1898.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY,
Washington, D. C.:

General Aguinaldo tells me he has about 15,000 fighting men, but only 11,000 armed with guns, which mostly were taken from the Spaniards. He claims to have in all 4,000 prisoners.

When we first landed he seemed very suspicious, and not at all friendly, but I have now come to a better understanding with him and he is much more friendly and seems willing to cooperate.

But he has declared himself dictator and president, and is trying to take Manila without our assistance. This is not probable, but if he can effect his purpose he will, I apprehend, antagonize any attempt on our part to establish a provisional government.

* * * * * * *

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

True copy:

J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, P. I., July 14, 1898.

Señor Don EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding Philippine Forces.

GENERAL: Wishing to get complete information of the approaches to Manila from every direction, I therefore have the honor to request that you give my officers all possible assistance in making reconnoissance to the lines and approaches and that you favor them with your advice.

Officers coming from me will have a note to that effect.

With great respect,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

True copy:

J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

L. R. No. 122. Received July 20, 1898. From Aguinaldo, Emilio, general Philippine forces. Dated at Bacoor, P. I., July 15, 1898.

Brief.—States that his government has seen necessity of adopting form and organization more adequately popular. Expresses friendly and harmonious relations with "the great North American nation."

Action.—Forwarded to General Merritt, July 27, as an inclosure to L. S. No. 45.

HDQRS. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES TO THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
CHIEF QUARTERMASTER'S OFFICE,
Cavite, P. I., July 17, 1898.

General EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Addressed.

SIR: General Anderson wishes me to say that the second expedition having arrived, he expects to encamp in the vicinity of Paranaque from 5,000 to 7,000 men. To do this, supply this army and shelter, will require certain assistance from the Filipinos in this neighborhood. We will want horses, buffaloes, carts, etc., for transportation, bamboo for shelter, wood to cook with, etc. For all this we are willing to pay a fair price, but no more. We find so far that the native population are not willing to give us this assistance as promptly as required. But we must have it, and if it becomes necessary we will be compelled to send out parties to seize what we may need. We would regret very much to do this, as we are here to befriend the Filipinos. Our nation has spent millions of money to send

forces here to expel the Spaniards and to give good government to the whole people, and the return we are asking is comparatively slight.

General Anderson wishes you to inform your people that we are here for their good, and that they must supply us with labor and material at the current market prices. We are prepared to purchase 500 horses at a fair price, but can not undertake to bargain for horses with each individual owner.

I regret very much that I am unable to see you personally, as it is of the utmost importance that these arrangements should be made as soon as possible.

I will await your reply.

Very respectfully,

S. R. JONES,
Major and Quartermaster, U. S. V., Chief Quartermaster.

[Indorsement.]

FIRST BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS,
July 17, 1898.

The request herein made by Major Jones, chief quartermaster, was made by my direction.

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

The within communication was delivered to me personally by a staff officer of General Aguinaldo's, who stated that General A. requested to know whether it was sent by my authority. The above indorsement was placed on the paper, which was then returned to the staff officer.

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, Volunteers, Commanding.

A true copy:

J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

L. R. No. 137. Received July 22, 1898. From Jones, Sam R., chief quartermaster, First Brigade. Dated at Cavite, P. I., July 20, 1898.

Brief.—States that it is impossible to procure transportation except upon General Aguinaldo's order, in this section who has an inventory of everything. The natives have removed their wheels and hid them.

Action.—Filed.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, P. I., July 18, 1898.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY.

GENERAL: Since reading the President's instructions to General Merritt, I think I should state to you that the establishment of a provisional government on our part will probably bring us in conflict with insurgents, now in active hostility to Spain.

The insurgent chief, Aguinaldo, has declared himself dictator and self-appointed president. He has decreed martial law and promulgated a minute method of rule and administration under it.

We have observed all official military courtesies, and he and his followers express great admiration and gratitude to the great American Republic of the north; yet in many ways they obstruct our purposes and are using every effort to take Manila without us.

I suspect also that Aguinaldo is secretly negotiating with the Spanish authorities, as his confidential aid is in Manila.

The city is strongly fortified and hard to approach in the rainy season. If a bombardment fails we should have the best engineering ability here.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

True copy:

J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, P. I., July 19, 1898.

Senor Don EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding General Philippine Forces.

GENERAL: The bearer, Maj. J. F. Bell, U. S. A., was sent by Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, U. S. A., to collect for him, by the time of his personal arrival, certain information concerning the strength and positions of the enemy and concerning the topography of the country surrounding Manila.

I would be obliged if you would permit him to see your maps, and place at his disposal any information you may have on the above subjects, and also give him a letter or pass addressed to your subordinates which will authorize them to furnish him any information they can on these subjects and to facilitate his passage along the lines, upon a reconnoissance around Manila, on which I propose to send him.

I remain, with great respect, your obedient servant,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

True copy:

J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

L. R. No. 47 (new series). Received August 8, 1898. From Aguinaldo, Emilio. Dated at Bacoor, P. I., near Manila, July, 18, 1898.

Brief.—Relative to the assistance of his people to us in furnishing supplies and transportation. Retains his great admiration for the great North American nation. No action recorded.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, P. I., July 19, 1898.

Senor Don EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding Philippine Forces.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th instant. Your offer of assistance is appreciated and your assurances of good will are most gratifying. The difficulty of collecting supplies, referred to by you, is apprehended and will be considered in fixing compensation.

As a medium of communication with your people, we will be pleased to have you assure them that there will be no confiscation of their property, that our requisitions will be reasonable, and that a fair compensation will always be given.

I remain, general, with all respect, your obedient servant,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

True copy:

J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

[Extract.]

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, P. I., July 21, 1898.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY,
Washington, D. C.:

Since I wrote last, Aguinaldo has put in operation an elaborate system of military government, under his assumed authority as dictator, and has prohibited any supplies being given us, except by his order. As to this last, I have written to him that our requisitions on the country for horses, ox carts, fuel, and bamboo (to make scalin ladders) must be filled, and that he must aid in having them filled. His assumption of civil authority I have ignored, and let him know verbally that I could, and would, not recognize it, while I did not recognize him as a military leader.

It may seem strange that I have made no formal protest against his proclamation as dictator, his declaration of martial law, and publication and execution of a

despotic form of government. I wrote such a protest, but did not publish it, at Admiral Dewey's request, and also for fear of wounding the susceptibilities of Major-General Merritt, but I have let it be known in every other way that we do not recognize the dictatorship.

These people only respect force and firmness. I submit, with all deference, that we have heretofore underrated the native. They are not ignorant, savage tribes, but have a civilization of their own; and although insignificant in appearance, are fierce fighters, and for a tropical people they are industrious. A small detail of natives will do more work in a given time than a regiment of volunteers.

* * * * * * *

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

True copy:
J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

HDQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, P. I., July 21, 1898.

Señor Don EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding General Philippine Forces.

GENERAL: I have the honor to request that passes and such other assistance as practicable be given to the bearer, Lieut. E. J. Bryan, and party, who are making a reconnoissance of the surrounding country.

Thanking you for assistance given on previous occasions,
I remain, with great respect, your obedient servant,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

True copy.
J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

L. R. No. 138. Received July 22, 1898. From Aguinaldo, Emilio, general commanding Philippine forces. No date or place.

Brief.—Objects to United States troops occupying warehouse No. 1, Calle Colon, as it is property of a Filipino named Don Antonio Osorio, and is under insurgents' protection. Requests the removal of same.

Action.—Forwarded to General Merritt July 27 as an inclosure to L. S. No. 45.

L. R. No. 166. Received July 25, 1898. From Aguinaldo, Emilio, general Philippine forces. Dated at Bacoor, P. I., July 24, 1898.

Brief.—Makes a statement as to the house of Osorio in Cavite, and also makes full statement of his connection with the revolution and the United States forces.

Action.—Forwarded to General Merritt July 27 as an inclosure to L. S. No. 45.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, July 22, 1898.

Señor Don EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding Philippine Forces.

GENERAL: Replying to your excellency's letter in relation to the property of Don Antonio Osorio, I have the honor to state that if he transferred the property to you personally, before the capture of Cavite by our forces, it will give me great pleasure to transfer the property to you, in question. If, however, the property was not transferred to your excellency until after the capture of Cavite, the property would appear to have been public Spanish property or contraband of war and subject to capture.

This property will be held subject to investigation, but Don Osorio must make his claim and offer his proof to the commanding officer of the American army.

I observe that your excellency has announced yourself as a dictator and proclaimed martial law. As I am here simply in a military capacity, I have no authority to recognize this assumption. I have no orders from my Government on the subject; and so far as I can ascertain, your independent status has not

been recognized by any foreign power. Your fine intellect must perceive that. Happy as I am to see you fighting so bravely and successfully against a common enemy, I can not, without orders, recognize your civil authority.

I remain, with great respect,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

True copy:

J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, P. I., July 23, 1898.

Senor Don EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding Philippine Forces.

GENERAL: When I came here three weeks ago I requested your excellency to give what assistance you could to procure means of transportation for the American Army, as it was to fight the cause of your people.

So far we have received no response.

As you represent your people, I now have the honor to make requisition on you for 500 horses and 50 oxen and ox carts.

If you can not secure these, I will have to pass you and make requisition directly on the people.

I beg leave to request an answer at your earliest convenience.

I remain, with great respect,

_____ _____,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

True copy:

J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

L. R. No. 167. Received July 25, 1898. From Aguinaldo, Emilio, general Philippine forces. Dated at Bacoor, P. I., July 24, 1898.

Brief.—States that he misunderstood the desires of the United States forces before, but now he will assist in supplying all requisitions for transportation if given reasonable notice and time.

Action.—Forwarded to General Merritt, July 27, as an inclosure to L. S. No. 45.

HDQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, P. I., July 24, 1898.

Señor Don EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding Philippine Forces.

GENERAL: Your favor of the 26th ultimo in relation to requisitions for cattle, horses, etc., is satisfactory. I regret that there should have been any misunderstanding about it. The people to whom we applied, even for the hiring of caramates, etc., told our people that they had orders to supply nothing except by your orders. I am pleased to think that this was a misapprehension on their part.

We are not so unreasonable as to suppose that all we want can be supplied at once or from one place. We may even have to send to other islands. Our quartermaster will establish a depot near the American camp, where he will receive and pay for supplies and from which he will send out parties to whatever places your excellency will indicate, to transact business with your people.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

True copy:

J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

HDQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, P. I., July 27, 1898.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Manila Bay.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit the last letter I received from the insurgent chief, Aguinaldo, dated Bacoor, July 24, 1898. This letter has not been answered by me.

My whole correspondence with him is also inclosed.

Very respectfully,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

True copy.

J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

HDQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, P. I., July 27, 1898.

Señor Don EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding Philippine Forces.

GENERAL: Referring to your letter of the 24th instant, relative to the alleged property of Don Antonio Osorio, I have the honor to inform you that it has been forwarded to Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, commanding United States expeditionary forces, for his action.

Very respectfully,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON.
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

True copy.

J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Cavite Arsenal, P. I., August 5, 1898.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC, ETC.:

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that General Aguinaldo, through a staff officer, complains that the Signal Corps, U. S. A., in putting up wires has interrupted his communications, that he was promised that this interruption would not last more than one day, but that it has now been out of working order for three days; that he is very glad to have the army use his telegraph poles, but it is so important to keep his communication that he earnestly requests prompt action in the matter.

Very respectfully,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

True copy.

J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

AUGUST 10, 1898.

INSTRUCTIONS FROM GENERAL MERRITT BROUGHT BY GENERAL BABCOCK.

1. No rupture with insurgents. This is imperative. Can ask insurgent general or Aguinaldo for permission to occupy their trenches, but if refused not to use force.

2. No extensions of lines, as proposed in memorandum of August 9, which will bring partial engagement, resulting in loss prior to general assault.

3. One gun can be placed within two hours after receiving the order in the insurgent emplacement on the road facing No. 11; not as good a position as farther to the front and right. Three more guns can be placed behind trench near the beach without precipitating an engagement. Embrasures can be cut through trenches to-night.

4. Troops can occupy trenches on two hours' notice, but are not prepared to make a determined assault without carrying out memorandum of August 9, requiring three days. We can hold trenches against any possible attack and bring a field guns into action in front of enemy's lines.

True copy.

J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite, P. I., July 30, 1898.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Department of the Pacific and Eigth Army Corps,
S. S. Newport, Manila Bay, P. I.

SIR: Referring to verbal instructions in relation to an issue of rations to Spanish prisoners, I have the honor to state that I have just received a verbal message from General Aguinaldo, conveyed by Capt. Marti Burges, aide-de-camp, to this effect: That he, Aguinaldo, appreciates the kindness that prompts the offer, but fears that if this should become known in Manila the Spaniards would regard it as an indication that resources were exhausted and would consequently take heart and make renewed resistance.

He will therefore endeavor to increase their rations, but reminds us that prisoners always complain. I made answer verbally that if their prisoners were kept here they would have to be well fed, but that he could of course remove them if he saw fit to do so.

Very respectfully,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

[Telegram.]

CAMP DEWEY, *near Manila, 8—10—'98.*

Gen. EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding Filipino Forces, Bacoor:

Will your excellency consent to my occupation of the intrenchment facing Blockhouse No. 14, on the road from Pasay to Cingalon? Our object is to place artillery to destroy the blockhouse. If you consent, please issue necessary orders to-night. I shall highly appreciate a prompt reply.

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

[Telegram.]

BACOR, *August 10, 1898.*

Brig. Gen. THOMAS M. ANDERSON, U. S. V.,
Camp Dewey.

SIR: Replying to your note of this date, in which you ask me the occupation by your troops of the intrenchments facing Blockhouse No. 14 only, on the road from Pasay to Cingalon, I have the pleasure to tell you that I [am] giving the necessary orders so that your troops may occupy the mentioned intrenchments, and my troops will pass to the immediate intrenchment or to any other place where they think convenient to intrench themselves.

I remain, most respectfully, yours,

E. AGUINALDO.

[Telegram.]

MANILA, P. I., *August 13, 1898.*

General AGUINALDO,
General in Chief, Filipino Forces:

Serious trouble threatening between our forces. Try and prevent it. Your forces should not force themselves in the city until we have received the full surrender. Then we will negotiate with you.

ANDERSON.

[Most urgent—Pineda received from Bacoor 10.50 a. m., 13th.]

General Aguinaldo, Ermita, president of revolutionary government, to General Anderson, Ermita.

I received a telegram. My interpreter is in Cavite. In consequence of this I have not answered until now. My troops are forced by yours, by means of threats of violence, to retire from positions taken. It is necessary to avoid conflict, which I should lament, that you order your troops that they avoid difficulty with mine, as until now they have conducted themselves as brothers to take Manila. I have given strict orders to my chiefs that they preserve strict respect to American forces and to aid them in case they are attacked by a common enemy.

I do not doubt that the good relations and friendship which unite us will be continued if your soldiers correspond to the conduct imposed upon mine.

E. AGUINALDO.

[Telegram.]

BACOOR, *August 14, 1898.*

General ANDERSON:

My troops, who have been for so long besieging Manila, have always been promised that they could appear in it, as you know and can not deny, and for this reason, and on account of the many sacrifices made of money and lives, I do not consider it prudent to issue orders to the contrary, as they might be disobeyed against my authority. Besides, I hope that you will allow the troops to enter because we have given proofs many times of our friendship, ceding our positions at Paranaque, Pasay, Cingalon, and Mytubig. Nevertheless, if it seems best to you, and in order to enter into a frank and friendly understanding and avoid any disagreeable conflict before the eyes of the Spaniards, I will commission Don Filepe Buen Camino and others, who will to-day go out from our lines to hold a conference with you, and that they will be safe during the conference.

E. A. AGUINALDO.

[Memoranda without date, in General Anderson's handwriting.]

If you apparently have been treated harshly, it is from military necessity and not for want of confidence. We had to take Manila to effect the purpose of our war.

While we may admit the justice of your insurrection, to prevent all possible complications, still it is thought judicious and necessary to have only one army in Manila at once.

[In General Merritt's handwriting.]

The Government of the United States, you may be assured, which as its agent I can make no promises, will deal fairly with the Filipinos, but we must now insist, for the good of all, there shall be no joint occupation of Manila.

NOTE.—This is apparently the draft of a telegram sent in reply to General Aguinaldo's message, dated 10.50 a. m., August 13, and marked "Most urgent."

[Telegram.]

BACOOR, *August 14, 1898.*

General ANDERSON, Manila.

DEAR GENERAL: Not being able to leave government, have conferred special powers to Buencamino, Araneta, and others, who left here for you at 8 o'clock this morning.

E. AGUINALDO

From Aguinaldo, Emilio. Dated at Bacoor, P. I., August 15, 1898.

Brief.—Mis comisionados me dicen que y ha promitiss enviarme antes el plans del radio que quitren ustedes solos ocupar sin embargo iran alli manana mismo mis Comisionados para hacer arreglos despues de los enales vere si conviene la retirado de mis tropas desersco siempo de conservar la amistad y un a burao intelligencio.

[Memorandum.]

General Merritt remarks, in relation to the telegrams you sent us, that it would be well to inform General Aguinaldo as follows:

We can not permit joint occupation of the city. The city surrendered to the United States forces, and all the headway that you have been able to make was

due entirely to the assistance furnished you by the United States. We now hold the city, which includes all the outlying districts of the city properly within the city limits. We most earnestly and sincerely hope and trust that there may be no conflict between us, but we are prepared to enforce our orders in this matter and expect from time to time large additions to our strength. We desire most sincerely to remain friendly with the Filipinos, and have nothing but their best interests at heart in all our dealings with them.

We have given orders to our troops as well as to General Aguinaldo that there shall be no violence whatsoever.

NOTE.—Apparently a memorandum prepared for General Anderson by General Babcock.

True copy.

J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC
AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., August 15, 1898.

Brig. Gen. T. M. ANDERSON, U. S. V.,
Commanding Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: The commanding general directs that in any arrangement made with the insurgents in regard to retiring from the vicinity of the city care will be taken to make them understand that they must not hold a line encircling the city. The commanding general will not tolerate a line of troops or works which would give the appearance that our troops were hemmed in by a besieging force. The insurgents may billet their commands in villages in the vicinity, but under no circumstances will they be allowed to hold a line as above indicated.

Very respectfully,

J. B. BABCOCK,
Adjutant-General.

True copy.

J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

NOTES TO GENERAL ANDERSON.

1. We concede the military disposition of the town of Manila, always that there be understood by said town the jurisdiction of the old municipal limits or walled city and its suburbs, Binondo, Tondo, Canta Cruz, Quiapo, Sampaloc, San Miguel, Concepcion, Hermita, Malate, and Paco or San Fernando de Dilao.

2. We concede the source of potable water, always that (i. e., on condition that) the Ayuntamiento of Manila bear the cost of repairing the machinery and piping, and the current expenses of the machinery, such as coal and the pay of the working force. We will be responsible for order and security at that place.[1]

3. We ask free navigation for the *Patria*, with entrance and exit to the port and River Pasig, and that our products be admitted free of duty, and free entrance to and departure from the city to all the Filipinos, the arms of our chiefs and officers being respected.

4. The sacrifices that we have made in contribution to the siege and capture of Manila being notorious, it is just that we should have a part of the booty of war.

5. We ask for our use that palace at Malacanan and the convents at Malate, Hermita, and Paco or San Fernando de Dilao.

6. We ask that the civil offices of Manila be filled by North Americans and never by Spaniards; but if General Merritt should have need of the Filipinos we would be pleased that he concede to our president, Gen. Don Emilio Aguinaldo, the right of nominating those Filipinos who would be most energetic and apt. The jurisdiction of the authorities of Manila will not be recognized outside of the municipal radius (limits).

7. The American forces can not (will not be permitted) to approach nor pass through our military positions without permission of the respective commander, and all positions outside of the municipal limits shall be evacuated. Spaniards

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[1] Both the pumping station (at Santolan) and the reservoir (at San Juan del Monte) had been taken from the Spaniards by and were in the hands of the insurgents prior to our entry into Manila.

who pass through our lines without permission of the commander will be considered as spies.

8. We ask the return of the arms of the 150 military (men) who were disarmed by American officers.

9. All arrangements (negotiations) must be made in writing and ratified afterwards by both generals in chief.

10. We are pleased lastly, to be certain (to affirm) that our own commissions and petitions do not assume any acknowledgment on our part of North American sovereignty in these islands any more (or longer) than the necessity of actual war (demands).

NOTE OF EXPLANATION.—This is presumably a memorandum drawn up and submitted to General Anderson by the commissioners (of Aguinaldo) mentioned in the preceding telegram.

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., August 20, 1898.

THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE FORCES.

SIR: The commanding general of the American forces has received a memorandum addressed to General Anderson, which purports to contain a statement of certain desires on the part of the Filipinos.

As most of them seem to be reasonable, it gives him much pleasure to say that he agrees to the following:

The forces of the Filipinos are to withdraw entirely beyond the jurisdiction of the old municipal limits or walled city and its suburbs Binondo, Tondo, Santa Cruz, Quiato, Sampaloc, San Miguel, Concepcion, Ermita, and Paco or San Fernando dilo (*sic*). The Filipinos will repair at once whatever may be needed in order that the water may be turned on to the city, and the expenses of the repairs and current expenses of the works will be paid by the city. The commander of the Filipinos agrees to be responsible for order and security at the pumping station.

Permission for the free navigation of the *Pasig* to entrance and exit of the port and river passage, and that country products for sale be admitted free of duty, is granted.

Free entrance and departure from the city for all Filipinos without arms is granted. Chief and officers of the Filipinos army may, as a matter of courtesy, wear their side arms, though this is deprecated as possibly leading to disturbance of quiet of city.

No pistols should be carried. The major-general having taken for his own use the palace at Manacanan, the request that it be turned over to the Filipinos can not be granted, and the convents at Malata, Ermita, and Paco can not be turned over and must be evacuated. The civil offices at Manila are being filled as rapidly as possible by Americans, and the commanding general will be glad to receive recommendations for appointments to office of such Filipinos as may be considered fitted for the duties of subordinate officers.

American soldiers without arms are to be allowed to pass through the Filipinos' positions outside of the city, just as the Filipinos without arms are permitted to enter the city.

The return of the arms of the 150 men will be granted by the general in immediate command.

The opening of the waterworks at once and the retirement of your soldiers from the positions now occupied within the municipal jurisdiction will be sufficient notice on your part that everything is satisfactorily arranged on the terms of this letter.

With the sincere hope that it may be speedily accomplished, I am, very respectfully,

W. MERRITT,
Major-General Commanding.

NOTE OF EXPLANATION.—I delivered this letter the day it was written, and was to verbally convey the contents of the memorandum which follows the answer thereto at the same time, but Aguinaldo was absent from his headquarters at the time the letter was delivered, and I did not mention the contents of the memorandum, except that portion relating to opening the waterworks immediately. His associates claimed that General A. had already ordered this done (and I feel certain that he had). They promised that it should be done at once and sent a message to again order it done at once while I was there. I made an engagement to see General Aguinaldo at 11 a. m. the next day.

J. F. BELL.

BAKOOR, *August 21, 1898.*

THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE
AMERICAN FORCES IN THE PACIFIC.

SIR: The commanding general of the Philippine forces has been favored by your excellency with a letter of the 28th instant, containing the conditions that you will accept from the Filipinos, provided the latter abandon the posts that they now occupy within the suburbs of Manila. The aforesaid letter speaks of permission for the free navigation of the *Pateia*, and as the Filipinos have no boat of that name, the undersigned takes the liberty of clearing up that point, as he considers it understood that the Filipinos desire the protection of the American squadron for the free navigation of all their boats, and free entrance and exit in the ports that are in charge of the same.

Moreover, in substitution for the conditions proposed (in a previous communication) which the aforesaid letter does not mention, the Filipinos desire to go on occupying that part of the suburbs of San Fernando de Dilao, or Paco, adjacent to the east side of the bridge and creek of the same name, the undersigned answering for the foreign interests which exist in that district. They also desire that if in consequence of the treaty of peace which may be concluded between the United States of America and Spain, the Philippines should continue under the domination of the latter, the American forces should give up all the suburbs to the Filipinos, in consideration of the cooperation lent by the latter in the capture of Manila.

With these conditions and others which you have already accepted in the beforementioned letter, the undersigned promises in the name of the Filipinos to evacuate the positions they now hold in the suburbs; and the acceptance of the same on the part of your excellency will be one proof more that you have in consideration the innumerable lives sacrificed in the siege of Manila, and that you are able to appreciate the unqualified friendship which he, the undersigned, will try to preserve at all costs.

Very respectfully, yours,

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

NOTE OF EXPLANATION.—This answer was already prepared and was handed me on my arrival at 11 a. m. Therefore it was prepared before the contents of the memorandum which follows was made known to Aguinaldo and his associates.

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR BELL.

1. In case you find Aguinaldo inclined to be generous in his arrangements with us, you may communicate to him as follows:

(1) That if a meeting between himself and the commanding general here could be arranged, I would be very glad to meet him and have a talk with him upon the general situation.

(2) That it is of the most importance to us that the water supply of the city be at once turned on, as, the rainy season having suspended, it is important that the sewers be flushed and the city gotten in fair sanitary condition.

(3) That I have every disposition to represent liberally the Government at Washington, which I know is inclined to deal fairly with him and his people; but not knowing what the policy of that Government will be, I am not prepared to make any promises, except that in the event of the United States withdrawing from these islands care will be taken to leave him *in as good condition as he was found by the forces of the Government.*

(4) That I agree with Mr. Williams, the consul, in thinking that it would be well for him and some of his leaders to visit Washington and represent the case to the American authorities. I feel sure that good would result from this course. However, it is not considered necessary.

(5) It is my intention to depose the Spanish officials from all important positions hitherto held by them, and this already has been done to a considerable extent. I will be very glad to receive recommendations from him for Filipinos who are especially trustworthy, though I can not agree to make any appointments in the immediate future. The American officers and men will be employed as far as is practicable in conducting the affairs of the municipality.

(6) I expect daily a considerable accession to the forces which I now have here, and it is my design to lodge them in Cavite, provided room can there be found. In conclusion, I sincerely trust that there will be no friction in the future between our commands and that the good feeling that we have made every attempt to foster will

be encouraged by Aguinaldo and his chiefs. For myself and the officers and men under my command I can say that we have conceived a high respect for the ability and qualities of the Filipinos, and if called upon by the Government to express an opinion, it will be to that effect.

WESLEY MERRITT, *Major-General.*

NOTE OF EXPLANATION.—Aguinaldo told me to thank General M. for his kind offer and to say that just as soon as his health would permit of such a thing (he had been sick) he would send a staff officer to General M. to ascertain when it would be convenient to meet him. He had not sent the staff officer, as far as I know, when General M. left. Soon after General M.'s arrival he sent a staff officer on board the *Newport* to arrange for an interview with him, but the General sent back word that he was exceedingly pressed by business just then, but as soon as he could he would send him word when he could see him.

I was pressed to explain further just what meaning General M. meant to convey by the underscored [italicized] portion of this remark, but I replied that I had repeated the language General M. had used to me and I preferred they should seek any further explanation from him, lest I might unwittingly fall into error if I undertook to explain his meaning myself. Their lack of definiteness and my unwillingness to comment upon the language seemed to arouse their apprehensions and suspicions. They have been trying ever since to obtain in writing some definite promise on this subject.

Without losing a moment you will proceed to open (start) the machinery of the waterworks, being sorry that up to the present my orders have not been completed (fulfilled) for said object, and I expect that the present will be immediately completed (fulfilled).

I inform you that this order will be carried to you by Majors Bement (engineer) and Bell, accompanied by an assistant, Mr. Infante, with the object of examining said machinery.

E. AGUINALDO.

BACOOR, *April 21, 1898.*

NOTE OF EXPLANATION.—Aguinaldo and his associates seemed much gratified when I made known to them the contents of the preceding memorandum. I asked for a written order to the officer in charge of the forces holding the reservoir and pumping station, to be delivered by myself. The above was prepared and handed me. Captain Infante, one of Aguinaldo's adjutants, was also sent with me to make sure his object (the immediate opening of the works) was accomplished. On arriving at the pumping station next day I found that the delay had been due not to official obstruction, but to the inability of these manana people to overcome the inertia incident to starting up machinery which had lain idle for some months.

OFFICE MILITARY GOVERNOR AND
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
Manila, August 24, 1898.

General EMILIO AGUINALDO, *Bakoor, P. I.*

SIR: The commanding general of the American land forces has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of August 21, and in reply to inform you as follows:

The error which you speak of which needs clearing up as to the navigation of the *Patria* seems to have arisen from a request on your part that the Filipinos of the country should be permitted to trade freely and navigate without obstruction the streams and bays surrounding Manila. So far as the products of the country are concerned, this has been acceded to, and there will be no obstruction placed by the American land forces in the way of a free trade in the products of the country between the residents of this island and the city of Manila.

The protection which you ask from the American squadron rests with Rear-Admiral Dewey, and it is for him to determine whether it can be granted or not.

A commission of your appointment, which had an interview with the undersigned about the 15th instant agreed that if a line were designated by a proper commission on my part that the armed Filipinos should retire beyond it. While this has been done in some instances it has been neglected in others, and it is now

desired to call your attention to the fact that the occupation of the suburbs of Manila or any part of them can not be acceded to by the undersigned. It has already been pointed out to you that dual occupation of Manila was impossible in the interests of either party; and as the troops of the United States are in possession of Manila I must insist upon the carrying out of the original agreement between your commission and myself. I am the more insistent in this particular because recent instructions from my home Government contemplate this course.

So far as any promises as to what should be done in the event of a conclusion of a treaty between the United States and Spain is concerned, it is utterly impossible for me as the military representative only of the United States to make any promises such as you request. As you have already been informed, you may depend upon the good will of the Americans out here, and the Government, of which you already know the beneficence, to determine these matters in the future.

This answer to your communication has been delayed by a press of business which could not very well be neglected.

I thank you in the name of my country for the good will expressed toward it, and feel assured that nothing will occur to mar the friendly feeling that now exists. It is for the interests of all that the good feeling that now exists between us should be carefully fostered and maintained.

Very respectfully, WESLEY MERRITT, *Major-General.*

[Telegram received from Aguinaldo, 5.13 a. m., August 25, 1898.]

General MERRITT.

Concerning trouble between Philippine and American forces at Cavite, I have received notice of the death of 1 American soldier and 3 wounded. It is said that this happened by their being drunk. They fired in the air in the beginning, but afterwards fought among themselves. General Anderson says death has been occasioned by my people, on account of which I have ordered investigations to ascertain the truth and demonstrate that the Filipinos try to be in harmony with the Americans. If I shall find any one of my people guilty, I shall order severe punishment.

Yours, respectfully, AGUINALDO.

[Reply to telegram received from Aguinaldo 5.13 a. m., August 25, 1898.]
[Telegram.]

MALACANAN, *August 25, 1898—8.05 a. m.*

General AGUINALDO, *Commanding Philippine Forces, Bakoor:*

Thanks for your telegram. I am glad to learn of your intention to investigate fully. I am desirous with you that harmony should prevail, and request you always, in event of trouble, to communicate directly with me, as you have so wisely done this time.

MERRITT.

REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Presidencia, Bakoor, August 27, 1898.

General WESLEY MERRITT, *Manila.*

MY DEAR SIR: Knowing the contents of your letter of the 24th instant, I can not do less than manifest my surprise at knowing that you have formed the idea that my commissioners compromised themselves in the conference of the 15th, to retire my troops outside of the line that you would designate.

I understood, and still understand, as well as the commissioners, that the evacuation of my troops of the posts that they occupy to-day on the outskirts of the city would take place when the proposed conditions were accepted by you, among which figured the condition that the agreement (treaty) should be in writing to be valid; for which reason, not having yet accepted some of the propositions made at the time, nor those that were substituted in my previous communication, I do not think that up to now I have contracted said obligation.

If I have permitted the use of the water before the formalization of the treaty, it was more to demonstrate that I am disposed to sacrifice to friendship everything that does not prejudice too much the rights of the Philippines. I comprehend as

well as yourself the inconvenience of a double occupation of the city and its suburbs, given the condition stipulated in the capitulation with the Spaniards; but you ought to understand that without the long siege sustained by my force you might have obtained possession of the ruins of the city, but never the rendition of the Spanish forces, who could have retired to the interior towns.

I do not complain of the disowning of our help in the mentioned capitulation, although justice resents it greatly, and I have to bear the well-founded blame of my people; I do not insist upon the retention of all the positions conquered by my forces within the city limits at the cost of much blood, of indescribable fatigues and much money; I promise to retire them to the following lines:

In Malate the continuation of the Calzada of Singalon to the bridge that joins that road; from this bridge in straight line to that of Paco; from this last bridge following the creek Paco and leaving outside the suburb of Tangue to the River Pasig; following this river and entering by the creek that goes to the bridge of Aviles; from this bridge following the road (calzada) of the same name, and that of Santa Mesa that are the dividing lines between Sampaloc and the village of Pandacan to the jurisdictional limit of the suburbs of Sampaloc, Trozo, and Tondo.

But before I retire to this line I pray you to reclaim from Admiral Dewey the protection of our ships from free navigation, and permit me to insist, if you wish, upon the restitution of the position that we are now going to leave if in the treaty of peace to be celebrated between Spain and the United States they acknowledge the dominion of Spain in the Philippines. I expect as well that you order the American forces outside of the above line to retire within the city, as already agreed to. I do not believe that the acceptation of the conditions proposed will prejudice the smallest right of your people, as it signifies nothing more than the acknowledgment of a part of the rights of a friendly people.

I am now compelled to insist upon the said conditions to quiet the complaints of my chiefs and soldiers, who have exposed their lives and abandoned their interests during the siege of Manila. I hope that this time you will manifest the spirit of justice that pertains to such a free and admirably constituted government as that of the United States of America.

Very respectfully,

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

NOTE OF EXPLANATION.—No positions whatever, with a possible exception of Paco (San Fernando de Dilao), were conquered within the city limits by Aguinaldo's forces. Definite information can be procured of General MacArthur as to whether the insurgents or our forces forced the Spanish to retire from that place.

The Calzada a Aviles merges at the crossroads (where there is really a round, open space, with a fountain in the center, and called the Plaza de Rodriguez) into the road to Santa Mesa, marked on the map "A Mariquina," to which place it also goes. The First Colorado Regiment has a picket post on this road a half mile beyond the limit mentioned by Aguinaldo.

I gather from the statements of many naval officers that Aguinaldo was invited here and given much assistance and encouragement by Admiral Dewey, who, of course, did not anticipate any complication and probably never supposed Aguinaldo would at once assume an independence of American control. He has been much concerned and displeased by Aguinaldo's course of conduct, and told me several days ago that he had ceased to recognize him in any way and had refused to any longer receive his representatives. This prayer to yield to "reclaim" Admiral Dewey's protection is doubtless due to this change of attitude on the Admiral's part, who, if permitted to follow his own inclinations, will not only grant Aguinaldo no protection, but will seize his person and launch his fleet at the first overt act.

Attention is invited to General Merritt's promise (page 11, par. 2) made known to Aguinaldo by me verbally, namely, that in the event of the United States withdrawing from these islands, care would be taken to leave Aguinaldo in as good condition as he was found by the forces of the Government. From a remark the General made to me I inferred he intended to interpret the expression "forces of the Government" to mean the naval forces, should future contingencies necessitate such an interpretation. At the time of the entry of the American forces into Manila, which was accomplished without assistance from the insurgents being either needed, requested, received, or desired, the insurgents held the following lines: Joining onto the American trenches facing Mytubig (the Indian name for the locality at the south end of Malate, in the vicinity of the old fort and bridge), their trenches extended in a large circle around and outside of the Spanish line of blockhouses. The Spanish held Santa Ana, Concordia, Paco, Singalon, and Malate, then the line dropped back to blockhouse No. 8, to Macleod's house in Santa Mesa, and continued on around to the bay at

Bancu Say, including within it all the suburbs on the northern side of Manila. The lines are indicated in map accompanying my report of July 27. Paranaque, Pasay, San Pedro Macati-Mandaloian, Pasig, Guadalupe, Partero Santalon (where is situated the pumping station), San Juan del Monte (where the reservoir is located), Kabao, Santol, San Francisco del Monte, Caloocan, and Malabon are the villages, towns, and places (immediately in rear of the insurgent trenches and positions) where the insurgent forces were generally located. After our entry to the city they all advanced their positions and encroached upon our outposts without anyone's authority or permission save their own, and in the face of repeated objections on the part of General Merritt. They can lay no just claim to having conquered from the Spanish the positions now held except those at the pumping station and reservoir. Prior to the 13th of August they had for weeks been straining every resource in an effort to capture Manila without the assistance of Americans, and before they got ready, without making the slightest progress. Of course, they could never have made the progress they did in investing the city had it not been for the destruction of the Spanish fleet by Admiral Dewey; but they did do much hard fighting and did drive the Spanish from positions in the provinces immediately surrounding Manila into the confines of the city itself. This credit they are entitled to.

OFFICE MILITARY GOVERNOR AND HDQRS. OF THE PACIFIC,
Manila, August 30, 1898.

Colonel BARRY,
Adjutant-General, Eighth Army Corps.

DEAR COLONEL: Inclosed you will find a letter from General Aguinaldo and a blue print of Manila. The letter was brought by his aid two days ago, and he was informed that a reply would be sent within four days. The matter should have immediate attention, as General Merritt has not been able to take it up, owing to his hurried departure. The letters referred to by Aguinaldo from General Merritt will be found in the press-copy book at the department headquarters and here.

The demand now made by Aguinaldo is to retain his people just outside of the interior—black pencil mark on the map. The outside pencil marks indicate the positions that General Merritt desired to have the insurgents withdraw to. I inferred from what the aid said that what Aguinaldo particularly desires is that in case his requests are not granted that reasons are to be given, which he can use to satisfy his people. The trouble seems to be that he does not think it prudent to give positive orders for his people to withdraw from the city.

Very respectfully.

_____,
Chief of Staff.

[Telegram.]

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL,
Manila, P. I., August 31, 1898.

General AGUINALDO, *Bacoor, P. I.:*

Referring to promise made by General Merritt to reply to your letter of August 27 within four days, I desire to state that General Merritt was unexpectedly ordered away and had not opportunity to reply. Being unacquainted with the situation, I must take time to inform myself before replying, which I will do at earliest opportunity.

OTIS, *Commanding.*

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., September 8, 1898.

The COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE FORCES.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 27th ultimo, addressed to General Merritt, my predecessor, and by him transferred to me on the eve of his departure from Manila. By telegram of the 31st ultimo I informed you of General Merritt's hurried departure, in obedience to orders of my Government; that his necessarily hurried preparations did not permit him to make

reply to the communication and that such duty devolved upon me, which I would perform at the earliest opportunity and as soon as I could acquaint myself with the condition of affairs, of which (as I had but recently arrived) I had slight knowledge. To my telegram you made a most courteous response. Having now carefully considered the situation, I have the honor to make reply as follows:

And first, in your note of the 27th ultimo, you are pleased to manifest surprise that the late United States military governor should have reached an erroneous conclusion as to the result of a conference with your commissioners on August 15, as apparently manifested by his letter to you of August 24. I do not know the extent of any conversation which may have been indulged in at that conference and the nature of the impression which may have been conveyed. Referring to a written memoranda in my possession, which purports to contain the substance of propositions discussed at the time, I find that certain concessions were made by the commissioners in expected return for specific privileges to be conferred, and as there has not been a mutual agreement in these matters between the interested parties I do not understand that any obligations have arisen by reason of that conference.

Second. I note with pleasure your allusion to your very friendly disposition toward my Government, as manifested by your prompt attendance to our request for a supply of water; also your expression as to the inconvenience of a dual occupation of the city of Manila, and I do not forget that the revolutionary forces under your command have made many sacrifices in the interest of civil liberty and for the welfare of your people, and to this I will be pleased to allude hereafter.

Third. In connection with your remark as to the injustice of the United States in not properly appreciating your assistance in the capture of Manila, I beg a full consideration on your part of the mandatory conditions which accompany the occupation, which I am sure you fully appreciate, but to which I will respectfully invite your attention in a subsequent portion of this reply.

Fourth. You designate certain lines within the suburbs of the city of Manila to which you promise to retire your troops, and name as conditions precedent, first, protection to your shipping by the United States Navy and the free navigation of your vessels within the waters in United States occupation; second, restitution to your forces of all positions which are now occupied by your troops in the event that treaty stipulations between the United States and Spain surrender to the last-named Government the territory occupied by the former; and thirdly, that United States troops now occupying positions beyond the lines which you name shall retire within the same.

A discussion of your proposition to hold jointly with the United States Government the city of Manila involves consideration of some of the other concessions you desire to be made, and to that I will at once refer. I wish to present the matter, in the first instance, in its legal aspect, although from remarks contained in former correspondence I am of the opinion that you are fully aware how untenable the proposition is. The United States and Spain were and are belligerent parties to a war, and were so recognized by the civilized world. In the course of events the entire city of Manila, then in full possession of the Spanish forces, was surrendered to the first-named belligerent power. The articles of agreement and capitulation gave to the United States Government full occupancy of the city and defenses of Manila, and that Government obligated itself to insure the safety of the lives and property of the inhabitants of the city to the best of its ability. By all the laws of war and all international precedents, United States authority over Manila and its defenses is full and supreme, and they can not escape the obligations which they have assumed.

By the able representatives who have charge of the interests of the Philippine revolutionary forces this conclusion will be admitted to be incontrovertible, and argument on the point is unnecessary. Can they who seek civil and religious liberty and invite the approval and assistance of the civilized world afford to enter upon a course of action which the law of nations must condemn?

But conceding, as you do, the strictly legal right of my Government to hold and administer the affairs of the city of Manila and all of its suburbs (I thus conclude from expressions contained in former correspondence and from my appreciation of your intellectual attainments), you base your proposition of joint occupation upon supposed equitable grounds, referring to the sacrifices your troops have made and the assistance they have rendered the American forces in the capture of Manila. It is well known that they have made personal sacrifices, endured great hardships, and have rendered aid. But is it forgotten that my Government has swept the Spanish navy from the seas of both hemispheres, sent back to Spain the Spanish army and navy forces recently embarked for your destruction and for the secure holding of its Philippine possessions; that since May 1 last its Navy

has held the city of Manila at its mercy, but out of considerations of humanity refused to bombard it, preferring to send troops to demand surrender and thereby preserve the lives and property of its inhabitants? Is it forgotten that the destruction of the Spanish navy and the retention of Spanish armed men in its European possessions has opened up to you the ports of the island of Luzon and held Spain helpless to meet its refractory subjects?

As between my Government and the revolutionary forces of the Philippines, I fail to discover on what principle of common justice a joint occupation of Manila can be maintained. Equity, in the legal acceptation of the term, would most assuredly condemn it. A sense of justice should, in my opinion, have prompted the revolutionary forces to aid those of my country in every way possible in return for the great assistance they have received. You remark in substance that had you not prevented the Spanish forces from retreating from the city the United States would have received naught but its ruined streets and buildings. Possibly, but had all Spanish subjects elsewhere and here been the contented subjects of Spain, war between it and my Government would not have been waged. It was undertaken by the United States for humanity's sake, and not for their aggrandizement or for any national profit they expected to receive, and they have expended millions of treasure and hundreds of the lives of their citizens in the interest of Spanish suffering colonists.

Apart from all legal and equitable considerations and those having their origin in personally conceived ideas of justice, I wish respectfully to call your attention to the impracticability of maintaining a joint occupation of Manila and its suburbs, and in this I know that I shall have the approval or your excellent judgment. It would be extremely difficult to prevent friction between our respective forces, which might result in unfortunate consequences, labor as we may for continued harmonious relations. Located in close proximity, irresponsible members of our organizations by careless or impertinent action might be the means of inciting grave disturbances, and in this connection I cite the recent shooting affair at Cavite, which still requires investigation. There might also arise conflict of authority between our respective officers. Even now within precincts in entire actual possession of our troops I find that permits are given to citizens, who are styled local presidents, to make arrests, to carry arms, etc., in violation of our instructions and authority, and that several cases of kidnaping have taken place. In pursuance of our obligations to maintain, in so far as we can, domestic tranquillity, our officers have arrested suspected parties, and they have asserted (with what element of truth I know not) that the insurgent forces are the offenders. I have declined to accept their statements, as I prefer to believe the contrary, although it would appear that officers connected with those forces have issued the permits to which I allude. Such interference with our administation of civil affairs mus, eventually result in conflict.

Again (reverting to a legal aspect of the subject), the affairs of the entire city corporation must be administered from a common center. The trust accepted by my Government from those who surrendered actual possession confers a discretionary power which can neither be shared nor delegated. The validity of this conclusion will be readily understood by yourself and associates as a well-established legal proposition and does not require argument. And here permit me to remark upon a view of the subject you have advocated in support of the plea for dual occupation of the city's suburbs. Your forces, you say in substance, should have a share in the booty resulting from the conquest of the city on account of hardships endured and assistance rendered. The facts on which you base your conclusion granted, the conclusion, under the laws of war which are binding on my Government, does not follow. It has never recognized the existence of spoils of war denominated booty, as have many European governments. No enemy's property of any kind, public or private, can be seized, claimed, or awarded to any of its officers and men, and should they attempt to appropriate any of it for their individual benefit, they would be very severely punished through military tribunals, on which have been conferred by law very sweeping jurisdiction. The enemy's money and property (all that is not necessary to be expended in administering local affairs in the enemy's surrendered territory) must be preserved for final arbitrament or settlement by and between the supreme authorities of the nations concerned. My troops can not acquire booty nor any individual benefits by reason of capture of an enemy's territory. I make this comment believing that you hold erroneous opinions in respect to individual advantages which occupation bestows.

I request your indulgence while I briefly consider the concessions you ask us to make as conditions precedent to the retirement of your forces to the lines indicated by your note of the 27th ultimo. The first is:

Protection to your shipping and free navigation to your vessels.—Neither the extent of protection nor the limit of free navigation you request is understood.

Certainly you could not mean pre-occupation on the high seas or in ports not in the rightful possession of the United States. That, as you are fully aware, could only be effected by a treaty of guaranty following international recognition of the belligerent rights of a Philippine revolutionary government. While the existing armistice continues the United States are in rightful possession, in so far as the navigable waters of the Philippine Islands are concerned, only of the Bay of Manila and its navigable tributaries. Within the same all vessels of trade and commerce and the war vessels of recognized national powers sail freely as long as the sovereignty of my Government is not assailed, nor the peace of the locality threatened. In this respect, whatever concessions are extended by way of relaxation of trade restrictions, incident to war, to citizens of these islands will be extended to all alike; no discrimination in this regard is intended or will be permitted. Admiral Dewey exercises supervisory jurisdiction over all navy matters, and they are in no way related to the duties conferred upon me by law. Nor would it avail should I seek his consent for greater latitude of action, for even if disposed to grant special concessions he could not do so, and I doubt if the supreme authority of my Government could now, under the prevailing truce with Spain, invest him with the requisite powers to do so and at the same time preserve its international obligations.

The second concession named by you is re-titution of positions in the city of Manila to your forces in case a treaty of peace remands to Spain the territory surrendered by her in the late capitulation articles, and the third, and last, is a promise to retire our troops within the lines indicated by you as the lines on which you desire your troops to remain permanently. These propositions, having a kindred nature, may be considered together, and, indeed, have already been impliedly answered. From previous statements of facts and logical conclusions made and stated in this communication concerning the nature of the obligations resting upon the United States with regard to the territory to which they have the legal right of possession under contracting articles with Spain, it is evident that neither in law nor morals can the concessions be made. I would be powerless to grant them in any aspect of the case, being nothing more than an agent to carry out the instructions of the executive head of my Government and not being vested with discretionary power to determine matters of such moment. In the present instance I am not only powerless to accede to your request, but have been strictly enjoined by my Government, mindful of its international promises and national honor, which it has never broken nor sacrificed, not to concede joint occupation of the city and suburbs of Manila, and am directed specially to preserve the peace and protect persons and property within the territory surrendered under the terms of the Spanish capitulation. These mandates I must obey.

Thus have I endeavored, with all candor and sincerity, holding nothing in reserve, to place before you the situation as understood by me, and, I doubt not, by the Republic which I represent. I have not been instructed as to what policy it intends to pursue with regard to its legitimate holdings here, and hence I am unable to give you any information on the subject. That it will have a care and labor conscientiously for the welfare of your people I sincerely believe. It remains for you, beneficiaries of its sacrifices, to adopt a course of action which will manifest your good intentions and show to the world the principles which actuate your motives.

You and your associates could not regret more than I any conflict between our forces, which would tend to excite the citizens of my country, who are always a unit in action when its sovereignty is attacked or when its right to full fill its international obligations is called in question. Then they never count cost, and, as you are fully aware, resources are abundant. Rather than see the ships of the Navy of the United States controlling the navigable waters of these islands and its armies devastating their territory, I would greatly prefer to advise my Government that there is no longer need to send more of its troops to this section of country, and that those whom it holds waiting on its Pacific slope can be remanded to their homes or employed elsewhere as it may determine.

It only remains for me to respectfully notify you that I am compelled by my instructions to demand that your armed forces evacuate the entire city of Manila, including its suburbs and defenses, and that I shall be obliged to take action with that end in view within a very short period of time, should you decline to comply with my Government's demands, and I hereby serve notice upon you that unless your troops are withdrawn beyond the lines of the city's defenses before Thursday, the 15th instant, I shall be obliged to resort to forcible action and that my Government will hold you responsible for any unfortunate consequences that may ensue.

Permit me to believe that my confidence in the sound judgment and patriotism of yourself and associates is not misplaced.

You will please pardon me for my apparent unnecessary delay in replying to your communication of the 27th ultimo, but the press of duties connected with the administration of the affairs of the city is my excuse.

In conclusion, I beg to inform you that I have conferred freely with Admiral Dewey upon the contents of this communication, and am delegated by him to state that he fully approved of the same in all respects; that the commands of our Government compel us to act as therein indicated and that between our respective forces there will be unanimity and complete concert of action.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

E. S. Otis,
Major-General, U. S. A.,
and United States Military Governor in the Philippines.

Report of Major-General Otis from September 2, 1898 (including documents not published in the report of Major-General Merritt), to February 4, 1899 (the date of breaking out of the insurrection).

NOTE.—The foregoing instructions of the President dated December 21, 1898, upon which all subsequent acts of administration were predicated, was published in Circular from War Department, A. G. O., under date of August 1, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, December 21, 1898.

Maj. Gen. E. S. OTIS, U. S. V.,
Commanding Department of the Pacific and
Military Governor of the Philippine Islands, Manila.

SIR: By direction of the Secretary of War, I have the honor to transmit herewith instructions of the President relative to the administration of affairs in the Philippine Islands.

"EXECUTIVE MANSION,
"*Washington, December 21, 1898.*

"To the SECRETARY OF WAR.

"SIR: The destruction of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Manila by the United States naval squadron commanded by Rear-Admiral Dewey, followed by the reduction of the city and the surrender of the Spanish forces, practically effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands and the suspension of Spanish sovereignty therein.

"With the signature of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain by their respective plenipotentiaries at Paris on the 10th instant, and as a result of the victories of American arms, the future control, disposition, and government of the Philippine Islands are ceded to the United States. In the fulfillment of the rights of sovereignty thus acquired and the responsible obligations of government thus assumed, the actual occupation and administration of the entire group of the Philippine Islands becomes immediately necessary, and the military government heretofore maintained by the United States in the city, harbor, and bay of Manila is to be extended with all possible dispatch to the whole of the ceded territory.

"In performing this duty the military commander of the United States is enjoined to make known to the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands that, in succeeding to the sovereignty of Spain, in severing the former political relations of the inhabitants, and in establishing a new political power, the authority of the United States is to be exerted for the securing of the persons and property of the people of the islands and for the confirmation of all their private rights and relations. It will be the duty of the commander of the forces of occupation to announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we come not as invaders or conquerors, but as friends, to protect the natives in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights. All persons who, either by active aid or by honest submission, cooperate with the Government of the United States to give effect to these beneficent purposes will receive the reward of its support and protection. All others will be brought within the lawful rule we have assumed, with firmness if need be, but without severity, so far as may be possible.

"Within the absolute domain of military authority, which necessarily is and must remain supreme in the ceded territory until the legislation of the United States shall otherwise provide, the municipal laws of the territory in respect to private rights and property and the repression of crime are to be considered as continuing in force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, so far as

practicable. The operations of civil and municipal government are to be performed by such officers as may accept the supremacy of the United States by taking the oath of allegiance, or by officers chosen, as far as may be practicable, from the inhabitants of the islands.

"While the control of all the public property and the revenues of the state passes with the cession, and while the use and management of all public means of transportation are necessarily reserved to the authority of the United States, private property, whether belonging to individuals or corporations, is to be respected except for cause duly established. The taxes and duties heretofore payable by the inhabitants to the late government become payable to the authorities of the United States unless it be seen fit to substitute for them other reasonable rates or modes of contribution to the expenses of government, whether general or local. If private property be taken for military use, it shall be paid for when possible in cash, at a fair valuation, and when payment in cash is not practicable receipts are to be given.

"All ports and places in the Philippine Islands in the actual possession of the land and naval forces of the United States will be opened to the commerce of all friendly nations. All goods and wares not prohibited for military reasons by due announcement of the military authority will be admitted upon payment of such duties and other charges as shall be in force at the time of their importation.

"Finally, it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring them in every possible way that full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the heritage of free peoples, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule. In the fulfillment of this high mission, supporting the temperate administration of affairs for the greatest good of the governed, there must be sedulously maintained the strong arm of authority, to repress disturbance and to overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of the blessings of good and stable government upon the people of the Philippine Islands under the free flag of the United States.

"WILLIAM MCKINLEY."

Very respectfully,

H. C. CORBIN, *Adjutant-General.*

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., January 12, 1899.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: Some time since I forwarded by cable information that conservative men of the revolutionary government of the Filipinos had withdrawn from its councils, stating that they were unable to exert any further beneficial influence. I am of the impression that they were also influenced by apprehensions of personal danger.

The cabinet of President Aguinaldo resigned in a body, as it was not able to come to an agreement upon the terms of the proposed constitution. Aguinaldo's chief adviser, a man of very radical views, undertook to form a new cabinet, but found it impossible to secure the services of representative men. He finally succeeded in forming a provisional cabinet, composed of men of limited importance, and Aguinaldo called his congress, to which call the conservative members failed to respond, and therefore it was controlled by its radical element. Although many of the members who put in an appearance greatly desire to avoid any difficulty with the United States, and so declare themselves in private conversation, they fear to give public expression to their views. There were, however, a number who were unremitting in their secret endeavors to maintain peace. They approached me, asking that I assist them to secure a conference with the United States authorities in order that they might work upon their congress in the interests of harmony. I replied through a civilian (an American citizen) that I would gladly meet any of the representative men of the Filipinos and Aguinaldo himself in their individual capacities, but was powerless to recognize the "de facto" government of which they boasted, or to receive any of its members in an official capacity.

I further informed them that I would appoint a committee to meet a similar committee appointed by General Aguinaldo, commanding the revolutionary

army, if such was their desire. They appealed to me to make some concessions which they could use with their people in the interests of peace. Conditions were very fully explained to them, and while I discovered that they had a very fair understanding of affairs, they urged the difficulty of making their ignorant people understand them. The people had gone wild on the words "protection" and "independence," whereas the words "sovereignty," "annexation," and "United States control" served to excite them greatly. These gentlemen worked faithfully with the Malolos people and finally I received a letter from Aguinaldo, of which the inclosed, marked Exhibit 1, is a translation, and to which I made reply, a copy of which is inclosed, marked Exhibit 2. I appointed General Hughes, Colonel Smith, of the First California, and Lieutenant-Colonel Crowder, of the judge-advocate's department, as members of the commission, and General Aguinaldo appointed two officers and a civilian of considerable judicial ability. A long conference ensued in which the Filipino gentlemen failed to establish a single proposition for which they contended. The most amicable exchange of views was had and the result of the conference was beneficial. These Filipino gentlemen are still laboring for desired results and I think that another conference will be called.

In the meantime affairs here are much strained. The insurgent army and city mobs view the quiet conduct of United States troops as a sign of weakness or fear and are very boastful of their prowess. In this lies the danger of the situation, and should these insurgents, defying the forces of the Malolos government, bring on a conflict, a slaughter of their people will result. The troops are on the alert and well in hand.

I am of the opinion that some of our worst foes are those of our own household. I inclose an article cut from the Singapore Free Press of December [illegible] Exhibit 3, which the insurgents declare was written by United States Consul Pratt, now on duty in that city. The better class of insurgents have complained of this article, as it has had quite an exciting effect upon their people. The active intermeddling of other United States consuls has also given us considerable trouble. I inclose also copies of two proclamations issued by Aguinaldo. One was prepared and withdrawn by advice, I understand, and the second sent out, both of same date. A few copies of the one first prepared got into circulation after the second one was posted. I think that Aguinaldo was as pacific as he had the courage to be under the circumstances in which he found himself placed. He does not desire war, but finds it difficult to stem the dangerous current of excitement which he and his advisers have set in motion.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

EXHIBIT 1.

MALOLOS, *January 9, 1899.*

Maj. Gen. E. S. OTIS,
General of the American Forces of Occupation in Manila.

GENERAL: I have been informed after the interview between the commissioners of my government and Mr. Carman that there will be no inconvenience on your part in naming, as commanding general, representatives that will confer with those whom I will name for the same object.

Although it not being explained to me the reason why you could not treat with the commissioners of my government, I have the faculty for doing the same with those of the commanding general "who can not be recognized." Nevertheless, for the sake of peace I have considered it advisable to name, as "commanding general," a commission composed of the following gentlemen: Mr. Florentino Flores, Enrique Flores, and Manuel Arguelles, that they may together represent me and arrive at an accord with those whom you will name, with the object of using such methods as will normalize the actual situation created by the attitude of your Government and troops.

If you will deign to attend to said commissioners and through these methods come to some understanding, "if only temporary," that will insure the peace and harmony amongst ourselves, the Filipino public would reach a grateful glory.

I am yours, General, with the highest consideration, your most respected servant,

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

EXHIBIT 2.

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., January 9, 1899.

General EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding Revolutionary Force, Malolos, P. I.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of to-day and am much pleased at the action you have taken. I greatly regret that you have not a clear understanding of my position and motives and trust that my explanation, assisted by the conference I have invited, will make them clear to you.

In my official capacity I am merely the agent of the United States Government to conduct its affairs under the limits which its Constitution, laws, precedents, and specific instructions prescribe. I have not the authority to recognize any national or civil power not already formally recognized by my Government, unless specially authorized so to do by the instructions of the Executive of the United States. For this reason I was unable to receive officially the representatives of the revolutionary government, and endeavored to make that inability clear to the distinguished gentlemen with whom I had the pleasure to converse a few evenings since. You will bear witness that my course throughout my entire official connection with affairs here has been consistent, and it has pained me that I have not been able to receive and answer communications of the cabinet officers of the government at Malolos, fearing that I might be erroneously charged with lack of courtesy.

Permit me now briefly, General, to speak of the serious misunderstanding which exists between the Filipino people and the representatives of the United States Government, and which I hope that our commissioners, by thorough discussion, may be able to dispel.

I sincerely believe that all desire peace and harmony, and yet by the machinations of evil-disposed persons we have been influenced to think that we occupy the position of adversaries. The Filipinos appear to be of the opinion that we meditate attack, while I am under the strict orders of the President of the United States to avoid conflict in every way possible. My troops, witnessing the earnestness, the comparatively disturbed and unfriendly attitude of the revolutionary troops and many of the citizens of Manila, conclude that active hostilities have been determined upon, although it must be clearly within the comprehension of unprejudiced and reflecting minds that the welfare and happiness of the Filipino people depend upon the friendly protection of the United States. The hand of Spain was forced, and she has acknowledged before the world that all her claimed rights in this country have departed by due process of law. This treaty acknowledgment, with the conditions which accompany it, awaits ratification of the Senate of the United States; and the action of its Congress must also be secured before the Executive of that Government can proclaim a definite policy. That policy must conform to the will of the people of the United States, expressed through its representatives in Congress. For that action the Filipino people should wait, at least, before severing the existing friendly relations. I am governed by a desire to further the interests of the Filipino people, and shall continue to labor with that end in view. There shall be no conflict of forces if I am able to avoid it, and still I shall endeavor to maintain a position to meet all emergencies that may arise.

Permit me to subscribe myself, General, with the highest respect,
Your most obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

EXHIBIT 3.

[Editorial in Singapore Free Press, December 12, 1898, opposing annexation of the Philippine Islands by the United States.]

If we are to accept a statement made through the Times by its Washington correspondent, President McKinley is again displaying vacillation over the future disposal of the Philippines. The treaty of peace has been signed provisionally, of course, but the final ratification of its terms will have to issue with all due formality from the respective Governments concerned. As between Spain and the United States, the Philippine Islands are ceded to the latter power. As between the revolutionary government of the Philippines and the United States, all that Spain validly has to cede are the very few square miles on which her military remnant stands. Spain may cede, the United States may nominally acquire, but possession

is ever nine points of the law. And at this moment the Filipino government stand possessed of their own soil, subject only to the exercise of foreign force majeure. Spain had been practically expelled out of doors by the revolution. Admiral Dewey comes round and knocks Spain off the doorstep, but the Filipino revolution is in actual occupation of so much of the premises as to practically constitute the whole. American statesmen still grope about in the gloom of conflicting counsels. Obviously the United States, which has yet been unable at this stage of the country's history to establish a stable, effective, incorruptible, permanent civil service, does not possess and can not for many years hope to train men competent in character, aptitude, and qualification to aid in the responsible administration of her new dependencies. A colonial service will have to be improvised, just as the last campaign saw war supply and transport departments improvised—with what sorry result we all know. But these novel and delicate issues, such as the relations of the Filipino government to the United States protectorate, can not be safely left to a batch of amateurs whose self-confidence, probably, is only equal to their incapacity.

We can not profess to be surprised that President McKinley, even now, is reported to be harking back to the contemplation of an arrangement that would lighten, by a few dozen islands in the Philippine group, the responsibilities about to devolve on the United States. But Mr. McKinley is wrong. He does not yet see, for lack of the seeing eye, what hundreds of Englishmen, accustomed to consider the methods of British imperial administration, could tell him, that safety and success for America lies in treading the straight, beaten path of British precedent. If Mr. McKinley and his advisers only knew it, fortified by these precedents, they have only to follow the grooves. And it so happens, thus guided, that the safe and easy way indicated is just that way that simplifies everything for the protecting power and most fully will secure the good will and cooperation of the protected. The first step to be taken is the open declaration of an American protectorate over all Spanish dependencies connected with the Philippines. Secondly, a full recognition of the Filipino government to the status of the organized government of a protected state, such, practically, as Egypt is to-day, or such as many of our Indian protectorates are: the Filipino government to settle its own fiscal arrangements, its legislation, its administration of justice, its police, its education system, but always, where misadventure may be possible, guided by professional advisers, selected, if necessary, by itself, but subject to the approval or disapproval of the American resident-general; the relations between the United States and the Filipino government to be fully defined by treaty such as we have with our British protectorates. The American plan, or no plan, of refusing recognition to the Filipino government is a counsel of sheer downright stupidity, or, let us call it, political inexperience. The United States representatives in the Philippines have gone perilously near to convincing the Filipino people and the Filipino government that they are but exchanging King Log for King Stork.

The saving of the situation has lain in the prudence and wise restraint, wonderful in such a people, that has characterized the Filipinos. If good relations are henceforth to be created between the United States authorities and the people of the country, it will be mainly due to the forbearance and patience, under systematic slight and snub, of the revolutionary government, which has a full and effective control over the population. It is unpleasant to hear of President McKinley giving at the knees, if the fact be so. The pity of it is that he does not seem to realize what an easy and honorable duty lies before him. Let the Filipino government be honored, recognized, encouraged. Let it make its experiments. Mistakes may be made, but it is best that they should come to see in what they may go wrong, and how they may themselves repair the error. It is strange that America does not seem to grasp it, but they have only to do to the Filipinos what over a century ago they desired that Britain should do unto themselves. It will mean endless trouble if the United States forgets the lessons of her own history and endeavors to "bahadur" the Filipinos into serfdom.

Exhibit 5.

[General Aguinaldo's first proclamation, which was withdrawn, and second proclamation of same date issued and posted.]

The government of the Philippines has considered it its duty to set forth to the civilized powers the facts determining the rupture of its amicable relations with the Army of the United States of America in these islands, to the end that they may thereby reach the conviction that I, for my part, have done everything possible to avoid it, although at the cost of many rights uselessly sacrificed.

After the naval combat, which occurred on May 1 of last year, between the Spanish squadron and that of America, the commander of the latter consented to my return from Hongkong to this beloved soil, and he distributed among the Filipinos some rifles found in the arsenal at Cavite, doubtless with the intention of reestablishing the revolution, somewhat quieted by the convention of Biacnabato, in order to have the Filipinos on his side.

The people, influenced by the declaration of war between the United States and Spain, understood the necessity of fighting for its liberty, feeling sure that Spain would be destroyed and rendered incapable of leading it along the road to prosperity and progress. The Filipinos hailed my advent with joy, and I had the honor of being proclaimed leader on account of the services which I had rendered in the former revolution. Then all the Filipinos, without distinction of classes, took arms and every province hastened to expel from its frontiers the Spanish forces. This is the explanation of the fact that, after the lapse of so short a period of time, my government rules the whole of Luzon, the Visaya Islands, and a part of Mindanao.

Although the North Americans took no part in these military operations, which cost no little blood and gold, my government does not disavow the fact that the destruction of the Spanish squadron and the gift of some rifles from the arsenal to my people influenced the progress of arms to some extent. It was also taken for granted that the American forces would necessarily sympathize with the revolution which they had managed to encourage and which had saved them much blood and great hardships, and above all, we entertained absolute confidence in the history and traditions of a people which fought for its independence and for the abolition of slavery, which posed as the champion liberator of oppressed peoples; we felt ourselves under the safeguard of the faith of a free people.

The Americans, seeing the friendly disposition of the Filipino people, disembarked forces at the town of Paranaque and took up positions all along the line occupied by my troops as far as Maytuvig, taking possession of many trenches constructed by my people by the employment of astuteness not unaccompanied by violence. They forced a capitulation on the garrison of Manila, which, inasmuch as it was invested by my troops, was compelled to surrender at the first attack. In this I took a very active part, although I was not notified, my forces reaching as far as the suburbs of Malate, Hermita, Paco, Sampaloc, and Tondo.

Notwithstanding these services and although the Spaniards would not have surrendered but for the fact that my troops had closed every avenue of escape to the towns of the interior, the American generals not only ignored me entirely in the stipulations for capitulation, but also requested that my forces should retire from the port of Cavite and the suburbs of Manila.

I represented to the American generals the injustice done me and requested in friendly terms that they should at least expressly recognize my cooperation, but they utterly declined to do so. Nevertheless, being always desirous of showing friendliness and good feeling toward those who called themselves liberators of the Philippine people, I ordered my troops to evacuate the port of Cavite and the suburbs of Hermita, Malate, Sampaloc, and Tondo, retaining only a portion of the suburb of Paco.

In spite of these concessions not many days passed before Admiral Dewey, without any reason whatever, arrested our steam launches, which had been plying in the bay of Manila with his express consent. Almost at the same time I received a letter from General Otis, commander of the American army of occupation, demanding that I should withdraw my forces beyond the lines marked on a map which he also sent me, and which showed within the lines the town of Pandacan and the hamlet of Singalong, which never have belonged to the municipal area of Manila and its suburbs.

In view of this unjustifiable attitude of both American leaders, I summoned a council of my generals and asked the advice of my cabinet, and in conformity with the opinion of both bodies I named commissioners, who placed themselves in communication with these Americans. Although Admiral Dewey received in an insolent manner and with aggressive phrases my commissioners, whom he did not permit to speak, I yielded to the friendly suggestions of General Otis, withdrawing my forces to the desired line for the purpose of avoiding contact with his troops. This gave rise to many misunderstandings, but I hoped that once the Paris Conference was at an end, my people would obtain the independence promised them by the consul-general in Singapore, Mr. Pratt, and that the friendship formerly assured and proclaimed in manifestos and speeches would be established by the American generals who have reached these shores.

But it did not turn out thus. The said generals accepted my concessions in favor of peace and friendship as indications of weakness. Thus it is that, with rising ambition, they ordered forces to Iloilo on December 25, with the purpose of

acquiring for themselves the title of conquerors of that portion of the Philippine Islands occupied by my government.

Such proceedings, so foreign to the dictates of culture and the usages observed by civilized nations, give me the right to act without observing the usual rules of intercourse. Nevertheless, in order to be correct to the end, I sent to General Otis commissioners charged to collect him to desist from his rash enterprise; but they were not listened to.

My government can not remain indifferent in view of such a violent and aggressive seizure of a portion of its territory by a nation which has arrogated to itself the title champion of oppressed nations. Thus it is that my government is disposed to open hostilities if the American troops attempt to take forcible possession of the Visaya Islands. I denounce these acts before the world, in order that the conscience of mankind may pronounce its infallible verdict as to who are the true oppressors of nations and the tormentors of humankind.

Upon their heads be all the blood which may be shed.

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

MALOLOS, *January 5, 1899.*

EXHIBIT 6.

[General Aguinaldo's second proclamation, the one publicly posted.]

SUPPLEMENT TO THE HERALD OF THE REVOLUTION—OFFICIAL.

Proclamation from the president of the revolutionary government to my brothers, the Filipinos, all the honorable consuls, and other foreigners.

Maj. Gen. E. S. Otis's proclamation published yesterday in the Manila papers obliges me to circulate the present one, in order that all who read and understand it may know of my most solemn protest against said proclamation, for I am moved by my duty and my conscience before God, by my political obligations with my beloved people, by my official and private relations to the North American nations.

In the above-mentioned proclamation General Otis calls himself "Military governor in the Philippines," and I protest one and a thousand times, with all the energy in my soul, against such an authority.

I solemnly proclaim that I have never had, either at Singapore or at Hongkong or here in the Philippines, any verbal or written contract for the recognition of American sovereignty over this cherished soil.

On the contrary, I say that I returned to these islands, conveyed by an American man-of-war, on the 19th of May of last year, with the firm and clear purpose of fighting the Spaniards in order to reconquer our liberty and independence, and so I expressed myself in the declaration made on the 24th of said month of May. Thus I published it in a proclamation directed to the Philippine people on the 12th of last June, when, in my natal town, Kawit, I for the first time unfurled our sacred national flag, as a holy emblem of that sublime aspiration; and, lastly, the American general, Merritt, predecessor of Mr. E. S. Otis, has confirmed that same thing in a proclamation addressed to the Philippine people days before the surrender of the town of Manila was proposed to General Jaudenes, which proclamation clearly and decisively stated that the land and naval forces of the United States came to give us our freedom and to displace the bad Spanish Government.

In a word, our countrymen and foreigners are witnesses that the land and naval forces of the United States existing here have recognized by act the belligerency of the Philippines, not only respecting but also doing public honor to the Filipino banner, which triumphantly traversed our seas in view of foreign nations represented here by their respective consuls.

As in his proclamation General Otis alludes to some instructions issued by His Excellency the President of the United States relative to the administration of affairs in the Philippines, I solemnly protest in the name of God, root and source of all justice and all right, who has visibly acceded me the power to direct my dear brethren in the difficult task of our regeneration, against this intrusion of the United States Government in the administration of these islands.

In the same manner I protest in the name of the Filipino people against the referred to intrusion. For when they gave me their votes in confidence, electing me, although unworthy to be so, president of the nation, they imposed upon me the duty of sustaining unto death its liberty and independence.

And, in conclusion, I protest against such an unexpected act which treats of American sovereignty in these islands in the face of all the antecedents that I have in my possession referring to my relations with the American authorities, which

are unequivocal testimony that the United States did not take me out of Hongkong to make war against Spain for their own benefit, but for the benefit of our liberty and independence, to which end said authorities verbally promised me their active support and efficacious cooperation.

So that you all may understand it, my beloved brothers, it is the principle of liberty and absolute independence that has been our noble ambition for the purpose of obtaining the desired object, with a force given by the conviction, now very widespread, not to retrace the path of glory that we have passed over.

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

MALOLOS, *January 5, 1899.*

COPY OF CABLEGRAM RECEIVED.

MANILA, *February 21, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington:*

Following issued by an important officer of insurgent government at Malolos, February 15, 1899, for execution during that evening and night in this city.

OTIS.

"First. You will so dispose that at 8 o'clock at night the individuals of the territorial militia, at your order, will be found united in all of the streets of San Pedro, armed with their bolos and revolvers or guns and ammunition if convenient.

"Second. Philippine families only will be respected; they should not be molested, but all other individuals, of what race they may be, will be exterminated without appeasement (or) compassion, after the extermination of the army of occupation.

"Third. The defender of the Philippines in your command will attack the guard at Bilibid and liberate the prisoners and 'presidiarios,' and accomplished this, they will be armed, saying to them: 'Brothers, we must avenge ourselves on the Americans and exterminate them, that we may take our revenge for the infamy and treachery which they have committed upon us; have no compassion upon them; attack with vigor, all Filipinos en masse will second you.' 'Long live Filipino indipendienta.'

"Fifth. The order which will be followed in the attack will be as follows: The sharpshooters of Tondo and Santa Ana will be the attack from without, and these shots will be the signal for the militia of Trozo, Binondo, Quiapo, and Sampaloc to go out into the street and do their duty. Those of Pako Ermita and Malate, Santa Cruz, and San Miguel will not start out until 12 o'clock unless they see that their companions need assistance.

"Sixth. The militia of Tondo will start out at 3 o'clock in the morning; if all do their duty our revenge will be complete. Brothers, Europe contemplates us. We know how to die as men shedding our blood in defense of the liberty of our country. Death to the tyrants! War without quarter to the false Americans who have deceived us! Either independence or death!"

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS OF OPERATIONS AGAINST INSURGENTS, FEBRUARY 4, 1899, TO APRIL 6, 1899.

REPORTS.*

FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.

1. Maj. Gen. Thomas M. Anderson, U. S. V., commanding First Division, Eighth Army Corps.
2. Brig. Gen. Charles King, U. S. V., commanding First Brigade, First Division, Eighth Army Corps (two reports).
3. Maj. Frank M. Foote, commanding First Battalion Wyoming Infantry.
4. Capt. F. Wheeler, Fourth Cavalry.
5. Col. James H. Smith, commanding First California Volunteer Infantry.
   Maj. H. T. Sime, First California Volunteer Infantry (two reports).
   Lieut. Col. Victor D. Duboce, First California Volunteer Infantry, commanding First Battalion (six reports).
6. Maj. Carroll H. Potter, commanding Fourteenth Infantry.
7. Capt. L. A. Matile, Fourteenth Infantry, commanding First Battalion.
8. Capt. John Murphy, Fourteenth Infantry, commanding Second Battalion.
9. Capt. Frank F. Eastman, Fourteenth Infantry, commanding Third Battalion.
10. Maj. Guy F. Shiels, brigade surgeon.
11. Lieut. Col. Thomas H. Barry, U. S. V., adjutant-general Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps.
12. Brig. Gen. Samuel Ovenshine, U. S. V., commanding Second Brigade, First Division, Eighth Army Corps.
13. Lieut. Col. W. C. Treumann, commanding First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.
14. Maj. Frank White, commanding First Battalion, First North Dakota.
    Maj. John H. Fraine, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.
15. Maj. F. D. Pease, surgeon, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.
16. Col. John H. Wholley, First Washington Volunteer Infantry.
17. Maj. D. W. Figgins, First Idaho Volunteer Infantry.
18. Capt. W. H. Sage, Twenty-third Infantry, assistant adjutant-general First Division, Second Brigade.
19. Capt. W. E. Birkhimer, Third United States Artillery, acting inspector-general First Division, Eighth Army Corps.
20. Lieut. Franklin M. Kemp, assistant quartermaster, Fourteenth Infantry.
21. Capt. A. B. Dyer, Sixth Artillery, commanding.
    Lieut. H. L. Hawthorne, Sixth Artillery.
    Lieut. A. S. Fleming, Sixth Artillery.
    Lieut. E. D. Scott, Sixth Artillery.
22. Lieut. Col. Gracey Childers, First Tennessee Volunteer Infantry.
23. Lieut. Col. Gracey Childers, First Tennessee Volunteer Infantry.
24. Maj. B. F. Cheatham, First Tennessee Volunteer Infantry.
25. Lieut. Charles E. Kilbourne, jr., Volunteer Signal Corps.
26. Lieut. William G. Haan, Third Artillery, commanding Company A, Battalion Engineers.
27. Capt. W. T. Wood, Eighteenth Infantry, chief ordnance officer.
28. Map to accompany General Anderson's report.

*These reports are omitted from the abridgment, as the main features treated therein were fully covered in the reports of Major-General Otis. They will be found complete in volume 1, part 4, of the Report of the Secretary of War.

SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.

29. Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, U. S. V., commanding Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.
30. Brig. Gen. H. G. Otis, U. S. V., commanding First Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.
31. Brig. Gen. H. G. Otis, U. S. V., commanding First Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, supplementary to February 22.
32. Maj. W. A. Kobbe, commanding Third Artillery.
33. Lieut. R. S. Abernathy, Third Artillery.
34. Lieut. W. S. Overton, Third Artillery.
35. Lieut. Lloyd England, Third Artillery.
36. Lieut. P. M. Kessler, Third Artillery.
37. Col. H. O. Kessler, commanding First Montana Volunteer Infantry.
38. Col. A. L. Hawkins, commanding Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry.
39. Col. Frederick Funston, commanding Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry.
40. Brig. Gen. Irving Hale, U. S. V., commanding Second Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.
41. Col. John M. Stotsenburg, First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry.
    Capt. R. H. Barber, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry.
    Lieut. C. A. Murphy, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry.
42. Col. A. S. Frost, First South Dakota Volunteer Infantry.
    Lieut. Burt D. Wheedon, First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry.
    Col. Henry B. McCoy, First Colorado Volunteer Infantry.
    Maj. G. A. Goodale, Twenty-third Infantry, commanding First Battalion.
43. Brig. Gen. Irving Hale, U. S. V., additional report.
    Col. J. M. Stotsenburg, First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry.
44. Col. J. M. Stotsenburg, First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry.
    Capt. Frank D. Eager, First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry.
45. Col. J. M. Stotsenburg, First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry.
46. Col. J. M. Stotsenburg, First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry.
47. Capt. Frank D. Eager, First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry.
48. Col. J. M. Stotsenburg, First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry.
    Capt. Nelson M. Black, assistant quartermaster, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.
    Maj. Frank M. Foote, First Wyoming Volunteer Infantry.
49. Col. A. S. Frost, First South Dakota Volunteer Infantry.
50. Maj. H. B. Mulford, First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry.
51. Maj. R. W. Young, Utah Light Artillery, commanding battalion.
    Lieut. George A. Seaman, Utah Light Artillery.
    Lieut. A. S. Fleming, Utah Light Artillery.
    Capt. F. A. Grant, Utah Light Artillery.
    Capt. E. A. Wedgwood, Utah Light Artillery.
    Lieut. William C. Webb, Utah Light Artillery.
    Lieut. George A. Gibbs, Utah Light Artillery.
52. Maj. J. F. Bell, Engineers (two reports).
53. Maj. J. S. Mallory, inspector-general.
54. Capt. B. H. Randolph, Third Artillery, commanding gunboat *Laguna de Bay*.
55. Capt. Edgar Russell, Volunteer Signal Corps.
56. Capt. Edgar Russell, Volunteer Signal Corps.
57. Capt. C. G. Sawtelle, assistant quartermaster, U. S. V.
58. Maj. R. H. Fitzhugh, chief commissary subsistence, U. S. V.
59. Capt. M. G. Krayenbuhl, commissary subsistence, U. S. V.
60. Capt. S. B. Bootes, commissary subsistence, U. S. V.
61. Maj. H. F. Hoyt, chief surgeon.
62. Maj. George H. Penrose, brigade surgeon, Fourteenth Infantry.
63. Maj. J. F. Bell, Engineers.
64. Capt. Lea Febiger, Twenty-third Infantry, chief department sanitation.
65. Maj. Gen. T. M. Anderson, U. S. V., commanding First Division.
66. Capt. W. E. Birkhimer, Third Artillery, acting inspector-general.
67. Maj. Percy Willis, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry.

REPORTS OF STAFF OFFICERS OF OPERATIONS AT THEIR DEPARTMENTS FOR FEBRUARY AND MARCH, 1899.

68. Lieut. Col. Charles L. Potter, U. S. V. chief engineer, February.
69. Lieut. Col. R. E. Thompson, U. S. V., chief signal officer, February.
70. Lieut. Col. J. W. Pope, chief quartermaster, U. S. V., February.
71. Maj. C. A. Devol, assistant quartermaster, U. S. V., transportation quartermaster, February.
72. Capt. Charles C. Walcutt, assistant quartermaster, U. S. V., chief quartermaster First Division, Eighth Army Corps, February.
73. Col. D. L. Brainard, purchasing commissary, U. S. A., chief commissary, February and March.
74. Lieut. Col. J. R. McGinnis, Ordnance Department, chief ordnance officer, February and March.
75. Lieut. Col. Henry Lippincott, deputy surgeon-general, U. S. A., chief surgeon, March.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC
AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., April 6, 1899.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL U. S. A.,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have the honor to forward herewith reports of recent military operations in the city of Manila and vicinity, submitted by the commanding generals of the two divisions of the corps and by members of the department staff.

The reports received from the First Division detail the work of the troops during February 4 and 5, commencing with the outbreak of active hostilities between the insurgents and our forces, while those of the Second Division, herewith submitted, cover the period from February 4 to the 1st day of March.

These military operations are fairly well presented in the reports, and I have little to add thereto, but desire particularly to call attention to the rise and development of conditions and circumstances which resulted finally in war. This I deem to be essential in order to correct the somewhat prevailing impression that the Government of the United States is responsible through deceit or wrongful action for the present existing hostilities.

It is well-known that a small band of men, natives of Luzon, and leaders of the rebellion of 1896 against Spain, were induced by the latter country, through a money consideration, to remove permanently from the islands. It is also well-known that after the destruction of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Manila, and the blockade of that city by the United States naval forces, a number of these men returned to the vicinity of Manila, and undoubtedly with the aid and consent of the agents of the United States Government. They were doubtless encouraged by citizens of the United States, and others, acting without authority, to attempt the organization of what they were pleased to denominate an independent government for the Philippine people, they themselves to become its controlling element.

The widespread animosity which a great majority of the inhabitants of southern Luzon entertained against the continuance of Spanish domination made these people eager to assist any demonstration which promised deliverance. Aguinaldo and his associates landed from

American vessels in Cavite (the province of his nativity), supplied by United States agents with arms and ammunition in small quantities for the purpose of raising a native force to assist the American troops to keep back from the shore of Manila Bay the scattered Spanish troops giving annoyance in that vicinity. Availing themselves of the zealous cooperation of the people of the southern provinces to terminate Spanish supremacy, they took advantage of the active hostilities then existing between the United States and Spain, by which the great bulk of the Spanish army was held at Manila, to drive out or capture the Spanish army detachments stationed at southern points, thus increasing their war munitions and being enabled thereby to add numerical strength to their forces. In May, shortly after landing at Cavite, Aguinaldo issued a proclamation forecasting an independent Filipino government with himself as its chief executive. Early in August the establishment of the independence of the insurgent government was officially proclaimed by him to the world, and as early as June he warned the United States authorities against the landing of its military forces on Philippine soil without first obtaining his consent, because, as he expressed it, "The Filipino people might consider the occupation of Philippine territory by North American troops a violation of their rights."

When the United States forces landed from their transports near and to the south of Manila for the purpose of attacking the city, the fiction that they were acting as allies of the insurgents and in furtherance of Philippine independence appears to have been conveyed by insurgent leaders, and thus when the city was surrendered by Spanish authorities the insurgent troops entered the city to the number of several thousand at the same time the United States was securing possession.

The subsequent efforts on the part of the United States to comply with the articles of capitulation with Spain, by occupying the city of Manila and its defenses, and the demands of Aguinaldo to be placed in possession of public buildings and to nominate for office all city functionaries, has been fully shown in correspondence which has been already submitted. He released his hold of such portions of the city as were in possession of his troops, thereby permitting the United States to carry out its agreement with Spain only after he had peremptory commands to do so, and then he established his military lines in close contact with the city limits this on the plea that should Manila revert to Spain he desired to be in position to take the offensive, and he even asked that his troops might be permitted to return to the positions evacuated by them in case Spanish authority should be reestablished. Not yet prepared to declare hostility against the United States, he busied himself with strengthening his lines about the city, confining our forces strictly within its limits, while he and other rebellious subjects of Spain busied themselves with the formation of what they were pleased to call a republican form of government for the Philippine Islands.

In the absence of Spanish authority without adequate power to forcibly assert itself, many able and conservative men gave adherence to this seemingly de facto government, and continued to cooperate with it until the latter part of November, when the determination of Aguinaldo and his confidential advisers for absolute political independence and their declared hostility against the United States caused them to

withdraw their adherence. Affairs thereafter were controlled by that radical element which from the first had manifested an unfriendly disposition, and which, securing additional arms and ammunition from the Asiatic coast, organized, equipped, and partially uniformed a military force, strengthened its lines around Manila, and boasted of its ability to place 80,000 armed men in the field. Its established newspapers, printed in Manila, indulged freely in falsehood and abuse of American authority, insulting officers and men. The condition of affairs continued to grow more threatening daily, aided possibly by the quiet, undemonstrative attitude which the United States troops had assumed, and their apparent disregard of the disparaging remarks of insurgent officers, both military and civil, who were permitted full freedom to circulate throughout the city at their pleasure.

Finally, early in January, a few of the leading conservative Filipinos of the section, marking the critical condition of affairs and fearing war, which appeared inevitable unless some pacific measures could be adopted, waited upon me and desired that I appoint a committee of army officers to meet a committee appointed by the insurgent government for the purpose of effecting some compromise by which peace might be maintained. The gentlemen were informed that I was ready at any time to open negotiations with the general of the insurgent army, but could not recognize in word or deed an insurgent government; that I would be pleased to appoint a commission to confer with one which General Aguinaldo, as chief of the insurgent forces, might be pleased to name. This reply, made in written memoranda, was conveyed to Malolos and elicited the following response:

MALOLOS, *January 9, 1899.*

Maj. Gen. E. S. OTIS,
General of the American Forces of Occupation in Manila.

GENERAL: I have been informed, after the interview between the commissioners of my government and Mr. Carman, that there will be no inconvenience on your part in naming, as commanding general, representatives that will confer with those whom I will name, for the same object.

Although it not being explained to me the reason why you could not treat with the commissioners of my government, I have the faculty of doing the same with those of the commanding general, "who can not be recognized." Nevertheless, for the sake of peace I have considered it advisable to name as "commanding general" a commission composed of the following gentlemen: Mr. Florentino Flores, Ambrosio Flores, and Manuel Arguieles, that they may together represent me and arrive at an accord with those whom you will name, with the object of using such methods as will normalize the actual situation created by the attitude of your Government and troops

If you will deign to attend to said commissioners, and through these methods come to some understanding, "if only temporary," that will insure the peace and harmony amongst ourselves, the Filipino public would reach a grateful glory.

I am yours, General, with the highest consideration,
Your most respectful servant,

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

To this letter I replied as follows:

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., January 9, 1899.

General EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding Revolutionary Forces, Malolos, P. I.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of to-day and am much pleased at the action you have taken. I greatly regret that you have not a clear understanding of my position and motives, and trust that my explanation, assisted by the conference I have invited, will make them clear to you.

In my official capacity I am merely the agent of the United States Government to

conduct its affairs under the limits which its Constitution, laws, precedents, and specific instructions prescribe. I have not the authority to recognize any national or civil power not already formally recognized by my Government, unless specially authorized so to do by the instructions of the Executive of the United States. For this reason I was unable to receive officially the representatives of the revolutionary government, and endeavored to make that inability clear to the distinguished gentlemen with whom I had the pleasure to converse a few evenings since. You will bear witness that my course throughout my entire official connection with affairs here has been consistent, and it has pained me that I have not been able to receive and answer communications of the cabinet officers of the government at Malolos, fearing that I might be erroneously charged with lack of courtesy.

Permit me now briefly, General, to speak of the serious misunderstanding which exists between the Filipino people and the representatives of the United States Government, and which I hope that our commissioners, by a thorough discussion, may be able to dispel. I sincerely believe that all desire peace and harmony, and yet by the machinations of evil-disposed persons you have been influenced to think that we occupy the position of adversaries. The Filipinos appear to be of the opinion that we meditate attack, while I am under the strict orders of the President of the United States to avoid conflict in every way possible. My troops, witnessing the earnestness, the comparatively disturbed and unfriendly attitude of the revolutionary troops and many of the citizens of Manila, conclude that active hostilities have been determined upon, although it must be clearly within the comprehension of unprejudiced and reflecting minds that the welfare and happiness of the Filipino people depends upon the friendly protection of the United States. The hand of Spain was forced, and she has acknowledged before the world that all her claimed rights in this country have departed by due process of law. This treaty acknowledgment, with the conditions which accompany it, awaits ratification by the Senate of the United States; and the action of its Congress must also be secured before the Executive of that Government can proclaim a definite policy. That policy must conform to the will of the people of the United States expressed through its representatives in Congress. For that action the Filipino people should wait, at least, before severing the existing friendly relations. I am governed by a desire to further the interests of the Filipino people and shall continue to labor with that end in view. There shall be no conflict of forces if I am able to avoid it; and still I shall endeavor to maintain a position to meet all emergencies that may arise.

Permit me to subscribe myself, General, with the highest respect,

Your most obedient servant,

E. S. Otis,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

Two members of the commission appointed by Aguinaldo were officers of his army, the third being a distinguished lawyer not a member of the Malolos government. On behalf of the United States, Gen. R. P. Hughes, Col. J. F. Smith, of the California Volunteers, and Lieut. Col. E. H. Crowder, judge-advocate of the department, were detailed. The joint commission had several sessions extending over a period of some three weeks, but no conclusions were reached, as the insurgent members could not submit any formulated statement which they were able to maintain. They presented as the desire of the insurgents absolute independence under the protection of the United States, but the nature and scope of the protection wished for they could not explain and the conference resulted in failure.

During the latter part of January the insurgents, along their established lines and within the city, exhibited increased aggressiveness, assuming a defiant attitude, so much so that our troops were gathered well in hand to meet any demonstrations which might be attempted. Insurgent armed parties entered far within our lines and defied our troops to resist their approaches. To arrest these proceedings our officers, and citizens of Manila connected with the insurgent government, were sent to insurgent general officers at various places along their lines to request that they keep their men in check, which the latter invariably promised to do, paying, however, little heed to their

promises. On February 1 a small detachment belonging to our engineer company was arrested within our territory and sent to Malolos. This act brought on the following correspondence:

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., February 2, 1899.

Gen. EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding Filipino Revolutionary Forces, Malolos.

GENERAL: I have the honor to inform you that a small party of engineers, consisting of a sergeant and four privates, who were engaged in making surveys for the completion of the map of Manila, which the Engineer Corps is now busy in perfecting, has been missing for two or three days and is reported to be confined in Malolos. The detachment was sent out to work within the city, with directions to confine itself to the city and suburban lines. Why they were arrested I do not understand, nor can I imagine for what reason they are held at Malolos. I am also informed that a citizen connected with Harper's Weekly newspaper of New York, engaged in taking views for that paper, has also been arrested and held as a prisoner. I know nothing of this except from report, nor do I know who the man is. I am also informed that a private soldier who went beyond the lines without authority, with what motive I do not know, is also held as a prisoner.

I send my staff officer, Lieutenant Haan, of the Engineer Corps, to make inquiry and request your action in this matter.

I am doing everything possible to preserve the peace and avoid all friction until the Filipino people can be made fully acquainted with the sentiments and intentions of the American Government, when I am confident that they will appreciate the endeavors of the United States and will again look upon that country as their friend and protector. I also fully believe that the present unrest is the result of machinations of evil-disposed persons.

I am, General, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

[Translation.]

MALOLOS, *February 4, 1899.*

Major-General OTIS,
Chief of the Forces of Occupation of Manila and Cavite.

GENERAL: In reply to your letter of February 2 I have the honor to state that the sergeant and the four American soldiers of the Engineer Corps, to-day liberated, were detained within our territory, beyond our advanced lines on Solis street, examining our intrenchments and defenses at a distance of less than 200 meters.

The said individuals carried a revolver, knives, a compass, plans of Manila and its suburbs, a book with topographical notes, a measuring tape, a machete, two penknives, scales, etc.

I deeply regret that these soldiers have been taken within our lines, according to the testimony of our officers, witnesses of their detention, inasmuch as there exists a decree, dated October 20, which prohibits all foreigners from approaching our defensive works, taking photographic views of the same, drawing plans, or entering our territory with arms, although free transit is permitted all who are unarmed.

The correspondent of Harper's Weekly has been detained in San Juan del Monte taking photographic views, and the proof of this is that in care of Colonel Miguel he has been sent his camera and his horse.

I must state that in consideration of the friendship of the Filipino people for the Americans the said soldiers have not been imprisoned, but detained, in accordance with the spirit of the decree of October 20 last. They have been lodged in the gobierno militar, and have been issued the daily rations of our officers. If they have been uncomfortable it is due to the excessive sobriety of our race and of our soldiers, who are accustomed to eat but little and to sleep on the hard ground.

With these explanations, I believe, General, you will understand the motive for the detention of your soldiers to-day liberated, and who have been treated with all due consideration.

I therefore hope that your determination may be another motive on which to base our friendly relations with the great American Republic, and in consideration of this I also decree the liberty of the correspondent referred to.

I am, General, as ever, your obedient servant,

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

It will be observed that the insurgent Government insisted that this engineer party was arrested outside of our small field of operations, which I am confident was not the fact, but the correspondence is given to show the efforts of the American authorities to maintain the peace. During all this time our officers and men were insulted and openly proclaimed to be cowards; our outposts were attacked at night, and the impression became general that the insurgents, notwithstanding our efforts, would indulge soon in open attack and in the belief, apparently entertained by them, that they would meet with feeble resistance.

During the entire month of January they had labored incessantly to strongly intrench their lines and place their artillery in position, and boasted freely of their intentions to soon drive the American forces out of Manila. On the night of February 2 they sent in a strong detachment to draw the fire of our outpost, which took up a position immediately in front of and within a few yards of the same. The outpost was strengthened by a few of our men who silently bore their taunts and abuse the entire night. This was reported to me by General MacArthur, whom I directed to communicate with the officer in command of the insurgent troops concerned. His prepared letter was shown me and approved, and the reply received (both papers found in General MacArthur's accompanying report) was all that could be desired. However, the agreement was ignored by the insurgents and on the evening of February 4 another demonstration was made on one of our small outposts which occupied a retired position at least 150 yards within the line which had been mutually agreed upon—an insurgent approaching the picket and refusing to halt or answer when challenged. The result was that our picket discharged his piece, when the insurgent troops near Santa Mesa opened a spirited fire on our troops there stationed.

The insurgent army had thus succeeded in drawing the fire of a small outpost, which they had evidently labored with all their ingenuity to accomplish in order to justify in some way their premeditated attack. It is not believed that the chief insurgent leaders wished to open hostilities at this time, as they were not completely prepared to assume the initiative. They desired two or three days more to perfect their arrangements, but the zeal of their army brought on the crisis which anticipated their action. They could not have delayed long, however, for it was their object to force an issue before American troops then en route could arrive at Manila.

The movement of troops during the protracted engagement which followed and their success at every point are described in the accompanying reports of the commanding generals of division. I transmit herewith copies of the most important telegraphic instructions sent from these headquarters to the different organizations of the command, from which the progress of events can be quite accurately traced. I can not speak too highly of the efficiency displayed by the troops under the most trying ordeals, and where all organizations engaged conducted themselves so courageously it would be difficult to undertake special mention. My adjutant-general, my aids, and other members of my staff conveyed many verbal instructions during the day to points most hotly contested and assisted materially in the repeated successes of the battle.

During the night of February 4 and the following day the insurgents of the city were greatly agitated, fearing for their personal safety. A portion, to the number of about 8,000, had been enrolled in a secret society for the purpose of attacking our troops within the city and performing incendiary work while the insurgents pressed us from without. This purpose was well known and an attack upon our forces, both in front and rear, was anticipated. So admirably, however, had General Hughes, the provost-marshal-general, disposed of 3,000 troops of his command that the rising was suppressed wherever attempted. His action was quick and decisive. Early on the morning of the 5th the police companies so effectively delivered their fire upon these assembling organizations that they were dispersed and discouraged. Their loss in killed and wounded could not have been above 50 or 60. They made no further very dangerous demonstrations until the night of February 23, when they suffered a most severe punishment.

The movement on Caloocan, February 10, was made with the intention of placing our northern line in better tactical condition and consisted in swinging the left of General MacArthur's division to the front. That officer had requested to do this shortly after the 5th instant, but was informed that we would await an anticipated concentration of the enemy on our left, where their activity was daily increasing. It was expected that if we remained quiet for a short time that the enemy would collect its routed forces, which we could not pursue, and would place them in position on our northern front. Our expectations were partially realized and when he had massed his forces on our left, which we were informed numbered some 4,000 but which in fact did not exceed 2,500, the movement was made and was attended with our accustomed success.

A reference to the accompanying copies of telegrams indicates quite clearly the intent and character of this movement.

I transmit here with reports of several of my staff officers, submitted by my direction.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. S. Otis, *Major General, U. S. V., Commanding.*

Report of an expedition to the province of La Laguna, Luzon, Philippine Islands, April 8 to 17, 1899, by Maj. Gen. H. W. Lawton, U. S. V., Commanding.

Hdqrs. First Division, Eighth Army Corps,
Manila, P. I., August 1, 1899.

Adjutant-General Department of the Pacific.

Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of an expedition to Santa Cruz, in the province of La Laguna.

Santa Cruz, the richest and most important city of La Laguna province, is situated on a neck of land on the southeastern shore of Laguna de Bay and is the outlet for the produce of the rich country to the south and southeast.

The insurgents were reported here in force and full of confidence, and in compliance with the verbal instructions of the general commanding the department this expedition was organized. Its purposes were:

First. The capture of Santa Cruz, and if possible to cut off the enemy's retreat.

Second. Destruction of the telegraph lines.

Third. The distribution among the inhabitants of the country of copies of the United States commissioners' proclamation.

Fourth. The location and capture of launches or gunboats in the hands of the insurgents.

Fifth. After the capture of Santa Cruz, the country and towns to the east and north along the east coast of the lake were to be reconnoitered.

Sixth. All this having been accomplished, it was contemplated to reembark and make a landing and advance upon Calamba.

The expedition was to be limited in strength to approximately 1,500 men. It was to be transported to its destination in cascos, towed by steam launches up the Pasig River and on the lake. The hour of departure and destination were to be withheld, but the former was to be fixed so that the journey might be made during the night, arriving at the point of landing at or before daylight.

To carry out the verbal instructions from the department commander in detail, the following order was promulgated:

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 19. HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, *Manila, P. I., April 6, 1899.*

The following-named organizations will be immediately prepared to take the field on a special expedition. They will be equipped in light marching order and will be supplied with 200 rounds of ammunition per man and ten days' rations, two of which will be "travel rations," and will be carried in the haversack:

Fourth U. S. Cavalry, Gale's squadron, Troops C, G, and L, 219 men.

Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, Patten's battalion, Companies C, D, E, and I, 290 men.

Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, Hasbrouck's battalion, Companies A, G, L, and K, 311 men.

First Idaho Volunteer Infantry, Linck's battalion, Companies A, C, D, and F, 225 men.

First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, Fraine's battalion, Companies C, D, I, and K, 248 men.

Two mountain guns (Hawthorne's battery), Lieutenant Koehler, commanding, with necessary equipment, etc., and 60 rounds of ammunition for each piece (shell and shrapnel), 16 men.

For the purpose of this expedition the authorized sharpshooters whose names have been reported to these headquarters, with the officers selected to command them, will be temporarily organized as follows:

First company, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, 9 squads, 45 enlisted men, and Fourth Cavalry, 3 squads, 15 enlisted men, commanded by Lieut. W. C. Geiger, Fourteenth Infantry; 60 men.

Second company, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, 8 squads, 40 enlisted men, commanded by First Lieut. W. J. Gruschus, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

Third company, First Idaho Volunteer Infantry, 8 squads, 40 enlisted men, commanded by First Lieut. R. H. Hartman, First Idaho Volunteer Infantry.

Fourth company, First Washington Volunteer Infantry, 12 squads, 60 enlisted men, commanded by First Lieut. W. E. Weigle and Second Lieut. R. T. Hazzard, First Washington Volunteer Infantry.

Making a total of 1,509 men.

With the exception of those belonging to the First Washington Volunteer Infantry, sharpshooters will remain for rations with their respective companies, and those detached from the companies not taking part in this expedition will be assigned for rations to companies of their regiments above designated, but will be held under charge of squad leaders and the officers assigned to command them, in readiness to respond promptly to calls for service in their special duties.

The Washington detachment will be equipped as a separate company.

Major Weisenburger, First Washington Volunteer Infantry, is assigned to command the battalion of sharpshooters.

Brig. Gen. Charles King, U. S. V., is assigned to command the forces as thus organized, and will report in person to the major-general commanding the division for detailed instructions.

The Quartermaster and Medical departments and Signal Corps will furnish the necessary personnel and material.

Brigade commanders are charged with the concentration of the troops of their respective commands at a point and time to be designated by telegraph from these headquarters.

No transportation other than by boat will be provided except from camp to place of embarkation. As the journey by boat will probably be made during the night, company commanders will arrange to have coffee made and served during the night or just before landing, which will doubtless occur about daylight or before.

It is the desire of the major-general commanding the division that this expedition have a thorough and complete organization, and to that end the companies will be divided into squads, and a noncommissioned officer as chief will be assigned to the charge of each. This assignment to squads will be made permanent, and the men will remain attached to the squads to which they are assigned, except when changed by direction of the company commander, and the chief of squad will keep in his possession a list of names of the men of his squad, and he shall know at all times the whereabouts of each man and be able to account for them.

In battle the men of each squad will constitute "comrades in battle," and will support and assist each other. In no case will a man be abandoned, except when specially so directed by the company commander in each case. When a member of a squad is killed, wounded, or otherwise disabled, the fact will be immediately reported by the chief of squad to his next superior. In case it becomes necessary to detach individual men from squads, they will be sent in pairs, and the chief of squad will know that all of his men are accounted for.

One of the purposes of this expedition is the fulfillment of a desire and determination of the United States Government to prove to and reassure the Filipinos that a campaign conducted by Americans through a hostile country can and will be prosecuted according to the most generous rules of civilized warfare. To this end General Orders, No. 7, series 1898, and No. 7, current series, these headquarters, and paragraph 2, General Orders, No. 15, current series, headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, will be rigorously enforced.

Capt. F. A. Grant, Utah Volunteer Light Artillery, is assigned to command the gunboats forming a part of this expedition. He will also arrange, prescribe, and superintend the formation of the flotilla and the order of sailing of the same, taking due and proper precautions against accident.

During the absence of the major-general commanding the division on this expedition the line of intrenchments from Pasig to Pasay will be in charge of Brig. Gen. Samuel Ovenshine, U. S. V., commanding Second Brigade, who will assume control of all the troops remaining of the First Division.

By command Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Subsequent to the issue of the above order, verbal instructions were given placing Maj. D. W. Figgins, First Idaho Volunteer Infantry, in command of the designated battalion of that regiment, and detailing First Lieut. E. E. Southern, First Washington Volunteer Infantry, to command the fourth company of sharpshooters, in place of First Lieut. W. E. Weigle, of the same regiment.

Capt. W. W. McCammon, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, commanding that regiment by virtue of seniority, accompanied the Second Battalion of his regiment.

Maj. Herbert Cardwell, division surgeon, U. S. V., as chief surgeon of the division, provided an efficient corps of medical officers and hospital men. (See Appendix 1.) Chinese coolies were supplied for litter bearers, thus increasing the efficiency of the Hospital Corps.

The United States Army gunboats *Laguna de Bay*, *Napindan*, and *Oeste* had been assigned to duty with the expedition.

On the evening of April 7 the following message was sent brigade commanders:

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
April 7, 1899.

BRIGADE COMMANDERS:

The division commander directs that all troops selected for duty with the expeditionary brigade will be reported to Brigadier-General King, at San Pedro Macati, promptly at 4 o'clock p. m. to-morrow, the 8th instant, and will embark immediately.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

About sunset all the troops were embarked on 8 launches, 17 cascos, and 2 bancos, and the journey up the river commenced. Owing to the winding, narrow channel, inexperienced pilots, and frequent grounding of launches and cascos, the journey to the lake consumed the night. Through the indefatigable efforts of Captain Grant (see Appendix 10, p. 46) the entire flotilla was formed at 4 o'clock a. m., and the start up the lake was made (see Appendix 2, p. 43).

At 10.30 a. m. the flotilla assembled off Santa Cruz, and the following plan of attack was communicated to the command:

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS, No. 1.

ON BOARD U. S. LAUNCH MARIA,
Off Santa Cruz, P. I., 10.30 a. m., April 9, 1899.

The gunboat *Laguna de Bay* will take position north and a little east of Santa Cruz, the *Napindan* south of west of the city, the *Oeste* directly in front and opposite wharf of city. The disposition and operations of these gunboats will be under charge of Capt. F. A. Grant, Utah Volunteer Light Artillery.

The sharpshooters under command of Major Weisenburger, First Washington Volunteer Infantry, will land under the guns and opposite the position of the *Napindan*. These troops will be the first to debark. They will be supported and immediately followed by the 2 battalions of the Fourteenth U. S. Infantry. The North Dakotas will land on the left and the Idahos on the right flank of the Fourteenth Infantry, protecting its adjacent flank.

The above embarkation will be under the immediate charge of Brig. Gen. Charles King, U. S. V.

The Fourth Cavalry squadron will be towed to a point near the position assigned the gunboat *Laguna de Bay*, to be debarked at such point, under the protection of that gunboat, as may be determined after the landing of the Fourteenth Infantry battalions has been accomplished.

By command Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

The landing was accomplished with much difficulty, owing to the stiff breeze blowing and consequent rough sea. Many of the men were compelled to wade ashore through water at first shoulder deep.

After landing, the command under Major Weisenburger, the senior officer, advanced a short distance according to plan. Almost immediately a sharp fire was developed on their right. The enemy was routed with loss, leaving 10 dead. Darkness coming on, the troops bivouacked for the night on the lines. (See Appendices 10, p. 46; 14, p. 48; 34, pp. 59.)

Along the north of the city the enemy was in force and well fortified. In view of the near approach of darkness, a landing was not attempted. However, verbal instructions were given and dispositions made for the landing of Gale's squadron and the attack on the north side of the town. (See Appendix 17, p. 50.)

During a personal examination of the condition of the command, made after nightfall, it was ascertained that General King was so seriously ill that he had been unable to land with his command, and that he would probably not be able to participate in any part of the expedition. (See Appendix 5.)

The immediate command of the line was assumed by myself. General King was authorized to return to his headquarters (see Appendix 6), and the next officer in rank, Major Weisenburger, was verbally appointed to command of the provisional brigade.

At daybreak next morning, the 10th instant, the troops were at once put into position, 3 companies on the right of the road leading north toward the town, the remainder extending to the left until the flank rested on the beach. The artillery moved along the road supported

by Company I, First Idaho Volunteer Infantry. The advance toward the city was immediately taken up.

The illness of General King caused much embarrassment, some confusion and delay, but thanks to the energy and efficiency of my staff officers this was soon overcome. To Maj. Clarence R. Edwards, assistant adjutant-general, was intrusted the center of our advancing line, and Maj. Charles G. Starr, inspector-general, conducted the left flank. These gallant officers, fully alive to the responsibilites resting upon them, were equal to the occasion, and no line of battle could have been more courageously or intelligently led, as the results proved. I desire to commend these officers in the highest terms for the gallant work done by them on this occasion. It must be understood that no transportation accompanied the expedition, officers were all on foot and carried on their backs all their supplies and equipments. Still these officers moved from point to point where their presence was required, led in the charge and in the advance over difficult and dangerous places, keeping the line continuous, unbroken, moving continually, driving and destroying the enemy at every point. I especially commend these officers for conspicuous gallantry on this occasion.

To Major Weisenburger I wish to express my appreciation of his valuable services.

More or less opposition was encountered, but when the large bridge crossing the river in the edge of the city was approached the enemy was developed in strong force, entrenched and occupying well-fortified positions. Without hesitation Captain Hasbrouck and his battalion of the Fourteenth Infantry, the Washington sharpshooters, and some of the Idaho battalion charged across the bridge and completely routed the insurgents. At the same time the troops on both sides of the bridge waded rapidly across the river and engaged the enemy at close range, inflicting severe loss. (See Appendices 10, p. 46; 15, p. 49; 34, p. 59.)

Under cover of the fire of the gunboat *Napindan* the cavalry had landed and charged the trenches on the water front, as planned. (See Appendices 10, p. 46; 17, p. 50.) The enemy was driven back out of these trenches into the city against our main line, which, advancing from the south, had just crossed the river and entered the city, as above described. The only means of escape was toward the northeast, in which direction the insurgents fled in great disorder. In doing so they were exposed not only to the fire of our land forces, but also to a very effective fire from the machine guns on the boats. (See Appendices 11, p. 46; 12, p. 48.) Ninety three insurgent dead were picked up on the streets and on the open ground northeast of the city and buried. Thirty of their wounded were captured and taken in hospitals, where 3 shortly afterwards died. Forty-one other prisoners were captured, and, with the exception of a few, were afterwards given their freedom. (See Appendix 10, p. 46.) Many of the dead and wounded of the enemy were undoubtedly carried away by their comrades or escaped discovery in the thickets, where much of the fighting was done, and which also flanked their avenue of escape from the city. Forty-two dead insurgents were subsequently found in those thickets and buried by our troops. (See Appendix 30, p. 57.)

Our casualties were 3 enlisted men, Fourteenth Infantry; 2 enlisted men, First Idaho, and 1 officer and 1 enlisted man, Fourth Cavalry, wounded. None killed, none missing. (See Appendices 15, p. 49; 16, p. 49; 17, p. 50; 34, p. 59.)

The prisoners and wounded of both armies were sent to Manila the night after the battle.

The Hon. H. A. Ramsden, H. B. M. vice-consul at Manila, had presented credentials from the military governor and accompanied the division headquarters from that city. (See Appendix 21.) He participated in the engagement resulting in the occupation of Santa Cruz, and was of great assistance during the entire expedition. His thorough knowledge of the Spanish language and of the characteristics of the natives was of much aid in securing information from captives and friendly Filipinos.

It was learned that, with the exception of the few Chinese shopkeepers whom we found in the city, all the inhabitants had fled to the mountains on the day previous. The provincial governor and commandant of the insurgent forces had also made his escape before we landed. His immediate subordinate in military command, a colonel whose name was not learned, is reported to have died fighting in the trenches south of the city.

Headquarters were established in the governor's palace, and proper disposition was made of the troops for the night.

The following order was issued:

GENERAL FIELD ORDER No. 2. HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, *Santa Cruz, April 10, 1899—2 p. m.*

1. This command, with the exception of the Fourth U. S. Cavalry, will be prepared for marching orders early to-morrow morning. Two days' cooked rations will be taken in haversacks. It is probable that no access to the cascos can be had until the night of the 12th.

2. Major Weisenburger, First Washington Volunteer Infantry, is assigned to the command of the expeditionary brigade.

By command Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Captain Gale, as provost-marshal, with his dismounted squadron as provost guard, protected the houses and such property as were left in the city from injury and removal. No burning of houses or looting of property occurred. (Appendix 8, p. 45.)

The proclamation of the United States commission (see Appendix 36) was freely distributed in the houses of the city, to be found by the inhabitants on their return, and, as opportunity offered, distribution outside our lines was made.

The telegraph line running south from Santa Cruz was destroyed for more than a mile, and so much of it as followed the main road northward was left to be utilized by us on our advance. (See Appendix 10, p. 46.)

From a prisoner it was learned that the steam launches and other water craft in the possession of the insurgents had been concealed in a navigable river near Pagsanjan, an important town about 5 miles northeast of Santa Cruz. It was believed that the remnant of the enemy which escaped from Santa Cruz had fallen back to Pagsanjan. The latter point thus became the next objective, and the following orders were issued:

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS, No. 3. HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES, *Santa Cruz, P. I., April 10, 1899.*

The command will march at 6 a. m. to-morrow, the 11th instant, with two days' cooked rations in haversack. The direction will be toward Pagsanjan. The order of march will be as follows:

Sharpshooters in advance, Fourteenth Infantry, Idaho Volunteer Infantry battalion, and North Dakota Volunteer Infantry battalion. The artillery will march

in rear of the Fourteenth Infantry. The greatest precaution will be observed in the advance. In case the enemy is met, and if it is necessary to deploy the column, the Fourteenth Infantry will deploy to the right and left of the road, center resting on the road. The artillery will form in the center of the Fourteenth Infantry and will be supported by the left company of the right battalion of that regiment. The Idaho battalion will deploy to the right of the Fourteenth Infantry and push well to the front. The North Dakota Volunteer Infantry battalion will deploy to the left of the Fourteenth Infantry, also pushing well to the front.

The effort will be to make a wheel to the right and left, the right wing making a left wheel and the left wing making a right wheel, the idea being to encompass or surround the town.

By command Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Verbal instructions were given for the gunboats to proceed before daybreak to the mouth of the Pagsanjan River and remove the obstructions placed near there by the insurgents. (See Appendix 19, p. 46.) After this was accomplished, the gunboats were to come up the river and cooperate with the land forces, which would leave Santa Cruz shortly after daybreak and move by the main road northeastward toward Pagsanjan. The advance of the gunboats up the river was prevented by the bar which the obstructions had caused across the channel at the mouth of the river. (See Appendix 22, p. 52.)

The movement of the land forces was made as planned, leaving Santa Cruz shortly after daybreak, Captain Gale and his squadron remaining in the city as a garrison.

After advancing along the main road about 2 miles our scouts developed the enemy strongly intrenched across the road and along the adjacent open field. The column promptly deployed and the artillery brought into action, as had been contemplated and directed in General Field Orders, No. 3, given above. The enemy fled precipitately as soon as the artillery opened on them. The insurgent loss was reported as 8 dead; left on the field. Our casualty was First Lieut. E. E. Southern, First Washington, severe wound, right arm. (See Appendixes 23, p. 52; 25, p. 53; 34, p. 59, 61, 69, 89.)

The advance was resumed toward Pagsanjan, and the town occupied without further resistance. (See Appendixes 23, p. 52; 34, p. 59.)

With the exception of 2 Spaniards, who claimed to have escaped from the insurgents, and a few Chinese, the town was entirely deserted.

The steam launches *Oroni* and *El Capitan* and casco *No. 689* were found in the river at the town. The other launches were reported by a prisoner to have been moved farther up the river, and to have on them 2 machine guns. Maj. Clarence R. Edwards, assistant adjutant-general, was sent up the river with the North Dakota battalion to secure these launches and bring them down to the town. This was done without casualty, and to the two launches found at the town were added 4 more, viz, *Cavadonga*, *Nueva Ecija*, *Suerte*, and *Oceania*, also casco *No. 1888*. (See Appendix 34, p. 59.

Companies C and E, Fourteenth Infantry, and the Washington sharpshooters were sent down the south bank of the river to meet the gunboats and assist in removing the obstructions near the mouth of the river. After proceeding about 2 miles they were fired on by insurgents concealed in a church on the north side of the river in the small town Lumban. The river at that point is not fordable, and the ferry had been destroyed before the arrival of our troops, who, being unable to cross the river, engaged the enemy from the south bank. By a well-directed fire the insurgents were dispersed. (See Appendixes

25, p. 53; 34, p. 61, p. 65.) Shortly afterwards the Idahos, who crossed on cascos farther up, arrived and occupied the town. (See Appendixes 23, p. 52; 34, p. 61; 34, p. 67.)

The command on the south bank then continued down the river to the obstructions. (See Appendix 25, p. 53.) Captain Hasbrouck's battalion of the Fourteenth Infantry was sent down to and occupied a position across from Lumban where the main road crossed the river. (See Appendixes 34, p. 61; 34, p. 66.) Company I, Fourteenth Infantry, Lieutenant Field, commanding, remained at Pagsanjan as provost guard. (See Appendix 34, p. 65.)

Meanwhile the gunboats had engaged a force of the enemy at the mouth of the river and routed them. (See Appendix 22.)

The captured launch *Orani* was manned by a soldier crew and ran down the river to a point near the obstructions the night of April 11. On the day following the remainder of the launches and the cascos were brought down under the supervision of Captain Grant. (See Appendix 23, p. 52.) In this work the gunboat *Napindan*, Second Lieut. Thomas Franklin, Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, commanding, rendered great assistance, that gunboat having been able to pass over the bar and come up the river after the obstructions had been removed the morning of the 12th instant.

It was found that there was not sufficient water on the bar to permit the passage of the captured launches into the lake. A dredge was accordingly sent out by order of the department commander. Arriving the 12th instant, it was set to work cutting a channel through the bar. (See Appendixes 23, p. 52; 24, p. 53.)

A ferry having been improvised at Lumban the artillery, sharpshooters, Hasbrouck's battalion of the Fourteenth Infantry, and the First North Dakota were crossed to the north side of the river April 12, and with the First Idaho proceeded to Longos, a lake-side village of some size, without meeting any opposition. (See Appendixes 30, p. 57; 34, p. 61; 34, p. 63; 34, pp. 65, 66.)

Captain Patten's battalion, with the exception of Company D, which acted as support for the artillery, was concentrated at the mouth of the river, where it remained guarding the dredges until the close of the expedition. (See Appendixes 34, p. 61; 34, p. 66.)

With a view to securing a good place to reembark the troops for the movement on Calamba the North Dakota battalion was sent from Longos shortly after noon the 12th instant to reconnoiter the town of Paete, located about 4 miles farther north on the lake shore, where it was reported a good landing place could be found. After advancing about 1 mile the enemy was discovered intrenched across the road, and immediately opened fire from behind almost impenetrable undergrowth on the mountain side. (See Appendixes 34, p. 61; 34, p. 64.) Major Fraine promptly disposed his command to execute a flank movement on the enemy, who were pouring a heavy fire into the advance guard; 4 of them were killed and 3 wounded, one mortally. Of these the latter and 3 killed belonged to a party of 5 flankers who had been sent up the hillside. Their surviving comrade, Private Thomas Sletteland, Company C, First North Dakota, remained with them, and by his cool and unerring aim successfully held the enemy back until reenforcements came. Then, after carrying his wounded comrade to the rear, he assisted in recovering the bodies of the killed. (See Appen-

dixes 27, p. 54; 34, pp. 61, 68.) He has been recommended for a medal of honor.

At the first sound of firing Lieut. William Brooke, Fourth U. S. Infantry (now captain, Thirty-fifth U. S. Volunteer Infantry), aid-de-camp, was sent to ascertain the cause. He reported the engagement of the North Dakotas, and asked for reenforcements. (See Appendixes 26, p. 54; 30, p. 57.)

The artillery, with its support, Company D, Fourteenth Infantry, and the sharpshooters were hastened forward under command of Major Weisenburger. (See Appendixes 30, p. 57; 34, p. 61; 34, pp. 63, 68.)

Boarding the gunboat *Laguna de Bay* a position was secured near the beach from which it was possible to aid the artillery in shelling the enemy. (See Appendix 30, p. 57.)

As our line advanced its flanks were marked by signal flags, carried by Capt. E. A. McKenna and a private, U. S. Volunteer Signal Corps. (See Appendixes 28 and 30, p. 57.)

After an engagement lasting about one hour the enemy was driven up the mountain side and dispersed.

The command then continued to and occupied Paete without further resistance. (See Appendix 34, p. 61.) Here was found a good place for the reembarkation of the troops.

On the 13th instant Captain Hasbrouck's battalion of the Fourteenth Infantry and the First Idahos were brought forward from Longos. (See Appendixes 34, p. 61; 34, p. 66.) Two tugs were asked for to tow back the dredge and such of the captured launches as were unable to go in with their own steam. (See Appendix 30, p. 57.) They were supplied. (See Appendix 32, p. 58.)

It had been a part of the original plan to move by water to a point near Calamba, and there debarking the troops to continue our land operations along the south and west shores of the lake, where many important towns are located. This plan was changed by the department commander April 15, and the expedition ordered to return to Manila. (See Appendix 32.)

On the 16th instant, the last of the launches having been brought into the lake, the troops at Paete, at the mouth of the river, and the garrison at Santa Cruz were reembarked on cascos and returned to San Pedro Macati and Manila (see Appendix 34, pp. 61, 62, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69), arriving the 17th instant.

Appended hereto are copies of brief reports rendered the department commander as opportunity offered for transmission; of reports of subordinate commanders; of correspondence, orders, in fact, every available record pertaining to the expedition.

Attention is invited to final reports of subordinate commanders, which are as a rule so complete and lucid as to merit especial commendation.

Lists of the names of officers considered entitled to brevet commissions "for distinguished conduct and public service in the presence of the enemy" and of enlisted men who are entitled to special consideration, who have been mentioned in this and accompanying reports, are submitted as follows:

List of names of officers of the Army, Regular and Volunteer, considered entitled to brevet commissions "for distinguished conduct and public service in the presence of the enemy," under section 1209, Revised Statutes.

Name.	Rank, regiment, or corps.	Description specific act of gallantry.	Recommendation.
Clarence R. Edwards.	Major, assistant adjutant-general volunteers (captain, Tenth Infantry, U. S. A.).	Battle of Santa Cruz, April 10, 1899: "The illness of General King caused much embarrassment, some delay and confusion, but thanks to the energy and efficiency of my staff officers this was soon overcome. "To Maj. Clarence R. Edwards, assistant adjutant-general, was instrusted the center of our advancing line, and Maj. Charles G. Starr, inspector-general, conducted the left flank. "These gallant officers, fully alive to the responsibilities resting upon them, were equal to the occasion, and no line of battle could have been more courageously or intelligently led, as the results proved. I desire to commend these officers in the highest terms for the gallant work done by them on this occasion. It must be understood that no transportation accompanied the expedition, officers were all on foot and carried on their back all their supplies and equipments. Still these officers moved from point to point where their presence was required, led in the charge and in the advance over difficult and dangerous places, keeping the line continuous, unbroken, moving continually, driving and destroying the enemy at every point. "I especially commend these officers for conspicuous gallantry on this occasion." (See p. 35, report.)	Major, regular service.
Charles G. Starr.....	Major, inspector-general volunteers (captain, First Infantry, U. S. A.).		Do.
J. J. Weisenburger...	Major, First Washington Volunteer Infantry.	Commanding expeditionary brigade, Apr. 9 to 16, both days inclusive. Battle of Santa Cruz, Apr. 10, 1899: "To Major Weisenburger I wish to express my appreciation of his valuable services." (See p. 35, report.) Battle near Paete, Apr. 12, 1899: "The conduct of Major Weisenburger was such as to materially encourage the men." (See Appendix 34*b*, Maj. J. H. Fraine's report, p. 68.)	Lieutenant-colonelcy, volunteers.
J. H. Fraine.....	Major, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.	Commanding battalion First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry on expedition to province of Laguna, Apr. 9 to 16, inclusive. Battle near Paete, Apr. 12: "Maj. J. H. Fraine, of the North Dakota battalion, deserves high praise for the very effective work done by him in the trying ordeal he went through with when his battalion was so fiercely attacked by a concealed foe on the 12th instant." (See Appendix 34, Maj. J. J. Weisenburger's report; Appendix 29, p. 62.)	Do.

List of names of officers of the Army, Regular and Volunteer, considered entitled to brevet commissions, etc.—Continued.

Name.	Rank, regiment, or corps.	Description specific act of gallantry.	Recommendation.
G. H. G. Gale	Captain, Fourth Cavalry.	Battle of Santa Cruz, Apr. 10: "Captain Gale was not only successful in landing his squadron in the face of the insurgent intrenchments, but also contributed no small part to the capture of this town by dislodging the enemy and taking their fortifications on the north." (See Appendix 10, p. 46.)	Major, regular service.
Alfred Hasbrouck, jr.	Captain, Fourteenth Infantry.	Battle of Santa Cruz, April 10: "More or less opposition was encountered, but when the large bridge across the river in the edge of the city was approached the enemy was developed in strong force, intrenched and occupying well-fortified positions. Without hesitation Captain Hasbrouck and his battalion of the Fourteenth Infantry, the Washington Sharpshooters, and some of the Idaho battalion, charged across the bridge and completely routed the insurgents." (See Appendix 10.)	Do.
E. A. McKenna	Captain, Volunteer Signal Corps.	Battle near Paete, April 12: "As our line advanced, its flanks were marked by signal flags, carried by Capt. E. A. McKenna and a private, United States Volunteer Signal Corps." (See Appendix 30.)	Major, volunteers.
William Brooke	First lieutenant, Fourth Infantry. Aid-de-camp. (Now captain, Thirty-fifth Volunteer Infantry.)	Battle near Paete, April 12: "The conduct of officers and men was excellent. The conduct of Lieutenant Brooke was such as to materially encourage the men." (See Appendix 34, Major Fraine's report, p. 68.)	Captain, regular service.
E. E. Southern	First lieutenant, First Washington Volunteer Infantry.	Expedition to province of Laguna, April 9 to 16, both days inclusive: "Lieutenants Southern and Hazzard, of the Washington Sharpshooters, deserve special mention for the manner in which they responded to every call, bringing their men out to the front and aiding and efficiently handling their men so as to fully meet every expectation in the service for which that company was organized. They were always in the front, and notwithstanding the fact that theirs was a most dangerous duty, they handled their men with such skill and efficiency that their casualties were extremely light." (See Appendix 34, Major Weisenburger's report, p. 62.)	Captain, volunteers.
R. T. Hazzard	Second lieutenant, First Washington Volunteer Infantry.		First lieutenant, volunteers.
Le Roy Eltinge	Second lieutenant, Fourth Cavalry.	Battle of Santa Cruz, April 10: "Owing to my being dismounted, I was unable to exercise supervision of the entire line, and I am indebted to Second Lieuts. J. S. Parker and Le Roy Eltinge, of the Fourth U. S. Cavalry, for their intelligent, useful cooperation." (See Appendix 17, Captain Gale's report, p. 50.)	First lieutenant, regular service.
J. S. Parker	Second lieutenant, Fourth Cavalry.		Do.

List of names of officers of the Army, Regular and Volunteer, considered entitled to brevet commissions, etc.—Continued.

Name.	Rank, regiment, or corps.	Description specific act of gallantry.	Recommendation.
F. M. Savage	Second lieutenant, Fifteenth Infantry, commanding Company G, Fourteenth Infantry.	Battle of Santa Cruz, April 10, 1899: "All the officers and men did splendidly; I would especially recommend Second Lieut. F. M. Savage, Fifteenth Infantry, for his gallant conduct in leading his company (G, Fourteenth Infantry) across the bridge at Santa Cruz under a heavy fire." (See Appendix 34, Captain Hasbrouck's report, p. 66.)	First lieutenant, regular service.
W. C. Geiger	Second lieutenant, Fourteenth Infantry, aide to brigade commander.	Expedition to province of Laguna, April 9 to 16, both days inclusive: "In addition to the officers and men specially mentioned for gallant conduct in action by various officers, whose reports are herewith transmitted, I desire to call attention to the very excellent work done by Second Lieut. W. C. Geiger, Fourteenth Infantry. This officer acted in the capacity of aide to the brigade commander after the sharpshooters were returned to their respective companies, and during the entire expedition he was indefatigable in the discharge of that duty, carrying the orders of the brigade commander from one end of the line to the other during the progress of the action before Santa Cruz and during the other operations of the expedition. In the action on the 12th instant, when the North Dakotas were attacked on the road from Longos to Pacte, Lieutenant Geiger was out at the very front, exposed to the full fire of the enemy. He returned to the brigade commander with full information as to the situation, and when the battery arrived on the ground he again exposed himself and assisted the battery in getting into position at the front; and during the whole action his coolness and courage was marked by all the officers of the command." (See Appendix 34, Major Weisenburger's report, p. 62.)	Do.
B. M. Koehler	Second lieutenant, Sixth Artillery.	Expedition to province of Laguna, April 9 to 16, both days inclusive: "Lieut. B. M. Koehler, commanding the battery, also deserves mention for the able and efficient manner in which he handled his battery on all occasions." (See Appendix 34, Major Weisenburger's report, p. 62.)	Do.

List of enlisted men entitled to special consideration.

Name.	Grounds for basing recommendation.	Recommendation.
Sergeant Balch, Troop I, Fourth Cavalry.	Advancing within 30 yards of the enemy by wading river at Santa Cruz and shooting insurgent officer rallying enemy. (Appendix 34, p. 70.)	Recommended for commission in one of the new volunteer regiments. (Commission received in Thirty-seventh Volunteer Infantry.)
Corpl. H. Brand, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.	Remained at point of advance near Paete, April 12, and indicated to battery location of enemy. (Appendix 35, p. 92.)	Special mention in orders.
Corpl. Robert J. Wilson, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.	Swimming river to capture launches near Pagsanjan. (Appendix 35, p. 76.)	Do.
Private A. C. Erickson, Company D, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.	.....do.....	Do.
Private B. Holler, Company I, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.	.....do.....	Do.
Private C. Talley, Company I, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.	.....do.....	Do.
Private J. J. Wampler, Company D, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.	Bravery in engagement near Paete, April 12, 1899. (Appendix 34, p. 68; 35, p. 70.)	Do.
Private Thomas Sletteland, Company C, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.	Bravery in action near Paete, April 12, 1899. (Page 22, report; appendix 34, p. 68.)	Has been recommended for a medal of honor.
Private George Scott, Company A, First Washington Volunteer Infantry.	Bravery in action of Santa Cruz, April 10, and near Paete, April 12. (Appendix 34, p. 69.)	Special mention in orders.
Private F. A. Heiter, Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry.	"Privates Fred A. Heiter, Twentieth Kansas, and Emory S. West, First North Dakota, Volunteer Infantry, should be specially mentioned for intelligent obedience of Captain Grant's orders, being detached from the gunboat as members of the crew of a small boat, indicating channel," etc. (Appendix 10, p. 46.)	Do.
Private E. S. West, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.		

Very respectfully,

H. W. LAWTON,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

Report of an expedition to the provinces of Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, and Pampanga, Luzon, P. I., April 22 to May 30, 1899 (San Isidro or northern expedition), with appendix containing copies of all records pertaining thereto, Maj. Gen. H. W. Lawton, U. S. V., Commanding.

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., September 26, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY, *Washington, D. C.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of an expedition in the provinces of Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, and Pampanga, covering the period April 21 to May 30, 1899.

The object of this expedition was to operate in the country north of Manila, between the mountains on the east and the Rio Grande de Pampanga on the west, with San Miguel as the first objective. It was arranged that the main column should assemble at La Loma Church on the evening of the 21st of April and march to Novaliches the 22d, thence to San Jose the 23d and to Norzagaray the 24th; that a second column under Colonel Summers, of the Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, should march from Bocaue the 23d and join the main column at Norzagaray the 24th. In the meantime General MacArthur was to attack at Calumpit, April 24; carrying that place, he was to proceed northeast and form a junction with this column at or near San Miguel.

The arrival of this column at Norzagaray and on the flank of the enemy on the date fixed for the attack on Calumpit was arranged with

the purpose of attracting the attention of the enemy in that position, and holding as large a force in that vicinity as possible to prevent the reenforcement of Calumpit.

As will be observed from the following report, many changes necessarily occurred in the original plan, and the objective was, after the fall of San Miguel, extended to San Isidoro.

To carry out the verbal instructions received from the department commander, the following orders were issued:

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 20. HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, *Manila, P. I., April 19, 1899.*

The following named troops of this command will hold themselves in readiness to march on receipt of notice:

Twenty-second U. S. Infantry.
Gale's squadron, Fourth U. S. Cavalry (dismounted).
First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.
Two field guns, Scott's battery (D, Sixth Artillery).
Two mountain guns, Hawthorne's separate battery.

The command will be supplied with ten days' rations, and each man will carry on his person 100 rounds of ammunition, and 100 rounds per man will be taken in reserve. The Quartermaster's Department will furnish the necessary transportation. As transportation is very limited, the command must be equipped in the lightest possible marching order. Nothing whatever will be permitted to be transported except rations and ammunition and the least possible equipment for officers. Wagons must be loaded to 3,000 pounds and carts to 1,500 pounds, exclusive of forage taken for the animals.

The chief quartermaster of the division will temporarily perform the duties of chief commissary of subsistence.

The teams on the march will be under the control of the chief quartermaster and will march in rear of the command in the order which the troops are marched.

The regimental and battalion trains will be in charge of the regimental and battalion quartermasters, or, in case there is no such officer, then a suitable and competent sergeant, who will report to and be under the direction of the chief quartermaster on the march.

Capt. G. H. G. Gale, Fourth U. S. Cavalry, is announced as provost-marshal of the expedition, and his squadron will form the provost guard. Straggling, looting, pillaging, burning, or the commission of any unlawful excesses on the part of any member of this command is prohibited, and the provost-marshal will exert himself to prevent the same.

The officers representing the various staff corps on duty at these headquarters will be held responsible that their respective departments are properly equipped and provided for any emergency that may arise on this expedition.

The inspector-general will ascertain by personal investigation that the command is properly equipped and supplied as contemplated in this order.

Communication will be maintained with this command on this expedition by field telegraph. Capt. E. A. McKenna, U. S. Volunteer Signal Corps, who has been acting as chief signal officer of this division, will take the necessary steps to accomplish this object.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

In addition to those mentioned in the above order, the following-named organizations were detached from the Second Division for duty with the expedition: Two battalions (Companies F, G, H, M, and A, C, K, L), Third U. S. Infantry; 2 battalions (Companies A, B, I, L, and F, G, K), Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry; 2 battalions (Companies G, K, L, M, and C, D, E, H), Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry; Troop I, Fourth U. S. Cavalry (mounted), and 1 gun, Utah Volunteer Light Artillery. The battalions of the Third Infantry were camped north of this city near La Loma Church; the other organizations were farther north and in the vicinity of the railway.

It was arranged by the department commander that, with the exception of the battalions of the Third Infantry, the troops from the

Second Division would concentrate at Bocaue, and, marching via Santa Maria, make a junction with the main column at or near Norzagaray. Maj. C. G. Starr, inspector-general, U. S. V., was sent, April 21, to Bocaue to conduct that column.

At 5 o'clock p. m., April 21, 1899, the troops mentioned in General Orders, No. 20, current series, these headquarters, given above, were concentrated near La Loma Church, about 4 miles north of Manila, in obedience to verbal instructions conveyed by staff officers, and bivouacked for the night.

The battalions of the Third Infantry, Capt. J. W. Hannay, of that regiment, commanding, were encamped about a mile distant. Captain Hannay reported his command for duty with the expedition, and received verbal instructions to join the column directed to march next morning, as indicated in the following order:

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS, No. 1. HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, *In the field, near La Loma Church, Manila, April 21, 1899.*

This command will march at 5 o'clock to-morrow morning, the 22d instant, in the following order:

First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, which will constitute the advance guard of this command.

Hawthorne's separate mountain battery.

Twenty-second U. S. Infantry.

Third U. S. Infantry.

Scott's platoon, Dyer's battery.

Gale's squadron, Fourth U. S. Cavalry, which will constitute the rear guard of this command.

The trains will form on the road in the above order, as indicated in General Orders, No. 20, current series, these headquarters under the charge of the chief quartermaster. The rear guard will march in rear of the wagon trains.

No one, other than those authorized, will march with the trains. These authorized persons will be provided with written authority approved by the commanding officer of their regiment.

Under no circumstances will any person be permitted to ride on wagons or carts.

Ambulances will march in rear of troops just in advance of the wagon train.

Proper and suitable dispositions will be made by the commanders of advance guards to insure the safety of the command on the march. In column the sharpshooters will be held in readiness to be instantly deployed on either flank in case of attack or alarm.

The march will be in the direction of Novaliches. A staff officer will accompany the advance guard to indicate the road.

The Signal Corps detachment will operate under the instructions of the chief signal officer.

The principles set forth above will obtain on the march until further orders. With the exception of the artillery, which will retain its relative position in column, organizations will advance in column daily, the advance guard of one day forming the rear guard of the day following.

By command of Major-General Lawton.

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

As reported by their respective commanding officers, the effective strength of the several organizations forming the command at La Loma was as follows:

	Officers.	Men.
Third U. S. Infantry (8 companies)	17	683
Twenty-second U. S. Infantry	22	945
Squadron Fourth U. S. Cavalry	3	218
North Dakota Volunteer Infantry (8 companies)	22	453
Scott's platoon (D, Sixth Artillery)	1	32
Hawthorne's separate mountain battery	1	23
Total	66	2,354

At 5 o'clock a. m., April 22, the column formed and marched northward toward Novaliches.

After proceeding about 6 miles a small force of the enemy was encountered. But little resistance was met, the enemy falling back rapidly on the deployment of the first five companies of the North Dakotas. After driving the enemy for about a mile, column was reformed and the march continued. (Appendix, p. 128.)

The enemy in greater force was developed about a mile farther on, meeting our advance with a determined resistance, pouring in a fire from both sides of the road. Four companies of the North Dakotas were deployed and brought into action, routing the insurgents, who were driven back about 2 miles across the Rio de Tulihan and through Novaliches, which was occupied by our troops about 10 a. m.

Our casualties were 2 enlisted men, First North Dakotas, wounded, and several cases of heat prostration. (Appendix, p. 129.)

Considerable difficulty was experienced in crossing the transportation over the river, the north bank of which is solid rock through which no suitable approach to the ford for wagons had ever been constructed.

During the afternoon the pickets of the Twenty-second Infantry on the northeast side of the village were fired on by the enemy, who was intrenched on a hillside near the San Mateo road, about 1,700 yards distant. (Appendix, p. 129.) Scott's artillery platoon was brought into position, and with shell and shrapnel temporarily silenced the enemy (Appendix, p. 130), scattering shots continuing throughout the night.

An ambulance had been telegraphed for to take in the wounded men whose condition was so serious as to prevent their continuing with the expedition. (Appendix, pp. 129, 130.) It arrived about midnight and immediately returned to Manila, reaching there next morning without incident. (Appendix, p. 131.)

It seemed probable that the insurgents who had moved off to the northeast would close in behind us on our advance to the northward next morning and destroy our telegraph line. An additional supply of ammunition would be needed if continued opposition was met along the line of march. Both of these matters were brought to the attention of the department commander, and information received that a detachment would be sent to keep up the telegraph line as long as possible and that additional ammunition would be supplied in a few days. (Appendix, pp. 129, 131.)

The town being entirely deserted by the inhabitants, the troops occupied nipa huts as quarters for the night. Everything of value, including rice and other provisions, had been removed before the arrival of our troops.

At 5 o'clock next morning, the 23d instant, the command was again on the move northward, San Jose being the objective point.

Telegraphic instructions were sent Major Starr, at Bocaue, to push his cavalry forward and open communication with the main column when near Norzagaray. (Appendix, p. 130.)

On leaving Novaliches the road which up to that village had been, with the exception of the approaches to the ford, passable for wagons and carts, now became a mere footpath. Great difficulty was experienced in moving the wagon train, the "road" leading over a succession of hills and through deep valleys. On the former the troops

and animals were exposed to the burning rays of the sun and in the latter they labored through jungle and mud holes. The trail was rough, and the heat so intense it was necessary to unhitch the carabao on many of the divides and lead them down to the water holes to soak for half an hour, thus greatly impeding the progress of the train. (Appendix, pp. 130, 131, 132, 133).

Headquarters Third and Twenty-second regiments of infantry and Scott's artillery platoon reached the ford crossing the Pasunkambor River, about 2 miles south of San Jose, at 3.30 o'clock p. m., and rested for the night.

The squadron Fourth Cavalry, Hawthorne's battery, and the North Dakotas, with the wagon train, went into camp about 4 miles in rear; the men and animals being almost completely exhausted. The advance during the day had been without contact with the enemy.

Early next morning, April 24, the Twenty-Second Infantry and Scott's artillery platoon were sent forward, accompanied by Capt. W. E. Birkhimer, of the division staff, to reconnoiter the town of San Jose. None of the enemy was encountered and the town was occupied about 8 o'clock a. m. (Appendix, p. 131.)

The Third United States Infantry was posted at the approaches to the ford, where the advance portion of the column had rested the night before, to protect the passage of the transportation.

The remainder of the command, with the wagon train, resumed the advance toward the river. The same conditions (or worse, if possible) as on the day previous continued to impede the progress of the wagon train. Captain Gale, with his dismounted squadron of the Fourth Cavalry, furnished the advance guard and convoy of the train, and with his entire command rendered valuable aid assisting in building bridges and making roads. Lieutenant Hawthorne, with his mountain battery detachment, Major George Penrose and Lieutenant Kemp, of the Medical Corps, with their hospital squads and Chinese litter bearers, lent willing hands to overcome what frequently appeared insurmountable obstacles to further progress. But of the North Dakotas, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Treumann, it is desired to express special appreciation. They exchanged their well-performed duties of advance guard of the day before for the laborious ones of rear guard of the two days necessary to reach Norzagaray. This regiment had orders to leave nothing behind, and literally carried transportation over bad places and put squads of men in the shafts to replace worn out and dead bulls. Every service—even to the use of pick and shovel—was performed by each, from the colonel down to the private, with the same commendable earnestness that has given this regiment its reputation for cheerful and effective accomplishment of any task set it. (Appendix, pp. 131, 132.)

About 1 o'clock p. m., April 24, Lieutenant Boyd with his mounted Troop I, Fourth Cavalry, reached San Jose, bringing information of the arrival of the Bocaue column, under Colonel Summers, at Norzagaray; returning to Norzagaray with his troop the same day. (Appendix, p. 131.)

The wagon train of the main column arrived at San Jose during the night. Both men and animals completely worn out. (Appendix, pp. 131, 132.)

For the movement on the morning of April 25 the following instructions were given:

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
San Jose, Luzon, April 24, 1899.

MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR.

The command will be prepared to march as usual to-morrow, the 25th instant, as soon as it is practicable to get the transportation on the road. Each separate command will be accompanied by its transportation and is charged with the assistance and safe conduct of the same.

Captain Gale's squadron of the Fourth Cavalry will accompany the commanding general as escort. With the above exception, the command will move out in the following order:

Third U. S. Infantry, advance guard.
Hawthorne's mountain battery.
First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.
Scott's artillery platoon.
Ambulances.
Twenty-second Infantry, rear guard.
Transportation will be carefully inspected and loads reduced to the minimum.
By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

As directed, the column resumed the advance in the morning at the usual hour. The commanding general and staff, accompanied by Troop L, Fourth Cavalry, as escort, moved out without waiting for the column, headquarters arriving at Norzagaray about 12.30 p. m. without incident, the escort coming in about an hour later. (Appendix, p. 132.)

Colonel Summers reported that his column had left Bocaue April 23; that soon after crossing the Rio Guyon at 2.45 p. m. the enemy was encountered by the cavalry, which was in advance; a battalion of the Oregons was deployed and the advance continued, meeting with but slight resistance until the bluffs overlooking Norzagaray were reached; here 2 battalions and the cavalry engaged the enemy until darkness came on, when they rested for the night. On the following morning the enemy was driven out of Norzagaray and across the river, the town being occupied about 7 a. m.

Our casualties: Three enlisted men, Thirteenth Minnesota, and 1 enlisted man, Fourth Cavalry, wounded; 1 horse killed. (Appendix, pp. 132, 133.) He had then sent a battalion of the Thirteenth Minnesota down the river toward Angat to reconnoiter the road in that direction. (Appendix, p. 133.) Captain Heath's battalion, Second Oregon, and Troop I, Fourth U. S. Cavalry, were sent toward San Jose to open communication with the main column. (Appendix, p. 134.)

Major Eastwick's battalion of the Second Oregon, Captain Spear's battalion of the Thirteenth Minnesota, and detachment of Utah Volunteer Light Artillery left Norzagaray about 6 o'clock the morning of the 25th and advanced toward Angat. The enemy was encountered in considerable force. After a spirited engagement, during which the artillery was brought into action, the insurgents evacuated the town and took up a position across the river, the fire from which was silenced; a portion of the town was burned, and the troops returned to Norzagaray. Casualties: One enlisted man, Thirteenth Minnesota, wounded. (Appendix, pp. 136, 142.)

While the engagement at Angat was in progress troops in camp at Norzagaray were fired on by the enemy from across the river; this

kept up for some time, but was finally silenced. (Appendix, pp. 136, 138.)

The effective strength of the Bocaue column was as follows:

	Officers.	Men.
Troop I, Fourth Cavalry	1	63
Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry	24	561
Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry	25	490
Detachment Utah Volunteer Light Artillery		15
Total	50	1,129

which, with the main column, gave a grand total of 116 officers and 4,473 men.

April 26 the Third and Twenty-second Infantry, the First North Dakota, and Hawthorne's mountain battery were put into camp at Angat. (Appendix, p. 136.)

The following orders were issued reorganizing the troops from the Second Division (Bocaue column):

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS, No. 2. HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, *Norzagaray, Luzon, April 26, 1899.*

(1) The First and Second battalions, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, and the Second and Third battalions, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, having reported at these headquarters in obedience to Field Orders, No. 21, Headquarters Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, April 20, 1899, are constituted a provisional brigade.

(2) Colonel Summers, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, is assigned to command the provisional brigade, constituted in the preceding paragraph.

(3) Troop I, Fourth U. S. Cavalry, having reported at these headquarters in compliance with verbal instructions from the commanding general Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, will report for duty under the immediate direction of the division commander.

(4) The section of the Utah Volunteer light artillery which reported at these headquarters in compliance with verbal instructions from the commanding general Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, is attached to Scott's platoon, Battery D, Sixth Artillery. The section commander will accordingly report without delay.

(5) Commanding officers will frequently inspect their transportation and keep the loads at the minimum.

(6) In view of the small amount of ammunition with the command, every precaution will be taken to prevent its unnecessary use.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

April 26 the mounted troop was sent on reconnoissance along the west bank of river, and about 2 miles west from Angat, toward Marunco, encountered the enemy in force, reported to be about 500, 200 being actually counted by Captain Birkhimer, of the division staff. (Appendix, p. 133.) At the same time one battalion of the Oregons under Major Eastwick forded the river just above Norzagaray and drove the enemy from the country opposite Marunco. Major Eastwick reported an insurgent loss of 6 or 7 killed and 9 prisoners captured. (Appendix, pp. 138, 142, 149.)

On the morning of April 27 the troops at Norzagaray, with the exception of Troop I, Fourth Cavalry, moved down the left bank of the river to Angat and went into camp at that point, except Colonel Summers's brigade, which continued down the river and went into camp at Marunco. (Appendix, p. 142.)

On the report of Lieutenant Boyd that the enemy was trying to cross the river at Norzagaray, 2 companies of the Twenty-second Infantry were sent from Angat to that point April 27. (Appendix, pp. 140, 189, 190, 192.)

April 28, Capt. J. F. Case, acting engineer officer of the expedition (Appendix, p. 142), escorted by one battalion each of the Oregon and Minnesota regiments, commanded by Major Diggles, made a reconnoissance north from Angat for the purpose of locating any roads or trails leading in that direction. The enemy was developed in small force, but was soon dispersed by a flank movement. The party then returned to Marunco, having failed to find a road of any description other than a narrow sled path. (Appendix, p. 142.)

Telegraphic communication was established with Manila, via Bocaue, April 28, and the occupation of Marunco reported to the adjutant-general of the department, as was also a contemplated movement on San Rafael, to take place the day following. (Appendix, p. 144.) For this movement two columns were organized: One, consisting of the Provisional Brigade and Hawthorne's mountain battery, under command of Colonel Summers, to move down the right bank of the river and occupy San Rafael; (Appendix, p. 144); the other, consisting of the First North Dakota, Third United States Infantry, and Scott's artillery platoon, to move down the left bank, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Treumann, to support Colonel Summers. (Appendix, p. 144.) Early next morning, April 29, instructions were given for this movement as indicated (Appendix, p. 145); and at 4.33 a. m. the adjutant-general of the department was informed that the movement on San Rafael had commenced; that if hostilities were to cease telegraphic notice should be given at once. (Appendix, p. 145.)

The troops which did not participate in the movement on San Rafael remained at their camps at Angat and Norzagaray, under the command of Maj. L. Parker, Twenty-second Infantry. (Appendix, p. 147.) The transportation of the participating organizations was left behind with suitable guard detachments in readiness to be promptly brought forward if ordered. (Appendix, p. 146.)

After waiting a reasonable time for instructions from department headquarters, the division commander and staff proceeded down the left bank of the river and joined Colonel Treumann's column, which, later, developed the enemy, estimated to be about 300 strong, just before reaching a point opposite San Rafael. (Appendix, p. 148.) After about one hour's spirited engagement, during which the enemy had been driven some distance, telegraphic instructions were received from the department commander that the command remain at Angat until it receive its supplies. (Appendix, p. 147.) This telegram had been received at Angat at 9.08 a. m. and hurriedly brought forward by mounted courier. Reply was immediately sent that the intention to move on San Rafael had been telegraphed the night before; that notice of the commencement of the movement had been given that morning; that the command would return to Angat as directed; and that the possibility of encamping our advance near San Rafael had been considered. A brief account of the operations of the morning was also given. (Appendix, p. 147.) Verbal instructions for the return to Angat were at once given Lieutenant-Colonel Treumann and sent Colonel Summers, of whom nothing had as yet been heard. The

former had dispersed the enemy, inflicting some loss, although but 1 killed fell into our hands, with him his rifle and 86 rounds of ammunition. Our casualties were Second Lieut. C. C. Todd, Third Infantry, slight gunshot wound, right thigh; 2 enlisted men, Third Infantry, and 1 First North Dakota, wounded, the latter seriously. (Appendix, p. 148.)

Colonel Summers's column on the right bank of the river had advanced to and occupied San Rafael without meeting opposition. (Appendix, p. 147.) As ordered, this command, as well as that which had driven the enemy down the left bank, returned to the camps of the night previous (Appendix, p. 148), necessarily permitting the enemy to reoccupy San Rafael should he so desire.

During the morning of April 29 a telegram was received from the adjutant-general of the department informing that rations would be sent from Bocaue Sunday morning, April 30; that representatives of the insurgent army were in Manila, and that everything would "be peaceful, at least while they are in our lines;" also, that the orders to advance on San Miguel might be changed. (Appendix, pp. 146, 148.) Reply was made that rations would be received at Angat, and receipt of information concerning peaceful conditions and possible change of objective acknowledged. (Appendix, p. 148.)

Later in the day, after the return of all of the troops to their original positions, a telegram was received from the adjutant-general of the department, stating that it was not necessary the "entire force should return, but sufficient of it to insure safety of train" and return of escort from Angat; that the armistice requested by the insurgents had not been granted; and that on moving, our next objective would be Baliuag, "where a considerable force" of the enemy was reported to be. (Appendix, p. 148.)

With the exception of the escort and wagons which were sent to Bocaue to bring up supplies (Appendix, p. 147), the command remained in camp, the Provisional Brigade at Marunco, near Angat; Troop I, Fourth Cavalry, at Norzagaray, headquarters; and the remainder of the expedition at Angat, April 30.

A detachment of scouts was organized consisting of 25 specially qualified enlisted men, selected from organizations in the command (Appendix, p. 150), and an experienced civilian scout (Mr. W. H. Young) was employed as chief scout (Appendix, p. 149) and placed in charge (Appendix, p. 153).

On the morning of May 1, Troop I, Fourth United States Cavalry, was ordered to join the command at Angat (Appendix, p. 151), and, with a view to resuming the forward movement at the earliest possible moment, the following orders were issued:

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS, } HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
No. 4. } *In the Field, Angat, Luzon, May 1, 1899.*

If practicable, this command will move to-day as soon as the issue of rations is completed.

The order of march will be as follows:

Provisional Brigade (Colonel Summers commanding);

Gale's squadron, Fourth U. S. Cavalry;

Mounted troop of cavalry; and

Scott's battery will cross the river at a suitable ford and proceed, if possible, down the north bank to San Rafael, where they will encamp for the night.

The commanding officer Third Infantry will report his command to Colonel Summers and march under his instructions.

The mounted troop will accompany the major-general commanding.

The issue of rations will be made to Colonel Summers's column first, to enable it to commence the crossing as soon as possible of its transportation.

The First North Dakota, Twenty-second Infantry, and Hawthorne's battery will proceed down the south bank of the river under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Treumann (the commanding officer Twenty-second Infantry and battery reporting to Lieutenant-Colonel Truemann) to a point near or beyond where the last skirmish occurred. Maj. C. C. Starr, inspector-general, will accompany this column, representing the major-general.

A detachment of mounted cavalry will report to Major Starr to be used in maintaining communication with the column on the north bank.

A party of scouts specially detailed from these headquarters will precede each column to the point indicated; but this will not relieve the commanding officer of each column from the responsibility for the proper precaution on the march.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Colonel Summers was directed to send to Angat at once for rations, and to then commence crossing the river. Before noon his command was moving across and down the river (Appendix, pp. 149, 153); and by 3 p. m. Lieutenant Colonel Treumann's command had received its rations and was advancing down the left or south bank of the river as ordered. (Appendix, p. 154.)

About 2 miles below the Marunco Ford Colonel Summers's scouts and advance guard were fired on by sharpshooters, who were speedily dislodged and silenced. (Appendix, p. 156.) When within a mile and a quarter of San Rafael, 2 of the scouts developed a force of the enemy about 200 strong, which they drove back toward the main body on a ridge to the right and rear of the town (Appendix, p. 156), and held them in check until Lieutenant-Colonel Yoran came up with 2 battalions of the Second Oregon and forced the enemy back through the town, across the river, and into the jungle on the opposite bank. The remainder of Colonel Summers's column continued on the road along the river and entered the town about the same time as Lieutenant-Colonel Yoran's detachment. The enemy opened a heavy fire on the town from the thickets across the river; Scott's artillery was brought into position by the division commander, within easy rifle range, and by a well-directed fire dispersed the enemy, the column on the south bank cooperating. Our casualties were: 1 enlisted man, Thirteenth Minnesota, killed; 1 enlisted man, Light Battery D, Sixth Artillery, and 3 enlisted men, Second Oregon, wounded. (Appendix, pp. 156, 157.) The enemy, whose strength was estimated at 1,000, must have suffered many casualties although none fell into our hands. (Appendix, p. 157.)

The troops on the right bank of the river rested in the town that night; the other column bivouacked on the opposite side of the river. The adjutant-general of the corps was informed by telegraph of the result of the day's operations; that the forward movement would be resumed at 5 o'clock next morning (May 2), and that resistance was expected from there on. (Appendix, p. 157.)

Both columns took up the advance down the river next morning as planned, the column marching along the left bank under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Treumann meeting opposition about 1 mile above Bustos, drove the enemy, and occupied the town without casualty (Appendix, p. 157); shortly afterwards the scouts crossed the river to Baliuag and announced their arrival by ringing the cathedral bells at 12 noon. (Appendix, pp. 156 and 157.)

The command on the right bank, under Colonel Summers, met the

enemy about 2 miles out from San Rafael, skirmished, driving them for more than 2 miles, when both troops and noncombatants were seen fleeing in great confusion along the road to San Miguel and other roads to the west and northwest. Owing to the great number of women and children, and what appeared to be wounded men being carried on litters, our fire ceased and a flag of truce was sent out, hoping it might assure them of safety. Capt. J. F. Case, of the division staff, Sergt. Maj. J. W. Marshall, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, and Private Edmund Schuteharts, jr., Company A, First Idaho Volunteer Infantry, flag orderly, conducted the flag toward these people until when within 500 yards the detachment was fired upon and returned to our lines. (Appendix, pp. 146, 157, 158, 161.) Colonel Summers's command was then deployed and an effort made to surround and cut off the fugitives, but they scattered in the wildest confusion. (Appendix, p. 157.) Captain Gale was sent with his dismounted squadron and mounted troop along the San Miguel road for the purpose of cutting off those who were attempting to escape in that direction. After proceeding about 3 miles the enemy opened fire from the front; 2 troops were deployed and moved forward rapidly on either side of the road, skirmishing with what seemed to be the rear guard of the enemy, until 35 of our men fell from heat exhaustion, 8 of them in a comatose condition. The pursuit was discontinued, and the command proceeded 'cross country to the left and entered Baliuag from the north without further incident.

In the operations of May 2, during which Gen. Gregorio del Pilar's division was routed and the important cities of Baliuag and Bustos occupied by our forces, the column on both sides of the river were engaged, yet our casualties were only 2 enlisted men, Third Infantry, wounded. (Appendix, p. 157.)

The effective work of the scouts since their organization was reported to the adjutant-general of the department, as well as the intention to send them to look up the enemy above mentioned as engaged in "concentrating storehouses." Also, permission was requested to send Colonel Summers forward on the San Miguel road to the Maasin River crossing that night or the following morning. The exaggerated strength of the enemy was pointed out, as well as his demoralized and disintegrating condition and failure, thus far, to offer determined or effective resistance. The impracticability of the country for vehicles off the roads on account of the daily rains was also reported. (Appendix, pp. 157 and 164.)

In reply authority was given to send Colonel Summers forward as proposed, provided he was "strong enough to take care of himself," and instructions were given to search for and destroy subsistence stores which the enemy was sending into the Maasin country. (Appendix, pp. 164, 166.)

Accordingly the following orders were issued;

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS, } HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
No. 5. } *In the field, Baliuag, Luzon, May 3, 1899.*

The following named troops, fully equipped, under command of Col. Owen Summers, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, will proceed as early as practicable to-morrow morning, the 4th instant, on the San Miguel road as far as Maasin and occupy that town:

Provisional brigade.

Third U. S. Infantry (First and Second Battalions) and the section Utah Volunteer Light Artillery.

The artillery and infantry organizations will be immediately reported to Colonel Summers by their respective commanding officers.

The chief signal officer will make the necessary arrangements for telegraphic communication with this column.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, Luzon, May 3, 1899.

Col. OWEN SUMMERS,
Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, Commanding Expedition to Maasin.

COLONEL: With reference to General Field Orders, No. 5, current series, these headquarters, the major-general commanding directs me to inform you the corps commander is assured that subsistence belonging to the insurgent army is being sent into the country of Maasin for future use. You will let scouting parties, of sufficient size to insure safety, find and destroy subsistence belonging to insurgent army, respecting private property and reporting amount destroyed.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Telegraphic communication, via Quingua and Malolos, was now established, and, in compliance with telegraphic instructions from department headquarters (Appendix, p. 162), a company of infantry was sent to the former place for the purpose set forth in the following orders:

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS, No. 6. HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 4, 1899.

One company of the Twenty-second U. S. Infantry, to be designated by the commanding officer of that regiment, will this morning proceed to and occupy the town of Quingua.

The commanding officer of that company, upon arrival at that point, is charged with keeping open the road from this town and preventing interference with the railroad from the north.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

The detachment of scouts which had been sent out on the San Miguel road encountered the enemy, at least 200 strong, about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, some 3 miles out from Baliuag. They attacked and routed the enemy, and the mounted troop, which had been sent out as reenforcement, took up the pursuit, which continued until darkness came on. There were no casualties on our side. (Appendix, p. 164.)

Colonel Summers, with his provisional brigade, the two battalions Third Infantry, and the Utah gun, left Baliuag en route to Maasin early May 4. (Appendix, pp. 161 and 167.) No opposition was met until the advance arrived at the river opposite Maasin, when the enemy, about 400 strong, opened fire from intrenchments on the Maasin side of the river. Colonel Summers deployed his command, crossed the river under fire, charged and carried the intrenchments and drove the enemy beyond the town, which he occupied. Our casualties were Capt. P. S. Heath, Second Oregon, slight wound of leg, and 2 enlisted men, Thirteenth Minnesota, severely wounded. The enemy left 4 killed on the field. (Appendix, pp. 167, 187.)

The scouts were sent out in the afternoon with instructions to find and destroy all supplies of the enemy in the country to the northeast between San Rafael road and Maasin River. They were cautioned to respect the persons and property of noncombatants, to conceal their

movements as much as possible, and avoid assuming the offensive against the enemy. (Appendix, pp. 166 and 167.) Troop I, Fourth Cavalry, was sent up the river toward the foothills of the mountains with verbal instructions to the same effect.

During the day, May 4, the wagon train left for Malolos to bring out supplies which would arrive there the day following; it was accompanied by the sick and wounded in ambulances. (Appendix, pp. 166, 176, 177.)

Much annoyance was caused by the Chinese coolies, furnished by the quartermaster department as litter bearers and laborers, wandering from the organizations to which they were attached and committing many minor depredations, necessitating the issue of the following orders:

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS, No. 7. } HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, *In the Field, Baliuag, May 4, 1899.*

Hereafter each Chinese cooly with this command will be required to wear upon his hat, or other conspicuous part of his clothing, a tag which will be legibly marked in English the name of the organization to which the wearer is assigned or belongs.

Commencing to-morrow, the 5th instant, all such camp followers found without the identification tag above required will be arrested and turned over to the provost guard.

No cooly wearing such an identification tag will be required to perform labor for individuals or organizations than that to which he is assigned or belongs, and no unauthorized person will, in any way, interfere with any Chinaman not misconducting himself.

Commanding officers of organizations are charged with the prompt execution of the above orders, and will be held strictly accountable for the conduct of the coolies assigned or belonging to their respective commands.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Large quantities of rice and sugar were found in Baliuag, much of it in storehouses said to belong to the enemy. (Appendix, pp. 165, 169.) A conservative estimate of the contents of storehouses not manifestly private was no less than 150,000 bushels of rice and 265 tons of sugar, which, with the quantities not included, but none the less available, would undoubtedly be sufficient to subsist all troops of the enemy for at least six months. (Appendix, p. 170.) A large storehouse of the tax collector was opened and the contents issued to the natives, who claimed to have been robbed of their rice by the insurgents and were now in a famishing condition. (Appendix, p. 170.) Under the careful supervision of the provost-marshal this distribution was continued at the suggestion of the department commander to families residing at Baliuag and vicinity. (Appendix, p. 169.)

Telegraphic information was received from the palace (department headquarters) May 6 that it was reported Generals Geronimo, who had 3,000 troops in the vicinity of San Mateo, and Pio del Pilar, with about 2,000 in and around Antipolo, had received instructions from Aguinaldo to proceed with their united forces by a mountain road to Norzagaray, thence via Angat, San Rafael, and Bustos, for the purpose of cutting off our lines of communication and supplies, which was supposed to be by Angat, then to attack our flank. Caution was made to watch well by scouting parties the country to the east. (Appendix, pp. 161, 178.) Reply was immediately made that the company of North Dakotas escorting the party taking up telegraph line via Angat would be warned to watch for the enemy; that the mounted troop now east of

San Rafael and Maasin would be pushed farther east, and that Colonel Summers, at Maasin, would be notified to watch the enemy's movements (Appendix, pp. 178, 187), and later that the mounted troop would be on the hills southeast of Norzagaray, where the country could be observed for miles; also that three companies would be at San Rafael next morning. The department commander's views as to the situation and wishes regarding movement of the expedition were requested, as well as permission to have Colonel Summers drive the enemy from San Ildefonso, and threaten San Miguel. (Appendix, p. 179.) To this the adjutant-general of the department replied that it was "not prudent to advance Summers north until the reported movement of insurgents from south develops," and that his command should be held in readiness to unite with the troops at Baliuag to crush the enemy should he appear in force. (Appendix, p. 180.)

Since the occupation of Baliuag by our forces large numbers of the inhabitants had returned, and on May 6 verbal permission was given them to hold a meeting in the public square, or plaza, for the purpose of electing a capitan municipal, or mayor, to administer the civil affairs of the town and represent its interest in connection with the military forces occupying it. The result of this election was announced in the following orders, which were published in English, Spanish, and Tagalog:

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS, No. 8. } HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, *In the field, Baliuag, May 7, 1899.*

For the purpose of official and just representation of the inhabitants of this town with the military authorities, as well as for temporary convenience in restoring and maintaining order among the former, the citizens were authorized to meet and elect a mayor (capitan municipal). The result of such meeting has been the election of Señor Francisco Guerrero, who is therefore announced as mayor, and authorized to select a council and such other assistants or officers as may be necessary to properly administer municipal affairs. He will be accordingly respected and obeyed.

The United States will in no way be held accountable or responsible for any salaries or compensation.

By command of Major-General Lawton. CLARENCE R. EDWARDS, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

This mayor of Baliuag was the first native official, by virtue of election by his peers, holding office in these islands under the jurisdiction of the United States.

While the command was held waiting for the movement of the enemy from the south to develop (Appendix, p. 167) preparations were made for the advance toward San Miguel. It was learned by reconnoissance that the enemy, when driven out of Maasin, had fallen back to San Ildefonso and was intrenching along a ridge about 1,800 yards south of that town. (Appendix, pp. 175, 181, 190.) The engineer officer went to Maasin on May 8, and with one company each from the Minnesotas and Oregons reconnoitered and sketched the enemy's position. (Appendix, pp. 187, 191.) During the reconnoissance Maj. A. M. Diggles, Thirteenth Minnesota, was mortally wounded. (Appendix, pp. 187 and 191.) Nothing remained to be done by the force at Maasin beyond keeping the enemy well under observation and the command in readiness to attack when ordered until authority to advancecould be obtained from department headquarters. (Appendix, p. 192.)

Parties sent out from Maasin and the scouts found and destroyed more than 100,000 bushels of rice, large quantities of corn and sugar, also reloading tools and uniforms. (Appendix, pp. 175, 201, 202.)

Early May 9 Capt. H. C. Hodges, with Companies B, C, H, and L, Twenty-second Infantry, made a reconnoissance along the roads leading from Baliuag toward San Luis and Candaba without finding any signs of the enemy, all natives seeming to be engaged in peaceful pursuits. (Appendix, pp. 192 and 193.)

In a telegram to the adjutant-general of the department on the morning of May 9 it was suggested that the scouting east of Norzagaray would clear up the situation in that direction, and permission was asked to call in the troops which had been engaged the last three days in a fruitless search for the Antipolo and San Mateo columns, stating that the expedition would "then be ready to move immediately in any direction." (Appendix, p. 189.) To this reply was received authorizing the withdrawal of the scouting parties, but making no reference to the implied request for orders to advance (Appendix, p. 189), the remark in a telegram of the day previous, "You will hardly be able to make any decided move until MacArthur gets in condition" (Appendix, p. 188), remaining the latest from department headquarters on this most interesting subject. Next morning a telegram was sent the adjutant-general of the department asking if further instructions were to be waited for before moving (Appendix, p. 193), to which he replied in the affirmative, stating that "Certain information which we are expecting is important before directing further operations." (Appendix, p. 193.)

May 11 telegraphic instructions were received that the expedition should be prepared for a movement on the following Monday (May 14) and should be rationed to include May 25. Information was given at the same time to the effect that a battalion of the Seventeenth Infantry would be sent on the morning of May 12 to join the expedition; that the gunboats (on the Rio Grande de la Pampanga) (Appendix, pp. 194, 198, 199, 200) and General MacArthur (commanding Second Division at San Fernando) should be ready to advance at the same time (May 12), MacArthur by Mexico and Candaba, making a junction with this expedition at San Miguel, if necessary, from which point its movement would be in a westerly direction. (Appendix, p. 200.) On the day following this plan for a concerted movement was changed, the adjutant-general of the department stating in a telegram of that date, "General MacArthur thinks he can not move successfully via Mexico and Candaba," and that it was in contemplation sending the entire Seventeenth Infantry, 1 battalion of the Ninth Infantry, and part of Light Battery E (Andrews's), First Artillery, equipped with 3 mountain Hotchkiss guns, "to move as an independent column on Candaba, with aid of gunboats," which column would join the main expedition at San Miguel, or with which the expedition could later join on the river south of San Isidro. (Appendix, p. 206.) This column was organized, moving up the river, and was joined by the expedition south of San Isidro according to plan, as will appear later.

On account of a rumor that the enemy at San Miguel had been greatly reenforced (Appendix, p. 194) the scouts were sent to report to Colonel Summers at Maasin. He was directed to have them search for a road to the east of San Ildefonso which was supposed to lead into the main road north of that point and secure all the information possible as to the location and strength of the enemy. (Appendix, p. 194.)

Captains Birkhimer and Case, of the division staff, were ordered to proceed to Maasin May 12 to thoroughly acquaint themselves with and reconnoiter the enemy's position with a view to the future operations of the command. They were instructed to confer with the commanding officer at Maasin, requesting the necessary assistance, including the use of the scouts. (Appendix, p. 199.) Additional instructions were given Captain Birkhimer, verbally, to locate positions from which field artillery could be used with advantage and to examine the road passing to the east of San Ildefonso into the main road north of that place. (Appendix, p. 203.) When these staff officers arrived they found the scouts examining the enemy's position at San Ildefonso and drawing therefrom considerable fire, to which they returned only an occasional shot when a good target presented itself. Two companies (84 men) Second Oregons, under Major Eastwick, were secured as support, and, withdrawing the scouts to be used as escort, Captain Birkhimer reconnoitered the enemy's front, Captain Case meanwhile sketching the position. As they approached the enemy's left the scouts were subjected to a hot fire, the support having been sent by a circuitous route, under cover, leaving only the staff officers and scouts, about 20 men in all, to be seen by the enemy. The fire came from a knoll which commanded the adjacent country, particularly that over which the scouts were advancing. Without hesitation these few men charged and drove the enemy from the knoll, back onto his main line, and occupied the position, waiting the arrival of the support for which Captain Case had gone. While in this position the scouts (one being wounded) were under a heavy fire, delivered with great precision over previously measured and marked ranges. By effective marksmanship the enemy was held in check until the support could come up, when their fire immediately lessened. The scouts were replaced on the knoll by an equal number from the support to prevent any untoward movement of the enemy in that direction, and the reconnoissance resumed.

On a point due east of San Ildefonso the enemy could be seen withdrawing in haste toward San Miguel. Parties could also be seen moving independently to the northeast. From a hilltop, commanding a view of both San Ildefonso and San Miguel, it could be seen that the enemy had evacuated the former.

It was now shortly after 1 o'clock in the afternoon. The command, scarcely 100 strong, was concentrated at the front, and after a few minutes' rest continued the reconnoissance toward San Miguel. In doing so the enemy was forced back to the vicinity of that city, losing several in killed and wounded while skirmishing. Returning as far as San Ildefonso, Captain Birkhimer forwarded a brief report of the day's operations and stated that that point was then held by our forces. (Appendix, pp. 181, 204.) The report was repeated to the adjutant-general of the department, with remark that a reconnoissance had been ordered that morning, but without intention of advance making attack. (Appendix, p. 204.)

Captain Birkhimer was instructed to have the scouts "keep in touch with the enemy and open communication with them if possible," exercising caution to avoid capture or harm. (Appendix, p. 204.) Later, Colonel Summers reported the occupation of San Ildefonso by a battalion of his command, and the presence of the enemy 3 miles beyond that point. (Appendix, p. 206.) A telegram was sent the adjutant-

general of the department that the Oregons and Minnesotas would be ordered to occupy San Ildefonso, the Third Infantry (8 companies) remaining at Maasin. (Appendix, p. 208.) Nothing to the contrary being received from higher authority, Colonel Summers was directed to make the above disposition of his command and to keep the enemy well under observation. (Appendix, p. 208.)

During the day's operations many wounded were seen being carried to the rear, among them, as was afterward learned, a captain and a lieutenant. Four killed and 6 wounded were found on the field. (Appendix, p. 204.)

Almost immediately after the occupation of San Ildefonso an insurgent officer entered our lines under a flag of truce and presented a communication from General Gregorio del Pilar, requesting that a safe-conduct to Manila be granted a Filipino commission authorized to arrange terms of peace. (Appendix, pp. 206, 207.) In accordance with instructions from department headquarters (appendix, p. 207) he was sent in to Manila, Capt. Robert Sewell, aid de camp, accompanying. After a short conference with the department commander he returned to Baliuag, and from there outside our lines, bearing with him a letter to General Pilar from the division commander promising safe-conduct to and from Manila for the proposed commission. (Appendix, pp. 206, 207, 216, 217.)

In acknowledgment of the dispatch regarding the Candaba column (see p. 209, supra), and with reference to the enemy's peace advances, an entire lack of faith was expressed in the propositions to discuss terms of peace, which were believed to be only a scheme of the enemy for time to gather supplies, strengthen positions, and bring us into the rainy season. It was pointed out to the adjutant-general of the department that already the fields were partly covered with water, and that twenty-four hours' rain would render travel with transportation impossible. Immediate resumption of operations under the then favorable weather conditions was urged, the opinion being offered that from experience the enemy was not believed to be in very great force nor disposed to show much pertinacity. The necessity for a good interpreter and for maps of the country north of San Miguel was also stated. (Appendix, p. 209.) To this, reply was received that it was contemplated putting Major Kobbé, Third Artillery, in command of the column to move along the Rio Grande de la Pampanga, and that "your advance must be postponed a day or two to get troops in position." (Appendix, p. 209.)

Captain Birkhimer, with the scouts, only 18 of whom were able to march after the fatiguing work of the preceding day, moved out from San Ildefonso toward San Miguel at an early hour, May 13, to carry out the original instructions to examine the enemy's position, and, their later orders, to keep in touch with the enemy. To secure unity of action (appendix, p. 212), Captain Case accompanied the support, which consisted of one company each of the Minnesotas and Oregons, under command of Capt. P. S. Heath, of the latter regiment. Advancing northward neither opposition nor considerable parties of the enemy were encountered until when, within about a mile of San Miguel, the scouts in skirmish line entered a thicket and were met by volleys from a force of no less than 300 of the enemy lying behind rice-field dykes, about 100 yards distant, and right and left flanks resting, respectively, upon the steep bank of a large stream and behind a dense thicket.

Captain Case brought the support forward promptly in extended order, but before it could come up and engage, the 12 scouts on the left of the center, encouraged by two of their number (Chief Scout Young and Private Harrington), under the direct supervision of Captain Birkhimer, broke from the bushes which temporarily concealed them and charged straight across the open for the right center of the enemy's line, which wavered, broke, and, carrying with it the flanks, precipitately fled before the scouts could reach it. The enemy on reaching the buildings in the outskirts of the city fired from behind houses and other cover. Being driven rapidly eastward through the town, part took a northerly direction toward San Isidro, another part went southeast in the direction of Biacnabato, and, as usual, many small parties moved off independently in other directions. Just before reaching the bridge, which crosses the river near the center of the city, while pursuing the enemy, Chief Scout Young received a severe wound through the right knee. Although given every attention, and receiving the most skillful treatment the hospitals of Manila could afford, the wound resulted fatally. (Appendix, pp. 212, 214, 215, 216, 222, 226, 227, 230, 231, 239.) In the disabling and death of this man the expedition and the service lost an ideal chief of scouts.

Having driven the enemy from the city, immediately disposition of the command (116 men) was made to hold it until reenforcements could arrive, and dispatches were sent informing the division commander of the result of the morning's reconnoissance. (Appendix, p. 212.)

The adjutant-general of the department was informed of the capture of San Miguel (appendix, p. 212), and Colonel Summers was instructed to send a battalion at once to occupy it. (Appendix, p. 213.)

The expedition, which was still (May 13) being held at Baliuag, waiting for supplies, reenforcements, and what had been most frequently requested, and was most desired, viz, orders to advance, thus reached its objective San Miguel, as a result of two reconnoissances by less than a score of picked men supported on both occasions by less than a full company of infantry. Captain Birkhimer and the following-named 11 surviving scouts, who so gallantly charged and routed the enemy at San Miguel, have been recommended for Congressional medals of honor:

Private Eli L. Watkins, Troop C, Fourth U. S. Cavalry.
Private S. Harris, Troop G, Fourth U. S. Cavalry.
Private Peter McQuinn,[1] Troop L, Fourth U. S. Cavalry.
Corpl. F. L. Andres, Company B, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.
Private J. McIntyre, Company B, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.
Private G. Jensen, Company D, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.
Private W. H. Downs, Company H, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.
Private P. Hussey, Company K, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.
Private F. Summerfield, Company K, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.
Private E. Lyon, Company B, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry.
Private J. Harrington, Company G, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry.

The wounding of Chief Scout Young and one of his detachment comprised our casualties in the operations of the day. Three of the enemy's dead were found on the field. (Appendix, p. 212.)

Later, Colonel Summers's entire command was moved forward to San Miguel, with the exception of four companies of the Third Infantry, two of which remained at Maasin and two at San Ildefonso. (Appendix, pp. 213, 216.)

[1] Peter Quinn.

The payment of $30 Mexican for each serviceable rifle surrendered by disbanded detachments of the insurgent army or others was authorized in a telegram of May 13 from the adjutant-general of the department (Appendix, pp. 210, 211). Immediate announcement was made to the command, and, in Spanish and Tagalog, to the native population, every effort being made to get the information within the enemy's lines (Appendix, p. 210). Measures were taken to provide for prompt payments (Appendix, pp. 210, 211, 212, 213).

May 13, in reply to a telegram saying the expedition would move as soon as rations, then en route, were distributed (Appendix, p. 214), the adjutant-general of the department stated, "It is thought that the time for your advance can be fixed this evening (Appendix, p. 215)." The matter of the size of the detachment to be left at Baliuag on the advance of the expedition was also touched on in this telegram.

That point possessed great strategic importance. Seven main roads converged there; it was the market center for a large territory, and had a considerable present population who professed friendliness to and desired the protection of our Government. Also, our line of communication, for a time at least, would be via Baliuag and Malolos, and unless protected would be speedily cut. As a result of telegraphic correspondence on the subject, it was finally decided to leave a battalion at Baliuag (Appendix, pp. 217, 218, 220, 221, 224).

The company at Quingua was ordered to Baliuag May 14 (Appendix, p. 220), a garrison for that point having been supplied from another command (Appendix, p. 220).

About 9 a. m. the adjutant-general of the department was informed by telegram that all supplies for the expedition would arrive and be distributed that day; that the command could not move that afternoon, and that, unless otherwise instructed, headquarters would proceed to San Miguel at noon that day. (Appendix, p. 218.)

Reply was received inquiring whether the 3.2-inch gun from General MacArthur's command and the two companies Third Infantry from Calumpit, which had been ordered to join the expedition at Baliuag (Appendix, pp. 218, 219, 220), had yet arrived, and stating, "Commanding general directs that you hold your forces in readiness to move, but do not move till ordered from here." (Appendix, p. 218.) Reply was made acknowledging receipt of orders to hold the force in readiness to move, and inquiring if it was desired that headquarters be held at Baliuag until further orders (Appendix, p. 218); and that the artillery and companies of the Third Infantry had not yet arrived, but, having left Calumpit at noon the day previous, they should arrive at any moment. (Appendix, p. 219.) A telegram was later received from the adjutant-general of the department authorizing an advance as soon as the artillery, companies Third Infantry, and transportation reached Baliuag. It also stated that Major Kobbé was preparing the column to proceed up the Rio Grande, but could not move before Tuesday (May 15); that he was placed under the supervision of the commanding general of this expedition, but that all orders organizing the column and directing Major Kobbé's advance on Candaba would be given from department headquarters. (Appendix, p. 217.) These instructions regarding the Candaba column were repeated to Major Kobbé (Appendix, p. 224) on his reporting to the expedition commander. (Appendix, p. 220.)

Companies E and I, Third Infantry, First Lieut. H. Freeland commanding, and one 3.2-inch gun, light battery D (Dyer's) Sixth Artillery, joined at Baliuag during the afternoon, from the second division at Calumpit. (Appendix, pp. 218, 219.)

Under authority granted by the department commander in the telegram quoted above (Appendix, p. 218), verbal orders were given in the afternoon of May 14 for the command to advance from Baliuag to San Miguel next morning, leaving a battalion Twenty-second Infantry behind to garrison the former. (Appendix, pp. 221, 224.) The movement commenced at the usual hour on the morning of May 15, headquarters being joined at Maasin by its escort, Troop I, Fourth Cavalry, which had the day previous arrived at that place from a scout north and east of San Rafael. (Appendix, pp. 225, 226, 231.) As the column passed through Maasin and San Ildefonso it was joined by the companies of the Third Infantry left at those points by Colonel Summers on his advance. The march to San Miguel was without incident. Headquarters arrived there about 10 o'clock a. m. in advance of the column, the rear of which came up the next morning.

In reporting arrival of headquarters at San Miguel (Appendix, p. 231), San Isidro was naturally assumed as the next objective, and plans were suggested, based on recent information, for the movement of columns to the north and east, one to go forward that afternoon along the San Isidro road, across which it was reported a small force of the enemy had thrown up intrenchments about 2 miles out (Appendix, p. 231); another column to reconnoiter Sibul and Biacnabato and the country to the northeast. It was also stated that if the gunboats and Kobbé's column could go as far up as Arayat he could probably be met there. The enemy was reported as demoralized, discouraged, and disintegrating, and the opinion was offered that much force or opposition need not be anticipated at San Isidro. (Appendix, pp. 231, 232.)

In reply to the above telegram (Appendix, p. 231) San Isidro was named as the next objective, unless the progress of the expedition were so impeded by the enemy as to render it probable that the subsistence would give out, in which case a road to the Rio Grande should be sought and an effort made to communicate with Kobbe's column and the gunboats, where rations could be found. Caution was given to watch to the right, stating, "It is reported that a large number of insurgents are at Biacnabato; report not verified." (Appendix, p. 232.) In acknowledging receipt of the message specifying the next objective, the following was sent the adjutant-general of the department: "Am rationed to include the 26th instant and find troops have some savings. Have also along extra coffee and sugar. Can on a pinch get along till end of month. Continued rains would block me; perhaps the enemy may. So far they have shown no alarming strength. My men are in good spirits and will run over anything confronting them." "Will reconnoiter to the east in the morning as indicated. Summers will move on toward San Isidro; will be supported by French." (Appendix, p. 232.) The command was cautioned to exercise all economy in the use of rations and ammunition. (Appendix, p. 234.)

At 3 o'clock p. m. May 13 Colonel Summers, with his provisional brigade and the Utah gun, in accordance with verbal orders, moved out

from San Miguel on the San Isidro road, Captain Case, of the division staff, accompanying. The enemy was engaged shortly after leaving San Miguel and driven rapidly northward about 4 miles to a point 1 mile north of Salacat (Bubac), which was occupied by our troops. At this point the enemy was strongly intrenched on the north bank of a river and in force of about 300, but when charged by our forces fled, leaving killed, wounded, and equipments behind. Our casualties: one enlisted man, Thirteenth Minnesota, slight, nondisabling wound of right wrist. The known casualties of the enemy were, 16 killed, including an officer, and 5 wounded, who fell into our hands. Twenty-six guns were captured from the enemy. (Appendix, pp. 232, 233.) Colonel Summers's telegraphic report of the engagement was reported to the adjutant-general of the department, with remark that "this was a brilliant engagement, for which Colonel Summers and his command deserve great credit." (Appendix, p. 232.)

May 16 a reconnoissance was made in the direction of Sibul and Biacnabato by the dismounted cavalry squadron, 2 battalions Third Infantry, Troop I, Fourth Cavalry, and Hawthorne's mountain battery, under command of Capt. G. H. G. Gale, Fourth Cavalry. The lack of a competent guide and the condition of the roads and trails prevented the reconnoissance being continued beyond Sibul, and the column returned that night to San Miguel without having encountered the enemy. (Appendix, pp. 233, 234, 235, 236.)

The troops at Salacat advanced to and occupied San Roque about 9 a. m. May 16, without meeting opposition. The scouts, under command of Lieut. J. E. Thornton, Second Oregon, were sent forward to reconnoiter and search for water, one battalion of the Oregons following as support. About 2½ miles out they were fired on by the enemy, whom they drove across a bridge over a deep river some 40 feet wide. The enemy set fire to the bridge and retired to trenches which commanded it and the road to the southward by frontal and enfilading positions. Under a heavy fire the scouts charged across the bridge into the nearest trenches, routing the enemy, who retreated to San Isidro (Factoria), leaving 6 killed, among them an officer, 6 wounded, 2 prisoners, 14 Mausers, 2 Remingtons, equipments, and ammunition. (Appendix, p. 236).

While the greater number of the scouts were engaging the enemy in the trenches, a few, recognizing the extreme importance of saving the bridge (a wooden structure) from burning, devoted all their energies to putting out the fire, and in doing so were exposed to the fire of the enemy until the latter was routed by their comrades. The support coming up, the enemy was driven to the city (San Isidro), about a mile distant; then, returning to the bridge, both scouts and support set to work repairing it. (Appendix, p. 235.)

In repeating Colonel Summers's telegraphic report of the affair the division commander remarked: "I desire to specially commend Colonel Summers and those he mentions. Colonel Summers has been active and intelligent in his work. He will take the city in the morning. I also call attention to the fact that my scouts were again commended. Harrington, killed, the only casualty, is the man who has several times before been commended for unusual bravery. He was as noble and brave a soldier as I have ever known, and his death and the disabling of Young, who organized the scouts, will be a great loss to us." (Appendix, p. 236.)

The following-named scouts who participated in the engagement at the burning bridge, which they saved from destruction, were recommended for Congressional medals of honor:

Peter Quinn, private, Troop L, Fourth U. S. Cavalry.

Simon Harris, private, Troop G, Fourth U. S. Cavalry.

E. C. Lyon, private, Company B, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry.

M. W. Robertson, private, Company B, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry.

Frank High, private, Company G, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry.

M. Glassley, private, Company A, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

R. M. Longfellow, private, Company A, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

J. W. McIntyre, private, Company B, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

J. B. Kenne, private, Company B, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

Eli L. Watkins, private, Company C, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

G. Jensen, private, Company D, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

Charles P. Davis, private, Company G, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

S. A. Galt, private, Company G, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

W. H. Downs, private, Company H, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

J. Killion, private, Company H, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

Frank Ross, private, Company H, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

Otto Boehler, private, Company I, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

J. F. Desmond, private, Company I, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

W. F. Thomas, corporal, Company K, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

F. W. Summerfield, private, Company K, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

Patrick Hussey, private, Company K, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

T. M. Sweeney, private, Company K, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

Col. J. W. French, Twenty-second Infantry, commanding his own regiment and the First North Dakotas and Scott's three guns, had been sent forward during the afternoon to camp at Salacat for the night, and the next day to join Colonel Summers for the contemplated movement on San Isidro May 18. (Appendix, p. 237). Colonel Summers's rapid advance and the result of the fight at the bridge changed the plan. Colonel French was ordered to leave a battalion with his transportation and to hurry forward to join Colonel Summers, who was advised of these reenforcements and directed to make disposition of

his troops that night for the attack next morning. (Appendix, p. 237.) Colonel Summers wired that it would be impossible to place the command in position that night, but that he would make proper disposition for attack by daylight. (Appendix, p. 238.)

About 4 o'clock a. m., May 17, headquarters and staff left San Miguel, arriving about 6 a. m. at the front, which was found to be just north of the bridge and trenches occupied the day before by the scouts and Second Oregons. Telegraphic communication was established with San Miguel and corps headquarters without delay and the movement on San Isidro commenced. Colonel Summers deployed the column; the Twenty-Second Infantry on the left, their right resting on the road; the First North Dakotas and the First Battalion Second Oregons on right of road, along which Scott's battery followed; the scouts preceded the right of the line. Troop I, Fourth Cavalry, operated on the left of the road.

The command advanced toward the town, and when within about 1,800 yards of it, fire was opened on the scouts of the Oregons and on the North Dakotas on the right of our line. (Appendix 315a, 315a, 332a, 478b, 353a.)

The advance was continued and the city occupied by our forces — our casualties, 1 enlisted man each Thirteenth Minnesotas and Second Oregons, slightly wounded; an insurgent loss of 15 killed, 20 wounded, 3 prisoners. Seven guns and 4 horses fell into our hands. (Appendix, pp. 238, 239, 240.)

Prompt telegraphic report of the capture of the city was made to the adjutant general of the department (Appendix, p. 240, and, later, summary of Colonel Summers's report of operations and casualties was wired. (Appendix 240.) The department commander replied, congratulating the expeditionary forces and designating Arayat, down the Rio Grande, as our next objective. (Appendix, p. 240.)

Several Spaniards who claim to have been held prisoners by the insurgents were found in the city, among them 3 officers, who were provided with food and later returned to Manila. (Appendix, p. 239).

Many wealthy natives remained with their property and families, and at once applied for and were accorded protection by our troops. Dr. Albert, a former peace commissioner selected by the Filipino congress, of which he was still a member (Appendix, pp. 244, 245), reported the presence at his residence of a large number of noncombatants, including the wives and children of insurgent officers, and gave much information concerning the doings of the insurgent leaders. (Appendix, pp. 244, 245.)

It was learned that the insurgents had had at this place 14 prisoners— 13 Americans, including a lieutenant of our Navy, and 1 Englishman — whom they had moved back into the mountains on our advance. Letters from the prisoners, including one from Lieutenant Gilmore (copies of which will be found in the Appendix, p. 243), were delivered by Señor Raymon Rey, an aged Spaniard and fellow-prisoner, who had escaped and was employed as guide for the expedition. (Appendix, p. 243.)

The afternoon of the capture of San Isidro it was rumored that the enemy had fled toward Gapan, a town of considerable importance about 4 miles east of San Isidro, where the army had a field hospital filled with wounded. It was reported next day from department

headquarters a gun factory was also located there. (Appendix, p. 255). One battalion of the Oregons and one of the Minnesotas were sent to Gapan from San Isidro under command of Maj. P. G. Eastwick, jr., and their departure so timed as to effect a junction with another column under Captain Hannay from San Miguel, by way of cross roads at San Roque, the second column consisting of Gale's dismounted squadron, 6 companies of the Third Infantry, and Hawthorne's mountain battery. The two columns joined as anticipated, and with the exception of a desultory fire from the other side of the river no resistance was encountered. The town had been deserted by the enemy, and no evidence of a gun factory could be found. The San Isidro troops were returned the next morning, and the San Miguel troops were sent to San Miguel the same afternoon. (Appendix, pp. 241, 242, 247.)

Dr. Albert and other residents reported that Aguinaldo had been located at San Isidro since the capture of Malolos; that Aguinaldo was then, May 17, at Cabanatuam, 18 miles north (Appendix, p. 245), and that the government was at Tarlac (Appendix, p. 249), all of which information was wired headquarters. (Appendix, pp. 244, 250.)

Arrangement was made for the entry of General Gregorio del Pilar and three other members of the Filipino peace commission, who desired to go to Manila for conference with the American Commission and with a view to the termination of hostilities. (Appendix, pp. 247, 248, 249, 250, 252.)

These persons came within our line May 18, and next morning started for Manila, accompanied by Lieut. E. L. King, aid-de-camp. (Appendix, pp. 249, 250, 251, 260, 272.)

Captain Hannay with 10 companies of the Third Infantry and 1 gun from Hawthorne's mountain battery was ordered to remain at San Miguel, and Gale's squadron with another gun from Hawthorne's battery were ordered to reenforce the garrison at Baliuag, which was reported to be in danger of attack by a large force of the enemy. (Appendix, pp. 241, 242, 243, 254.)

On the afternoon of the 18th instant, Col. J. W. French, Twenty-second Infantry, with his own regiment, the North Dakotas, and 2 guns of Scott's Battery, accompanied by Captain Birkhimer of the division staff, proceeded down the river (Rio Grande de Pampamge) toward Cabaio, where it was reported there were about 300 insurgents. (Appendix, p. 246.) Near San Fernando he encountered the enemy intrenched at a bend in the road. The advance guard is reported to have been commanded by Capt. H. C. Hodges, Twenty-second Infantry, with intelligence and professional skill (Appendix, p. 246), and his formation for attack was made with admirable coolness and great precision, although under a heavy fire from the enemy about 600 yards distant. (Appendix, p. 264.) An engagement ensued which lasted until dark, when the enemy was forced across the river, and his fire silenced. The untrustworthiness of our shrapnel was here demonstrated when Scott's artillery having with shells accurately found the range, attempted to use shrapnel, every one of which burst in the gun. (Appendix 382a.) Casualties, 5 enlisted men, Twenty-second Infantry, wounded—two severely. (Appendix, p. 265.) The column rested here until morning, when it proceeded to Cabaio, where it camped waiting the main column.

On May 19 the following orders were published:

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS, No. 10. HDQS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, *In the Field, San Isidro, Luzon, May 19, 1899.*

The following telegram received from corps headquarters is published for the information of this command:

"THE PALACE, *Manila, May 19, 1899.*

"To General LAWTON:

"The following has just been received and will be published to your command.

"By command of Major-General Otis:

"BARRY.

"'HOT SPRINGS, VA., *May 18, 1899.*

"'OTIS, *Manila:*

"'Convey to General Lawton and the gallant men of his command my congratulations upon their successful operations during the past month, resulting in the capture this morning of San Isidro.

"'WILLIAM MCKINLEY.'"

The above will be read to the several organizations composing this division at retreat on the day it is received.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

(Appendix, p. 256.)

For the movement from San Isidro the following was issued:

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, *In the Field, San Isidro, Luzon, May 19, 1899.*

CIRCULAR.

Unless orders to the contrary are received, this command will march at 5 o'clock a. m. to-morrow, the 20th instant.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

A telegram was received from department headquarters late May 19 directing the expedition to proceed to Candaba after reaching Arayat. (Appendix, p. 261.)

The entire command left San Isidro on the morning of May 20, proceeding down the river toward Candaba, with the exception of the Signal detachment, which returned toward San Miguel, recovering the telegraph line. (Appendix, p. 257.)

Just before the command marched from San Isidro two or three Mauser volleys were fired into the city from across the river, some of the bullets passing through the house occupied by headquarters. The scouts, in accordance with verbal orders of the evening before, forded the river above the city, and, under cover of the morning mist, secured a good position directly in the enemy's rear. Lieutenant-Colonel Yoran, with the Second Oregon (2 battalions), accompanied by Captain Case, of the division staff, forded the river about 1 mile below San Isidro, and proceeded up the road toward San Antonio, effecting a junction with the scouts who had located the enemy. The attack was made, Major Willis's battalion in advance, and the enemy, in force about 550, driven from the town, leaving 5 dead on the field. (Appendix, pp. 261, 263.) Captain Case's report of this engagement was later repeated to the adjutant-general of the department, and Colonel Summers and Captain Case commended. (Appendix, p. 263.) The column then continued down the river, and, fording back to the left bank, rejoined the main column at Cabaio. Here Colonel French and his

command also joined (Appendix, p. 261), and all proceeded down the river to the vicinity of Mount Arayat, where the command rested for the night.

The entire command left its bivouac early in the morning of May 21, and proceeded down the river, arriving at the ferry near the town of Arayat shortly after sunrise, without meeting opposition. Considerable labor was required to prepare the approach to the ferry for the passage of wheeled vehicles and in improvising a suitable raft for the crossing of stores and ammunition. This was done under the supervision of Captain Case, of the division staff. (Appendix, p. 262.) The river at this point is about 4½ feet deep, and, as indicated by its banks, subject to a considerable rise at some seasons of the year.

The advance of the column—a battalion of the Twenty-second Infantry—entered the town of Arayat at 7.12 a. m., and found no evidence of the presence of the enemy anywhere in the vicinity. (Appendix, p. 262.)

Two companies of the Twenty-second Infantry, which had crossed the river at Cabaio and marched without opposition down the right bank, rejoined here. These companies had had to push their way through thick underbrush, finding nothing but cross trails.

As rapidly as possible the command was ferried over to the west bank of the river and entered the town, the last of the column getting in next morning. (Appendix, p. 262.)

The column which had been advancing up the river, under command of Maj. J. A. Kobbé, Third Artillery, joined the expedition at Arayat at about 8 a. m. (Appendix p. 262). This column, which had in no way participated in the expedition, which had practically terminated at San Isidro, was reported by Maj. J. A. Kobbé as composed of the following troops:

	Officers.	Men.
Light Battery E, First Artillery	3	59
Seventeenth U. S. Infantry	23	1,119
Ninth U. S. Infantry	9	369
	35	1,547

The launch and cascoes carrying supplies had grounded about 2 miles below Arayat. (Appendix, p. 262.)

On the morning of May 22 the entire command moved on down the river toward Candaba, pursuant to telegraphic orders from department headquarters (Appendix, p. 261), arriving without incident about noon of the same day.

In compliance with telegraphic instructions from the adjutant-general of the department (Appendix, p. 264) the following orders were issued, relieving from further duty with the expedition the troops composing Colonel Summers's provisional brigade:

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS, No. 11. } HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, *In the Field, Candaba, Luzon, May 22, 1899.*

Pursuant to telegraphic instructions from headquarters, Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, of this date, the Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry is relieved from duty with this command and will proceed to Manila.

The commanding general in relieving this regiment desires to express his appreciation of the efficiency, courage, and uncomplaining endurance constantly shown by its officers and men while on this expedition.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS, No. 12. HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, *In the Field, Candaba, Luzon, May 22, 1899.*

Pursuant to telegraphic instructions from headquarters, Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, of the 22d instant, the Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry (Second and Third battalions) is relieved from duty with this command and will proceed under orders of Col. O. Summers, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, to the south bank of the river at Calumpit; at that point Colonel Summers will report to the adjutant-general of the corps.

The commanding general in relieving this regiment desires to express his appreciation of the efficiency, courage, and uncomplaining endurance constantly shown by its officers and men while on the expedition.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

The organizations mentioned in the above orders left Candaba en route to Calumpit on the morning of the 23d of May.

During the day, after the departure of the troops for Calumpit, considerable firing was heard to the eastward in the direction of San Miguel and Baliuag. A battalion of the Twenty-second Infantry, commanded by Captain Ballance, and the detachment of scouts were sent in the direction from which the sound of the firing came, but were unable to discover anything, the swamp preventing their continuing to the San Miguel-Baliuag road. (Appendix, p. 267). Later it was learned that the troops in San Miguel in obedience to orders from department headquarters had, under command of Captain Hannay, Third Infantry, started to Baliuag to join the garrison at that place; that they met the enemy near San Ildefonso and were engaged almost continuously the rest of the way to Baliuag. The insurgents were in strong force and suffered severely. Captain Hannay is entitled to much credit for the way in which he handled his regiment (10 companies) during a series of difficult situations. He was prostrated by heat, and as a result of overwork during the expedition was unable until June 3 to report the details of the engagement. (Appendix, pp. 267, 268.)

Casualties: One enlisted man killed; 1 officer (Lieut. J. A. McArthur) and 14 enlisted men, Third Infantry, wounded. (Appendix, p. 268.) Insurgent loss reported at 50 killed and 50 wounded. (Appendix, pp. 267, 268.)

During the evening of May 23 telegraphic orders were received from the adjutant-general of the department, breaking up the expedition, and the following orders were issued early next morning. (Appendix, p. 266.)

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS, No. 13. HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, *In the Field, Candaba, Luzon, May 24, 1899.*

Pursuant to telegraphic instructions of the 23d instant from headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps the following movement and reassignment of troops now belonging to this command are ordered:

Twenty-second U. S. Infantry: Headquarters and 2 battalions to San Fernando; 1 battalion to Candaba and San Luis (headquarters and 3 companies at Candaba, 1 company at San Luis).

Seventeenth U. S. Infantry to San Fernando.

Third U. S. Infantry: Five companies to Baliuag, 4 companies to San Fernando, and 1 company to Quingua.

Separate mountain battery (Hawthorne's) to Baliuag.

The section Utah volunteer light artillery (1 gun) to Candaba.

The squadron Fourth Cavalry (Gale's), Troop I, Fourth Cavalry, the First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, the battalion Ninth U. S. Infantry, and Scott's platoon, Battery D, Sixth Artillery (3 guns), to Manila.

Regimental commanders will designate the battalions of their respective commands for detached service.

Troops will not move from their present stations until subsequent orders are received from these headquarters, but will hold themselves in readiness to move promptly.

With the exception of those returning to Manila, the troops above mentioned will report by telegraph to the commanding general, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, when movement is commenced and upon arrival at new stations.

The commanding general in thus breaking up this expedition desires to express his appreciation of the efficiency, courage, and uncomplaining endurance constantly shown by the troops composing it.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

The movement commenced shortly afterwards under verbal orders conveyed by staff officers. Headquarters embarked on the protected launch *Oceania* by 9 a. m., and proceeded down the river to Calumpit, thence by rail to Malolos, to carry out the instructions from the department commander in regard to distributing and rationing the troops added to General MacArthur's command (Second Division), and to supervise the rearrangement of the Thirteenth Minnesotas guarding the railway. (Appendix, pp. 266, 268, 269.) The infantry destined for Manila was shipped in by rail from Calumpit as rapidly as possible, and the artillery, the mounted troops, and the wagons marched overland. (Appendix, p. 269.) In view of the repeated attacks of the enemy on the troops returning from San Miguel, it was deemed prudent by the department commander (Appendix, p. 269) to leave the 10 companies Third Infantry and Hawthorne's 2 guns at Baliuag, withdrawing the battalion Twenty-second Infantry and dismounted cavalry as first ordered (Appendix, p. 269). However, 2 companies Twenty-second Infantry were held temporarily at Quingua (Appendix, p. 269), the other 2 proceeding to Malolos, where they were held temporarily. On May 26 it was reported that a force of the enemy was being concentrated in the vicinity of Baliuag, and instructions were given to the commanding officer at that point to send out reconnoitering parties in the direction of the enemy to ascertain the facts. (Appendix, pp. 280, 281, 282, 283, 285.)

A battalion was ordered from San Fernando by the adjutant-general of the department for use in connection with Baliuag if found necessary, and late in the afternoon Roach's battalion of the Seventeenth Infantry arrived at Malolos. (Appendix, p. 280.) Companies D and M, Twenty-second Infantry, were returned to Quingua, making a battalion of that regiment at that point. (Appendix, p. 282.) Troop I, Fourth Cavalry was also sent there temporarily. (Appendix, p. 282.)

One company of the Third Infantry, under Lieutenant Moore of that regiment, developed a force of the enemy in the direction of San Rafael, and being encumbered with 2 wounded men was forced to continue the engagement until relieved by 2 more companies, when the enemy was dispersed. (Appendix, pp. 283, 285.)

Recommendation was made that no more troops be withdrawn from Baliuag at that time, as it was an important point which the enemy would doubtless endeavor to recover. (Appendix, p. 285.)

General MacArthur sent a staff officer to look after the Baliuag situation, and the whole matter was turned over to him May 26. (Appendix, pp. 285, 287.)

The adjutant-general of the department was informed that all organizations to return to Manila were en route or would be during the day (May 26), and instructions requested. (Appendix, p. 285.)

Next morning, May 27, telegraphic instructions were received, in accordance with which headquarters returned to Manila that afternoon, nothing important having developed in the meanwhile. (Appendix, p. 286.)

The wagon train arrived in Manila May 30, terminating the expedition, although this practically took place at San Isidro when the department commander named Arayat as the next objective. (Appendix, p. .)

An appendix embodying copies of brief reports rendered to the department commander; reports of subordinate commanders which were at the time forwarded; of correspondence, orders, circulars; in fact, every available record pertaining to the expedition, is hereto attached, and should be read in connection with the text of this report.

The medical history of the expedition is succinctly given in the report of the chief surgeon, and forms a part of the Appendix. (Appendix, pp. 114, 117.) His mention of the North Dakotas is worthy of notice.

In addition to the mention of officers and others already made in this report and its Appendix, the following is to be added:

From the preliminary work connected with the organization of the expedition until return of headquarters to Manila the adjutant-general of the division, Maj. Clarence R. Edwards, assistant adjutant general, U. S. V., rendered service worthy of special commendation.

He participated in the engagements at Novaliches, San Rafael (2), Baliuag (including the pursuit and fight with the enemy's rear guard on the San Miguel road), and at San Isidro. On all these occasions he exhibited that cool demeanor and disregard of personal danger that have characterized his bearing in the presence of the enemy.

The voluminous work of his office was efficiently and promptly disposed of, often under most trying circumstances. His administrative ability, professional zeal, and military talent merit substantial recognition.

In the advance from La Loma to Novaliches Capt. William E. Birkhimer, Third U. S. Artillery, acting judge-advocate, was, by order, present during the entire day with the point of the advance guard. He performed his duties with efficiency and with the disdain for personal danger when under fire that constantly characterized this officer throughout the expedition. His conspicuous gallantry at San Ildefonso and at San Miguel has already been a matter of comment. For the latter engagement he has been recommended for a medal of honor.

Upon arrival at Norzagaray there was no other means of communication except by carrier pigeon or courier. A dispatch by the former was sent that day through the courtesy of Mr. Bass, of the New York Herald, to whom acknowledgment is due. On the following day, telegraphic communication not having yet been established, it was necessary to communicate by messenger. No one had been over the route from Norzagaray to Bocaue since Colonel Summers's advance and its safety for small parties was problematical. Maj. Charles G. Starr, inspector-general of the division, was selected for this duty, which he unhesitatingly performed, accompanied only by his personal orderly.

At the first battle of San Rafael, April 29, Major Starr accompanied the advance guard throughout the day. To him, Capt. Robert Sewell, aid, and to Capt. G. H. G. Gale, Fourth Cavalry, who volunteered his services as aid that day, I desire to express my appreciation.

They were subjected to a hot fire, but always rendered cool and efficient service.

During this battle, just before the enemy was developed, an incident took place that should be mentioned, in that it made known that splendid and gallant man and scout, William H. Young. He, in civilian dress, was noticed walking well in front of the right flankers of the advance point. He was ordered in to be reprimanded and sent to the rear. Something in the man's bearing and appearance caused a change of intention. He was directed to go to the front and bring in a citizen that definite information about the location of San Rafael might be obtained. He cheerfully complied, and in less than five minutes three shots were heard; Young appeared, as cool and collected as ever, bearing a rifle and haversack with 86 rounds of ammunition, dripping with blood. He had run on to an insurgent outpost of 8 men, alone, killed 1 and driven the others off. His action prevented a surprise to our advance guard, which was soon under a rapid and hot fire.

During the second battle of San Rafael, May 1, the division and personal staffs were, as usual, constantly under fire. Second Lieut. E. L. King, Eighth U. S. Cavalry, aid, reported just before this, his first engagement. His cool demeanor when under a hot fire from across the river, as he stood mounted near the battery, is worthy of special mention.

Second Lieut. E. D. Scott, Sixth U. S. Artillery, is deserving of commendation for the intelligent and fearless handling of his battery on this occasion.

The energetic pursuit and sharp engagements with the rear guard of the retreating insurgent forces from Baliuag toward San Miguel May 2 has been reported, except the fact that this engagement was under the able command of Capt. G. H. G. Gale, Fourth U. S. Cavalry.

Few quartermasters ever had greater difficulties to overcome, and none could have rendered more cheerful and untiring service than did Capt. C. C. Walcutt, chief quartermaster of this division. From the 21st of April to the last day of May he spared himself neither night nor day in his indefatigable efforts to render the expedition a success.

Capt. P. J. Perkins, U. S. Volunteer Signal Corps, by intelligent, indefatigable work kept up telegraphic communication between the front and the base of supply until, after recovering the Baliuag-Angat-Bacaue line, he was forced by illness to return to Manila, turning over his department to Capt. E. A. McKenna, U. S. Volunteer Signal Corps. The latter remained in charge of the signal service of the expedition until telegraphic communication was temporarily abandoned on the departure of the command from San Isidro. His courage, devotion to duty, and professional ability merit special commendation.

In addition to the professional zeal and executive ability always shown by Maj. H. W. Cardwell, chief surgeon of the division, his cheerful willingness to be of use, in whatever capacity, should be recognized. This ability frequently brought him under fire, notably at the first battle of San Rafael.

In the afternoon of the 17th instant, after the battle of San Isidro, several insurgents wounded were reported abandoned on the field of the morning's fight outside of our lines. Maj. George H. Penrose, brigade surgeon, U. S. V., accompanied by First Lieut. F. M. Kemp,

of the Regular Medical Corps, with ambulances, was sent to care for them and bring them in.

These officers met a few natives whom they took to be insurgents, and unhesitatingly attempted to capture them. They, revolvers in hand, rode down two and found their rifles hidden in the bamboos near by. Major Penrose and his orderly, while watering their horses at the ford, returning, were surprised by two or three Mauser volleys from the enemy concealed across the river. Six insurgents wounded were brought to the hospital. While on the firing line during the skirmish at Cabaio next day, Dr. Kemp's horse was shot through the head. Whatever their duties, these officers always showed earnestness, energy, and ability in the accomplishment.

The Hon. H. A. Ramsden, H. B. M. vice-consul at Manila, had rendered valuable service during the expedition to the province of Laguna, by reason of his thorough knowledge of the Spanish language and familiarity with the characteristics of the natives. He was by special invitation a guest of headquarters and, as formerly, proved himself in every way a valuable addition to the staff. Much regret was felt and expressed when illness demanded his return to Manila from Angat. In the hope that his indisposition might be soon over, request of the department commander was made that Mr. Ramsden's presence might be again solicited. (Appendix, p. 150.)

Mr. F. W Carpenter, chief clerk, adjutant-general's office, showed the same efficient loyal qualities throughout this expedition as during the Laguna de Bay expedition, when he won the commendation of his commanding officers, under fire as well as for efficiency in his legitimate duties.

Very respectfully, H. W. LAWTON,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

Report of an expedition to the province of Morong, with diagrams, Antipolo, Cainta, Taytay, and Morong, June 2 to 8, 1899, with appendix containing copies of all records pertaining thereto, Maj. Gen. H. W. Lawton, U. S. V., Commanding.

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., October 8, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY, *Washington D. C.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of an expedition for the purpose of driving the insurgents from Cainta, Taytay, and Antipolo into the Morong Peninsula and then either capturing or destroying them. (Appendix, p. 292.)

For the purpose of the expedition the following troops were ordered to concentrate at the pumping station: Troop I, Fourth U. S. Cavalry (mounted), Lieut. Cecil Stewart, commanding; the dismounted squadron, Fourth U. S. Cavalry, Capt. G. H. G. Gale, commanding; 2 battalions Fourth U. S. Infantry, Lieut. Col. J. M. Sanno, commanding; 1 battalion Ninth U. S. Infantry, Capt. T. S. McCaleb, commanding; 6 companies First Colorado Volunteer Infantry, Col. H. B. McCoy, commanding; 11 companies Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, Col. O. Summers, commanding; the Wyoming Volunteer Infantry Battalion, Maj. F. M. Foote, commanding; and a provisional battery consisting of 1 platoon of Light Battery E, First U. S. Artillery, caliber 1.65 inches, Lieut. Alston Hamilton, and 1 platoon of Hawthorne's

mountain battery, caliber 3 inches, all under the command of First Lieut. H. L. Hawthorne, Sixth U. S. Artillery. The total force numbered 102 commissioned officers and 2,474 men. (Appendix, pp. 292, 293, 296, 297, 299, 300, 301, 303, 304, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310.)

The command of this part of the expedition was given to Brig. Gen. Robert H. Hall, U. S. V.

To act in conjunction with the above command, the following troops were ordered to proceed to Pasig and report to Col. John W. Wholley, First Washington Volunteer Infantry: First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, Lieut. Col. W. C. Treumann commanding; 8 companies First Washington Volunteer Infantry, Lieut. Col. W. J. Fife, commanding; 1 battalion Twelfth U. S. Infantry, Maj. H. L. Haskell, commanding; 1 platoon Dyer's (D) battery, Sixth U. S. Artillery, Lieut. E. D. Scott, commanding. (Appendix, pp. 307, 308.)

The plan of the expedition was as follows: Hall's column was to start from the pumping station, moving across the Mariquina Valley, clearing the country of insurgents, and marching with the view of placing the head of the column east of Antipolo and toward Teresa. Here line was to be formed, facing west or south of west. An advance in line was then to be made for the purpose of capturing Morong and Taytay, and driving the insurgents into the Morong Peninsula. (Appendix, pp. 292, 293.)

In the meantime the force under Colonel Wholley was to make a demonstration against Cainta, and later, if the insurgents were driven into the peninsula, the First Washington Regiment was to proceed in cascoes from Pasig to Morong to complete the victory. (Appendix, p. 307.)

The gunboats in the lake were to silence the enemy's battery at Angono. (Appendix, p. 307.)

The movement commenced at 5 o'clock a. m., June 3, 1899. (Appendix, p. 293.) As it was known that the country to be traversed was rough and hilly and unfit for wagons, the troops were ordered to carry two days' rations in their haversacks.

Troop I, Fourth Cavalry, supported by the dismounted squadron, same regiment, was sent down the San Mateo River to capture the enemy's outpost. (Appendix, pp. 293, 294.) The Colorado regiment was sent up the river to advance on Mariquina. (Appendix, pp. 293, 299.) Neither force encountered any enemy, and joined the main column which was marching across the valley under the guidance of two natives. These guides professed a complete knowledge of all trails across the mountains, but their information was of little value, as the recent rains had changed the face of the country so that ravines and trails that were reported practicable were found to be impassable for footmen or the small-wheeled vehicles. (Appendix, pp. 293, 294.) Much time was lost building bridges. (Appendix, pp. 293, 294.) The ambulances that it was intended should accompany this column were sent back. (Appendix, pp. 293, 294.) The column advanced with much difficulty, and finally, at 11.20 a. m., encountered a small force of the enemy. (Appendix, pp. 294, 296.) The cavalry soon cleared the country, but as the enemy was seen to be concentrating in considerable force, the Second Oregon Regiment and the Fourth United States Infantry (Appendix, pp. 294, 296, 299, 300) were deployed with battery in the rear. No serious resistance was encountered during the remainder of the day's march until 4 o'clock p. m., when the enemy made a decided stand, being so placed as to bring to bear a fire from three directions.

The Second Oregon and Fourth Infantry and the cavalry were deployed, and after a brisk engagement of an hour and a half the enemy was driven off. (Appendix, pp. 294, 297, 303, 304.) While this engagement was in progress the Ninth Infantry, acting as a rear guard, was also engaged. (Appendix, pp. 294, 298, 300, 305.)

Casualties: Killed—2 enlisted men Fourth Cavalry, 1 enlisted man Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry; wounded—4 enlisted men Fourth Cavalry, 6 enlisted men Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry. (Appendix, pp. 293, 295, 296, 300, 303.)

The column bivouacked on the scene of this last engagement. (Appendix, pp. 294, 297.)

Meanwhile, at 1.30 p. m., the command under Colonel Whalley moved out from Pasig (Appendix, pp. 307, 308), the First North Dakota Infantry moving on the right of Cainta, the Washington Infantry moving on the left, and the battalion of the Twelfth Infantry having the center. (Appendix, pp. 307, 308.) One gun went with the North Dakotas and one with the Washingtons. (Appendix, p. 307.) Cainta was captured without serious resistance. (Appendix, pp. 307, 308.) The gunboats, under command of Captain Grant, participated in the movement by shelling the insurgent lines at Taytay and Cainta, and later at Angono. (Appendix, pp. 295, 307, 309.)

The North Dakotas, Scott's guns, and the battalion of the Twelfth Infantry was left to cover this line, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Treumann. For a time a sharp fire was encountered, darkness putting an end to the conflict.

The Washington regiment was in the meantime withdrawn to Pasig, where they were placed on cascos. (Appendix, pp. 295, 307.)

The next morning Hall's column entered the town of Antipolo with little resistance. (Appendix, pp. 294, 308.) The town was found to be practically deserted. (Appendix, p. 294.) About 1,000 Mauser and 2,500 Remington cartridges were found; also a small number of 3.2-inch shells, and some improvised canister of same caliber. (Appendix, p. 294.)

About 10 o'clock a. m. General Hall's column set out for Taytay, and about 2 miles from Antipolo the other column under Lieutenant-Colonel Treumann was met. (Appendix, pp. 294, 309.) This latter column had entered Taytay about 7.30 a. m. without resistance. (Appendix, p. 294.) The insurgents, upon leaving Taytay, had fired the church at this place.

The troops in both columns were suffering greatly from the heat, and many had fallen out exhausted. (Appendix, p. 294.)

A halt was ordered and rations were issued. (Appendix, p. 294.)

At about 3 o'clock p. m. the march was resumed. General Hall's column was ordered back to Antipolo and thence to Morong. Colonel Treumann's column was ordered to Morong via the west side of the peninsula. (Appendix, p. 295.)

Meanwhile the Washington regiment had gone to Morong in cascos, where they had landed under the protecting fire of the gunboats, and after a short but sharp fight had taken the town. The enemy's loss was 9 killed and 5 wounded. Ours, none. (Appendix, p. 307.)

Hall's column reached Morong at 11 o'clock a. m. on the 5th of June after an exceedingly hot and exhausting march, many of the men being overcome by the excessive heat. (Appendix, p. 308.) The same afternoon the Washington regiment was embarked on cascos and returned to its original stations. (Appendix, pp. 295, 308.)

The Second Oregon returned to Manila on cascos on June 6. (Appendix, p. 295.)

At 1 o'clock p. m. on June 6 General Hall's column took up the return march via Binangonan, the dismounted squadron of the Fourth Cavalry being left at Morong as a garrison.

This latter organization was later reenforced by the First North Dakota Regiment. (Appendix, p. 295.)

The remainder of Colonel Treumann's column, consisting of the battalion of the Twelfth Infantry and the platoon of artillery, joined General Hall's column at Binangonan. At Angono it was found that the Krupp gun which had fired on and hit the gunboat *Napindan* (Appendix, p. 295) had been removed, probably to Santa Maria de Bulacan. (Appendix, p. 295.) The whole command then proceeded to the pumping station and thence to their original positions on the line. (Appendix, p. 295.)

The difficulties experienced in this expedition in the way of bad roads and excessive heat were very great, and all the troops engaged deserve special credit for the splendid way in which these difficulties were overcome.

The sharp and decisive manner in which the Washington regiment, under Colonel Wholley, captured Morong without the loss of a man is worthy of especial mention, as is also the efficient manner in which the battalion of the Twelfth Infantry, Major Haskell commanding, consisting of 4 companies, relieved at Cainta the 8 companies of the Washington regiment. The manner in which the artillery under Lieutenants Hawthorne, Hamilton, and Scott was handled, with green and insufficient transportation, reflects great credit on these young officers.

Maj. C. R. Edwards, assistant adjutant-general, U. S. V., adjutant-general of the division at Pasig, kept the division commander informed of the situation and superintended the movement of the gunboats, and Colonel Wholley's command contributed in no small degree to the success of this portion of the expedition.

An appendix embodying copies of brief reports rendered to the department commander; reports of subordinate commanders which were at the time forwarded; of correspondence, orders, in fact every available record pertaining to the expedition, is hereto attached and should be read in connection with the text of this report.

Attention is invited to final reports of subordinate commanders, which are, as a rule, so complete and lucid as to merit especial commendation.

Very respectfully,

H. W. LAWTON,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

REPORTS OF BRIG. GEN. LOYD WHEATON, U. S. V., OF OPERATIONS ALONG THE PASIG RIVER, MARCH 13-19, AND IN THE PROVINCE OF CAVITE, JUNE 8-30, 1899.

MANILA, P. I., *March 21, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: By General Orders, No. 11, current series, headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps I was assigned to the command of "a provisional brigade" composed of the Twentieth and Twenty-second Regiments, U. S. Infantry, two battalions of the First Washington Volunteer Infantry, seven companies of the Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, a platoon of the Sixth U. S. Artillery, and a squadron of three troops Fourth U. S. Cavalry.

My instructions were to clear the enemy from the country to Pasig and to strike him wherever found. The brigade was formed on the right of the 12th instant and bivouacked in line in rear of the intrenched position extending from San Pedro Macati on the Pasig 1½ miles in the direction of Passay from right to left in the following order:

Squadron Fourth U. S. Cavalry, Major Rucker; Twenty-second U. S. Infantry, Colonel Egbert; Twentieth U. S. Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel McCaskey; seven companies Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, Colonel Summers; one platoon (2 guns) Sixth U. S. Artillery, Lieutenant Scott; two battalions First Washington Volunteer Infantry, Colonel Wholley.

Soon after daylight on the morning of March 13 the brigade moved under my instructions, by echelon, from the right, the Fourth U. S. Cavalry and Twenty-second U. S. Infantry moving first; then the Twentieth U. S. Infantry, followed by the Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry. When the cavalry and Twenty-second U. S. Infantry had advanced 1½ miles the line wheeled to the left and marched toward the river road along the Pasig. Scott's guns had now opened upon the position of the enemy at Guadalupe, and the left of the line advancing forced him out, the Twentieth U. S. Infantry and First Washington Volunteer Infantry reaching the church at Guadalupe at nearly the same time. The right of the Twenty-second U. S. Infantry struck the enemy as he was retreating in the direction of Pasig, inflicting heavy loss. The whole line moved on and occupied the Pasig road, and then marching east along the road soon came under fire of the enemy from his intrenched position at Pasig, on the north side of the river. Opened fire upon his intrenchments from 1 gun on the road, and placed the other upon a cliff or ridge extending at right angle to the Pasig; occupied the ridge with infantry and extended the Twentieth and Twenty-second U. S. Infantry to the right on the high ground in the direction of Pateros. One battalion of the Twenty-second

U. S. Infantry, under Captain Lockwood, and the squadron of Fourth U. S. Cavalry, under Major Rucker, attacked a force of the enemy in the direction of Pateros and drove him beyond Taghuig. The gunboat *Laguna de Bay*, under command of Captain Grant, came up, and night closed with the enemy driven to the north side of Pasig.

March 14.—Extended my line to the south and west of Pateros and reconnoitered the country to the west and south. The cavalry engaged the enemy in force in the direction of Taghuig, and drove him beyond that place. The enemy being intrenched in the bamboo thickets across the channel, near Pateros, the First Washington Volunteer Infantry—one battalion, under Maj. J. J. Weisenburger—crossed the channel in cascos and by swimming, stormed the intrenchments, and captured or killed all the rebels there. The town of Pateros took fire and burned.

March 15. I sent one battalion of the Twentieth U. S. Infantry, under Major Rogers, across the river at Pasig, brought up a gun, and shelled the intrenchments in front of Pasig and to the left. The battalion of the Twentieth U. S. Infantry carried the city by storm. Crossed a part of the Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry below Pasig, and when the rebels fled from Pasig they were exposed to a heavy flank fire from this detachment. Sent the whole of the Twentieth U. S. Infantry over to Pasig, the regiment being taken across upon the steam launch *Maritima*. Advanced the First Washington Volunteer Infantry on my right to Taghuig and captured about 500 prisoners. Night came on with the enemy in my front and on my right killed, captured, or dispersed. The enemy lost at least 1,000 men this day.

March 16.—Instructed Lieutenant-Colonel McCaskey, commanding Twentieth U. S. Infantry, at Pasig, to clear the country in his immediate vicinity of any of the insurgents who might be lurking near, and soon after received a dispatch from him that he had sent out two battalions to be deployed as skirmishers to clear the island of Pasig. Soon after, heavy and long-continued firing was heard to the east and north of Pasig. At 12 m., learned that Maj. William P. Rogers, commanding Third Battalion Twentieth U. S. Infantry, had come upon the enemy, intrenched 1,000 strong at the village of Cienta, and that he had carried the intrenchments and burned the town, the enemy flying in the direction of Tay-Tay. Major Rogers returned with his battalion to Pasig. In this affair he lost 2 killed and 14 wounded.

On the 17th of March, by direction of the corps commander, I returned the Twentieth U. S. Infantry to Manila, relieving the regiment at Pasig by a part of the First Washington Volunteer Infantry.

On the afternoon of March 18 a force of the enemy appeared in the vicinity of Taghuig, which was held by one company of the First Washington Volunteer Infantry. Reenforced the place with two companies of infantry and directed the colonel of the Twenty-second U. S. Infantry to send one battalion of his regiment south of the position held by his regiment and to the west of Taghuig to ascertain the force of the enemy. The enemy was found about 800 strong occupying the crests of the ridges, and a spirited combat ensued, which was terminated by darkness. The Twenty-second had 20 men killed and wounded in this affair. Among the wounded was Capt. Frank B. Jones, Twenty-second Infantry, commanding the battalion. The enemy fell back toward the south.

The morning of the 19th instant soon after daylight I formed line, deployed in the extended order facing to the south, as follows: Twenty-second U. S. Infantry and 1 gun Sixth Artillery on the right; Second

Oregon Volunteer Infantry (six companies), center; First Washington Volunteer Infantry (six companies), left. Advanced the line and struck the enemy 4 miles south of Taghuig. My line, wheeling to the left, partly inclosed him toward the lake, and he was completely routed, with great loss. My left pursued him down the lake 15 miles from Taghuig as far as San Pedro Tamisan, all the houses along the lake to that point being burned. The enemy's intrenchments on our left and in front of the First Washington Volunteer Infantry were carried, the enemy leaving more than 200 dead upon the field. Returned to the vicinity of Pateros and there bivouacked, receiving orders to return the command to former encampments near Manila, excepting that the First Washington Volunteer Infantry was designated to hold Pasig, Pateros, and Taghuig and adjacent country.

This ended the operations of the provisional brigade. In one week all his positions that were attacked taken and his troops killed, captured, or dispersed; the towns from where he brought over troops or in which he resisted us burned or destroyed. He burned them himself. His loss in killed, wounded, and captured was not less than 2,500 men.

I was ably supported and assisted by the several regimental commanders through the series of operations. I desire to call attention to the energetic conduct of Col. J. H. Wholley, First Washington Volunteer Infantry, and the gallant conduct in action of Maj. William P. Rogers, Twentieth U. S. Infantry, and Maj. J. J. Weisenburger, First Washington Volunteer Infantry, and to the gallant and meritorious services of Capt. Frank B. Jones, Twenty-second U. S. Infantry. Second Lieut. E. D. Scott, Sixth U. S. Artillery, rendered most efficient service with his guns, showing skill and intrepidity. I desire to call attention to the very gallant conduct of Capts. Herbert S. Foster, James A. Irons, and Benjamin Alvord, Twentieth Infantry, in the storming of Pasig and in the combat at Cienta. I am indebted to Lieut. F. D. Webster, Twentieth U. S. Infantry, aid-de-camp, and to Lieut. Charles R. Howland, Twentieth U. S. Infantry, aid-de-camp, acting assistant adjutant-general, for valuable assistance; also to First Lieut. William D. Connor, Corps of Engineers, acting aid.

Service both gallant and efficient was rendered by Capt. Elmore McKenna and Lieut. Charles E. Kilbourne, Volunteer Signal Corps.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

LOYD WHEATON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

MANILA, P. I., *June 30, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

(Through headquarters First Division, Eighth Army Corps.)

SIR: Relating to recent operations in the province of Cavite in which I have taken part, I have to report that by direction of Major-General Otis, commanding Eighth Army Corps and Department of the Pacific, I reported for temporary duty to Major-General Lawton, commanding First Division, Eighth Army Corps, on the 8th instant, and was ordered to proceed to San Pedro Macati and assume command

of a provisional brigade, consisting of 1 company Nevada Cavalry (dismounted), First Colorado Volunteer Infantry (6 companies), Col. J. B. McCoy; Ninth U. S. Infantry (8 companies), Capt. John A. Baldwin; Twenty-first U. S. Infantry (8 companies), Maj. William H. Boyle; 2 field guns (3.2-inch), Battery D, Sixth U. S. Artillery, 2 Hotchkiss (1.65-inch), Battery E, First U. S. Artillery, under command of Second Lieut. E. D. Scott, Sixth Artillery; the brigade in all numbering about 2,000 men effective for duty.

June 9 the several detachments composing the brigade reported to me at San Pedro Macati and were placed in bivouac, with instructions to be ready to march at daylight on the 10th instant, the men to carry two days' rations and 150 rounds of ammunition.

I passed the greater part of the 9th instant in reconnoitering the position of the enemy southeast of San Pedro Macati. At dawn on the 10th instant the brigade marched in the following order: Company First Nevada Cavalry, First Colorado Volunteer Infantry, artillery, Ninth U. S. Infantry, Twenty-first U. S. Infantry. The command was preceded by a detachment of sharpshooters from the Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, of Ovenshine's brigade, that brigade following mine as we marched out.

Upon arriving at Guadalupe Ridge, 2 miles south and east of San Pedro Macati, I found the sharpshooters of the Fourteenth Infantry, under direction of Major-General Lawton, deployed at about 1,000 yards in front of Guadalupe Ridge, the ridge marking our line of out posts and held by companies of the Twelfth U. S. Infantry. I immediately deployed the First Colorado Volunteer Infantry in the extended order in front of the ridge and directed it to advance. The company of Nevada Cavalry was directed to deploy in the extended order on the right of the First Colorado and to keep connection with that regiment, but soon after this company was directed by a staff officer of the division commander to move to the right, and the company remained with Ovenshine's brigade until night.

My instructions were to attack and break through the intrenched position of the enemy and march southeast, endeavoring to turn the enemy in toward the lake and inflict all possible damage upon him, then to march south along the lake to Montelupe. I was informed that Ovenshine's brigade would at the same time break through the enemy's intrenched line and, turning to the right, march to some point below Paranaque and cut the enemy's line of retreat. About 2 miles south of Guadalupe Ridge the first Colorado struck the enemy's intrenched line, and a spirited combat ensued, the artillery coming into position and delivering a heavy fire upon the enemy, who soon abandoned his works, a part of his force retreating south and east toward the lake and a part to the south and west. Two miles farther south the enemy endeavored to resist our farther advance. Fire was opened upon him with the 3.2-inch guns, and the infantry all coming up and going into action, his fire was silenced and a part of his force retired yet farther south. I now discovered that at about 600 yards distant and to my right the enemy were in considerable force behind a ridge running nearly parallel to my line of advance. Directing the First Colorado to pursue the enemy retreating south, I changed front to the right, placing the Twenty-first Infantry on the right, Ninth Infantry on the left, the artillery on the left of the Ninth Infantry, and advancing firing, soon drove the enemy from his positions, his

routed troops being subjected to long-range fire until he disappeared in the direction of Paranaque. Major-General Lawton, who was present during these movements, now directed that I remain with my command in its position until he could ascertain the progress made by Ovenshine's brigade, when he would send me further instructions.

Within an hour I received an order from Major-General Lawton to advance in line, my center to move on the church tower at Paranaque, which was done with the Twenty-first Infantry on the right, Ninth Infantry on the left, First Colorado to march in column and cover my left flank, the artillery to march near the center. After advancing about 2 miles, by direction of Major-General Lawton my artillery was brought to the right of my line and opened fire upon the enemy, who were resisting Ovenshine's troops. The flank fire of the artillery soon drove the enemy in confusion on Paranaque. About 12 m., by direction of Major-General Lawton, I halted my line and assembled the troops in the shade of a wood. A well was found and the canteens refilled.

The march to this point had been one of great fatigue. The temperature was from 100° to 110° in the sun, no wind blowing, and the country passed over destitute of wells or springs, and covered by high grass. The men were carrying about 50 pounds each and there was much suffering from the excessive heat, but nearly all men who had fallen out joined while my command was halted at the well.

At 2.30 p. m., by direction of Major-General Lawton, the march was resumed and the direction to Las Pinas taken, the first Colorado taking the head of the column, followed by the artillery and the Ninth and Twenty-first infantry. About 4 p. m. the enemy was found in considerable force on the west side of the estero, between Paranaque and Las Pinas. This force was attacked with great spirit by the First Colorado, its fire silenced, and a part of the regiment, crossing the estero on cascos, drove the enemy in flight on Las Pinas. Soon after the enemy appeared in some strength on our left and front at about 1,000 yards distance, and was attacked by the Ninth Infantry and the Twenty-first Infantry and the artillery, and driven off, and the march resumed. Several esteros were found which caused considerable detours, so that when darkness came we were more than a mile from the road leading south from Las Pinas, and the enemy apparently occupying the jungle in front, and an estero to cross over which a ford could not be found in the dark. I brought up all my artillery and shelled the supposed position of the enemy, and the command bivouacked in a rice field. No wood or water was to be had, but, it raining hard during the night, the men were able to fill their canteens from rain water on the ground.

At daylight on the 14th instant the march on Las Pinas was resumed, which place was occupied at an early hour and without further resistance. I was directed to return the First Colorado to Manila.

At 8 a. m., the 13th instant, I was directed by Major-General Lawton to send 2 companies of the Twenty-first Infantry on the Bacoor road and in the direction of the bridge across the Zapote. The enemy was found in force intrenched on the south side of the Zapote, with a heavy smooth-bore gun in position near the bridge. By direction of Major-General Lawton these 2 companies (I and F, under command of First Lieut. Joseph L. Donovan, Twenty-first Infantry) were placed on the extreme right, near the bay, and, after wading a number of channels, reached a position near the north bank of the Zapote and within a

short distance of the enemy, on the south bank. Lieutenant Donovan and First Lieut. Patrick Connolly were wounded and 2 men killed and 11 men wounded. Their ammunition being exhausted, they were relieved at noon by a battalion of the Ninth Infantry. The remainder of the Ninth and Twenty-first Infantry were sent forward at 2.30 p. m. The troops of Ovenshine were by this time heavily engaged, attacking the enemy's intrenched position from the left of the Bacoor road, the artillery attacking from the road. Between 4 and 4.30 p. m. the enemy gave way, abandoning his intrenchments and falling back.

By direction of Major-General Lawton I crossed to the south bank of the Zapote and immediately sent forward a company of the Twenty-first Infantry, under First Lieut. William M. Morrow, to ascertain the position of the enemy, and formed line, with the Ninth Infantry on the right, Twenty-first Infantry on the left, and 4 guns in the center. Lieutenant Morrow soon drew the fire of the enemy, who were found about a mile south of the Zapote, occupying the bamboo thickets and the outskirts of a village. Attacked him at once, and within twenty minutes he fled in confusion in the direction of Imus.

The command bivouacked the night of the 13th one-half mile south of the Zapote.

On the 14th instant sent a battalion of the Ninth Infantry to occupy Bacoor and made reconnoissance toward Imus.

June 15 it was learned the enemy had evacuated Imus and abandoned all points on the shore of Manila Bay. Ninth and Twenty-first Infantry ordered to Manila. I returned to Manila same day.

June 18 I was directed to report to and confer with Major-General Lawton relative to threatened attack of the enemy from direction of Dasmarinas upon Imus. Proceeded to Imus, arriving there in the afternoon, and reconnoitered vicinity. The force concentrated for proposed operations was 2 battalions Fourteenth U. S. Infantry (Maj. L. A. Matile), the Fourth U. S. Infantry (Lieut. Col. J. M. Sanno), 1 troop Nevada Cavalry, dismounted, and 8 guns (First Lieut. William L. Kenly, First Artillery).

June 19, sent the Nevada Cavalry on road to the east to make reconnoissance. No indications of the enemy discovered. Sent 1 battalion of the Fourth U. S. Infantry with one 3.2-inch gun on the Dasmarinas road to make a reconnoissance. The battalion was under command of Maj. John W. Bubb. Soon after noon heard heavy firing on the Dasmarinas road, and ordered the other two battalions of the Fourth U. S. Infantry and three guns to reenforce Major Bubb, and proceeded in person to the place of combat. When within a half mile of Major Bubb's battalion the enemy opened a heavy infantry fire upon me from a line of bamboo thickets parallel to the road. This fire having disclosed to me the enemy's main position, I placed a 3.2-inch gun on that part of the Dasmarinas road that was perpendicular to this position and enfiladed their line for more than a mile. The fire on Major Bubb's battalion at once ceased, and bringing up the other two battalions of the Fourth U. S. Infantry, the enemy were driven, with heavy loss and in great confusion, off the field.

The whole line was advanced to within 4 miles of the Dasmarinas and the four guns and the Fourth Infantry went into bivouac on the Dasmarinas road.

It appeared that the reconnoissance had, at about 3 or 4 miles from Dasmarinas, struck the evemy advancing in force, estimated at 2,500

strong. In compliance with instructions Major Bubb had fallen back slowly until reenforced, when the combat terminated with the enemy completely routed. From reports of officers who counted the enemy's dead on various portions of the field over which we marched, and from reports of prisoners and refugees, their loss in killed was between 100 and 200, with the usual proportion of wounded.

By direction of Major-General Lawton I was reenforced during the night of the 19th instant by one battalion Ninth U. S. Infantry, and as soon as practicable the morning of the 20th marched on Dasmarinas.

Moving in line in the extended order, one 3.2-inch gun, 1 troop Nevada Cavalry, dismounted, on the road, the Fourth U. S. Infantry on the right (west) of the road; 1 battalion Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, under Capt. F. Taylor, on the left (east) of the road; two 1.65-inch guns marched with the Fourth Infantry on the right, the remainder of the artillery 400 yards in rear, followed immediately by battalion of Ninth Infantry, to cover flank and rear. Soon after movement commenced a feeble resistance was made by the enemy on our front and right and left front. His fire was at extreme range, although he made an attempt to work toward our rear and right. His movement in that direction was turned into flight by two battalions of the Fourth Infantry on the extreme right and two 1.65-inch guns.

About noon I occupied Dasmarinas, dispersing and driving out of sight all of the enemy. During the afternoon the country was reconnoitered in the direction of Buena Vista, a place 3 miles west of Dasmarinas, and supposed to contain an arsenal for reloading ammunition, etc. It was found that to reach Buena Vista an unfordable river must be crossed, and all trails impracticable for artillery. Fire with a 3.2-inch gun was directed on the buildings at Buena Vista from Dasmarinas, and 6 shells exploded within the buildings supposed to have been used as an arsenal. I have since learned that all material was moved south from Buena Vista the night of the 19th instant.

The night of the 20th the command was disposed as follows: Nevada Cavalry, the artillery, 1 battalion Fourth U. S. Infantry, 1 battalion Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, and brigade headquarters, Dasmarinas; 2 battalions Fourth U. S. Infantry 1 mile north of Dasmarinas on the Imus road; battalion Ninth U. S. Infantry on Imus road 4 miles north to protect train coming up with rations.

On the 21st instant, soon after daylight, marched for Imus. I remained with the rear guard during the march. The enemy had disappeared and not a shot was fired during the day. It had rained the night of the 20th and the road was difficult, the indications being that after the heavy rains begin it will be impassable for artillery and wheeled vehicles. I returned to Manila June 22.

I desire to commend the conduct of Col. J. B. McCoy, First Colorado Volunteer Infantry; Maj. William H. Boyle, Twenty-first U. S. Infantry, and Capt. John A. Baldwin, Ninth U. S. Infantry. Maj. John W. Bubb, Fourth U. S. Infantry, is worthy of special mention for gallant conduct on the 19th instant. I am indebted for efficient service and cooperation to Lieut. Col. J. M. J. Sanno, Fourth U. S. Infantry. The services rendered by First Lieut. William L. Kenly, First Artillery, Second Lieut. B. M. Koehler, Sixth Artillery, and Second Lieut. E. D. Scott, Sixth Artillery, were valuable. I am indebted to Capt. H. C. Cabell, Third U. S. Infantry, assistant adjutant-general, for gallant and efficient services. I desire to specially men-

tion the conduct and services of Maj. George F. Shields, brigade surgeon, who rendered the greatest assistance to the wounded under fire. First Lieut. F. D. Webster, Twentieth Infantry, aid-de-camp; First Lieut. Charles R. Howland, Twentieth Infantry, aid-de-camp; Second Lieut. Russell T. Hazzard, First Washington Volunteer Infantry, acting aid-de-camp, and Second Lieut. A. P. Hayne, California Heavy Artillery, acting aid-de-camp, rendered me valuable assistance, carrying my orders under fire to all parts of the field. I wish to call attention to the very efficient service rendered by the Signal Corps in this series of operations. Capt. Edgar Russell, U. S. Volunteer Signal Corps, rendered most valuable aid, and the services of Lieutenant Cunningham, Volunteer Signal Corps, in the movement to Dasmarinas and return to Imus, were most praiseworthy. The telegraph line advanced with the firing line and upon occasion for the withdrawal of the line it was accomplished without delay to the command.

While the operations in the province of Cavite since the 10th instant have resulted in great damage and loss to the enemy, clearing the vicinity of Manila of his presence and driving the remnants of his force into the southern part of the province, this has been accomplished with comparatively slight loss on our part and in the face of obstacles of climate and great difficulties by the nature of the country marched over.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

LOYD WHEATON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

CIVIL REPORT OF MAJ. GEN. JOHN R. BROOKE, MILITARY GOVERNOR OF CUBA.

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF CUBA,
Habana, Cuba, October 1, 1899.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: Upon my arrival at Habana on December 27, 1898, it was found advisable to at once publish the orders assuming command of the newly created Division of Cuba, and the assumption of the duties and prerogatives of the military governor, in compliance with the orders of the President, as published in General Orders, No. 184, Headquarters of the Army, December 13, 1898, to wit:

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 184.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, December 13, 1898.

The following order has been received from the War Department:

"By direction of the President, a division to be known as the Division of Cuba, consisting of the geographical departments and provinces of the island of Cuba, with headquarters in the city of Habana, is hereby created, under command of Maj. Gen. John R. Brooke, U. S. A., who, in addition to command of the troops in the division, will exercise the authority of military governor of the island.

Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee, U. S. V., commanding the Seventh Army Corps, is assigned to the immediate command of all the troops in the province of Habana.

Maj. Gen. William Ludlow, U. S. V., is designated as the military governor of the city of Habana, and will report direct to the division commander. He is charged with all that relates to collection and disbursement of revenues of the port and city, and its police, sanitation, and general government, under such regulations as may be prescribed by the President."

R. A. ALGER, *Secretary of War.*

The travel enjoined is necessary for the public service.

By command of Major General Miles:

H. C. CORBIN, *Adjutant-General.*

Whereupon the following order was issued from these headquarters, to wit:

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 1.

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF CUBA,
Habana, December 28, 1898.

In accordance with the order of the President, as published in General Orders, No. 184, dated Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, December 13, 1898, the undersigned hereby assumes command of the Division of Cuba, and by the requirements of the same order will exercise the authority of military governor of the island of Cuba.

JOHN R. BROOKE,
Major-General, U. S. A.

Also to announce the staff of the division commander, to wit:

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 2.

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF CUBA,
Habana, December 29, 1898.

The following officers are announced as the staff of the major-general commanding the Division of Cuba:

Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee, U. S. V., chief of staff.

Maj. James T. Dean, chief ordnance officer of volunteers, acting aid-de-camp.

Capt. Frank B. McKenna, assistant adjutant-general of volunteers, aid-de-camp.
Capt. James A. Campbell, assistant quartermaster of volunteers, acting aid-de-camp.
First Lieut. Charles W. Castle, Sixteenth Infantry, aid-de-camp.
Lieut. Col. William V. Richards, assistant adjutant-general of volunteers, adjutant-general.
Maj. Lyman W. V. Kennon, assistant adjutant-general of volunteers, assistant adjutant-general.
Lieut. Col. Edgar S. Dudley, judge-advocate of volunteers, judge-advocate.
Brig. Gen. Charles F. Humphrey, U. S. V., chief quartermaster.
Lieut. Col. Tasker H. Bliss, chief commissary of subsistence of volunteers, chief of customs service.
Lieut. Col. Abiel L. Smith, chief commissary of subsistence of volunteers, chief commissary.
Lieut. Col. Robert M. O'Reilly, deputy surgeon-general, chief surgeon.
Maj. George R. Smith, paymaster, chief paymaster.
Col. Henry H. C. Dunwoody, assistant chief signal officer, chief signal officer.
By command of Major-General Brooke:

L. W. V. KENNON,
Assistant Adjutant-General."

Brig. Gen. Oswald H. Ernst, U. S. V., was directed to report to the major-general commanding, by paragraph 29, Special Orders No. 299, series of 1898, Headquarters of the Army, and was assigned as inspector-general of the division under General Orders No. 17, current series, Headquarters of the Army, and General Orders No. 2, current series, these headquarters.

It was found that considerable confusion incident to the withdrawal of the Spanish troops and replacing them with the United States troops existed, but no untoward event occurred, however, as every precaution was taken to maintain order. The gradual withdrawal of the Spanish troops and the advance of the United States troops continued, until the morning of the 1st of January, 1899, found but few Spanish troops in the city, and these went on board transports, which movement was completed about 12.30 p. m.

Outside of the principal towns the retiring Spanish army was closely followed by the Cuban army, which took charge of the towns and country, maintaining order, and, generally, performing police duty. This state of affairs continued, substantially, until the final disbandment of that army. The disbandment of the Cuban army was commenced in November, 1898, but only such as could procure work, or were anxious to resume their former vocations, seem to have taken advantage of the "licencia" (furlough) which was given to many. A large part of the army was held together on various pretexts until the distribution of the $3,000,000 and the giving up of their arms effected a final disbandment. During the time the army was held together as an organized body the police duties performed seemed to be well done and order was preserved.

The spectacle of an army of, according to the rolls, 48,000 men being peacefully dispersed among the people has for its prototype the disappearance of the great volunteer army of the United States in 1865. In neither case has there been any great disturbance, as was feared in both cases, and particularly so as regards the Cuban army. The small attempts at brigandage were quickly suppressed, the lawbreakers placed in prison, and the courts are now hearing their cases.

On January 1, 1899, a division of the Seventh Army Corps, under the command of General Fitzhugh Lee, General Keifer's division, was brought to the city, and, with the regiments on duty in Habana under the command of Gen. William Ludlow, were so placed as to insure good order during the ceremonies of the relinquishment of sovereignty by Spain, which occurred in the Governor-General's palace at 12 o'clock noon, where were assembled the Captain-General and his staff, the

United States commission with its officers, the American military governor with his staff, Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee, Maj. Gen. William Ludlow, Maj. Gen. J. Warren Keifer, and their staffs, and nine Cuban generals as his guests. This ceremony was simple in its character, though very impressive, consisting of a formal speech by the Spanish Governor-General, which was replied to by General Wade, the chairman of the United States evacuation commission, who, in concluding his remarks, turned to the military governor and transferred the island of Cuba to him, who, thereupon, entered upon the full exercise of his duty as the military governor of Cuba. Of course, the gathering into his hands of all the duties of his office took time.

The desire of a large body of the Cuban army to take part on the 1st of January in the ceremonies of the relinquishment of sovereignty by Spain was reported verbally, by General Ludlow, and he was informed that the danger to life and property was too great, and that the celebration must be postponed to a time when the excitement had cooled off and the passions of the people could be under control. This celebration afterwards took place on the arrival in the city of Gen. Máximo Gomez, Commander in Chief of the Cuban forces, on February 24. General Ludlow was directed to meet General Gomez at the city limits and show him every courtesy possible. The Quinta de los Molinos, the summer residence of the Governor-General, was placed at his disposal, and for several months he, with his staff and escort, occupied the houses and grounds as the guests of this Government.

The civil bureaus of the Governor Generalcy were taken over by officers of the military governor's staff, and held by them until the proper civil officials could be selected and appointed.

On this day, January 1, was published the following proclamation:

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF CUBA,
Habana, January 1, 1899.

To the people of Cuba:

Coming among you as the representative of the President, in furtherance and in continuation of the humane purpose with which my country interfered to put an end to the distressing condition in this island, I deem it proper to say that the object of the present Government is to give protection to the people, security to person and property, to restore confidence, to encourage the people to resume the pursuits of peace, to build up waste plantations, to resume commercial traffic and to afford full protection in the exercise of all civil and religious rights.

To this end, the protection of the United States Government will be directed, and every possible provision made to carry out these objects through the channels of civil administration, although under military control, in the interest and for the benefit of all the people of Cuba, and those possessed of rights and property in the island.

The civil and criminal code which prevailed prior to the relinquishment of Spanish sovereignty will remain in force, with such modifications and changes as may from time to time be found necessary in the interest of good government.

The people of Cuba, without regard to previous affiliations, are invited and urged to cooperate in these objects by exercise of moderation, conciliation, and good will one toward another, and a hearty accord in our humanitarian purposes will insure kind and beneficent government.

The military governor of the island will always be pleased to confer with those who may desire to consult him on matters of public interest.

JOHN R. BROOKE,
Major-General, Commanding Division of Cuba and Military Governor.

In carrying into effect the design of conducting the government through civil channels, it was found to be necessary to reorganize the various civil departments or secretaryships, which was done by reducing the number and combining several departments under one head, except the finance department, which was not combined with any other.

The order announcing the organization of the civil departments is as follows:

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF CUBA,
Habana, January 11, 1899.

In pursuance of the authority vested in him by the President of the United States, and in order to secure a better organization of the civil service in the island of Cuba, the military governor orders that hereafter the civil government shall be administered by four departments, each under the charge of its appropriate secretary, as follows:

First. The department of state and government.
Second. The department of finance.
Third. The department of justice and public instruction.
Fourth. The department of agriculture, commerce, industries, and public works.

Public records and property will be transferred and rearranged accordingly.

ADNA R. CHAFFEE,
Major-General of Volunteers, Chief of Staff.

The following gentlemen were appointed as secretaries:

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF CUBA,
Habana, January 12, 1899.

The military governor of Cuba directs me to announce the following appointments:

To be secretary of the department of state and government, Domingo Mendez Capote.

To be secretary of the department of finance, Pablo Desvernine.

To be secretary of the department of justice and public instruction, José Antonio Gonzáles Lanuza.

To be secretary of the department of agriculture, industries, commerce, and public works, Adolfo Saenz Yanez.

ADNA R. CHAFFEE,
Major-General of Volunteers, Chief of Staff.

To these secretaries were transferred, by the officers in charge of them, the various bureaus of the Spanish civil government. The reports of the secretaries will show the condition in which these were found, and the amount of labor required to bring order out of the chaotic condition can be better imagined than described. Finally, the departments were placed in sufficient working order to begin to take over, from the military officers who were temporarily in charge, those duties which pertained to the department of each; this has been gradually going on until the civil departments are now nearly complete in all the provinces, and the affairs of Cuba may be said to be conducted "through the channels of civil administration, although under military control," except the department of customs, which is conducted according to the system prescribed by the Secretary of War.

In reaching this stage on the highway of progress toward the establishment of government through civil channels, many obstacles have been overcome, the most serious being the very natural distrust of the people, which was born and nurtured under the system of the preceding government, and was particularly the effect of the wars which these people waged in their effort to improve their condition. It is believed that this distrust has given way to confidence in the minds of a majority of the people, and that they are generally beginning to see that the government, as administered by the United States, is for them and for their benefit.

It is proper at this time to speak of the condition of the people and the country as it existed at the time of the relinquishment of sovereignty by Spain. A large number of the people were found to be actually starving. Efforts were immediately made to supply food, which the War Department sent, all told, 5,493,500 Cuban rations, in addition to the 1,000,000 rations distributed by Mr. Gould, and these

were sent into the country and distributed under the direction of the commanding generals of departments, through such agencies as they established; while in the cities the distribution was generally conducted by an officer of the Army. The result of this action was the immediate lowering of the death rate, the restoration to health of the sick, and a general change for the better was soon apparent. Medicines were also supplied for the sick with most beneficial results. Employment was given to those who could work, and they were paid weekly, so that they might have money to buy food. In fact, no effort was spared to relieve the terrible condition in which so many thousand people were found.

It may be well to give a synopsis of a letter received from a distinguished Cuban general, who has recently returned from a trip through the four western provinces, which he made at my request, and who was fully advised as to the conditions when the Spanish authority was withdrawn, viz:

A state of desolation, starvation, and anarchy prevailed almost everywhere. In Santa Clara, with the exception of the municipal district of Cienfuegos, agriculture and trade had practically disappeared. For this reason, and on account of the number of reconcentrados, mendicants, and criminals, the most complete political, economic, and social chaos prevailed. The country roads, mail service, public instruction, and local governments were in a state of almost complete abandonment. Matanzas Province was in a worse condition, the city of Matanzas having been the worst sufferer among the cities. The province of Habana presented a similar aspect; and in Pinar del Rio the war had caused its greatest havoc, about 30 per cent of the population having disappeared.

Turning to the present conditions, we have in view such a change that the progress seems incredible. A great part of the improvement dates from the month of May, when the muster out of the Cuban army removed a great source of distrust. The extent to which have been carried the cultivation of the fields, the reconstruction of homes, the reestablishment of order and public service, especially in the matter of hygiene in the towns, is something wonderful.

As regards agricultural conditions in Santa Clara, it appears that the eight months drought has caused scarcity of food, but not misery. In the tobacco and sugar-cane districts the work of reconstruction is proceeding so rapidly as to promise prosperity in the near future; but in the districts devoted to cattle raising almost nothing has been accomplished. The province of Matanzas is the most backward in the restoration of agriculture, as the condition of the sugar estates and the want of the necessary capital make progress very slow. The province of Habana has progressed the most of all, on account of its proximity to the center of wealth of the island and to the seat of government, which causes a feeling of confidence that attracts capital. The province of Pinar del Rio has changed from a state of hopeless desolation to one of unexpected prosperity. The tobacco lands of the Vuelta Abajo region are being thoroughly exploited, and the rapidity of the crops and the high prices for the leaf affect directly the promotion of commerce and the reconstruction of the towns.

As to the economic condition of the municipalities of the western provinces, on the 1st of January it was one of complete bankruptcy. Every possible means of taxation had been used and exhausted, but on account of the corrupt and centralized methods, little benefit had ever been derived therefrom by the communities. It is still impossible for them to fulfill their obligations without assistance from the State, but if the system be modified so as to allow the municipalities greater

liberty of action, the greater part will be able to meet their expenses with their own resources. In the province of Puerto Principe I understand that breeding cattle are being introduced. As this province was mainly devoted to cattle raising before the recent war, it may soon be able to resume in a small way.

At an early day it became necessary to announce that civil officials, however appointed, would be retained in their positions, and that the military governor would make all such appointments in the future. (See order of February 1.)

Upon inquiry as to the internal revenues, it became apparent that the country was even more impoverished than was thought to be the case, and it was then decided to remit all taxes due and remaining unpaid on January 1 (see order of February 10). In the inquiry made to ascertain what internal taxes should be determined upon, there was a project proposed to take a census of the island, in order to give clear and definite information on which to base a tax system, and correspondence was had with the War Department without result. It was therefore necessary to go forward with the best obtainable information, which resulted in the order of March 25, which can only be considered a temporary arrangement, as the condition of property was generally at its lowest valuation, and taxes could only be expected from such sources as had not been destroyed, and it may be said that the restoration of agricultural property and its products is only being commenced at this time. This was an interruption of this inquiry only, which resulted in the order of March 25, by which the laws and the distribution of taxes were changed, the main object being to relieve unnecessary and unbearable burdens at the same time, by giving to the municipalities certain State taxes to recompense them for the loss of those taxes which came from those the least able to pay, and which were, in fact, in the highest degree oppressive and brutal.

The matter of financial aid in sanitation, repairs and restoration of public buildings, maintenance of police, aid to municipalities, etc., involved a large expenditure of customs revenues, and it became necessary to establish a system of accountability, which was perfected by the treasurer of the customs revenues, Major Ladd, and as treasurer and auditor, the accounting under this system was continued until the 1st of July, when the system prepared by the War Department was placed in operation.

In reorganizing the courts great difficulties were encountered. The time required to inaugurate the system now existing was very great, considering the extent and present population of the island. Great care was taken to avoid the establishment of a system not suited to this people or to the laws to be administered by these courts. It is believed that these objects have been met by the action taken. The existing laws are peculiar, in that a modified law, if great care is not taken, may have such connection with former laws as will, practically, nullify the modification; hence it is necessary to examine the law in all of its past history. It may be well to state here that, at one time, a project for a revision of the laws of Cuba was considered, but as time passed it was found to be better to meet each case of modification, or change, as it arose. This has been found to be the best course. The secretary of finance has undertaken to write a full digest of all the laws of Cuba in all their branches, and when this is completed I believe it would be wise to revise and codify the existing laws and to modify or change them as may be found necessary. The work of revision and codification is one that will require considerable time and the employment of experienced

lawyers well acquainted with Spanish laws, and with a knowledge of the many changes which have so frequently been made by royal order or decree, and which are nowhere collected and are only to be found in the Official Gazette, which itself is not now obtainable, except as found in the hands of parties who have retained copies thereof.

In the organization of the courts the difficulties attending the selection of the judges are much the same as in the United States. The practice of law is too remunerative to many very able men, and these can not be induced to forego their practice; the field for selection is thus circumscribed. Despite this, it is thought the appointees are of high character and attainments, and it is hoped the courts will, in so far as it depends upon them, change the opinion of the world as to the purity and uprightness of their work.

The difficulties which had hitherto existed in the way of obtaining prompt trials and effective justice before the courts, were found to be due more to the methods of procedure and personnel of the courts than to a lack of remedies in the existing laws.

The law of procedure, in criminal cases especially, had all the defects of those ancient systems where the rights of men were but little regarded, and it lacked those methods of modern times whereby the humblest citizen, as well as the most powerful, may be protected in the enjoyment of his just rights and personal freedom.

Those remedial writs which give assurance to the Anglo-Saxon of the preservation of his personal rights, and of the right to securely hold his property, were found lacking.

Through a system of the payment of the municipal judges and the subordinate employees by fees received, particularly in criminal cases, instead of by regular salaries, there were established schemes of collection of additional illegal fees which became a regular part of the system; and so accustomed had these officials become to it that it was impossible to secure speedy transaction of business, or even to obtain justice, without the payment of extra fees demanded, and unjust judgments were often secured through false or partial record of the escribanos who wrote up the cases which were to be presented to the courts.

It will require time to thoroughly educate these officials to the fact that a public office is a public trust and not a place to be used for personal gain.

With the changes already made by the abolishment of the "incomunicado" system, the payment of regular salaries to the judges, officials, and employees of the supreme court and of the audiencias and to judges of first instance, and the payment of salaries likewise to municipal judges, clerks, and employees not now salaried, which is now under consideration, this opportunity for corruption will disappear. These, with other changes and reforms now in contemplation, and the reorganization of the personnel of the courts, made or now in progress, will tend to reform past methods and place the judicial system of the island upon a more honest and satisfactory basis.

The question of finance, as relates to the restoration of crippled and destroyed agricultural industries, is one which has occupied a great deal of attention on the part of this government. It is evident that assistance in the way of repairing the roads and bridges, as well as to municipalities in their present impoverished conditions, is a necessity, and the most pressing wants in this direction have been met by granting money from the revenues of the island.

There is every reason to hope that the municipal revenues will meet all requirements as soon as agriculture is again on its feet, and there

will, doubtless, be some changes in the present tax law made. In this connection, it is well to know that planters and small farmers in the tobacco growing districts are rapidly recovering from their forlorn condition. The quick growing crop and the remunerative prices have enabled them to restore, in a measure, the lost cattle, mules, and implements necessary to the farmers. There is, also, a desire to use labor-saving devices, which are now being slowly introduced.

In the cane-growing districts the progress is slower. The large capital necessary to the economical production of cane sugar precludes the small farmer from entering this field, at present at least, though it is possible that in the future small farmers will grow sugar cane in those sections where the soil is favorable and sell it to the "centrals." The quick returns from the tobacco and food crops will, it is believed, deter many from entering upon cane growing. As soon as the favorable sites for fruit growing are occupied there will be found large profits in the foreign trade produced from this source. The drought which has prevailed this summer has been a sad drawback to the people. Their small crops have largely failed. The cane crop has been affected by it, particularly in the new cane, which has, it is reported, not been successful. Within a few days past there have been rains, but not in all parts. Those parts where the rains fell have been much benefited, though they came too late to save the early crops of corn and vegetables, but it is now thought the winter crops give promise for an abundance.

The expected advent of the rainy season in May prevented the commencement of work on the repair of roads and bridges, it being deemed better to wait until later. Some of the roads have been repaired—the macadamized highways and some of the country roads near the coast west of Habana; surveys have been commenced on other roads and are still in progress, and, it is hoped, these will be in condition to move the crops when they are ready for market.

The collection, care of, and uses to which the revenues of Cuba, derived from customs, are treated in the reports of General Chaffee, the chief of staff; Colonel Bliss, the collector, and Major Ladd, the treasurer.

General Chaffee was placed in charge of the details of the uses to which the revenues were applied, and his report shows in extenso the working out of the problem of the public funds, and the reports of the department commanders recite the benefits derived from this expenditure.

In the reports of the commanders of the various departments of the division on civil affairs it is recommended that their reports, forwarded direct to the Adjutant-General, copies of which were appended to the military report from these headquarters, be considered also. In this way a full understanding of the affairs treated in both reports can be obtained. In these reports it will be found that opinion differs as to what should have been done, and it is undoubtedly true that the conditions differed somewhat in each command. An effort was made to obtain some concert of action and the department commanders were assembled at division headquarters on June 1 to confer with the division commander and with one another. Unfortunately, the conference was without result. The differences were irreconcilable. The division commander was obliged to take such action as the conditions in each department seemed to demand and the finances permitted. In carrying out this purpose it was necessary to exact compliance with the

necessary regulations and the greatest economy as well. In the matter of sanitation a wide latitude was permitted, but in other matters it has been, and is now, most imperatively necessary to reduce the large amounts of money which have been heretofore allotted. The reasons for this are well known to the authorities and it is not necessary to revert to them here. It is believed that the revenues have been properly applied and in the best possible manner. Much has been accomplished in a sanitary way, much suffering has been relieved, many sick taken care of, and, at this time, asylums and hospitals are being supported from these revenues to the full extent of the needs, so far as I am informed.

In the way of systematic and concurrent action by the commanding generals of departments attention is invited to the letters addressed to them on the subjects of food supply, care of the sick, furnishing medicines, etc., and to their relation to the conduct of civil affairs. Copies of the orders modifying or changing the laws are also appended; the orders appointing civil officials are included in these.

Many requests have been made by the planters and farmers to be assisted in the way of supplying cattle, farming implements, and money; the latter to enable them to restore their houses. The matter has been most carefully considered and the conclusion reached that aid could not be given in this direction. The limit has been reached in other means of assistance to the verge of encouraging or inducing pauperism, and to destroy the self-respect of the people by this system of paternalism is thought to be a most dangerous implanting of a spirit alien to a free people, and which would, in carrying it out, tend to create trouble by arousing a feeling of jealousy in those who would not receive such aid. It should be understood that the full amount of the revenues would not be sufficient to meet all demands of this kind, even were this the only objection to the scheme. The real solution of this question of furnishing means to those who need this kind of aid is through the medium of banks, agricultural or others; through them and through them alone, it is believed, the means now sought from the public treasury should be obtained. In this system of loans, which can be under the scrutiny of the banks or associations from which loans are secured, lies the only apparent solution of this much talked of source of assistance. This system would not destroy or impair the self-respect of the borrower; he would not be the recipient of charity, but a self-respecting citizen working out his own financial salvation by means of his own labor and brain. From information on the subject, it is believed that there is enough capital lying idle in Cuba to-day to supply all that is needed, were the capitalists assured as to the future.

The scheme of those who urge this system of assistance to agriculturists by the use of the revenues of the island is that, as appears in the papers submitted, very cumbersome and expensive governmental and other machinery must be organized to carry it out. It is believed that the workers of farms will have obtained through other and more satisfactory channels the assistance needed before this system could be put to work. One feature of this particular scheme is that it will require five years to work it out, possibly more.

A scheme to create an association or bank, which desired to have the incentive of the exclusive right to make such loans in Cuba, could not, of course, be granted, and, as the scheme was based on this monopoly, the projectors withdrew it when they found that no monopoly could be obtained.

Personal applications have been received from people who are the owners of large estates for assistance in the way of loans, cattle, and implements, the interest to be nominal and payment to be made at a time beyond that indicated in the matter of extending the time for the collection of mortgages, viz, two years. Another feature, which has a vital bearing on this matter, is that the revenues of the island are about $1,163,000 per month, and out of this there is an expenditure of about $917,000 per month, without considering the necessity, now becoming imperative, for the improvement of harbors, building docks, repairing roads, etc. It is well to state here that the receipts of cattle to June 30 were 187,138; July 1 to October 1, 100,397. It is fair to assume that the greater number of these are work cattle.

In fact, the era of prosperity appears to be at hand; all that is needed is to have capital satisfied as to the future conditions, and this being reasonably assured, there can be no doubt but that the fertility of the soil and the industry of the people will work out a happy solution of the problem.

I wish to call particular attention to the statistics accompanying General Chaffee's report, in which can be found, grouped in a manner easily understood, the financial operations of this military government also certain statistics relating to the affairs of the municipalities which present their conditions as told by the mayors, and which show, in the districts from which intelligent reports have been made, that the United States flag is an actual "advance agent of prosperity." In fact, the rehabilitation of the island requires a reasonable time to recover from a condition similar to that presented by the country between Washington and Richmond in 1865.

The report of Colonel Bliss shows how well the collection of customs in Cuba has been done. The amount received and the continuation of the monthly average of receipts certainly show that there is a demand which continues and which evidences an increasing prosperity, to which only can this condition be ascribed.

The cost of collection is a fair indication of the careful supervision of the customs service. At least one light draft steamer, suitable for these waters, should be added to the collector's equipment. Complaints of depredations on the fishermen living on the keys are made and of invasion of the reserved fishing rights of Cubans by outsiders, which might be prevented if a vessel of this class could be supplied.

The report of the treasurer and auditor necessarily ends with the last fiscal year. The work of this officer has been performed in the best possible manner; the accounts have been arranged by him, and it is thought his system has proved to be most successful, though the auditor's work has not yet been completed. The confusion which prevailed during the early days of the occupation of Cuba by the Army of the United States, and the want of training in the way of keeping accounts according to the army methods, made the work of the officers assigned to duty as disbursing officers of the Cuban revenues very difficult for them. Of one thing we may be assured, that the money intrusted to them has been honestly disbursed, even though the technical accounts may have some irregular features. I can not too highly commend Major Ladd's zeal and ability.

The constant and able work of Major Dudley, judge-advocate, has been of great service to the military governor, relieving him of a great amount of research and the necessary and comprehensive deductions. The ability of this officer in matters of law was recognized by the War Department when he was transferred from his own department to that

of the judge-advocate general. His report will show the extent and value of his constant labor.

The quiet severance of church and state has been effected by the fact of the Government of the United States being in control. Certain changes have already been made in the laws, and others will follow in due course; this without violating the legal rights of the Roman Catholic Church, which was the only religious denomination tolerated in the island, except a small body of Baptists.

The important subject of schools is now approaching a solution. The present system will be improved upon, but it will require time to develop fully a good school system throughout the island. There are no school houses, and under present conditions there can be none built for some time to come. It is hoped that a manual training school will be opened as soon as certain repairs and changes can be made in the Spanish barracks at Santiago de las Vegas, a short distance south of Habana, in which about 600 of both sexes can receive instruction at one time. This form of instruction is more important, under the conditions found to exist, than the ordinary instruction given in the other schools. As conditions improve, an opportunity can be given to increase the number of these schools, and by their means introduce modern methods more rapidly than by other systems.

The island has been remarkably free from yellow fever this season, the outbreak at Santiago being the only serious occurrence. At Puerto Principe there have been a number of cases, but it could not be termed epidemic. In Habana there have been a number of cases, but in comparison with past records, it may be considered that this city has had very few cases. Every effort has been made in the way of sanitation to prevent its occurrence, or if it came to stamp it out by vigorous measures of isolation and thorough disinfection. The duration of the dangerous season is supposed to include October and possibly November, but it is certain that cases occur at all times of the year and in most unexpected places. One of the possible remedies for the existing endemic conditions would seem to be a complete system of sewerage, which will be very expensive, owing to the difficulties attending the proper disposition of the sewage, and the reconstruction also of nearly all the dwellings. These remarks apply, in a sense, to all the towns in Cuba, differing only in so far as topographical and water-supply conditions affect various localities.

The recent occurrences in Habana show a bitter feeling against the Spanish population. This feeling appears to be general throughout the island, but has not had such open and pronounced expression as in this city. This indicates clearly that time alone can heal the animosities which exist as a result of war and what preceded war.

The kind of government to be established, and when, is not a subject which the military governor believes to be a matter which can be discussed in this report, if at all. Obviously, this must be determined by higher authority, to whom such matters properly pertain.

It is, however, proper to say that the people of Cuba will do well to refrain from political agitations, devoting themselves to the material matters in the redemption of their island from the ravages of war, and the building up of agricultural, mineral, and other resources, which will make a rich and prosperous people, who can then, by means of the experience gained during their apprenticeship, hope to meet the problems of the day with some hope of a happy realization of their dream of freedom. The way may be long and difficult, but the overcoming of these difficulties will depend upon the people themselves.

CUBAN ARMY.

Mr. Robert P. Porter arrived at Habana on or about January 30, with letters from the Secretary of War, which explained the object of his visit and indicated the desire of the President that Mr. Porter be aided in carrying out the purpose of his coming. After a conference with the military governor, in which the purpose of his visit was fully made known, arrangements were hastily made for the journey to his destination. At Mr. Porter's request, an officer of the military governor's staff, Capt. J. A. Campbell, was directed to accompany him. On his return Mr. Porter announced the success of his mission and left almost immediately for Washington. A note to General Gomez was taken to him by Mr. Porter, in which the General was cordially invited to come to Habana and confer with the military governor as to the distribution of the $3,000,000 which had been allotted for the purpose of aiding the soldiers of the Cuban army to return to their homes, and, so far as was possible, to enable them to reestablish their homes and resume their vocations. General Gomez replied, saying that he would proceed to Habana at an early day and that he would do all in his power to accomplish the purpose.

General Gomez reached Habana late in February, and after several conferences with the military governor, a plan was determined upon to distribute the money among the Cuban soldiery. The money in the meantime arrived, was placed on an Army transport, and safe guarded by a strong detachment of United States infantry.

The Cuban army assembly was in session during this time and developed a strong opposition to General Gomez, which delayed the preparation of the rolls of the various bodies of troops. Finally, the assembly deposed General Gomez by abolishing the grade he occupied. This created a serious delay, as the data on which to base the rolls was under its control and could not be obtained. The military governor continued to recognize General Gomez as the representative of the Cuban army. The plan determined upon was to give to each officer and soldier $100, but when the rolls were obtained it was found that they gave the number of officers and men as 48,000. All attempts to ascertain if this number was not excessive proved unavailing, and it was then determined to omit the officers and such of the soldiers who had been employed under the military government as rural police, clerks, mechanics, or in any other lucrative employment. This reduced the number below 40,000. The amount to be given to each man was $75. The procedure agreed upon for the detail of the distribution was that the money would be disbursed by paymasters or other officers of the United States Army, and that a commission, having charge of each party going out to make the distribution, consisting of one officer of the United States Army and two officers of the Cuban army, should be selected by the military governor and General Gomez; that their names should be announced in an order issued by the military governor, and that the different parties would be assigned to certain districts in which certain designated corps of the Cuban army were to be found. When all was ready it was found that the Cuban commissioners declined to serve and the distribution was made without their aid.

The rolls were not obtained until after the dissolution of the assembly, which had continued in session for a long time, considering the propositions received by them for the creation of a loan of a large amount of money with which, it was stated, it expected to make some

partial payment of the debt due the Cuban army. This project fell through finally, and the assembly dissolved.

In the distribution of the money to the Cuban army great difficulties were encountered in identifying the men. Many of the men whose names appeared on the rolls could not be found, and many were found who seemed to possess evidences of service and whose names were not on the rolls. These could not receive any money, and much dissatisfaction was caused, there being no possible basis for the disbursements but the rolls, which were, on the face of them, authentic.

It was also agreed that if any money was left after all on the rolls had received their distributive share certain maimed and destitute officers should receive a share of this money. General Gomez was requested to ascertain whom these officers were and furnish a list of them, with their residences, so that they could be reached, but he did not think he could do so. The General was reminded several times that this list had not been received, that the close of the distribution was at hand, and finally he was informed that the work would cease on a certain date and the balance on hand would be returned to the Treasury of the United States. The money was returned on the date specified and the officers did not receive any money.

During the course of this distribution some badly wounded and necessitous officers were known to receive from the men liberal contributions which were voluntarily made; also that some widows received assistance in the same way.

The conferences with General Gomez were, principally, verbal and only such memoranda were kept as would enable an intelligent carrying out of the arrangements agreed upon. The amount of labor given to this matter and the time consumed was out of all proportion to the work in hand, but the interference by the assembly was largely the cause of the delay. All the expenses attendant on this distribution have been paid from the revenues of the island.

During the time occupied in the distribution of the money a force of clerks, under the direction of General Roloff, inspector general of the Cuban army, was employed in preparing certificates of discharge, a statement of service, and amount due to each officer and soldier, the expenses of which were paid from the customs revenues. These papers are to be distributed to those to whom they pertain. The manner of doing this has not yet been determined upon.

SECRETARY OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT.

Attention is invited to the report of the secretary of state and government, stated in which will be found the duties of this department and its important connection with the various branches of the government in the provinces.

It will be seen that steps are being taken to establish municipalities on a proper basis, they being the foundation of the governmental structure, granting all necessary powers which may be required in addition to those they now possess under the law to enable them to conduct their affairs along the lines which all free governments find to be essential to the proper maintenance of liberty. In this matter the first steps, the reorganizing of the municipal governments under existing law as to their personnel, have been taken, with the exception that the principal officials have been appointed by the military governor and the members of councils by the civil governor, in both of which the

wishes of the people were, as far as possible, ascertained and recognized. In some instances there were good and sufficient reasons for not appointing certain candidates. In most cases the commanding generals of departments were asked to report upon the candidates under consideration.

The statistical matter which is embraced in this report is very interesting and gives remarkable information, which will open the way to a knowledge of the conditions in Cuba not otherwise so well portrayed.

The institutions which come under the care of this department are those over which governments usually exercise an absolute or supervisory control.

SECRETARY OF FINANCE.

In the report of the secretary of finance there will be found an exhaustive review of the condition of this department, which it is recommended be most carefully considered. It gives a clear insight into the operations of the department under the existing conditions and the restrictions placed upon it without any change being made in the law.

In the proclamation of January 1 last the laws in effect on December 31, 1898, were continued in force until they should be modified or changed. The order of the President establishing the customs service in Cuba was issued December 9, 1898, and the laws regarding the collection and control of the customs revenues, in so far as this branch of the finance department was concerned, were therefore changed by the President. The same order fixed and regulated the coasting trade. Notwithstanding those facts, I would ask for the remarks of the secretary of finance that consideration, from their being undoubtedly an expression of the views on this subject of a great many prominent and able residents and natives of Cuba, the gravity of the matter demands. In this report will be found most interesting information as to the lands, mines, forests, and other resources of Cuba, and in which will be found also reference to the laws on those subjects.

It is thought some action in the line of the suggestions of the secretary can be taken by the military governor which will enable him to have a complete statistical knowledge of the whole financial conditions.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND PUBLIC INSTRUCTION.

In the reorganization of the departments of government, made by the order of January 11, 1899, the department of justice and public instruction was constituted. That portion of the former department of grace, justice, and government relating to government was separated from it and transferred to the department of state, while the department of public instruction, which had hitherto been a distinct and separate department, was added to the department of justice.

As a result of this reorganization there has been a more economical administration of affairs secured than existed under the old régime. A large reduction in expenses was made in his department by the secretary of justice and public instruction, as may be seen in his report.

The work of this secretary has been transacted under many difficulties, due to the difference of language used by the governing power and by the people, and the necessity, therefore, for translation of all papers coming before the department from English to Spanish, or vice versa; and also of all orders issued affecting the administration of the laws,

or changes therein, to be published in both languages. Where questions arose or were submitted in one language it was necessary to translate, and perhaps to discuss, them in the other.

The work of translation involved in the order for the establishment of the supreme court was particularly difficult, because of technical legal terms employed in each language, which were difficult of translation with the same meaning one into the other. This has been found to be the case in other orders, and it is for this reason that many of the Spanish terms and names are retained in the English version.

The same difficulty was experienced in reorganizing the audiencias, and that of the "tribunal local contencioso administrativo."

The organization of these bodies had to be so made as to adjust them to the existing systems of laws, with such modifications in the interest of the better administration of justice as could be made without creating discord. It was found that changes in any particular form of the laws or institutions in existence affected other parts of the system of government or the laws, so that those proposed were necessarily subject to careful consideration as to their effect upon the existing system, and consequent delays occurred before being adopted.

The jurisdiction of the supreme court, and of the audiencias, the rules of procedure before these courts, and the functions of the "tribunal local contencioso administrativo" are stated by the secretary in his report.

The difficulties under which the personnel of these courts was selected, due to the condition of affairs existing in the island, are portrayed, and also the reasons for the change of certain boundary lines and of jurisdiction of some of the courts are given.

In addition to the work of reorganization of the courts and regulation of the laws of procedure, various modifications of existing law, which were necessary, were acted upon after examination by the department, one of the earliest and most important being the separation of the state and church by taking from the latter and transferring to the former powers formerly possessed by ecclesiastical courts in matters relating to divorce and nullification of marriage, and in the requirement that hereafter only the civil marriage would be legal; these are explained by him.

In addition to the above, questions of modification of the law of libel, pardon for offenses against the Spanish Government prior to January 1, 1899, for certain persons under army and navy jurisdiction, and for offenses against the so called electoral laws; authorization of notaries to make their own translation of documents and holding them responsible for correctness thereof, and extending the time for registration of births not registered on account of the war are among the matters also acted upon by the secretary.

THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION.

The absolute necessity for immediate action in connection with questions arising in the branch of justice of this department, and the urgency thereof being greater than that demanded in the branch of public instruction, and as reforms in this bureau could not be introduced so as to be applied before the following scholastic year, many matters relating to it were postponed. A project for reorganization of primary instruction is now being prepared and will soon be acted upon. This is one of the most important tasks of the bureau of public instruc-

tion. Orders, however, have been issued abolishing the fees paid to the government for issuing academic and professional degrees of any kind; abolishing the bureau of pensions for retired primary teachers, with all its personnel; dissolving the relations which existed between the University of Habana and other institutions with similar institutions in Spain; abolishing the practice of "jubilación," whereby professors who had passed the period of activity were accustomed to appoint substitutes for themselves, taking part of their salaries, themselves residing in Spain or elsewhere; revoking leaves of absence with half salary, which had been granted to teachers by Spanish authority just prior to its relinquishment of control, for periods extending to six months and a year; the promulgation of an order prescribing terms by which foreign degrees might be accepted by the University of Habana to enable persons to practice professions in Cuba; such, briefly stated, are the changes made thus far in this bureau.

As indicated throughout the report, the work of this department has been very great, and if all has not been accomplished that could be desired, yet difficulties met have been overcome and a progress made that seemed impossible when the task of government of this island, upon principles of justice to the people and equal rights to all men, was begun January 1, 1899.

SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, COMMERCE, INDUSTRIES, AND PUBLIC WORKS.

The scope of this department is quite broad and covers several important industries, as well as the public lands, forests, and mines. The statistical information added to the special report called for by the Secretary of War gives an insight into the resources of this island, which is of great value. The amount of work which has been done in reorganizing and equipping this department, like the other three, has been very great. In spite of all the difficulties the department has finally completed its organization, and, as soon as the various portions have gained that familiarity so necessary to a proper understanding of what is required, it will be of great value to the island. Up to this time its main work has been done in the way of taking over the lighthouses from military control, sending its engineers out to make surveys of roads which will need to be repaired before the people of the sections they penetrate can again reach the markets with their products. This course of action was decided upon early, but it was not thought possible to prosecute to advantage the work during the rainy season, which was supposed to commence in May and continue until October. Unfortunately, much valuable time was thus lost.

Preliminary surveys will be made of harbors to determine what can be done to increase their value as ports. In fact, the work done by the Engineer Corps of the United States Army is to be performed by this department in so far as Cuba is concerned. The work actually done is the restoration of the great macadamized highways, replacing bridges, rebuilding and repairing light houses, arranging for building others at dangerous points on the northwestern coast, notably near which the French steamer *Versailles* went ashore. In fact, the work of this department now extends beyond its legitimate limits, because of the inability of the various sections to repair roads and bridges, which inability is caused by want of resources. This condition will pass away when the agricultural and other rural industries are restored, part of which restoration depends upon the condition of the public roads.

DEPARTMENT OF POSTS.

The report of the director-general of posts shows the financial condition of the postal service. The work done by this department has been very great. The complete organization of a postal system is practically what has been successfully accomplished. Of course there is still much to do, which can only be done in time. The department deserves commendation for its work, which is most cordially given.

In closing this report I desire to make acknowledgment of the able support and assistance received from the officers of the division staff, both in the military and civil administration. Their adaptability to the various requirements is an evidence that the officers of the United States Army, brought up under our institutions, are so thoroughly imbued with the system of our free government that they are seldom found unequal to any task intrusted to them. Their readiness and comprehensive adaptability on all occasions is the result of the home training of the American citizen.

Where all have acquitted themselves so entirely to the satisfaction of the military governor and to the honor of their profession, it is difficult to particularize among them. I can not refrain, however, from specially mentioning General Charles, General Lee, Lieutenant-Colonel Richards, Major Dudley, Major now Colonel, U. S. V., Kennon, Major Hickey, Major Rolfe, Captain Page, Captain Dean and Lieutenant Castle, aids-de-camp; also for their able conduct of and laborious duty in the supply departments, Lieutenant-Colonel Humphrey, chief quartermaster, and Maj. Abiel L. Smith, chief commissary. Major O'Reilly, chief surgeon, has ably conducted his department, and Colonel Derwoody has shown marked ability in organizing the signal corps and perfecting the telegraph and telephone systems throughout the island.

To those officers of the line, staff, and medical department who have been so earnest and efficient in the work of disinfection and sanitation, to which is largely due the present healthful condition of the island, and whose names are not all known, the appreciation of their labors is most gratefully acknowledged.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

JOHN R. BROOKE,
Major-General, Military Governor.

REPORT ON THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT OF PUERTO RICO.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF PUERTO RICO,
CIVIL DIVISION,
San Juan, September 30, 1899.

SIR: With respect to the military government of this island and its political, social, and industrial conditions I have not heretofore submitted any formal communication. The reason is that my opportunities for observation and study have been limited to the period of my duty here, which commenced on May 8 last.

The problems of government presented have been numerous and greatly varied in aspect and in import. There was scarcely any feature of the existing method of administration under the local laws that was familiar to our countrymen. Judicial procedure was strange, and the temperament, mode of life, and manners of the inhabitants differed greatly from those with which Americans are conversant.

A profound study of the people, their habits, customs, and aspirations, is essential to a bare conception of the task with which I was confronted, and a mastery of the problems presented can not be expected in any brief period.

At the time of my arrival not a page of the voluminous laws of the island, all of Spanish origin, had been translated into English. Those laws, upon which the whole fabric of society was based, were as a sealed book and had been so to my predecessors. Fortunately I had been able to learn something of Spanish institutions through study and by observation during a brief tour of duty in Cuba. That opportunity was used for observation of the Cuban system of administration and jurisprudence, which was similar to that prevailing in Puerto Rico.

It is not, therefore, without misgivings that these general remarks respecting the civil affairs of Puerto Rico are now submitted for the consideration of the Department.

THE FORMER RÉGIME.

The régime prevailing in Puerto Rico previous to the adoption of the autonomic system was a constant source of discontent to the natives of the country and a permanent cause of social and economic unrest. All the governmental and administrative machinery being placed in the hands of one man, the cooperation of valuable and responsible native elements was systematically rejected, individual initiative of every sort was rendered ineffectual, empiricism was transformed into a system of government, and routine formed the basis of public administration. The natural consequence of such a régime was the stagnation of the country, and this was the actual result.

There were other respects wherein the system was extremely prejudicial to public interests. It fostered the creation of a political party composed of Spanish residents of the islands, into whose hands was completely surrendered the interior administration in return for the service of helping at all times to elect for representatives of Puerto Rico in the Spanish Cortes deputies and senators identified with the politics of the home cabinet. This policy of *do ut des* converted the island into a fief of a group of foreigners and their native allies; and, as was to be expected, the most absolute administrative corruption resulted therefrom, especially in the matter of tax assessments, the natural sequel being standing grievances and continual uneasiness.

Such a condition of affairs was the cause of complaints and representations for a period of thirty years, when at last the Spanish Government, urged by diplomatic action in connection with the war in Cuba, established in both islands the autonomic regime, which is the origin of the late system of secretaries in existence when the United States came into sovereign power.

The functions of sovereignty (which might be called the federal functions) were, by virtue of this system, severed from the functions relating to the local government. The former remained with the Governor General as the representative of the home government, while the latter were transferred to the insular cabinet, consisting of the council of secretaries.

In everything that exclusively concerned the island these secretaries assumed the powers that under the old system appertained to the Governor-General. Wider latitude and power were given them in financial matters than are accorded the States and Territories of the Union; for the treasury of Puerto Rico was separated from that of the nation, and the customs, revenues, and imposts of the island were all paid into the insular exchequer. From these revenues were drawn large sums to pay a part of the expenses of maintaining the ministry of the colonies, and another very large sum was assigned to support the military and naval establishments in Puerto Rico.

Up to the end of the year 1896 the Spanish administration in Puerto Rico was organized in the following manner:

First. A Governor-General, who was chief of the civil administration and commander in-chief of the army and navy. As executive dependencies he had: A secretary, for the dispatch of administrative business; a department of the treasury (intendencia) for economic and financial business; a bureau of public works for roads, bridges, buildings, etc.; a chief of staff for army affairs, and a naval commander for naval affairs. Legislation for Puerto Rico emanated from the colonial ministry at Madrid, and was published by the Governor General in the Gazette here, and by him enforced.

Second. For the purpose of administration the island was called a province, and possessed:

A provincial board of deputies (diputacion provincial), composed of members elected by suffrage;

A town council in each town, whose members were also elected by suffrage, the suffrage being enjoyed by residents of 25 years of age who possessed a professional diploma or who paid taxes of not less than 5 pesos.

The town council had the same powers that they have today. The Government named the alcaldes and could select any one for office. To-day these appointments are made by the civil secretary, upon the approval of the Governor General. When practicable the town council is permitted to hold an election and nominate one of its members to the civil secretary for appointment.

In the beginning of 1897 Canovas del Castillo's so-called reforms were instituted. These gave larger powers to the diputacion provincial and to the town councils. But the reforms were of but short duration, for in November of the same year the decree establishing autonomy in Cuba and Puerto Rico was published.

This form of government was put into practice on February 11, 1898, and lasted, with a few variations, until this island was annexed to the United States.

The autonomous régime included the following:

1. A Governor-General, named by the Queen of Spain, who was commander-in-chief of the army and the navy. In civil and political matters he could not intervene unless authorized by the cabinet, formed of the secretaries of the insular government.

2. An insular cabinet, composed of a president, a secretary of government and justice, a secretary of the treasury, a secretary of education, a secretary of public works, and a secretary of agriculture.

3. An assembly or parliamentary legislative body to vote the budgets and legislate in local matters, but without powers of legislation in political, civil, or judicial matters; all of which had to follow the laws in force in Spain and were voted upon by the National Parliament.

4. The city councils were to be declared autonomous and universal suffrage for all males of more than twenty-five years to be established.

When the Spanish Government granted this plan of autonomy there were said to be four political parties in the island, viz, the Spanish party, which up till then had held the reins of government; the Opportunists, or those of the Spanish party who accepted autonomy; the Pure Autonomists, a local party which had opposed the Spanish Government and had incessantly clamored for colonial autonomy; and the Liberal party, an offshoot of the Autonomist party. There were other designations and other groups or factions known by various names, such as the Orthodox Autonomists, Conservatives, and Radicals.

It is said that the Spanish Government wished that these parties should have part in the autonomous government. Therefore, on the 11th of February, 1897, the insular government came into existence, with the following functionaries:

President, Francisco M. Quiñones; secretary of treasury, Manuel Fernandez Juncos; secretary of education, Manuel F. Rossy, Autonomists; secretary of government, Luis Muñoz Rivera; secretary of public works, Juan Hernandez Lopez; secretary of agriculture, José M. Quiñones, Sagasta Liberals.

Immediately thereafter elections were held for representatives to the national and insular parliaments. It is asserted that the secretary of government had provisionally nominated his political allies to the positions of alcaldes and town councilors, completely excluding the Autonomists, and that he used his influence with the alcaldes of his nomination to oblige them to see that national representatives in sympathy with Sagasta were returned for the Spanish Parliament and his own political friends for the insular parliament, leaving the Autonomists minority representation. The war between Spain and the United States having just been declared, the Autonomists, as a protest against the scandalous elections which were asserted to have been conducted by the secretary of government in combination with the alcaldes, resigned their places in the government and decided not to attend the insular parliament.

The three Autonomist secretaries retired from the cabinet on the 20th of July, five days before the Americans disembarked at Guánica.

The insular parliament was then convened, attended only by the Liberals. The members of the other three parties—the Autonomists, Opportunists, and Spanish—all retired, it is said, in protest of the elections just held.

During the few days that its sessions lasted this body resolved to modify the cabinet so as to make it as follows: Secretary of government and president of the cabinet, secretary of the treasury, secretary of education, and secretary of the interior.

As all of the Autonomist secretaries had retired, the new cabinet was composed as follows: Secretary of government and president of the council of secretaries, Luis Muñoz Rivera; secretary of the treasury, Julian E. Blanco; secretary of justice, Juan Hernandez Lopez; secretary of the interior, Salvador Carbonel. These were in office on October 18, 1898.

On February 6, 1899, General Henry discontinued the council of secretaries and created instead four secretaryships, viz: Secretary of state, secretary of the treasury, secretary of justice, and secretary of the interior. These officers, who were independent of each other, possessed ampler powers than the former secretaries, all of whom had been under the president of the cabinet. Three of the new secretaries were Liberals; the fourth, the secretary of the interior, was an Autonomist. The Autonomist party thereupon dissolved and a Republican party was formed, made up of adherents of the old Autonomists and Opportunists, a few Liberals, and some who had formerly belonged to no party, while the Liberal party, with a somewhat changed membership, is still in existence.

In order to permit American customs and policy to take root in this island and to prepare it for tranformation into an organized Territory, it is desirable to set aside personal politics, which is one of the inherited vices here. The public mind must also be disabused of the idea, still dominant, that the whole art of politics consists in securing power in order to give offices to one's friends. It has been too much the rule here for officeholders to neglect public interests and to blindly obey those who, having put them in office, can also remove them. Their endeavors are directed chiefly to obtaining high salaries, and they give little return therefor. Besides, it is necessary to instill vigor into municipal life by granting full local autonomy. This will accustom the people to act for themselves and not look to the Government for everything, as has been the case until now.

It is especially necessary to wipe out all those inherited vices and to prepare the country for a real democratic regime, to suppress all abuses, and to install new methods of administration and government, so as to allow the people to take part in the control of their local affairs without the predominant influence of persons having only political ambitions to serve.

This, it seems to me, must be done under superior supervision; for to hastily abandon the island to local control unrestrained by superior power would, or might, result in the greatest disaster.

In all my intercourse with the inhabitants I have endeavored, on every appropriate occasion, to impress upon them the fact that the time when territorial autonomy could be instituted and the civil power take its proper place as the superior of the military, depended solely upon the people themselves; that the people should demonstrate their capacity for the most important and sacred of all duties of citizenship by furnishing examples of towns well governed, public moneys properly expended, and full protection in the enjoyment of natural and lawfully acquired rights extended alike—to the rich and the poor, the learned and the ignorant, the strong and the weak. They are assured that not until the people of the United States could see that this had been done would they probably feel that there should be supplied for Puerto Rico a Territorial government, which in due time could be raised to the highest dignity of membership as a State in the American commonwealth; that until the achievement of that result, Puerto Ricans should not expect to be vested with those higher responsibilities and privileges.

THE PROVINCIAL DEPUTATION.

On November 29, 1898, General Brooke ordered the discontinuance of an insular legislative and administrative body known by the above designation.

It consisted of 32 members, chosen by the people and charged with several important functions of government. It is my understanding that it was intended by Spain that these functions were to be transferred to the legislative assembly of the autonomical government, created by royal decree of November 25, 1897.

As stated under the caption of "The former régime," the skeleton of this government was set up in March, 1898, but it never really assumed power.

The provincial deputation as a governing body was supported by revenues derived from lotteries, contributions from municipalities, the trade school, etc. For the year 1898–99 this revenue was estimated to amount to 324,592 pesos. It was charged with various branches of expenditure, such as administration of its own affairs, lotteries, public instruction, public works, subventions to railroads; orphan, insane, and other asylums; the reformatory and other correctional institutions, College of the Esculapian Fathers for Boys, Convent of the Sacred Heart for Girls, schools of art and music, vaccination, and pensions. The total of all estimated expenses equaled the income.

This deputation had various assets and liabilities, all of which were, under General Brooke's order, required to be liquidated by the secretary of the treasury, Mr. Cayetano Coll y Toste, who is at present the civil secretary.

Under date of July 31 the liquidator submitted a statement of the progress made in discharging his duties. On that date he had collected on account of the deputation $107,213.74 in provincial money and negotiable paper. He had paid out on same account $1,140.25 pesos, leaving a balance in his hands of 26,073.49 pesos, which consisted principally of negotiable paper.

He also reported, under date of August 3, that the outstanding obligations known to him amounted to nearly 130,000 pesos.

He submitted a schedule of assets, consisting principally of real property, which appeared on the books of the deputation as of value 1,246,878 pesos, but there is no likelihood that the property would realize upon sale a sum nearly so large.

The principal items of this property are certain public buildings with a claimed value of 1,145,000 pesos. These in any event should be applied by the insular government to the same or similar uses as those to which they are now put.

In order that a fair valuation of this property should be made a board was recently appointed, consisting of one army officer, who is an expert in building construction, and three local architects, one an American, with orders to appraise this property. The valuation of the board, expressed in gold, is as follows:

The Assembly Chambers (Deputation Building)	$72,958.70
The Beneficencia	178,905.79
The Insane asylum	63,690.65
The Santurce College for Boys	90,715.33
The Chapel attached to same	12,810.75
The Sacred Heart Convent, Santurce School for Girls	69,158.61
	488,239.83

The deputation has some other assets, consisting of claims against unpaid taxes, etc., which, according to the statement of the liquidator, amount to	$77,639.93
Making a total of assets of	548,200.76
Against which is an estimated indebtedness of	78,000.00
Leaving a net balance of	470,200.76

There is one claim of considerable magnitude against the deputation brought by the Josephite Brethren, known here by the designation of the Padres Escolapios, a teaching order of the Catholic Church. They occupy one of the aforesaid buildings under a contract made several years since with the deputation, under which they are to receive upward of $1,000 per month for services rendered in conducting an educational institution. This claim and the accompanying papers were forwarded to the Secretary of War for consideration on the 10th of July, 1899. It is very important that the question should be speedily settled as to the responsibility of the insular government for the support of this religious order.

Another building is used as a school for the education of girls under the supervision of the Mothers of the Sacred Heart. This society also received a subvention, but the order has no claim for a continuance of the subsidy. The building, is valued at $69,158.61 and belongs to Puerto Rico.

The final disposition of this property has not been determined; but when all the data respecting value is at hand the subject will be referred to the judicial board for an opinion and with request for advice as to the rights and powers of the insular government as respects the several equities of the municipalities on the one hand and the insular treasury on the other.

It is said that two of the buildings were erected with the funds contributed by municipalities under Spanish regime, and that these town governments have certain rightful claims to participation in the proceeds of sale, or to reimbursement by the insular government should the latter take possession of the buildings. On the other hand, the insular treasury is now supporting the institutions and works which were formerly a charge against the deputation.

THE PRESENT RÉGIME.

The military government here was administered by Maj. Gen. John R. Brooke, U. S. A., from October 18, 1898, until his departure near the close of the year, and by Maj. Gen. Guy V. Henry, U. S. V., from December 6, 1898, to the 8th of May, 1899. On the date last named I assumed the command.

For a fairly full exposition of the more important orders issued by the several general officers who have exercised military control in Puerto Rico, you are referred to the paper herewith, an allocution that was recently published here. Its purpose is stated in the first paragraph, and its issuance has had, and will have, a good effect as supplying an exposition of the aims and policy of the temporary military government. Inclosed are copies of all important orders issued by the military governor, which give further information.

In office were four so called "cabinet officers," each receiving a salary of $6,000 in gold per annum. One of these was the secretary of justice,

whose authority over the judges, courts, and procedure was very great; and, as it resulted in a certain degree of dependence of the courts upon the secretary, his influence was too much extended, and not only detrimental to good administration, but also opposed to those ideas of government that would of necessity prevail should territorial autonomy be accorded to the island. The local system was an inherited one, no other being known. It gave to the secretary of justice, or permitted him to exercise, a certain influence over the courts and justices, and even over the prisoners in jail, whose pardon or mitigation of punishment was practically regulated by him.

It was expected that this officer would oppose any curtailment of his prerogatives, and it so resulted. However, after a month of discussion, illustration, and comparison, the secretary of justice recommended the discontinuance of his own office and the organization of a board that should advise the military governor respecting all judicial matters.

This board is composed of three prominent Puerto Rican lawyers and two Americans, one of the latter being an army officer.

After considerable delay and opposition a recommendation was procured from the supreme court for the appointment of a board of pardons and prison control, composed of three Puerto Ricans and two army officers. They have administered this branch of the service successfully for several months.

Mixed boards of similar composition have been appointed in charge of education, public works, charities, and health, and all the secretaries have been discontinued.

The former department of state, with a secretary at its head, has been constituted a bureau, with a chief at a salary of two-fifths that previously allowed to the secretary. The department of the treasury has been reorganized as a bureau of internal revenue, with same reduction of salary for its head officer, and a bureau of agriculture, formerly under the secretary of the interior, has been reorganized, its chief having the same salary as the other heads of bureaus. The remaining duties formerly committed to the interior department have been assigned to the boards of public works and education, and the department of the interior has been discontinued.

This reorganization, except in some details, was also recommended by boards of eminent residents of the island, all natives.

The three bureaus—state affairs, internal revenue, and agriculture—are all under the official supervision of the civil secretary, who reports directly to the military governor.

In appointing members of administrative boards representatives from the two political parties have been selected, so as to balance partisan ambitions and rivalries. The army and other American members, in their intimate association with the natives, learn much of the latter and their institutions, while the Puerto Ricans learn of the new system—all of which is mutually advantageous and educational.

The only alternative to this method of administration was to make the changes by military decree. This course was not thought to be wise, and the measures would have had opposition instead of support.

While the so-called cabinet is discontinued, there is in its stead a non-salaried board of Puerto Ricans to whom are referred questions of public policy for opinion and recommendation, but they have no initiative or control. The Advisory Board has been very helpful by its advice on many important questions of administration, especially as respects relief measures necessary after the hurricane of August 8.

But the board has not moved smoothly, as already reported to the Department under date of September 20, 1899. So long as no question of patronage was before them, their deliberations were harmonious; but when the board was asked to suggest the names of census supervisors, the three members of one political party retired and gave notice of renunciation of their functions. Later the subject was withdrawn from their consideration, and supervisors were chosen unaided by their counsel. Then the board resumed its functions. The incident was discouraging, as showing that it was impossible for nine distinguished natives of Puerto Rico to separate themselves from political considerations in taking action upon a small matter, when that matter involved a disposal of patronage. It also gave grounds for fear that a larger body—one possessed of legislative functions—would not be unconstrained by party considerations in carrying on the work that would necessarily occupy the attention of such a body were the island endowed with territorial autonomy.

In only three individual cases do Puerto Rican members of boards receive salaries. Two members of the prison board are members of the supreme court, and are paid as such; one member of the board of public works, who is a civil engineer, is also the head of the agricultural bureau, in which position he receives a salary.

The present organization of the personnel of the military government of the island is shown by the directory herewith enclosed.

In the circular to the people of Puerto Rico, dated August 15, the motives actuating the military governor were stated. The process by which the civil government, pure and simple, could and probably would replace the military régime was also explained.

POLICY OF THE MILITARY GOVERNOR.

As might be expected, the Puerto Ricans hold very tenaciously to their local manners, customs, and laws, with which they are familiar. To carry out a reform or to institute an innovation is attended with many difficulties; not so much because the public are wedded to all the old customs, for some of these they readily concede to be vicious, but because they can not understand the measures proposed as substitutes. They prefer to retain the old institutions and laws even though defective, rather than to adopt new and unfamiliar codes, procedure, and administration.

It has not been easy to overcome this very natural human prejudice. From the first the course has been adopted which involved the *argumentum ad hominem*, instead of the severe dictum of the military mandate.

Almost every proposition to change or repeal a Spanish statute that was obnoxious to our laws and repugnant to good administration was at first opposed or resisted; but this opposition was met by the citation of palpable defects and suggestions of a remedy. The Puerto Ricans would usually make some concessions, but hold to the general objection. A counter draft would then be offered, and this would receive attention and discussion. Other concessions would follow; and so far these methods have never failed to secure the favorable recommendation of the most interested, best informed, and prominent Puerto Ricans, for the adoption of the changes proposed. These methods have characterized the administration.

The only written instructions received for guidance of the military governor are contained in General Orders, No. 101, of 1898, which,

mutatis mutandis, was promulgated in this island by General Miles on July 28, 1898. The general provisions of this order were reiterated to the undersigned verbally by the President upon the eve of the latter's departure from New York to assume his present duties. The President also intimated his hope that it would soon be practicable to establish in Puerto Rico a civil government, so that the military could be relieved or withdrawn from the direction of civil affairs.

The authority of the military governor of the island for issuance of orders changing existing laws and instituting reforms is contained in General Orders, No. 101, above cited.

When convinced that a change ought to be made—and no changes have been made until each project was most thoroughly considered from every point of view—effect was given to the resolution in a general order from headquarters. A proposition to establish a United States provisional court was authorized by the President before issuance of orders promulgating it.

In the appendix will be found a copy of every order of importance that has been issued by the military governor respecting civil affairs. A few orders of minor importance were published only in the Official Gazette of the island.

On September 9 cable instructions were received from the Secretary of War directing that a draft of all orders, etc., proposed for issuance be submitted for his approval in cases where the same would result in a form of government, or have a tendency thereto.

THE POPULATION.

Inclosed herewith are certain papers relating to population, which were prepared by the able civil secretary, Mr. Coll y Toste. Among these documents is a statement of the population from the time of discovery to date.

The movement of population, it would appear, has been something like the following:

In 1765 the population was stated by the governor to have been 44,833. During the succeeding eighteen years the number had increased to 87,984, or an increase of nearly 100 per cent. In 1803 the inhabitants were reported as numbering 174,902, i. e., in nineteen years they had again doubled. By 1834, the total had reached over 358,000, which is somewhat more than double the population of 1803. By the year 1877 it was again more than doubled. These last two periods of more than 100 per cent increase were thirty-one and thirty-three years, respectively.

The figures also show that from 1765 to 1846—that is, eighty-one years—the population had been multiplied very nearly ten times, and in the fifty-three following years it was again more than doubled. To what extent immigration aided this increase it is impossible to ascertain, for there is no available or accessible data on the subject. That large numbers arrived from foreign lands is known. Including natives of the Peninsula, of the Canary and Balearic Islands, of England and her dependencies, and the French, Corsicans, Danes, and Venezuelans resident here, there must be now on the island well on to a hundred and fifty thousand foreigners; but if immigration should be stopped absolutely—which is not possible—the natural increase, at a rate approximating that shown by reports, would, in the absence of a plague or famine, double the population every thirty or forty years.

In the British West Indian Colonies there are now about 1,500,000 negroes, and in the French, Dutch, and Danish islands 300,000 more. In Cuba and Santo Domingo there are another million. A large proportion of these blacks are ready to immigrate to Puerto Rico whenever a wage rate is paid exceeding that—say 1s. per day or less—which they can secure in their own islands.

In Puerto Rico but few women work in the fields, but in other islands they are employed as field hands, receiving about 16 to 20 cents per day as wages.

The last census, that of 1897, showed that the pure-blood negroes here numbered but 75,824 out of a total of 899,394, while of the same total there were 242,000 mulattoes. Combining the full and mixed bloods, and designating them as colored (the term by which they are known in the States), it would appear that the pure white are in a considerable majority; and comparing both totals with the statistics of the year 1887 it would seem that in that decennial period the numbers of those denominated above as colored are not increasing in numbers, but instead have actually decreased.

The numbers of pure-blood negroes and mulattoes above mentioned comprise the survivors and descendants of those who in 1873 were slaves. The number of slaves set free in the year just given was about 31,000, and the cost to the island for their manumission is stated at 10,996,219 pesos, all of which has been paid save 21,801 pesos.

A census of Puerto Rico was taken in 1897, but the results were never published or even tabulated in full. Some of the returns have been available, while a portion have but just been discovered, and a small part are still missing. In the appendix will be found such data as are deemed of importance that could be extracted from these papers. They had never been collated before.

The enumeration of 1887 gave the total number of inhabitants as 806,700, of which number there could read and write, males, 57,216, and females, 39,681; making a total of 96,867, or 12 per cent. Those able to read only were reported as 14,513.

It is claimed that the number that can read and write at this time has a considerably larger ratio to the whole population than in 1887.

The statistics for 1887 report the number of legitimate births as 14,847, and illegitimate as 10,947, giving a total of 25,794, or 32 per 1,000, the percentage of legitimate births being much larger than in many of the islands owned by Great Britain.

The mortality in Porto Rico was reported at the rate of 26.8 per 1,000, which compares favorably with other countries, and is lower than in Madrid, St. Petersburg, Rome, Berlin, and Vienna.

The compendium of the Eleventh United States Census shows, from registration returns upward of 21,000,000 population, a death rate of 20.27 per 1,000.

In 1888 those receiving instruction in schools were reported as numbering 26,103, while those of age suitable for instruction must have been at least eight or ten times greater. Further data respecting education will be found elsewhere.

On March 27, 1898, an election was held in Puerto Rico for delegates to the insular house of representatives. At this election suffrage was accorded to all males over 25 years old who did not belong to the army or navy or had not been convicted of crime. One hundred and eight thousand one hundred and ninety-two ballots appear to have been cast.

Early in the present year the commanding general of the department

called for reports from alcaldes that would show the number in the respective jurisdictions who were eligible to be chosen as members of the town council. Only taxpayers were eligible under the then existing law, whose names were included in the upper two-thirds of those classed as such. The number of eligibles reported was 12,231. Three small municipalities were not reported.

A calculation was made by a local authority to show the number of electors, on the supposition that the franchise should be exercised only by male natives over 21 years of age who could read and write or were taxpayers of record. The numbers of these two classes are given as:

Those who could read and write	28,073
Those who were taxpayers	26,285
Total	54,358

On the 25th day of July, 1899, an election was held in Adjuntas for municipal officers, and the registration was made in conformity to General Orders, No. 112, c. s., Headquarters Department of Puerto Rico.

The order imposed the following qualifications for electors: Men over 21 years old, able to read and write, or who were taxpayers of record, who had been actual residents of the island for at least two years, and of the municipality for six months preceding the date of the election. The number who proved these qualifications before the board of registration was 906, out of a population, according to the census of 1897, of 18,505; that is, less than 5 per cent could vote under the conditions stated.

There was much public interest in this election, and it is believed that about all who were eligible were registered. This incident indicated that in the whole island there may be approximately 45,000 who could vote under the conditions of the order above referred to.

The class who can not fulfill these conditions, say 75 per cent of the males over 21 years of age, are usually in a state of abject poverty and ignorance, and are assumed to include one-fifth of the inhabitants.

They are of the class usually called peones. This word in Spanish America, under old laws, defined a person who owed service to his creditor until the debt was paid. While those laws are obsolete, the condition of these poor people remains much as before. So great is their poverty that they are always in debt to the proprietors or merchants. They live in huts made of sticks and poles covered with thatches of palm leaves. A family of a dozen may be huddled together in one room, often with only a dirt floor. They have little food worthy of the name and only the most scanty clothing, while children of less than 7 or 8 years of age are often entirely naked. A few may own a machete or a hoe, but more have no worldly possessions whatever. Their food is fruit, and if they are wage-earners, a little rice and codfish in addition.

They are without ambition and see no incentive to labor beyond the least that will provide the barest sustenance.

All over the island they can be seen to-day sitting beside their ruined huts, thinking naught of to-morrow, making no effort to repair and restore their cabins nor to replant for future food.

The remarks of Mr. James Anthony Froude in his work on The English in the West Indies apply with full force to these people:

> Morals in the technical sense they have none, but they can not be said to sin because they have no knowledge of law, and therefore they can commit no breach of

the law. They are naked and not ashamed. They are married but not parsoned. The women prefer the looser tie that they may be able to lose the man if he treats her unkindly, yet they are not licentious. * * * The system is strange, but it answers. * * * There is evil, but there is not the demoralizing effect of evil. They sin, but they sin only as animals, without shame, because there is no sense of doing wrong. They eat the forbidden fruit, but it brings with it no knowledge of the difference between good and evil. * * * They are innocently happy in the unconsciousness of the obligations of morality. They eat, drink, sleep, and smoke, and do the least in the way of work they can. They have no ideas of duty, and therefore are not made uneasy by neglecting it.

Between the negro and the peon there is no visible difference. It is hard to believe that the pale, sallow, and often emaciated beings are the descendants of the conquistadores who carried the flag of Spain to nearly all of South America, and to one-third of North America.

One family of industrious people, such as are found all over the United States, contributes more to the general prosperity and wealth of the country than ten families of these peones.

Among the merchant and proprietor classes there are many Spaniards and other foreigners, but nearly all such are actual residents of Puerto Rico. Among the cane growers are a few English, Americans, French, and Germans, but usually they are old residents. At this time there is but one sugar "central" being installed—this by American capital. All the tobacco growers and nearly all the coffee proprietors are natives or Spaniards.

PUBLIC ORDER—CRIMES AND PRISONS.

The distribution of troops has been such as to have available at all the centers of population ample force to repress all attempts, should any be made, to disturb the peace. At present the forces are located as follows:

At San Juan.—One troop of cavalry, 6 companies of infantry, 2 batteries of artillery, 2 companies Puerto Rico Battalion.
At Mayaguez.—Three troops of cavalry, 1 company Puerto Rico Battalion, 1 company of infantry.
At Ponce.—One troop of cavalry, 3 companies of infantry, 1 company Puerto Rico Battalion.
At Humacao.—One troop of cavalry.
At Lares.—One company of infantry.
At San German (subpost of Mayaguez).—One troop of cavalry.
At Adjuntas.—One troop of cavalry.
At Aibonito.—One troop of cavalry.
At Cayey.—One troop of cavalry.
At Arecibo.—One troop of cavalry.

DETACHMENTS.

At Las Marias.—One officer, one-half company.
At San Sebastian.—One officer, one-half company.
At Maricao.—One noncommissioned officer and 10 men.
At Yauco.—One officer and 25 men.
At Vieques.—One officer and 22 men.
At Guayama.—Two noncommissioned officers and 12 men.
At Cayuas.—Detachment of Puerto Rico Battalion.
At Utuado.—Two noncommissioned officers and 8 men.

The regular force, as will be seen, consists of one regiment of cavalry, one regiment of infantry, and two batteries of artillery. The battalion of native Puerto Ricans are specially useful, as they are acquainted with the country and the people, and speak the local language. They are principally employed as jail guards, and spare the

necessity for the employment of hired guards, etc. The commanding officers of these guards are also the inspectors of the jails.

There is also in the service a force of insular police of 400 men, all natives. They are distributed in small groups of from 5 to 10 men throughout the rural districts, and have been specially useful in arresting criminals and in preserving the peace. While this organization bears a resemblance to the Guardia Civil of the Spaniards and has some analogous duties, it differs from the latter radically in that it is not made the instrument of oppression as the former is said to have been. The insular police are held to the strictest obligation to observe the laws and to molest no one save the criminals. All who are arrested by it are immediately delivered to the nearest local magistrate, by whom, in the formal manner, the cases are disposed of as required by the penal code, and the guilty punished.

The cases of arrest are numerous. The offenses are usually personal assaults originating in the vendetta or they are predial larceny. During the period from the landing of the American troops last July to the withdrawal of the Spanish forces in October there was, as might be expected, much disorder. The evil-disposed classes rose against the Spaniards, and murders, robberies, and arson were common. It is claimed by some that property to the value of many million dollars was burned, and personal property and money in large amounts were seized and carried away. This lawlessness was not stopped until the American troops had taken control and established garrisons in the most disturbed districts.

The difficulties encountered by the United States Army in stopping these outrages were very great. All was strange to the officers and men—the country, the people, the laws, and the language.

Almost immediately after the signing of the peace protocol the withdrawal of the volunteers commenced, and, although considerable numbers remained, there were cases where thoroughly efficient protection could not be extended owing to the difficulties above noted. The murderers or robbers would take refuge in the remote parts where there were no roads and but few trails. It was sometimes impossible for the troops to follow the marauders to their haunts and it was very difficult to apprehend the criminals.

These conditions resulted in the creation of the insular police above referred to, which reports directly to the Governor-General. Their continued maintenance for some time to come is indispensable. The annual cost of the force to the insular treasury is about $165,000, or a little more than $400 per man per annum, for services, material, and food. One-fourth of the whole number are mounted men.

Spain maintained in Puerto Rico before the war a force of upward of 4,000 regular troops, about 1,600 more than the number now in the island, while the Spanish guardia civil had double the strength of the present insular police.

The former government, it is said, was administered with great rigor and the civil guards were the agents for apprehending violators of the laws and of royal decrees and orders. The accounts given of the barbarities practiced by these men tell of a condition that is scarcely conceivable. The island was peaceful, but it must have been such a peace as exists only where the inhabitants are subjected to a reign of terror.

With the departure of the Spanish forces came a swing of the pendulum to the opposite side. The pressure was released. The people, good and bad, had yet to learn and see that there could be no rule of

order or well-being without subjection to the ordinary requirements of organized society. It was difficult for them to conceive of a reign of law without display or constant exercise of force. Obedience to law for the common benefit of all seemed to them incomprehensible, and the inculcation of this doctrine has been far from easy. But notwithstanding the unfavorable conditions much progress has been made, though the advance from day to day and from month to month has been scarcely perceptible. But comparing the past with the present it is not difficult to recognize the general advance and progress toward a greatly improved system of administration, a system that will insure peace and tranquillity and that will furnish a fair opportunity for the island to prove its capacity and to take its place as one of the well-governed communities of the world.

The steps by which this result has been attained are stated in the circular of August 15 herewith and it is unnecessary to enumerate them a second time.

In any country where more than one half of the population is continually on the verge of starvation or are pinched by hunger; where labor, when employed at all, is remunerated only to the extent of from twenty to thirty five cents per day; where thousands upon thousands are unable to secure work at any rate; where only 10 or 15 per cent of the inhabitants can read and write; where the ordinary standards of public morality are largely ignored; where half the children are illegitimate; and, finally, where the functions of the government have been used to discourage, repress, or prevent initiative, and the people have no knowledge of any duty or obligation but to obey the orders of the governing classes—it would be strange if, under such conditions, murder was unknown, and pilfering, stealing, and plundering were uncommon. Let it be supposed that under conditions such as are recited a government of repression should be suddenly relaxed and for it another substituted, which these ignorant people have heard of as one under which freedom is the predominating characteristic; it would be still less strange if, when released from restraint, the tendency to lawlessness should greatly increase, and a reign of terror should take the place of a reign of oppression.

Although General Brooke announced upon assuming command that the existing local laws would be enforced by hold over officials, yet the latter were intimidated; and, knowing little or nothing of the laws and customs of the new sovereign, they were apathetic and largely helpless. They were overawed by the threats of the lawless, and the local police, if not in actual sympathy with the plunderers, were afraid to act. It was not until the United States troops had been generally distributed through these disturbed districts that the civil officers began to feel that they could have effective support.

While the native Puerto Ricans welcomed the American troops, the resident Spaniards would naturally deplore their coming. The number of this latter class was large, and if to the natives of the Peninsula are added the emigrants from the Canary and Balearic Islands (whose sympathies are largely with the former Spanish administration and government), the number of Spanish sympathizers would reach, perhaps, one-tenth of the total population of the island. There were also many other foreigners from the neighboring English, French, and Danish islands, and from Corsica, so that it is within the bounds of probability to say that approximately one-eighth of the residents of Puerto Rico were either of foreign nationality or not in sympathy with the nation which by conquest had acquired the sovereignty of Puerto Rico.

If industrial conditions change, insuring better remuneration for labor, and if the local administering of the laws shall be just and uniform, the state of society and public order will, it is hoped, assume conditions that will compare favorably with other tropical islands in these waters.

The official reports from the island of Barbados for the year 1898 show that the number of commitments in prisons and jails of that island aggregated 3,558, and the number committed by local magistrates which resulted in conviction numbered 9,134, in a total population of 189,000; that is, a total of convictions of 12,672, which is at the rate of 6.7 per cent of the population.

At the present time, while the condition of this island is peaceful, there are frequent cases of robbery and personal assault, often resulting in murder. That this crime should still be prevalent and far too common is not strange when we take note of the exceptional conditions that now exist, due to intensified destitution, the result of the destructions caused by the hurricane of August 8, referred to elsewhere in some detail.

The statistics of crime in the island are not full or complete. So far as can be learned, an annual report on this subject is not known here. Rules have been made that will secure from the alcaldes such reports in the future; but the frequent changes of local officials has made it impossible to collect data such as well-governed and well-administered communities render to the central government.

Connected with each of the courts of first instance there was always a jail in which were confined prisoners under sentence or awaiting trial. These institutions were supported from municipal expenditures. Each town in the district composing the jurisdiction of the court of first instance contributed to jail expenses in proportion to the population. But upon the arrival of the United States troops these quotas of expenses were greatly in arrears, and as a result the jail expenses remained unpaid for many months in nearly all towns.

The condition of the jails, as regards discipline, administration, and sanitation was reported to be very bad indeed. It was evident that the municipalities in their enfeebled and often chaotic condition could not or would not bear the burden. As before remarked, the jails have been consolidated into five, and, with the penitentiary in this city, there are six places where malefactors may be confined.

By order of a predecessor the whole expense of the jail support was assumed by the insular treasury. The total expense of this service for the current fiscal year was estimated at $232,000, but as it has been found practicable in many cases to substitute soldiers of the Puerto Rico battalion for the civil guards and turnkeys the total will probably be brought down to about $173,000 for the year.

In no jail or prison had it been the practice to require any labor of the prisoners, either of those undergoing confinement or of those awaiting trial. A reform in this respect has been instituted. Shops are being installed in the penitentiary, where articles for use in the prisons, clothing for those confined, and goods for sale are being manufactured, thus making some approach toward self-support. Men under sentence are required to do work on the roads and to do police work in the towns and cities. The manufactured product of prison industry, consisting principally of clothing, is used for the insane and the orphans.

THE CLERGY.

In the insular budget for several years past there has been carried an item of expenditure for the support of the Catholic clergy. The total for each of the fiscal years 1897–98, 1898–99 was stated at 163,610 pesos. Allowance for the priests continued at this rate until October 18, 1898, when the sovereignty of Puerto Rico was transferred to the United States. Since that date no further payments have been made, notwithstanding claims for a continuance by the local representative of the Catholic Church.

These claims are understood to be based on the treaty of Paris, and particularly on the second paragraph of Article VIII of that instrument. In further support of the claim it is asserted that for and in consideration of the stated allowance referred to above the Church, in 1857, by agreement between the Pope and the King, relinquished in favor of Spain certain tithes or "first fruits of the earth," which by long established custom had previous to that date been enjoyed by the clergy.

The claims preferred by the vicar capitular of Puerto Rico were, on June 29, 1899, forwarded for the action of the Secretary of War. Among these papers will be found a full exposition of the claim, and also a copy of the concordat between the Pope and the King of Spain.

It is very important to Puerto Rico that this question be speedily resolved.

Almost all the inhabitants, both native and foreign, are Catholic, or nominally so. In every town there are one or more churches, and in charge of each church there are one or more priests.

The control actually exercised over the people by these ecclesiastica is only nominal. Beyond the fact that nearly all the people are baptized by the priests, that the last rites of the Church are celebrated at their funerals, and that such as are married at all are married by the priests, the visible evidences of the influences of the clergy are very few. Many thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, never enter a church save to attend a christening, a wedding, or a funeral. Until cockfighting was prohibited this barbarous sport was much better patronized than the Sunday services. Sunday schools for teaching the catechism are seldom held, or, if held, are not well attended. A request has been made by the vicar capitular to permit religious instruction of children in the village and rural schools during hours when the buildings are not occupied by the regular instructors, the teaching of the catechism to be given by the priests, and by representatives of other religions.

There are a few Protestant churches in the island—perhaps half a dozen in all—the attendance being made up largely of newly arrived foreigners and Americans.

While no formal claims have as yet been preferred by the representative of the Catholic Church for restoration to the Church of certain public buildings and lands, it is understood that it is the intention of that representative to claim ownership to several valuable structures in San Juan and to ask for surrender to him of the property. The basis of these claims is understood to be that said edifices belonged originally to certain religious orders, but were taken possession of by Spain without good reason and held as public property, finally being transferred as such to the United States. Some of the most valuable lots in San Juan are understood to be included in this category.

EDUCATION.

Herewith is submitted the report of the board of education, in which the former and present conditions respecting public education are discussed. From the census of 1887 it is learned that the number of Puerto Ricans who could read and write in that year were 96,867 (age limit not given), and in addition those who could read only (same limitation) were 14,513, out of a total of 806,708 of all ages.

The proportion of inhabitants of the United States who are less than 10 years of age is very nearly 24.3 per cent of the whole. Assuming that this numerical relation of those less than 10 years of age is applicable to Puerto Rico, then there would be 610,678 in this island who are more than 10 years of age.

The proportion of the inhabitants of the United States who are more than 10 years of age and who can not read and write is given by compendium, Eleventh Census, as 13.34 per cent. If the ratio of illiteracy in this island were the same as in the Union, then of the 610,678 stated above there would be 529,234 who could read and write. I assume that the 96,867 reported as so able are all over 10 years of age. The census records for Puerto Rico, year 1887, would indicate that of the class of persons, assumed to be 10 years old and upward, who have not the degree of education stated, there are here 514,811; or, in other words, of those who can not read and write there are:

	Per 100.
In the United States	13.34
In Porto Rico	84.14

But, as before stated, the figures for this island are based on the census records of 1887, the accuracy of which can not be verified, and further it is assumed that all who were reported as able to read and write were more than 10 years of age.

In some towns the percentage of the inhabitants having a knowledge of reading and writing is as low as 5, while in others it is as high as 18, and in one as high as 46.

In each municipality, under the Spanish régime, was a board of education, and these boards are still in office. As municipal elections are held, new boards will be elected by the qualified electors. In more than one instance persons have been found serving as members of local boards of education who could not read or write.

In a few towns there are some poor school buildings owned by the municipality, but there is not one that, as respects its construction and equipment, conforms to modern ideas of essentials.

In the report of the insular board of education will be found much valuable data respecting a great variety of subjects cognate to education and social conditions, and special attention is invited to this valuable paper.

The board of education consists of two Americans and three Puerto Ricans, two of the latter serving gratuitously.

The education laws of Puerto Rico were all revised and greatly changed shortly before the undersigned assumed his present duties. The revision was prepared by Mr. John Eaton, who was formerly Commissioner of Education in the United States. These new school laws were approved and promulgated by Major-General Henry, then commanding the Department of Puerto Rico.

The changes which result from the new code are very radical and have been subject to some complaint, but a return to the old system was not felt to be justified. If, considering the subject *de novo*, so radical a measure would not have been adopted, but instead a procedure

on the lines of gradual adaptation; for it has been found that, in general, it is not the laws which cause abuses but rather their bad administration.

Were home rule to be now established it is believed that the tendency would be to not only revert to the old methods, but also to dispense with the services of the Americans who are engaged in implanting the new educational system and performing most valuable work.

The amounts carried by the insular budget under the head of "Public instruction," for the fiscal year 1898–99, all reduced to dollars, were:

General budget of the island	$54,559.27
Provincial deputation, insular	35,472.00
Total	90,031.27
Besides there were municipal appropriations for educational purposes of	203,373.00
Making a total for the whole island for public instruction of	293,404.27
For the present fiscal year the appropriations carried by the insular budget for education are	330,050.00
And by municipal budgets	83,063.57
Making a total of	413,113.57

The total appropriations for all purposes of government for the last fiscal year were:

General budget of the island	$2,674,396 00
Provincial deputation (insular)	194,755.73
Municipal budgets (1897-98)	1,618,769.72
Total appropriations	4,487,921.84

The current year's appropriations for all purposes are:

General budget of the island	$1,943,678.11
Municipal budgets	1,429,981.26
Total	3,373,659.37

Therefore the ratio borne by the school appropriation to the whole expenditure of the island for 1898–99 is 6.53+ to 100; for 1899–1900 is 12.24+ to 100.

Applying this ratio of 12.24+ to 100 for 1899–1900, to the total appropriation for all insular purposes for the preceding year, the total for schools would have risen to $549,321, a sum equal to 16.28 per cent of the budget for the current year; in other words, out of a revenue and expenditure of $4,187,921.84 counted on by Spain for 1898–99, there would have had to be allotted to schools the sum of $549,321.63 to make her allowances for this most important branch of service equal the proportion of revenue applied to it under the United States military rule.

The Eleventh Census Compendium gives for the United States a total of persons of school age, 5 to 17 years, as 15,207,691 out of a population of 62,622,250, or very nearly 30 per cent.

The total population for Puerto Rico for the year 1897 was given as 890,911. If the ratio of these ages to all ages in the United States were applied to Puerto Rico, there should be found here over 267,000 children of age suitable for public instruction.

It will be seen by the report of the board of education that the number registered last year as attending school in Puerto Rico was:

Boys	19,804
Girls	9,368
Total	29,172

While the attendance was:

Boys	14,720
Girls	7,153
Total	21,873

Therefore but very slightly more than 8 per cent received instruction, leaving untaught in any way over 245,000.

To provide schoolhouses and equipment for all schools needed would probably cost, for very plain accommodations, not less than $1,500,000; and besides this original outlay, a further annual expenditure would be required of not less than an equal sum, or at the rate of $5 per capita for, say, 300,000 pupils, a rate much lower than is customary in the United States.

This indicates the proportions and magnitude of the task that confronts the people of Puerto Rico in their efforts to secure for the island a prominent place among the educated and enlightened communities of the world.

In the States of the Union it is a common practice to make a general tax levy for the support of schools, in pursuance to a general policy that has been adopted by the people, speaking through their State legislatures. The State boards of education, therefore, are able to make their plans for years in advance, and know long beforehand what will be the amount of means available for school purposes.

In Puerto Rico there has been no such policy pursued. About one-third of the revenues for schools were derived from the general treasury, and the remainder had to be provided by the municipalities. The amount was never more than sufficient to educate a few of the children, and this has had the result that might be expected—a small educated class and a large illiterate one. The educated and well-to-do are those who control the municipal and other government machinery. The poor and ignorant have but to obey, and the gulf that separates the peons from the ruling classes is impassable.

In the brief period of military occupation it has not been found practicable to develop and apply a general tax law. It results, then, that all branches of the public service must be supported directly from the public treasury through allotment of means that are available. This year no more could be done than to apply to education a sum about three and a half times larger than Spain allowed. Municipalities are in this way relieved of a part of the burden, as they have been entirely relieved of jail expenses (see chapter on public order, etc.), but the councils of these towns prepare their own budgets, and they have greatly reduced their allowances for education, averaging much more than half reduction, certainly not an encouraging outlook for the illiterate youths that swarm all over the island.

I have quoted some general statistics of the United States respecting illiteracy, but considering in detail those that relate to one of our territorial divisions, little justification can be found for criticism of Puerto Rico, or indeed of her former rulers.

On September 22, 1846, General Kearney published a code of laws for New Mexico, and after four years of military rule the territory of this

name was erected into a temporary government by an act of Congress. It has been endowed with Territoral autonomy since that date, 1850, but Congress has not yet seen fit to confer upon it full statehood.

The first enumeration of the population of New Mexico was made in 1850. The inhabitants are stated to have numbered 61,547. Of course they were all, or nearly all, natives whose tongue was Spanish. Although there were many wild Indians in the Territory, there was no enumeration of them and none of the civilized Indians until 1860, when the number of the latter was reported as 10,080. The Compendium of the Eleventh Census gives the population of New Mexico as 153,593, of whom 8,554 were civilized Indians. The number over 10 years of age who could not speak English is stated as 73,271. The whole number of persons less than 10 years of age is given as 44,521; therefore, those more than 10 years of age numbered 109,072. Since 73,271 of these could not speak English, it follows that but 35,801 could do so. Yet in the year 1890 New Mexico expended $4.66 per capita of pupils enrolled, who numbered 23,620.

Data is not at hand as to the number of New Mexicans who could speak English in 1850, but it is safe to assume that very few indeed could do so. The above shows that after fifty three years under United States laws only 1 person in 4 over 10 years of age could speak the official language of the country. How many of those ignorant of English could read or write Spanish is also unknown, but the number certainly could not be large.

It is not a violent assumption to say that 3 out of 5 of the people living in New Mexico can not to day read and write any language. Personal knowledge of New Mexico is the justification for the statement that the native New Mexicans and Pueblo Indians are not much more, if at all, advanced in intelligence, wealth, and industry beyond the poor class in Puerto Rico. Along the valley of the Rio Grande to its mouth the same conditions prevail.

THE JUDICIARY.

The reorganization of the courts and legal procedure caused most concern. In Puerto Rico was found a supreme court of seven members, two audiencias of three members each, and, in addition, twelve courts of first instance and instruction. Their jurisdiction and procedure were complicated, and there were great difficulties and delays attendant upon criminal and civil trials. The codes of law and regulations in force were numerous and voluminous, and the whole system was un American and strange. General Orders, No. 118, herewith, has just been issued, giving a basis for a new judicial system. The courts and their jurisdiction are projected on the usually established system of State courts in the American Union. It was not easy to bring this about, but by dint of constant efforts with full and free discussion, a unanimous recommendation for a departure from the old system and the installation of these new courts was made by the judicial board. But this was easier than to effect an abandonment of the Spanish procedure. At last this was accomplished, and a general order promulgated prescribing a procedure which, while in many respects not fully American, is a wide departure from that prevailing heretofore.

One member of the judicial board remarked in respect to it that now a litigant or criminal would have a decision in four months which formerly required four years.

Under the new order of things there are still crudities, and many

requirements and rules strange to American lawyers and judges, but one by one these will disappear, and ultimately a much more complete harmony of the Puerto Rican with the American system of procedure will come into being.

As respects changes in the laws of the land—the penal code, the civil code, the law of contracts, etc., and indeed the whole written law of Puerto Rico—the course pursued is one of gradual adaptation. It has been stated that the insular commission has written an entire code for this island, which is to be offered for adoption. With all deference to the distinguished gentlemen who compose that commission, it is suggested that the abitrary installation at this time of any system, no matter how perfect, would be most unfortunate, as tending to defeat the very object sought to be accomplished.

While any code of laws drafted by Americans and officially approved would be respected, yet it would not be understood; it would have to be applied by lawyers and judges who do not understand, and who will not be able to understand for some time, the common law of Anglo-Saxon peoples.

This was well illustrated by example here. Proceedings under the writ of habeas corpus were authorized, this on the recommendation of the then secretary of justice: but through inability to understand the real purpose of the writ, it has been practically a dead-letter. One case did arise, but an error occurred in its application. This, however, has been explained; and gradually the use of this instrument for the protection of the rights of those charged with crime will be better understood.

The system of laws that prevail here is the outgrowth of quite a thousand years of human experience, and can not be struck down or radically changed in a day, nor yet in a year. In the administration of those of her colonies that were formerly under the sovereignty of other states, England has pursued the wise policy of respecting and preserving the former laws and customs. For example: British Guiana still has a code of laws implanted there largely by the Dutch colonists; so the Province of Quebec and the island of Mauritius have codes largely based on the ancient French-Roman law; and many more examples might be cited. In our own country California still preserves in its laws some features of the old Spanish Mexican code in force there at the time of its conquest. It is to be hoped the same practice will follow here, should an autonomical government be finally established for this island.

The educated people of Puerto Rico—and there are many who are learned and highly accomplished—and the commercial and industrial proprietors as well as the plain people are living under a highly organized, though complicated, system of laws and customs. They are jealous of their rights, and with the advent of American sovereignty they look for an extension of those rights. It is also true that they may not have a fair conception of the responsibilities that must always accompany an extension of privileges, but they are highly sensitive and even jealous of encroachments. Great care has been observed to respect existing prejudices, even though such respect may not comport with the extreme views of some resident Americans and some at home who wish to see the island "Americanized," as they call it, in a day.

The island is densely populated, there being well on to 1,000,000 people here. It was easy to "Americanize" the sparsely settled regions of the West, acquired by conquest and purchase, for there society had no organization and there was no civilized population to be amalgamated.

In a paper herewith, prepared by Major Sharpe, judge-advocate of

the department, will be found a description of the former judicial organization under Spain, and in another inclosure—Circular from Headquarters Department of Puerto Rico, of August 15—and in copies of general orders, also herewith, will be found considerable data respecting the measures put into operation for the adaptation of the former judiciary and its procedure to methods with which the people of the United States are familiar.

Omitting details, which will be found in accompanying papers, the present situation may be stated as follows:

The insular courts have been reduced in number from 15 to 6; the number of prisons and jails from 1 penitentiary and 11 jails to 1 penitentiary and 5 jails. Each of the 69 towns still retains a municipal court, but on a modified and improved basis. At each town there is also a "lockup."

Those who are arrested and charged with crimes have a prospect of speedy trial, and any criminal who feels that he is wrongly deprived of his liberty may, through the writ of habeas corpus, have a hearing before a judge, who will dispose of the matter according to the rules of right and justice.

The district courts have been in operation but a few weeks, and have as yet many cases on their dockets. It is hoped that within a short time they will be able to dispose of the accumulation of the cases turned over to them. One district court—that at Humacao—is reported as having its docket cleared up to date. This is the first time that such a thing has happened in the history of the island.

When the control of the civil affairs of the island was taken over by the United States on October 18, 1898, there were in the jails a very large number of prisoners, of whom some had been tried and many more were awaiting trial. Among the latter were a number of marauders, who had been arrested during the so-called interregnum, or shortly thereafter. Some of these offenders were charged with violation of United States statutory laws, and others were members of bandit organizations. For the trial and punishment of such offenders resort was had to military commissions, and a considerable number were adjudged guilty by such commissions. Upon approval of the proceedings by the commanding general they were imprisoned in the local jails, where they served or are serving their sentences.

But as the military commission is an instrumentality for the enforcement of the laws of war, the use of that means of administering justice ceased on April 11, 1899, the date of the proclamation of the President announcing the termination of hostilities with Spain.

But the trials by commissions could not be had in a great many other cases, where the jurisdiction lay with local courts. So slow had been the procedure that there had been congregated in the jails large numbers of malefactors that were awaiting action by the local courts, and had been so waiting for many months or years. Everything possible was done to expedite these proceedings. When the witnesses had disappeared, or the offenders had been incarcerated for a long time, the accused were released by military order.

For the trial of offenders who were charged with the violation of United States law—i. e., such cases as would in the United States be tried by the United States Federal courts—a provisional court was created under authority of the President. It consisted of a law judge and two members (the latter being army officers), with an American lawyer as prosecuting attorney. By this court a large number of cases have been disposed of and punishment has been awarded to the guilty.

Its procedure is that of the United States courts, and there have been a few trials by jury, two in cases of capital crimes.

The proceedings of this court are attentively observed by some of the local courts and lawyers as illustrative of the methods followed in the United States in administering justice, and of what may be expected to prevail here. The local courts are:

(1) The supreme court of appeals, consisting of six judges and a prosecuting attorney. It has original jurisdiction only in cases of impeachment of judges of lower courts.

(2) Five district courts, consisting each of three judges and a prosecuting attorney.

(3) Sixty-nine municipal courts, one in each town in the island.

A map is inclosed showing the five judicial districts.

THE CURRENCY.

As is well known, the circulating medium of Puerto Rico previous to American occupation was principally the provincial silver, coined at the mints of Madrid and Sevilla, and put in circulation in this island at the close of the year 1895, displacing the Mexican silver that for some years had been in use. The exchange was an arbitrary one, made at the rate of 100 Mexican to 95 Puerto Rican, a discount of 5 per cent in favor of the latter.

The provincial silver peso, which thereupon came into use, is of the same weight and fineness as the Spanish peso. The fractional silver, in denominations of 5, 10, 20, and 40 centavos, is of the same weight and fineness as the Spanish coins of the same denominations, and of the French franc and its multiples.

All the provincial pesos appear to have been struck in 1895, while the fractional silver coins are of the years 1895 and 1896. There is no provincial coinage of copper; but Spanish centavos and double centavos were shipped to the island and used instead. In order to identify the coppers for use in Puerto Rico they were usually punched, the customs officials forbidding the exportation of such.

It appears that the number of provincial pesos coined was 8,360,000 and the nominal value of fractional silver was 1,060,000 pesos, making a total Spanish coinage of provincial silver of 9,360,000 pesos. But the volume of Mexican silver to be withdrawn was overestimated, as it amounted to only 6,426,393 pesos. It is claimed that the amount represented by the difference, i. e.—2,933,607 pesos—was never put in circulation, but was returned to Spain during the years 1896 and 1897.

The sum of $480,000 in gold was also sent from Spain to Puerto Rico, but of this amount $410,916 was returned to Spain in January and February, 1898, leaving in the island only $69,084 of the original shipment. The amount of Spanish gold now here is very small.

Spanish copper coins to the value of 70,000 pesos were also sent to Puerto Rico, so that the total amount of the provincial money that remained in the island was as follows:

	Pesos.
Provincial silver	6,426,393
Gold	69,084
Spanish copper centavos	70,000
Total	6,565,477

This information is taken from a paper prepared by the civil secretary, Mr. Coll y Toste, with title "Statement of amounts spent in the exchange of Mexican money, 1895," which appears in the appendix herewith.

It is impossible to ascertain more than approximately what is now the volume of the circulating medium. Some light is thrown upon this by Mr. Carlos Soler, the subdirector of the Banco Español de Puerto Rico, whose letter dated August 10, 1898, will be found in the appendix. He estimates the amount of provincial silver placed in circulation at 6,576,000 pesos and the copper at 70,000 pesos, giving a total of 6,646,000 pesos. Disregarding the gold noted in Mr. Coll y Toste's statement, it would appear that Mr. Soler's total exceeds the other by about 149,000 pesos.

Respecting the volume of this Puerto Rican coinage remaining in circulation at this time, no better information is at hand than that contained in Mr. Soler's letter, cited above. It will be seen that he places the silver at 5,875,000 pesos and the copper at 45,000 pesos, giving a total of 5,920,000 pesos. He also states that the estimated sum of 600,000 pesos has been sent or taken out of the country by the returning Spanish troops and private individuals; but as this silver peso is worth in Puerto Rico about 20 cents more than anywhere else, it is safe to assume that it will all drift back here in time, and therefore it should be taken into account in any study of the currency of this island.

As respects the volume of American money now circulating, it is impossible to furnish a satisfactory estimate. Although the army disbursements in the island have been several millions, it is believed that most of it has been sent back to the United States. It came usually in bills, a form convenient for cheap conveyance and transmission by post. Merchants and others wishing to remit to New York or Europe are in the habit of buying American currency and sending the same to New York in registered letters, buying there European exchange for such amounts as they may wish to remit to London, Paris, or Madrid. Bank bills are therefore at a premium over American gold, for the latter can only be shipped by express at much greater cost than the postage or registration expenses of parcels by mail.

It is presumed to be the policy of the Government, and the wish of the people of the United States, as it certainly is of the business men of Puerto Rico, to have American money displace the local coinage. The funds sent here for army disbursements should be in silver, nickel, and copper. As before stated, paper money soon disappears, while metallic money would be much more likely to make its way into general circulation and remain here. In this way the inhabitants would much more quickly become familiar with United States currency; but the fact should not be lost sight of that the peso is the money of the country and will so remain until it is forcibly withdrawn.

In the present prostrated condition which affects all industries, the volume of Puerto Rican money, together with the bills of the Spanish Bank (the latter amounting to about 1,000,000 pesos) is ample for all needs. On August 10 there were stored in three local banks the sums of 2,691,500 pesos in silver and over 800,000 pesos in bills of a local bank.

The provincial circulation being ample, it follows that the United States currency, which is strange to the people, is in small demand in commercial transactions.

The army disbursements amount, approximately, to $200,000 per month, but this money inevitably drifts to the banks and does not go into circulation. The estimated amount of American money now in the bank vaults is $253,598.98, as shown by data recently obtained from the cashiers.

The only way to force American money into circulation, save arbitrarily, is to withdraw the pesos, thereby creating such a deficiency as will result in the American money leaving the vaults.

While the insular accounts are all kept in American currency, and disbursements made therein, many municipalities, and almost all merchants, keep their accounts in the provincial denominations. The peso and centavo are still the money of the people, and no great progress has been made in displacing them. Our currency, having the value of gold, is still an article of merchandise.

Early in the summer, when the demand for means to move the crops was active, the private rate of exchange of pesos for dollars was to the disadvantage of the latter (considering the official rate of 1.66⅔ as a standard), the ruling rate being about 1.63 for $1. But now that the exports have greatly fallen off, and next year's production will probably not be half as great as this year's, the bank rate of exchange is reversed, and stands at about 1.68 Puerto Rican for $1 American.

While American money was received in private transactions for less than 1.66⅔—the official rate of exchange—a condition of things existed greatly to the disadvantage of the laborers who were paid from insular funds. American money was available for disbursements, and, in the interim, when no other local coins were in general circulation, the merchant imposed rates of exchange that were most onerous. Now, however, while the peso is at a disadvantage, there is no difficulty in securing pesos, pesetas, and centavos. Nevertheless, in one respect the result is the same; namely, that American money is kept out of circulation; and this seems apt to continue until Puerto Rican silver is withdrawn.

This result is not likely to be soon, or indeed ever, reached without legislation, and the character the latter should take is obvious, namely, the gradual retirement of the peso by some equitable means.

The relative value of the peso to the silver dollar—bullion value—is stated by the Secretary of the Treasury to be as 93.5 to 100. The undersigned is not advised as to the present market value of silver, but this is supposed to be such as to make the bullion value of the United States dollar about 43 cents, which would give the peso a similar value of about 40 cents.

As before stated, so long as an exchange value for the peso is arbitrarily fixed at 60, this provincial money will remain in the island, or any that finds its way to foreign countries will certainly drift back, unless it be melted and recoined.

It is not seen that any good result would be had from the recoining of these Spanish-Puerto Rican pesos into American-Puerto Rican coin, unless it be the will of Congress to treat this island indefinitely as a possession, and to require that it shall be self-sustaining.

If such a special coin were struck and made exchangeable at par for United States money, dollar for peso, the value of the latter would, of course, be the same as the former; but the same result would be more easily reached if provincial money were replaced arbitrarily by that of the United States. In this case there would be no need of a special coin.

The local exchange value of the peso has always been greater than its bullion value, and this fact was evidently recognized when an arbitrary value of 60 was given it by Executive order. The fluctuations in exchange have been very great in the past, the peso at times approaching a value of 70 and at others falling below 60, as referred to gold.

Were the substitution of local for national money to be decided on at the bullion value of the former, there would be a loss for somebody of nearly 60 per cent, and if this loss was placed upon the holders of the local money it would result in great economic and industrial disas-

ter. Its effect would be so grave and so obvious that it is not conceivable that such an exchange could be approved by wise financiers.

Suppose the amount of local money in Puerto Rico, including what would return here, to be, say, 6,500,000, then the aggregate of the loss by such substitution would be nearly 4,000,000 pesos.

If the substitution be made at the present official rate, the loss should this island have to bear it to Puerto Rico would approximate 2,400,000 pesos.

Local business men and native officials of the military government have argued that it would be but just and equitable to establish a new official rate of exchange of 133 to 100, which would make the peso worth 75 cents American money, and to effect the substitution on this basis. In such case the difference to be made good by Puerto Rico would be 1,625,000 pesos. They urge that when the island shall have free trade with the United States the industrial development will be so great, and the economic conditions so much improved, that the expense of this change could be borne without hardships.

If the trade conditions between this island and the United States remain as at present only industrial paralysis can be expected. But if, on the other hand, the productions of Puerto Rico can be admitted free into the Union there will be brought about a condition justifying the prediction that the island can carry and finally discharge the entire burden of an exchange of the present currency for the American on the basis of the bullion value of the peso.

With trade conditions such as are suggested there will be a very great revival of business and an enormous increase in productions. After a few years for development on those lines it will not be at all difficult to increase internal taxation by three or four million dollars annually. In that case half a million a year could be applied to reimbursing the National Treasury for the benefit conferred on Puerto Rico in giving it a currency having parity everywhere with gold.

If there is not a revival and increase in production the island must remain as now, or reach a worse condition, and it will be unable to meet the cost of the substitution, even at 25 per cent discount.

This all leads to the suggestion of the practicability and wisdom of retiring the Puerto Rican currency and replacing it with Treasury and national-bank notes, gold, silver, nickel, and copper coins of the Union, the cost of the exchange to be borne at first by the United States, and the indebtedness thus incurred to be wiped out gradually by the island in annual installments.

In effecting remittances to the United States and to foreign countries the merchants are having recourse to the postal money order, for which the charge and costs is three tenths of 1 per cent, while bankers' exchange on New York costs one half of 1 per cent in large sums and three fourths of 1 per cent for small amounts. These postal money orders are here bought in pesos at the official rate of exchange and at home are cashed in dollars.

The fact of the large remittances gave rise to the suspicion in some minds that the Puerto Ricans were systematically converting into dollars their native silver, worth 60 cents under existing orders, whereas its bullion value was only about 41 cents.

It was also suggested that, as the postal orders were usually, or frequently, paid for in new pesos, the latter must be coming to the island from some source not legitimate. The fact was called to mind that the original coinage was over 9,000,000 provincial money, more than 2,500,000 of which was afterwards returned to Spain. It was intimated that per-

haps these coins were again coming to Puerto Rico or that new pieces were being struck from the original dies.

These beliefs and apprehensions have not been shared. It is scarcely conceivable that Spain should have stored in her treasury for over three years nearly 3,000,000 of useless silver—this during a period when, it is understood, Spain was herself a large borrower. Besides, it is stated that this surplus Puerto Rican silver was immediately recoined into Spanish pieces.

That Spain should permit the use of the Puerto Rican dies in coining pesos to ship to this island is not believed to be possible. The gain of two-tenths of 1 per cent in exchange that is secured by using the postal service as a means of remittance in payment of balances is a sufficient explanation of the matter. That the coins proffered in payment of the orders on New York are new is explained by the fact that up to the present time there have been lying in the banks and merchants' safes two or three millions of Puerto Rican pesos that had never been removed from the original paper envelopes in which they were packed at the mints.

It has recently been brought to attention that some copper coins of Spanish mintage were being shipped out of the country. It is found that all centavos so shipped were unpunched or unmarked, and it seems that they are worth in Spain enough more than here to justify their return to the Peninsula.

Of course a continuance of this movement would strip the island of copper coin, but as nearly all here in circulation are punched, and therefore unreceivable in Spain, there is little likelihood of any extensive shipment.

The centavo is a very important coin to the natives, especially to the poor, who have little use for any other money. The United States cent pieces are not yet in common use locally, and it is probable that but a few thousand are in circulation in the island.

TRADE STATISTICS, ETC.

The value of the three principal exports for the calendar years 1895, 1896, and 1897 were as follows, in pesos:

Year.	Coffee.	Tobacco.	Sugar and molasses.
1895	9,492,212	698,225	4,606,540
1896	13,864,340	422,912	4,246,104
1897	12,222,599	1,194,318	4,411,518
Total	35,579,151	2,315,455	13,264,162

or a total for three years of 51,158,768 pesos, and an average of 17,052,922 per annum, which was but slightly above the mean of the three previous years.

The exports to Spain during the years of 1895, 1896, and 1897 were as follows, in pesos:

Year.	Coffee.	Tobacco.	Sugar and molasses.
1895	2,302,220	262,093	395,123
1896	3,869,632	237,012	1,318,319
1897	3,563,920	141,720	1,272,884
Total	9,735,772	640,825	2,986,326

or a total in three years of 13,362,923, and an average of 4,454,307 pesos.

The exportation to Cuba during the same triennial period was valued, in pesos, as follows:

Year.	Coffee.	Tobacco.
1895	3,382,719	411,565
1896	3,674,288	128,483
1897	2,048,563	990,808
Total	9,105,570	1,530,856

or a total of 10,636,426 pesos, and an average of 3,545,475 pesos per annum.

Combining the exportation to the Peninsula with that to Cuba, a total is given of 23,999,349 pesos, or a yearly mean of 7,999,783 pesos.

Therefore very nearly one-half the aggregate value of those three Puerto Rican staple products found a market in countries the doors of which have been practically closed to this island since the American occupation. The remainder of the coffee and tobacco found markets in France, Germany, England, and Italy, while nearly all the sugar went to the United States.

American sovereignty for Puerto Rico has so far been disastrous to its commerce, for it has deprived the island of markets where were sold nearly one-half of its total output. It is true that some slight commercial benefit has resulted from the change of nationality, considering that import duties have been lowered and export duties abolished, but, no matter what be the rate of taxation on imports, the concession is of little value while the power of purchase is taken away. The true measure of the purchasing capacity of all nonmanufacturing countries is their capacity to produce and send to market their home productions.

If the present trade conditions are to continue it is not difficult to foretell the future of Puerto Rico. At the present time there is but one new sugar mill being erected, and those who are investing their capital in this enterprise—Americans—are doing so because they believe that sugar will soon be admitted free into the United States. But for this belief the enterprise would not have been undertaken. I am not in possession of data giving the number of existing cane mills; I presume the number would reach 300, but the ruins of many such structures can be seen here and there, abandoned because the owner could not afford to improve his machinery—in other words, abandoned or idle—because the business does not pay.

The sugar export of the island has fallen from a total of 170,000 tons in 1879 to 57,000 tons in 1897. On the basis of the ruling price of sugar that prevailed here during the years 1895–1899, inclusive, about 2 cents per pound, no new mill will be erected; and as the old ones get beyond economical repair they will be abandoned and the cane lands pertaining thereto will be used only to pasture cattle.

The average export of sugar for 1897 and 1898 was about 4,000,000 pesos; that for this year will be about the same, and next year's crop will not exceed this figure, supposing that all the mills grind; but if those that have been leveled with the ground or greatly damaged by the recent hurricane are not repaired and reestablished the crop will hardly exceed 3,000,000 pesos in value.

Puerto Rico imports and exports, 1890 to 1897.

[In provincial currency.]

Year.	Imports.	Exports.	Excess imports over exports.	Excess exports over imports.
1890	18,230,385	10,710,519	7,519,866	
1891	16,864,764	9,885,999	6,978,765	
1892	17,081,610	16,076,312	1,005,298	
1893	17,320,454	16,745,393	575,061	
1894	19,778,587	17,295,536	2,483,051	
1895	17,446,065	15,798,590	1,647,475	
1896	18,995,793	19,000,663		4,870
1897	17,858,063	18,574,618		716,555
Total	143,575,721	124,087,630	20,209,516	721,425

From the foregoing it will be seen that the average exports for eight years have been 15,510,953 pesos and the average imports 17,946,965 pesos, or an excess of imports over exports of 2,436,012 pesos; also that during the years 1896 and 1897 the balance was the other way, or in favor of exports by a little more than 720,000 pesos in the two years.

AGRICULTURE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT.

The superficies of the island of Puerto Rico is stated at 3,668 square miles, which is the equivalent of 2,347,520 acres, but the Spanish statistics give this as 2,090,181 cuerdas, which is equal to 2,100,632 acres.

The area under some kind of culture is given in same statistics as 298,825 cuerdas; the area in pasture at 1,127,086 cuerdas, and the area barren or in woods and swamp at 664,270 cuerdas.

The lands now devoted to some kind of culture are stated in cuerdas as follows: Cane, 61,556; coffee, 122,358; tobacco, 4,227; maize, beans, and rice, 93,508; native fruits, 17,176. It follows, therefore, that three-fourths of all the land are either in pasture or wholly unimproved.

Much of the pasture land has in the past been cultivated in cane, and much more might be on a basis of 3½ cents per pound for sugar. Not one-fourth of the land adapted to coffee is now devoted to that berry.

The area applicable to tobacco is very much larger than now utilized. The quality of this product can be very greatly improved.

The domestic animals, as given in last statistical reports, 1897, number as follows: Horses, 67,751; mules, 4,467; donkeys, 717; bovine animals, 303,612; sheep, 2,055; goats, 5,779, and swine, 13,441. Their aggregate value is stated at 8,300,736 pesos.

The value of the land, as returned for taxation by its owners, was 48,694,584 pesos; but this is believed to be far below its real value. This appraisal takes no account of buildings, which represent a large additional sum.

It is safe to say that the agricultural wealth of the island, including cattle, is considerably above 100,000,000 pesos.

The soil and climate favor the cultivation of many tropical products, such as bananas, plantains, etc., not now grown for export. Other West India islands now supply 30,000,000 bunches of bananas annually, and their land is no better adapted to the growing of this fruit than is that of Puerto Rico.

Oranges, limes, and pineapples, all of excellent quality, may be produced for export. At present these are grown here only for home consumption. Sisal hemp may be produced here as well as in Yucatan

and the Bahamas. Cacao rivaling that from Venezuela is grown, but not in sufficient quantities to supply local needs, although the area adapted to it is very extensive.

The demand for and price of gum caoutchouc is increasing rapidly throughout the tropics, while trees of a size suitable for yielding the gum are being rapidly destroyed by the tapping that the trunk must undergo in order that the gum may be obtained.

Experiments for producing this material from twigs and shoots by grinding the small branches, extracting and evaporating the juice, as is done with sugar cane, is said to have resulted successfully in Mexico. Should the full reports of these experiments bear out the advance statements, there should be no delay in an experimental planting of the india rubber tree, and if the results justify it a new and very valuable product may be added to those already supplied by Puerto Rico.

There are many other productions of the tropics that may be found adapted to this climate and soil, and every effort should be made to discover the most suitable so as to diversify production.

The entire industrial future of the island depends on agriculture: it has, and can have, no other reliance, and this fact must never be overlooked in considering any measures with a view to the development of its wealth.

There is a superabundance of labor here; no other West India island except Barbados is so densely populated. But labor is increasing much more rapidly than the capacity of the island to employ it, and the natural consequence is low wages.

In any country where labor is rewarded by compensation of but about 20 or 30 cents per day, the prospect of speedily reaching a high state of civilization and industry must not be expected. The wage rate throughout nearly all Spanish speaking American territory is not above the figures given. In the British, French, Dutch, and Danish West Indies, the laborer receives only from 16 to 25 cents per day for his services. In Brazil, whence comes over 70 per cent of the world's coffee supply, the cost of labor is but about 10 to 15 cents per day. If higher rates than now are ever paid here it will only be when better prices are obtained for home productions.

So great is the bounty of nature here that the inhabitants can live—that is, exist—without any remuneration. Work not being a necessity, therefore, the present incentive to labor is so small that it seems to matter little to the average peon whether or not he is employed at all. On the other hand, if wages were to be largely increased, there would come hordes of immigrants from neighboring islands to share the benefit unless this was prevented by the adoption of restrictive measures.

SUGAR.

Better rates of labor than now prevail can not be expected until there is an advance in the price of the principal products. Were the sugar planter now confronted with the necessity of paying 50 cents in gold per day for field and mill hands—a result which is looked for to follow free trade with the United States—nearly all sugar estates would have to be abandoned. Last year sugar polarizing 96° netted the producer but just about 2¼ cents per pound, American money. This year the net returns are slightly better, but the duty paid on sugar imported into the United States is burdened with a tax of 1.685 cents the pound on polariscope test of 96°. Could this tax be abated the producer would receive this year nearly 4½ cents per pound and wages of 50 cents or more could be paid.

Twenty years ago the area under sugar was much greater than now. One can see, all over the island lowlands, the ruins of old mills, properties that have been abandoned to pasturage because the cultivation of cane and the manufacture of sugar with the primitive "Jamaica train" was no longer remunerative, and capital for installation of modern plants was not available. This condition, which prevails all over the West Indies, has brought about in many of the islands a state of industrial prostration.

In 1878 the number of sugar estates that had been abandoned because no longer remunerative amounted to 138, and 505 yet remained under cultivation. About this time the establishment of "central" factories commenced, and in 1880 there were five such establishments where cane was ground for several estates. In October of last year the number of planters had dwindled to 2,497. There were 22 factories where cane was ground for more than one farmer.

The maximum value of the sugar produced in Puerto Rico was in 1878, when the reported export (83,000 tons) was valued at 7,487,211 pesos. The maximum volume of the island's sugar export was in 1879, amounting to 170,000 tons, upon which there was paid an export tax of 313,600 pesos. No such tax had previously existed. It was continued at the same rate (about one-fifth of a cent per kilo) until 1888, when it was abolished altogether. Sugar production, however, still continued to decline after 1879 until, in 1893, it reached a minimum, the export of that year being only 47,000 tons. It is interesting to note that there were only three years between 1850 and 1880 when the quantity exported fell below this minimum. Since 1893 there has been an increase, the average for the last four years being about 55,000 tons.

The output of sugar for 1899 will, it is estimated, approximate 60,000 tons, grown on as many acres. I am without data as to the extent of land in Puerto Rico adapted to cane culture, but it must be one-fourth of the whole, or about 500,000 acres. To what extent the sugar production may be increased can be estimated when it is remembered that last year the island of Mauritius, with a total area of 708 square miles, or less than 500,000 acres, exported 180,000 tons of sugar. The population of Mauritius is only about one-sixth that of Puerto Rico, its area less than one-fifth, and its topographical features similar.

Barbados, with an area of 166 square miles and a population of about 185,000, in 1897 exported over 58,000 tons of sugar, 36,000 puncheons of molasses, and 14,000 gallons of rum—a total output of cane products considerably exceeding Puerto Rico's.

Supposing the wish of the cane grower and sugar exporter for free trade with the United States to be realized, what will be the effect upon those hundreds of thousands of inhabitants whose labor must be utilized to produce this sugar? Bearing in mind that for all purposes there is required nearly one laborer per acre of cane, it is easy to estimate the number of peones that will be needed.

Sugar can be most profitably produced only by means of large central establishments, the larger and more perfect the plant and the greater the acreage tributary to it the better the profits. To install a "central," capable of producing 5,000 tons annually, an investment of quite $500,000 is required. The tendency is for the great manufacturers to secure control of adjacent cane lands within a radius of several miles, either by purchase or lease. The cane grown on land not thus controlled is ground on a basis of commission or shares. The best cane produces 10 or 12 per cent of sugar; the owners of the "central" allow the farmer, say, half of this amount. The small proprietors are disappearing, for the capitalist so manages his business in Puerto Rico and nearly everywhere

else as to force the small proprietors to sell their holdings. The tendency in the sugar business, as in all other requiring large aggregations of capital, is to combine or consolidate. While the population is steadily increasing, the number of small proprietors is steadily decreasing, as shown by statistics adverted to above.

In producing coffee and tobacco the necessities or advantages of combination are not so urgent, but since sugar can not be produced at a profit without large concentrated investments, it is only through combines and trusts that the best commercial success will be attained. Should the development of the cane industry in Puerto Rico approximate that achieved in Mauritius, Barbados, and Hawaii, the cane lands will be ultimately owned or practically controlled by these huge "central" proprietors. There will be a few thousand owners, managers, overseers, clerks, etc., and many hundreds of thousands of peon laborers, whose social and, if we may judge by numerous examples in other countries, industrial conditions will be the same as now, and without hope of improvement.

Nowhere in the world, save in the United States and Hawaii, is sugar now extensively produced on a basis of a wage rate for field and mill hands exceeding, say, 30 cents per diem, and in many tropical countries the rate is not above 20 cents.

Considering the world's enormous acreage suitable to cane cultivation and the teeming population available, it is probable, indeed almost certain, that, whatever be the price at which sugar may be sold, the peon will still remain in a state of serfdom, and generation after generation, living in fief to a merchant monopoly, will be able to earn only the wherewithal to indulge in drink, debauchery, and vice. Some of the most instructively warning pages in West Indian history deal with these diverse interests of the population.

This is a gloomy picture, but, turn it how we will, no brighter side appears for the swarming hordes of human beings who now exist here, and who will increase and multiply indefinitely.

Yet the country will increase in wealth, trade will flourish, roads will be made, public buildings will rise, harbors will be enlarged, vessels in increasing numbers will be freighted with riches, and the wealth of nations will go on augmenting. Such appear to be everywhere the inevitable tendencies of modern industrial and commercial development.

Notwithstanding these gloomy reflections, it is hoped that the inhabitants of this beautiful and rich tropical island may have a better lot in store. If the legislation for Puerto Rico is wise and if an extension of commercial privileges to the sugar grower is conditioned upon an obligation on the part of the proprietors to ameliorate the condition of their employees, to provide near by schools for children, hospitals for the sick, and asylums for the old and infirm, an example may be given that will be unique in the history of government of tropical lands.

COFFEE.

The exports and unit value of Puerto Rican coffee for the first year of each decade have been as follows:

Year.	Pounds.	Value per pound.
		Centavos.
1850	11,783,684	6
1860	15,929,524	6
1870	17,416,762	6
1880	48,032,296	6.37
1890	43,822,794	12.22
1897	51,710,997	23.63

The year 1897 is the last for which these statistics have been published. Lower down in this report will be found such data respecting exports during the American occupation as could be collected. From this it will be seen that the average selling value here of the different grades of coffee since the American occupation has not exceeded 9 cents, gold, per pound. There will also be found some statistics respecting the comparative quantities and values of the three principal Puerto Rican exports.

It will not escape your observation that the value of the coffee crop exported is two and two thirds times as great as that of the sugar, and was nearly seven-tenths of the value of all the exports of the island during the three years, 1895–1897. It will be noticed that more than half of all the coffee sent out of the island went to Cuba and Spain, markets that are now practically lost to this island.[1] Had former prices been maintained this loss of more than half of the markets would have been of no moment, but with the closing of the doors to this staple came the very great fall in price, due probably in a large degree to the phenomenally heavy export from Brazil and other coffee-producing countries. Nevertheless, had the same trade relations existed between this island and Cuba that formerly existed, Puerto Rico would certainly have enjoyed some advantage from her favorable and convenient situation for supplying the needs of her near neighbor. And this deprivation has seemed the harder to Puerto Rico because both islands were under the American flag. As a result, Cuban needs have been met by importations from Brazil by way of the United States, involving a voyage of more than 4,000 miles and two rehandlings, whereas this island would have sent its coffee direct to Cuba, a voyage of but one-fourth or one-fifth as long, and without rehandling, but it was and is shut out from its old established market with an import tax of 5.5 cents (gold) per pound, or over 9 centavos to the pound.

Although the Puerto Rican berry is much more highly esteemed by many coffee users than the product of Brazil, it is unknown in the United States, and can not now be sold there at a price which would net the producer more than 4 or 5 cents per pound. In 1897 the exportations of coffee hence to the United States did not reach 110,000 pounds of the total export of 23,505,000 pounds. Of this last amount Spain consumed nearly 17,009,000 pounds, a fact that points clearly to the great desirability of establishing such trade relations with Spain as might permit freer commercial intercourse than now. But in any event it is not believed that the output of coffee will be largely increased. It does not seem probable that the high prices of 1896–97 can be maintained. New York, Hamburg, and Havre fix the prices, and since Brazil, Central and South America, Mexico, and the Islands of the Pacific can produce coffee in vast quantities and market the same at 5 cents per pound, this island must expect to adjust its prices accordingly. Ten centavos per pound is about all the producer can expect to receive for this product, unless Puerto Rican coffee should become well known in the United States and so much preferred to other grades as to put it on a level with Mocha and so-called Java. If the export keeps to the average since 1892, bringing annually to Puerto Rico from 10,000,000 to 14,000,000 pesos, the island will be fortunate.

On the basis of the present price of coffee the value of a normal crop will not exceed three-fourths of that of 1897, or, say, 8,000,000

[1] This was written before receipt of advices changing the Cuban duties on Puerto Rican coffee.

pesos; but by the storm fully two-thirds of the coffee trees are either uprooted and destroyed or else stripped of leaf and berry.

There is no likelihood that next winter's picking will save more than one-third of a normal crop, which, at the reduced price, will not sell for more than 3,000,000 pesos. Five years must elapse before the coffee trees and their necessary shade can be renewed so that the growers can resume the average production. Unless some new market for tobacco is found that product may be hereafter disregarded as an export for the reason stated in notes on its production.

Therefore the showing for next crop of sugar and coffee—all that Puerto Rico has to sell—is sugar, 3,000,000 to 4,000,000 pesos, and coffee, 3,000,000, or a possible total of 7,000,000 pesos, which is about one-third of the annual export.

TOBACCO.

The product of this island third in importance is tobacco, of which the exports and local value in the first year of each decade have been as follows:

Year.	Pounds.	Value per pound.
		Cents
1850	2,972,308	4
1860	2,557,448	4.43
1870	5,950,322	4
1880	12,188,517	6.81
1890	5,977,987	14.81
1897	6,255,953	19.09

The year 1897 is the last for which statistics have been published. It is noticed as relevant that the records show that the value has remained about the same—i. e., from 19 to 21 cents per pound, since 1892.

As respects the quality or grade of tobacco there are several kinds, as in many other countries. The cheapest is known locally as "baliche," which is only marketed in Europe and is worth from 4 to 14 cents per pound. The portion so graded is not more than one-fourth or one-third of the total crop. Of the remainder, about 1,000,000 pounds, more or less, is manufactured into cigars and cigarettes and is consumed locally. The more valuable grades are known to the trade as "filler and wrapper," and the aggregate of this grade of a normal crop would reach quite 4,000,000 pounds. In 1897 all this grade of tobacco went to Cuba and brought, on an average, from 15 to 20 cents per pound. But the prohibitive duty on tobacco imported into that island of $5 per pound has sealed the door to further business, and as there is no market for it in Europe, and taxes in the United States are all the way from 35 cents to $1.85, it results that there is no foreign market at all for the better grades.

When the Cuban tax went into effect last January the fact was at once known, and last spring not more than one-third of a normal crop was planted; hence there is a comparatively small quantity now in store. This is the surplus of the last two crops, and may reach 1,500,000 pounds, but there are few buyers. Unless the United States or Cuban market is open to Puerto Rico, this stock must remain stored until finally worked up here, and future planting must be diminished until supply and local demand adjust themselves. This means the cutting off of a source of revenue that has in the past brought to Puerto Rico an annual income of from 500,000 to 1,250,000 pesos.

Were the United States tax abated outright the production would rapidly increase, and might in two or three years be expected to reach a total of $5,000,000, for with improved methods of culture and preparation for market it will bring much better prices.

PUBLIC PROPERTY.

Elsewhere in this report are references to some of the public buildings in San Juan. Besides those belonging to the extinct provincial deputation there are many others—some civil, and many of a military character.

In the report of the evacuation committee records are schedules of land and buildings transferred to the United States, and a repetition is unnecessary, as these records are in the War Department.

The city of San Juan is built upon a small island of the same name, about 3 miles long and from one-fourth to one-half mile wide. About one-half or two-thirds of its area was held as military lands by Spain and, as royal property, was transferred to the United States. Much of the area is occupied by works of defense and, it is supposed, will continue so to be; but a considerable area does not seem to be needed for defensive purposes and could well be sold for city extension, for which it is greatly needed.

A part of the wall of defense that surrounded the city was demolished two or three years since, and more of these old walls might well be demolished, inasmuch as they add nothing to the strength of the defenses and occupy valuable land.

By royal decree, promulgated some two or three years ago, a portion of these military lands was ordered to be sold or given to the city, but the project was never consummated.

Within the borders of San Juan are some hundreds of acres of swamp land, a part of which could easily be reclaimed by dredging and filling. The area thus gained would be very valuable for commercial and naval purposes, and the dredging, which would be comparatively inexpensive, would add a very valuable area to the harbor.

At Cayey, Aibonito, Ponce, Mayaguez, and Aguadilla are military reservations occupied by barracks that were transferred by Spain to the United States and that are now occupied by troops. The area of these lands does not exceed in the aggregate 150 acres, which is entirely too small to meet the military necessities.

By Executive order a very valuable portion of the water front of San Juan, 2,400 feet frontage and extending three-fourths of the way across the island of San Juan, was proclaimed a naval reservation on March 29, 1899. A portion of this area is swamp and reclaimed land, and some 40 acres is high ground, much of it already owned by private parties and occupied by their dwellings. To obtain title to this land will involve a large expenditure, and the appropriation of so large a part of the present inadequate water front will be a very severe detriment to the city and an obstacle to its commercial development and growth.

In the appendix will be found a schedule of the agricultural and wild lands that are the property of the State. This is known to be only a partial list, but it is not now practicable to make a complete one. Some of this land has never been in private ownership, while the title to other areas has been derived from tax sales. The total is about 120,000 cuerdas or acres. The swamp lands, denominated here manglares, are along the coast, and valueless until they shall be reclaimed.

In all Spanish countries the title to mineral found beneath the sur-

face is in the State, even though the soil belongs to an individual. Therefore it is that on this island a mine may be denounced, taken up, and exploited, though it is situated within the farm or pasture of a planter. The law sanctions this procedure, and is understood to be the same in all Latin countries.

Under the old regime there was very little attention paid to mining. The placer washings in Puerto Rico were long since worked out and there has been no development of deep workings, but with the arrival of Americans a great impetus was given to this speculative industry, and several mines have been denounced in pursuance of the existing laws, which are all of Spanish origin. My predecessor, acting within the local statutes, conferred several mining titles. An investigation convinced me that a continuance of this practice was inexpedient, though strictly legal, and some time since and to date all similar applications have been denied.

At this time there is no operated mine in the island, but there are large iron deposits that are represented to be valuable.

No public lands have been sold since the military occupation commenced, but a title was completed to one small tract whereon the payment of purchase money had been made some months since.

The need of a geodetic, geological, and topographical survey of the island is very urgent, and should be undertaken without delay. All the existing maps are very unreliable, but local funds for these objects are not available.

A tabulated statement giving information concerning mining claims is in the appendix.

FRANCHISES AND PRIVILEGES.

The Executive order dated December 22, 1898, forbade the granting of any franchise, grant, or concession for any public work without the authorization of the Secretary of War, and later the opinion of the Attorney-General was communicated to the effect that no franchise for public works could be granted until Congress should, by appropriate legislation, so authorize.

Although there have been many applications for these privileges, all have been denied. They relate to various objects, such as the construction of railroads and trolley lines, the building of wharves, the utilization of water power, the establishment of electric-light plants, etc.

In two instances certain works useful to the people have been authorized under license revocable at the will of the Secretary of War. One case was the construction of a wooden wharf in the harbor of San Juan by a steamship company. The license contains a clause that permits the insular government to at any time acquire title to the wharf by payment of its value. The valuation, it is provided, shall be made by a board and shall in no case exceed in amount the original cost as ascertained during construction by the United States supervising engineer.

The other license permits a private party to erect a sawmill and wood working plant upon a vacant lot in the city of San Juan. This lot was ceded to the United States by Spain and is in effect a military reservation. There was at the time no such mill in San Juan, and the installation of one will be very beneficial to the United States and to civilians.

The granting of three other revocable licenses have been recommended, namely:

(1) A license for the extension and improvement of a tramway, and

for changing its motive power to electricity. This tramway was constructed many years ago under Spanish authority.

(2) A license permitting a large sugar factory to lay some 300 feet of track along the margin of a public highway with a view of conveying cane to the mill. American capital to the extent of over a million dollars is being invested in this enterprise.

(3) A license for the utilization of a water power, the temporary privilege to be auctioned.

These are the only licenses that have been recommended.

Some grants for public or quasi public improvements were confirmed under the local laws during the Spanish regime. About a half dozen railroad projects were thus sanctioned. The most important is a road intended to encircle the island near the coast, and to have a total length of some 338 miles, of which 132 have been constructed. To this road the Government guaranteed 8 per cent interest on a cost previously fixed and determined. The total sum to which the guaranty was intended to apply was nearly 10,000,000 pesos, and of course the interest guaranteed would be nearly 800,000 pesos annually; but the company failed to complete the road within the time limit, and its status and rights under the original franchise are now undetermined. The company is operating the portion completed, the damages caused by the August hurricane having been repaired in principal part.

There extends from San Juan to a suburban town, 7 miles away, a tramway that has recently been acquired by an American company now operating it. Its franchise has about forty years to run. There is no subsidy allowed, nor is there any guaranty of earnings.

Another tramway extends from San Juan Harbor front, at Cataño, to Bayamon, a distance of 4 miles. It receives no guaranty or bonus.

There are two other grants for railroads known to be in existence. One road was never built, and the other, some 17 kilometers long, was so seriously damaged by the recent storm that its service has not been reestablished. I believe there are a few more outstanding grants, but they are not of great moment.

It is of the utmost importance for the industrial development of the island that some way should be quickly found by means of which public improvements can be undertaken by foreign capital. Capitalists can not now invest under any satisfactory conditions, for there is no authority in Puerto Rico that can confer corporate rights and authority upon associated capital applied to the building of roads and to the installation of manufactories.

The local laws respecting the development of natural resources and the establishment of industrial manufacturing works are ample and not without merit, but at present these statutes are practically a dead letter so far as new enterprises are concerned. It is recommended that this condition of things be changed at the earliest possible date.

PUBLIC WORKS.

The only works of public utility that are constructed in Puerto Rico through direct expenditure of the Government and under its immediate control are the fortifications, the barracks, the light-houses, and the military roads. The funds to pay for these undertakings were, all derived from local taxation. So it may be said that whatever exists in the way of forts, buildings, roads, etc., has been paid for by Puerto Rico.

The fortifications of San Juan are important and must have cost several millions; their extent and character, however, are not pertinent to this report. At Ponce and Mayaguez are some valueless redoubts or small forts.

The island coast is very well lighted indeed. There are thirteen lights in good condition, and they serve their purposes well. One new light is just being completed on Vieques Island and another is building on Mona Island. Both will be completed during the current fiscal year, making fifteen in all—enough for all present needs of commerce.

The harbors of San Juan and Ponce are fairly well buoyed, but improvements are required, for which the budget contains an allotment. A few range beacons are also necessary.

The military roads in the island are very valuable, but the need for their extension is most urgent. In no country in the temperate zone is this necessity half so imperative as here. Without them industrial development is impossible.

Two-wheeled ox carts, pack horses, and mules comprise almost the only means of transportation. There is not a four-wheeled vehicle used by natives in the island for freighting or drayage purposes. For personal conveyance light carriages are used.

The one great crop of the island, the haulage of which is considerable, is sugar and sugar cane. The tonnage of coffee and tobacco is inconsiderable and good country roads will suffice to fetch them to the seacoast. But in the sugar districts good metalled roads are indispensable. A few through lines of a permanent, substantial character are in operation. Connecting San Juan and Ponce is a road of this class, 134 kilometers in length. Others are—

	Kilometers.
From Cayey to Guayama	33
Cataño toward Arecibo	29
Rio Piedras toward Fajardo, about	33
Mayaguez toward Ponce	14

There are a few other detached pieces, making in all 255 kilometers (159 miles) that are finished, except for some heavy bridging. About 65 kilometers are, or have been, under construction. The total length of all the military roads, completed or projected, is 719 kilometers.

What may have been the total expenditure on these highways it is now impossible to ascertain, but it is the opinion of experienced American engineers that they can not be duplicated for less than $15,000 a mile. It is, therefore, easy to see that the completion of the military roads alone (and all of them are indispensably necessary) will cost over $1,000,000; and if to this be added the cost of completing those sections now under construction and the cost of supplying the bridges that are lacking, the whole will reach not less than $5,000,000.

But these are only the principal lines of communication; it yet remains to connect all the interior towns with the main roads. The length of these minor roads will be not less than 250 miles and the cost not less than $10,000 per mile. Before this island can be said to have proper and suitable highways an expenditure of $8,000,000 must be made. There will still remain the construction or decided improvement of a network of farm roads and trails. Of course it will be a long time before such projects can be realized, no matter how prosperous the country may be.

It is impossible for a person unfamiliar with tropical countries (especially with those which, like Puerto Rico, are rough and mountainous) to understand why practicable highways need cost such enormous

sums, but a residence in this island through one rainy season will make the reason quite clear.

Not less than a half dozen times during the summer and fall there will be a rainfall of two or more inches in an hour. Early in August of this year a rain of 11½ inches fell at one place in four hours. On every occasion of great precipitation every river, rivulet, and brook is a raging torrent. No road ditching is adequate to lead off the water, and the surging floods carry down drift and sweep away the bridges. The limestone soil becomes a mass of mud, and even empty carts can not be moved over any kind of roads save those which are thoroughly ballasted.

For the various branches of public work the budget this year carries over $500,000, which is more than one-fourth of the total of all appropriations for the island. The public works are under the direction of a very competent officer of the Corps of Engineers of the Army, and the methods of administration and supervision customary in the United States are applied.

The number of miles of telegraph wire in use is 669, and the number of miles of line is 493. The number of offices is 25. Six telephones are used in connection with the telegraph. In the hurricane of August 8 fully half the poles went down, but nearly all have been reestablished. The line is operated by the Army Signal Service, and is maintained without cost to the island. Its commercial receipts do not half pay the cost of maintenance and operation.

The only harbor upon which there has been any public expenditure is that of San Juan. It is about 4 miles long and 1½ miles wide, but the area of anchorage ground for large sea vessels is not more than one-tenth the total area.

Ships drawing 24 feet can enter freely, the entrance being easy. Those drawing 24 feet can lie alongside the bulkhead line to discharge directly without lightering. It is not the practice, however, for commercial vessels to unload there. Usually everything is lightered ashore.

Under Spain much dredging was done and the deep-water area much enlarged. The soil was deposited on the marsh land or shallow-water front of the city, and much valuable land reclaimed by this process.

The project for further harbor improvements was quite an ambitious one, for besides deepening the entrance to 28 feet, it was proposed by removing a point of shoal extending from a marsh to double the area of the inner port.

Lying abreast of San Juan in this harbor are two swampy islands—Mangiar, or Isle Grande, and Miraflores. Both could readily be reclaimed, and the area of the former would be very valuable for the erection of wharfs, storehouses, etc. Miraflores bounds the inner harbor on the north, and it would seem that it could be made very valuable for naval purposes. An old powder magazine on it is now used as a lazaretto in connection with the quarantine service.

The inner or eastern extension of the harbor is, however, too shallow for vessels of more than 12 or 15 feet in depth. It could be very easily dredged and the material removed could be deposited on the swamp islands above named.

The reserve set aside for naval purposes by Executive order in March last includes a large number of private lands. Were the naval station established as proposed, these properties would have to be purchased, and their cost would be very considerable.

It is suggested that a sum equal to the cost of extinguishing those private rights devoted to public works would suffice to reclaim a much

larger area of swamp lands, and at the same time greatly extend this harbor. The commercial growth and extension of the city and island would be much promoted by this course. To execute the present naval project would very much prejudice such extensions, as it would leave no adequate space for wharfs, docks, or storehouses.

The harbor improvements in Puerto Rico were in the charge of a board of harbor works. This was a semipublic semilocal institution, of which there are many examples in European countries. It has the right to reclaim lands and to own and sell property, revenue being derived from the tonnage tax, from shipping, harbor, and light dues, and from the sale or rental of unclaimed lands. These proceeds were applied to harbor improvements.

The harbor at Ponce is little more than an open roadstead. All goods are lightered, there being no improvements save a small wharf built for landing imports, a very small and inadequate affair. The business of the port, however, is large, and, with general industrial development, should be sufficient to justify such works of improvement as dredging and the construction of wharves and a breakwater. At present a wharf extending far enough out to reach 20 feet of water would require a structure quite 1,500 feet long.

There was formerly a board of harbor works at Ponce, but it accomplished nothing, and is not now in existence.

Mayaguez has had no public improvements worthy of the name save an old wharf built several years ago. This is said to have been constructed badly and in the wrong place. It is a question whether the structure is worth repairing.

The board of harbor works at San Juan was discontinued and the property placed in the charge of the department engineer officer. Recently the duties of harbor works were merged into those of public works in general and placed under charge of the board of public works, the president of which is an officer of the United States Army engineers. The property taken over from the old "Junta de Obras del Puerto" (board of harbor works) is of considerable value, consisting principally of dredges, tugs, and machine shops.

MAIL SERVICE.

The postal service has been under the direction and control of Mr. William H. Elliott, sent to the island shortly after its military occupation by the Postmaster General. Before the beginning of the present fiscal year the expense of this service in excess of receipts was made up from the general appropriations of the United States for mail service. Subsequent to that date the deficiency has been a charge to the revenues of the island. In the first quarter of the current economical year this deficit has been $17,234.64.

By Executive order the mail service is placed under the supervision and direction of the director general of posts, who reports direct to the Postmaster General. The military governor has no authority or control over the postal department, although Mr. Elliott is directed to fully confer with him. Details can not, therefore, be supplied concerning the operations of this service. Whatever money is required to make up the deficiency of expenses over receipts is supplied from the revenues of Puerto Rico. The accounts are audited by the auditor of the island, who reports to the military governor.

It will be seen from the above and from the auditor's report that the expenses much exceed the income. Its cost for the year was estimated at $144,000 and the receipts or income from sale of stamps, registrations, and money orders were figured at $80,000 per annum.

Except for about three or four weeks after the hurricane the mails have been promptly received and forwarded. During the period referred to all means of transportation were disorganized throughout the island, and it was difficult or impossible to promptly force the mail carriers through on schedule time.

THE QUARANTINE.

By Executive order the quarantine service has been under the direction and supervision of Dr. Glennan, of the Marine-Hospital Service. He reports direct to the Surgeon-General of that service, but funds to meet expenditures are supplied from the insular treasury. His estimates for the year were about $23,000 for the service proper.

There has been no epidemic or contagious disease in Puerto Rico since American occupation. The quarantine of vessels has been such as to very slightly inconvenience them or to embarrass trade, and yellow fever, which has prevailed in Cuba, has not effected a lodgment here.

The quarantine service has been well administered by Dr. Glennan.

THE TREASURY.

Maj. James A. Buchanan, Fifteenth Infantry, is the treasurer of the island, filling the position created by Executive order of May 8, 1899. This officer has been in Puerto Rico since the American occupation, and since September, 1898, has been on duty in the insular customs service. For six months before he became treasurer he had been the chief customs collector for Puerto Rico. This experience was valuable to him in the office of treasurer.

All moneys from whatever source collected or received are placed in the custody of the treasurer, and all advances are made by him, besides many disbursements. His office force of two clerks and a messenger boy has sufficed for clerical assistance.

The funds received are all deposited with the War Department depositories, De Ford & Co. and the American Colonial Bank. Each of these institutions is under fidelity bonds for $500,000.

The total number of disbursing officers is twenty-nine, and each of them is under bond of fidelity, in sums varying from $500 to $20,000. There have been no defalcations and no important disallowances in the auditing. About half of the disbursing officers are natives, and they are receiving valuable instruction which should profit them hereafter.

The new system of accounting is strange to the natives, and replaced one which seemed to Americans very complicated and laborious. The utilization of places of deposit for money instead of keeping it in safes is an innovation. The amounts in possession of disbursing officers is small, and the accounts of expenditures are demanded promptly. Formerly they had three months in which to account, but now the period allowed is but twenty days. All money accounts are in United States currency, and if provincial money is received it is credited by the depositories at the official rate of exchange, of 60 United States for 100 Puerto Rican.

AUDIT OF ACCOUNTS.

By Executive order of May 8, 1899, an auditing system for all receipts and disbursements of insular accounts was established, and about the same date Mr. J. R. Garrison was appointed auditor. He

arrived early in June and immediately entered upon his duties. Before the close of the month preparations were made, employees appointed or assigned, blank forms prepared, office rooms designated, and all was made ready for the installation of the system, which went into effect on July 1, the beginning of the fiscal year, which here corresponds to the United States practice.

Later blank forms were supplied from Washington, and the work has been carried on in accordance with the regulations of the War Department on this subject, which were promulgated in Washington on May 11, 1899. In order to supplement these regulations and cover minor points, defining more specifically the duties of the minor officers, orders were issued which would effect this result. (See General Orders, Nos. 87 and 104, current series, in Appendix.)

The system has worked smoothly and well. As minor defects are developed the proper remedy is applied, and the native officials are becoming familiar with the method.

Special attention is invited to the report herewith of Mr. J. R. Garrison, auditor, dated September 30, 1899, to whom special mention is due for his efficient services. This report only covers the period of his incumbency.

The receipts and expenditures of the military government for the period of occupation to June 30, 1899, have been audited under the supervision of Maj. C. H. Heyl, inspector-general, Department of Puerto Rico, assisted for a part of the work by Mr. W. T. Kent, expert accountant, Inspector-General's office. Major Heyl's report is herewith and covers the period stated. The receipts and expenditures of customs have been separately audited by Mr. W. W. Barre, assistant auditor for the island. His report is also herewith.

During the early period of military occupation there was no general treasurer. The commanding general gave orders for advancements and disbursements directly to the collectors of customs, and there was necessarily some confusion in accounts which it has been difficult to disentangle, but it is hoped the general statement herewith will be found satisfactory.

In auditing these complex money returns it was not possible to hold strictly to the customary United States rules. In the confusion of military operations some disbursing agents neglected to take formal receipts, but the auditor is satisfied that the expenditures were all for a public purpose, and that all receipts were duly accounted for.

In the accounts of the civil branches of the military government the auditing has been still more difficult. The collectors of internal revenue did not, under the then existing rules, state their accounts in the same manner as now. It was very difficult to secure the information required, and to secure adequate vouchers for the moneys disbursed.

These civil accounts have not yet been entirely audited, and it will require seven weeks more to complete them. In one office particularly, i. e., public works, this has been especially difficult. Early in the calendar year the Director of Public Works was ordered to employ from 15,000 to 20,000 men on the roads—the many roads all over the island—the purpose being to afford relief to the poor and to improve the highways. The men were taken in great haste, and no record permitting a close audit was kept. In June these road operations were discontinued, for it was evident that the money was not accomplishing the objects sought to be gained. A new system has now been introduced by which it is easy to have method and regularity.

The entire sum expended on roads during this period, i. e., before

work was stopped on those lines, was upward of $300,000, and, while it gave some relief to the laboring class, it did not produce the results to be expected in completed work on improved roads. If more time had been spent in arranging a better accounting system, the relief would have been as great and the product of the expenditure would have been much more useful and valuable.

THE BUDGET.

The insular presupuestos for 1897–98 and 1898–99 are as follows:

Character of budget.	Income.	Expenditures.
1897–98.	*Pesos.*	*Pesos.*
Insular	3,939,500.00	3,536,342.19
Provincial deputation	1,217,700.00	1,217,700.00
Total	5,157,200.00	4,754,042.19
1898–99.		
Insular	4,782,500.00	4,457,327.31
Provincial deputation	324,592.89	324,592.89
Total	5,107,092.89	4,781,920.20

These last amounts, converted into dollars at peso $0.60, United States money, give:

Income	$3,064,255.73
Expenditures	2,869,152.12
Surplus	195,103.61

The estimates for the fiscal year 1899–1900, under the military government, are:

Income	$1,909,390.14
Expenditures	1,943,678.11
Deficit	34,287.97

The estimate for the current year has recently been revised, in view of the reduction of income that must inevitably result from the reduced purchasing capacity of the island following upon greatly reduced exports. The figures given above are the result of this revision and indicate a probable deficit.

Fortunately, however, there was brought over from the last fiscal year an unexpended balance of $450,452.83. It was hoped that it would be practicable to retain this for expenditure on roads, which are so sadly needed. The contingency of a calamity such as recently befell the island was not taken into account in preparing the year's project, and the hurricane emphasized the unwisdom of basing confident expectations upon the use of this surplus for the purpose stated.

While the above estimate of income is a conservative one, and ought not to exceed the receipts, yet there may be a greater falling off of customs and internal-revenue receipts than is indicated by the above. Trade conditions are very unsettled, and any decided change in the tax on importations, or any increase in the free list, will of course affect the budget.

This project for expenditures has been very carefully studied, and a great many reforms have been introduced in all branches of the government.

Under Spanish rule there were 21 officials who received salaries exceeding $4,000 per annum, while now there are only two who receive as much as $4,000.

The Spanish Governor-General received 20,000 pesos besides other allowances; the bishop of the diocese received 9,000 pesos, and the commandant of the troops received 8,000 pesos and horse allowances.

Under Spanish rule 43 officials received over 3,000 pesos and 35 others between 2,000 and 3,000 pesos, while 168 persons in all received between 1,000 and 3,000 pesos. The number of officials drawing corresponding salaries under the present régime are 17, 31, and 143, respectively.

But notwithstanding the large reductions that have been made, it is not doubted that the number of employees is still excessive. It is not easy to know how best to curtail expenses by modifying laws and customs such as are found here. Constant watchfulness and observation only will show the way. Should it be the lot of the undersigned to prepare another annual budget the personnel will be still further reduced and many other economies introduced.

Here follow statements of estimated receipts and expenditures in the Puerto Rican budget of 1899–1900:

ESTIMATED RECEIPTS.

Imposts:		
Land	$100,000.00	
City	50,000.00	
Industrial	10,000.00	
Commercial	90,000.00	
Mining	8,000.00	
Property transfer	20,000.00	
Trade-marks and patents	2,000.00	
Diplomas	200.00	
Licenses to carry arms	2,000.00	
Stamp tax (proposed)	50,000.00	
		$332,200.00
Miscellaneous:		
Rents, etc., public property, etc	13,149.14	
Judicial and other fines	5,000.00	
Profit and loss	1,200.00	
Back taxes	100,000.00	
Donation for normal school building at Fajardo	20,000.00	
		139,349.14
Customs:		
Actual collections, twelve weeks	357,841.00	
Estimated, forty weeks	1,000,000.00	
		1,357,841.00
Postal service:		
Sale of stamps, etc	80,000.00	
Rent of post-office boxes	1,000.00	
		81,000.00
Total		1,910,390.14
Balance from 1898–99		450,452.83
Total available		2,360,842.97

ESTIMATE OF PROPOSED EXPENDITURES.

Commanding general's office	$32,700.00
Insular police	165,838.00
Director-general of posts	22,376.00
Post-offices	88,510.25
Star route, service and rent	34,001.32
Culebra Island	1,000.00
Marine-Hospital Service	23,690.00
Superior board of health	11,925.00
Vaccination	2,300.00
Leper hospital	3,336.80
Board of charities	3,725.00

Orphan and insane asylums	$49,882.00
Repairs and improvements to same	13,238.00
Aid to civil hospitals	8,000.00
Judicial board	12,216.00
Supreme court	32,040.00
Provisional court	20,700.00
District courts	97,440.00
Municipal courts	22,680.00
Board of prison control	13,280.00
Prison expenses	212,864.00
Advisory board	2,200.00
Civil secretary's office	19,680.00
State and municipal bureau	11,740.00
Internal-revenue bureau	14,740.00
Agricultural bureau	6,140.00
Collection of internal revenue	26,900.00
Collection of customs	91,729.90
Board of public works	33,470.00
Repair of buildings	26,000.00
Repair of military roads	150,000.00
Repair of country roads	40,000.00
Construction of new roads	200,000.00
Harbor works	20,772.94
Light-houses (engineering)	23,211.84
Light-house inspection, buoys, etc	21,173.68
The treasurer's office	3,000.00
The auditor's office	31,990.00
Board of education	27,300.00
Secondary education	60,000.00
Common schools (salaries)	209,880.00
School books	31,350.00
Library and museum	1,520.00
Pensions	1,956.00
Outstanding liabilities	17,181.98
Total	$1,943,678.71

RÉSUMÉ.

Estimated available resources	$2,360,842.97	
Estimated expenditures	1,943,678.71	
Surplus		417,164.26

Taking up these items of income, a few remarks may be appropriately made. The largest items of internal income are the land, city, industrial, and commercial taxes, estimated to amount to $250,000. Under these heads Spain collected 650,000 pesos. The reductions are due to two causes; one is the change in the rate of taxation, and the other is the fact that it is impossible, since the destruction of so much property by the hurricane, to collect the taxes. Agricultural land is now taxed about half as much as formerly. The income from industrial and commercial investments and business is taxed much less than before.

Formerly the income from royal dues amounted to 148,000 pesos; at present this form of tax is unknown. The petroleum tax came to 61,000 pesos, but this is no longer levied.

The other items in the budget under "imposts" sufficiently explain themselves, except the last of $50,000 from a proposed stamp tax. This has not yet been instituted, but is contemplated in case the necessities of the government should require it. It is proposed to place a tax of 2 cents on each bank check, draft, note, or receipt, and it is estimated this will yield $50,000.

The miscellaneous items hardly require an explanation, except the one for "back taxes." It seems to have been the practice in Puerto Rico for the treasury department to grant extensions of time in the

collection of back taxes. In other cases there were controversies respecting the accuracy or justice of the assessments, and each year there was a considerable amount uncollected. In the year 1898-99 this amount was larger than usual, and the civil secretary expects to secure $100,000 from this source during the current year.

Under the head of "Postal service" is mentioned the certain deficit in income from this service. As before remarked, this service is not under the supervision of the military governor.

At the beginning of the year the estimated income from customs was $30,000 per week, or upwards of $1,500,000 for the year. The receipts for the first ten weeks reached this average, and for twelve succeeding weeks came very near to it; but the collections are falling off, as might be expected, and it is not probable that for the remainder of the year the customs income will exceed $25,000 per week.

In May the number of custom-houses was ten, and the expense of collection nearly 8 per cent of the receipts. This ratio has since been reduced below 6 per cent, the change being brought about principally by reduction in the number of employees and in other items of expense. The number of custom-houses has been reduced to seven, as it has been found to be practicable to supply all requisite facilities for the small ports by substituting for the collector and his employees one deputy, who acts at the same time as customs guard. When importers wish to land goods at any of these ports, they give timely notice of such intention, whereupon the deputy, under orders from the chief collector of the island, receives the goods, employing such special help as he may need, the cost of this extra assistance being repaid by the importers. This plan has just been instituted, and it promises to result in a saving of considerable expense, without at the same time impairing the efficiency of the service.

Attention is invited to the report herewith of Maj. Charles L. Davis, Eleventh Infantry, collector of customs for the island. From the papers submitted data will be obtained concerning receipts and expenses at custom houses, tonnage dues, and export and import trade. It is not yet possible to make this last report complete so as to cover the whole period of military occupation. Some data, still lacking, will be supplied at an early date. The custom-house at the port of Arroyo was destroyed in the storm of August and all the records were lost, so it will be impossible to add to existing statistical information respecting the amounts collected at that place.

I have collated from statistical reports found here some valuable data respecting receipts at the custom houses under Spanish domination, covering the period from 1890 to 1897:

Customs receipts.

Year.	Export duties.	Import duties.	Tonnage and storage dues and fines.	Total.
	Pesos.	*Pesos.*	*Pesos.*	*Pesos.*
1890	112,018	2,465,161	.....	2,577,179
1891	107,607	2,088,781	.....	2,196,388
1892	121,109	1,766,638	.....	1,887,747
1893	179,467	1,939,437	.....	2,118,904
1894	291,150	2,240,523	162,157	2,693,830
1895	186,286	2,846,767	290,943	3,323,996
1896	268,882	3,101,511	264,776	3,635,109
1897	241,310	2,481,965	246,926	2,970,201
Total	1,507,829	18,930,783	964,802	21,403,354
Mean	188,478	2,366,347	241,200	2,675,419

It will be observed that the total collections for the four years, 1894–1897, inclusive, amounted to 12,623,136 pesos, or a mean for each year of 3,155,784 pesos, which is the equivalent of $1,893,470.40 American money. As is well known, the present rates of customs tax are quite different from those prevailing in the past, many articles being on the free list; moreover, there is no export tax, so it is impracticable to establish any comparisons of details and schedules.

When the compilation of statistics is completed a better understanding will be possible as respects the details of trade. The data lacking will soon be forwarded.

Reviewing the items of the budget covering proposed expenditures for the current year, I would remark that, while they have been very carefully studied, it is not impossible that variations will have to be made. In the auditor's office account is kept with the several items of appropriation as above. In case there should be a deficiency under any one head the same will be met by a transfer from some other, or from the general surplus.

The first quarter of the fiscal year has just ended, and the auditor's report shows that expenditures have been kept within the ordinary receipts.

Commanding general's office.

The allowance under this head covers the clerical force for both military and civil work. It has been found necessary to have a much larger force of clerks, interpreters, and translators than would be needed under ordinary conditions obtaining in military departments.

In such departments there have ordinarily been allowed a considerable number of clerks paid from army appropriations, but Puerto Rico has no such allotment. If such assistance had been allowed, the expenditures for the civil force would have been about half what is assigned above.

Insular police.

Under this head see remarks relative thereto in another place. While the present unsettled state of civil affairs continues it will be necessary to retain this police force.

Postal expenses.

See remarks elsewhere relative thereto. The cost of the postal service under Spain was about 70,000 pesos. It is now somewhat larger, but its control and supervision is retained by the Postmaster-General.

Culebra Island.

This is not a part of any municipality, and as its inhabitants—some 600 in number—are very poor, it has been administered directly from the central government. The administration and police matters are under a delegate, who receives $60 per month. There is also a physician to look after health matters.

Marine-Hospital Service.

See remarks elsewhere under the title of "Quarantine."

Superior board of health.

This board is composed of the chief surgeon of the Department, the naval surgeon stationed in San Juan, one other army surgeon and two local physicians. It has general supervision over sanitary matters, vaccination, and the lepers.

In the months of January to July 790,000 persons were vaccinated in Puerto Rico, at a cost of a little less than $30,000 to the insular treasury. There were many cases of smallpox when Puerto Rico was occupied, but since this great work of vaccination was completed there have been no cases reported.

There are some 50 unfortunate persons in Puerto Rico who are afflicted with the dread disease, leprosy. Arrangements are being perfected for their isolation and proper care.

Board of charities.

This consists of eight persons: two are natives of the island and the others are army and navy surgeons.

This board has supervision over the insane, the orphans, and other charities. There are 125 of the former and some 400 of the latter. Both asylums are located at San Juan. Connected with the orphan asylum is a school. The aggregate of expense under this board is estimated at $66,000. This includes $13,000 for very necessary repairs and improvements to the buildings, which were in a very bad sanitary condition.

The accommodations are quite inadequate and should be greatly extended. Not more than half the island's insane are in the asylum, because of lack of accommodations.

The board of charities has also had charge of the distribution of relief supplies sent for saving the poor from starvation. A special report of the president of this board is forwarded herewith, from which can be learned something of the magnitude of this great undertaking. Major Hoff, chief surgeon of the Department and president of the board of charities, has shown very marked administrative ability in managing the distribution of these supplies.

Aid to civil hospitals.

There are eight hospitals in which the sick are cared for. The municipal resources are so inadequate that I felt it to be expedient to extend some financial help to these institutions; accordingly, $1,000 is allowed to each of the eight civil hospitals.

Judicial board.

Attention is invited to remarks elsewhere under the head of "Judiciary." The board consists of three distinguished native lawyers, the law judge of the United States provisional court, and the judge-advocate of the department.

Supreme court—Provisional court—District courts—Municipal courts.

These are elsewhere referred to at some length. See also herewith report by Maj. A. C. Sharpe, judge advocate of the department, whose assistance has been of great value to me.

Board of prison control.

This board consists of the chief justice of the supreme court, two other distinguished native lawyers, the judge-advocate of the Department, and the commanding officer of the Puerto Rican battalion. In Major Sharpe's report above adverted to will be found much useful information respecting the operations of this board. See also remarks elsewhere, under the title "Public order, etc."

Advisory board.

It was found to be very difficult to administer many important matters without the assistance of men who were familiar with local economic and social conditions. An advisory board supplies this deficiency.

The acknowledged leader of each political party was asked to name three men to serve gratuitously on such a board. The leaders responded and the six men so named, together with three who were not connected with any political party, are constituted a board of advice and consultation.

Another moving motive was to put into existence a body that might be regarded as the predecessor of a legislature such as a territorial government would require.

The proceedings of the board have not been without friction. In consideration of one question referred to it, that had in it an element of patronage, there was a disagreement and three of the members resigned, but later the troubles were overcome.

The recommendations of the board have been of much value, but it is found to be expedient to ask for no recommendations that involve political considerations.

Civil secretary—Municipal and state bureau—Internal-revenue bureau—Agricultural bureau.

These public offices, that formerly pertained to the state, treasury, and interior departments, are now under the civil secretary, who reports to the military governor. The reorganization facilitates business.

All of the large amount of correspondence that relates to municipal affairs, elections, adjustment of budgets, etc., comes up through the chief of the municipal bureau. The island must, it is supposed, ultimately derive its principal revenue from internal taxation, but this can not be until a new scheme of taxation for the whole island can be worked out. This work requires very careful consideration and can not be properly done until the general policy to be pursued with respect to the future status of Puerto Rico is known. It is therefore necessary to maintain a bureau of internal revenue, having a personnel familiar with the local laws and conditions that relate to internal taxes. The treasurer of the island is not yet equipped for handling this department.

The whole wealth of the island depends upon agriculture, but very little has yet been done in development of new industries that depend upon agrarian operations. It is hoped that through the reorganized agricultural bureau a beginning in farming experiments may be made.

Collection of customs.

The cost of these collections is estimated at $91,729, which is equal to 6⅔ per cent of the amount estimated to be collected, but several reductions of personnel and salaries have been made, and these will

reduce the ratio. It is also remarked that had the receipts from customs dues held up to the amount estimated before the recent revision and reduction, the cost of collections would have remained the same. It is hoped and expected that at the end of the year it will be shown that the cost of collecting the revenue will not exceed 5½ per cent of the amount received.

In the three months just passed the total collections amounted to $378,851, and the total of advances to customs officers for payment of expenses is $25,797, which gives a ratio of receipts and expenditures of 100:6.8, but some unexpended balances remain in the hands of these collectors. There is also included under the head of expense a considerable amount for repair of damages to custom-houses and property by the storm. Were these deducted the expense would not exceed 5½ per cent.

Board of public works—Repair of buildings—Repair of military roads—Repair of country roads—Construction of new roads—Harbor works—Light-houses.

Respecting these important items reference is made to remarks elsewhere under the head of "Public Works." The board is composed of Captain Judson, of the Corps of Army Engineers; one American civil engineer, and one native engineer. The inspector of the light-house service, following the practice in the United States, is an officer of the Navy.

The treasury—The auditor.

Reference is made to remarks under similar titles to be found elsewhere in this report.

Board of education—Secondary education—Common schools—School books—Library and museum.

These subjects have been fully discussed elsewhere, and the remarks thereunder are respectfully referred to. There were practically no school books in the island suitable for use. A large expenditure for their procurement was necessary.

Pensions.

Spain allowed under this head 348,000 pesos, carried by the island budget, and 1,560 pesos by the provincial deputation, making a total equivalent to $209,736.

The only allowances for pensions now recognized are $660 to the widow of a distinguished patriot and public man, and the same amount to another man of the same character who, now about 70 years of age, has a large family of dependent children. He has rendered some forty years of public service as a school teacher and in other important capacities. The remaining amount of $750 is allowed the three youths who last year were sent abroad to pursue studies as teachers and who are still so absent; but they have been notified that the allowance will be discontinued.

Outstanding liabilities.

These are stated by the civil secretary at $17,181, and represent audited accounts. There are other claims against the insular treasury that have not yet been liquidated, among them one of the French

Railway for a large sum as subvention on its lines. As the concession to this road is claimed to have been forfeited, the claim is not recognized. Another claim, that of the Josephite Brethren (Padres Escolapios Pios), was some time since forwarded to the War Department. No doubt many other claims will be presented in time.

Here follows an abstract of the budget of receipts and expenditures of Puerto Rico for the fiscal years 1897–98 and 1898–99, both for the island proper and for the provincial deputation:

	1897-98.	1898-99.
RECEIPTS.		
Budget of the island:	*Pesos.*	*Pesos.*
1. Land and other taxes	576,200.00	901,200.00
2. Customs	3,132,900.00	3,377,900.00
3. Taxes on monopolies	184,200.00	312,200.00
4. State property	9,300.00	9,300.00
5. Contingent receipts	36,900.00	181,900.00
Budget of provincial deputation:		
Total of receipts	1,217,700.00	324,592.89
Total for both budgets	5,157,200.00	5,117,092.89
EXPENDITURES.		
Budget of the island:		
1. General liabilities	498,501.60	498,501.60
2. Justice	423,818.80	454,773.80
3. War	1,252,377.76	1,252,377.76
4. Finance	260,800.00	225,825.00
5. Navy	222,668.20	222,668.20
6. State	878,175.83	592,653.83
7. Interior		1,210,527.12
Budget of provincial deputation:		
1. Deputation provincial	221,261.48	227,772.89
2. State	210,254.00	
3. Interior	786,184.52	96,820.00
Total for both budgets	4,754,042.19	4,781,920.20

MORTGAGES.

The mortgage indebtedness of Puerto Rico from 1880 to 1898, inclusive, is shown in the tabulated statement herewith. The tabulation was compiled by Mr. Coll y Toste, the civil secretary, from the records of property transfers. Of course it has not been possible to verify these records since the American occupation.

Elsewhere are allusions to this important subject and attention is invited thereto. The current indebtedness of merchants and others, covered by commercial paper, will also amount to a large sum. The total indebtedness may reach, if not exceed, $50,000,000. The island government, however, has no debt—a very fortunate circumstance; nor do the municipalities owe any large sums, the aggregate of all their loans not reaching $1,000,000.

On January 19, 1899, General Henry issued orders that, with reference to agricultural property and machinery, the laws relating to the foreclosure of mortgages and all legal and judicial proceedings thereunder, should be suspended for one year from the date named, provided the interest on such debts be paid when due at a rate not exceeding 12 per cent per annum. The order authorizing suspension of foreclosure did not apply to the collection of insular or municipal taxes.

This order has been productive of both benefits and injuries. It has saved many a poor proprietor from the loss of his home by foreclosure, but it has displeased those who held the securities, and has resulted in the withholding of loans to others, who, wishing to borrow, were denied the privilege by those able to lend, because the latter feared that at the

expiration of the year the provisions of the order would be extended, and they would be again denied the right of forced collection of indebtedness by foreclosure. Some appeals asking for reissue of the order in question so as to make it apply for another year, and others from the mortgagees, protesting against further extension have been presented.

The rates of interest agreed upon in these secured loans were in many cases far above the rates that agricultural lands ever pay in the United States. Rates exceeding 12 per cent are common here, and many loans are secured by mortgage where the interest promised is 18 and 20 per cent. Of course the agricultural industry in Puerto Rico can not long be burdened with such a tax.

In the period following the evacuation, and before the promulgation of this order by General Henry, a large number of mortgages were foreclosed, and had there been no interference with legal process for foreclosure a very considerable part of the land of Puerto Rico would in a brief time have changed hands, the economical and industrial conditions being such that it was in the power of creditors to have forced foreclosures.

In Cuba the Spanish governor-general suspended foreclosures in 1896, and there was another suspension by General Blanco in 1897, while, in 1898, General Brooke again extended the suspension for another period. It would appear that General Henry followed this precedent.

This is a very important matter which deserves thorough consideration. Taking into account the present depressed condition of industries and business, it seems probable that many of the existing proprietors will soon be sold out.

This was the subject of a special report to the Department under date of September 5, 1899, and attention to it is respectfully invited.

The cane growers are in a better economic condition than any other agrarian proprietors. Those having modern machinery have, at the present prices of sugar, a margin of profit reaching in exceptional cases 1 cent per pound of sugar produced, and these men are able to arrange not only to meet their old engagements, but also to obtain new loans.

The coffee growers, however, are in very poor shape, for, with the already low prices and the losses by storms, they have no way of meeting overdue payments, to say nothing of securing additional credits.

POLITICS.

Elsewhere in this report will be found allusions to the political parties which have existed in the recent past and to those that still exist.

The two political parties having active organizations and representation in all the municipalities are designated, respectively, Liberal and Republican; but very recently the Liberals have dissolved and reorganized under the name of the Federal Party. Its programme, or what we should call its platform, dated October 1, 1899, will be found in the appendix. While known by the name of Liberals they had no written platform.

Those associated under the name of the Republican Party announced their platform in March last. This will also be found in the appendix.

There are some other active groups having political aims, but no formal organizations. Some call themselves the Labor Party, and there is said to be an offshoot of this with socialistic tendencies.

The hope of all politicians in this island is for an autonomic government. Individuals of both parties differ as to the time when home rule

should be instituted, but all have that ultimate object constantly in mind.

There has been no general election in Puerto Rico since March, 1898, and the issue then at stake was not one that permitted a judgment as to the relative partisan strength of those now calling themselves Federals and Republicans. The names of the parties were then different, and the question at issue was one that is not now pending. Five parties were represented, and the one then called Autonomist-Liberal prevailed.

Each of the two parties now struggling for mastery claims the majority of voters. The people know that municipal elections are soon to be held, and there will be a very active campaign for political mastery of localities. The successful party will hope and expect to elect delegates to and control a Territorial legislature, which all appear to expect will soon be in existence.

As respects the principles of these two parties, no characteristic differences are stated. Each desires to control the insular government, and considers the first elections as stepping stones to that end.

There is much unseemly partisan strife in some towns. A tendency to permit political differences to control in personal relations appears to exist. Individuals of the opposite party are often rated as criminals or blackguards or as in some way disreputable.

Puerto Ricans have had elections, so called, for many years, but there was no real freedom of action. The government always elected its candidates and the people understood that this would be so. They might turn out generally or stay at home; the result was the same. There was formerly no sufficient motive for zeal and activity, but now there is a reward in sight. Close observers who are old residents, but nonpartisan, declare that whichever party prevails we may expect a continuance of methods similar to those of the past, and a corrupt government administered solely in the interest and for the aggrandizement of the party in power.

Under the title of "Municipalities" there are stated some of the conditions that exist. In order that the town councils may be elected by the people instead of being appointed, as done heretofore and at present, orders have been given for elections, and these will very soon take place.

While the franchise will be a restricted one, permitting only taxpayers and those who can read and write—say, 5 per cent of the population—to vote, those elected will probably be of the same class as those formerly in power, concerning whom there have been the most bitter complaints of maladministration and misuse of power. It remains to be seen if the chosen representatives of the people will show a better record than their predecessors, who held office by appointment. It is scarcely possible that it should be worse.

These party leaders have read of civil rights, are somewhat familiar with representative institutions existing in the United States and elsewhere, and in their essays and political utterances picture to the Puerto Ricans as soon to be theirs all the joys and privileges that the best-governed countries possess. Their promises are certainly alluring.

The old Puerto Rican government was the rule of a class, and the common or plain people had no other relation to the government than as subjects. They had been thoroughly taught obedience, and accepted the situation without more than a murmur, and repression always ended the murmuring.

A political leader is always received with acclamations of praise by his friends and with maledictions by his opponents. The plain people have been led and governed and controlled so long that they expect nothing else; and the leaders will see that they are not disappointed.

Appeals to send military officers to take charge of municipal governments are constant, because, it is alleged, those of minority representation in the town councils are oppressed, buffeted, and insulted. So summary a course is objectionable, and only in three places have the civil authorities been replaced by the military. At this writing appeals are daily received from one of the principal towns in the island detailing the civil commotion and state of unrest that prevail, supplemented with a request that a military man be sent to displace the town council and assume entire charge. From the same town reports come of threats of personal violence toward public men. A military detachment in that locality has orders to see that the public peace is preserved, but to interfere in no way with civil administration. An election will soon be held there and the experiment tried of local self-government by chosen representatives.

It is of record that a few nights since a bottle filled with ordure was thrown into and broken in the sitting room of the family of the alcalde. A night or two later the compliment was returned by a similar salute in the home circle of a rival political leader.

So suspicious are these native politicians that no military officer can be for one month stationed in any town, but no matter how careful he may be in abstaining from any participation with political men and measures, he is sure to be accused by one party or the other of a leaning to its opponent. If such officer should chance to be seen speaking to a politician or showing any civility to one, some rival is certain to assert that the officer has gone over to the enemy, and it is asked that he be at once relieved. It is, of course, impossible to comply with such requests. All military officers are enjoined to abstain absolutely from anything, whether word or deed, that could in any way impair their usefulness for impartial and unbiased action.

MUNICIPALITIES.

This word, as applied in Puerto Rico with respect to government, has no equivalent in the United States. In one respect it resembles the city governments in the States—i. e., it is an administration by a mayor and town council, as in our own cities; but here the powers of a corporation are not conferred by legislative enactment, as with us, nor are the jurisdiction and control limited to the area covered by streets and buildings, but includes farms, pastures, forests, waste lands, and swamps. In the United States what is called a town or township is here called a municipality; but, unlike our rural towns, it is governed and administered in the same manner as our cities, and its officials have duties and responsibilities very much like those of our own city officers.

This system of administering local government is understood to have been general throughout all parts of the colonies of Spain that were inhabited by Europeans or their descendants. Article 53 of the autonomic scheme of government for Puerto Rico, proclaimed by royal decree of November 25, 1897, made municipal government compulsory for every group of inhabitants numbering more than 1,000. The practice was, and is, to subdivide the country into what we would call townships, and to supply these divisions with local governments similar to those that are accorded to our cities; so here were found in control the municipal councils formed on the old lines.

Each municipality has a mayor, or alcalde, from two to five assistant alcaldes, and from ten to thirty aldermen, also a secretary. These com-

pose what is called the ayuntamiento, which in English is properly named the town council. Other officials are: A municipal judge, a prosecutor, a secretary, a municipal physician, police, taxgatherers, and school board.

The municipal district is divided into wards, called here barrios. At the head of each of these is a comissario, or agent, appointed by the town council, and reporting directly to the municipal alcalde.

The town council had power to frame laws, not inconsistent with the general statutes, respecting education, highways, health, and public order, to levy and collect taxes, and to borrow and expend money. The members of the council are civilly responsible for any damage caused by their acts.

Associated with the council is a municipal board, appointed by the town councils, having numbers equal to the whole number composing the municipal council, but their functions related exclusively to financial measures. Only taxpayers were eligible to sit on either board. From the year 1873 the councilmen were required by law to be appointed by popular election, the suffrage being more or less restricted.

The appointment of mayors, according to the laws which had been in force for some time, was in the power of the governor-general, to whom three names from which to make a selection were sent by the council, but if the names of the parties sent were not to his liking, the governor could instead appoint any other councilman, or even an individual out of the council. This case, which the law recognized as an exceptional procedure, became the general rule. By this means the Government secured direct and immediate intervention, not only in the municipal administration, but also in the election of representatives for the Cortes, a very essential point in Spanish practical politics.

The practical working of this system had been most unsatisfactory to the Puerto Ricans during Spanish rule, and is condemned by all who have had opportunity for observation. With the exit of Spanish power and the advent of the United States military rule, it became necessary to find some means through which the councils could be kept going without the intervention of elections, which were impracticable.

The island is racked and torn by political animosities. Under the title of "The former regime" the parties are named which have striven and are striving for mastery.

Municipal elections were impossible for several reasons. In the first place, the whole framework of society was disorganized, in consequence of the war and the change of sovereignty. The civil disorders produced a sort of reign of terror, and disturbers of the peace intimidated almost everyone. As offshoots or outgrowths of the times and of the disturbed conditions two political parties came into being, each striving for mastery of the island when it should be given Territorial existence. It is asserted that each resorted to measures of intimidation and threat that did not leave the well disposed in a state of mind to permit of a free ballot and a fair count.

When vacancies occurred in the towns occupied by the invading army the military commanders filled vacancies of alcaldes and town councilmen, for there was no other practical way of preserving town government, even in name.

After General Brooke assumed command of the department on October 18, he continued the practice, and General Henry pursued the same course, but attempted to regulate the balance of political power by requiring vacancies to be filled in such a way that the councils would be half and half, Liberal and Republican. His orders to this

effect have been continued, but much friction has ensued, for when a majority of one controlled the action of the council on any question it was easy for one man to so manipulate as practically to control the action of the ayuntamiento.

The Advisory Board convened by department order, consisting of five able and representative men who do not belong to either political party, and whose opinions were asked respecting certain features of the existing government, remarked as follows respecting municipal affairs:

> Elections have been held in Puerto Rico for the last thirty years with different kinds of suffrage and with divers electoral systems. Unfortunately all the systems have resulted in a farce. On the one hand, the Government always tried to corrupt the suffrage in order to obtain its political ends; on the other hand, the gross ignorance of the large electoral body has always been a fruitful field for the germination and growth of all kinds of abuses.

The abuses that exist in municipalities are notorious. In many of them in this island misgovernment and chaotic conditions are the rule. In a few society seems to have resolved itself into its original elements of individuals acting without concert. In such places civil order is secured through the presence therein of military detachments or through the aid of the insular police.

The aggregate of all the municipal budgets for the year 1897–98 amounted to 2,697,949 pesos, while the total for the current fiscal year has been brought down to 1,429,981 pesos. This last figure is believed to be much too high; but without the cooperation of honest and public-spirited men it is impossible to know where to make reductions.

Just before the hurricane an election was ordered to be held for municipal officers in one of the towns, but the confusion caused by the hurricane prevented the consummation of this measure. Arrangements have been made to complete this election and to hold others throughout the island in pursuance of an order recently issued, in which are contained full directions for conducting the different steps.

By the end of the year it is hoped that all municipalities will have in office town officers of their own choice, so that it will be possible to have a fair test of the capacity of these people to conduct their local affairs in an orderly, honest, and economical manner. The rules governing these elections will result in the supremacy of the dominant party in each town, giving that party a good working majority; but the minority will also have at least a one-third representation.

As before stated, the number of municipalities is now sixty-nine—that is to say, the whole area of the island is made up of political divisions which, while municipalities in so much as concerns the nature or character of government, are such territorial subdivisions as in our own country would be called townships. County and parish subdivisions are unknown, and there never has been any machinery for conducting the administrative affairs of such subdivisions.

By recent orders five district courts were created. These districts, or legal jurisdictional areas, might appropriately be styled counties, as they have an area and population not greater than those commonly included in such subdivisions in the States of the Union.

But it does not seem practicable to change from the present system—this for the reason that the existing municipal government is well known and understood, while the Anglo-Saxon county organization is new to the people. To cut loose suddenly from the familiar governing system that now exists would be very difficult. The basis of municipal government in all Latin countries appears to have been the Roman municipium. This latter, once independent, was secured by conquest, reduced and incorporated into the Roman commonwealth

under the name given, and admitted to a more or less ample participation in the rights of citizenship, retaining, after the annexation, their own distinct organization and political divisions, and their own magistrates, legislatures, and judicatories; but being, nevertheless, subject to the general control of the sovereign body in Rome. Whatever their origin, we now have in Puerto Rico sixty-nine of these political divisions, each entirely independent of all the others and subordinate only to the central government. While this arrangement brings the central government into direct touch with the towns, it also results in a much greater mass of official correspondence and intercourse than would be necessary in a State of 1,000,000 inhabitants subdivided and governed as in the American Union.

With us, county supervisors, or county commissioners, with boards of assessors, have jurisdiction or authority over the whole county of ten or twenty towns or civil districts, and the governing and administrative body consists only of a few trustees or "selectmen," and justices of the peace, often without salary. This gives the utmost simplicity to the governmental organization in our towns and saves expense, while here the machinery required for a municipality (town) is as complicated as in our incorporated cities. The Puerto Ricans, however, are accustomed to this organization, and have no knowledge of any other. Gradually the transformation, if finally found to be desirable, can be made, but a radical measure disjointing and disarranging the existing municipal system would be deplored.

By orders of the military governors, some improvements have already been effected. Municipal courts have been organized, the number of officials being reduced more than half, and several superfluous offices have been abolished. All this has been done in response to public sentiment here formally expressed. Still there has been no change as respects the form of government; the modification relates only to the present administration. The laws of the country are not bad; on the contrary, many of them are excellent. It is only the bad administration of those laws that I have endeavored to reform.

The number of municipalities is excessive, and many of them are unable to sustain the burden of separate existence. Appeals for financial help are constantly coming in, accompanied by the statements that the taxes can not be collected; that officials, school-teachers, and the police are unpaid, and that the sick are without medicines and attendance.

In response to these appeals, the petitioners are enjoined that the only measure of relief suggested is the amalgamation of the weak with the stronger towns. In one case this merging of two towns was accomplished after public voting.

The objections to amalgamation are various and some of them have weight. It is asserted to be the rule that the taxes collected throughout a municipal district are almost exclusively expended in maintaining the officials, police, etc., who live in the central pueblo, or village, and that should one small place be merged into a large one, the former would have no corresponding benefit and would escape the taxgatherer no better than before.

Another ground of objection is the woefully bad means of communication between the municipal centers. Hardly any of the roads between any of the towns are worthy of the name, and it is often absolutely impossible for travelers to get from one town to another save on foot or on horseback.

There are other reasons assigned for refusal on the part of these

feeble municipalities to agree to being merged into others. The above set forth are the most cogent. On the other hand, the reasons why the consolidations ought to be effected are many and scarcely need to be stated. A committee of one of the political parties recommended a consolidation whereby the number of municipalities should be reduced to twenty-six. This board remarked:

It is very important that a plan should be thought out to reduce the present excessive number of municipalities. The present number had its origin in Spanish times when only employees and those persons paying taxes of $25 and above had the right to vote for representatives to the national parliament. The government stimulated the formation of small municipalities, so as to be able to count on the votes of alcaldes, secretaries, doctors, priests, and other employees. These small villages are very badly governed, and can not support the excessive charges which the present law of municipalities burdens upon them. But they are afraid to annex themselves to the larger towns, which would absorb their income without giving them the necessary service required by every locality in order to live comfortably and decently.

This committee has thought of two methods which it thinks necessary in order to diminish the present number of municipalities. One is to promote the formation of municipal districts composed of two or more small towns. Each town would preserve its name and individuality, and would be governed by an alcalde and three or four minor employees. The municipal district would be governed by an assembly composed of delegates from each of the towns therein comprised. This assembly would vote the budget for the whole district, of which two-thirds of the part collected from each town would be assigned to that town's local expenses, such as town doctor, medicines, slaughterhouse, meat market, schools, health, police, etc. In this way the small towns would not have to fear that, on dispensing with their own councils and annexing themselves to the larger towns, they would lack the service they to-day enjoy, for, on the contrary, they should have better service and more benefits than they now have.

The other method is to stimulate small towns in the neighborhood of the larger ones to annex themselves, assuring them that they will not be absorbed, and that their local existence would be bettered.

Equal guaranties should be granted to the rural wards (barrios) constituting centers of population—for example, Jayuya in Utuado and Cataño in Bayamon.

These wards desire to be segregated from their municipalities, alleging that they pay heavy municipal taxes, and that the municipality to which they form part give their local needs no attention, leaving them unprovided with doctor, dispensary, meat market, police, street lighting, and other services, and using the greater part of their share of taxation to the improvement of the large or head town of the municipal district.

The plan is impracticable save by the military mandate, and that is objectionable in a democracy, a form of government which it is thought to develop here, if the moving thought in the United States is correctly grasped.

The only practicable plan is to limit and restrict the number of municipal officials, fix and define their sources of revenue, supervise expenditures, check excesses, reduce salaries, improve roads and other means of communication, and convince the people that a combination of two or three weak towns would secure for all pueblos, near or remote, a better economic and social state than they could secure by separate existence. But this must all be taught by experience and example.

So great have been and are the social disorders and economic mismanagement that these towns which have abundant wealth and should be able to give ample securities for loans can not secure advances from credit institutions for the most obviously necessary improvements and repairs.

But three towns in the island have any but the most rudimentary arrangements for water supply, and only one has a sewer system—a very poor one at that. There are very few that have adequate municipal buildings; and schoolhouses owned by the towns are generally lacking. Hence the majority of the municipalities are bankrupt, or so nearly so that as borrowers they have no standing. There are a few exceptions. Fajardo has just negotiated a loan of $20,000 to be

applied to the erection of a normal trade school—this sum to be raised to $40,000 by an advance of $20,000 which has been authorized from the insular revenues—all to be expended under the general supervision of the board of public works. Arecibo has the promise of a loan of $40,000 for the completion of a system of water supply, and general sanction will be given to the application to make this loan, without, however, guaranteeing the payment. Ponce, a town of 45,000 inhabitants, is also endeavoring to make a loan, but the money is proposed to be used to pay a floating debt. San Juan was long since bonded for $600,000 to pay for water installation which at the time of American occupation was unfinished. My predecessor advanced to this city $28,000 from insular revenues, which sufficed to permit the turning on of the water. He had the intention to advance a further sum of $32,000 for other city improvements; but as the capital is in a better financial condition than any other town, and abundantly able to provide by taxation for all its needs, further advance from insular revenues has been refused. The bonds of San Juan, just referred to, carry 7 per cent interest and provision for amortization, and were bought by an American banking house and offered to investors; but the firm has succeeded in placing but an insignificant number, notwithstanding long and general advertisement.

Elsewhere reference is had to municipal elections shortly to be held. To what extent the installation of duly elected town councils will add to the confidence of investors remains to be demonstrated, but it is feared that the immediate effect will not be of great moment. The investors will probably prefer to await developments and to take nothing for granted. They will also note whether the laws of contracts and mortgages are such that protection to invested capital will be assured, and whether the local courts see to it that these laws are faithfully executed.

Until municipal government and administration is reformed and elevated to a very much higher plane than now, I see no hope of greatly improved social, domestic, or economic conditions.

The aggregate of all loans from the insular treasury asked for by the municipalities amounts to many millions. All have, of course, been denied. The applicants for loans are referred to bankers and money lenders, but the latter scarcely even consider the requests except in the cases mentioned above.

It is but just to say that at the time the advance referred to was made to San Juan the city was without water, and that the money granted sufficed for completion of certain works and utilization of the water system, which was a very great advantage to the civil and military interests. The advance is regarded as a loan from insular revenues to be repaid in the form of water used by the military and civil departments.

The credit of these municipalities can be established by and through the same means as those employed elsewhere by corporations that reach a condition of insolvency.

I also invite attention to the reports herewith of Col. I. D. De Russy, Eleventh Infantry; Lieut. Col. C. C. C. Carr, Fifth Cavalry; Maj. Albert L. Meyer, Eleventh Infantry; Maj. Francis D. Mansfield, Eleventh Infantry; Maj. W. A. Glassford, signal officer of the department; Capt. H. S. Bishop, Fifth Cavalry; Capt. C. H. Watts, Fifth Cavalry; Capt. W. S. Schuyler, Fifth Cavalry; Capt. Eben Swift, Fifth Cavalry; Capt. F. W. Foster, Fifth Cavalry; Capt. Harry L. Lee, Eleventh Infantry; First Lieut. Seaborn G. Chiles, Eleventh Infantry; First Lieut. Alonzo Gray, Fifth Cavalry.

FINANCIAL STATISTICS.

In the appendix there will also be found some interesting statistics respecting the financial operations of the military government.

The accounts of customs receipts and expenditures have been carefully audited by the inspector general of the department and by Mr. Barre, an auditor sent here from the United States.

In the early period of occupation the orders for expenditures were given direct to the collectors of customs, and it has not been possible to verify the several applications of funds as closely as has been done since the installation of the present auditing system; but there does not appear to be any doubt that all such funds were properly applied, considering the stress of circumstances.

It has not been easy to state the receipts and expenditures of the internal revenues as much in detail and in conformity with our methods as might be wished. The local method of keeping accounts was intricate and difficult of comprehension by our officers. The papers herewith give as full details as could be secured, and a critical audit of these accounts now being made may result in some minor changes.

In this connection special attention is invited to the reports and exhibits prepared by Major Heyl, the able inspector-general of the department, whose assistance has been of very great value to me.

The receipts and expenditures under the military government may be thus classified:

RECEIVED.		
From customs collections	$1,238,535.93	
From internal taxation	1,089,021.94	
		$2,327,557.87
DISBURSED.		
Account customs collections	727,096.40	
Account internal revenues	1,033,424.45	
		1,760,520.85
Balance on hand June 30, 1899		567,037.02
This balance is made up of the following:		
Account of customs	511,439.53	
Account of internal revenue	55,597.49	
		567,037.02
Of the balance stated above there was on June 30—		
Balance in hands of military officers	30,508.66	
Balance in hands of customs collectors	30,478.04	
Balance in hands of treasurer of Puerto Rico (deposited with De Ford & Co.)	450,452.83	
Total on account of customs	511,439.53	
On account of internal revenue	36,036.01	
In debentures, account internal revenue	19,561.48	
		567,037.02

The figures respecting internal revenue are taken from the statement of the civil secretary and are subject to correction through critical audit.

Attention is invited to the magnitude of the figures for internal-revenue receipts for the period from October 18 to June 30, over $1,250,000. During the current fiscal year the collections from this source will be very small as compared to the last year's receipts. The reason for this has already been explained. Under present conditions, and until a new tax scheme is worked out, the receipts from all internal taxes will not amount to more than $500,000.

From October 18, 1898, to June 30, 1899 (eight and twelve-thirtieth months), the expenditures of internal revenue amounted to $1,033,424, which is at the rate of $123,026 per month, or $1,476,312 per annum. The expenditures of customs receipts were $727,096, which is at the rate of $86,558 per month, or $1,038,696 per annum. The total average monthly expenditure from the two was, therefore, $209,584, which would give a yearly total of $2,515,008. In the present year's budget the estimated average monthly expenditure is $161,943, which would indicate a yearly saving, as compared with the above, of $571,692. The expenditures for the first three months of the current year have been much less than the estimated average monthly rate for the year.

THE HURRICANE OF AUGUST 8.

On the morning of the 7th of August, 1899, the United States Weather Bureau, through its branch establishment here, announced the approach of a cyclonic disturbance, and the danger signal was ordered to be hoisted at substations of the Bureau at Ponce and Mayaguez. At the same time I directed that the danger be reported to all commanding officers of posts throughout the island.

There had been no serious or destructive storm in Puerto Rico since 1867, and the inhabitants had ceased to feel great concern on account of tropical tempests. Except at seaports, little heed was given to the caution, and in some cases the telegraph operators failed to receive or to promptly deliver the warning messages.

The vortex of the cyclone appears to have traversed the island throughout its whole length, from about Humacao to Mayaguez, and its path was a scene of very great devastation. The wind must have attained nearly its greatest observed velocity, but there is no authentic record. The anemometer on the Weather Bureau building at San Juan was blown away after having registered a velocity of from 70 to 80 miles an hour. But this port was not in the track of the greatest disturbance. The gale struck the island at Humacao about midnight of August 7, and furiously blew all the rest of that night and well into the next day, while at Mayaguez the violence was not great until 9 o'clock on the morning of the 8th. But as the latter town was under the lee of high mountains, it suffered much less than it would have done had it been higher or not thus protected.

Most of the habitations in the track of the center of the cyclone were entirely smashed and the debris strewn all over the country. The full reports of the loss of life bring the number of deaths up to 2,709.

The wind worked dreadful havoc with nearly everything useful to man. Besides the mortality, which was appalling, the material damage was almost beyond belief. But the greatest loss of life resulted, not from the wind, but from the terrible downfall of rain that immediately followed. The precipitation in a few hours of 11½ inches was reported at one place, and the volume of rain must have averaged quite 6 inches throughout the island, for the fall was not less severe in districts away from the vortex than in its actual track.

Added to the horror of the situation there came with the gale on the southern coast a tidal wave which submerged large areas with sea water and swept away what the wind and the rain had spared, in some places completing the destruction.

Every river bed or bottom of a land depression was a roaring torrent. The wind uprooted myriads of trees, and the rain, entering and permeating the soil, loosened it, and on steep declivities resulted in avalanches

of earth, mud, and water, covering wide areas and piling up the débris in the ravines and gorges.

The principal industry in the elevated portions of the island is coffee growing. These fine coffee fincas were dreadfully damaged. The trees were at the beginning of the time for the maturing of the fruit. Coffee is only successfully cultivated in the shade of larger trees or plants, which are planted and cultivated for their protection to the shrubs that produce the berries. The large trees of course went down, smashing those they were designed to protect, and a gale tore off the green berries or uprooted the bushes. The material loss to the coffee growers can as yet only be estimated, but the most conservative figures received place this year's crop at one-third of the normal.

The exported portion of the crop for 1897 sold for about 13,000,000 pesos. The promise for this year had encouraged the belief that the value of the crop would not be smaller.

If these figures are accurate, and there is every reason to believe them so to be, the loss in this one crop for the current year will reach nearly 9,000,000 pesos. The losses of other property, especially sugar mills, cane, dwellings, roads, and bridges, will bring the total to an immense sum.

Regard being had to the fact that five years must elapse before the coffee trees and their shade can be replanted and reach a normal bearing condition, the total loss can not be safely placed below 25,000,000 pesos for Puerto Rico on account of this hurricane.

The shipping in port suffered little, as the warnings sufficed to permit of protective measures being taken.

Special attention is invited to the able report herewith of Major Hoff, chief surgeon of the department, who was placed at the head of a board of natives and Americans to concert and concentrate relief measures. The work that was assigned to this board, and especially to its principal executive officer, has been of very great magnitude and most onerous. That many thousands of human lives have been saved through the bounty of the United States Government and people can not be doubted.

The greatest difficulty is encountered in discriminating between those who are really needy and those who pretend to be so. While it is possible that every ration has not fed a really needy person, it is also certain that very little food has failed to reach those who were much pinched by hunger. Those who deserved assistance and have failed to receive it are very few indeed.

It has been found to be practicable to cut down the aggregate of food issued from about 1,000 tons per week to less than 500 tons. Constant and progressive reductions are being made in the issues as the people reach better conditions and reproduction of native fruits is accomplished.

The difficulties which have been encountered in distributing the food are of very great proportions. While all the available means of transport by land and water belonging to the quartermaster's department were utilized, resort was had to the local facilities for conveyance, and ox carts and pack animals were secured.

Every post commander became a relief inspector. Depots were established at all points of central supply. The depots were filled from the San Juan base. In every municipality was a subdepot under an officer or a noncommissioned officer, and food was distributed through auxiliary relief committees composed of the best citizens.

Two months have now passed since the bursting of the heavens and the wrecking of this fair island, resulting in a shocking tragedy. Every-

thing is again green and smiling on the face of nature, but back in the interior are yet unknown thousands upon thousands of families who have as yet no resource for to-morrow save that bounty of the great American nation which has poured out its wealth to feed the hungering and help poor humanity to exist.

FUTURE CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

In discussing this most important subject all aspects of it should be considered, and I approach it with misgivings and much hesitation, preferring to be excused from attempting any presentation of this question, but the orders from the Secretary of War require it.

With better facilities and more time for reflection and study it is quite possible that conclusions would be reached varying greatly from those now submitted. I therefore ask that this qualification and my confessed inability to master this profound question be noted.

The annals of my country furnished no closely analogous precedents that could aid me, and my preoccupations have been such as to leave little time for a critical study of political economy.

In some of the great universities a professorship of civics has been established, where instruction is given in subjects such as ethics, civil policy, law in its applications involving the interests of society, the laws of the wealth of nations, and the history of civic development and movement. Preparation by a course of study of these subjects under the instruction afforded by our great educational institutions was, unfortunately, not possible.

The problems confronting the United States, respecting its newly acquired islands and their future government, can only be solved by an application of those wise rules and principles that are the product of human experience. To find modern examples of the application of those rules to tropical states, colonies, dependencies, or possessions we must turn to the experience of other nations.

It will not be profitable to study historical precedents unless there be points of resemblance to Puerto Rico in natural conditions, population, and history. Some of the States which have been formed from what we are accustomed to call "Spanish-America," and some of the islands discovered, settled, and populated under Spanish, English, and French domination, have many points of resemblance to Puerto Rico, although it is probable there is none of these save Chile, at date of revolt from Spanish rule, which had so large a proportion of its inhabitants of the Caucasian race as Puerto Rico now has.

The only American tropical regions where the conditions are at all analogous are Venezuela, Colombia, Guiana, Central America, and the Greater and Lesser Antilles. But the Spanish States of South and Central America were very sparsely settled and all of them had a large Indian population, while Puerto Rico is densely populated and has no Indian blood. In Haiti the negro very largely predominated, and the same was true of Barbados, Martinique, Guadaloupe, and Jamaica, and indeed nearly all the others save Cuba. The countries which most nearly resembled Puerto Rico as respects the nationality of the inhabitants, climate, soil, and government at the time they were lost by Spain are that portion of Santo Domingo now known as the Dominican Republic and the island of Trinidad. The former became an independent State and the latter was ceded to the English Crown—one a few years before and the other about the beginning of the present century. Both

had Spanish laws and institutions. In each there were a considerable number of negro slaves. In neither were there Indians. The Roman Catholic religion was established in both, and other denominations were not allowed. The natural productions of both islands were similar, sugar being the most important, as it was until recently in Puerto Rico.

In 1797 Trinidad was captured by the English and entered upon a new career under local Spanish laws, which were preserved and properly administered by Great Britain. Not so, however, with the island of Santo Domingo, which at the beginning of the century achieved its independence under Toussaint L'Ouverture.

France endeavored to recover her part of the island, but was unsuccessful. In 1844 the eastern or Spanish part became independent, but later Spain tried to recover it, failed, and since then the Republic of Dominica has been unmolested in its career save by civil wars and some strife with Haiti and Spain, but for more than thirty years the inhabitants of Santo Domingo have been demonstrating their incapacity for self government. There have been a half dozen civil wars and overturnings, the last but a few days ago.

Statistics show that the negro blood is not very much more in evidence in Dominica than in Puerto Rico, and the persons of white blood are of the same race and have been controlled by the same codes and institutions that have prevailed here. Had Dominica been a dependency of some strong and well-administered government, it is probable that much of this civil strife would have been prevented. But had it had home rule, such as is accorded to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Territories of the United States, there would still have been struggles for preponderance of one party or faction over the other, which could only have been prevented from becoming sanguinary by the military intervention of the supreme government. It does not seem to me possible that the Dominicans would have furnished an example of autonomic government well administered. They seem to know of but one use to make of political privileges, and that is to erect and maintain a despotism or a government of a class for the benefit of its adherents.

This so called republic has an area more than five times as great as Puerto Rico, a soil of exceptionable richness, adapted to all tropical productions, a salubrious climate, a population containing many highly educated and intelligent men of Spanish origin, and yet we see what misuse has been made of their opportunities, which were of the fairest in the world.

Under a good government, well administered, this little State could as well support a population of 5,000,000 as Puerto Rico can 1,000,000, but so great has been the turbulence, and even chaos, that immigration and industrial development have been prevented, and Dominica has been cited all over the world as a typical example of the incapacity of Spanish Americans to govern themselves. The contrast to Dominica furnished by Trinidad is so noteworthy that a further mention may be justified respecting the latter.

The inhabitants of Trinidad when the island was conquered by General Abercromby in 1797 were largely of Spanish birth and parentage, although there were many French who had emigrated thither from Santo Domingo following the outbreak in 1793. There were also many thousand negro slaves. Its area is about 1,750 square miles (the largest of the British West India Islands, except Jamaica), or a little less than one third the size of Puerto Rico. At the date of the conquest it was inhabited somewhat less densely than Puerto Rico, which then had about 36 inhabitants to the square mile.

The population of Trinidad has increased to upward of 300,000, giving it 170 per square mile. Its revenues exceed $3,000,000, its exports exceed by one-third the same from Puerto Rico, its government is one of order and stability, and crime does not go unpunished. The number of children attending school is more than three times as large, in proportion to population, as here. They have a royal college and several schools for higher education. All religious denominations are free, good roads abound, industries are diversified and are being constantly extended.

If left uncontrolled and free, Trinidad would probably have supplied another example of a chaotic government. It had the most favorable elements for such a result—Spanish, French, negro slaves, "maroons" from the neighboring Spanish and French possessions. Besides, its waters were infested with privateers, who were no better than pirates. Home rule was fortunately not accorded to this island, but instead it was governed at first by military officers directly. It is now a Crown colony, having an executive council of five official and three native appointed members, the governor presiding. It has also a legislative council of 21 members, 10 of whom are appointed by the governor and 11 are elected. The governor presides over this council. Only those who possess a stated property or income qualification, or who are members of the liberal professions, can vote at elections for councilmen.

There is not anywhere in the world a tropical island having a happier and more contented population, nor one where life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness of the humble native, the freed slaves, and the East Indian "cooley," as well as the rich and powerful, are more firmly secured in the enjoyment of all their natural and acquired rights. While the wage rate of the laborer is small, gauged by United States standards, taxation is so adjusted and revenues are so expended that the poorer laboring classes have many advantages lacking in many other islands, Puerto Rico not excepted.

The conditions in Jamaica and many other British islands not differing materially from Trinidad in regard to orderly government are not closely analogous to Puerto Rico in other respects. The inhabitants of many of these islands are principally negroes. In Jamaica, out of a population of about 700,000, only 2½ per cent are white. In Barbados about 9 per cent are white. Trinidad is the largest of all the Lesser Antilles, and, as above stated, was chosen for comparison with Puerto Rico and Santo Domingo because most of the natural and social conditions are, or were, more nearly the same as in Puerto Rico.

In regard to taxation, all the British islands are similarly administered. Each is self-sustaining and has its own export, import, and internal taxes, the same as though it were an independent government. In some of these places, where sugar was the principal reliance, the industrial and economic conditions are unsatisfactory. The United Kingdom—adhering to free trade—can supply herself with the bounty-fed sugar of continental Europe at a cheaper price than from her own colonies. As there is practically no market save the United States for sugar grown in the West Indies, that industry has greatly declined save in islands where exceptionally favorable conditions exist, and therefore business conditions are very unfavorable and unsatisfactory.

The government of Barbados differs somewhat from the usual Crown colony type. The governor and colonial secretary are appointed by the Crown. The executive council consists of the governor, the commander of the troops, the attorney-general, and the president of the legislative council, and this last consists of 9 individuals, 4 of whom are nominated by the governor from the house of assembly.

This house consists of 24 members, all elected. There is an executive committee connected with the assembly, a sort of committee of "ways and means." It introduces all money votes, prepares all estimates, and initiates all government measures. It consists of the governor, the commander of the troops, the colonial secretary, the attorney-general, the president of the executive council, and five members of the assembly appointed by the governor.

The number of qualified electors was 2,208 in 1897, out of a population of about 190,000.

The assembly, under the direction of the legislative committee, levies taxation, votes supplies, and enacts general laws. Business proceeds by bills read three times and by resolutions. Private members can move an address to the governor in legislative committee, requesting that certain acts may be done involving expenditure, or requesting that certain bills or resolutions may be presented to the assembly which involve expenditure. They may also introduce bills demanding the granting of powers to local bodies to raise loans.

They are 11 parishes or townships, each having a council of from 9 to 11 members. One member of its council is nominated by the governor and from 8 to 10 are elected members. These councils or vestries have power to levy taxes which are subject to confirmation by the governor in council. They have charge of expenditures for the poor and the church and of taxes within the parishes.

It is almost universally admitted that Great Britain has been more successful as a colonizing power than any other, and it has seemed to be profitable to study her examples of successful colonial management of peoples of almost all races. In only one marked instance has that policy been recognized as a failure. It grew out of the effort to make English colonies a direct source of profit to the Crown. Since the American Revolution this policy has been abandoned and all English possessions, save a few military stations, are now maintained and governed on a basis of self-support.

English possessions as respects the character of their government may be arranged into three classes:

First. Those that, like Canada, have a Governor-General appointed by the Crown, but have a responsible parliament.

Second. Those that, like Barbados, have a governor and an executive council to determine the general policy, but also have an elected representative legislature which ratifies and confirms the policy of the governor and his council and enacts into laws or amends the measures proposed by him and some that are initiated in the assembly.

Third. Those that, like Mauritius and Jamaica, have a governor and an executive council by whom the governmental policy is fixed and determined without reference to an elective assembly. In this case the people have practically no voice in their own governmental affairs.

Were England now holding toward Puerto Rico the position and relations borne by the United States, there is little doubt, judging from her past, that she would for the present govern Puerto Rico as strictly as she governs her Crown colonies. Nothing would be taken for granted respecting claims of capacity for establishing and maintaining home rule. The people would have to demonstrate by active practical experience their abilities for conducting a representative government—i. e., for autonomy such as Canada enjoys—before it would be accorded. It also seems certain that Spain would never have accorded autonomical government to Cuba and Puerto Rico but for the external pressure that was applied in 1895–96 and 1897.

New Mexico was held under military rule from its cession until 1850, and the Territory of Arizona dates from 1863. California had no Territorial existence, but until it became a State, in 1850, the military was recognized as the governing power. The government of Washington was military in its character until 1848, Idaho until 1863, Colorado until 1861, Dakota until 1881, Louisiana until 1812, Florida until 1822, and Wyoming until 1868. The sovereignty of Hawaii was transferred to the United States on August 12, 1898, but as Congress has taken no action respecting its future status, the island remains a dependency governed by its former laws. It has parted with its sovereignty as an independent nation, but is as yet in all other respects independent, having a duly organized government possessing the executive, judicial, and legislative branches. Import duties upon goods brought from the United States and from foreign countries are still collected, and the United States gathers import taxes upon products of Hawaii that are not free under treaty stipulations.

It is my understanding that all the islands recently acquired by cession from Spain are held as possessions of the United States, our sovereignty over them being complete and the government administered by the military.

In the Philippine Islands a state of war still exists, and but a small part of the area is within military control. In Puerto Rico there is not only no resistance to the military rule of the President as exercised through the Army, but the people welcomed the coming of the American troops with joy and enthusiasm. After the formal transfer of sovereignty by Spain, the first order issued by the commanding general directed that the island be administered and governed in accordance with local laws in all cases where they were not opposed to the military rule or to the Constitution of the United States. The island never had a civil governor, nor a legislature worthy of the name. The commanding general therefore became the acting governor, and was endowed with legislative powers. The courts were continued in their functions and municipal government was not interferred with, save that vacancies existing in the town councils were filled by appointments made by the general commanding.

The people of this island have been long and thoroughly taught an unfortunate object lesson. They have seen the island governed and exploited by a class in the interest and for the benefit of a few.

The Spanish governing element has disappeared, but their example remains. There is no lack of natives of learning and ability ready to take the place of their former masters, step into their vacant shoes, and take up the government laid down. And, having power, would they not use it as their predecessors did? So long have the people been accustomed to this kind of control and absolute subordination that the most of them would accept it as a matter of course.

There is no lack on the part of these people of pretension to all the virtues, and as beautiful theories of government as were ever propounded by the wisest statesman are put forth continuously. The cause of the brotherhood and the rights of man has as ardent expounders in Puerto Rico as could have been found in France in 1793 or in Philadelphia in 1776. There are here a few really public-spirited men who appear to have ideas of government other than self-seeking, but the number is very small. Were the mass of the inhabitants educated and possessed of some conception of the duties of citizenship and experience in civil government their immediate endowment with rights and privileges equal to those enjoyed by our own citizens would be

gladly recommended. But in view of the profound illiteracy of 85 per cent of the people, of their total unfitness to exercise the elective franchise, of the corruption and maladministration that now characterize the affairs of many municipalities, and of the misuse that would almost certainly be made of political power by those who would inevitably secure it, I can not find warrant or justification for a recommendation to now vest Puerto Rico with the faculties and power of self government—an investiture that I think should be withheld until there shall have been a plain demonstration of their competence to exercise it. When they govern municipalties well they may have larger duties devolved upon them.

There are very learned and able men in both parties, and their profession of principles and political platforms would receive warm commendation by the most ardent patriot. But I have no knowledge of any country where Latin-Americans, released from arbitrary control, have established well ordered representative institutions within a generation succeeding their liberation, and there are to-day many unfortunate illustrations of their incapacity to do so in countries which have been independent for sixty or seventy years. History tells us that usually in Spanish-American republics there is a revolution or civil war at intervals of a few years, except when despotic use of power has prevented it. In vain have I diligently sought for a reason justifying a confidence that Puerto Rico would be able to make a better record.

There is one fortunate circumstance, and it certainly warrants some hope that the latent animosities and tendency to do as others of their race have done would be restrained in this island. Puerto Rico, unlike Dominica, Haiti, and Venezuela, and many other republics, never was, is not, and probably never will be, independent. It is now a possession of the United States and must so continue until Congress decides otherwise. Whatever government may be given to the island, it will be subject to the general control of Congress, and, having no local army or navy, it would be without the means and power to carry its local issues to the ultimate of armed repression and subjection of opponents. In other words, riot or insurrections would be suppressed. This is the balance wheel that would prevent the catastrophe which has overtaken so many other Spanish-American States newly vested with sovereign power.

But so long as the tendency to abuse of power exists—and there seems to be no doubt of its existence—the local government would probably be administered purely and solely for the benefit of those who, securing political control, would be able through customary and familiar methods to retain and misuse it.

It is with great regret that this statement is made, for the thought of continuance of an arbitrary government by the military is repugnant to the letter and spirit of our laws and institutions and to the aspirations and instincts of our people.

The knowledge which I possess of the inhabitants of this island, combined with that derived from a study of historical precedents, where failure has always followed an attempt to vest similar populations with the functions of independent or responsible government, forces me to the conviction that such investiture of Puerto Rico would be a disaster to them and to the best interests of their fair island.

The conditions here are quite unlike any that existed in the sparsely settled western territories which were acquired by purchase from France, by cession from Mexico, and under convention with Great Britain. They are unique in our history. We have no American precedent to

which we can refer as an aid to decide the form of civil government that should be set up.

Hawaii has remained more than a year without Congressional consideration of its status. It is not only not a State; it is not even in a legal sense a Territory. There seems to be no reason why it could not remain indefinitely as now. Its local municipal government is recognized by Congress and its continuance sanctioned.

But the continuance of any government enforced by the orders of a general of the Army is obnoxious to Americans, and should be replaced as soon as possible by one in which the people themselves should have a voice, and as complete control as they are capable of exercising. The people of Puerto Rico should not wish for more power than they were capable of justly and wisely exercising.

It is assumed that a long continuance of the military government is impracticable. It is unnecessary to say that this island is not now capable of carrying on such a government as Hawaii is able to maintain. The suggestion is dismissed for its abandonment by the United States to entire self-control and independence, for the Puerto Ricans do not deserve it. The island was forcibly seized, and the people had no voice in determining their own destiny. They do not wish for national independence, but instead seek final incorporation with the American Union, which it would seem they have a right ultimately to expect. This hope may be finally realized if the grave duty devolving upon us is well done and events take their natural course.

I am satisfied the island is not ready for full Territorial autonomy. Only a few desire it, and I fear that the great mass of the people feel no interest in the question of government at all, beyond the notion they had and have that with American sovereignty would come free trade and high prices for labor and produce, bringing general prosperity. They have been disappointed and loudly complain, but it seems to an observer that only stolid indifference is shown by the lower classes as to their political future. The business class is strongly opposed to Territorial government, for they see in store only maladministration and misgovernment, and taxes misapplied, if full control is now given to the natives.

Probably one-eighth of all the inhabitants are foreign. Among them there must be well on to 100,000 souls, natives of the peninsula, the Canaries, the Balearic Islands, and Corsica, nearly all of whom may wish to preserve their foreign nationality. A very large part of the mercantile and proprietor class are Spanish, and the feeling manifested toward them by the native Puerto Ricans causes the foreigners to fear that oppression and injustice would be their lot if the former should have full power. Unless foreigners here renounce their foreign nationality, and probably very few of them will do so at present, they can not take part in the civil government; but they are entitled to the protection which is guaranteed to them by treaty, and which is always accorded under the unwritten rules of international comity.

Being called upon to submit a recommendation for a governmental measure adapted to this island, I have the honor to propose the following scheme for a temporary government, to be established on ——— [date]:

PROJECT OF GOVERNMENT.

The island of Puerto Rico to be styled a *Dependency* and placed under the executive control of the President, through the Secretary of State of the United States.

I. This contemplates an organization to consist of a governor, an executive council, a judiciary, and later on a legislative assembly.

II. The chief executive of the dependency to be the governor, reporting direct to the Secretary of State of the United States.

III. The administrative duties to be assigned to a secretary, an attorney-general, a treasurer, an auditor, a commissioner of public works, lands and agriculture, a commissioner of posts and telegraphs, and a commissioner of education.

IV. The executive council to consist of the governor, the seven above-named chiefs of administrative offices, and four other members chosen by the governor from the legislative assembly.

V. The legislative assembly to consist of thirty-five assemblymen—i. e., one from each municipality or group of municipalities, according to population, all chosen as hereinafter provided.

VI. A town council for each municipality.

VII. A comisario or commissioner for each barrio or ward.

VIII. The judiciary to consist of a supreme court, a United States Federal court, five district courts, and municipal courts.

IX. The supreme court to consist of a chief justice, two associate justices, a prosecuting attorney, a secretary, and a marshal.

X. The United States Federal court to consist of two judges, a prosecuting attorney, a clerk of the court, and a marshal.

XI. The district courts, five in number, each to consist of two judges, a prosecuting attorney, a secretary, and a sheriff.

XII. The municipal courts, one for each municipality, each to consist of a judge and a clerk.

The governor and official members of the executive council, the officers of the supreme court and those of the Federal court, all to be appointed by the President of the United States, with confirmation by the Senate.

The political division of the island to be five districts or counties, corresponding to the existing judicial districts, each composed of municipal districts and represented in the legislative assembly by seven assemblymen.

There will be seven or more municipalities in each district; if more than seven the smaller ones would be so grouped and combined as respects population that representation in the assembly would be as nearly equal as practicable.

The organic law should provide for the ultimate consolidation of municipalities into, say, 35, with population as nearly equal as may be. Each municipality to have full autonomy and its government administered by an alcalde and town council elected by popular suffrage the same as the members of the legislative assembly.

DUTIES OF THE GOVERNOR.

He would attend and preside at all meetings of the council. In case of his absence on account of illness or for other grave cause, the secretary to act as governor; and should the latter also be absent or disabled, the attorney general to so act. The governor to pass upon and dispose of

all routine matters and correspondence, without reference thereof to the council, and also in all matters too urgent to admit of their advice being given within the time in which it would be necessary for him to act in respect thereto, but in all such urgent cases, the governor, as soon as possible, to communicate to the council the measures he may have adopted, with the reasons therefor.

The council to meet at least once each week, the day and hour being fixed by the governor. The ex-officio members present to take precedence in the order above stated, and the members appointed by the governor to take rank next below the ex-officio members, in the order in which their names appear in the order of appointment. The ex-officio members to hold office until their successors should be appointed, or during the pleasure of the President of the United States, and the appointed members to hold office during the time of the existence of the legislative assembly.

The council not to be authorized to proceed to the dispatch of any business, unless it be duly summoned by authority of the governor, and at least six of the members, exclusive of the governor or presiding officer, are present throughout the whole sitting.

A clerk for the council, appointed by the governor, to be required to keep a true and exact journal, or minutes, of all the proceedings, and for this purpose to be allowed the necessary clerical assistance; and at each meeting the proceedings of the meeting last held to be read over and approved or amended as the case might require, before proceeding to the dispatch of other business.

Twice a year a full transcript of all the said minutes for the preceding half year to be transmitted to the Secretary of State in Washington. All orders in council to be published in the Official Gazette.

Except in the cases above mentioned, the governor to be required, in the execution of his powers and authority, to consult with the executive council, unless he believes that the public service would sustain material prejudice by his so doing. But, if any member should in writing suggest the submission of any matter upon which the governor may have acted, or may have reserved action, independently of the council, it would be competent for that member to require that there be recorded upon the minutes the written application together with the answer of the governor to the same. In case the governor should take such independent action upon any matter, it would be his duty to immediately report the grounds and reasons for his action to the Secretary of State in Washington; and to have entered in the minutes of the council a full statement of the grounds or reasons set forth by the member or members for requesting reference to the council of the subject of the request.

The governor, upon resolution of the legislative assembly, in his discretion and with the advice of the executive council, to have the power to remit and order the repayment of any duties raised, levied, collected, and paid into the Treasury.

Subject to the review of the executive council, the governor, in his discretion and in cases of emergency, to have the power to authorize the expenditure, out of funds voted in the estimates, of a sum not to exceed $100 at one time.

The appointment to office of all persons, whose pay or emoluments are voted by the assembly and do not exceed $1,200 per annum, to be made by the governor with the concurrence of the executive council: *Provided*, That the secretary and the employees of the legislative assembly be appointed by the speaker of the assembly.

In cases of riot or disturbance of the peace, and in cases of imminent danger to the peace of the community, the governor, upon the recommendation of two thirds of all of the members of the executive council, to have the power to call upon the commanding officer of the United States forces stationed in Puerto Rico for the assistance of the troops to quell the riot or disorder, and such commanding officer to be required to promptly respond to the call made by furnishing the troops called out, the facts to be immediately reported to the Secretary of State in Washington.

DUTIES OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL.

The sphere of control of the council to include:

The transaction of public financial business.

The consideration of ways and means.

Advising with the governor on any measure that he may deem expedient to bring before the legislative assembly.

The conduct of public works.

The control and management of public institutions.

The initiation in the legislative assembly of money votes by bill, resolution, or otherwise.

To prepare estimates in detail of the probable expenditures and revenues of Puerto Rico for each fiscal year.

To prepare and submit supplementary estimates.

To consider all bills or resolutions passed by the legislative assembly, and to recommend to the governor his approval or veto of the same.

To execute all conveyances, leases, contracts, or documents, and to sue and be sued in the name of the Secretary.

To lease for such time and on such conditions as shall be fixed by the legislative assembly, such portion of the public property and lands, not including public lands in the control of the War Department, as may be applied to a useful purpose in the interest of the public. But all leases of such property and lands for any term more than five years, including all extensions of the same, to require the approval of the legislative assembly by formal resolution.

To publish three times in the Official Gazette all laws, resolutions, and appropriations passed and made by the legislative assembly, such publication to be a sufficient announcement of the enactment of said laws, resolutions, and appropriations.

DUTIES OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY.

The members of the legislative assembly to be elected for two years by popular suffrage, the elective franchise to be restricted as hereinafter provided. The elections for assemblymen to take place on the first Tuesday in April of each second year.

The first election for assemblymen to be held under the direction and control of the military governor of Puerto Rico, it to be his duty to see that orderly elections be held in all municipalities for the purpose of choosing members of the legislative assembly. Subsequent elections to be held under the direction of the governor in executive council.

The following qualifications to be required of a resident of Puerto Rico in order to vote in elections for assemblymen:

(1) To be a male, over 21 years of age, an actual resident of the municipality for at least six months and of the island for at least two years preceding the election.

(2) To be able to read and write, or else to be a taxpayer of record in his own municipality.

(3) Foreigners to fulfill foregoing qualifications, and in addition to have renounced under oath their foreign allegiance and declared their intention to become citizens of the United States (Puerto Rico?).

The assembly to meet annually on the third Tuesday in April of each year, the sessions to be numbered consecutively. The assembly to be the sole judge of the qualification of its members; to elect its own presiding officer, who would be styled and designated "The speaker" and be addressed as "Mr. Speaker." The speaker to appoint a secretary and the necessary employees.

The assemblymen to be entitled to pay at the rate of $5 per day for forty days' continuous session in each year (not including Sundays, national holidays, and Puerto Rican feast days). If the session should be extended beyond forty days, except as above noted, no pay or emolument to be allowed for such additional time.

In case of absence from meetings of the assembly without satisfactory excuse, the assemblyman to forfeit his pay for the time of such absence.

No mileage or personal expenses to be allowed assemblymen.

A majority of the whole number of assemblymen to constitute a quorum for business. In the event that the speaker should be absent for any cause, the assembly to choose a speaker pro tempore.

The speaker of the assembly and the clerk to sign all bills and resolutions, and a committee of the assembly appointed by the speaker to deliver all such bills to the governor in executive council.

All bills or resolutions to be either approved or vetoed within ten days of their receipt by the governor in council. Should he approve the measure submitted, he would immediately so notify the house of assembly in session. Should he veto the bill, he would return it with his objections. In such case a two-thirds vote of all the members of the assembly could pass the bill over the governor's veto, and in that event it would become a law notwithstanding his objections.

The initiation by individual members of the assembly of all money appropriations—either annual, supplementary, or special—by bill, resolution, or otherwise to be forbidden, for such initiation would rest exclusively with the governor in executive council, but the house of assembly would have and exercise its undoubted and exclusive right to withhold, reduce, or grant such aids and supplies, and to direct, limit, and appoint the ends, purposes, conditions, limitations, and qualifications of such grants, aids, and supplies, but it would not be competent for the house of assembly to increase any of the items or the aggregate of any estimates submitted by the governor in executive council.

The right of individual members of the house of assembly to introduce any bill, resolution, or any other measure of legislation is not to be prevented, impeded, or restricted, provided such bill, resolution, or measure of legislation does not create any charge upon the revenues of the island or in terms provide for the expenditure of public money.

All laws would be styled "ordinances," and the enacting words to be "Enacted by the governor of Puerto Rico, with the advice and consent of the legislative assembly thereof."

Legislative business to proceed by bills, read three times, and by resolutions. Individual assemblymen to move an address to the governor in executive council requesting that certain acts be done. They would also introduce bills providing for the granting of powers to municipal bodies to raise loans.

The legislative power to extend to all rightful subjects of legislation, not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States locally

applicable; no private charters, franchises, privileges, or immunities to be granted without the authority of the Congress of the United States. The assembly to be able, by special acts, to permit persons to associate themselves together as corporate bodies for general manufacturing, agriculture, and other industrial pursuits, and for conducting the business of insurance, savings banks, banks of discount and deposit, but not of issue, loan, trust, and guaranty associations, cemeteries, railways, wagon roads, vessels, irrigation ditches, colleges, churches, seminaries, libraries, and divorces. No loan to be raised that would make the total indebtedness of the dependency more than 7 per cent of the value of the taxable property. No loan to be authorized that would exceed in any one year 1 per cent of the taxable property.

It would be within the power and authority of the President of the United States to disallow, repeal, alter, or annul any order of the governor in council, and any law or ordinance passed by the assembly; such disallowance, repeal, alteration, or amendment to take effect from the time when the same shall be promulgated in Puerto Rico.

The duties of the heads of administrative offices would comprise, for—

The secretary.—To see that all proceedings of the executive council be properly kept, and all executive orders, as well as all laws and resolutions passed by the assembly, be duly promulgated.

To furnish the Secretary of State of the United States, the President of the Senate of the United States, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the United States one copy each of all such laws and orders.

To furnish the Secretary of State of the United States a copy of the minutes of proceedings of the executive council.

To act as governor in case of the death, disability, or absence of the executive.

To have charge of all correspondence with municipal town councils and of all consular correspondence.

To furnish to the governor an annual report upon the general condition of the dependency; and to perform many other duties, not necessary to specify, that would also devolve upon him.

The attorney general.—To perform the ordinary duties of that office as is customary in the States of the Union; also to have general authority and supervision over all prisons and penitentiaries, and over notaries and escheat of lands.

In case of the death or disability of both the governor and the secretary, to act as governor.

The treasurer.—To have supervision of all matters respecting taxes and the collection of the same, licenses, corporations, copartnerships, trade statistics, newspapers, conveyances, patents, trade marks and labels, bonds of fidelity, etc.

The auditor.—To have control of all matters respecting the auditing of accounts and the expenditures of public funds.

The commissioner of public works, etc.—To have supervision of all public works, pounds, weights and measures, buildings and building regulations, explosives, eminent domain, markets, parks, cemeteries, pilots, harbor police, quarantine establishments, light-houses, buoys, harbor lines and police, the leasing of lands and buildings, mines, agricultural experiment stations, etc.

The commissioner of postal service and telegraphs.—To have charge of these services throughout the island.

The commissioner of education.—To have supervision over all matters concerning public instruction in Puerto Rico.

The appointment and employment of all persons whose salary or compensation is less than $1,200 per annum would be in the discretion of the heads of departments in which those persons should be employed, but the rates of compensation of all officers and employes appointed by the President would be fixed by him, while the rates of compensation of all other officers and employees would be fixed and determined by the assembly; provided, always, that the salary of no such officer or employe would exceed that recommended by the executive council.

There would be a quarantine officer, presumably appointed by the President and working under the general supervision of the Marine-Hospital Service.

The expectation is that the number of municipalities would be reduced to thirty-five, corresponding to the number of assemblymen; but should that result be not attained, then the combined vote of two or more of the smaller municipalities would be necessary to choose an assemblyman.

Of course the above is but an outline of the proposed government. To supply the requisite verbiage and to put the whole into chapters and sections would require much time and further study. I have attempted to give only the framework.

The degree of autonomy or home rule that this project contemplates is very much broader than that accorded now to the English Crown colonies, and approaches to that accorded to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Cape Settlements. It provides for as large a measure of self government as the Puerto Ricans are capable of using wisely. When it is demonstrated by a few years of experience—if it should be—that these powers can be wisely extended, it will be easy to broaden them, and such extension will be very much easier than later to curtail and restrict them.

While this proposed scheme bears some resemblance to that under which some English colonies are now administered, there are many points in which it differs. The bill "To provide a territorial government for Hawaii," printed in Senate Document No. 16, Fifty-fifth Congress, third session, supplied some features which have been incorporated, but as a whole it does not bear a very close resemblance to any existing system of government.

This proposition contemplates a civil government pure and simple, the military remaining here returning to the duties they perform in the States and Territories of the Union and only intervening in local affairs when, under dire necessity, called out by the Executive, as has often been done in the States of the Union.

The question of salaries is left to be worked out when and if the general project should be deemed worthy of further consideration by the Department or by Congress, but, excepting the governor, no official should receive more than $4,000 per annum.

Regarding general legislation by Congress, it is recommended that the trade between the United States and the island be left as free as possible, and that the customs revenues collected here be left to the island temporarily as an income for local expenditure. As soon as a new local internal-revenue tax law can be framed and put into operation, the custom-house collections would inure to the General Treasury, but for a few years it will be very difficult to balance the budget without this aid.

The proposition is to make the island self-supporting, and to maintain all services here, including posts and quarantine, as a charge against local revenues; to extend the existing wagon roads and rail-

roads; to build hospitals, schools, and asylums; to deepen the harbors; to extend or create dock facilities; and to foster and promote the general welfare by utilizing for this purpose all available resources as well as the proceeds of wisely-placed loans.

In the foregoing project of civil government I have suggested the three coordinate branches—executive, legislative, and judicial—proposing ultimately to include in the legislature a lower house or assembly, but I do not wish to be understood as proposing the immediate creation of this body, and this for reasons stated in the preceding pages. For the present the governor and executive council should control legislation. When experience shall have shown that the people comprehend the gravity of the duties and obligations of self government will be soon enough to establish the lower house.

I have previously referred to the special merits and able assistance in the discharge of civil duties rendered by Maj. John Van R. Hoff, chief surgeon of the Department, and Maj. Charles H. Heyl, inspector-general. It is but due to Maj. A. C. Sharpe, acting judge-advocate of the Department, that I should place upon record my sense of official and personal recognition of the services of this very able officer. His knowledge of civil and criminal law has been of the utmost importance.

Capt. George T. Langhorne, Twenty seventh U. S. Volunteer Infantry, has been with me as an aid during the time of my command here. He has rendered very valuable services and this official recognition of them is his due.

Lieut. Col. William P. Hall, the adjutant-general of the Department, has acted as chief of staff, and intelligence and ability have characterized his services.

In closing, attention is invited to a quotation from the report to the President of the Hawaiian commissioners, dated December 2, 1898, printed on pages 17 and 18 of Senate Document No. 16, Fifty-fifth Congress, third session. It is as follows:

> Much has been said to the effect that the policy or scheme of government for the Hawaiian Islands will be taken and accepted as an index or precedent to be followed in the plan of government of Puerto Rico and the Philippines.
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> * * * * * * *
>
> It can not be said that the Puerto Ricans or the Filippinos are at all familar with our system of government, or with any other based on the principles of liberty.
>
> The underlying theory of our government is the right of self-government, and a people must be fitted for self government before they can be trusted with the responsibilities and duties of free government.
>
> These remarks are made to negative the idea that, because the people of Hawaii can, in the judgment of the commission, be consistently given self-government to an extent almost equaling that given the people of the United States, it can be safely inferred that other insular possessions that the United States have, or may acquire by treaty with Spain, can be granted equal freedom in government.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. W. DAVIS,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

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SPECIAL REPORT ON INSULAR AFFAIRS, AS PER INSTRUCTIONS OF CIRCULAR NO. 10, WAR DEPARTMENT, MARCH 25, 1899.

DEPARTMENT OF SANTIAGO AND PUERTO PRINCIPE.

GEOGRAPHICAL AND PHYSICAL FEATURES.

FIRST—GEOGRAPHICAL AND PHYSICAL FEATURES OF THE PROVINCE OF SANTIAGO.

This province contains the principal mountain ranges of Cuba. Commencing at Cape Maisi the land rises in a series of irregular terraces of limestone rock until an elevation of about 1,500 feet is reached, then gradually slopes upward, mingling with a series of irregular mountains, which extend from the north to the south coast. These mountains are extremely precipitous and irregular, and are covered with vegetation almost to the summits. They are fairly well supplied with water by numerous small springs, but are so rough that no roads have ever been constructed through them, and all traffic between the north and south coast in the vicinity of Maisi and for 80 miles to the westward has always been by trail. The mountains in this portion of Cuba rise to an elevation of about 4,000 feet. Seventy miles from Cape Maisi, on the south coast, the country flattens out and the mountains recede from the ocean, leaving a large and comparatively level plain, indented by a deep, irregular harbor, furnishing excellent anchorage for any amount of shipping. This plain is known as the Guantanamo Valley, and the harbor is the harbor of Guantanamo. The Guantanamo River is a stream of considerable size and navigable for light-draft boats for about 6 miles. It drains the mountains and country adjacent to the valley. The valley of Guantanamo is extremely fertile, and contains some of the largest and best sugar plantations in Cuba. Between Guantanamo and Cape Maisi, on the south coast, there are no settlements to speak of—now and then fishermen's huts perched on the precipitous sides of the mountains near the ocean. On the north coast, about half a mile from the cape, is "Cape Maisi Light," a light of the first class.

The coast of Santiago Province west of Guantanamo is extremely rough and mountainous. The mountains here reach an altitude of 5,500 feet and extend down to the sea. Between Guantanamo and Santiago the remains of an old wagon road are seen, but it is out of repair and extremely rough and dangerous to pass over. At a point about 25 miles west of Guantanamo the mountains commence to bend back from the seacoast, leaving near the sea one or two ranges of comparatively low foothills. In the second row of these foothills are situated the large iron mines of the Juragua and Spanish-American iron companies. The first settlement on the coast between Guantanamo and Santiago is Daiquiri, the point of the first landing of the army of invasion during the recent war with Spain. The Spanish American company's iron mines are situated about 6 miles back from Daiquiri, at an elevation of nearly 700 feet above the sea. A broad gauge railroad connects these mines with the ocean, where a large pier, with extensive ore bins, has been constructed. The output of these mines is increasing, and there seems to be comparatively no end to the ore in sight.

Eight and a half miles farther to the westward is the village of Siboney, distant a little less than 12 miles from Santiago. From Santi-

ago to Siboney, running along the seacoast, is a narrow gauge railroad belonging to the Juragua Iron Company, whose mines are situated back of Siboney and, like those of the Spanish-American Company, about 6 miles from the seacoast. The output of this company is large. From Siboney to Santiago there is a wagon road passing through a rather low, swampy valley, in which were formerly some rather large sugar plantations. Along the sides of the mountains are the sites of many old coffee plantations. As we approach Santiago the mountains recede farther and farther from the coast, leaving another large, irregular valley, covered with rolling hills, in which is situated the city of Santiago, the villages of Caney, Cubitas, Dos Bocas, Boniato, and Cobre. A large portion of this valley was formerly under cultivation, the largest plantations being sugar. The hills were covered in former times with coffee plantations, owned and controlled largely by Frenchmen, refugees from Haiti.

Santiago is a city of about 50,000 people, founded in 1514. It is situated on a limestone hill, 160 feet high, and is at the northeast extremity of the harbor. The harbor is about 4½ miles long, and varies from a few hundred yards to a mile and a half in width. It has sufficient water for the largest ships up to a point within half a mile of the present wharves. It is completely landlocked and furnishes an absolutely safe harbor. At Cobre are located large copper mines, which formerly were famous for their large output of high-grade copper ore. Santiago is connected with the interior by a standard-gauge railroad, running through a pass in the mountains to San Luis, and sending a branch off to the north and eastward to the old Sabanilla plantation. The entire line consists of about 45 miles of road. The pass through which it reaches the interior is about the only available one for a railroad, a fact which gives this road considerable importance in the eyes of those contemplating the construction of a line from Santiago to Santa Clara. The mountains around Santiago form almost a continuous rim. On the east the Sierra Maestre rises to an altitude of 5,500 feet. This gradually slopes down to an almost even ridge of grass covered hills or small mountains, varying in height from 1,000 to 1,800 feet and rising again on the west to a height of nearly 6,000 feet. The effect is very pleasing, and the bay and the city appear to be completely hemmed in by the mountains. Passing over the lower part of the encircling range are the remains of several old roads leading to the interior, which must have been built with great labor and expense. These were constructed, some of them, over two hundred years ago, but for the last fifty or sixty years have been allowed to fall into almost complete ruin. One of them, the Camino de la Isla, or Island road, formerly ran from Santiago to Havana. It is extremely important that these roads be opened again, as they furnish the only means of communication between the rich interior valleys and the seacoast. The relics of many fine old masonry bridges and culverts indicate that in the past these roads were kept in excellent repair.

After passing over the low rim of mountains directly back of the city, the traveler finds himself on the edge of the great central plateau of this portion of Cuba. To the eastward the plateau sweeps around the coast range of mountains connecting with the head of the Guantanamo Valley, gradually losing itself in the foothills of the mountains, which cover the whole breadth of the eastern portion of the island. To the northward it runs for nearly a hundred miles in an almost unbroken succession of wonderfully rich tracts of agricultural land, with here and there a high range of hills. It is well watered by numer-

ous streams, and presents almost limitless possibilities in the way of cultivation and development. Throughout the center of this great plateau are still found large forests of mahogany and cedar, as well as other valuable woods. The construction of the central railroad through this portion of Cuba will mean everything to the development of this section of the island.

To the westward this valley swings around the coast range of mountains and joins the great valley extending from Bayamo to Manzanillo, and to the north and west it connects with the level rolling country of Puerto Principe.

Returning to the seacoast, west of Santiago, we find the mountains rising to the height of over 7,000 feet and extending down to the water's edge. In fact, from Maisi to Cape Cruz the mountains at most points rise from the sea, which is to all intents and purposes fathomless, and anchorages are few and far between. There are numerous small harbors, none of them practicable for large ships, between Santiago and Cape Cruz, which is about 118 miles to the westward. At Cape Cruz the coast bends sharply to the northward and the mountains fall back from the sea. This is the commencement of the great valley or plain of Manzanillo, which extends from the mountains on the east to the Cauto River on the west and north, and runs inland, becoming merged in the great central plateau of the island. Manzanillo is situated at the head of the Bay or Gulf of Manzanillo on the border of a great level and extremely fertile plain, in which are some of the finest sugar plantations in Cuba. Years ago a railroad was projected and a small portion of it built from Manzanillo toward Bayamo, but for some reason the project was abandoned. The construction of this railroad will be of the greatest benefit to the country. From Manzanillo to Bayamo the country is a level plain of great width and wonderful richness. It will compare advantageously with the richest adobe soil of southern California. The greatest needs here are good wagon roads and a railroad, for, while this plain is easily traversed in dry weather, it becomes literally impassable after a few heavy rains. All this magnificent country is practically undeveloped. Its extreme fertility and richness can only be appreciated by those who have ridden over it. It is comparatively well watered, and is bound in the future to become the source of great wealth and prosperity. On the west, and sweeping completely around the head of this valley, is the river Cauto, the largest of all the Cuban rivers, and navigable for light-draft vessels for 60 miles from its mouth. At the head of the valley where it joins the tableland is situated the old town of Bayamo, a picturesque old place, now largely in ruins. It was destroyed during the ten years' war to prevent its capture by the Spaniards. Twenty miles beyond is the old town of Jiguani. Years ago about these towns were almost countless herds of cattle and horses, but these have entirely disappeared since the ten years' war. In fact, all this section of Cuba has never recovered from the crushing blows of this war. From Bayamo to the north coast we have a beautiful rolling country, broken by great forests of timber such as are found north of Santiago. Returning to the north coast, and starting westward from Baracoa, we find the coast still lofty and mountainous.

Baracoa, which is 20 miles to the west of Cape Maisi, is the oldest settlement in Cuba, and was founded in 1512 by Velasquez. The harbor is small and comparatively shallow. The country is rough and mountainous, but extremely picturesque and beautiful. The principal industry is the cultivation of cocoanuts and bananas; some tobacco is

grown, although this is limited in amount. The natives of Baracoa are very skillful in manufacturing articles from tortoise shell.

The first harbor of importance west of Baracoa is the Bay of Nipe. This is probably one of the finest harbors in the world. The entrance is narrow but deep nearly 10 fathoms on the bar , with high cliffs on either side. Suddenly one emerges into what seems almost like an inland sea. This magnificent harbor is about 15 miles long and 8 or 9 wide. It is completely sheltered from the ocean by a high range of hills, which shut it off entirely from view. Flowing into it are two comparatively large streams, the larger one known as the Mayari River. This river is navigable for boats and scows for about 15 miles, up to the town of Mayari. About Mayari are some of the best tobacco lands in Cuba, also large forests of hard wood. The country is wonderfully fertile, and presents great opportunities for the enterprising agriculturist and investor. Almost any kind of fruit can be grown here in the greatest abundance. Commencing at the Bay of Nipe the mountains recede from the ocean and practically come to an end, so far as their extension westward is concerned. They swing south and gradually merge into the central plain. The country about Nipe and farther on to the border of Puerto Pincipe is low and rolling, and in former times was the seat of great tobacco and sugar plantations, as well as the cultivation of bananas.

The next port westward of Nipe is Banes—another excellent harbor, much like Nipe, but smaller and difficult to enter on account of strong currents. The entrance is deep, narrow, and bordered by high cliffs, and is known as the Canyon of Banes. This entrance is about 3 miles long, and suddenly merges into the beautiful harbor. The vicinity of Banes was formerly one of the greatest banana-producing districts in Cuba, and it was not unusual to load a steamer a day with this fruit. At present the old companies are endeavoring to reestablish the business and have combined with the Boston Fruit Company.

The land all about this bay is very much like that about the Bay of Nipe. It is wonderfully rich and will grow, generally speaking, anything which can be grown in the Tropics. From Banes a standard-gauge railroad runs up to the plantations.

About 6 miles from the port is the little town of Banes. This town, like most others in this section of Cuba, was almost entirely destroyed during the war, but is now being slowly built up. All this section presents splendid opportunities for investment.

Still farther to the westward we come to the harbor of Vita, with its deep, narrow entrance, like all the eastern harbors of Cuba. Once inside one finds an absolutely quiet, landlocked harbor, at the head of which is situated the terminus of the Santa Lucia Railroad and the large warehouse and storehouses of the great Santa Lucia sugar plantation. A standard-gauge railroad runs from the dock to the plantation and to its various cane fields. This estate has on it some 25 or 30 miles of railroad, and has within its limits 110,000 acres of land, many thousand of which are under cultivation (sugar cane . In the town of Santa Lucia, situated near the great central mill, are over 3,000 inhabitants, made up entirely of the employees of the estate and their families. It is quite worth a trip to Cuba to go over this sugar plantation and study the scientific methods employed.

Still farther to the westward is the old town of Gibara. The harbor of Gibara is of fair size. On the town side the depth of water is not sufficient for large ships, and all cargoes have to be discharged by lightering. The town is a quaint and picturesque old Spanish town,

entirely inclosed by a wall along which are scattered masonry blockhouses. This town, or port, has been for years the port of entry for all the northern portion of the province of Santiago. It is essentially a pro-Spanish town, and commercially has always been prosperous.

Twenty miles in the interior is situated the old town of Holguin, connected with Gibara by a narrow-gauge road in good condition and repair. Gibara has always been largely commercial. Holguin, on the contrary, in the midst of an agricultural and grazing country, is dependent on these industries for its resources. About Holguin, as elsewhere in the province, there is evidence of the extensive ruin and destruction wrought by the wars, and here, also, the cattle and agricultural industries have been completely destroyed. The town is situated in a rolling, barren country, reminding one very much of certain sections in New Mexico. In former times small amounts of gold were washed in the streams near Holguin, and now and then reports are circulated relating to the rediscoveries of old placer mines. The people are in an extremely destitute condition, and have not yet recovered from the double hardship of the war followed by a terrible epidemic of smallpox, which almost literally depopulated whole villages. Holguin is connected with Bayamo by what was at one time a passable road, but is now entirely impracticable, except for riding and pack animals. Holguin and the country about it would be immensely benefited by the construction of the railroad from Santiago to Santa Clara, to which reference has already been made.

Passing westward from Gibara, the next port of importance is Puerto Padre. Here we have another of those magnificent Cuban harbors with its deep, narrow entrance and extensive inner harbor. Puerto Padre is at the head of the harbor and is a small and comparatively prosperous village in fair state of repair, which condition is due largely to the energy and ability of its mayor, a certain Manuel Lechuga, who has the distinction of being the only mayor in this province whose town has not required financial assistance up to date. The country back of Puerto Padre is low and rolling and has several large sugar plantations.

About 40 miles inland is the old town of Victoria de las Tunas, or rather what is left of it. This town was practically destroyed during the recent war and at the present time there are not half a dozen roofs standing. The country all through this section is low and rolling and suitable for either grazing or agriculture. From our point of view it is entirely undeveloped.

West of the province of Santiago lies that of Puerto Principe, with which I am not yet sufficiently familiar to attempt a detailed description. Generally speaking, it is a rolling prairie country, especially well adapted for grazing, with certain rich sections suitable for sugar and tobacco, although these are comparatively limited in area.

Taken as a whole the province of Santiago presents wonderful opportunities for industrious Americans. I know of no portion of our own country from which such great returns can be expected in so short a time as can be obtained in this province of Cuba provided a stable government exists. Aside from the seaport towns, many of which have been infected with yellow fever, the country is healthy. Sunstroke is unknown; heat prostration is rare. It is necessary to avoid working in the middle of the day, especially during the first year or two of one's residence on the island. Most of the people who come here have at first a certain amount of malaria, which, if they treat properly, will pass off, and at the end of a year a man of good habits and fairly sound consti-

tution can consider himself comparatively safe in Cuba. Of course in all tropical countries we have malaria always with us, and Cuba is no exception to the rule. But intelligence in the selection of house sites, combined with simple precautionary measures, will enable one to avoid it to a great extent.

CLIMATE AND RAINFALL.

Along the northern coast of the province rain falls every month in the year, although the same general conditions apply there as on the south coast; that is, the rainy season commences in the latter part of April or early May, and it is indicated by an occasional heavy rain at rather long intervals. In June there is temporary cessation in the rainfall, and in July the real rainy season commences and almost daily rains can be expected until the latter part of August or middle of September. These rains are not long continued, but are sharp and sudden, followed by a fair sky and sunshine. They may occur only once a day, or possibly several times. On the south coast the late fall, winter, and spring months are practically without rain. The real rainy season here commences at the same time as on the north coast and has the same duration. The rainfall in the interior during the rainy season is much more heavy and constant than on either coast and pours in torrents. On the seacoast the rains are unusually short and sharp.

CHARACTER AND PRODUCTS OF THE SOIL.

The general character of the soil in the extreme eastern end of the province is rocky and barren, except in the narrower valleys between the mountains, where it is extremely rich, but very limited in extent. Farther westward we enter upon the rich plains of Guantanamo, Manzanillo, Bayamo, etc.; we find a rich adobe soil of great depth and of almost inexhaustible richness. Through the interior of the island this same characteristic obtains; only now and then do we find the clay or loam cropping out. Generally speaking, it can be said that all comparatively level tracts of land are highly fertile. As to the products of the soil, almost all vegetables grow rapidly and quickly, but lose flavor unless fresh seeds are brought in every two or three years. The tropical fruits all grow in the greatest abundance—especially is this true of the different kinds of bananas. Cocoanuts grow in the greatest abundance, also figs, although no attention is paid to their cultivation. Limes and lemons grow wild, as do many tropical fruits unknown to us, such as the nispero, anoncillo, sapote, mamey, plantain, guanabana, caimito, anon, pineapple, and oranges; also the much-abused mango in unlimited quantities. This delicious fruit serves as a food for thousands of Cubans, and when ripe and freshly gathered is, I believe, extremely healthy and may be eaten with safety. Ordinary "garden truck" grows with great rapidity and is of good quality, but, like the vegetables, the seeds should be changed frequently. Oranges of excellent quality grow wild. From what I have seen of the native orange I am of the opinion that there is every reason to believe that the very best quality of oranges can be grown here, and that there is a great future for the orange industry. Excellent tobacco is also grown all about the Bay of Nipe and along the Mayari River. This tobacco is rated second only to the best Pinar del Rio tobacco. Sugar, of course, had been for many years the principal product of the soil.

The larger sugar estates are at Guantanamo, at San Luis and vicinity on the plateau back of Santiago, at Manzanillo, and along the north coast at Vita and Puerto Padre, etc. At these large plantations are found modern machinery and appliances, and the development of the sugar industry is carried on upon a strictly scientific basis. The land is largely loaned to the workingmen, who agree to turn in the cane at the "Central" or mill of the owner of the land. He pays them not by the gross weight of the cane, but in accordance with the percentage of sugar the cane produces. This is an incentive, of course, to produce the very best kind of cane. All through the extreme eastern part of the island, along the mountain ranges and hillsides, are the remains of almost numberless coffee plantations. This was formerly a great industry in eastern Cuba, but like almost everything else, it was totally destroyed by the ten years' war and the recent war. These plantations were principally established by French refugees from Haiti, who came to Cuba after the rising of the negroes against their French masters. These coffee plantations were a great source of revenue to their owners and to the State for many years. The coffee grown was of excellent quality and, like the best grades of the present Puerto Rican coffee, commanded very high prices in the markets of Europe. The cocoa was also grown extensively by these same Frenchmen, cocoa and coffee bushes being cultivated together, the former furnishing the necessary shade for the latter. All over the mountains one finds the ruins of the coffee plantations and all through the valleys the ruins of the sugar plantations.

STATE OF IMPROVEMENTS.

There are almost no improvements, excepting on the estates which I have already mentioned by name in previous portions of this report. Since the military occupation of the province by the United States, commencing the 17th of July, 1898, certain improvements have been made in the towns of Santiago, Guantanamo, Manzanillo, Baracoa, Holguin, Gibara, and other towns occupied by American troops. In Santiago we have doubled the water supply, reduced the death rate on a conservative estimate 40 per cent, put in about 5 miles of asphalt streets, with first-class curbing, etc., built about the same length of macadamized streets, and put under all the streets a thoroughly modern sewerage and water system, so that when funds shall be available to complete the system throughout the city it will not be necessary to tear up the newly constructed pavements. Extensive and very complete surveys have been made in view of submitting a plan for greatly increasing the present water supply. The present water supply, although double what it was, is barely a fifth of what we should have, and until this water supply is very much increased we can not put into operation a modern system of sewerage or use the water for flushing and cleaning the streets. An unlimited supply of water can be developed, but it is going to be costly, and require here, as at home, extensive engineering work in the way of dams, etc., as well as a large outlay for a new water main, pipes, fixtures, etc., through the unimproved portions of the city.

Thorough repairs are being made on the old government wharf, and an addition of 150 feet is being made to it. A low sea wall has been constructed along a large section of the water front, and the old

unsanitary flats have been dredged and the material carried to deep water outside of "Morro."

A complete sanitary department has been organized and supplied with modern appliances. The work done by this department has been excellent. Extensive fillings have been made in low, swampy lands in and near the city.

An emergency hospital has been established and equipped; the jail has been thoroughly repaired and renovated, concrete floors put in, etc. The same is true of the civil hospital, which has been completely repaired and supplied with modern plumbing and sewerage. The orphan asylum has been extensively repaired and is still in process of renovation. Government buildings have been put in thorough repair and rendered sanitary. The same is true of the military hospital and barracks. Country roads have been opened in all directions. In short, the general appearance of Santiago has in the last year completely changed, and while still an old, tumble-down Spanish town, it presents some marks of modern civilization. An extensive intercepting sewer will be commenced in the near future, and disinfecting and settling basins constructed. This will enable us to completely free the harbor from present sources of contamination. Throughout the province we have attempted to spend a limited amount of money on all the smaller towns and to impress upon the people the necessity of good sanitary conditions, good streets, etc. Of course the bulk of the money has been and will continue for some time to be spent upon seaport towns, because these are the gates of the province, and until they are rendered clean, healthy, and habitable we can not expect any development of the interior. Everything entering the province and leaving it has to pass through them, and if they are filthy and infected with yellow fever all business and progress will be paralyzed. What is wanted in all these towns is water; it is the great and vital problem of the present, and until obtained there will be trouble in maintaining good sanitary conditions. Misconceptions of economy in expenditures for water supply and sanitation will result in reckless expenditure of life. It is not only evident to every well-informed man that these conditions of water supply and sanitation must be insisted upon, but it appears absolutely imperative to every one who has had any technical instruction in sanitation, however superficial this instruction may have been. The closets (sinks) in Santiago, as in most Spanish towns, are enormous affairs, and as a rule cleaned only once in a generation. Here is a fruitful source of disease which can only be remedied by establishing a first-class sewerage system, which in turn depends upon the necessary water supply. Everything possible has been done here to clean out these old vaults and put them in sanitary condition, but the work is expensive and extremely difficult.

At Manzanillo Colonel Pettit did a great deal to improve the sanitary condition of the town. He cleaned it up thoroughly, drained the swampy places, and did everything that he could with the means at hand, and his faithful and intelligent work has been rewarded by a great improvement in the health of the people and a marked diminution of the death rate. The same is true of the work of Colonels Hood and Grubbs at Holguin, Colonel Wylly and Captain Chatfield at Baracoa, and Colonels Ray, Sargent, and Hooton at Guantanamo. In fact, wherever the American troops have been stationed pronounced improvements in sanitation, roads, and streets have followed. At least 175 miles of roads have been rendered passable for wagons. The lighthouse at Santiago has been entirely rebuilt and put in working order.

A new light-house has been erected at Guantanamo. A number of the harbors on the south and north coasts have been buoyed. In short, improvements—limited only by the means which have been available—have been either established or commenced at all points of the province where there have been garrisons.

The wants are numerous and the field is large, and it is in the largest towns that the work done is particularly apparent.

INLAND TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES.

Inland transportation facilities are almost entirely by wagon and pack train, principally by pack train. Roads are sadly needed, and until they are constructed we can not expect any real development of the interior of the province. Crops can not be marketed, and consequently will not be raised. There is nothing outside of sanitary work that is more important than the opening up of roads through the interior. In fact, this work should be insisted upon even at the sacrifice of almost everything else in the way of internal improvements. Good roads will tend not only to increased production, but to the suppression of brigandage and internal disorders generally, and will facilitate communication between different points of the island. The road making is going to be expensive in many sections, especially where the roads run through the great adobe plains, which are entirely free from gravel and stone. The method of construction of roads here will have to be by a turnpike sharply arched, with good lateral ditches, and covered with a thin layer of broken stone or gravel. It is the supply of stone and gravel that is going to be most expensive, as in many instances it will have to be brought from a considerable distance. Through the mountainous section of the country road making will be a great deal less expensive, for the reason that the material necessary is at hand.

RAILROADS.

Railroads are few in number and mostly in the hands of a few people. At Santiago we have the line running to Cristo. Here it branches, one branch going to San Luis and the other passing through the villages of Songo and Socorro and terminating at some manganese mines. The total mileage of this road is about 45 miles. At Guantanamo there is a railroad with about the same mileage, the road commencing at Caimanera, running through Guantanamo to Jamaica, with branches to the different sugar estates in the valley. At Manzanillo a standard broad-gauge railroad to Bayamo has been commenced, but work upon it has been abandoned for several years. The Banes Fruit Company have about 20 miles of standard gauge road running from Banes through the various banana plantations under control of the company. At Santa Lucia there are probably 25 miles of standard-gauge railroad belonging to the sugar estate. Between Gibara and Holguin there is a narrow gauge road about 20 or 21 miles long in good repair. The stock of these roads is principally under local control, either in the hands of the owners of the different plantations or mining companies. The construction of the proposed Central Railroad from Santiago to Santa Clara, with branches to Guantanamo, Nipe Bay, Manzanillo, and Holguin, is of vital importance to the prosperity of the island and will have an incalculable influence in its rapid develop-

ment. Every effort should be made to facilitate the construction of this road. It means everything for this section of Cuba, and will, I believe, yield good return for those building it.

MINERAL RESOURCES.

The province of Santiago includes the richest mineral region in the island of Cuba. The deposits of iron, copper, and manganese have long been known and have been extensively and successfully worked. In addition to the minerals mentioned there are found zinc and lead.

The deposits of copper in the vicinity of Cobre were formerly worked with great success, but for many years nothing has been produced from them.

The iron mines near Daiquiri and Jaragua have been successfully producing for several years and continue to be worked. Considerable deposits of manganese exist in the neighborhood of Songo and Socorro and are profitably worked now.

The deposits of zinc, lead, and other ores have not been exploited. Coal of poor quality exists in small deposits. Evidences of petroleum have been found in the western part of the province, near the south coast. Asphaltic rock, believed to be suitable for paving and similar purposes, has been found, but has never been utilized. Gold was formerly produced in small quantities, but no paying deposits are now known to exist.

PUBLIC LANDS.

A large part of the area of the province consists of lands which have never been reduced to private ownership, and may therefore be described as public lands. These are of two kinds—State lands and municipal lands, the former corresponding to the public lands of the United States. No general system for disposing of the public lands has ever been adopted nor has any complete survey ever been made. The municipal lands are the property of the several municipalities and are not disposed of to private owners. Leaseholds of such lands have been granted in many cases for long terms and often for inadequate considerations to political favorites. The timber lands are not disposed of in fee, as in the United States, nor are leases given to such lands; but a right to cut the timber is granted to applicants on payment of compensation therefor to the State or to the municipality, as the case may be.

One of the immediate needs of the province is a complete and accurate survey which shall show the extent of the public lands, both State and municipal. After such a survey shall have been made, a system of disposing of the lands to actual occupants should be devised and put in operation without delay.

STATE OF EDUCATION.

By reason of the prolonged disturbances of the country, education, both public and private, is very backward. Lack of facilities for transportation prevents the attendance at school of children who live at any distance from the centers of population, and even in those centers lack of means retards the development of anything like an educational establishment. No school property exists, nor is there a single endowment of any nature for educational purposes in the province.

POST-OFFICES.

The postal system of the island remains under the control of an American director, and many improvements on the service as conducted under the Spanish régime have been successfully introduced.

As the system is not considered to be a part of the postal system of the United States, and as the American postal laws do not apply, difficulties have been encountered in the detection and prosecution of offenders in the postal service, and there is need of legislation to protect the service from such offenders and to punish them when apprehended. The Spanish law relating to this subject is entirely inadequate to the needs of a modern postal service. Post-offices have been opened in all the villages of the province, and the service has been generally satisfactory, but postal communication between the ports of the province and the United States is entirely insufficient. There is but one regular mail from the United States per week, which goes by the way of Havana, and but one mail returning to the United States, by the same route. A delay in the arrival of the steamer bringing this mail may render it impossible to reply by the same steamer, which takes the mail on its departure.

It is urgently required, in the interests of the Government and of commerce, that direct mail communication between New York and Santiago City should be established, and that at least two mails per week should arrive and depart. This result can be accomplished at small expense by contract arrangement with the steamers of the Boston Fruit Company. These steamers at present deliver three mails per week at the ports of Jamaica, 80 miles south of Santiago, letters being received there four or five days after they are mailed in New York City. It is understood that the steamers which carry the mails to Jamaica were built under the provisions of "the United States mail subsidy acts" and are therefore available for the service indicated. At present letters arrive in Santiago eleven days after being mailed in New York.

TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES.

The telegraph service under Spanish rule was practically a part of the postal service administered by the Government, and no lines owned by firms or corporations existed. The lines remaining from Spanish régime, with extensions which have been built since the American occupation, are now managed by the United States Signal Service as a part of the military establishment. The service is not satisfactory, great difficulty having been encountered in maintaining the lines and in retaining expert telegraphers and linemen in the service. Telegraphic communications between Santiago and Havana by the land lines usually require twenty-four hours in transmission.

Two foreign companies, one British the other French, afford telegraphic communication by submarine cables along the coast of the island with neighboring West India Islands and with the mainland of North America and Europe. The service rendered by these companies is prompt and reliable.

Telephone systems have been established in some of the larger towns, under concessions granted in accordance with the Spanish laws before the American occupation of the island. These concessions involve monopolies of telephone service over large areas and permit the exaction of onerous dues for the services rendered. The concessions were usually granted for long periods in consideration of inadequate returns to the public treasury, and the service rendered has in no case

been satisfactory. In some cases reasons can be found for annulling these concessions for failure on the part of the grantees to fulfill the obligations required by the terms of their grants. In other cases the municipalities should be authorized to purchase, for reasonable considerations, the rights of the franchise holders and to make the service a public one or to grant franchises therefor on more equitable terms and such as will insure a more extended and satisfactory service than is possible under existing conditions.

CHURCH PROPERTY.

The property of the Catholic Church, as formerly established in Cuba, was held by the Spanish Government as part of the property of the State, the administration of public worship being considered a part of the duty of the Government in consideration of the surrender to the State of such ecclesiastical properties.

The Government charged itself with the payment of all the expenses of religion and public worship, including the salaries of the clergy. On the withdrawal of Spain from the island these payments of course ceased to be made.

It is now claimed on behalf of the ecclesiastical authorities that the properties used for religious purposes should revert to the possession and ownership of the church by reason of the failure of the Spanish Government to meet or to fulfill the obligations contracted when these properties passed into the possession of the State.

On the other hand, it is claimed by some of the representative Cubans that the church property may be regarded as any other public property, the church having parted with all claims to ownership or use when the property was surrendered to the Government. Pending a settlement of this question by competent authority the ecclesiastical authorities remain in possession of the churches and worship is held in them, the expenses being defrayed by the voluntary contributions of the worshipers. There are other properties which are not used for purposes of worship which are held by the ecclesiastical authorities as property of the church as a corporation.

Another species of ecclesiastical property which bids fair to cause considerable trouble before the resettlement of the country can be effected is found in what are called "capellanias."

A capellania is a perpetual annuity, payable out of the income of the real property on which it is charged; usually established by testamentary provision and payable to a certain church or certain ecclesiastics, as provided by the will of the founder. It amounts to a perpetual estate in the realty so charged, although provision has been made by law for the redemption of capellanias and the releasing of the property from the incumbrance. The arrears of annual payments due and unpaid accumulate as a lien on the property charged, so that many of these capellanias have been created on properties in this province and payments have fallen so much in arrear by reason of the continued disturbances in the country that the amounts now due in some cases are in excess of the value of the incumbered property. The effect of this condition is to retard if not prevent the rebuilding or reconstruction of properties which have been destroyed or damaged during the war.

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

By the order of the President of the United States of July 13, 1898, published in General Orders, No. 101, Adjutant-General's Office, of that

year, the municipal law prevailing in the island was continued in force, so far as was compatible with the result of the American occupation of the province.

Under the provisions of this Executive order the judicial system, as it has existed under Spanish rule, was as soon as possible reestablished with Cuban magistrates, judges, and court officials. Under this system three kinds of courts exist in the province.

The lowest court, known as a municipal court and held by a magistrate known as a municipal judge, takes cognizance of all civil cases in which the amount of controversy does not exceed $200, and of all criminal cases involving what the Spanish law calls "faltas," offenses which correspond approximately, though not accurately, with the misdemeanors of the American laws.

From this court an appeal lies to the next higher tribunal, which in some of its functions is called a court of first instance, and in others a court of inquest. This court is held by a single judge. As a trial court it is called the court of first instance. In that capacity it has original jurisdiction in all civil cases and hears appeals from the municipal courts, its decision on such appeals being final.

As a court of inquest it investigates all criminal offenses, discharging in this respect most of the functions of a grand jury. If upon the investigation of any criminal case the offense appears to be of the grade of a falta or misdemeanor, the judge reports the case to a municipal judge to hear and determine. If, however, the offense on investigation appears to be of the higher grade, known to the Spanish law as "delito," corresponding approximately to a felony, the result of the investigation, with all the evidence obtained, is reported to the audiencia, the highest court of the province, for trial. The audiencia has exclusive jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which the offense charged is above the grade of a misdemeanor, and has appellate jurisdiction in all civil cases, the original trial of which is in the court of first instance.

It will be seen from this statement that while ample provision exists for the speedy trial of persons accused of minor offenses, there is but one court in the province which has jurisdiction to try a person accused of felony. This court, the audiencia, sits only at the capital of the province. It is therefore necessary under the existing system to transport all prisoners, as well as all witnesses, from the scene of the offense, however remote, to the capital of the province, and to maintain them there until such time as the case may be heard. The result is a great delay in the administration of criminal justice. In most important cases great and unnecessary expense is involved, and unwarrantable interference with the number of the witnesses who may have the misfortune to be apprised of the circumstances of the crime and the courage and sense of duty to enable them to acknowledge the same. Very frequently it is difficult to secure evidence in cases of crime because of the dread which the witnesses naturally have of being taken from their homes and from their occupations and detained for an indefinite time while the investigation and trial of the case proceed.

This condition of things calls loudly for immediate remedy. On the establishment of American authority over the entire island, the orders of the governor-general reestablished the Spanish law in its entirety, excepting in so far as it might be specifically abrogated or modified by his authority. This law, in its substantive part, is in the main acceptable and satisfactory to the people and they have been accustomed to

it; but in the means provided for the application of this law to litigated cases or in prosecutions for crime it is radically defective. The procedure is slow, cumbersome, and expensive. It is in the codes of procedure as well as in the judicial system that the most immediate and pressing need of reform and improvement is felt.

LAND TENURE AND CONVEYANCES.

Land is held under the Spanish law by various tenures, corresponding to some of the tenures known to the common law. No difficulty has been experienced in determining the nature of estates so held.

Conveyances are effected by means of public writings in the nature of deeds, which, however, are not executed in the same manner nor with the same formalities as the deeds known to the laws of the several States. Every conveyance or incumbrance of real property is required to be executed not only by the parties, but also by the notary public, before whom the parties to the deed or their representatives must appear. The deed itself is the act of the notary rather than of the parties to the transaction which the deed witnesses. The notary retains the original instrument in his records, which are to that extent public records, the parties to the instrument receiving such certified copies made by the notary as they may see fit to ask and pay for. The system is cumbersome and expensive and could with advantage and without difficulty be modified.

All titles to real property are recorded in the office of an official known as the "registrar of property," as well as all liens and incumbrances and all contracts affecting such property. The system resembles what is known as the Australian or Torrens system, inasmuch as the record in the registrar's office is a record not of conveyances alone, but of the titles resulting from such conveyances. The certificate of the registrar as to the title to any piece of real property can be had on application by any inquirer, and such certificate is deemed to be conclusive.

Instruments affecting real property are not required to be recorded, but unless so recorded take effect only between the parties thereto, and are not binding on third parties.

In some parts of the province estates have been granted out of large tracts of land to different individuals, which estates have never been set apart to the individual holders. The result is a sort of tenancy in common by tenants practically unknown to each other, whose interests may be adverse, making it difficult to settle, improve, and cultivate the land with satisfactory results. Provision should be made for the partition of such tracts and their allotment in severalty to the present owners in common.

OPPORTUNITES FOR INVESTMENT.

The prolonged disturbances in the island have largely destroyed the means of production. The natural capacity of the island to produce riches is unimpaired, but for large regions of this province the ordinary means of production are entirely lacking. Even where improvements and machinery have not been destroyed by the contending forces they have been in many cases abandoned by their owners, who found themselves unable to live on and manage their properties during the continuance of hostilities. The result has been that many estates which formerly produced coffee, cacao, and sugar in large quantities have become overgrown with brush, the houses have decayed, and live stock and agricultural implements have disappeared entirely.

The majority of the owners of the smaller properties are destitute of the means required to repair their estates or to provide themselves with necessary implements and stock, and to cultivate the first crop. Unless resources are found outside of the island to enable them to resume production the reconstruction of the province will be extremely slow. Many of these estates would in two or three crop seasons produce sufficient not only to provide for the support of the owners and their families, but also to discharge the loans necessary to enable cultivation to be resumed, with interest at 10 per cent. The estates themselves would be more than ample security for such loans as would be necessary. No better opening for the investment of foreign capital is now offered in the island than that presented for the establishment of agricultural banks prepared to advance reasonable loans for terms of four or five years, at good rates of interest, on improved but recently neglected properties.

With the improvement in the system of wagon roads, which will undoubtedly follow the peaceful and prudent administration of the government, the value of the produce from such estates will be gradually increased and the security for loans correspondingly improved. Heretofore the cost of transporting crops to the points of shipment or consumption has been exorbitant. With improved conditions greater profits than formerly would accrue to the cultivators, even though there should be a considerable fall in prices due to an increased output.

The mineral resources of the country, far from being adequately developed, have never been approximately determined. The development of the mining industry of the province must also await improved facilities for transportation, although many deposits can even now be profitably worked which formerly were of no value on account of the character of the regulations established by the government.

The timber of the province is abundant and valuable, but the cost of cutting and shipping has hitherto been so great that the industry has languished. Recently many inquiries have been made for timber lands by Americans seeking opportunities for investment, and some sales have been effected, the result of which will be to establish centers of industry in points where employment for labor has not been found before. But this industry, like every other in this province, must await for its full development increased facilities for transportation within the island and cheaper freights to foreign markets.

Capital in large quantities can find remunerative employment in the construction of railroad lines, of which at present there are practically none; in sugar estates and mills, provided the political future of the country shall not be such as to shut this, its principal product, out of the world's market; in mining on a large scale by the consolidation of small contiguous claims, and in the exploitation of large tracts of timber lands by the use of logging railroads, wire tramways, and sawmills. Franchises for street railroads in cities and for electric lighting, if procurable on equitable terms, should prove inviting to capitalists who can afford to wait a short time for returns on their investments.

For the small capitalists it is believed that no better opportunities can be found for investments which require personal attention and supervision, in the cultivation of small tracts of coffee and cacao. Lands suitable for these crops are abundant and cheap.

Tobacco of good quality is grown in some parts of the province, and this industry should give good returns.

Fruits have never been really cultivated, reliance being placed on the spontaneous product of the soil and the climate for the supplies for the

local market. There is no reason why the cultivation of fruits should not be improved by reasonable cultivation, and the quantity so largely increased as to enable fruit growers in Cuba to supply in great part the demand for fresh fruit in the Eastern and Southern States.

Labor for most purposes is abundant, cheap, reliable, and all investments which do not call for skilled labor in large quantities can depend upon the local supply. Strikes and similar trade disturbances are almost unknown.

Available water power.—Many of the small streams in the interior can be used for water power, although no correct surveys have been made, and any opinion I might express on this subject would be nothing more than a guess. The population of the province is about 310,000 to 315,000. The last regular census showed 360,000, but probably 50,000 or 60,000 have disappeared in the recent war, principally old men and women and children. The loss among the younger men who went into the war has been comparatively slight. The reconcentrados were those who suffered most.

Vital statistics.—Absolutely no available records on this subject. The people are very prolific. Large numbers of children are born, but total ignorance of all sanitary principles, poverty and neglect incident thereto cause a high percentage of deaths among them.

Cities and towns.—The principal cities are Santiago, 50,000; Guantanamo, 8,000; Manzanillo, 14,000; Holguin, 7,000; Gibara, 6,000; Baracoa, 3,000.

Principal towns.—Mayari, 2,500; San Luis, 3,000; Songo, 2,500; Socorro, 600; Jamaica, 600; Alto Songo, 400 or 500; Mayari Arriba, 800; Sagua, 1,500 to 2,000; Campechuela, 500; Niquero, 500; Caney, 1,000; Cobre, 1,000; Cristo, 800; Dos Bocas and Dos Caminos, 400 each; Bayamo, 5,000; Jiguani, 900 to 1,200; Puerto Padre, 2,000, and many small towns running from 200 to 300 people.

Available maps.—Very few and practically worthless.

Street railways.—None.

Electric lighting.—The company in Santiago furnishes a limited number of lights in the streets and lights as desired for business houses and private houses. It is a comparatively small affair.

Water supply.—Already mentioned under "Improvements."

Sanitary conditions.—Already discussed. In general terms, while sanitary conditions have been much improved, there is still a great deal to be desired in every part of the province.

Manufactures.—Principally cigars, cigarettes, leather, sugar, rum, alcohol, chocolate, matches, some few shoe shops; generally speaking, manufactures are unimportant.

Business enterprises.—Practically unknown. The same is true of investment companies. Banks few and confined almost entirely to local business more or less intimately connected with large sugar estates.

Professions represented.—These embrace all the learned professions. Generally speaking, the professional men have received a fair education, many of them having been educated in the United States and Europe.

Missions and missionaries.—In this province practically none.

Civil administration of affairs.—From all that can be learned the civil administration of affairs under the Spanish Government was inefficient and frequently unjust. Civil officers were at liberty to do what they found it convenient to do and to neglect anything that was not to their interest. This condition of affairs may recur at any time

when a firm control of civil affairs is no longer maintained, until old habits shall have been forgotten and corrected. In regard to the duties of civil officers and their salaries this subject can be spoken of only in general terms. There were many more officials than were needed. Cuba seems to have been the dumping ground for impecunious but influential inhabitants of the Peninsula.

Currency.—The standard money in this part of the island of Cuba is American currency; but some mercantile transactions continue to be conducted and obligations are sometimes still discharged in Spanish and French gold. Spanish silver has disappeared from circulation.

Civil government.—With respect to the organization of civil government it is earnestly recommended that such institutions, in the nature of local self-government and for the general government of the island by civil functionaries, should remain in either case subject to the ultimate control of the military authorities until experience shall have demonstrated, after sufficient trial, that the governments so instituted are stable, practicable, and capable of self-support. It is possible that many experiments will have to be made and many modifications introduced into any plan of local and general self-government which may be adopted in the beginning, and such changes as may be proved to be necessary can be most easily introduced by the military authority as at present constituted.

The defects in the judicial system as now organized have been referred to above. To remedy the existing defects two things are needed:

First. A more speedy process of deciding questions arising in civil causes and a diminution of the vast amount of paper records required by the present procedure.

Second. And of far greater importance, provision should be made for the speedy trial of criminal cases either by the establishment of local courts with jurisdiction to hear and determine accusations in cases amounting to the degree of a felony or by the institution of an itinerant court invested with such jurisdiction. From the judgment of such courts appeals in criminal cases might be permitted to be taken to the audiencia, the court which now has the sole jurisdiction to try such cases.

Education.—The retention in full force of the Spanish legislation relating to public instruction has had the effect of preventing the establishment of a complete system of public schools in this department. Some schools have been opened in the primary grades and the desire for instruction has been so general as to put it beyond the resources of the impoverished municipalities to provide accommodation for all the children who desire to attend.

The Spanish law on this subject seems to have been designed more in the interest of teachers and other officeholders than in the interest of real and general public instruction. Nothing worthy of the name of public schools ever resulted or could ever result from such a law, and so long as it continues in force not much improvement can be looked for.

In December, 1898, I caused an inquiry into the whole subject of public instruction to be made, the result of which was embodied in a report drawn up under my direction, which was submitted to the general government at Havana. No action was taken on it to my knowledge. I append hereto a copy of the report referred to as containing a complete statement on this highly important subject. In the recommendations accompanying the report I concur, and regard it as imperatively necessary that action be taken, along such lines as are there indicated, to reform immediately the antiquated and absurd legislation which survives

from the Spanish régime, and which is now responsible for the continued existence of a state of public education which is discreditable in any country under American control.

TRIAL OF AMERICAN OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS AND AMERICAN CITIZENS.

As before pointed out, the present arrangement and distribution of judicial power tends to discourage the investigation of crimes, the production of evidence, and the punishment of the guilty; and in some cases makes a false accusation of crime an effective means of persecuting the innocent.

This reform of the judicial system I regard as the most important and most pressing needs of the province.

Under the existing condition of things in Cuba no means are provided for the trial of officers and soldiers of the Army and civilian employees of the military establishment for offenses not cognizable under the Articles of War, except the Cuban courts described above. I do not believe that it is wise or prudent or in any way desirable to subject American citizens, who are in the service of their own Government, to the jurisdiction and to the capricious decisions of tribunals composed of persons alien in race and sentiment, administering a system of law with which Americans are entirely unfamiliar and which would not be tolerated in any American community.

With the cessation of hostilities the jurisdiction of the military tribunals to try and punish offenders belonging to or attached to the military establishment ceased. The military code of the United States seems to have been constructed without any consideration of the needs of an army in occupation of foreign territory in time of peace. In absence of legislation of the Congress supplying this defect it is believed that resort could be had to the power delegated by the President, as Commander in Chief, to the commanding general in Cuba as Governor-General of the island. Acting under such authority, the Governor-General could constitute courts composed of officers, or civilians sufficiently skilled in the law, to which could be intrusted the duty of administering justice in the case of American citizens temporarily in the island, whether employed in the public service or not.

The establishment of such tribunals would remove what may prove in their absence to be the cause of serious disagreements between the judicial and the military authorities. I do not believe that a good understanding between the Cuban people and the military authorities in the island will be promoted by the spectacle, which may at any time be presented, of American officers and soldiers subject to trial and punishment at the hands of alien courts for alleged offenses against a system of law which continues to exist only by the toleration of the military authorities themselves; nor do I believe that it is the intention of the United States to subject not only its citizens but its soldiers to such treatment as they may expect, in some cases, under the law and in the courts as they are now established in Cuba.

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS IN REGARD TO CIVIL AFFAIRS.

The present system of municipal government is cumbersome and unwieldy. There are many more officials than necessary, and municipal expenses for salaries are far in excess of what is required to obtain an efficient performance of public duty.

We find small towns of 400 or 500 people with a mayor, secretary, treasurer, town or city doctor, and on an average from three to four municipal policemen. These officials all draw comparatively large salaries, ranging from $75 to $30 per month, while the duties performed are merely nominal.

The official list of these small towns should be very much cut down, and it is quite possible that they could be placed upon the same simple basis as small villages in the United States. At least one or two paid officials should be ample. In the place of salaried policemen, the mayor could be authorized to summon citizens to his assistance whenever required, for the preservation of order. Of course, certain men could be designated as acting constables and called upon whenever required, and receive proper compensation for services rendered.

The same official top-heaviness which we find in the smaller towns, exists in like ratio in all the larger towns and cities, and in all of them a sweeping reduction could be made without any loss in efficiency. With this end in view it is very desirable to classify the towns on a basis of population and fix a definite official list with definite salaries for each class.

Judging from the experience of the past year the military control of the island must continue for some time to come. Experience in this department has indicated clearly that efficient service can be relied on from the local officials only so long as they know that prompt removal or punishment will follow any laxities or irregularities and that they will be firmly supported in enforcing the law.

Years of misrule and an improper use of official and private influence have produced a most unfortunate effect upon the average Cuban officials. They have come to believe that influence and money can accomplish anything, and they have also learned by many sad experiences that it is unwise to attempt action against those in high places.

A straightforward and honest administration of affairs under military control and with military support will do a great deal to convince both people and officials that offenders will be punished, whatever may be their rank or position. The effect of strong positive support is nowhere so apparent as among these people. They are perfectly willing to be led in the right direction, and will carry out orders to the letter when they feel that they will be supported, and they have learned that this support in the performance of duty will always be given them by the military authorities. It is not advisable for the military authorities to interfere constantly in civil affairs. All that is necessary is to have the authority to act promptly whenever the occasion arises. Department commanders should have authority to suspend any civil official upon the presentation of evidence of incompetency or malfeasance in office and to appoint a successor to act until the case can be presented in all its details to the Governor-General of the island and a decision received. If his action is disapproved, the case is then open for such action as may be directed by the Governor-General.

It is respectfully submitted that the present method of procedure, acting under which the department commander suspends an official and reports his action, investigation of which requires the collecting of evidence and forwarding it to Havana, resulting sometimes in a month's delay, is disastrous in its effects, inasmuch as it leaves the authority of the military commander in contempt. It destroys the exemplary character of the punishment effected by the ultimate removal of dishonest or incompetent officials during the long period required for the investigation and determination of the questions at a seat of authority remote

from the scene of the facts to be investigated and from the witnesses available.

Although absolute distances in the island of Cuba are not great, yet the means of communication are so primitive and uncertain that the prosecution of public business is necessarily, at best, exceedingly slow; and for this reason, if for no other, it is desirable that the department commanders should be invested with authority to take definite action in local affairs, subject to review or reversal, if necessary, by the Governor-General.

TAXATION.

The present system of taxation is simply the old Spanish system, modified in details so as to make it a little less burdensome and inequitable, but preserving the vices and defects inherent in it from the beginning. The burden of the public revenue is not distributed among the people in proportion to the extent of their individual possessions nor with any consideration of their individual abilities to contribute. The system, as it exists and is administered, not only fails to encourage but actually retards and in many instances prevents the improvement and development of the country by penalizing energy and enterprise, and by rewarding, indirectly, neglect and inertia. Taxes are placed largely on trade, exchange, and consumption, with the inevitable result that an undue share of the burden ultimately rests on the poor, who, in proportion to their means, are the largest consumers, and who can not avoid the imposition. Taxes assessed on the value as distinguished from the product of real and personal property are practically unknown.

CHARITIES AND HOSPITALS.

On the evacuation of the province by the Spaniards hospitals and charitable institutions were found in a deplorable condition. The civil hospital of Santiago was packed with patients of all descriptions—lepers, insane, in fact every class of human infirmity was represented. From our standpoint there were almost no provisions for their proper care. In making this statement no reflection upon those in charge is intended. The institutions were principally in charge of the various sisterhoods, and these devoted women had made every possible effort and had accomplished all that could be expected with the limited means at their disposal. The trouble was not with them, but with the authorities, who had absolutely neglected to supply them with the necessities of life and articles absolutely requisite for the proper treatment and care of the sick and infirm. The condition in the hospitals and public institutions has been improved as much as possible with the means at our disposal, but there still remains to be undertaken a very important work, namely, a proper and suitable provision in the way of homes combined with industrial and other schools for the proper care, education, and training of orphans and children of parents who are neither fitted nor able to take care of them.

In this portion of Cuba there are many orphans and many destitute children whose future depends very largely upon the instruction which we may give them during the next few years. It is believed that the proposition now under consideration by certain charitably disposed persons in the United States to establish orphanages, combining with them industrial schools and schools for common education, presents one of the best means for correcting this unfortunate condition.

From the standpoint of what has been accomplished in the United States for the homeless and destitute, the condition of these poor Cuban children is most pitiable, and every effort should be made to gather them up, put them into institutions where they can not only be taught physical and moral hygiene, but also receive the rudiments of common-school education and instruction in some of the branches of mechanical art which will enable them in future to become useful members of the community in which they may live.

LEONARD WOOD,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

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SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT.

HDQRS. DEPT. OF SANTIAGO AND PUERTO PRINCIPE,
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, CIVIL DEPARTMENT,
Santiago de Cuba, October 31, 1899.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL DIVISION OF CUBA,
Havana.

SIR: According to instructions contained in letter, Headquarters Division of Cuba, August 18, 1899, I have the honor to submit the following report relative to general conditions existing in this department:

AGRICULTURE.

The season up to the middle of October was unusually dry, the rainfall having been less than that of many years past. Since the middle of October, however, frequent and heavy rains have fallen and vastly improved the prospects for a good sugar crop. The main products, sugar and tobacco, will be about half of a normal crop in past years of greatest prosperity and more than double the crop of last year. The coffee crop will be small, owing to the discouragement which has been caused among the coffee planters on account of the free importation of Porto Rican coffee. In addition to this severe handicap the coffee plantations, situated mostly in the mountains, have been practically abandoned during the years of the war, and much time and labor will be required to put them in their former productive condition.

On the north coast about Banes and Baracoa extensive work is being done with the idea of greatly extending the sugar and banana plantations in that section, and 2,000 additional workmen are being employed. Nearly all the country people have planted and cultivated gardens of good size, producing sufficient vegetables and grain for the subsistence of themselves and families.

PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS.

The construction of roads and improvements of streets and sanitary and other work have been carried on systematically to the greatest extent possible with the means available, the unusually dry season permitting this work to be continued almost without interruption until the middle of October, since which date it has been necessary to partially suspend work, especially in the country districts. This suspension, however, will probably not continue beyond the 10th of November.

The new aqueduct for Guantanamo is progressing slowly but steadily. Considerable pipe and material have been purchased and preliminary work for the dam and settling basin is being pushed forward.

An artesian well has been completed at Puerto Principe, which, it is believed, will furnish a fair supply of water of good quality. Another well is at present being sunk at Nuevitas for the purpose of supplying that town with water. The present supply of water at Nuevitas is derived entirely from rainfall and from a few insufficient wells. The result has been that for years past many water famines have occurred, resulting in great hardship and expense to the people. This was particularly trying during the present year, when for a long time water had to be shipped to Nuevitas from Puerto Principe and even from Havana. A similar condition of affairs exists at Gibara, and it is proposed to transfer the well-boring machinery to Gibara when the well at Nuevitas is completed. The public wharf at Gibara is in a very dilapidated condition and is in need of extensive repairs. Plans and estimates for this work have been submitted by the officer in charge of the customs at that port.

At Holguin limited work of a public character has been done in the shape of road building, sanitary improvements, construction of a public bath house for the people of the town, and improvements in the wells. At Baracoa and Mayari the commanding officers are expending the appropriations allotted to them to the best advantage in the way of improvement of streets, sanitation, and such limited public works as their appropriations enable them to undertake.

At Palma Soriano, a town situated on a bluff on the Cauto River, a water system is being established for the purpose of supplying the town with water from the river; this being done by means of a small pumping engine capable of supplying 50,000 gallons per diem, this amount being amply sufficient for the needs of the town.

At San Luis systematic and permanent improvement of the streets is being pushed forward. Substantial sidewalks of stone have been constructed and the principal streets are being paved.

At Manzanillo every effort is being made to improve the sanitary condition of the town by ditches and a system of open drainage.

At Puerto Principe paving the streets and general sanitary improvements of the town are being pushed forward as rapidly as possible.

At Santiago de Cuba systematic work on streets is being carried on. The new wharf is nearly completed, as well as the extensive repairs required on the old wharf. Extensive filling along the water front is still being carried on and general sanitary improvements are being pushed forward as vigorously as possible. The main road to the interior of the island, passing from the city over the mountains by way of Dos Caminos, San Luis, and Palma Soriano, is being constructed as rapidly as possible. The extent and difficulty of the work in passing from the plain about Santiago over the mountain to the interior plateau are great and will require considerable time and labor for its accomplishment. The road is at present passable for vehicles, but extensive macadamizing of certain sections will be required before it can be considered to be of a permanent character and serviceable at all seasons and under all conditions. This road is of the greatest benefit, furnishing as it does the only outlet for the interior country except the railway, whose freight rates are so high as to be practically prohibitive. The general line of this road is that of the old "Camino Real de la Isla."

INLAND TRANSPORTATION AND FACILITIES.

Inland transportation is almost entirely by wagon and pack train. Good roads are badly needed and their construction is going to require a good deal of time and a large outlay of money, as the country is largely black adobe, which a few heavy rains turn into a sea of mud. Many of the old trails and roads have become badly overgrown during the war and require to be again opened up and cleared of trees and underbrush. This work is being done as fast as practicable.

RAILOADS.

No change has occurred since my special report on this subject last August. There is one point, however, to which I wish to invite attention, and trust that some legal remedy may be found. The railroad from Nuevitas to Puerto Principe is a monopoly of the worst type. Its charges are enormous. It pays as high a dividend as 3 per cent per month to the stockholders. It seems to have been able to maintain this tariff under Spanish rule through the powerful influence of its owners and directors. The rates at present are unchanged and are at least double what they should be. As an illustration, a bill for $250, with the statement that it was half the usual rate, was recently submitted for the use of an engine and an empty box car from Nuevitas to Puerto Principe, a distance of about 40 miles, and a single coach on the return trip. It is suggested that if any legal remedy for such an excessive tariff be available it should be applied, and if not it is respectfully recommended that an investigation be made of the charges imposed by this railroad and that steps be taken to formulate a just and equitable tariff.

MINERAL RESOURCES.

Many rich and valuable mines are being denounced, and there is a prospect that quite a mining boom will take place in this province during the next few months. Copper of high grade, asbestos of excellent quality, and large amounts of manganese ore are constantly being reported.

It is extremely important that a geological survey of this department be made as soon as possible. With this end in view it is recommended that steps be taken to secure the cooperation of the Office of the Geological Survey of the United States. Prospecting is extremely difficult on account of the dense vegetation, and vegetable refuse completely covers the surface of the rock and makes following of float and discovery of veins or other deposits extremely difficult. It is apparent from the numerous mines which are now being located that no systematic or thorough prospecting has ever been done here before.

PUBLIC LANDS.

As stated in my special report, submitted in accordance with circular No. 10, headquarters division of Cuba, March 25, 1899, a large part of the area of this department consists of lands which have never become the property of private individuals and may be described as public lands. Much of this land is the property of the State. In this connection I would respectfully submit the following statement and recommendation.

During the war many of the estates in the interior were abandoned and have become overgrown. Their owners are either dead or in foreign parts or living in towns, too poor to attempt any work tending to reclaim and reestablish their estates. The result has been and is that many persons have settled on these estates, as well as on different portions of the public domain, and have remained in undisputed possession for several years. Their removal will be attended with considerable difficulty and hardship, and probably with some considerable disturbance, as the individuals who have made these irregular settlements are largely soldiers of the late Cuban army. These men are mostly worthy and deserving, and have rendered their services to their country cheerfully and faithfully. At present they find themselves without means and without homes. Many of them were formerly slaves. Others are the descendants of people who have never owned or had a permanent home. Some are poor people who were formerly tenants on the larger estates. The question of the ejectment and removal of this large and really deserving body of men is a serious one, and in view of the fact that there is a large extent of public domain lying absolutely idle and undeveloped, it is recommended that steps be taken, as soon as such action may be considered feasible, to allot, under conditions to be prescribed, to each honorably discharged soldier of the Cuban army who had served not less than three months prior to the 17th of July, 1898, one caballeria of public land with full and absolute title to the same, in order that he may have land on which to support himself and family. The result of such action will be, I believe, highly beneficial both in its direct effect and in its far-reaching influence on the prosperity and quiet of the island. Moreover, it is an act of eminent justice and will tend much to harmonize and develop the country.

STATE OF PUBLIC EDUCATION.

Public instruction remains practically as stated in my special report referred to above. The schools are all running under the old system, and are in no sense creditable.

MAIL SERVICE.

The land mail service is generally promptly and efficiently handled by local officials. In many of the interior districts it is, of course, unsatisfactory, the population being small and scattered and not sufficiently numerous to warrant the establishment of a regular system with a frequent delivery.

The subject of the foreign mail service, especially mail service with this portion of Cuba and the United States, is an important one. At present this service is unsatisfactory. It is not unusual to receive letters which have been from ten to seventeen days in transit. In view of the fact that the steamers of the Boston Fruit Company, in their passages from Philadelphia, New York, and Boston to Kingston and other ports of Jamaica, carry mail and pass within 45 miles of this port, it is believed that satisfactory arrangements can be made for a delivery of mails twice per week, to and fro, by these steamers. Their schedule time is from four to four and a half days, and their stops at this port to pick up mail at the entrance of the harbor would not add more than three hours to their schedule time. The president of the company, Mr. R. A. C. Smith, informed me that the company would be glad to transport mail provided an inducement was given them to do so. An arrange-

ment such as mentioned above would give this city two mails to and from New York and other American ports and would diminish the time of our mail in transit at least one-half.

TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH SERVICE.

This is improving. Much difficulty is experienced during the dry season by fires burning telegraph poles. It is recommended that iron poles be substituted for wooden ones on the main lines. In addition to fire great difficulty is experienced from falling trees and vines and branches. This service will improve with the opening up of the roads.

CHURCH PROPERTY.

The condition is as stated in my special report above referred to. It is important that steps should be taken as soon as possible to define what is and what is not church property. The present condition is unsatisfactory to both church and municipality, and leads to many misunderstandings.

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

The administration of justice is slow and unsatisfactory, although the judges are making efforts to improve it. More courts capable of trying criminal cases are required. The present system results in the greatest hardship and injustice to those accused of crime and held for trial, months being required in many cases to establish guilt or innocence. The municipal judges are as a rule unsatisfactory. They receive no salary and are consequently more or less indifferent and neglectful of duty. It is recommended, in accordance with the previous recommendations of the audiencia of this province, that municipal judges be given a fixed salary, averaging from $30 to $100 per month, in accordance with the amount of work they have to perform. This is to be determined by the audiencias. It is, moreover, recommended that the judges of first instance be instructed and authorized to procure suitable buildings for their courts, and that they be forbidden to hold their courts in their private houses. There is no condition in the island of Cuba, which I am aware of, which calls for more careful attention and more rigid inspection than the administration of justice.

INVESTMENTS.

The opportunities for investments are excellent, and include valuable timber lands, mining properties, sugar, tobacco, and coffee estates.

AVAILABLE WATER POWER.

Considerable water power can be obtained from many of the smaller streams in the interior. At Guantanamo arrangements are being made to develop water power and transmit it by electricity to the various plantations in the valley and even to Santiago for the purpose of lighting and traction. This scheme is still in its infancy, but bids fair to develop in the near future.

Sanitary conditions throughout the department are, generally speaking, good, and are steadily improving.

REGISTRATION OF PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS.

It is recommended that local boards be constituted in the cities of Puerto Principe, Santiago, and Gibara for the examination of the diplomas held by the different physicians and surgeons, and if any doubt exists, that a thorough examination as to their qualifications be held. It is respectfully submitted that it is great hardship and expense to require the physicians and surgeons to go to Havana for examination and registration.

CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OF AFFAIRS.

This, I believe, is improving. The great tendency is still toward unnecessary officials and unnecessarily large salaries. It is recommended that all towns be classified in accordance with population and that a definite official list of officials and salaries be established beyond which municipalities shall not be authorized to go at present.

TAXATION.

The present system of taxation is inadequate and incompatible with an advanced civilization. Immediate steps should be taken toward its remodeling and reform.

CHARITIES AND HOSPITALS.

The people of the department are to day, almost without exception, self supporting, and no rations are being issued except to charities and hospitals. The issue is made because it is more economical to pay for the ration for these institutions than to purchase supplies in the open market.

GENERAL CONDITIONS.

It can be safely said that there is no hunger or suffering in the general sense of the term in this department. The people are orderly, quiet, and, generally speaking, law abiding. Brigandage, which was encouraged during the spring months through judicial incompetency and inefficiency, has disappeared. We still have in several towns local papers whose principal object seems to be to produce discord and trouble. These papers are generally edited by men without character or any honorable antecedent record. Their influence, if it ever was great, is rapidly diminishing. Their principal object is notoriety, and nothing would so much delight them as to have their papers suppressed, and thus enable them to appear of some consequence.

The great desire of the people at present is for a more prompt and equitable administration of justice, especially in criminal cases; a thorough reform and remodeling of the present system of education, and the construction of schoolhouses in the larger towns. There is not in this department a single building constructed for public school purposes.

The establishment by the municipality of reading rooms and public libraries, even on a small scale, containing local and foreign papers and monthly journals would do much toward educating the people in current affairs.

BARRACKS AND QUARTERS.

All the troops in this department will at the end of November be in comfortable barracks. The abandoning of the Reina Mercedes barracks in Santiago on account of yellow fever infection has necessitated the construction of four sets of barracks, with necessary mess halls, kitchens, and other buildings, near Morro Castle. The location chosen is an excellent one, at an elevation of 208 feet above the sea. The soil is largely limestone rock, drainage is rapid and complete, and there are excellent opportunities for sea bathing, fishing, boating, and other amusements. I believe this can be made the most attractive station for troops in this department. Supplies coming from the States can be landed at the post without coming into contact with the town or with infected buildings or people. The health of the troops is on the whole very good. The troops in the province of Puerto Principe are practically all under canvas. Too much can not be said in praise of the excellent judgment shown by Colonel Davis in selecting, laying out, supplying, and maintaining the camps of the Eighth Cavalry and Fifteenth Infantry near Puerto Principe. They are model camps in every way. It will be necessary to construct barracks for troops garrisoning the province of Puerto Principe at points outside the towns, as both Nuevitas and Puerto Principe are infected. The new stables recently erected in the suburbs of the city of Puerto Principe can be taken down and reerected at the site recommended for new barracks at a point distant about six miles from the city of Puerto Principe. The barracks erected at Nuevitas can also be taken down and removed to present camp site outside town limits. Excellent sites for posts have been recommended near Nuevitas and Puerto Principe.

It is believed that the garrison of the province of Puerto Principe can be safely reduced to one regiment of cavalry. In this connection I would respectfully submit the following recommendation:

It will be a number of years before yellow fever will be under control in the large towns of Cuba and constant liability to epidemics will continue, and in all probability each summer will see a repetition of the past one, possibly not in the same locality, but somewhere. Our troops are all, generally speaking, nonimmune, and during the months that the fever is prevalent or liable to become prevalent they can not be employed on garrison duty in the larger towns without almost absolute certainty of becoming infected. Such being the case I believe it to be advisable to reduce the garrisons of nonimmune American soldiers to the lowest possible point and substitute in this department a regiment of native cavalry under American officers down to and including the captains. A regiment of this description would take the place of the Rural Guard in the two provinces included in this department in which the Rural Guard numbers 500 men; from this it will be seen that there would be a great saving in expense and I believe an equal degree of efficiency obtained. My experience here has been that the people are very anxious to enlist in our service and that they are thoroughly amenable to discipline, readily acquire the drill and necessary information, and that they take very kindly to the duties of a soldier. A regiment of this description 1,200 strong would furnish sufficient garrison for the larger seaport towns in which a garrison would be required and would also serve as a force for maintaining law and order in the rural districts, and if properly recruited from all portions of the department would give us a body of men thoroughly familiar with the entire country and acquainted and connected with its inhabitants. I believe

that such a force would result in a great saving of public funds and in an equal or greater degree of efficiency and in the establishment of friendly relations through these soldiers with the great bulk of the people. They can be easily maintained, and much of the ration necessary for them could be purchased from the products of the country in which they are serving.

I believe that as soon as such a regiment as above described is brought to a fair degree of discipline and efficiency that the garrisons of American troops can be reduced not to exceed two squadrons of cavalry for this department. I believe this plan will increase the good feeling between Cubans and Americans and do a great deal toward drawing the two peoples together on a basis of harmony and mutual understanding.

There is also one subject which I believe deserves consideration—that is, the proper care of certain crippled and disabled soldiers of the late Cuban army, of whom there are quite a number. These men are not sick nor invalids in the sense which would entitle them to admission to the civil hospitals, but they are broken-down men, cripples without any means of support, and at present are receiving very little care or attention. One establishment could be economically established in each province to which those absolutely helpless and unable to take care of themselves could be admitted and taken care of at the public expense. Such action, initiated by the military authorities, would, I believe, be extremely satisfactory to and appreciated by the representatives of the Cuban army and the people of the island.

IMMIGRATION.

I believe that desirable immigrants are needed in Cuba and will be welcomed by the intelligent classes of the population, and that such immigration should be encouraged. Recent recommendations to this effect have been submitted to me by the civil governor of this province and by his secretary, the present acting civil governor, as well as by many of the representative citizens of the department.

Very respectfully,

LEONARD WOOD,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

REPORT

OF THE

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., November 22, 1899.

The PRESIDENT.

SIR: The second volume of the report of the Department for the year 1898 covered all the operations of the fleets during the period of hostilities with Spain. Since that time active operations have been confined to the waters of the Philippines, where, by reason of the insurrection on the island of Luzon, it has been necessary to assemble and maintain a large squadron.

ASIATIC SQUADRON.

Admiral Dewey remained in command of this squadron until May 20, 1899, when he was relieved by Capt. A. S. Barker, who was relieved in turn, on June 20, by Rear-Admiral J. C. Watson, the present commander in chief.

The principal duties of the Asiatic squadron have been to cooperate with the Army and to maintain a blockade of such extent as has been determined by the general policy of campaign laid down by the War Department. Many important expeditions have been carried out involving duty of an arduous character, and few casualties have occurred.

On April 12 Lieut. J. C. Gilmore and a party of fourteen under his command were captured by the insurgents at Balar. So far as is known, all are still in the hands of the insurgents.

Some time during the month of September the gunboat *Urdaneta*, under command of Naval Cadet W. C. Wood, was destroyed by the insurgents at Orani, Orani River, Manila Bay. Cadet Wood was reported by the insurgents as having been killed, and it is presumed that all the party under his command fell into the hands of the insurgents, although it is possible that some of them were killed.

The Department regrets to report the loss of the cruiser *Charleston* on the morning of November 2. Rear-Admiral Watson states that she struck on an uncharted coral reef 10 miles east of Kamiguin Island. None of the officers or crew were lost.

The operations in the Philippines have necessitated much duty of an exceedingly arduous and exacting character, and have included the capture of certain ports, the landing and protection of the Army where practicable, expeditions of exploration around the coasts and through

the islands, and the patrol of the adjacent waters for the purpose of preventing the introduction of supplies of food and materials of war to the insurgents. The work has been thoroughly and efficiently done.

PACIFIC SQUADRON.

Rear-Admiral Albert Kautz has been in command of the Pacific squadron during the past year, and was dispatched in February last, with his flagship, the *Philadelphia*, to the Samoan Islands, where trouble had arisen as to the succession to the throne. In connection with this duty a combined force of English and Americans made a reconnoissance of the island on the afternoon of April 1 for the purpose of breaking up a camp of Mataafa natives in the vicinity of Vailele. The American force was in charge of Lieut. P. V. Lansdale, the executive officer of the *Philadelphia*, accompanied by Ensign J. R. Monaghan, Lieut. C. M. Perkins, of the Marine Corps, and Passed Asst. Surg. G. A. Lung.

The American force consisted of 60 officers and men, including 20 marines. The British force was 62 officers, seamen, and marines, under the command of Lieut. A. H. Freeman, of the Royal Navy. They were accompanied by a native force of friendlies, numbering between 100 and 150 men, and indifferently armed and disciplined. As they were returning to the ships they were attacked from cover by a force of Samoans, and in the engagement which followed Lieutenant Lansdale, Ensign Monaghan, and 2 enlisted men of our force and Lieutenant Freeman and 2 sailors of the British party were killed. Five American and 2 British sailors were wounded. The loss of these two young officers is deeply regretted. Ensign Monaghan and ordinary seaman N. E. Edsall sacrificed their lives in a gallant and hopeless attempt to rescue Lieutenant Landsdale, who was wounded and unable to escape and who died in the heroic performance of his duty.

The *Badger*, of this command, conveyed the Samoan commissioners of this country, Great Britain, and Germany to the Samoan Islands and remained there with the *Philadelphia* pending the settlement by the commission of the disturbances which had there arisen.

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON.

The North Atlantic Squadron was under the command of Rear-Admiral W. T. Sampson until October 14, when he was relieved by Rear-Admiral N. H. Farquhar. It continued, as for some years past, to be a school of drill and instruction for the fleet and for the officers and men individually.

SOUTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON.

After the close of the war with Spain this squadron was reestablished. The *Wilmington* was directed to make a cruise up the Orinoco and Amazon rivers, and much valuable information was gathered in regard to these waters and has been transmitted to the Department. The voyage up the Amazon extended as far as Peru.

Rear-Admiral H. L. Howison was assigned to the command of this station on March 30, and was directed to proceed with his flagship, the

Chicago, to his station by way of the Mediterranean. En route, the *Chicago* stopped at Tangier, where the commander in chief joined with the American consul in a request upon the Government of Morocco for the payment of a long-standing claim of certain of our citizens against that Government, and succeeded in collecting the amount. Rear-Admiral Howison was relieved from duty on October 2, 1899, and Rear-Admiral W. S. Schley was assigned to the command, and raised his flag on the *Chicago* on November 18.

THE RETURN OF ADMIRAL DEWEY.

Admiral Dewey, returning, arrived at New York September 26, and was received with a most enthusiastic welcome from the whole country. On his arrival in Washington the sword voted by Congress was presented to him in accordance with the provisions of the act authorizing that ceremony. It occurred October 3, on the steps of the Capitol, in your presence, in the presence of many members of the Senate and House of Representatives, of the Supreme Court, of the Diplomatic Corps, and of a vast assembly of citizens. It was the nation's tribute.

PROGRESS OF CONSTRUCTION.

Since the last annual report of the Department the following vessels, which were then building under contract, have been conditionally or finally accepted:

Name of vessel.	Type.	Date of trial.	Speed required by contract.	Speed obtained on trial.	Date of preliminary acceptance.	Date of final acceptance.	By whom built.
		1898.			1899.	1899.	
Davis	Torpedo boat	Nov. 24	22.5	23.41	Jan. 26	June 7	Wolff & Zwicker.
Mackenzie	do	Dec. 12	20	20.11	Jan. 7	June 2	Chas. Hillman Ship and Engine Building Co.
Farragut	do	Dec. 2 1899.	30	30.13	Jan. 30	July 3	Union Iron Works.
Rowan	do	Jan. 6	26	27.074	Jan. 31	May 10	Moran Bros. Co.
Fox	do	Feb. 18	22.5	23.13	Mar. 13	Aug. 14	Wolff & Zwicker.
Chesapeake	Practice ship				July 22		Bath Iron Works.
Penacook	Tug			12		[1] Feb. 9	Navy-yard, New York.
Pawtucket	do			12.20		[1] May 27	Navy-yard, Mare Island.
Kearsarge	Battle ship	Sept. 25	16	16.816	Nov. 8		Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co.

[1] Dates of reported completion.

In addition to the new construction added as above, the following vessels, which were sunk during the war with Spain, have been recovered and added to the Navy:

Name.	Type.	Name.	Type.
Reina Mercedes	Cruiser.	Isla de Cuba	Gunboat
Don Juan de Austria	Gunboat.	Isla de Luzon	Do.

These, with the exception of the *Reina Mercedes*, are at Hongkong for the repairs and changes necessary to fit them for service on the Asiatic Station, and it is estimated that the total cost of raising and repairing will be about $305,000, while their value when completed will be double that amount.

In addition to these a considerable increase in the small craft on the Asiatic Station has been made through the purchase or capture of the vessels in the following table:

Name.	Type.	Name.	Type.
Albay	Gunboat.	Panay	Gunboat.
Belusan	Do.	Paragua	Do.
Calamianes	Do.	Petrelita	Tug.
El Cano	Do.	Rapido	Do.
Guardoqui	Do.	Samar	Gunboat.
Manileno	Do.	Sureste	Tug.
Mariveles	Do.	Urdaneta	Gunboat.
Mindoro	Do.	Vasco	Do.
Pampango	Do.		

KEARSARGE AND KENTUCKY.

The *Kearsarge* had her official trial on September 25, and attained a speed of 16.816 knots. She was preliminarily accepted November 8, 1899. Her sister ship, the *Kentucky*, will be tried on the 24th of this month. The contracts for these ships were made in the early part of 1896, and require a speed of 16 knots. They will be the first ships of their class completed without a premium for excess of speed over the contract requirements.

VESSELS UNDER CONSTRUCTION.

Some delay has occurred on vessels under construction through the inability of the contractors to procure armor and other material, and the lack of experience on the part of some of them in building torpedo craft; and the dates of completion in some cases have been somewhat postponed from those given in my last report. The following table shows the condition on November 1 of all vessels building for the Navy, together with the probable date of completion:

Name of vessel.	Where and by whom building.	Percentage of completion Nov. 1.	Probable date of completion.
Kearsarge	Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., Newport News, Va.	97	January, 1900.
Kentucky	do	95	February, 1900.
Illinois	do	71	October, 1900.
Alabama	Wm. Cramp & Sons, Philadelphia, Pa	91	February, 1900.
Wisconsin	Union Iron Works, San Francisco, Cal	75	May, 1900.
Maine	Wm. Cramp & Sons, Philadelphia, Pa	15	June, 1901.

Name of vessel.	Where and by whom building.	Percentage of completion Nov. 1.	Probable date of completion.
Missouri	Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., Newport News, Va.	1	February, 1902.
Ohio	Union Iron Works, San Francisco, Cal	7	March, 1902.
Arkansas	Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., Newport News, Va.	4	September, 1901.
Connecticut	Bath Iron Works, Bath, Me	30	March, 1901.
Florida	Lewis Nixon, Elizabeth, N. J	17	April, 1901.
Wyoming	Union Iron Works, San Francisco, Cal	24	March, 1901.
Albany	Sir Wm. G. Armstrong, Mitchell & Co., Newcastle-on-Tyne, England.	94	January, 1900.
Chesapeake	Fitting out at Boston Navy-Yard	98	Contract with Bath Iron Works completed.
Bainbridge	Neafie & Levy, Philadelphia, Pa	30	December, 1900.
Barry	do	30	Do.
Chauncey	do	28	Do.
Dale	Wm. R. Trigg Co., Richmond, Va	45	November, 1900.
Decatur	do	44	Do.
Hopkins	Harlan & Hollingsworth Co., Wilmington, Del.	27	January, 1901.
Hull	do	27	Do.
Lawrence	Fore River Engine Co., Weymouth, Mass	64	June, 1900.
Macdonough	do	60	July, 1900.
Paul Jones	Union Iron Works, San Francisco, Cal	50	August, 1900.
Perry	do	50	Do.
Preble	do	50	Do.
Stewart	Gas Engine and Power Co., and Chas. L. Seabury & Co., Consolidated, Morris Heights, N. Y.	8	In doubt.
Truxtun	Maryland Steel Co., Sparrows Point, Md	5	Do.
Whipple	do	5	Do.
Worden	do	5	Do.
Dahlgren	Bath Iron Works, Bath, Me	98	November, 1899.
T. A. M. Craven	do	98	December, 1899.
Bailey	Gas Engine and Power Co., and Chas. L. Seabury & Co., Consolidated, Morris Heights, N. Y.	57	July, 1900.
Goldsborough	Wolff & Zwicker Iron Works, Portland, Oreg.	92	April, 1900.
Stringham	Harlan & Hollingsworth Co., Wilmington, Del	85	Do.
Bagley	Bath Iron Works, Bath, Me	3	November, 1899.
Barney	do	3	Do.
Biddle	do	3	Do.
Blakely	Geo. Lawley & Son Corporation, South Boston, Mass.	60	April, 1900.
De Long	do	60	Do.
Nicholson	Lewis Nixon, Elizabeth, N. J	42	July, 1900.
O'Brien	do	42	Do.
Shubrick	Wm. R. Trigg Co., Richmond, Va	68	April, 1900.
Stockton	do	65	Do.
Thornton	do	64	Do.
Tingey	Columbian Iron Works, Baltimore, Md	38	August, 1900.
Wilkes	Gas Engine and Power Co., and Chas. L. Seabury & Co., Consolidated, Morris Heights, N. Y.	20	October, 1900.
Plunger	Columbian Iron Works, Baltimore, Md	85	In doubt.

It will be seen from this table that four battle ships should be finished early next year and one in October. The three others under construction should be available, one in 1901 and the other two early in 1902. The cruiser *Albany*, now building in England, and most of the thirty three torpedo craft, should be available during the coming year, and the four monitors in 1901.

NEW CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZED BY ACT OF MARCH 3, 1899.

Little progress has been made with the designs for the three battle ships and three armored cruisers authorized under this act, owing to the provision prohibiting the Department from contracting for the hull of any vessel authorized therein until a contract has been made for the armor within the limit of a cost of $300 per ton.

The designs for the six cruisers authorized by the same act were duly completed, advertisement for proposals made, and the bids which were opened November 1 have been referred to the board of construction for consideration. Their report has been made and the awards will be made in a few days.

Work on the design of gunboat No. 16, to replace the *Michigan* on the Great Lakes, has been suspended awaiting the modifications of the treaty with Great Britain, which are now under consideration.

COST OF NEW NAVY.

In order to show the amount expended on the new navy the Department has had prepared in the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts the following table which shows in detail the cost of each finished ship since the rebuilding of the fleet began in 1883, and the amount expended on those under construction. The estimates as to unfinished work were prepared in the respective Bureaus.

The total for finished vessels of $98,529,511.85, and the estimated total for unfinished vessels of $62,570,610.23 make not a large amount comparatively in view of the result, which is a new navy of efficient and powerful vessels prepared for the emergencies of national defense. It is hardly more than the sum paid in a single year for pensions to the soldiers and sailors who served a generation ago in the late civil war.

Statement showing the amounts authorized for new vessels under "Increase of the Navy," in each act of Congress since and including the act of March 3, 1883, the vessels authorized, the amounts appropriated, the amount expended upon each vessel authorized, the total actual cost of finished vessels, including armament and equipment, to June 30, 1899, and the estimated amount to be expended upon unfinished vessels from that date.

FINISHED VESSELS.

Vessels authorized and dates of acts of Congress.	Amounts appropriated.			Amounts expended.					Total cost of finished vessels.
	Amounts authorized for hull and machinery, including hull armor.	For hull and machinery.	For armor, armament, and equipment.	For hull and machinery, including hull armor.	For armor for gun protection.	For speed premiums trial trip expenses, etc.	For armament.	For equipment, Bureaus of Equipment, Construction and Repair, and Steam Engineering.	
March 3, 1883.									
Chicago									
Atlanta									
Boston	$4,268,801.80			$4,268,801.80		Included in total cost.			$4,268,801.80
Dolphin									
For above vessels		$1,300,000.00							
For above vessels, including their armament and equipment, by acts of July 7, 1884, Mar. 3, 1885, July 26, 1886, and Mar. 30, 1888		2,968,801.80							
March 3, 1885.									
Newark	1,300,000.00			1,386,196.86		$53,185.34	$265,256.19	$125,478.81	1,830,117.20
Charleston	1,100,000.00			1,164,504.10		21,462.84	290,997.51	122,893.75	1,599,858.20
Yorktown	520,000.00			505,880.45		43,026.16	156,722.64	62,401.34	768,030.59
Petrel	275,000.00			307,996.55		1,985.10	81,736.08	72,317.79	464,035.52
For above-named vessels		1,895,000.00							
August 3, 1886.									
Baltimore	1,500,000.00			1,434,129.93		120,354.01	301,194.72	121,050.69	1,976,729.35
Vesuvius	350,000.00			357,255.33		2,669.89	11,865.29	8,500.25	380,290.76

Statement showing the amount authorized for new vessels under "Increase of the Navy," etc.—Continued.

FINISHED VESSELS—Continued.

Vessels authorized and built by contract	Amounts appropriated.			Amounts expended.					
	Amounts authorized for hull and machinery including hull armor.	For hull and machinery.	For armor, armament, and equipment.	For hull and machinery including hull armor.	For armor for gun protection.	For speed premiums, trial trip expenses, etc.	For armament.	For equipment, Bureaus of Equipment, Construction and Repair, and Steam Engineering.	Total cost of finished vessels.
August 3, 1886—Continued.									
Cushing	$100,000.00			$98,666.29			$16,641.56	$2,798.46	$118,106.31
Maine	2,500,000.00			3,685,797.27	$358,369.45		517,397.85	116,224.18	4,677,788.75
Texas	[illegible]			[illegible]	411,199.87		477,129.94	[illegible]	[illegible]
Puritan				1,800,094.24	274,421.63		251,977.87	76,990.00	2,403,483.74
Monadnock				1,752,418.76	174,046.07		139,907.21	67,682.44	2,134,054.48
Amphitrite	[illegible]			1,213,891.10	169,745.40		143,133.19	[illegible]	[illegible]
Terror				1,274,244.08	144,664.64		133,853.68	64,489.17	1,617,251.57
For all above-named vessels		$2,275,000.00							
March 3, 1887.									
Miantonomoh	[illegible]			758,517.85			259,211.68	39,506.53	1,057,236.06
For all above-named vessels		2,420,000.00							
Philadelphia	1,500,000.00			1,443,904.85		$117,427.62	295,406.69	101,861.22	1,958,660.38
San Francisco	1,500,000.00	1,500,000.00		1,612,811.50		125,446.32	272,876.54	124,168.95	2,135,303.31
Concord	550,000.00			557,607.83		8,748.38	126,736.75	72,190.76	765,283.72
Bennington	550,000.00			568,455.30		10,351.07	125,998.09	64,513.25	769,317.71
Monterey	2,000,000.00	1,000,000.00		2,066,199.95	190,534.38	11,547.42	344,795.13	115,471.18	2,728,548.06
Armament of all vessels authorized			$2,128,362.00						
Armor and gun steel of all vessels authorized			4,000,000.00						
September 7, 1888.									
New York	3,500,000.00			3,486,118.36	170,299.03	241,422.93	341,626.43	107,175.64	4,346,642.39
Olympia	1,800,000.00			1,970,709.97	141,522.62	371,794.95	343,343.84	151,912.00	2,979,283.38

Cincinnati	1,100,000.00			1,995,773.30	27,553.61		232,116.93	116,460.68	2,371,904.52
Raleigh	1,100,000.00			1,839,965.23	27,969.09		232,465.97	99,329.51	2,199,729.80
Montgomery	700,000.00			810,681.65	13,010.67	227,241.22	162,257.26	53,918.91	1,267,109.71
Detroit	700,000.00			808,782.04	13,154.14	182,775.47	176,150.44	52,177.81	1,233,039.90
Marblehead	700,000.00			900,391.85	11,918.56	149,115.89	172,458.20	57,278.43	1,291,162.93
For all above-named vessels		3,500,000.00							
Bancroft	260,000.00	260,000.00		308,318.07		54,186.98	47,559.50	21,217.08	431,281.63
Armament of all vessels authorized			2,000,000.00						
March 2, 1889.									
Machias	350,000.00			438,702.62		53,799.70	102,278.81	62,879.94	657,661.07
Castine	350,000.00			452,763.78		58,114.35	104,975.13	55,610.94	671,464.20
Katahdin	1,513,691.31			1,504,404.17		9,287.14	12,661.20	3,474.84	1,529,827.35
For all above-named vessels		4,055,000.00	2,500,000.00						
June 30, 1890.									
Armor and armament of all above named vessels			2,500,000.00						
Indiana	4,000,000.00			4,300,149.62	977,134.02	56,424.41	553,972.48	95,691.45	5,983,371.98
Massachusetts	4,000,000.00			4,254,910.66	1,030,051.58	116,882.73	564,572.92	80,700.06	6,047,117.95
Oregon	4,000,000.00			4,617,345.01	1,029,591.42	267,085.47	585,598.77	75,412.09	6,575,032.76
Columbia	2,750,000.00			3,045,164.47	31,795.79	385,000.00	288,506.77	158,544.23	3,909,011.26
Ericsson	125,000.00			123,484.75			14,423.25	6,234.08	144,142.08
For all above-named vessels		5,475,000.00							
September 29, 1890.									
Nickel matte for armor of all ships			800,000.00						
March 2, 1891.									
Minneapolis	2,750,000.00			2,927,030.82	31,205.27	445,470.98	275,847.35	170,442.02	3,849,996.44
For all above-named vessels		12,107,000.00	4,000,000.00						
For equipment of new vessels (Bureau of Equipment)			400,000.00						
March 3, 1891.									
For all above-named vessels		1,000,000.00							

Statement showing the amounts authorized for new vessels under "Increase of the Navy," etc.—Continued.

FINISHED VESSELS—Continued.

Vessels authorized by the various acts of Congress	Amounts appropriated.			Amounts expended.					
	Amounts authorized for hull and machinery, including hull armor.	For hull and machinery.	For armor, armament and equipment.	For hull and machinery including hull armor.	For armor for gun protection.	For speed premiums, trial trip expenses, etc.	For armament.	For equipment, Bureaus of Equipment, Construction and Repair, and Steam Engineering.	Total cost of finished vessels.
July 19, 1892.									
Brooklyn	$3,500,000.00			$3,254,019.37	$323,552.21	$367,249.15	$341,639.32	$137,330.04	$4,423,790.09
Iowa	4,000,000.00			3,971,502.44	956,460.65	234,624.03	583,859.48	124,759.72	5,871,206.32
For all above-named vessels		$7,000,000.00	$2,000,000.00						
For equipment of above-named vessels			400,000.00						
March 3, 1893.									
Nashville	400,000.00			419,700.50	11,041.56	45,980.00	58,326.61	51,319.48	586,368.15
Wilmington	400,000.00			374,435.83	8,920.82	41,512.00	58,978.12	53,328.10	537,174.87
Helena	400,000.00			371,892.21	8,834.44	49,942.40	57,707.92	52,689.36	541,066.33
Plunger (see unfinished vessels)	200,000.00								
For all above-named vessels		6,875,000.00							
For equipment of above-named vessels			250,000.00						
July 26, 1894.									
For all above-named vessels		5,955,025.00	4,000,000.00						
Foote	150,000.00			118,710.38		506.36	14,742.30	3,314.24	137,273.28
Rodgers	150,000.00			110,214.26		506.37	15,289.47	[illegible]	126,515.33
Winslow	150,000.00			103,288.39		506.37	15,027.63	2,783.32	121,605.71
Remission of time penalties, Vesuvius		39,700.00							
March 2, 1895.									
Annapolis	230,000.00			277,659.80		471.72	40,837.15	56,448.54	375,417.21
Vicksburg	230,000.00			285,579.20		471.72	40,772.18	55,927.51	388,750.61
Newport	230,000.00			298,143.42		471.72	44,217.10	61,124.09	403,956.33

Princeton	230,000.00			312,704.95		471.73	45,548.07	35,891.63	394,616.38
Wheeling	230,000.00			255,597.46		471.73	47,720.46	44,726.31	348,515.96
Marietta	230,000.00			260,100.29		471.73	46,914.25	43,938.35	351,424.62
Porter	175,000.00			199,036.69		285.04	15,425.98	2,154.67	216,902.38
Du Pont	175,000.00			165,204.39		285.04	13,535.30	2,043.02	181,067.75
Rowan	175,000.00			180,531.36		285.04	13,895.70	1,802.93	196,515.03
Kearsarge (see unfinished vessels)	4,000,000.00								
Kentucky (see unfinished vessels)	4,000,000.00								
For all above-named vessels		8,364,851.30	4,837,670.00						
For equipment of above-named vessels			125,000.00						
Remission of time penalties		40,350.00							
February 26, 1896.									
For equipment of above-named vessels			50,000.00						
June 10, 1896.									
For equipment of above-named vessels			237,000.00						
Illinois (see unfinished vessels)	3,750,000.00								
Alabama (see unfinished vessels)	3,750,000.00								
Wisconsin (see unfinished vessels)	3,750,000.00								
Dahlgren (see unfinisded vessels)									
Craven (see unfinished vessels)	800,000.00								
Farragut (see unfinished vessels)									
Mackenzie (see unfinished vessels)									
Fox (see unfinished vessels)									
Morris									
Talbot				94,575.23		348.64	17,069.44	2,717.77	114,711.08
Gwin	500,000.00			41,334.36		348.64	10,392.51	1,950.14	54,025.65
Davis				41,319.60		348.64	10,263.25	2,068.98	54,000.47
McKee				93,892.30		348.63	17,320.05	2,403.19	113,964.17
For all above-named vessels		6,870,600.00	4,371,454.00	58,139.65		348.69	9,962.73	1,889.44	70,340.81
Total	85,951,050.96	74,901,328.10	34,599,486.00	74,956,797.91	6,527,996.92	5,881,061.76	9,949,398.88	3,614,256.38	98,529,511.85

Statement showing the amounts authorized for new vessels under "Increase of the Navy," etc.—Continued.

UNFINISHED VESSELS.

Vessels authorized, and dates of acts of Congress	Amounts authorized for hulls and machinery, including hull armor.	Amounts appropriated— For hull and machinery.	Amounts appropriated— For armor, armament, and equipment.	Expended for hull and machinery to June 30, 1899.	Estimated amounts to be expended for completion in addition to expenditures to June 30, 1899. Bureau of Equipment.	Bureau of Ordnance.	Bureau of Construction and Repair.	Bureau of Steam Engineering.	Estimated total cost.
Plunger				$99,288.74	$1,500.00		$32,142.00	$26,100.00	$159,030.74
Kearsarge				3,760,322.77	35,000.00	$1,230,270.00	237,998.00	310,827.00	5,574,417.77
Kentucky				3,591,275.43	35,000.00	1,303,959.00	263,566.00	337,579.00	5,531,379.43
Illinois				1,947,306.42	34,000.00	2,701,063.00	820,538.00	366,361.00	5,869,268.42
Alabama				2,579 815.90	34,000.00	2,668,343.00	370,213.00	341,950.00	5,994,321.90
Wisconsin				2,272,706.68	34,000.00	2,576,652.00	872,024.00	285,344.00	6,040,726.68
Dahlgren				167,046.28	5,000.00	14,890.00	14,223.00	31,145.00	232,304.28
Craven				166,884.11	5,000.00	14,890.00	14,661.00	30,900.00	232,335.11
Farragut				229,074.24	5,000.00	16,412.00	17,350.00		267,836.24
Mackenzie				42,017.09	3,000.00	19,345.00	8,285.00		72,647.09
Fox				88,055.67	3,000.00	12,983.00	11,415.00		115,453.67
March 3, 1897.									
For equipment of above-named vessels			[illegible]						
Stringham				183,046.55	3,000.00	25,320.00	24,232.00	46,985.00	282,583.55
Goldsborough	$800,000.00			140,130.69	3,000.00	23,630.00	29,244.00	45,581.00	241,585.69
Bailey				139,993.45	3,000.00	25,350.00	31,058.00	53,080.00	252,481.45
For above-named vessels		$6,425,359.00	7,220,796.00						
Chesapeake	250,000.00	250,000.00		108,235.55	56,144.48	50,000.00	193,620.00		408,000.03
May 4, 1898.									
Maine	3,000,000.00			186,232.81	50,000.00	2,553,000.00	2,056,700.00	830,500.00	5,676,432.81
Missouri	3,000,000.00			9,526.34	50,000.00	2,553,000.00	2,184,467.00	877,000.00	5,673,993.34
Ohio	3,000,000.00			184,291.12	50,000.00	2,553,000.00	2,202,929.00	816,130.00	5,806,350.12
Arkansas	1,250,000.00			3,784.00	30,000.00	584,739.00	759,742.00	285,500.00	1,663,765.00
Connecticut	1,250,000.00			90,062.68	30,000.00	584,739.00	680,890.00	274,580.00	1,660,271.68
Florida	1,250,000.00			45,756.42	30,000.00	584,739.00	689,744.00	279,650.00	1,629,889.42
Wyoming	1,250,000.00			135,269.17	30,000.00	584,739.00	670,436.00	261,425.00	1,681,869.17

Bainbridge				1,561.36	3,500.00	30,000.00	151,890.00	143,500.00	330,451.36
Barry				1,546.36	3,500.00	30,000.00	151,904.00	143,500.00	330,450.36
Chauncey				1,456.71	3,500.00	30,000.00	151,957.00	143,500.00	330,413.71
Dale				24,765.82	3,500.00	30,000.00	119,692.00	130,000.00	307,957.82
Decatur				24,633.48	3,500.00	30,000.00	119,770.00	130,000.00	307,903.48
Hopkins				28,000.51	3,500.00	30,000.00	144,726.00	132,700.00	338,926.51
Hull				27,970.19	3,500.00	30,000.00	144,678.00	132,700.00	338,848.19
Lawrence				27,115.49	3,500.00	30,000.00	114,279.00	127,946.00	302,840.49
McDonough				27,346.01	3,500.00	30,000.00	114,278.00	127,940.00	303,064.01
Paul Jones				52,358.43	3,500.00	30,000.00	135,846.00	111,910.00	333,614.43
Perry				52,301.92	3,500.00	30,000.00	134,118.00	113,710.00	333,629.92
Preble				52,295.67	3,500.00	30,000.00	134,118.00	113,710.00	333,623.67
Stewart				367.30	3,500.00	30,000.00	151,669.00	143,500.00	329,036.30
Truxtun	6,900,000.00			1,466.49	3,500.00	30,000.00	154,692.00	143,500.00	333,158.49
Whipple				1,408.01	3,500.00	30,000.00	154,736.00	143,500.00	333,144.01
Worden				1,366.02	3,500.00	30,000.00	154,772.00	143,500.00	333,138.02
Bagley				574.65	2,500.00	25,350.00	88,589.00	83,000.00	200,013.65
Barney				494.66	2,500.00	25,350.00	88,820.00	83,000.00	200,164.66
Biddle				478.43	2,500.00	25,350.00	88,838.00	83,000.00	200,166.43
Blakeley				30,247.37	2,500.00	25,350.00	72,804.00	68,685.00	199,586.37
De Long				30,199.81	2,500.00	25,350.00	72,200.00	69,095.00	199,344.81
Nicholson				32,087.31	2,500.00	25,350.00	64,681.00	65,450.00	190,068.31
O'Brien				32,171.19	2,500.00	25,350.00	64,592.00	65,450.00	190,063.19
Shubrick				48,842.54	2,500.00	25,350.00	48,271.00	44,525.00	169,488.54
Stockton				48,723.81	2,500.00	25,350.00	48,375.00	44,525.00	169,473.81
Thornton				48,598.29	2,500.00	25,350.00	48,475.00	44,525.00	169,448.29
Tingey				31,933.32	4,000.00	25,350.00	76,918.00	70,904.00	209,105.32
Wilkes				1,511.49	4,000.00	25,350.00	72,681.00	83,000.00	186,542.49
Gunboat No. 16[1]	260,000.00								
For above-named vessels		13,648,473.00							
For vessels authorized since, and including, the act of July 26, 1894			7,162,800.00						
For equipment of above-named vessels			415,000.00						

[1] Contract not yet awarded.

Statement showing the amounts authorized for new vessels under "Increase of the Navy," etc.—Continued.

UNFINISHED VESSELS—Continued.

Vessels authorized [illegible]	Amount authorized for [illegible] g hull armor.	Amounts appropriated: For hull and machinery.	Amounts appropriated: For armor armament and equipment.	Expended for hull and machinery to June 30, 1899.	Estimated amounts to be expended for completion in addition to expenditures to June 30, 1899. Bureau of Equipment.	Bureau of Ordnance.	Bureau of Construction and Repair.	Bureau of Steam Engineering.	Estimated total cost.
March 3, 1899.									
Georgia	$3,600,000.00								
New Jersey	3,600,000.00								
Pennsylvania	3,600,000.00								
California	4,000,000.00								
Nebraska	4,000,000.00								
West Virginia	4,000,000.00								
Chattanooga	1,141,800.00	Contracts not yet awarded.							
Cleveland	1,141,800.00								
Denver	1,141,800.00								
Des Moines	1,141,800.00								
Galveston	1,141,800.00								
Tacoma	1,141,800.00								
For above named vessels		$5,992,402.00							
For vessels authorized since, and including, the act of July 26, 1894			4,000,000.00						
For equipment of above-named vessels			400,000.00						
Total	$51,820,800.00	$26,316,274.00	$10,361,274.00	$16,801,944.75	$618,644.48	$24,109,363.40	$17,243,836.00	$8,439,912.00	$62,570,610.23

RECAPITULATION

Amounts appropriated:	
For hull and machinery	$101,217,562.10
For armor and armament	51,521,082.00
For equipment (Bureau of Equipment)	2,439,628.00
Actual cost of finished vessels	98,529,511.85
Estimated final cost of vessels now in course of construction	62,570,610.23

VESSELS DROPPED FROM THE NAVY.

The number of vessels on the list has been reduced since the last report by the condemnation and sale of some no longer desired, and by the return of others chartered, borrowed, or transferred from other departments. The following table gives a list of these, together with their derivation and disposition:

Name.	Type.	Derivation.	Disposition.	Appraised value.
St. Louis	Auxiliary cruiser	Chartered	Returned to International Navigation Co.	
St. Paul	do	do	do	
Harvard	do	do	do	
Yale	do	do	do	
City of Pekin	Transport	do	Returned to Pacific Mail Steamship Co.	
Arctic	Ice boat	Leased	Returned to city of Philadelphia.	
Buccaneer	Converted yacht	Borrowed	Returned to William R. Hearst.	
Free Lance	do	do	Returned to Augustus Schermerhorn.	
Algonquin	Revenue cutter	Transferred from Treasury Department.	Returned to Treasury Department.	
Calumet	do	do	do	
Corwin	do	do	do	
Grant	do	do	do	
Gresham	do	do	do	
Hamilton	do	do	do	
Hudson	do	do	do	
Manning	do	do	do	
McCulloch	do	do	do	
McLane	do	do	do	
Morrill	do	do	do	
Perry	do	do	do	
Rush	do	do	do	
Thetis	do	do	do	
Windom	do	do	do	
Woodbury	do	do	do	
Armeria	Light-house tender	Transferred from Light-House Board.	Returned to Light-House Board.	
Mangrove	do	do	do	
Maple	do	do	do	
Suwanee	do	do	do	
Albatross	Fish Commission vessel.	Transferred from Fish Commission.	Returned to Fish Commission.	
Fish Hawk	do	do	do	
Ajax	Single-turreted iron monitor.	Regular Navy	Sold to Hitner & Sons, $29,566.66.	$13,000
Comanche	do	do	Sold to J. Pantoskey, Bercovith & Livingston, $6,581.25.	1,200
Passaic	do	do	Sold to Frank Samuel, $19,785.66.	11,000

Vessels dropped from the Navy—Continued.

Name.	Type.	Derivation.	Disposition.	Appraised value.
Wyandotte	Single-turreted iron monitor.	Regular Navy	Sold to Chas. G. Davis, $12,631.52.	$6,382.50
Governor Russell.	Auxiliary gunboat	Purchased for war service.	Sold to city of Boston, $25,000.	35,000
East Boston	do	do	Sold to A. J. Philip, $38,091.	30,000
Vulcan	Repair ship	do	Sold to Michael Jenkins, $175,750.	100,000
Niagara	Distilling ship	do	Sold to H. P. Booth, $75,563.	60,000
Enquirer	Converted yacht	do	Transferred to War Department at appraised value.	20,000
Scipio	Collier	Purchased for war service.	Condemned for sale	25,000
Hector	Steamer	War prize	Sold to Metropolitan Coal Company, Boston, Mass., $65,159.	50,000
Cassius	do	Purchased for war service.	Transferred to War Department at purchase price, $160,594.	

SUBMARINE BOATS.

On November 4, 1898, the Department, recognizing the importance of submarine construction, directed the board of inspection and survey to make an inspection of the Holland submarine boat, built and owned by private parties. A trial of this boat was made on November 12, 1898, in the presence of the board, which reported to the Department that the Holland Company, by reason of want of practice in handling the boat and the torpedo in connection with it, was not prepared to comply with the requirements of the board, and recommended that a further trial be made under systematic conditions, with a trained crew, with all the preparation for the trial properly made beforehand, and with regard to certain requirements which were laid down, as follows:

(A) Have three torpedoes in place.

(B) Have all arrangements made for charging torpedoes without delay.

(C) Be prepared to fire torpedoes at full speed when submerged, as well as when on surface.

(D) Have crew exercised by actual practice, so as to be able to make required submerged runs and steer a straight course. In order to make a trial-submerged run of 2 miles it is recommended that two marking buoys be placed in lower or Sandy Hook Bay, a mile apart, and that a boat to serve as torpedo target be anchored near one of these buoys, so that the *Holland*, after running a mile under water, can come up to the surface for observation, discharge her torpedo, and then diving again can return to first buoy. This would complete her 2-mile under-water run. A measure of her efficiency will be shown by the number of times it is necessary for her to come to the surface for observation.

(E) The buoys necessary for the above runs could readily be placed in proper positions before the trial by the light-house tender of the New York district.

A further trial of the *Holland* submarine boat was made by the board of inspection and survey on November 6, 1899, and the board reports that the requirements above outlined were fulfilled.

The Department at present has a submarine boat under construction at the Columbian Iron Works, at Baltimore, which was reported on November 1 as 85 per cent completed.

It is believed that the results thus far obtained, as above reported, are indicative of the very important possibilities of this type of naval war vessel.

PERSONNEL.

DISCHARGE OF VOLUNTEER OFFICERS.

Upon the ratification of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain all the volunteer officers commissioned for the period of the war were discharged, with the exception of the volunteer assistant surgeons, who were appointed under a special enactment which permitted their retention.

RETIRED OFFICERS.

The services of the retired officers who were assigned to active duty during the war with Spain, and of which 99 remained on the active list at the date of the last annual report, have also been dispensed with.

WARRANT MACHINISTS.

Section 14 of "An act to reorganize and increase the efficiency of the personnel of the Navy and Marine Corps of the United States," approved March 3, 1899, authorized the appointment of 100 warrant machinists. Preference was given under the provisions of the act to machinists of good record in the naval service. Competitive examinations, identical in all respects, were held under the supervision of naval officers within the limits of each station, at home and abroad, and the examination papers, together with the records and testimonials of the applicants, were forwarded to the Department and submitted to a board of officers to determine the relative standing of the applicants. One hundred and seventy-two machinists completed the examination, and 109 of them received more than 75 per cent of the maximum mark attainable. The Department therefore made the whole number of appointments from men already in the service.

ENLISTED MEN AND NAVAL APPRENTICES.

On June 30, 1899, the enlisted force of the Navy numbered 4,370 petty officers and 10,131 men and apprentices, a total of 14,501. Of this number, 3,500 were serving under continuous-service certificates.

It is gratifying to note the continued improvement in the enlisted force and the increase of the percentage of American citizenship. Eighty-eight per cent of the petty officers are citizens of the United

States and 65 per cent of the remainder have declared their intention of becoming citizens. Seventy-five per cent of the enlisted men are citizens and 18 per cent of the remainder have declared their intentions of becoming citizens.

In the case of the apprentices over 91 per cent are native born. The total number of apprentices in the service on June 30 was 2,221. It is from the apprentice system that the Department has hoped to gradually build up the tone of the enlisted force of the Navy, and to finally make it entirely American. The apprentices are enlisted between the ages of 14 and 17, and are sent to the training stations at Newport and San Francisco, where their education is continued and where they are carefully instructed before they are sent to sea. They are then put on board training ships until they become efficient man-of-war's men.

The Department has also taken steps, during the past year, to increase the number of man-of-war's men by enlisting several hundred native-born men, from 21 to 26 years of age, as landsmen, and sending them to sea on board cruising training ships in order that they may learn how to care for themselves and their clothing on board a ship of war, and to become familiar with naval discipline and proficient in handling boats and in the use of great and small guns and small arms. The *Hartford*, on the Pacific coast, and the *Lancaster*, on the Atlantic coast, have been selected for this purpose, and it is hoped in this way to train a number of men, who, when transferred to regular vessels of war, will be proficient for any service which may be required of them.

PERSONNEL ACT.

By virtue of the act entitled "An act to reorganize and increase the efficiency of the personnel of the Navy and Marine Corps of the United States," approved March 3, 1899, all officers of the former Engineer Corps of the Navy were transferred to the line, and new commissions have been issued to them as line officers.

Under the terms of the bill the engineer officers were divided into three classes:

First. Those of or above the rank of commander, who should perform only shore duty;

Second. Those below the rank of commander, and extending down to but not including the first engineer who entered the Naval Academy as cadet midshipman, who should perform such sea or shore duty as was performed by engineers in the Navy, and who might upon their own application, if made within six months after the passage of the act, be assigned to the duties of the line if they should pass the examination provided by law as preliminary to promotion to the grade they then held;

And, third, those engineer officers not included in the above two classes who should perform the duties now performed by line officers of the same grade, provided they pass the examination for promotion to the grade they then held, within two years subsequent to the passage of the act.

Of the officers of the second class, who were given the option of assuming line or retaining engineer duties, about a dozen have elected line duties. These have been given a special course of training in ordnance and compass work, and are now performing duties on board ship to qualify them for the line. Those of the third class, who by the terms of the act were to perform line duties, have received such assignment thereto.

The demand for engineer officers, the number of whom has been so greatly decreased by this act, has been met in some measure by the appointment of 100 warrant machinists who are competent by their service and experience for a certain class of practical work. It is not certain, however, that they can fully take the place of the highly trained technical engineer, upon whom must fall the duty of designing, superintending construction, instructing in engineering branches, as well as supervising the motive power of our great ships. The officers of this higher type should, in addition to practical knowledge, be possessed of that thorough theoretical training in steam engineering which comes from full academic education. The act has not yet been long enough in operation to warrant the Department in a more extended statement as to its effect.

BARRACKS FOR ENLISTED MEN.

Attention is invited to the recommendation of the Bureau of Navigation that barracks be substituted for receiving ships for the purpose of quartering such of the enlisted force as are not on board cruising ships of war.

For many years past the enlisted men awaiting assignment to regular cruising ships have been kept on board old wooden vessels, roofed over and moored alongside a dock at the navy-yards at Boston, New York, League Island, Norfolk, and Mare Island. These vessels have required extensive repairs, are rapidly deteriorating, and do not offer proper accommodations for the health and comfort of the men. The experience of other naval powers has shown that men quartered in barracks are much more comfortable, more healthy, and more contented than when quartered on board such ships; much better opportunities are offered for drills and exercises, and discipline is more readily maintained

It is now necessary to employ large permanent crews to care for these receiving ships, while it is estimated that only one-half the number of men would be required for the proper care of barracks on shore. The crews of the receiving ships at the present time number 453 men, and their cost to the Government amounts to $297,000 per annum. The annual saving in the cost of caring for barracks, as compared with the cost of caring for receiving ships, is estimated at about $150,000 and it is believed that a large saving would also be effected in the item of repairs. The United States is the only naval power of the first class which has not already constructed barracks for housing and training seamen. We should promptly take steps to the same end.

NAVAL ACADEMY BUILDINGS.

The report of the superintendent of the Naval Academy states that the condition of the buildings has been considerably improved during the year, and that a general overhauling of such buildings as are not to be destroyed to make room for new construction is now in progress.

The contracts for the erection of the new armory, boathouse, power house, and sea wall authorized at the last session of Congress have been made and the work has begun. The contract prices are as follows:

Armory and boathouse	$792,000
Power house	116,900
Sea wall	150,000

TRAINING STATIONS.

A contract has been made for the construction of new barracks and a boiler house at the naval training station at San Francisco, Cal., for $74,400; for the construction of a commandant's house at the same place for $16,000, and for the construction of officers' quarters for $9,375.

A contract for the construction of new barracks at the naval training station, Newport, R. I., has been made for the sum of $118,410.

COAL.

During the last fiscal year 281,169 tons of coal were purchased at a total cost of $1,679,510.55, as compared with 452,551 tons purchased during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1898, at a total cost of $2,122,005.28. The average price per ton during the past year exceeded by $1.29 the average of the previous year. Eighty-five thousand nine hundred and fifty-three tons, at an average cost of $5.13 per ton were purchased abroad and paid for on shipboard, and 195,216 tons, at an average cost, including transportation, of $6.34 per ton, were purchased in the United States. The increased cost of coal purchased during the fiscal year 1899 was due to the necessity of large shipments to distant points. The fleet at Manila consumes about 4,000 tons a month, and the freight charges alone from the Atlantic coast to Manila are usually from $6 to $7 per ton.

NAVAL OBSERVATORY.

During the past year 3,539 observations of the sun, moon, and planets, together with such stars as were required for special purposes, have been made with the 9.14 inch and 6-inch transit circles. The 26-inch telescope has been almost exclusively employed in spectroscopic observations, and on faint and difficult objects. Four hundred and sixty six observations have been made on stars with the prime vertical transit instrument, and 742 observations upon 214 stars have been made with the new steel altazimuth instrument.

The American Ephemeris for 1902 has been issued, and it is expected that the volume for 1903 will be issued in January or February of 1900, which will very nearly realize the original intention of issuing this publication three years in advance of its date.

HYDROGRAPHIC OFFICE.

There are 16 branch hydrographic offices at present established in the United States, which are of great service to the merchant marine. These offices are established in sea and lake ports and are in charge of naval officers, who give information upon request and distribute the pilot charts of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, which are issued monthly. They also collect a large amount of nautical information which is of great value to the Hydrographic Office in the preparation of publications.

During the past year substantial efforts have been made to provide new charts and nautical works for the coasts and waters of our new possessions in the Pacific Ocean, of the Empire of Japan, and along the routes from the Suez Canal and the Cape of Good Hope to the Philippine Islands.

It has been determined to construct a complete set of nautical charts of the world for the benefit of naval and maritime interests, and substantial progress has been made in this direction.

OCEAN AND LAKE SURVEYS.

During the past year a large amount of surveying has been done on the coast of Cuba by the *Yankton* and *Eagle*. The former has made a careful survey of the port of Santiago, and the latter of Guantanamo Bay. The work in both places has been completed and much information of importance secured.

In Guantanamo Bay more than 200 signals were built and over 25,000 soundings taken. A new deep-water channel was discovered from the lower bay to the port of Caimanera, through which vessels of 26 feet draft may pass. It was also found that there was an error in the geographical position of the bay, as established by the Spanish, of nearly 1 mile in latitude and more than a mile in longitude. The harbor of Santiago was equally as thoroughly surveyed by the *Yankton*, but as that port is much older there were not so many errors discovered in the existing charts.

An appropriation of $100,000 is at present available for surveying the coasts of the Philippine Archipelago, Cuba, and Porto Rico, and it is the intention of the Department to carry on this work as rapidly as the other demands of the service will permit.

The *Bennington* was ordered from Honolulu to the island of Guam in January last for the purpose of making a survey of the port of San Luis d'Apra, and established signal stations and did much preliminary work on the survey. It was, however, necessary later to detach her

from this duty and send her to the Philippines. The U. S. S. *Yosemite*, which was fitted out as a station ship for the island of Guam, and which arrived at San Luis d'Apra with the governor of the island on August 7, also carried a complete surveying outfit, and it is presumed that she is at present engaged in the work of surveying that port and the entire island of Guam.

The *Dolphin* sailed from Fortress Monroe on November 6, with instructions to survey the mouth of, and approaches to, the Orinoco River in Venezuela, to delineate the coast, islands, banks, and bars at the mouth of the river, and to ascertain the depth of water and rise and fall of each tide during the time the survey is going on.

TRANSPACIFIC CABLE SURVEY.

The increased importance of our possessions in the Pacific led you to recommend to the last Congress the establishment of a Pacific cable, and the Department, in furtherance of this object, has recently had a survey made of a cable route from Honolulu to the Philippine Islands, the route from San Francisco to Honolulu having been surveyed some years ago. The *Nero*, which had been used as a collier during the late war, was thoroughly fitted out and equipped for deep-sea work at the Mare Island Navy-Yard in the early part of the present year, and sailed from Honolulu on the 6th of May, via the Midway Islands and Guam, to a point on the east coast of the island of Luzon, where she arrived on August 1, having made 853 soundings. The length of the route is 4,812 knots. The reports received from the preliminary line of soundings indicate that the route will prove entirely practicable.

It is the intention of the Department to also survey a route for a cable from the island of Guam to Yokohama, Japan.

ELECTRIC PLANTS ON BOARD SHIPS.

The constant increase of the use of electricity on board ship is very clearly shown in the following table, which is submitted in the report of the Bureau of Equipment:

Name of ship.	Kilowatts.	Horsepower.	Name of ship.	Kilowatts.	Horsepower.
Indiana	72	96.5	Alabama	256	343
Massachusetts	72	96.5	Wisconsin	256	343
Oregon	72	96.5	Illinois	256	343
Iowa	96	115	Maine	328	454.5
Kearsarge	350	480	Ohio	328	454.5
Kentucky	350	480	Missouri	328	454.5

Of the ships in the above table the *Indiana*, *Massachusetts*, *Oregon*, and *Iowa* are the only ones as yet in commission. The extent to which electricity is used on board these ships is small as compared with those

of the *Kearsarge* and *Kentucky* class and all the later battle ships. There is a diversity of opinion among officers as to the extent to which electricity should be used on shipboard, but the Department hopes during the coming year, when the *Kearsarge* and *Kentucky* will be in commission, to form a better opinion as to its extended use under conditions of actual service.

The extent to which electricity is employed on these new ships has led the Department to establish a school of instruction in electricity and the care and use of electrical appliances on shipboard, at the naval torpedo station, Newport, R. I., for officers, and at the navy-yards at New York and Boston for enlisted men. It is contemplated to establish in the near future a similar school at the Mare Island Navy-Yard.

COALING STATIONS.

At the outbreak of the war with Spain, the Department found itself greatly hampered by the lack of coaling facilities both at home and abroad. As set forth in the last annual report, this was overcome, in large measure, by the employment of colliers, which kept the fleets in Cuban and Philippine waters well supplied. Our ability to do this, however, was due to the proximity of the North Atlantic fleet to our own shores and to the early destruction of the Spanish fleet in the Philippines, which left our colliers free to come and go without fear of interception by the enemy.

The necessity, however, of establishing at suitable points proper facilities for the storage and the rapid and economical handling of coal was impressed upon the Department. With this end in view, a request was made of Congress, and Congress appropriated on May 4, 1898, $250,000 "To enable the Secretary of the Navy to execute the provisions of section fifteen hundred and fifty-two of the Revised Statutes authorizing the Secretary of the Navy to establish, at such places as he may deem necessary, suitable depots of coal, and other fuel, for the supply of steamships of war." The provision of the Revised Statutes here referred to is of date August 31, 1842.

A board was appointed under orders of the Department of June 7 and 25, 1898, "For the purpose of examining into the question of and recommending the location for coaling depots at the different navy yards and stations not already provided with the same."

This board reported to the Department under date of August 16, 1898, and recommended the establishment of coal pockets and modern coaling facilities at the following places: Frenchman's Bay, Maine; Portsmouth, N. H.; Boston, Mass.; New London, Conn.; New York, N. Y.; League Island, Pa.; Washington, D. C., Norfolk Va.. and Port Royal, S. C.

Key West.—In the meantime there was pressing need for proper coaling facilities at Key West and Dry Tortugas, which, being near the scene of naval operations, had great demands made upon them to sup-

ply the fleet. A contract was made April 6, 1898, for the erection of two new steel coal houses at this point, with a storage capacity of 15,000 tons, and for one additional coal pier. These improvements, which include the necessary machinery for the economic and rapid handling of coal, are now nearing completion.

Dry Tortugas.—Steps were also taken to provide facilities at Dry Tortugas for the storage of 20,000 tons of coal, and for its economical and rapid handling. This is the only port between the capes of the Chesapeake and the Rio Grande which the deepest draft battle ships can enter at any stage of the tide, and is therefore especially valuable both as a port of refuge and for obtaining coal and water. Two steel wharves are under construction there, capable of accommodating the largest ships, and each is to have a storehouse for 10,000 tons of coal. The improvements at these points were undertaken as war measures, but they will doubtless prove of great value to the service in the future, as the vicinity in which they are located is one of increasing importance.

New London.—In accordance with the recommendations of the coal board, provision is under way at this station for the storage of 25,000 tons of coal, and the necessary machinery for its rapid handling is being installed. This station is considered important strategically, and offers a valuable harbor for torpedo boats and other small ships.

Mission Rock, San Francisco Bay.—A board was appointed in June, 1898, for the purpose of selecting a suitable site in or near San Francisco Bay for a coaling station. This board recommended the island of Mission Rock, which is located about a quarter of a mile from the water front of the city of San Francisco, as the most desirable site available. The property was in the possession of the California Dry Dock Company, which offered to sell it to the Government for the sum of $250,000. Upon an examination of the abstract of title it was reported by the Interior Department that the United States Government had never parted with its right to the island, and an executive order was issued assigning the property to the Navy Department. Thereupon the commandant of the Mare Island Navy-Yard was directed to take possession. This the company refused to permit, and the Department has brought suit in the courts of San Francisco for possession of the property.

A further appropriation of $100,000 was made at the last session of Congress for coal depots, and it is the intention of the Department to carry out the recommendations of the coal board and provide facilities for storing and handling coal at the navy-yards at Portsmouth, Boston, New York, League Island, Pensacola, and at the naval station, Port Royal S. C.

COALING FACILITIES IN OUR NEW POSSESSIONS.

At the beginning of the war with Spain Honolulu was the only foreign port in which the United States possessed coaling facilities. During the civil war coal depots were established in a number of foreign

ports throughout the world, but after the war they were abandoned, and since then little attention has been paid to this important subject.

The rules of international law permit a belligerent ship to take on board in a neutral port only sufficient coal to enable her to reach her nearest home port. If fleets are to be maintained, therefore, in time of war, it is necessary that provision should be made for furnishing adequate supplies of coal wherever hostile operations may occur, and this can only be done by establishing coal depots throughout the world and acquiring sovereign rights to the property on which they are located. Under modern conditions coal is the very life of the ship, and without it, no matter what her power or efficiency in other respects, she is utterly helpless.

The conditions existing at the outbreak of the war with Spain in this respect have been much improved in the waters of the West Indies and in the Pacific Ocean, where the Government of the United States has recently acquired extensive possessions. The Department has taken steps to provide in these new possessions such facilities as the means at its command permits for the storage of coal and for the establishment of naval stations with the necessary plants for making ordinary repairs to vessels of war.

Honolulu.—In November, 1898, an Executive proclamation was issued by the President reserving certain land at Honolulu, in the Hawaiian Islands, for naval purposes, and coal sheds have been erected there for the storage of 20,000 tons of coal. Contracts have been made for the erection of two piers and the excavation of two slips, which it is expected will be completed by March, 1900.

Pago Pago.—A contract was made on September 15, 1898, for the erection at Pago Pago, Samoa, of a steel coal wharf and house and other necessary buildings and equipment to make the station complete in every respect. The steel for these structures was shipped from the Atlantic coast in the U. S. S. *Abarenda*, which arrived at its destination on August 10, 1899. The work of erection, now in progress, will provide facilities for the storage of 5,000 tons of coal, and 2,800 tons were forwarded as cargo by the *Abarenda*. The commanding officer has reported that the harbor is one of great value and affords safe anchorage for vessels at all times.

Guam.—The island of Guam, which came into the possession of the United States as a result of the treaty of peace with Spain, is located about 3,300 knots west of Honolulu and 1,372 knots east of the Philippines. It affords a convenient stopping place for vessels traversing the Pacific, and it is the intention of the Department to establish facilities on the island for the storage of 10,000 tons of coal and for making ordinary repairs to naval vessels. The *Yosemite*, which is now stationed here, has instructions to make a complete survey of the island, and the collier *Brutus* is in the port of San Luis d'Apra for the purpose of supplying coal to ships as needed.

Manila.—At present there is no appropriate provision for storing coal at Manila. A board appointed by the commander in chief of the Asiatic Station has selected a site for a coal wharf and coal sheds, and the Department hopes to soon provide for the storage and protection of a large amount of coal there. Under the present arrangement, coal for the Asiatic fleet, upon arrival at Manila, is unloaded into barges of shallow draft, transported to the navy-yard, again unloaded, and piled. This operation is reversed when ships are coaled.

There are two other places in the Pacific where the Department has the necessary site for coaling stations—one at Yokohama, Japan, where the Department has a lease from the Japanese Government of two lots; the other in Lower California, on the Gulf of California, near the town of La Paz, where there has been a small deposit of coal on shore since 1859. Authority has recently been granted by the Mexican Government to make certain repairs to this station which are deemed necessary to render it of value.

Porto Rico.—In the Atlantic Ocean the recent acquisition of Porto Rico has given this Government a number of ports at which naval facilities might be established. The naval station at San Juan was turned over to the Navy Department in October, 1898, and by an Executive order of March 29, 1899, certain other lands there, including the entire island of Manglar, were set apart for naval purposes. The facilities for storing coal at this point, however, are very poor, as the yard is small and the water alongside shallow. It is the intention of the Department, as soon as it is determined which is the most desirable harbor in Porto Rico, to establish suitable coaling facilities on that island.

ORDNANCE.

The principal duties of the Bureau of Ordnance have been the current work of preparing the armament, ammunition, and ordnance outfits for vessels now under construction, supplying the batteries to newly acquired vessels, keeping the fleets and stations supplied with ammunition, and in adding to the reserve supply. The number of guns authorized for the main batteries of vessels has increased since the last report by 281, the total now being 1,071.

Work on gun construction, gun mounts, turret fittings, and ordnance supplies has progressed favorably, and the armament for all vessels authorized will be ready by the time it is required.

Extensive improvements have been made at the Naval Gun Factory and its facilities considerably increased. It is essential, however, that it be still further extended; and the purchase of more land, and the erection of additional shops, is desirable.

Owing to the number of vessels added to the Navy by purchase and capture, and which it has been necessary to supply with batteries, the number of reserve guns available for auxiliary cruisers has been greatly

reduced. An item of $250,000, therefore, has been included in the estimates for the manufacture of an additional supply.

The general performance of guns, mounts, and munitions of war throughout the naval service has been excellent.

GUNS.

During the past year 63 guns for the main batteries of vessels have been completed at the Naval Gun Factory, namely, four 13-inch, four 8-inch, eighteen 6-inch, twenty-two 5-inch and fifteen 4-inch; and seventeen others have been assembled and are well advanced, viz: One 13-inch, four 8-inch, eight 6-inch, and four 5-inch. Twenty-eight guns of ordinary type have been converted to rapid-firing guns, viz: Twenty-five 6-inch and three 4-inch.

Forgings have been ordered, and are in part delivered, for twenty 12-inch, fifty-one 6-inch, sixty-one 5-inch, and forty-two 4-inch guns of new design, with enlarged powder chambers and greater length, and capable of developing much greater energy than the guns now in service.

New and improved mounts have been designed, affording greater facility of manipulation.

The first of the new 4-inch guns has been completed and tested, exhibiting excellent ballistic properties, and developing 78 per cent greater muzzle energy than the present 4-inch gun. The first of the new 6-inch guns has also been completed and tested with very satisfactory results, a muzzle velocity of 2,950 foot-seconds having been obtained considerably within the limit of pressure allowed. The first of the new 12-inch guns, with its mount, is well advanced. It is confidently expected that a great increase in energy over guns of the same caliber now in service will be obtained by all the new type guns.

Two 8-inch guns of nickel steel have been assembled and are well advanced. One of these is fitted with a very quick-working breech mechanism of novel design.

A new type of breech plug, designated as the "Welin-screw," has been adopted for all the new guns above 4 inches in caliber. Its peculiar feature is that it has a proportionally larger threaded area than the old type of plug, admitting of the use of a relatively shorter, and therefore lighter, plug than was heretofore used—a matter of considerable importance in heavy guns.

The development of the 12-inch gun has been so great that it has been designated as the heaviest gun for the latest battle ships, rather than the 13-inch gun installed on previous vessels.

A new type of gun, a 14-pounder of 50 calibers, has been designed and manufactured, and will probably form a prominent feature in the secondary battery of new vessels.

During the year batteries and ordnance outfits have been supplied to a number of vessels, including the three former Spanish gunboats *Isla de Luzon*, *Isla de Cuba*, and *Don Juan de Austria*.

POWDER.

Immediately after the close of the war with Spain the purchase of brown powder was discontinued and the manufacturers were directed to turn their attention exclusively to the manufacture of smokeless powder, so far as their orders for the Navy were concerned. They have made commendable progress, and are turning out a satisfactory product in considerable quantities. It is proposed to supply all new ships with smokeless powder, and the powder for the *Kearsarge*, *Kentucky*, and *Alabama* is now ready for them. The older vessels will also be supplied as rapidly as possible.

The Government powder factory at Indian Head is progressing favorably and will be completed in a few months. Unavoidable delays in obtaining materials have retarded its progress to some extent and it is preferable to do good rather than hasty work. It is neither expected nor desired to enter into competition at these works with private manufacturers, except as to quality, it being the policy of the Department to foster the commercial industry, upon which the country must largely draw its supply.

NAVAL MAGAZINES.

Improvements of important character have been made to the naval magazine at Fort Mifflin, near Philadelphia, and to that at St. Juliens Creek, near Norfolk.

The magazines and shell houses at Chelsea, Mass., have been thoroughly repaired, but owing to the growth of the city and the erection of large commercial establishments in the immediate vicinity, it has been deemed inexpedient to store large quantities of powder at this point. Recommendation is therefore made that a new site outside the city limits be secured for the erection of a magazine where powder can be stored without danger to neighboring interests.

Substantial improvements have been made at Fort Lafayette, in New York Harbor, and at the naval powder station, Lake Denmark, New Jersey, and the further upbuilding of these is intended.

The Department has been as yet unable to obtain a suitable magazine site near New York, for which Congress appropriated funds at its last session. A number of sites have been under consideration, but where the necessary requirements were fulfilled so much opposition was developed among the property holders of the neighborhood that it was deemed inexpedient to proceed. The Department is, however, endeavoring to find a suitable location, and at the same time one sufficiently isolated as not to jeopardize neighboring interests.

UNIFORM CALIBER FOR SMALL ARMS AND MACHINE GUNS.

Steps were taken in December last, by the appointment of a joint board of army, navy, and marine officers to secure the adoption of a uniform caliber for small arms and machine guns, and of a standard

and uniform small-arm cartridge for the use of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. This board, after very careful consideration of all the interests involved, recommended the adoption of caliber .30, which is now used by the Army; and in furtherance of this recommendation, which is believed to be in the general interests of the services involved, the Department, in securing additional small arms and machine guns for the Navy and Marine Corps, will specify those of caliber .30, and to use the same cartridge as the Army.

STEAM ENGINEERING.

As the war fleet returned to the navy-yards, repairs to the machinery plants were promptly taken in hand, and, while there proved a comparatively small amount of work to be done, when the trying conditions to which the machinery plants had been subjected are considered, the retention of a large number of auxiliary vessels made greater demands upon the appropriations than was expected when the estimates for 1899–1900 were submitted, and it has therefore been necessary to discontinue much of the work in progress at the navy-yards under this Bureau.

The Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering has, therefore, recommended that $1,500,000 of the balance to the credit of the Bureau, and now unavailable, be reappropriated and made available for the current work, and in this recommendation the Department concurs.

INSPECTION OF MATERIAL.

The inspection of steel for our modern vessels of war is a work of great importance, and is performed under the bureaus of Construction and Repair and Steam Engineering. Permanent inspection headquarters are established at a number of works throughout the country, in charge of commissioned officers, who are assisted by civilian inspectors. During the past year they have inspected, tested, and shipped 36,210,675 pounds of material under the Bureau of Construction and Repair and 10,587,175 pounds of material under the Bureau of Steam Engineering.

A comparison of the specifications for the *Maine* and *Texas*, issued in 1888 and 1889, respectively, with the requirements for the same class of material for the ships authorized May 4, 1898, shows the great improvements made in the manufacture of steel. In the case of the *Maine* and *Texas*, the specifications for shafting required a tensile strength varying from 56,000 to 70,000 pounds per square inch, with an elongation of 16 to 20 per cent in 2 inches, both depending on where the test piece was taken. The specifications for the new vessels require for these forgings a tensile strength of at least 95,000 pounds per square inch and an elastic limit of 65,000 pounds per square inch, with an elongation of 21 per cent in 2 inches. This result is largely due to the efficient system of Government inspection at the works of the manufacturers.

REFRIGERATOR SHIPS.

The employment of refrigerator ships for supplying the fleet at Manila has proven most satisfactory. The *Glacier*, *Celtic*, and *Culgoa*, now performing this service, have, in addition to supplying the navy, been also transporting large quantities of provisions for the army.

HEALTH.

The annual report of the Surgeon-General of the Navy shows that the health of the Navy for the year has been excellent. In the Philippine Islands, where it has been necessary to maintain a large naval force, every precaution was taken to prevent the bad effects likely to result from the climatic conditions, and as a result a high standard of physical efficiency has been maintained in the vessels in those waters. A naval hospital was established at Cavite, Manila, in a suitable building, and was thoroughly equipped. Suitable provision has also been made for the care of our sick at the naval stations at Havana, Cuba, and San Juan, Porto Rico, where small buildings have been procured for hospital purposes and properly fitted up for the reception of patients. Provision has also been made for establishing a small hospital at Guam, Ladrone Islands, and medical supplies were sent out on the U. S. S. *Yosemite*.

The Naval Hospital Corps authorized at the last session of Congress has been organized, and all naval hospitals are now supplied with trained nurses, and hospital apprentices are trained in the naval hospitals before they are sent to sea.

MARINE CORPS.

By the act of March 3, 1899, known as the naval personnel act, the strength of the Marine Corps was increased to 211 officers and 6,000 enlisted men, exclusive of the Marine Band. The head of the corps was given the rank of brigadier general, the number of officers in each grade was increased, and provision made for filling the higher grades by promotion and the lower ones by appointment — first, from graduates of the Naval Academy in the manner now provided by law; second, from those who served as second lieutenants in the Marine Corps during the war with Spain; third, from noncommissioned officers of the Marine Corps; and fourth, from civil life.

Of the 43 volunteer officers who served during the war with Spain 30 have been commissioned as first lieutenants. Of the noncommissioned officers who were examined one has been commissioned and others are now under examination. A number of applicants from civil life have also been examined. Fifteen of these were commissioned as first lieutenants, bringing this grade up to 45, the number authorized by the act to be appointed prior to January 1, 1900. As the result of later examinations 18 second lieutenants have been appointed, and examinations are now in progress for filling the remaining vacancies.

At the request of Admiral Dewey, made in March last, a battalion of marines, consisting of 15 officers and 260 enlisted men, was sent to Manila to garrison the naval station at Cavite. This battalion sailed from San Francisco on April 20, on the Army transport *Newport*, and arrived at Manila on May 23.

Rear-Admiral Watson, who succeeded Captain Barker as commander in chief of the Asiatic station, made a further request for marines in July, and a second battalion, consisting of 16 officers and 362 men, sailed from San Francisco on the transport *City of Sydney* on August 18, and landed at Manila on September 21.

A battalion of marines sailed from New York on April 22, 1899, on the U. S. S. *Yosemite* for the island of Guam to garrison the naval station there.

NAVAL MILITIA.

The naval appropriation act approved May 4, 1898, appropriated $60,000 for arming and equipping the Naval Militia. Four thousand dollars of this sum was set apart for the purchase of the necessary books of instruction, to be distributed from time to time among the various State organizations, and the remaining $56,000 was allotted to the various States having Naval Militia organizations, in accordance with the number of properly uniformed petty officers and enlisted men certified by the respective governors on January 1, 1899, as forming a part of the naval force of the State, as follows:

California	$4,336.40
Connecticut	1,661.70
District of Columbia	1,715.01
Florida	2,354.81
Georgia	1,563.95
Illinois	6,886.70
Louisiana	3,003.49
Maryland	1,777.22
Massachusetts	5,456.04
Michigan	1,715.01
New Jersey	3,119.01
New York	8,281.81
North Carolina	2,328.15
Ohio	2,932.40
Oregon	1,181.35
Pennsylvania	1,786.10
Rhode Island	1,711.67
South Carolina	2,310.38
Virginia	1,848.30
Total	56,000.00

The Department has, during the past year, given to the Naval Militia organizations of the various States a tour of duty on board ship, and the drill and instruction thus afforded was made to conform as nearly as possible to that which obtains on board a modern man-of-war.

For the duty referred to three vessels were assigned, the U. S. S. *Prairie*, on the Atlantic coast, the U. S. S. *Michigan*, on the Great Lakes, and the U. S. S. *Badger*, on the Pacific coast.

The itineraries arranged for these vessels were carried out as proposed for all of the States having Naval Militia organizations except South Carolina, the legislature of which failed to provide subsistence and uniform for its men, and Florida and Louisiana, in which two States the local health conditions prevented the proposed visits of the *Prairie*.

Detailed accounts of the three cruises in question will be found in the report upon the operations of the Naval Militia, which has been embodied in the report of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy.

The following table shows the number of officers, petty officers, and enlisted men certified to by the governors of the various States on January 1, 1899, and also the number of officers, petty officers, and enlisted men from the same States who took advantage of the Department's offer of a cruise:

States.	Number certified Jan. 1, 1899.		Number who actually took the cruise of drill and instruction.	
	Officers.	Petty officers and enlisted men.	Officers.	Petty officers and enlisted men.
California	35	488	24	250
Connecticut	17	187	17	153
District of Columbia	14	193	10	152
Georgia	16	176	4	44
Illinois	52	775	51	375
Maryland	15	200	16	192
Massachusetts	48	614	29	457
Michigan	19	193	18	158
New Jersey	30	351	16	134
New York	59	932	14	296
North Carolina	28	262	9	59
Ohio	22	330	7	161
Oregon	13	133	11	103
Pennsylvania	18	201	9	105
Rhode Island	18	196	8	79
Virginia	18	208	1	15
Total	422	5,439	224	2,733

Although, as will be seen by the preceding table, there were in the several naval militia organizations on January 1, 1899, 422 commissioned officers and 5,439 petty officers and enlisted men, only 224 commissioned officers and 2,733 petty officers and enlisted men availed themselves of the opportunity for a cruise of instruction and drill. In view of this fact, and to afford further encouragement to the more zealous and enthusiastic organizations, it is the plan of the Department that, beginning with the appropriation for the fiscal year ending

June 30, 1900, future appropriations will be allotted in accordance with the number of petty officers and enlisted men who actually participate in the annual tour of duty.

The following table shows the vessels loaned to and now in the possession of certain of the States having naval militia organizations:

Vessel.	State to which loaned.	Date of transfer.
Aileen	New York	May 18, 1899
Dale	Maryland	Jan. 3, 1895
Elfrida	Connecticut	Apr. 29, 1899
Fern	District of Columbia	Oct. 22, 1898
Hornet	North Carolina	Dec. 24, 1898
Huntress	New Jersey	Jan. 16, 1899
Inca	Massachusetts	May 27, 1899
Marion	California	Jan. 20, 1898
Minnesota	Massachusetts	Oct. 22, 1895
New Hampshire	New York	Nov. 13, 1894
Pinta	California	Mar. 2, 1898
Portsmouth	New Jersey	June 29, 1895
St. Louis	Pennsylvania	Dec. 6, 1894
Shearwater	do	Dec. 31, 1898
Stranger	Louisiana	Dec. 26, 1898
Siren	Virginia	June 22, 1899
Sylvia	Maryland	Dec. 19, 1898
Yantic	Michigan	Nov. 3, 1897

BOUNTY AND PRIZE MONEY.

The examination and adjudication of claims for bounty and for prize money, resulting from the war with Spain, have gone steadily forward. The methods of procedure in the two cases are entirely distinct and have been stated by the Judge-Advocate General as follows:

Prize money is realized from the condemnation and sale under the supervision and authority of a United States court of captured vessels or other property; such property must be taken into court or its absence accounted for, and when the proceedings are concluded the net amount to be distributed is deposited with an assistant treasurer of the United States for use in the settlement of claims allowed by the Auditor in pursuance of decrees of court. In the case of claims for bounty (section 4635 of the Revised Statutes) for the destruction of vessels of the enemy, however, no property exists from which a fund for the payment of such claims can be realized, and no method of procedure is explicitly prescribed by statute.

In order to settle claims for bounty it is necessary that certain facts be first ascertained and established, among which are, on the one hand, the names, number, and character of the vessels destroyed, their complement, armament, and aggregate force as compared with that of the victors, and perhaps also the degree of cooperation extended to them by shore batteries, torpedoes, and mines; and with respect to the capturing vessels it is necessary to determine their identity and national character, their number, their offensive and defensive equipment, and the names and rates of pay of their officers and men. In certain cases these questions, or some of them, are obviously simple; in others, their ascertainment must depend either upon the interpretation to be placed on the law or upon the settlement of controverted questions of fact involving the elaborate examination of evidence adduced by parties interested in support of their respective claims.

It has therefore been deemed advisable that all bounty claims be adjudicated in order that all the facts may be properly ascertained, and the Department, after consultation with the Attorney-General, has referred the following claims for bounty to the Court of Claims for their determination:

Character of claim.	Claimants, etc.
Manila Bay, May 1, 1898	Olympia, Baltimore, Raleigh, Boston, Concord, Petrel, McCulloch. Individual claim of Pay Inspector Bellows. Report of Admiral Dewey, U. S. N., that in his judgment enemy's force was superior to United States force.
Santiago, July 3, 1898, destruction of Spanish fleet	U. S. S. Oregon, Brooklyn, Indiana, Iowa, Gloucester, New York, Texas, Vixen, Hist, Suwanee, Manning, Ericsson, and Resolute. Individual claim of Takematsu Kameya, cabin steward on board of Oregon; Passed Assistant Engineer Robert S. Talbot, U. S. N.; Lieut. A. H. Davis, U. S. N., and letter of Commander J. G. Eaton, U. S. N., relative to claim of Resolute.
Reina Mercedes, sinking of	U. S. S. New York, Indiana, Massachusetts, Oregon, Texas, Vesuvius, and Suwanee.
Santiago, Cuba, surrender of, July 16, 1898	U. S. S. Yale.
Santiago and eastern province of Cuba, vessels taken by terms of capitulation of.	U. S. S. Texas.
Terror, Spanish torpedo-boat destroyer, destruction of, off San Juan, June 22, 1898.	U. S. S. St. Paul. Report of Capt. W. M. Folger, U. S. N.
Antonio Lopez, destruction of, off San Juan, Porto Rico, June 28, 1898.	U. S. S. Yosemite.
Niquero and Manzanillo, June 30, 1898, destruction of Spanish gunboats and other vessels in battle of.	U. S. S. Hist.
Manzanillo, Cuba, July 18, 1898, destruction of Spanish gunboats and other vessels in harbor of.	U. S. S. Wilmington, Wompatuck, Hornet, Hist, Osceola, and Helena.
Don Jorge Juan, sinking of, Nipe Bay, Cuba, July 21, 1898.	U. S. S. Wasp, Annapolis, and Leyden. Letter of Lieutenant Ward relative to claim of Wasp.

All claims for prize money, where the Department has been informed of the condemnation of the captured vessels, and when found to be in proper form, have been referred to the Auditor for the Navy Department for examination and payment in accordance with the decree of the court of adjudication. Such action has been taken in the following cases:

Adula ..... U. S. S. Rodgers, Manning, Resolute, Marblehead, Annapolis, Ericsson, Vixen, and Porter.
Ampala ..... U. S. S. Vicksburg, Newport, Wilmington, and Marietta.
Antonio y Paca ..... U. S. S. Newport.
Argonauta ..... U. S. S. Nashville, Marblehead, and Eagle.
Antonio Suarez ..... U. S. S. Uncas.
Auquedita ..... U. S. S. Mangrove.

Ambrosio Bolivar	U. S. S. Terror, Foote, and Machias.
Buena Ventura	U. S. S. Indiana, Cincinnati, New York, Nashville, Iowa, Newport, Machias, Foote, Dupont, Wilmington, and Porter.
Belle Ynez	U. S. S. Hudson, Pompey, and Uncas.
Benito Estenger	U. S. S. Hornet.
Candita	U. S. S. Wilmington, Porter, and Cushing.
Cristina	U. S. S. Hudson.
Domingo Aurelia	U. S. S. Maple and Topeka.
Engracia	U. S. S. Newport.
Espana	U. S. S. Newport and revenue cutter Morrill.
Emanuel Raoul	U. S. S. Hornet.
Expresso de Gibara	U. S. S. Nashville.
Frasquita	U. S. S. Montgomery and Indiana.
Fernandito	U. S. S. Vicksburg.
Guido	U. S. S. Terror, Machias, and Foote.
Gibara	U. S. S. Nashville.
Gallito	U. S. S. Eagle.
Lorenzo	U. S. S. Detroit, Terror, New York, Niagara, Montgomery, and Porter.
Lola	U. S. S. Dolphin.
Matilda	U. S. S. Porter.
Maria Dolores	U. S. S. Eagle.
Mascotta	U. S. S. Foote, Machias, Terror, and Leyden.
Newfoundland	U. S. S. Mayflower.
Oriente	U. S. S. Vicksburg, Tecumseh, and Mangrove.
Panama	U. S. S. Indiana, New York, Mangrove, and Wilmington.
Pedro	U. S. S. New York.
Paquita	U. S. S. Newport.
Pinero	U. S. S. Newport.
Poder de Dios	U. S. S. Newport.
Quatro de September	U. S. S. Helena.
Rosas, Carlos F	U. S. S. Terror and New York.
Restormel	U. S. S. St. Paul.
Santiago Apostol	U. S. S. Mayflower and Annapolis.
Sofia	U. S. S. Cushing, Wilmington, and Porter.
Severita	U. S. S. Mayflower and Newport.
Spanish schooner (name unknown—probably Santiago Apostol).	Captured by Mayflower, May 8, 1898; U. S. S. Vicksburg.
Spanish schooner (name unknown—probably Severito).	Captured by Newport, May 9, 1898; U. S. S. Vicksburg.
Tres Hermanas	U. S. S. Terror, Machias, and Foote.
Twickenham	U. S. S. St. Louis.

PUBLIC WORKS.

DRY DOCKS.

A contract was made on April 10 for the construction of the steel floating dock, authorized by the act of March 4, 1898, to be erected at Algiers, La., for the sum of $810,000. The dock is under construction, and it is expected that it will be ready for use in November, 1900.

For the four graving dry docks at Portsmouth, Boston, Mare Island, and League Island, appropriated for by the same act, as modified by

the act of March 3, 1899, contracts have been made, the first two, under the authority of the act, to be of granite or concrete lined with granite.

The contract for the dry dock at Boston was made March 14, 1899, after public competition and upon plans and specifications prepared by the Bureau of Yards and Docks, for the sum of $883,400. The contract for machinery was let for the sum of $130,000, making the total contract price $1,013,400. Favorable progress has been made, and at the present time it is expected that the dock will be completed within the time limit of two and one-half years.

The dry dock at Portsmouth, N. H., was contracted for October 2, 1899, for the sum of $1,089,000, upon plans and specifications substantially similar to those for the Boston dry dock, and should be completed June 5, 1902.

The dry docks for the Mare Island Navy-Yard and for the League Island Navy-Yard, which are to be of timber, were also advertised for bids upon plans and specifications prepared by the Bureau of Yards and Docks, and contracts have been awarded for the entire work at $729,000 for the former and at $782,600 for the latter.

These docks are of a capacity to receive the largest vessels of the service or those likely to be employed as auxiliary cruisers in time of war. The principal dimensions are—

	Feet.
Length	750
Width on the floor	80
Draft at mean high water	30

In contracting for these docks the Department has followed the requirements of Congress as to materials, but the experience of the Department in contracting for the masonry docks has shown that they can be built of the most substantial character, with the best equipment and within a reasonable period of time, at a cost very little in excess of the wooden structures. Coupled with this record of moderate cost for permanent and safe docks of the largest size is the unfortunate experience the Department has had with practically all the timber dry docks it has constructed. In those cases in which there has been no alarming accident or failure the cost of repairs and renewals has been very great. In view of these facts the Department strongly recommends that authority be given to modify the contracts for the timber docks and to build them of concrete and stone.

NAVY-YARDS.

In order that the property accounts kept in the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts might be so adjusted as to more accurately represent the present value of the real estate, chattels, and machinery plants of the several navy-yards and stations, the Department, under date of April 22, 1899, ordered a reappraisement of all property belonging to the naval establishment.

The result is shown in the following table:

Statement showing the value of real estate and chattels and machinery plant at the several yards and stations June 30, 1899, as per appraisal under Department's circular No. 94.

Navy-yards and stations.	Real estate and chattels.	Machinery plant.
Navy-yard, Portsmouth, N. H	$2,684,627.32	$243,063.00
Navy-yard Boston, Mass	12,295,181.10	539,180.28
Naval War College, Newport, R. I	100,422.00	
Naval training station, Newport, R. I	313,005.60	7,315.00
Naval torpedo station, Newport, R. I	239,576.38	45,060.90
Naval station, New London, Conn	131,146.52	900.00
Navy-yard, New York, N. Y	19,165,023.79	543,277.68
Navy-yard, League Island, Pa	2,523,566.27	126,349.60
Naval Home, Philadelphia, Pa	901,944.45	
Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md	569,208.40	21,432.50
Naval Observatory, Washington, D. C	869,948.77	
Navy-yard, Washington, D. C	4,375,091.61	1,746,562.57
Marine headquarters, Washington, D. C	220,203.50	
Navy-yard, Norfolk, Va	5,649,554.37	560,544.70
Naval proving ground, Md	272,064.00	5,500.00
Naval station, Port Royal, S. C	906,630.75	55,226.63
Naval station, Key West, Fla	497,837.31	37,474.48
Navy-yard, Pensacola, Fla	1,710,821.00	51,754.00
Navy-yard, Mare Island, Cal	4,127,611.48	435,420.00
Naval training station, Cal	578,023.50	
Naval station, Puget Sound, Wash	798,550.55	
Naval station, San Juan, P. R	193,143.83	6,000.00
Naval station, Honolulu, H. I	595,762.32	
Total	59,719,004.82	4,425,061.34

From this table it will be seen that the total value of the real estate and chattels and machinery plants at the navy-yards and stations on June 30, 1899, was $64,144,066.16. The largest investment is represented at the New York and Boston yards, where the value of the real estate and chattels reaches a total of $19,165,000 and $12,295,000, respectively.

The cost of maintenance of these yards and stations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899, was $7,136,438.36, distributed in the following manner:

Statement showing expenditures for maintenance at the several navy-yards and stations during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899.

	Maintenance.		
	Pay of officers, etc.	Labor, material, etc.	Total.
Navy-yard, Portsmouth, N. H	$57,290.14	$198,482.63	$255,772.77
Navy-yard, Boston, Mass	87,806.70	578,520.59	666,327.29
Naval station, Newport, R. I	80,407.60	151,894.93	232,302.53
Naval station, New London, Conn	5,513.02	9,596.89	15,109.91
Navy-yard, New York, N. Y	182,551.14	1,517,188.35	1,699,739.49
Sacketts Harbor, N. Y		419.35	419.35

Statement showing expenditures for maintenance at the several navy-yards and stations during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899—Continued.

	Maintenance.		
	Pay of officers, etc.	Labor, material, etc.	Total.
Erie, Pa	$625.00		$625.00
Navy-yard, League Island, Pa	72,766.90	$485,388.38	558,155.28
Naval Home, Philadelphia, Pa	28,084.32	91,573.31	119,657.63
Navy pay office, Baltimore, Md	5,370.42	276.78	5,647.20
Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md	234,970.11	250,657.39	485,627.50
Naval Observatory, Washington, D. C	19,999.64	4,805.80	24,805.44
Navy-yard, Washington, D. C	158,660.79	462,690.55	621,351.34
Naval Dispensary and Museum of Hygiene, Washington, D. C	6,034.50	10,978.60	17,013.10
Hydrographic Office, Washington, and branches	24,140.83	10,292.13	34,432.96
Naval proving ground, Indian Head, Md	8,903.41	36,183.96	45,087.37
Navy-yard, Norfolk, Va	91,962.85	749,765.01	841,727.86
Naval station, Port Royal, S. C	35,107.07	196,352.36	231,459.43
Naval station, Key West, Fla	49,424.75	319,783.15	369,207.90
Navy-yard, Pensacola, Fla	31,778.76	137,554.97	169,333.73
Navy-yard, Mare Island, Cal	82,903.96	648,366.07	731,270.03
Naval training station, San Francisco, Cal	2,154.79	699.63	2,854.42
Coaling station, Honolulu	499.45		499.45
Naval station, Havana, Cuba	10,454.67	32,859.90	43,314.57
Naval station, San Juan, P. R	28,732.60	14,633.09	43,365.69
Naval station, Cavite, P. I	119,668.05		119,668.05
Coaling station, Pichilinque	150.00		150.00
Naval hospital, Yokohama	16,781.27		16,781.27
Naval station, Guam	9,550.00		9,550.00
Coaling station, Pago Pago			
Naval station, Puget Sound, Wash	21,403.59	53,778.21	75,181.80
Total	1,473,696.33	5,962,742.03	7,436,438.36

During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899, improvements were made to the real estate and chattels at these yards at a total expenditure of $1,935,594.11, and to the machinery plants at a total cost of $1,196,703.76. The cost of these improvements at each yard is shown in the following table:

Statement showing expenditures for improvements at the several navy-yards and stations during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899.

	Real estate and chattels (improvements).	Machinery plant (new machinery).
Navy-yard, Portsmouth, N. H	$15,655.72	$23,787.45
Navy-yard, Boston, Mass	34,904.65	117,022.83
Naval station, Newport, R. I	27,689.77	3,231.48
Naval station, New London, Conn	36,962.76	
Navy-yard, New York, N. Y	273,690.65	323,016.98
Sacketts Harbor, N. Y		
Erie, Pa		
Navy-yard, League Island, Pa	97,613.21	5,747.78
Naval Home, Philadelphia, Pa		

Statement showing expenditures for improvements at the several navy-yards and stations during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899.

	Real estate and chattels (improvements).	Machinery plant (new machinery).
Navy pay office, Baltimore, Md		
Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md	$139,719.59	
Naval Observatory, Washington, D. C	5,264.68	
Navy-yard, Washington, D. C	140,189.75	$447,434.95
Naval Dispensary and Museum of Hygiene, Washington, D. C		
Hydrographic Office, Washington, and branches		
Naval proving ground, Indian Head, Md	139,665.45	10,551.85
Navy-yard, Norfolk, Va	89,751.79	112,783.00
Naval station, Port Royal, S. C	95,911.80	28,666.64
Naval station, Key West, Fla	460,143.24	23,738.21
Navy-yard, Pensacola, Fla	110,133.71	
Navy-yard, Mare Island, Cal	146,111.13	84,813.91
Naval training station, San Francisco, Cal	16,223.16	
Coaling station, Honolulu		
Naval station, Havana, Cuba		
Naval station, San Juan, P. R		
Naval station, Cavite, P. I		
Coaling station, Pichilinque		
Naval hospital, Yokohama		
Naval station, Guam		
Coaling station, Pago Pago	50,757.62	
Naval station, Puget Sound, Wash	46,205.63	15,908.68
Total	1,935,594.11	1,196,703.76

The total expenditures for maintenance and improvements at the several yards and stations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899, amounted to $10,568,736.23.

The operations of the various bureaus at the yards during the war show that in very many respects the public works were not adequately equipped for the prompt and proper conduct of the work of repairing and fitting out vessels of war. Even in such navy-yards as New York, Norfolk, and Mare Island, the best equipped in the country, many deficiencies were found to exist. This was the experience of every bureau, and the importance of modernizing the navy-yard plants, erecting new storehouses and shops, providing adequate docking facilities, and thereby enabling the yards to meet the greatly increased requirements of the Navy was strongly impressed upon the Department.

In the estimates for 1899, therefore, Congress was requested to make liberal appropriations for this purpose, and it appropriated $4,910,812.50 for public works under the Bureau of Yards and Docks, and $500,000 for buildings at the Naval Academy. Much has been done during the past year under these appropriations toward the rehabilitation of the yards and plants. Further liberal appropriations were made at the last session of Congress for the continuing of this work, the total amount at the disposal of the Department for the current fiscal year being

$5,840,786.50 for public works under the Bureau of Yards and Docks; $720,000 for the Naval Academy improvements; $100,000 for coal depots; $250,000 for improvement of construction plants; $855,000 for improvement of engineering plants, and $10,000 for the Naval Observatory.

It is only possible within the limits of this report to give a general idea of the work in progress and completed during the past fiscal year, the work provided for under the current appropriations, and that for which estimates are submitted for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1901.

Portsmouth.—At the Portsmouth Navy-Yard little work was performed for many years owing to the policy formerly pursued by the Department of concentrating all the construction and repair work on the Atlantic coast at the New York and Norfolk yards. The demands upon these yards, due to the increase of the Navy and incident to the Spanish war, made it advisable to recently open the Portsmouth and Boston yards for repair work. In pursuance of this a number of vessels were sent to Portsmouth for extensive repairs during the past year, and important improvements are now in progress, which include a sawmill, foundry, and a plate-angle smith and beam shed for construction and repair; an electric-light plant and building; two officers' quarters; and coal storage and coal-handling plant.

Other improvements of importance are requested in the present estimates, and include remodeling and extending the steam engineering plant; a modern machine shop for the Bureau of Equipment; extensions to the sewer and water systems; office buildings for construction and repair, yards and docks, and steam engineering; quay walls for wharfing facilities; and grading in the vicinity of the dry dock. The construction of a stone and concrete dock of the first class at this yard, which is at present under way, will doubtless be followed by a large increase in repair work.

Boston.—The Boston Navy-Yard, like that at Portsmouth, had been entirely closed as a repair yard until the past year, and has fallen behind the requirements of a first class navy yard in many respects. The new conditions of the service have not been met by new buildings or the remodeling of the old ones, and the Bureaus of Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, and Equipment, need large outlays at this yard if they are to conduct work upon vessels upon a large scale and with dispatch.

The ropewalk at this yard has been much improved during the past year by the introduction of new and modern machinery, and improvements have also been made in the anchor plant and rolling mill. An electrical construction and repair shop has been established under the Bureau of Equipment which will considerably decrease the cost of manufacturing equipment supplies, which has been, until the past year, the principal work carried on at this yard. The improvements now in progress include the construction of new piers and the extension of

the old ones; repairs to the drainage system; an extensive coal-storage and coal-handling plant, and an electric-light plant. A contract has been made in accordance with the act of February 3, 1899, for the construction of a slip or dock partly upon land of the navy-yard and partly upon land of the Fitchburg Railroad Company.

The estimates for the fiscal year 1901 contemplate further improvements at this yard, which, from the fact that it is situated at a great commercial center, where the supply of skilled labor is practically unlimited, the Department believes should be rehabilitated and put in a thoroughly efficient condition. Appropriations are asked for a new ship fitters' shop; a smithery, a foundry, and a sawmill for construction and repair; new piers and wharves; refitting and improving machine shop No. 1; extensions to equipment shops, and the chain and anchor storage shed; a yards and docks building, and other minor items. The construction of a large stone and concrete dock of the first class at this yard, which is now in progress, emphasizes the importance of these improvements.

Brooklyn, N. Y.—This is the most important of all the yards and should always be kept in a condition of the highest efficiency in order that the very extensive work which is constantly under way here may be performed at a minimum of cost.

During the past year the improvements in progress have included repairs to dry dock No. 2, which contemplate renewing the structure largely in concrete and stone; the installation of a new 100-ton crane, extensive additions to the electric-light system; the construction of a quay wall from dry dock No. 1 to the Bishop derrick, and a quay wall at the coal dock; the reconstruction and extension of the railroad system; the erection of a new oil and varnish storehouse, and a number of minor items in the way of grading, dredging, etc.

At the last session of Congress $987,062 was appropriated under the head of public works, Bureau of Yards and Docks, for carrying on the work of rehabilitating this yard, which includes removing crib work, etc., Whitney Basin; extending quay wall, cob dock; extending steam engineering shop No. 28 and building No. 33; an administration building and coppersmith shop for steam engineering; extending the yard sewers, railroad system, and electric plant; two officers' quarters; reconstructing and enlarging building No. 22; a coal-storage and coal-handling plant; and $375,000 to restore the steam-engineering building destroyed by the fire of February 15, 1899. Congress also promptly appropriated $750,000, which was made immediately available, for the new machinery plant for the Bureau of Steam Engineering, and the work is now in progress. When completed this shop, it is believed, will be one of the most complete and efficient in the world.

The estimates for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1901, include $300,000 for the completion of repairs to dry dock No. 2, and the same amount to begin the construction of a new granite and concrete dry dock, to

cost $1,000,000. Appropriations are also asked for reconstructing building No. 21; to continue paving and grading; to complete quay wall, Whitney Basin; to extend electric light and power plant; for a pumping plant for dry dock No. 3; a storehouse for naval supply fund stores; and for a bascule bridge over the Wallabout Channel.

League Island.—The principal work in progress at this yard during the past year was the extension of the reserve basin, the New York Dredging Company having completed its contract, which provided for a depth of 30 feet at mean low water, for a width of 300 feet, and a total length of 2,000 feet. Further work on the reserve basin has been in progress under a contract with the Bowers Hydraulic Dredging Company. Under a special appropriation, $64,000 was made available for the construction of a new coping for the timber dry dock at this yard, and the work is in progress. Other improvements include a workshop and boiler house for ordnance, and mooring cribs for vessels in reserve basin.

The last Congress authorized a large number of improvements at this yard, which include the dredging and filling in of the Delaware water front; continuing work on the reserve basin, and the erection of a retaining wall; extending the sea wall west of the new dry dock; the erection of a plate-bending shop for the Bureau of Construction and Repair; a new commandant's office; four officers' quarters; a fireproof storehouse; locomotive crane about dry dock; storehouse for ships' equipment; a coal storage and coal-handling plant; and a number of other matters, such as the extension of the drainage system, railroad tracks about the yard, new roads and walks, etc.

The estimates presented for the year 1901 include a continuation of the work upon the fresh-water receiving basin and the retaining wall and the construction of a number of buildings and shops for the Bureaus of Construction and Repair, Supplies and Accounts, Steam Engineering, Ordnance, and Equipment, which contemplate supplying facilities not heretofore possessed, or provided in temporary sheds at great disadvantage.

The utilization of the receiving basin for laying up vessels and the improvements in progress and projected in the navigation of the Delaware River will be followed by increased demands upon this yard, and the construction of the large new dock will also greatly increase its importance. The Department hopes that the necessary appropriations will be made to put this yard in efficient condition.

Washington, D. C.—The principal expenditures for improvements at this yard during the past year were for a new storehouse for guns, a new roof for the south gun shop, and an increase of the electric-light plant.

Important additions and improvements were made to the Naval Gun Factory, including the complete equipment of a new machine shop with modern tools for performing miscellaneous work, additional electrical

cranes for the gun-carriage, forge, and erecting shops, and a number of large machines for the latter. New machinery has been installed in the new breech-mechanism shop, additional boiler power has been supplied, and the steam-power plant centralized.

A complete plant for making brass cartridge cases of all sizes for rapid-firing guns has been installed and is ready for operation, and the capacity and output of the forge shop has been largely increased by the introduction of a system of fuel gas in place of coal.

Appropriations are at present available for a new steel roof and repairs to the pattern-shop building, the copper rolling mill, and to storehouse No. 12; for the extension of the north gun shop and the storehouse for guns; and for the construction of a shop and office building for construction and repair, and one officer's quarters.

The estimates for improvements at this yard for 1901 amount to $875,017.32, and include a yards and docks building; the extension of store No. 1; an underground conduit system; the western extension of the navy-yard; a storehouse for inflammable material; coal shed and coal-handling appliances; miscellaneous shop for ordnance: tool shop; gunners' workshop; seamen gunners' machine shop; extension of forging shop; enlarging boiler house; new quarters for the superintendent, and a number of minor items.

Navy-yard, Norfolk.—Yard improvements at Norfolk during the past year have consisted largely in the extension of tracks for locomotive crane; repairs to the timber dry dock; improvements to electric plant; extension of quay wall, and a small amount of dredging, paving, and grading. Considerable repairs were made to the dry dock, including a thorough overhauling of the pumping plant.

The principal items in the appropriations for the present fiscal year are $145,687.50 for additional land, $100,000 for ship-fitters' shop for construction and repair, and $100,000 for quay wall for fitting-out basin. Other improvements include a building for electric plant; plumbers' shop and machine shop, yards and dock; a blacksmiths' shop and plumbers' shop; two officers' quarters; a storehouse for torpedoes; and a 120-ton floating derrick.

The estimates for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1901, for improvements at this yard reach a total of $1,649,000, including an item of $500,000 for the purchase of additional land and $300,000 toward the construction of a new concrete and granite dock, to cost $1,200,000. Among the improvements contemplated are the extension of the locomotive-crane track; the remodeling of the machine shop for steam engineering; a storehouse for patterns and an office building for steam engineering; increasing electric plant; storehouses for yards and docks and equipment, and a storehouse for ships' supplies.

In regard to the estimate of $500,000 for the purchase of land: The yard is at present almost completely occupied with structures, and in a few years the enlargement of its limits will be absolutely necessary.

The construction of a new dry dock would probably occupy all the land at present available.

Under the authority granted in the naval act of May 4, 1898, to condemn certain lands on the Elizabeth River, immediately opposite the Norfolk Navy-Yard, known as the Cedar Grove property, condemnation proceedings were instituted through the Department of Justice, and the lands were appraised at $87.50 per linear foot of water front. A resurvey of the property was made by the Bureau of Yards and Docks and the result differed materially from the survey which was before the commissioners who condemned the property. The owners of the property refused to accept payment upon the basis of the Department's survey and the matter has therefore again been referred to the Department of Justice with a request that the boundary line between the Government lands at St. Helena and the Cedar Grove property be determined by judicial proceedings, in order that the actual extent of the water front of the Cedar Grove property may be determined.

Pensacola.—Only a small amount has been expended at this yard during the past fiscal year for improvements. Twenty-five thousand dollars were expended on repairs to buildings and wharfs, and a small amount of dredging was done in order to make the yard accessible to vessels of larger draft. A new electric-light plant was installed and repairs made to the coal sheds and appliances.

A floating dock of 2,200 tons capacity was purchased from the Perth Amboy Dry Dock Company, of Perth Amboy, N. J., at a cost of $102,470, and after being docked in dry dock No. 3 at the New York Navy-Yard and properly sheathed with metal to protect it from the marine worm, was towed to this yard and is now available for service.

The estimates for the fiscal year 1901 include a caisson for the dock basin.

Mare Island.—The importance of the Mare Island Navy-Yard has been greatly increased by our recent acquisitions in the Pacific Ocean.

The principal items of expenditure here during the past year have been for repairing the damages due to the earthquake. Of the $350,000 appropriated for this purpose, $145,683 was spent during the past fiscal year. Other improvements have included coal cylinders and coal-handling plant; storage shed for lumber; plumbers', tinners', and paint shop; shelter roof for boats; wharf for the receiving ship; extension of electric system; and a washhouse and drying room.

Provision has been made in the appropriations for the current fiscal year for the further extension of the quay wall; the extension and renewal of the railroad facilities; an additional storehouse for supplies and accounts; for new shops for the Bureaus of Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, and Equipment; for dredging the channel and anchorage ground; for grading; for moving back the ferry slip; for a storehouse for equipment materials, and a number of other minor matters.

The estimates for 1901 for public works for this yard under the Bureau of Yards and Docks reach a total of $1,152,500, including $300,000 for barracks for enlisted men. The principal items are for a deep-water basin; a joiner shop for construction and repair; a new water system; a storehouse for supplies and accounts; a light and power station; and coal storage facilities.

NAVAL STATIONS.

Port Royal, S. C.—The improvements in progress at this station during the past year include a wharf adjoining the dry dock; a repair shop for steam engineering; an electric light and power plant; facilities for storing and handling coal; a locomotive crane and track for dry dock; repair and extension of wharf, and dredging the channel from the outside to the naval station.

The appropriations available for the present fiscal year include a building for workshops, yards and docks; a sawmill and boat shop for construction and repair; a paint shop and storage for combustibles, and the extension of the storehouse. The act of May 4, 1898, appropriated $20,325.50 for the purchase of certain lands adjoining the station, and condemnation proceedings have been instituted, but the purchase has as yet been completed only in part.

The estimates for the fiscal year 1901 include an item of $500,000 for rebuilding the dry dock at this place. This dock, which was completed only a few years ago, is of timber, and owing to the attacks of the teredo and certain structural weaknesses which were developed, is in such condition that its restoration should be in concrete and stone. One hundred thousand dollars is estimated for the continuation of the work of dredging the basin and widening the channel. Other items include a condensing plant, a storehouse for lumber, a building for equipment, and a quay wall. The total sum requested for public works at this station is $882,000.

Key West, Fla.—A steam engineering machine shop has been completed at this yard during the past year, and is ready for the reception of tools. The coal sheds and coal piers under construction at this station are dealt with under the head of coaling stations.

The appropriations for the current fiscal year contain an item of $100,000 for the purchase of additional land, and provide for two officers' quarters.

The estimates for the fiscal year 1901 include a building for equipment and a construction and repair shop.

Bremerton, Wash.—A shop for the Bureau of Construction and Repair was completed at this station during the past year, and the machinery and tools are being installed. Other improvements include an electric-light plant; extension of the water system; a steam engineering shop and boiler house, and a number of minor items in the way of dredging, clearing, and grading.

The principal items in the appropriations for the present fiscal year are for the extension of the boiler room and steam plant for yards and docks; for continuing the work of clearing and grading the station; for a yard railway; a pump and boiler house for the new water station, and for concreting the floor of the construction and repair shop.

The estimates for the fiscal year 1901 for this station amount to $226,065, the principal items being for an equipment shop; an anchor and chain shop; coal sheds and appliances; additions to the water system; an angle, plate, and smithery shed, and fencing in the station.

Algiers, La.—The construction of a large steel dock, which is at present in progress, to be placed at this point, makes it necessary to provide certain facilities for repairs. An estimate of $50,000 for shops for steam engineering and $95,000 for shops for construction and repair at this reservation is therefore submitted.

Dry Tortugas, Fla.—The improvements which have recently been made at this place in the way of coal sheds and piers make it necessary to perform certain dredging there, and an item of $200,000 has been included in the estimates for 1901 for this purpose.

Naval Academy.—For the extensive improvements at the Naval Academy the sum of $720,000 only was appropriated at the last Congress and is available for the current fiscal year. The estimates for 1901 for the continuation of the work of rehabilitating the Naval Academy buildings and grounds amount to a total of $2,012,000, which should be appropriated if the work is to be carried forward with proper economy.

FIRE PROTECTION.

The Bureau of Yards and Docks has made an examination of the systems of fire protection at the various navy yards on the Atlantic coast, and finds that extensive provisions should be made if adequate protection to Government property is to be afforded. At several of the yards the fire departments have almost gone out of existence, and protection is obtained from the fire departments of adjacent cities, which have in all cases of fire responded promptly and efficiently. Estimates have therefore been submitted under the Bureau of Yards and Docks to provide adequate facilities for protection from fire at the navy-yards at Portsmouth, Boston, New York, League Island, and Washington.

MARINE RAILWAYS.

In compliance with the recommendation of the Bureau of Construction and Repair, estimates are also submitted for the construction of marine railways at Portsmouth, New York, League Island, Norfolk, Port Royal, and Mare Island, in order that torpedo boats and small vessels, the number of which is constantly increasing, may be taken out of the water with facility, at small expense, and without recourse to the large dry docks needed for the use of the larger vessels.

BARRACKS.

An item of $300,000 has been included in the estimates under the head of "Public works, Bureau of Yards and Docks," for the erection of barracks for enlisted men to take the place of receiving ships, as recommended by the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, at the Boston, New York, League Island, Norfolk, and Mare Island navy-yards, the total appropriations requested for this purpose being $1,500,000.

The subject of improvements at the navy-yards and stations should not be left without a brief reference to the estimates which are submitted by the Bureaus of Construction and Repair and Steam Engineering for improvements to plants. The chief constructor includes in the estimates under his Bureau the sum of $210,000 for this purpose. He requests $25,000 for each of the navy-yards except Pensacola, and for the naval stations at Puget Sound, Wash., and Algiers, La., and $5,000 each for the naval station at Port Royal and the navy-yard at Pensacola.

The Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering requests an appropriation of $25,000 for improvements to the steam-engineering plants at the Portsmouth and Boston yards; $50,000 each for the naval station at Algiers, La., and the navy-yard at Mare Island, Cal., and $25,000 each for the naval stations at San Juan, P. R., and Honolulu, H. I.

CIVIL EMPLOYEES AT NAVY-YARDS.

Summary of labor-board reports for the year ending August 31, 1899, and comparison of totals for 1897, 1898, and 1899.

Navy-yards.	Number of applications for employment.	Rejected by the labor board as not eligible under the rules.	Called for by heads of labor departments.	Certified for employment to heads of labor departments.	Rejected by heads of departments as not qualified.	Declined service.	Failed to report for employment.
Portsmouth	928	.....	663	636	.....	5	141
Boston	3,568	51	2,446	2,581	.....	30	600
New York	7,109	34	3,728	3,720	15	52	917
League Island	2,584	25	1,517	1,494	4	32	377
Washington	1,504	1	1,068	1,026	13	34	193
Norfolk	3,701	61	2,143	2,022	3	2	405
Mare Island	2,227	5	1,158	1,128	14	7	305
Total 1899	21,621	178	12,723	12,607	49	162	2,938
Total 1898	31,254	305	22,367	21,152	170	182	4,314
Total 1897	16,226	105	6,538	6,699	49	62	982

NAVY-YARD APPRENTICES.

Prior to the close of the war of the rebellion it was the custom to employ a considerable number of apprentices at the various navy-yards. They were carefully selected and well disciplined during their apprenticeship, and many, if not all, of the most competent and efficient master workmen at that time were men who served their time as navy-yard apprentices. This the Department regards as an excellent method of educating men for navy-yard work. With the desire that boys of assured good mental and physical qualifications should be given the privilege, the Department has adopted, during the past year, a set of rules governing the appointment of apprentices and their promotion, which, it is believed, will eventually result in giving to the navy-yards a class of men familiar with all branches of their trade, and especially with navy-yard work, and from whom, in time, the foremen, quartermen, and leading men will be largely drawn.

LIBRARY AND NAVAL WAR RECORDS.

During the past year 1,089 volumes have been added to the Naval Library.

Since the last annual report of the Department the eighth and ninth volumes of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion have been printed, and by the end of the calendar year will both have been distributed.

MISCELLANEOUS RECEIPTS.

A detailed statement, prepared in the Office of the Auditor for the Navy Department, will be found in the Appendix, showing deposits in the Treasury from November 1, 1898, to November 1, 1899, arising from the sale of condemned vessels, stores, materials, nautical books and charts, fuel, clothing, rents of Government property, supplies furnished to other branches of the Government, and from other lawful disposition of public property under the cognizance of the Navy Department.

The total amount so deposited was $548,860.08, of which sum $389,324.61 was covered into the Treasury as "Miscellaneous receipts on account of proceeds of public property," as required by section 3618 of the Revised Statutes, and the remainder, $159,535.47, carried, as authorized by law, to the credit of the proper appropriations to be applied to naval purposes.

The Auditor for the Navy Department states that while the above-mentioned report is made to cover the period from November 1, 1898, to November 1, 1899, it shows eight deposits that were made in October, 1898, but were not included in the statement in the last annual report, because the proper disposition of the money had not then been determined, and it had not been covered into the Treasury.

The sum of $67,000 has also been deposited during the period covered by this table, but as the proper disposition of this money has not yet been determined and it has not been covered into the Treasuary, it is omitted, and will be included in the statement for next year.

SALE OF CONDEMNED VESSELS.

Since the date of the last annual report of this Department the following vessels, condemned as unfit for further service and stricken from the Navy Register in pursuance of section 2 of the act of August 5, 1882 (Stat. L., vol. 22, p. 296), have been appraised and disposed of at public sale in accordance with section 5 of the act of March 3, 1883 (Stat. L., vol. 22, p. 599), viz:

Name and type of vessel.	Navy-yard at which located.	Appraised value.	Date of sale.	Purchaser.	Price.
			1899.		
Wyandotte, single-turret monitor.	League Island, Pa.	$6,382.50	Jan. 17	Chas. Gibbons Davis, Philadelphia, Pa.	$12,631.52
Comanche, single-turret monitor.	Mare Island, Cal.	1,200.00	Mar. 22	Pantoskey, Bircovich & Livingston, Oakland, Cal.	6,581.25
Governor Russell, ferry boat.	Norfolk, Va.	35,000.00	July 19	City of Boston, Mass.	25,000.00
East Boston, ferry boat.	Boston, Mass	30,000.00	...do	Arthur J. Phillips, Harry L. Maynard, Theo. J. Wool, and John L. Watson, Portsmouth, Va.	38,091.00
Vulcan, repair ship.	League Island, Pa.	100,000.00	...do	Michael Jenkins, Baltimore, Md.	175,750.00
Niagara, steamer	New York	60,000.00	...do	Henry P. Booth, New York, N. Y.	75,563.00
Hector, steamer	Boston, Mass	50,000.00	Oct. 10	The Metropolitan Coal Co., Boston, Mass.	65,150.00
Ajax, single-turret monitor.	League Island, Pa.	13,000.60	...do	H. A. Hitner's Sons, Philadelphia, Pa.	29,566.66
Passaic, single-turret monitor.	Pensacola, Fla	11,000.00	...do	Frank Samuels, Philadelphia, Pa.	19,785.66

The total sum received from these vessels is $448,119.09, being $141,536.59 in excess of their appraised value, from which $758.96, the cost of publishing the several advertisements inviting proposals for their purchase, was paid. The net proceeds, $447,360.13, have been covered into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. A detailed statement of the sales and the disposition of the proceeds will be found in the appendix to the report.

FINANCIAL STATEMENT.

Appropriations, expenditures, and balances for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899.

Title of appropriation.	Appropriations for fiscal year 1899, exclusive of public works.	Amounts drawn in fiscal year 1899.	Balances, June 30, 1899.
General establishment:			
Pay of the Navy	$17,955,460.00	$10,253,912.05	$7,701,547.95
Pay, miscellaneous	400,000.00	398,322.13	1,677.87
Pay, miscellaneous, Jan. 1, 1899	*86,923.38	85,752.41	1,170.97
Contingent, Navy	7,000.00	1,940.33	5,059.67
Emergency fund, Navy Department	1,000,000.00	130,331.40	869,668.60
Emergency fund, Navy, Jan. 1, 1899:			
Appropriated $25,000,000.00			
Transferred to other appropriations 3,000,000.00			
	22,000,000.00	3,725,932.55	18,274,067.45
Bureau of Yards and Docks:			
Maintenance	*396,694.73	300,746.42	95,948.31
Maintenance, January 1, 1899	50,000.00	49,997.39	2.61
Repairs and preservation, navy-yards	*513,330.67	428,440.75	84,889.92
Repairs and preservation, navy-yards, January 1, 1899	50,000.00	49,182.36	817.64
Civil establishment	72,710.44	69,899.07	2,811.37
Contingent	25,000.00	14,865.35	10,134.65
Bureau of Equipment:			
Equipment of vessels	1,771,[illegible]	7[illegible]	1,[illegible]
Equipment of vessels, Jan. 1, 1899—			
Appropriated $6,300,000			
Transferred to 1899 385,804			
	5,914,196.00	3,856,399.04	2,057,796.96
Civil establishment	16,500.00	16,385.11	114.89
Civil establishment, Jan. 1, 1899	975.00	975.00	
Contingent	17,074.00	7,891.72	9,182.28
Contingent, Jan. 1, 1899—			
Appropriated $20,000			
Transferred to 1899 2,074			
	17,926.00	13,838.13	4,087.87
Naval Observatory	*10,964.32	10,055.91	908.41
Ocean and lake surveys	34,000.00	25,896.03	8,103.97
Ocean and lake surveys, Jan. 1, 1899	10,000.00	10,000.00	
Bureau of Navigation:			
Pay, Naval Academy	106,401.45	106,000.00	401.45
Repairs, Naval Academy	*56,632.00	32,435.74	24,196.26
Heating and lighting, Naval Academy	20,000.00	16,571.04	3,428.96
Special course, Naval Academy	3,000.00	2,914.49	85.51
Contingent, Naval Academy	45,545.00	37,993.74	7,551.26
Naval War College and Torpedo School	19,200.00	8,476.58	10,723.42
Naval training station	30,000.00	27,364.36	2,635.64
Gunnery exercises	6,000.00	2,127.25	3,872.75
Transportation, recruiting, and contingent	*161,450.00	84,652.78	76,797.22
Transportation, recruiting, and contingent, Jan. 1, 1899—			
Appropriated $200,000			
Transferred to 1899 120,000			
	80,000.00	79,483.90	516.10
Outfits for naval apprentices	41,250.00	7,911.42	33,338.58
Naval station, Newport, R. I.	1,000.00	358.65	641.35
Naval Coast Signal System, Jan. 1, 1899	275,000.00	26.50	274,973.50
Naval Home, Philadelphia, Pa.	77,725.00	61,436.23	16,288.77

* The appropriations for 1899 were made immediately available in 1898 by the act of May 4, 1898, after deducting expenditures made in 1898 these were the amounts available for 1899.

FINANCIAL STATEMENT—continued.

Appropriations, expenditures, and balances, etc.—Continued.

Title of appropriation.	Appropriations for fiscal year 1899, exclusive of public works.	Amounts drawn in fiscal year 1899.	Balances, June 30, 1899.
Bureau of Ordnance:			
Ordnance and ordnance stores	*$1,418,600.00	$832,665.97	$585,934.03
Ordnance and ordnance stores, Jan. 1, 1899—			
Appropriated $6,400,000			
Transferred to 1899 300,000			
	6,100,000.00	2,656,689.27	3,443,310.73
Repairs	30,000.00	25,570.38	4,429.62
Civil establishment	29,324.00	25,776.94	3,547.06
Contingent	*7,958.25	5,055.65	2,902.60
Torpedo station	97,500.00	79,371.92	18,128.08
Bureau of Construction and Repair:			
Construction and repair	*3,465,906.59	2,449,504.01	1,016,402.58
Construction and repair, Jan. 1, 1899—			
Appropriated $7,450,000			
Transferred to 1899 1,500,000			
	5,950,000.00	4,329,661.03	1,620,338.97
Civil establishment	23,407.00	22,783.04	623.96
Bureau of Steam Engineering:			
Steam machinery	*1,228,441.00	902,144.60	326,296.40
Steam machinery, Jan. 1, 1899:			
Appropriated $5,250,000			
Transferred to 1899 350,000			
	4,900,000.00	2,246,281.51	2,653,718.49
Civil establishment	11,900.00	11,880.01	19.99
Contingent	1,000.00	274.09	725.91
Bureau of Supplies and Accounts:			
Provisions, Navy	*1,401,141.28	738,978.80	662,162.48
Provisions, Navy, Jan. 1, 1899	*2,202,293.34	1,925,163.31	277,130.03
Civil establishment	70,432.03	67,157.49	3,274.54
Contingent	*49,824.90	35,794.69	14,030.21
Contingent, Jan. 1, 1899	150,000.00	119,914.44	30,085.56
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery:			
Medical Department	75,000.00	52,939.12	22,060.88
Medical Department, Jan. 1, 1899	100,000.00	63,059.92	36,940.08
Repairs	*19,982.00	11,029.10	8,952.90
Contingent	*39,852.00	24,549.79	15,302.21
Naval Hospital fund	20,000.00	20,000.00	.....
Ambulances for naval hospitals	600.00	565.00	35.00
Naval Cemetery, Norfolk, Va	1,000.00	1,000.00	.....
Marine Corps:			
Pay	1,176,034.23	1,063,634.00	112,400.23
Pay provisions, etc.:			
Appropriated *$535,831.30			
Transferred to Pay Marine Corps. 297,480.00			
	238,351.30	230,640.25	7,711.05
Clothing	*126,205.24	118,777.66	7,427.58
Clothing, Jan. 1, 1899	82,400.00	73,455.94	8,944.06
Provisions	131,911.50	97,781.05	34,130.45
Fuel	19,500.00	12,999.95	6,500.05
Repairs of barracks	18,925.00	15,812.94	3,112.06
Military stores	23,297.00	20,766.83	2,530.17
Military stores, Jan. 1, 1899	8,500.00	6,085.04	2,414.96
Transportation and recruiting	15,000.00	14,305.79	694.21

* The appropriations for 1899 were made immediately available in 1898 by the act of May 4, 1898, after deducting expenditures made in 1898 these were the amounts available for 1899.

FINANCIAL STATEMENT—continued.

Appropriations, expenditures, and balances, etc.—Continued.

Title of appropriation.	Appropriations for fiscal year 1899, exclusive of public works.	Amounts drawn in fiscal year 1899.	Balances, June 30, 1899.
Marine Corps—Continued.			
Transportation and recruiting, Jan. 1, 1899	$8,000.00	$7,844.98	$155.02
Forage	3,000.00	1,268.31	1,731.69
Hire of quarters	7,356.00	7,100.20	255.80
Contingent	37,500.00	33,022.66	4,477.34
Contingent, Jan. 1, 1899	12,500.00	11,776.63	723.37
Total	80,576,426.61	39,045,113.51	41,531,313.10

ESTIMATES AND APPROPRIATIONS.

Comparative statement of estimates and appropriations, 1900–1901.

Navy Department	Estimates, 1900.	Appropriated 1900.	Estimates 1901.	Increase of estimates for 1901 over amount appropriated for 1900 for same purpose.	Decrease of estimates for 1901 as compared with amount appropriated for 1900 for same purpose.	New items, 1901.
Pay of the Navy	$12,726,440.00	$13,500,171.00	$12,805,297.00		$694,874.00	
Pay, miscellaneous	500,000.00	500,000.00	500,000.00			
Contingent, Navy	20,000.00	10,000.00	10,000.00			
Bureau of Navigation	525,125.00	505,125.00	454,375.00	$89,500.00	140,250.00	$54,500.00
Naval Academy	195,153.45	195,153.45	227,813.45	12,660.00		3,660.00
Bureau of Ordnance	3,143,124.00	3,143,124.00	2,503,124.00	676,500.00	1,316,700.00	245,500.00
Bureau of Equipment	2,615,455.10	2,765,455.10	3,242,475.00	627,019.90	150,000.00	250,000.00
Bureau of Yards and Docks	453,442.23	453,442.23	533,322.83	80,000.00	119.40	
Public works, yards and docks	5,871,786.50	5,840,786.50	13,768,474.32	12,095,474.32	4,167,786.50	11,969,974.32
Public works, Naval Academy	2,340,000.00	720,000.00	2,021,000.00	2,021,000.00	720,000.00	2,021,000.00
Public works, Naval Observatory	10,000.00	10,000.00	30,500.00	20,500.00		20,500.00
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery	192,500.00	192,500.00	180,000.00	35,000.00	47,500.00	35,000.00
Bureau of Supplies and Accounts	3,220,432.03	3,220,432.03	3,220,432.03			
Bureau of Construction and Repair	3,273,407.00	3,273,407.00	6,295,824.25	3,087,417.25	65,000.00	87,417.25
Bureau of Steam Engineering	1,207,900.00	1,959,200.00	2,774,200.00	1,670,000.00	855,000.00	200,000.00
Marine Corps	2,523,871.27	2,523,871.27	2,700,370.27	257,499.00	81,000.00	3,800.00
Increase of the Navy:						
Construction and machinery	5,992,402.00	5,992,402.00	12,740,699.00	6,748,297.00		
Armor and armament	4,000,000.00	4,000,000.00	4,000,000.00			
Equipment	200,000.00	400,000.00	250,000.00		150,000.00	
Grand total	49,011,238.58	49,205,069.58	68,237,907.15	27,414,867.47	8,382,029.90	14,891,351.57

It will be noticed that the naval estimates for the fiscal year 1901 reach the total of $68,237,907.15, being an increase of $19,032,837.57 over the appropriations for the present fiscal year. While this increase is large, it is to be found in the three items of public improvements, the construction and repair of vessels, and increase of the navy—construction and machinery.

It is to be remembered that the naval establishment has greatly increased in the past year or two, and it is necessary to maintain it in an efficient condition.

NAVAL CONSTRUCTION ABROAD.

In order that it may be seen at a glance what other great powers are doing in the matter of naval construction as compared with our own progress, the Department has had the following tables prepared, which show the tonnage laid down in 1899 and the total tonnage now under construction:

Laid down in 1899.

Nation.	Battle ships.	Cruisers.	Torpedo vessels.	Total.
	Tons.	*Tons.*	*Tons.*	*Tons.*
England	116,000	127,700	4,200	247,900
France	25,456	113,943	4,800	144,199
Germany	44,324	2,800	4,200	51,324
Italy	32,000	----	1,800	33,800
Japan[1]	----	----	----	----
Russia	57,426	6,375	1,700	65,501
United States	36,970	(2)	4,191	----
Monitors	12,940	----	----	54,101

[1] All vessels called for by Japan's first building programme are either completed or under way.
[2] In November, 1899, bids were received for 6 protected cruisers of 3,200 tons.

Total now under construction.

Nation.	Battle ships.	Cruisers.	Torpedo vessels.	Total.
	Tons.	*Tons.*	*Tons.*	*Tons.*
England	251,700	267,080	[1]12,900	531,680
France	80,281	166,283	8,969	255,533
Germany	99,729	41,851	6,655	148,235
Italy	78,454	38,901	3,185	120,540
Japan	59,700	63,280	7,133	130,113
Russia	115,713	92,697	16,566	222,976
United States	94,715	4,935	10,646	----
Monitors	12,940	----	----	123,236

[1] Approximate.

From this it appears that only Italy and Japan laid down less tonnage than this country during the present year, and that Italy alone has less tonnage under construction.

LEGISLATION RECOMMENDED.

INCREASE OF THE NAVY.

The number of large, swift, and powerful armored cruisers of great coal endurance in our Navy is largely disproportionate to the rest of the naval establishment. The experience of the last year has also shown the need of several smaller vessels usually classed as gunboats. It is therefore recommended that Congress be requested to authorize the construction of the following vessels:

First. Three armored cruisers, of about 13,000 tons trial displacement, of a maximum draft at deep load not to exceed 26 feet, carrying the heaviest armor and most powerful ordnance for vessels of their class, to be sheathed and coppered and to have the highest practicable speed and great radius of action.

Second. Twelve gunboats, of about 900 tons trial displacement, to be sheathed and coppered.

And, third, as recommended a year ago, three protected cruisers of about 8,600 tons trial displacement, carrying the most powerful ordnance for vessels of their class, to be sheathed and coppered, and to have the highest practicable speed and great radius of action.

The increase in the tonnage of the last three named vessels from 6,000 tons, as recommended a year ago, to 8,000 tons is suggested by the naval board on construction as better adapted to the present needs of the service. The same board are also of the opinion that if any of the foregoing vessels are authorized, the law should provide that in case satisfactory bids can not be obtained for their construction by contract, the Department shall have authority to construct the same in the navy-yards.

CONSOLIDATION OF BUREAUS.

In the opinion of the Department it would be in the interest of good business organization and economy to consolidate the three Bureaus of Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, and Equipment under one head—the Bureau of Ships. These Bureaus have to do with the construction and fitting out of vessels; in one word, the material of the ship. It is an integral work. When a contract is made for the construction of a ship, it is made with one builder. It is not given part to a constructor of hulls, part to a steam-engine manufacturer, and part to an outfitting firm. Whatever various trades enter into the work are all under one head. This is the method of private shipyards which build the largest ships and which are not left to the administration of three heads between whom delicate questions of respective authority and responsibility are liable to arise, resulting in delays and too often in friction and lack of harmony of cooperation.

Each of the above bureaus has now, during the construction of naval vessels, its separate inspectors at each yard. A consolidated bureau could, of course, be run much cheaper than three bureaus, and a great saving made by a reduction of the now three separate working forces,

both clerical and mechanical, especially in our navy-yards. Fewer naval officers would be needed, as there would be but one staff instead of three, so that more officers would be available for other duty. Under the present system one bureau brings its work to the point of readiness for the work of another, which is not always ready for it. There is necessarily a lack of that adaptation and harmony of movement which one head would secure.

If this consolidation were effected, the matter of furnishing coal and other current supplies, which is now under the direction of the Bureau of Equipment, could be easily transferred to the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, and such other incidental changes made as became necessary.

The foregoing suggestion is made solely with a view to an improvement in departmental organization, and with the highest appreciation of the ability and dutifulness with which these bureaus have been administered under their present heads. Efficient as they have been, however, their consolidation is recommended, because it is believed that if consolidated under the direction of any one of their present heads, or of any competent officer, that efficiency would be still greater, less expense incurred, and a better business organization would succeed.

The terms of office of the chiefs of the three bureaus will all expire in a little more than a year, one of those officers then going upon the retired list, and it is due to them all, as an assurance that the change is recommended on systematic and not personal grounds, to suggest that if made, it shall not go into effect until the beginning of the fiscal year after the expiration of their said terms.

NAVAL OBSERVATORY.

Acting in cooperation with the Superintendent of the Naval Observatory and the Chief of the Bureau of Equipment, under which the observatory is placed, the Department, in June last, requested Hon. William E. Chandler, of the committee of the Senate on Naval Affairs; Hon. Alston G. Dayton, of the committee of the House of Representatives on Naval Affairs; Prof. Edward C. Pickering, of the Harvard Observatory; Prof. George E. Hale, of the Yerkes Observatory, and Prof. George C. Comstock, of the Washburn Observatory, to act as a board of visitors at the United States Naval Observatory, in Washington, to examine into the condition of that institution and to report to the Department their conclusions and recommendations.

These gentlemen complied with this request; made a very full examination and have reported their conclusions and recommendations, which the Department deems of great importance and in which it concurs. To carry out these recommendations legislation is necessary, and the Department recommends its enactment, believing that if the policy outlined by the board can be carried out the usefulness of the observatory will be increased and its work brought more fully into harmony with the best astronomical progress. The report of the board will be transmitted to Congress as soon as it meets.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JUDGE-ADVOCATE-GENERAL.

In the last report of the Department, attention was invited to certain recommendations of the Judge-Advocate General of the Navy for needed legislation, which included authority to use depositions in cases before naval courts-martial; to compel the attendance of civilian witnesses; to provide for the removal of the charge of desertion in certain cases, and for the acquisition by the Government of patent rights secured by officers of the Navy; to authorize a new classification of the vessels of the Navy; to empower a naval examining board to act as a retiring board where the candidate for promotion is found physically disqualified, and to grant the privilege of retirement to enlisted men of the Navy. Of these recommendations the only one which has been complied with is that authorizing the retirement of enlisted men. It is earnestly hoped that the other recommendations, which are found fully dealt with in the report of the Judge-Advocate-General of this year, will receive the attention of Congress and be enacted into law.

THE CHIEF OF THE BUREAU OF STEAM ENGINEERING.

Section 424 of the Revised Statutes provides that "the Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering shall be appointed from the chief engineers of the Navy, and shall be a skillful engineer."

Pursuant to the provisions of the act entitled "An act to reorganize and increase the efficiency of the personnel of the Navy and Marine Corps of the United States," approved March 3, 1899, the officers constituting the Engineer Corps of the Navy have been transferred to the line of the Navy, and commissioned accordingly, and there are now no chief engineers in the Navy. It is necessary, therefore, that Congress provide the source from which the position of Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering shall hereafter be chosen, while that Bureau continues. He should be a skillful engineer.

INCREASE OF CORPS OF NAVAL CONSTRUCTORS.

The number of constructors now allowed by law is 40. This number is reported by the Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair as insufficient to perform the arduous, increasing, and responsible duties devolving upon the construction corps with the large amount of construction which is at present in progress. It is therefore recommended that this limitation as to the number of constructors be removed, and that it be left to the discretion of the Secretary to appoint to this corps, from graduates of the Naval Academy, such additional assistant constructors as the demands of the service make advisable.

It has been the custom of the Department for a number of years to select two or three young men from among the brightest graduates of the Naval Academy and send them abroad for a post-graduate course in naval architecture. By this system the corps of constructors has been brought to a high state of efficiency.

INCREASE OF CORPS OF CIVIL ENGINEERS.

Attention is invited to the recommendation of the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks that the grade of assistant civil engineer be established in addition to that of civil engineer, and that the number of officers in the Corps of Civil Engineers be increased to 30. At present the corps is composed of 21 officers, all of the grade of civil engineer. This number is not sufficient for the proper conduct of the work of designing, building, and maintaining the public works of the Navy. There are at present four graving docks of the largest size and one steel dock under construction, and others may be authorized. Many new buildings are also in process or contemplation of construction at the various navy-yards, and a number of new yards established in our recently acquired possessions demand the attention of a civil engineer. The duties devolving upon the Bureau of Yards and Docks, therefore, have been greatly increased, and a larger staff of civil engineers is necessary if a proper supervision is to be maintained over the important improvements, which require careful watching while in progress and constant attention after completion.

AMERICAN REGISTER FOR VESSELS PURCHASED FROM THE GOVERNMENT.

Several of the foreign-built vessels that were bought by the Department during the Spanish-American war were afterwards offered for sale, as provided by law, and bid upon, but were subsequently withdrawn from sale owing to the fact that the Treasury Department, acting in accordance with an opinion of the Attorney-General, refused, although the bidders were American citizens, to grant registry in such cases on the ground that the statutes governing such matters exclude them from the privileges granted to vessels of domestic build.

Therefore, in order that purchasers of vessels of the kind referred to may be given the benefits of the shipping laws, it is necessary that Congress, if it approve of such action, enact a measure providing that all vessels hereafter bought by American citizens from the Government, no matter where built or how procured by it, shall be entitled by virtue of such purchase to all the rights and privileges allowed by law to vessels built in the United States.

NAVAL RESERVE.

The Department submitted a bill to the last Congress for the organization of a national naval reserve which it is hoped will be enacted into law during the coming session. The Navy afloat has increased to such an extent as to make it of great importance that there should be a reserve upon which to call in time of war. The officer in charge of the naval militia in his annual reports make certain recommendations in this connection to which attention is invited. It is deemed to be very important that such a reserve, representing the whole country and related directly to the national naval establishment, should be fostered and made ready for call.

INCREASE OF THE MEDICAL CORPS.

The Department approves the recommendation of the Surgeon-General that provision be made to transfer the eighteen acting assistant surgeons, who served during the Spanish war and are still in the service, to the Regular Navy without limitation as to age. This increase in the medical corps is made necessary by reason of the large increase in the number of enlisted men in the Navy and Marine Corps, made at the last session of Congress, and the establishment of new hospitals in our recently acquired possessions.

INSPECTION OF NAVY-YARD ACCOUNTS.

The Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts recommends that provision be made for the inspection of navy-yard accounts in their manufacturing and construction departments, and for scrutinizing cases which sometimes arise of financial or other business entanglement or irregularity. The inspection of accounts is not only a good business principle but necessary to prevent abuses and harmful practices. At present an officer of the pay corps is detailed to inspect the books and accounts of pay officers at the navy-yards and stations, but no provision is made for the exercise of the same supervision of the manufacturing and construction departments and the investigation of special cases. The Department believes that this work should be done by a trained accountant, appointed from civil life, and therefore free from the affiliations that are inevitable between officers of the same service. Legislation is therefore requested, authorizing the appointment of a permanent inspector for this purpose, to be attached to the Secretary's Office.

NAVAL COMMISSARY STORES.

The Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts calls attention to the inconvenience which the officers and men of the Navy and Marine Corps frequently suffer by reason of the inability to procure ordinary articles of provisions, clothing, etc., in remote places like Cavite, Guam, and Sitka. To enable the Department to afford the proper facilities in this respect, authority is requested to establish a naval commissary store department at such places as the Secretary of the Navy may deem necessary, and also granting to the officers and enlisted men of the Navy and Marine Corps the privilege of buying commissary stores from the Army.

CHARTS OF THE COASTS AND WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES.

Attention is called to the recommendation of the chief of the Bureau of Equipment and the hydrographer of that Bureau, that the Hydrographic Office be authorized by Congress to construct charts of our own coast on the Mercator projection. Under the law, as at present, the work of charting the coasts and waters of the United States is performed by the Coast and Geodetic Survey of the Treasury Department. The Hydrographic Office constructs the nautical charts of all

the other navigable waters of the globe. It seems absurd that the same method of projection should not be followed, and yet such is the case.

The Hydrographic Office, following the method pursued by all the great powers, uses Mercator's projection, which offers peculiar advantages to the navigator and is familiar to the navigators of naval and merchant ships the world over, while the charts of the Coast and Geodetic Survey are made on the polyconic projection and are unfamiliar to seamen. The result is that great inconvenience is suffered, not only by our own vessels, but by those of all nations when they come into the waters of the United States.

The Department believes that the work of charting the waters of the United States should properly be done by the Hydrographic Office of the Navy Department, and it has frequently recommended that this work be placed under its supervision. Authority should at least be given to construct charts of our own coasts and waters in such manner as to conform to all other ocean charts.

AUTHORITY TO ADMINISTER OATHS.

The Department concurs in the recommendation of the Brigadier-General Commandant of the Marine Corps, that the act entitled "An act authorizing certain officers of the Navy and Marine Corps to administer oaths," approved January 25, 1895, be so amended as to include the assistant adjutant and inspector of the Marine Corps. The duties devolving upon this officer are of such a character as to render this authority necessary.

MILEAGE.

Under the law as at present, officers traveling under orders from the Department, regardless of the frequency of the travel, or the distance, receive an allowance of 7 cents per mile. It sometimes happens that officers are required to perform regular duty between two or more places in the same near vicinity, and to travel backward and forward at frequent constant intervals. In such cases an officer should not receive mileage, but should be reimbursed for only the actual expense incurred. It is therefore recommended that authority be given to the Secretary of the Navy, in ordering officers to duty involving travel in such cases, to designate when actual traveling expenses only will be allowed.

ARMOR.

The most important question pertaining to naval construction at the present time, and one that demands prompt attention, is that of the armor for vessels now building, and for others authorized but not yet contracted for on account of the provision in the act of March 3, 1899, prohibiting the Department from contracting for the vessels therein authorized until contract has been made for the armor therefor within $300 a ton. The price fixed is one for which even inferior armor can not be obtained, and the Department has therefore been unable to

invite proposals for the three battle ships and the three armored cruisers authorized by the act of March 3, 1899.

Briefly, the armor situation is as follows: All the armor for the battleships *Kearsarge* and *Kentucky* has been contracted for and delivered. All the armor for the battle ships *Alabama*, *Illinois*, and *Wisconsin* has been contracted for, and deliveries under the contracts will probably be completed by May, 1900. The armor for the five vessels above named was contracted for at $400 per ton, exclusive of a royalty for face-hardening, for which $11.20 per ton might, under certain conditions, be paid.

In August and September of the present year contracts were made for 2,152 tons of armor for the four harbor-defense monitors authorized by the act of May 4, 1898. At the same time contracts were made for 116.58 tons of armor for the battle ships *Maine*, *Ohio*, and *Missouri*, this latter small quantity of armor being necessary in the early stage of interior construction. The above armor for monitors and battle ships, aggregating 2,268.58 tons, was contracted for at $400 per ton. All the deliveries will probably be completed by April, 1900.

There remain to be contracted for 7,358 tons of armor for the *Maine*, *Ohio*, and *Missouri*. These vessels are now building, and it is imperative that their armor should be contracted for early in the coming year; to delay it beyond that time will in all probability delay the completion of the vessels beyond the contract date of completion. Under existing laws $400 a ton may be paid for armor "of a suitable quality" for these vessels; but $400 a ton will not apparently buy the best armor, which for such vessels is, of course, the only "suitable" armor.

It will probably buy armor made by the ordinary process of face hardening, which, though good, is not the best, and the Department does not therefore consider it suitable for the vessels in question. Armor of this kind was reluctantly ordered for the four new monitors, because the vessels were progressing rapidly and the Department desired to avoid the delays and embarrassment likely to arise if their armor was not forthcoming when required. Moreover, these vessels are of a low free board type and offer comparatively small targets, while the contrary is the case with battle ships, whose prestige is very great, and should not therefore be impaired by the use of any but the very best armor.

In addition to the 7,358 tons of armor required for the *Maine*, *Ohio*, and *Missouri*, there will be required about 9,000 tons for the three battle ships, and about 5,100 tons for the three armored cruisers authorized by the act of March 3, 1899, a total of about 21,458 tons of armor required in all, and not yet contracted for.

In order to attract bidders the Department grouped together all the armor required, and in March last advertised throughout the country, inviting bids for 24,000 tons of armor plates and appurtenances of the kind desired for the new vessels. Notwithstanding the very great quantity desired and the long period over which deliveries might

extend, but one bid was received, and that named a price greater than that authorized, and it was otherwise an irregular bid.

With the new process of manufacture, armor can be made, and is made in this country and abroad, which is guaranteed to stand a ballistic test from 20 to 25 per cent more severe than that now applied. Moreover, such armor possesses remarkable immunity from cracking under numerous heavy impacts. The Department desires to make use of such armor for the vessels now building, which are yet unsupplied with armor, and for the armored vessels authorized but not yet contracted for.

It can be asserted that marked improvements have recently been made in the quality of armor and that the manufacture of such improved armor is now successfully and commercially carried on both in this country and abroad, and that it has been adopted by all leading maritime nations except the United States for their latest ships of war. Its superiority over that heretofore produced is unquestioned, and its use is considered an imperative necessity.

It is urgently recommended that in the early days of its next session Congress enact such special legislation, by joint resolution or otherwise, as may be necessary to enable the Department to make contracts early in the coming year for 7,358 tons of armor of the best quality that can be obtained in this country for the *Maine*, *Ohio*, and *Missouri*, and that the provision of the act of March 3, 1899, limiting the price of armor to $300 per ton, and the restriction preventing the armored vessels therein authorized from being contracted for until the armor therefor is contracted for, be removed.

Whatever may be the future action of Congress regarding the establishment of a Government armor factory, it can hardly affect the supply of armor for the *Maine*, *Ohio*, and *Missouri*, as it will under any circumstances be impracticable to obtain it from such a source in reasonable time to complete the vessels above referred to.

REWARD OF OFFICERS.

The Department renews its recommendation of last year for a change in the present law for rewarding officers for conspicuous conduct in battle and for extraordinary heroism. The injustice of the present system is apparent. The promotion of an officer over the heads of other officers operates as a reduction of the latter in rank and also delays them in securing the increased pay which accompanies regular rise in grade. In other words, the promotion is made not at the expense of the government, which should bear it, but at the expense of the unfortunate officers who are overslaughed and who are thus punished, although faithful to every duty and only unfortunate in lacking the opportunity for conspicuous conduct or heroism.

The spirit of the Navy is so good that I am sure this is painful to the officer promoted as well as the officer reduced. The Department

therefore again urges that legislation be enacted providing that advancement in rank for services rendered during the war with Spain shall not interfere with the regular promotion of officers otherwise entitled to promotion, and that officers so advanced to higher grade by reason of war service shall be carried as additional to the numbers in each grade to which they have been promoted. The Department submitted to Congress at its last session a bill substantially to this effect, which is printed as Senate bill No. 5006, and to which attention is invited.

While those engaged in the battle of Manila have been deservedly rewarded—and no men ever deserved reward more richly—those who took part in the operations at Santiago, displaying the same conspicuous conduct and extraordinary heroism, have received no recognition whatever for their great services except the recommendations for promotion by the President, which have lapsed, not having been acted upon by the Senate.

The Department believes it due to these gallant men to suggest to you that their services be recognized and equal justice done them, and that, in accordance with the statute in such cases made and provided, you recommend that the thanks of Congress be given to the commander in chief of the North Atlantic Squadron and to the officers and men under his command, as they were given in the case of the commander in chief and officers and men of the Asiatic Squadron. The North Atlantic Squadron was charged with great and exacting duties, including the blockade of Cuba, cooperation with the army, and the pursuit, blockade and capture or destruction of the Spanish squadron under Admiral Cervera, all which it discharged with signal efficiency. It was a campaign of great scope and enormous responsibilities, and was brought to a successful and glorious consummation, which terminated the war by the destruction of the Spanish sea power. It was marked by unsurpassed precision, brilliancy, and vigor. That the men who by such achievements earned their country's gratitude have received no reward from its Government is an omission which it can not be doubted will be cordially and generously repaired.

If reward by the present system of promotion is abandoned, as above suggested, the Department renews its suggestion embodied in Senate bill 5005, introduced at the last session of Congress, which provides for medals of three classes—one for conspicuous conduct in war, one for extraordinary heroism, and one for general meritorious service—the first to carry with it a percentage of increase of pay, based upon the rank of the recipient, and calculated to take the place of the increase which would be the result of promotion were that form of reward continued. It is believed that such a medal, worn during life and transmitted as an inheritance, will be far more grateful to a deserving officer than a promotion in rank at the expense of a comrade.

JOHN D. LONG,
Secretary of the Navy.

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PAPERS

ACCOMPANYING

THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

OPERATIONS OF THE NAVAL MILITIA.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, November 3, 1899.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith the report on the operations of the Naval Militia during the past year, and to call your especial attention thereto.

Early last year, under your direction, and for the first time, extensive preparations were made for giving the different State organizations a tour of duty at sea, as nearly as possible under Regular Navy conditions.

A careful itinerary was arranged, and three naval vessels were assigned to this service, each with an excellent complement of officers and men, especially selected with a view to the important work committed to their charge. This work has been faithfully and carefully completed, and the accompanying report is filled with timely and valuable information.

I take pleasure in commending the zeal and fidelity with which the officers connected with the vessels assigned have carried out their instructions.

In a report made to you one year ago, I had the honor of calling your attention to a scheme for the organization of a National Naval Reserve, which was embodied in the form of a bill (H. R. 11535) and presented to Congress upon your recommendation.

The experience of the past year has suggested certain changes in the above plan; such changes are embodied in the report of the officer in charge of Naval Militia affairs, and are cordially approved.

I desire to add the hope that the general plan for the organization of a National Naval Reserve may again receive the indorsement and recommendation of the Department.

Very respectfully,

CHAS. H. ALLEN,
Assistant Secretary.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., October 20, 1899.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following annual report upon matters connected with the Naval Militia organizations now in existence in several of the States.

The naval appropriation act approved May 4, 1898, contained the following provision:

Arming and equipping Naval Militia: For arms, accouterments, signal outfits, boats, and their equipments, and the printing of the necessary books of instruction for the Naval Militia of the various States, under such regulations as the Secretary of the Navy may prescribe, sixty thousand dollars. And the Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized and empowered to use any part of the share of moneys heretofore or herein appropriated for arming or equipping the Naval Militia forces of the State of Michigan in repairing the damage to the *Yantic*, caused by a collision during her transportation from the Boston Navy-Yard to Michigan, as he, the Secretary, may deem proper and advisable.

The following regulations for the allotment of this sum were prescribed by the Department:

Four thousand dollars of the appropriation for Naval Militia will be reserved for the purpose of providing books of instruction for the Naval Militia, which books will be distributed among the various organizations in such manner as the Secretary of the Navy may from time to time direct.

Returns will be made by the governor of each State having a Naval Militia to the Navy Department, certifying to the following:

Number of commissioned officers.....
Number of petty officers.....
Number of enlisted men.....
Location of the divisions.....

No person serving in any capacity in the land militia, or as a bandsman or servant in the Naval Militia, will be included in this return.

The governor will also certify that the above officers and men were regularly organized, mustered in, and serving in the Naval Militia of the State on the 1st day of January, 1898, and are provided with uniforms of a naval pattern.

Upon the receipt of these returns the Secretary of the Navy will allot to each State a proportionate part of the sum of $56,000, according to the ratio that the number of properly uniformed petty officers and enlisted men in each State bears to the total number returned by all the States, and the sum thus allotted will be placed to the credit of the respective States on the books of the Navy Department.

The following table shows the number of officers, petty officers, and enlisted men in each State on January 1, 1899, as certified to by the governor thereof:

State.	Officers.	Petty officers and enlisted men.	State.	Officers.	Petty officers and enlisted men.
California	35	488	New York	59	932
Connecticut	17	187	North Carolina	28	262
District of Columbia	14	193	Ohio	22	330
Florida	26	265	Oregon	13	133
Georgia	16	176	Pennsylvania	18	201
Illinois	52	775	Rhode Island	18	196
Louisiana	19	338	South Carolina	25	260
Maryland	15	200	Virginia	18	208
Massachusetts	48	614			
Michigan	19	193	Total	492	6,302
New Jersey	30	351			

The following table shows the allotment made to each State in conformity with the regulations of the Department:

State.	Allotment.	State.	Allotment.
California	$4,336.40	New York	$8,281.81
Connecticut	1,661.70	North Carolina	2,328.15
District of Columbia	1,715.01	Ohio	2,932.40
Florida	2,354.81	Oregon	1,181.85
Georgia	1,563.95	Pennsylvania	1,786.10
Illinois	6,886.70	Rhode Island	1,741.67
Louisiana	3,003.49	South Carolina	2,310.38
Maryland	1,777.22	Virginia	1,848.30
Massachusetts	5,456.04		
Michigan	1,715.01	Total	56,000.00
New Jersey	3,119.01		

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REPORT OF JUDGE-ADVOCATE-GENERAL OF THE NAVY.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE-ADVOCATE-GENERAL,
Washington, October 1, 1899.

SIR: In compliance with the order of the Department dated July 11 last, I have the honor to submit herewith a report of the operations of this office for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899, together with a copy of the estimates for the ensuing fiscal year:

INCREASE OF BUSINESS.

The annual increase in business, noted in previous reports, has continued, and while of course affected to some extent by the existence of a state of war during a portion of the last fiscal year, is shown by a careful examination of the records to be independent of any incidental or temporary cause, and to be due to the gradual growth and development of the Navy. It is found that the increase during the period of the war was greater than would in due course have been expected if peace had remained unbroken, but was not sufficient to carry the volume of business much beyond what it would have been if the previous ratio of annual increase had continued undisturbed; and although the Navy has during the current year not been called upon to perform such active duty as in 1898, that portion of the public business which has reached this office has been almost as heavy as during that year.

Taking the number of papers received annually as the only available measure of the volume of business transacted, the precise figures for the past twelve years, respectively, are as follows:

1887	2,159	1893	5,390
1888	4,400	1894	5,831
1889	4,907	1895	5,752
1890	4,326	1896	6,112
1891	5,204	1897	6,613
1892	5,055	1898	9,066

During the present calendar year, up to September 15, the number of entries was 6,159, while for the same period of the preceding year the number was 6,438; but upon comparing the present calendar year with the year preceding the war with Spain, 1897, an increase of 1,391 entries appears.

EXTENSION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE ACT OF AUGUST 14, 1888.

One of the most striking examples of inequitable legislation to be found upon the statute books exists in the case of a certain class of soldiers and sailors, veterans of the civil war, against whom the technical charge of desertion appears of record. The circumstances which have brought about these inequitable conditions may be briefly stated as follows:

In the spring of 1865 a considerable period of time elapsed during which the Army and Navy were not in active service, the exigencies of the war being over, while at the same time the steps necessary to a formal disbandment of the forces had not been taken. Men who had left their homes willingly to enter the Army or the Navy, and who had remained in the service faithfully during the activities of the war, understanding that the period of public peril had passed, and that the purposes of their enlistment had been substantially served, quietly returned to their homes and resumed their places in civil life, in very many cases without awaiting the formality of a discharge.

The manner in which the individual members of these great well-trained and efficient organizations, immediately and without confusion or disorder of any kind, reentered the civil body politic from which they had come, and took up again the pursuits of private business, has elicited the admiration of students of American national polity. But however admirable and desirable from the point of view of the political economist the speedy reentry into productive industry of soldiers and sailors no longer needed for active duty may have been, in all cases where such reentry was made without awaiting the arrival of formal papers of discharge, it was, from a military point of view, irregular; and the soldiers and sailors who, when the war was over, thus returned to their homes were technically guilty of the offense of desertion. In later years when seeking official employment, applying for admission to military or naval organizations, or desiring to obtain a pension, such men, conscious of their patriotic and honorable service, have been astonished to find that upon the records they are rated as deserters.

By an act of Congress approved August 14, 1888, it was provided that where men in such situation had served faithfully in the Navy for a period of at least six months during the war of the rebellion and until May 1, 1865, the mark of desertion might, in certain described meritorious cases, be removed. The operation of this act was limited to five years, doubtless because it was supposed at the time of its enactment that such period would be sufficient to afford all applicants thereunder an opportunity to present their requests for relief. It happened, however, that many of the men entitled to the benefits of this remedial provision did not ascertain their true status until after the act itself had expired by limitation, as they did not seek to obtain pensions until reduced to the necessity of so doing through advancing years or misfortune.

But whatever the cause, the records of this Department show that a very large number of meritorious claimants who could have obtained relief under this act, as falling within the class for whose benefit it was obviously intended, failed to make application in season; and the technical charge of desertion in their cases still debars them from rights and privileges fairly earned by honorable service in time of war. The inequity of these conditions is emphasized by the fact that an act passed for the benefit of the Army, and similar in terms to the

act of August 14, 1888, has been made operative without limitation as to the time when applications thereunder must be filed.

It is earnestly recommended that Congress be asked to take such action as will revive and render operative without limitation the beneficial provisions of the act of August 14, 1888.

RETIREMENT OF ENLISTED MEN OF THE NAVY.

The act approved March 3, 1899, "to reorganize and increase the efficiency of the personnel of the Navy and Marine Corps of the United States," contains, in section 17, a provision for the voluntary retirement of enlisted men and appointed petty officers after thirty years' service with the rank and three-fourths of the pay and allowances of the rank or rating held at the date of retirement. Active service in the Navy or in the Army or Marine Corps, either as volunteer or regular, during the civil or Spanish-American wars is counted as double time in computing the thirty years' service requisite to retirement, and except in cases of physical disqualification for service, it is further provided that applicants for the benefits of this clause must be at least 50 years of age.

The enactment of some provision for the retirement of enlisted men of the Navy has been urgently recommended in preceding annual reports, and it is believed that the operation of the statute referred to will prove of great advantage to the service. The prospect of honorable retirement at the conclusion of the prescribed period of active service will induce a desirable class of men to enlist and will tend to discourage desertion and other offenses which result in debarring those guilty of them from the benefits of continuous service. The statute embodies, furthermore, a just recognition of the claims of enlisted men in the Navy, whose services are entitled to consideration on the part of the Government, but who have not heretofore had the privileges of retirement enjoyed by enlisted men of the Army and Marine Corps.

CIVILIAN WITNESSES BEFORE NAVAL COURTS.

The necessity of the enactment of some provision of law empowering naval courts-martial and courts of inquiry to secure the testimony of civilian witnesses is a matter of growing importance. In this respect a gradual but marked change in the relations of the Navy generally, and particularly in the circumstances and conditions under which naval courts-martial exercise their functions, has taken place in recent years. During the period when the Navy was composed largely or exclusively of sailing vessels it was doubtless true that the majority of offenses were committed on board ship and at sea, in which case the witnesses were of course persons in the naval service.

In these days of steamships and comparatively short voyages, offenses committed at sea are, as a rule, few and relatively unimportant. Reference to the records will justify the statement that a very large proportion of the serious offenses for the punishment of which courts-martial are convened now occur at navy-yards or stations, or during the period when a naval vessel is in port and while officers and men are ashore on duty or otherwise. In such cases it very frequently occurs that the facts necessary to establish the guilt or innocence of a person accused lie either in part or wholly within the knowledge of civilians who, under existing laws, are not required to respond to any order or subpœna issued by a naval court-martial.

Without enlarging upon the failures of justice which must necessarily result from this defect in the law, which cripples naval courts in the discharge of the functions for which they were created, I venture to invite attention to the following measure, which, during the last Congress was considered and passed by the Senate, although it was not reached in the House:

Be it enacted, etc., That a naval court-martial or court of inquiry shall have power to issue like process to compel witnesses to appear and testify which courts of criminal jurisdiction within the State, Territory, or district where such naval court shall be ordered to sit may lawfully issue.

SEC. 2. That where any person duly summoned as a witness before a naval court-martial or court of inquiry, as provided in the first section of this act, makes default in attending, or, being in attendance as a witness, refuses to take the oath legally required by the court, or refuses to answer any question put to him as such witness to which the court may legally require an answer, or refuses to produce any document in his custody or control legally required by the court to be produced by him, or, in the presence of the court, is guilty of any other act of contempt, the president of such naval court may certify the offense of such person to the nearest United States court, to be by that court inquired into, and after examination of any witnesses that may be produced against or for the person so accused, and after hearing any statement that may be offered in defense, such United States court shall, if it seems just, punish such witness in like manner as if he had committed the offense in a proceeding before that court.

It is believed that this measure will, if enacted into law, provide a satisfactory remedy for the evils complained of without in any way operating harshly in its practical administration.

DEPOSITIONS.

In consequence of the peculiar duty on which the officers and men of the Navy are engaged, necessitating their frequent transfer from one station to another and their assignment to duty in different parts of the world from time to time, as the needs of the service require, it very frequently happens that they can not be present before naval courts-martial and courts of inquiry to give testimony with respect to matters lying within their knowledge.

It is provided by the Navy Regulations that certain preliminary investigations and reports be made in all cases where doubt exists as to whether or not a general court martial should be convened for the trial of an accused person, and pending these proceedings officers whose testimony is desirable, either on behalf of the prosecution or the defense, may be sent to distant stations. If the testimony of such officers is essential, they must be ordered to appear before the court at whatever expense and loss of time the necessary travel may occasion, or the trial must be abandoned. Such embarrassments, which frequently arise, could of course be prevented by the enactment of a properly guarded provision authorizing the use of depositions before naval courts martial. Congress has heretofore had before it a draft of a measure introduced by a member of the Naval Committee of the House, which provided that:

The depositions of witnesses stationed or residing at such a distance from the place at which a naval court is ordered to sit, or who are under orders and about to go to such a distance that it is not practicable to secure their personal attendance without incurring great expense or serious loss of time, if taken on reasonable notice to the opposite party and duly authenticated, may be put in evidence before such court in cases not capital.

It is believed that the use of depositions in proper cases would tend to reduce the expenses attending courts-martial on the one hand, and on the other would prove of material value in promoting the ends of

justice by placing at the disposal of the prosecution or the defense, as the case may be, evidence which must, in the absence of authority for their use, be dispensed with whenever it happens that witnesses are so far away or are engaged upon such duty that it is not deemed proper to order them to appear before the court.

It is proper to add that under the provisions of article 91 of the Articles of War depositions have long been in use before courts-martial in the Army.

NAVAL EXAMINING AND RETIRING BOARDS.

Attention is respectfully invited to the desirability of simplifying the present system under which examinations are conducted by naval examining and retiring boards. As the law now stands, a naval officer ordered to appear for examination for promotion and found by the medical members thereof to be physically disqualified for the duties of the next higher grade must be ordered before a retiring board. The retiring board may agree with the medical board or it may not, and in case of disagreement delay in the disposition of the case is occasioned. Such a system, necessitating the consideration of a single case by two separate boards, is cumbrous and unsatisfactory.

The method prescribed by the act of October 1, 1890, for the examination of officers of the Army, and by a subsequent act made applicable to the Marine Corps, is much more simple and expeditious in its operation, inasmuch as the examining boards prescribed by that act are empowered to serve as retiring boards also, should occasion arise, thus doing away with the prolix and occasionally unconclusive method of dealing with the matter by two separate boards.

It is recommended that Congress be asked to make the provisions of the act of October 1, 1890, so far as they relate to the order of procedure, applicable to the Navy.

CLASSIFICATION OF VESSELS.

By the provisions of sections 1529 and 1530 of the Revised Statutes the following classification of vessels of the Navy is made:

SEC. 1529. The vessels of the Navy of the United States shall be divided into four classes, and shall be commanded, as nearly as may be, as follows:

First rates, by commodores; second rates, by captains; third rates, by commanders; fourth rates, by lieutenant-commanders.

SEC. 1530. Steamships of forty guns or more shall be classed as first rates, those of twenty guns and under forty as second rates, and all those of less than twenty guns as third rates.

The changes which have taken place in naval construction during the latter half of the present century have been so radical that the foregoing classification of ships of war, prescribed by law hardly fifty years ago, has become obsolete. The line of battle ship, which, under this classification would have been ranked as a "first-rate," with its wooden hull, tier on tier of muzzle-loading guns and lofty spars, bears little resemblance to a battle ship of the first class of the present time, with its comparatively low, heavily-armored hull, revolving turrets, small number of powerful breech-loading guns, and military masts. Under the classification fixed by the sections of the Revised Statutes above quoted no proper place can be found for such a battle ship, or for modern cruisers, torpedo boats, or vessels of the monitor type. The requirement that "first-rates" be commanded as nearly as may be by commodores is likewise obsolete, the grade of commodore, so far as the active list of the Navy is concerned, having been abolished.

The classification of naval vessels according to the number of guns carried not being applicable to existing conditions, and it being undesirable to retain upon the statute books requirements which can not be carried out, it is recommended that Congress be asked to so change the statute as to establish a classification adapted to modern naval construction. While speed, armor protection, effectiveness of battery, and other considerations might be taken into account in making such a classification, it is believed that the division of naval vessels into classes according to tonnage would prove in practice perhaps the most simple and satisfactory that could be adopted.

SALE OF FORT MIFFLIN LANDS.

By an act approved January 6, 1893 (27 Stats., 414), the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy were authorized to sell at such price as might be agreed upon by the Attorney-General and themselves, and convey to the International Navigation Company a tract of land in the vicinity of Fort Mifflin, on the river Delaware, described in a certain deed mentioned in the act. After a somewhat extended correspondence and the adjustment of a number of incidental questions arising in connection with the transaction, the sale of the tract was, on the 30th of August last, completed, and the price agreed upon—$16,000—has been paid by the International Navigation Company.

PRIZE CLAIMS.

The act of Congress approved March 3, 1899, contains the following clause:

> And all provisions of law authorizing the distribution among captors of the whole or any portion of the proceeds of vessels, or any property hereafter captured, condemned as prize, or providing for the payment of bounty for the sinking or destruction of vessels of the enemy hereafter occurring in time of war, are hereby repealed.

Inasmuch as the provisions of this clause are not retroactive, they do not in any way affect claims for prize money or bounty which accrued prior to March 3, 1899, the date of the passage of the act in which they were embodied, and the adjudication of such claims, based upon captures made during the war with Spain, has accordingly gone forward under the provisions of sections 4613 to 5141, inclusive, of the Revised Statutes.

To avoid unnecessary delay in departmental examination of the claims of officers and men to share in prize money, such claims, so far as received and found to be in due form, have been from time to time transmitted to the Auditor for the Navy Department for settlement in all cases where this Department has been advised of the condemnation of the captured vessels to which they relate.

The following statement shows the cases in which such action has been taken:

Adula	U. S. S. Rodgers, Manning, Resolute, Marblehead, Annapolis, Ericsson, Vixen, and Porter.
Ampala	U. S. S. Vicksburg, Newport, Wilmington, and Marietta.
Antonio y Paca	U. S. S. Newport.
Argonauta	U. S. S. Nashville, Marblehead, and Eagle.
Antonio Suarez	U. S. S. Uncas.
Auquedita	U. S. S. Mangrove.
Ambrosio Bolivar	U. S. S. Terror, Foote, and Machias.

Buena Ventura	U. S. S. Indiana, Cincinnati, New York, Nashville, Iowa, Newport, Machias, Foote, Dupont, Wilmington, and Porter.
Belle Yuez	U. S. S. Hudson, Pompey, and Uncas.
Benito Estenger	U. S. S. Hornet.
Candita	U. S. S. Wilmington, Porter, and Cushing.
Cristina	U. S. S. Hudson.
Domingo Aurelia	U. S. S. Maple and Topeka.
Engracia	U. S. S. Newport.
Espana	U. S. S. Newport and revenue cutter Morrill.
Emanuel Raoul	U. S. S. Hornet.
Expresso de Gibara	U. S. S. Nashville.
Frasquita	U. S. S. Montgomery and Indiana.
Fernandito	U. S. S. Vicksburg.
Guido	U. S. S. Terror, Machias, and Foote.
Gibara	U. S. S. Nashville.
Gallito	U. S. S. Eagle.
Lorenzo	U. S. S. Detroit, Terror, New York, Niagara, Montgomery, and Porter.
Lola	U. S. S. Dolphin.
Matilda	U. S. S. Porter.
Maria Dolores	U. S. S. Eagle.
Mascotta	U. S. S. Foote, Machias, Terror, and Leyden.
Newfoundland	U. S. S. Mayflower.
Oriente	U. S. S. Vicksburg, Tecumseh, and Mangrove.
Panama	U. S. S. Indiana, New York, Mangrove, and Wilmington.
Pedro	U. S. S. New York.
Paquita	U. S. S. Newport.
Pinero	U. S. S. Newport.
Poder de Dios	U. S. S. Newport.
Quatro de September	U. S. S. Helena.
Rosas, Carlos F	U. S. S. Terror and New York.
Restormel	U. S. S. St. Paul.
Santiago Apostol	U. S. S. Mayflower and Annapolis.
Sofia	U. S. S. Cushing, Wilmington, and Porter.
Severita	U. S. S. Mayflower and Newport.
Spanish schooner (name unknown—probably Santiago Apostol).	Captured by Mayflower, May 8, 1898; U. S. S. Vicksburg.
Spanish schooner (name unknown—probably Severito).	Captured by Newport, May 9, 1898; U. S. S. Vicksburg.
Tres Hermanas	U. S. S. Terror, Machias, and Foote.
Twickenham	U. S. S. St. Louis.

The claims of the U. S. S. *Scorpion* and the U. S. S. *Osceola* for the capture on July 3, 1898, of a certain lighter, loaded with provision for Manzanillo, and the claim of the U. S. S. *Eagle* against the Spanish steamer *Santo Domingo*, captured near the Isle of Pines, Cuba, July 12, 1898, were referred to the Attorney-General, with request that appropriate proceedings be instituted in the United States district court for the eastern district of New York, by which tribunal, it is understood, these cases are now being considered.

The Spanish steamer *Rita* was captured by the U. S. S. *Yale*, a vessel belonging to the fleet of the International Navigation Company, but at the time under charter for service with the Navy, partially officered from the Navy, and having on board a marine guard, although otherwise manned by employees of the company. In accordance with precedents established in like cases during the civil war, the Government interposed no objection to the distribution of the proceeds of this seizure among the captors, in accordance with such decree as a prize court might render in the case, and distribution was, accordingly, in this instance, made, not by the Auditor, but by the United States district court for South Carolina, before which proceedings were instituted.

It is understood that the following cases have been carried to the Supreme Court of the United States on appeal and are now, with the exceptions noted, under consideration by that court:

OCTOBER TERM, 1898.

No. 350. Buena Ventura.
No. 372. Pedro.
No. 378. Miguel Jover. Dismissed by stipulation.
No. 379. Catalina. Dismissed by stipulation.
No. 381. Guido.
No. 389. Panama.
No. 596. Newfoundland.
No. 628. Adula.
No. 683. Bonita Estenger.
No. 704. Olinde Rodrigues. Dismissed with costs.
No. 753. Carlos F. Rosas.

OCTOBER TERM, 1899.

No. 323. Lorenzo. Filed and dismissed.
No. 395. Paquete Habana.
No. 396. Lola.

BOUNTY.

Claims for prize money are entirely distinct from claims for bounty in so far as the procedure necessary to be entered into for their recovery is concerned. Prize money is realized from the condemnation and sale under the supervision and authority of a United States court of captured vessels or other property; such property must be taken into court or its absence accounted for, and when the proceedings are concluded the net amount to be distributed is deposited with an assistant treasurer of the United States for use in the settlement of claims allowed by the Auditor in pursuance of decrees of court. In the case of claims for bounty (section 4635 of the Revised Statutes) for the destruction of vessels of the enemy, however, no property exists from which a fund for the payment of such claims can be realized, and no method of procedure is explicitly prescribed by statute.

In order to settle claims for bounty it is necessary that certain facts be first ascertained and established, among which are, on the one hand, the names, number, and character of the vessels destroyed, their complement, armament, and aggregate force, as compared with that of the victors, and perhaps also the degree of cooperation extended to them by shore batteries, torpedoes, and mines; and with respect to the capturing vessels it is necessary to determine their identity and national character, their number, their offensive and defensive equipment, and the names and rates of pay of their officers and men. In certain cases these questions, or some of them, are obviously simple; in others, their ascertainment must depend either upon the interpretation to be placed on the law or upon the settlement of controverted questions of fact involving the elaborate examination of evidence adduced by parties interested in support of their respective claims.

With such matters the machinery of an executive department is not well adapted to deal. Moreover, after attempted settlement by this Department, or by the accounting officers of the Treasury, all or any of the questions involved might have been immediately reopened by dissatisfied claimants and carried into the courts. For this reason, upon conference with and in pursuance of the views of the Attorney-General, it was decided to submit the material questions arising in

connection with claims for bounty to the Court of Claims for such judicial action as would result in determining them promptly and finally.

Accordingly the following claims have been submitted to that court:

Character of claim.	Claimants, etc.
Manila Bay, May 1, 1898	Olympia, Baltimore, Raleigh, Boston, Concord, Petrel, McCulloch. Individual claim of Pay Inspector Bellows. Report of Admiral Dewey, U. S. N., that in his judgment enemy's force was superior to United States force.
Santiago, July 3, 1898, destruction of Spanish fleet.	U. S. S. Oregon, Brooklyn, Indiana, Iowa, Gloucester, New York, Texas, Vixen, Hist, Suwanee, Manning, Ericsson, and Resolute. Individual claim of Takematsu Kameya, cabin steward on board of Oregon; Passed Assistant Engineer Robert S. Talbot, U. S. N.; Lieut. A. H. Davis, U. S. N., and letter of Commander J. G. Eaton, U. S. N., relative to claim of Resolute.
Reina Mercedes, sinking of	U. S. S. New York, Indiana, Massachusetts, Oregon, Texas, Vesuvius, and Suwance.
Santiago, Cuba, surrender of, July 16, 1898	U. S. S. Yale.
Santiago and eastern Province of Cuba, vessels taken by terms of capitulation of.	U. S. S. Texas.
Terror, Spanish torpedo boat destroyer, destruction of, off San Juan, June 22, 1898.	U. S. S. St. Paul. Report of Capt. W. M. Folger, U. S. N.
Antonio-Lopez, destruction of, off San Juan, Porto Rico, June 28, 1898.	U. S. S. Yosemite.
Niquero and Manzanillo, June 30, 1898, destruction of Spanish gunboats and other vessels in battle of.	U. S. S. Hist.
Manzanillo, Cuba, July 18, 1898, destruction of Spanish gunboats and other vessels in harbor of.	U. S. S. Wilmington, Wompatuck, Hornet, Hist, Osceolo, and Helena.
Don Jorge Juan, sinking of, Nipe Bay, Cuba, July 21, 1898.	U. S. S. Wasp, Annapolis, and Leyden. Letter of Lieutenant Ward relative to claim of Wasp.

ACQUISITION OF PATENT RIGHTS.

In previous annual reports the enactment by Congress of some measure providing for the acquisition by the Government, upon equitable terms, of the right to manufacture and use devices patented by officers of the Navy has been recommended. Such a measure, which had received the indorsement of the Department, was considered by the last Congress, but was rejected, as I am constrained to believe, through misapprehension of its scope and purpose. The necessity for the enactment of some provision of law controlling this subject grows more apparent from year to year, as in the course of naval development a wider range of inventions is drawn upon for the equipment of ships of war, and the recommendation heretofore made, that Congress be asked to consider the matter, is renewed.

NAVAL PRISONS.

While unable to make a personal inspection of the naval prison at Mare Island, California, I have every reason to believe, from reports received from that institution, considered in connection with the entire absence of complaints from any source on the subject, that it has been well managed, and is meeting satisfactorily the requirements of the service for such an institution on the Pacific coast.

As the result of my annual visit to the naval prison at Boston, I am able to say with confidence that it is in all respects a model penal institution, well adapted to the disciplinary requirements of the naval service.

LAW LIBRARY.

The office of the Judge-Advocate-General of the Navy has never been provided with a law library. From time to time heretofore, when the limited contingent fund was available and when any of it could be spared for such purpose, a few text books, absolutely indispensable "tools of trade," have been purchased. Aside from this the office has no equipment of law books or books of reference whatever, with the exception of reports of the Supreme Court of the United States, the Court of Claims, Opinions of the Attorneys-General, Decisions of the Accounting Officers of the Treasury, and such other publications as are furnished to officers of the Government generally, through the superintendent of documents or other official sources. The office does not even possess the reports of the United States circuit and district courts; has no sets of State reports, and is almost wholly without modern treatises on those specialties of the law necessary to be examined when any exhaustive research in a particular line of inquiry is undertaken. In such case, since the Navy Department is likewise without a satisfactory law library, this office is reduced to the necessity of borrowing from other departments. Notwithstanding the uniform courtesy extended by the custodians of the law libraries in this building and in the Department of Justice, the practice of borrowing law books and books of reference is open to serious objection, if on no other ground, certainly by reason of the inconvenience and loss of time thereby occasioned.

The number, variety, and difficulty of the purely legal questions referred to this office for examination annually increase with the development and growing activities of the Navy, and this fact emphasizes the desirability of providing the Judge-Advocate-General's Office with a suitable law library without longer delay.

I have thought it my duty to invite attention to this matter and to recommend that it be given such consideration and favorable commendation to Congress as may be deemed proper.

Respectfully submitted.

SAM. C. LEMLY,
Judge-Advocate-General.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

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REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE BUREAU OF YARDS AND DOCKS.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
BUREAU OF YARDS AND DOCKS,
Washington, D. C., October 1, 1899.

SIR: In compliance with the directions contained in the Department's letter of July 11, 1899, I have the honor to submit a report of the operations of the Bureau of Yards and Docks for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1899, accompanied with a set of annual estimates for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1901:

The expenditures under this Bureau during the fiscal year at all the yards and stations have aggregated $2,814,626.90.

Contracts have been entered into within the year ended June 30, 1899, numbering 78, and involving the expenditure of $3,447,212.34.

Of the many works of improvement carried on a considerable portion was rendered necessary by the Spanish war. Some of these were completed in the early months of the fiscal year, and others of greater extent, projected then, were continued throughout the year. Notable among these were the installation or extension of the electric-light systems at the following yards and stations, viz: Boston, New York, Washington, Port Royal, and Pensacola—which was done to meet demands for night work in the time of war or unusual activity from other causes—alterations and modifications in workshops, construction of additional storehouses and workshops, and coal houses and coal handling facilities.

In addition to these were many improvements appropriated for by way of the gradual development of the yards in the future, and without special reference to the emergencies of the past fiscal year.

Extensive dredging operations have been carried on at the Mare Island, League Island, and New York navy-yards, by way of improving the navigation at the first and last named yards, and the construction of a capacious fresh-water basin at League Island.

Permanent quay walls have been constructed at several of the navy yards to supplant temporary timber wharves and to extend the wharfing accommodations upon portions of the water front where none has heretofore existed.

A large amount of paving and grading has been done, and at several yards upon avenues which have not heretofore been surfaced. In even the most important yards the streets are paved to a small extent only, and many of those with pavements of inferior quality. Modern pavements are being laid down which will be durable, smooth, and sightly.

The damages sustained at the Mare Island Navy-Yard by the earthquake, referred to in the last annual report, and to repair which Congress made a special appropriation of $350,000, have been practically made good in the restoration of buildings entirely destroyed and the repairs of those injured.

During the fiscal year naval stations at Havana and San Juan have come under the charge of the Navy Department, at which points this Bureau has made expenditures. These, however, have been only for the ordinary repairs to the public works and improving and maintaining their sanitary condition.

In the act of May 4, 1898, Congress appropriated for one steel floating dry dock, to be located at the naval reservation at Algiers, La., to be capable of lifting a vessel of 15,000 tons displacement. General specifications were issued for this work and proposals invited, to be accompanied with competitive designs. The limit of cost was placed at $850,000. The offer of the Maryland Steel Company was accepted for the construction of a dry dock upon its designs for the sum of $810,000. The contract was executed on April 10 last, work has begun in the shops, and preparations are being made for the construction of the dock at Sparrow's Point, Md., to be towed to its destination at Algiers upon its completion at the former point.

Of the four timber dry docks appropriated for by the same act, as modified by the act of March 3, 1899, contracts have been let for three, to be located at Portsmouth, N. H., Boston, Mass., and Mare Island,

Cal. Authority having been granted by Congress for the construction of two of these dry docks of granite or concrete lined with granite, the Department, in the exercise of its discretion, decided to build those at Portsmouth and Boston of the latter materials.

The dry dock at the Boston Navy-Yard was contracted for after public competition upon plans and specifications prepared by this Bureau, and the award was made to O'Brien & Sheehan, of New York, for the dry dock proper, including the caisson, for the sum of $883,400. The contract for machinery was let to Farrell & Hopper, of New York, the lowest bidders, for the sum of $130,000, making the total contract price for this dock $1,013,400. The work has been commenced, favorable progress is being made, and up to the present time there is promise that it will be completed within the time limit of two and one-half years.

The dry dock for the Mare Island Navy-Yard, which is to be of timber, was also advertised from plans and specifications prepared by the Bureau, and the award was made to the Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company, of New York, for the entire work at $729,000. The contract was entered into and the work is now in progress.

The dry dock at Portsmouth, N. H., was contracted for with John Peirce, of New York, for the sum of $1,089,000, upon plans and specifications substantially similar to those for the Boston dry dock.

These structures are in accordance with the requirements of Congress as to the character of material and dimensions, and are of a capacity to receive the largest vessels of the service or those likely to be employed as auxiliary cruisers in time of war. The principal dimensions are:

	Feet.
Length	750
Width on the floor	80
Draft at mean high water	30

The dry dock designed for the League Island Navy-Yard, which is to be of timber, was open to public competition after the preparation of plans and specifications, but, owing to the indefinite character of the lowest bid, it was deemed wise to reject all and open the work for competition a second time. It was accordingly advertised again and bids are to be opened in a few days.

At the beginning of the fiscal year a camp was constructed at the Portsmouth Navy Yard, on Seavey's Island, for the accommodation of the Spanish prisoners who were captured in the naval battle of Santiago on the 3d of July. The accommodations consisted of about 24 structures of all kinds, fitted for the use of about 1,600 men. The buildings were erected in a few days, at a total cost of about $25,000, and were destroyed when they were no longer needed for the purpose, when the prisoners were released.

A destructive fire visited the New York Navy-Yard in February last, consuming the steam engineering machine shop and portions of the boiler shop, erecting shop, boiler house, etc. The loss, represented by the original cost of the buildings totally destroyed and the cost to repair those injured, amounted to about $640,000. The origin of this fire is unknown. Temporary provisions were made for carrying on the work of the department of steam engineering and it is now proceeding, although with much inconvenience. Congress promptly made an appropriation for the construction of new buildings and repairs to

those injured, and the latter have been put into condition for use. Plans and specifications for the main building were completed, but the lowest bid being in excess of the amount of the appropriation therefor, modifications were made in the design and new proposals were invited.

The operations of the year are given in detail under the head of each yard and station, as follows:

OPERATIONS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1898-99.

NAVY-YARD, PORTSMOUTH, N. H.

The expenditures during the fiscal year have been as follows:

Yard improvements	$13,034.95
Repairs and preservation	27,077.50
Maintenance	21,914.54
Civil establishment	5,844.50
Emergency fund	24,840.15
Total	92,711.64

YARD IMPROVEMENTS.

No works of improvement have been prosecuted at this yard during the fiscal year. Preparations have been made looking to the construction of a dry dock under the acts making appropriation for four timber dry docks, approved May 4, 1898, and March 3, 1899. Careful examinations were made of several sites considered available for locating such a structure by making careful surveys of the situations and boring to determine the character of the material in which the dock could be founded. The preliminary work in the way of studies and plans was with a view to constructing this dry dock of timber, but Congress having amended the original act at its last session to allow the Secretary of the Navy to construct a second of these four dry docks of stone and concrete, it was determined to build the additional dock of these materials at this navy-yard. Upon this decision being rendered, plans and specifications for such a dock were prepared, and as a result of the surveys and borings referred to above, it was decided to locate it in Jenkins' Gut, a channel separating the yard proper from Seavey's Island, and the plans were perfected for this location. They were completed near the close of the fiscal year. Proposals were invited by public advertisement, and bids were opened upon the 26th of August last. The award of the contract has been made to Mr. John Peirce, of New York, at $1,089,000. The expenditure under the head of improvements was upon preliminary work.

REPAIRS AND PRESERVATION.

Yard buildings.—At this yard there have been expended, for its repair and preservation, materials and labor of a total cost of about $27,000. This has been applied chiefly to the yard buildings, many of which had received only slight repairs during a long term of years, and required various slight modifications to adapt them to present service.

Other expenditures under this head were upon officers' quarters, water and gas works, and miscellaneous repairs.

MAINTENANCE.

The expenditures for the general maintenance of the yard aggregated $21,914.54, the principal items being for the maintenance of teams, fuel, cleaning and clearing up the yard, the pay of watchmen, and telephone system.

EMERGENCY FUND.

Spanish prisoners. In July, 1898, the Spanish prisoners who were captured in the naval battle of July 3 of the same year were landed at the Portsmouth Navy-Yard, numbering in all about 1,600. For their accommodation barracks and other buildings were constructed upon Seavey's Island under allotments from appropriation Emergency Fund. The buildings constituting the camp were as follows:

11 houses used as barracks, 100 by 10 feet.
1 house, 60 by 18 feet.
1 house for officers' quarters, 56 by 52 feet.
1 mess hall, 200 by 75 feet.
1 cook house, 100 by 18 feet.
1 wash house, 50 by 7 feet.
3 outhouses, one 50 by 8 feet and two 6 by 4 feet.
6 sentry boxes, 4 by 4 feet.

These buildings were all of undressed timber, hemlock and spruce, one story high, of simple and cheap construction, with single-pitched roofs covered with tarred paper to render them water-tight. The barracks and all inclosed houses had windows on all sides of glazed movable sashes, and skylights in the roof. They were blocked up a few feet above the ground, so that the air circulated freely underneath. The house for the officers, also of unfinished lumber, contained bedrooms, mess hall, and veranda, and was built of the same material as the barracks, the sides covered with tarred paper and the roof with tarred felting. The mess hall, mentioned as being 200 by 75 feet, was 12 feet high, but had no sides, and when food was not being served in it it was used by the prisoners for shelter from rain or the sun, and as a place where they could meet and amuse themselves. The buildings were whitewashed and kept very clean. The bedrooms were provided with bunks for the officers. In the barracks for enlisted men no bunks were erected, but all slept in hammocks, which were swung at night and taken down in the morning, leaving the rooms clear for occupation by the prisoners when they preferred to be indoors. The buildings were erected in a few days at a total cost of $24,840.15.

The remains of such of the prisoners as died during their confinement were buried upon the island a short distance from the camp. The graves have been carefully marked and inclosed with a neat fence, and the premises cared for.

NAVY-YARD, BOSTON, MASS.

The expenditures during the fiscal year have been as follows:

Yard improvements	$52,861.91
Repairs and preservation	38,025.41
Maintenance	37,337.39
Civil establishment	6,557.58
Contingent	467.80
National defense	2,155.85
Total	137,405.94

YARD IMPROVEMENTS.

Dry dock.— Under the expenditures for improvements appropriated for especially by Congress, additional culverts were inserted in the caisson of the stone dry dock to enable the dock to be filled in a shorter time than has been possible heretofore, thus saving considerable time when expedition in the docking of vessels is important.

Landing wharf for receiving ship.—Under the appropriation for repairing and extending wharves, a new landing wharf was built for the receiving ship, as it became necessary to change her situation in the channel in order to give to the contractors for the construction of a new dry dock the space necessary for the construction of a cofferdam and other work.

Wharf No. 6.—A contract has also been entered into for the repair and extension of wharf No. 6, in order to afford better wharf facilities.

Extension to electric light plant.—An appropriation of $50,000 having been made for extension to the electric-light plant of this yard, contracts were entered into for engines, dynamos, condensers, etc., and their foundations. Contracts were also made for the boiler plant and another for an extension of the wiring system for electric lights. Work under these three contracts was begun early in the present calendar year, but had not been completed at the end of the fiscal year. When these contracts are completed and the permanent buildings provided for by the last Congress are erected, the electric plant will be ample for the purposes of the Bureau, and modern and efficient in every respect.

Dredging.—Of the appropriation of $35,000 for dredging operations at this yard, about one-half has been expended in the removal of 58,000 cubic yards of material from the river front, deepening the draft of water in the slips at the north end of the yard to 30 feet at mean low water. A berth was also dredged for the receiving ship in the new location assigned her.

Building No. 42.— An appropriation was made for alterations in building No. 42, steam-engineering machine shop, and foundations for machinery to be contained therein; but the work necessary in order to make a satisfactory rearrangement of this building suited to the present purposes of the Bureau of Steam Engineering was found to be greater in extent than could be effected under the present appropriation, and a further appropriation for this object is recommended in another part of this report.

New dry dock.—The most important work of improvement undertaken during the year at this navy-yard was the construction of a new dry dock. The original provision for this work was embodied in the act approved May 4, 1898, which as originally framed contemplated the construction of four dry docks of timber, to be located at the navy-yards Portsmouth, N. H., Boston, Mass., League Island, Pa., and Mare Island, Cal. A proviso was added, however, before the measure became law which vested in the Secretary of the Navy authority to construct one of these dry docks of granite or concrete faced with granite, in which event the appropriation was to be increased from $825,000 to $1,025,000. Subsequently, in the act of March 3, 1899, the limit of cost was increased to $1,100,000. You exercised the privilege accorded by the act by deciding that the dry dock to be constructed at the Boston Navy-Yard should be of granite or concrete lined with granite. Preliminary surveys and borings were made upon the

site proposed for this dry dock, the situation being to the east of the present stone dry dock, distant 110 feet, and parallel thereto. The dry dock and its accessory structures were designed in this Bureau, and the work was advertised under date of December 29, 1898. Bids were opened January 31, 1899, and Messrs. O'Brien & Sheehan, of New York, being the lowest bidders for the dry dock structure proper, a contract was entered into with them dated March 14, 1899, for the sum of $883,400. Messrs. Farrell, Hopper & Co., of New York, being the lowest bidders for the machinery, including the pumping plant, capstans, winches, and generators, a contract was entered into with them for this portion of the work March 21, 1899, for the sum of $130,000, making the total contract price for the dock $1,013,400.

The borings made over the site of the dock indicated that the foundations for the structure would be sufficient without recourse to piling, and the bids were required to state a price for the pile foundations, which is to be deducted in the event that they be found unnecessary. This question will not be determined until the excavation is carried down to a level sufficient to indicate accurately the character of the soil, and if, as seems probable, the piling is omitted, the contract price will be reduced by the sum of $16,000. Should the foundations be found ample without the piling, it will be found practicable to build a concrete dock lined with granite of the best and most modern equipment, and of sufficient size to accommodate the largest naval vessels of the world, at a cost of $1,000,000. This will be, considering all the features of the work, the cheapest dry dock in every respect built in this country.

Possession of the dock site was tendered to the contractor on April 1, 1899, actual possession was taken on the 15th of the same month, and the work of excavation began one week later, upon the 22d. At the close of the fiscal year about 60,000 cubic yards had been excavated. Other work has been done, mostly in filling the material into the shallow basin on the east and bulkheading for the retention of material placed by scows in the same locality.

In the design of this dry dock it was deemed well to drive the pumps for pumping out the dock and the capstans by electric power, rather than steam, generated at the electric light and power station referred to in an earlier portion of this report. The pumping apparatus is also designed and located with a view to performing a similar duty for the present stone dry dock whenever the proper connections are made, abandoning the present pumping station at the head of the latter dock and avoiding much of the attendant expense.

REPAIRS AND PRESERVATION.

The repair and preservation of this yard during the year cost, for materials and labor applied, the sum of $38,025.41. More than one-half of this sum was expended upon various repairs to yard buildings, and the balance was devoted to officers' quarters and miscellaneous repairs, including wharves, pavements, heating apparatus, water-works, electric-light plant, etc.

MAINTENANCE.

Expenditures under maintenance amounted to a total of $37,337.39. They were principally for machinery, maintenance of teams, fuel, water tax, and pay of watchmen, the largest item being for fuel,

which amounted to nearly one-third of the total expenditure. This expense is for running the electric-light plant and heating buildings and quarters. Another large item of expense is that for water tax, involving nearly $8,000.

A very considerable amount of work upon vessels of the Navy was done at this yard during the war and since, and the expenditures for all purposes have been correspondingly great. The yard having been practically closed for several years, the buildings and other works had fallen into decay in many respects, and many expenses have been necessary in order to put them into better repair and adapt them to the present demands.

The construction of a new and first-class dry dock indicated an intention on the part of Congress to avail of this yard for the current work of the Navy in the future, and very much is yet needed in order to bring the works up into good condition.

SLIP FOR THE JOINT USE OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE FITCHBURG RAILROAD COMPANY.

In the last naval act, March 3, 1899, Congress provided for the construction of a slip or dock, partly upon the lands of the navy-yard and partly upon lands of the Fitchburg Railroad Company, for the joint use of the Government and the railroad company. The law provided that the slip should be 570 feet in length measured from the Harbor Commissioners' line as now established in front of the railroad company's property, with a total width of 160 feet, 20 feet of which were to be upon the lands of the company. The entire cost of the construction and maintenance of the slip is required to be borne by the railroad company. For the purpose of carrying its provisions into effect the act required the Secretary of the Navy to enter into a contract with the railroad company. The improvement was to be in accordance with plans prepared by the Navy Department, and in accordance with your instructions this Bureau has made designs and specifications for the work, which were finally accepted by the Fitchburg Railroad Company, prior to the expiration of the time within which the act required the construction to begin, September 3, 1899. The contract was also prepared and has been signed by the company. The designs provide for bordering the basin upon the lands of the Government with a substantial wall and the dredging of the basin to a depth of 30 feet at mean low water. Work was begun prior to September 3 last, but beyond a few days' work at that time nothing has been done toward constructing the slip.

NAVAL STATION, NEW LONDON, CONN.

The expenditures at this station have been has follows:

Yard improvements	$59,781.62
Repairs and preservation	1,288.01
Maintenance	4,556.03
Total	65,625.66

YARD IMPROVEMENTS.

Coal sheds or pockets.—An appropriation having been made for the construction of coal sheds or pockets at this station, in the act of July 7, 1898, after public advertisement for proposals a contract was

entered into with J. W. Hoffman & Co., of Philadelphia, dated November 14, 1898. Under this contract work was actively begun in March, 1899, and at the end of the fiscal year the foundations were practically completed and ready for the superstructure.

The appropriation for this work was $200,000. The work was contracted for at $137,500, and during the year the expenditures have been $59,781.62. It is expected that it will be completed this fall.

REPAIRS AND PRESERVATION AND MAINTENANCE.

The expenditures for repairs and preservation and maintenance have been small in extent, and only sufficient to take care of the property and save the buildings from serious deterioration. One of the officers' quarters at this station, House B, was destroyed by fire. It was unoccupied at the time, but the fire caught from burning grass in the vicinity bordering upon the public road. The origin of the fire is unknown. The value of the house and furniture was $1,896.69.

NAVAL STATION, SACKETT'S HARBOR, NEW YORK.

No expenditures were made at this point during the fiscal year except for the pay of the custodian and a few minor repairs, amounting in all to $419.35.

NAVY-YARD, NEW YORK.

The total expenditures at this navy-yard were as follows:

Yard improvements	$248,388.95
Repairs and preservation	130,799.63
Maintenance	78,145.96
Civil establishment	16,198.25
Contingent	37.00
National defense	10,382.15
Emergency	82,349.87
Total	566,301.81

YARD IMPROVEMENTS.

Dredging. Under an appropriation of $50,000, act of May 4, 1898, dredging operations were carried on during the fiscal year, principally in the eastern section of the Wallabout Channel, from Dry Dock No. 3 to the causeway, and in the Whitney Basin. Two hundred and seventy one thousand nine hundred and seventy-five cubic yards of material have been removed, and a depth of from 29 to 30 feet of water at mean low tide was attained, practically exhausting the appropriation.

Building No. 116. The storehouse for steel, for which $17,500 were appropriated by the act of May 4, 1898, has been completed and is now in use.

Building No. 117. During the war with Spain an additional storehouse was needed for the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, rendered necessary by the greatly increased quantity of stores it had to handle, and an allotment of $30,000 was made from the Emergency Fund, January 1, 1899, for its construction. This building, which was commenced in the previous fiscal year, was continued and practically completed.

Grading and sewers. The $10,000 appropriated by act of May 4,

1898, for grading and sewering between dry dock No. 3 and Clinton avenue have been expended as provided.

Grading and paving.—Another appropriation was made by the same act, amounting to $20,000, for grading and paving the causeway and about dry dock No. 3. This appropriation has been exhausted in the work provided for.

Paving yard streets.—The area in the vicinity of the north or coal dock has been graded and paved, as well as the two streets on the south side of building No. 33, under the funds amounting to $5,000, appropriated by the act of May 4, 1898.

Railroad system.—The act of July 7, 1898, provided $25,000 for the extension and reconstruction of the yard railroad system. This sum has been applied to laying 2.4 miles of track, connecting the principal storehouses and shops with the water front of the yard proper and Cob Dock. Two locomotives and several flat cars have been purchased, and old cars repaired. This system has proved of great value in the operations of the yard, reducing very much the cost of transportation, and expediting the work of the several bureaus.

Miscellaneous.—In addition to the above works completed during the fiscal year, there were various items of improvement of a small extent made under small balances of appropriations, allotments from National-Defense, Emergency Fund, etc., including railroad-track extension, quay-wall work, temporary buildings for the storage of supplies of various kinds, extension of electric lights in yard buildings, etc. There was also an expenditure at this yard of $8,248.15 upon the floating dry dock purchased in New York for service upon the Gulf coast. This expenditure was for taking this floating dock into graving dock, sheathing it with metal for service in southern waters, and fitting it for being towed to the Pensacola Navy-Yard.

Of other public works appropriated for by Congress, but which had not been completed during the fiscal year, were the following: Quay wall at coal dock, for the construction of which a contract was entered into in July, 1898. Considerable progress has been made, but it will be several months before it is completed. This section is to be 298 feet in length and the contract price is $99.50 per linear foot.

A quay wall from dry dock No. 1 to the Bishop derrick was contracted for in July, 1898, at $94.67 per linear foot. On account of the water front at this portion of the yard being urgently needed for berthing ships, the contractor postponed the work for six months at the request of the Government. It is now about two-thirds done.

A section of the wall authorized by the same act was undertaken by day labor, and about 550 linear feet have been entirely completed at a much more favorable cost than that contracted for.

When the above sections of quay wall are completed the entire water front of the yard proper will have a substantial wall with deep-water frontage.

Buildings for various purposes were begun during the fiscal year, under special appropriation therefor or under allotments from the Emergency Fund, and upon which more or less extended progress has been made. These include storehouse, building No. 31, a building for an electric-light plant, storehouse for equipment materials, and storehouse for ordnance materials. The last two buildings are being constructed under allotments from the Emergency Fund, act of January 1, 1899. The progress upon all these buildings has been slow, due chiefly

to delays in procuring structural steel, the market being in such condition that prompt deliveries are almost impossible to procure.

Extension of the electric light system.—An appropriation of $50,000 was made for an extension of the lighting system of the yard by act of July 7, 1898, and contracts have been entered into for dynamos, engines, and boiler plant, the greater portion of which has been delivered in the yard ready to install as soon as the building shall be completed.

Steam engineering buildings.—An appropriation was made for restoring these buildings, which were destroyed by the fire of February 15, 1899. The site has been cleared, ready for the erection of the buildings, plans and specifications for which were completed and advertised before the end of the fiscal year. As this fire destroyed the most important shop of the department of steam engineering, a temporary structure was erected at once, and has been in use a few months as a machine shop.

Dredging.—Under the appropriation for dredging, act of March 3, 1899, a contract was entered into near the close of the fiscal year for the removal of a half million cubic yards, and the work is in progress. The price at which this work was let, 16.7 cents per cubic yard, is the most favorable yet obtained for similar work at this navy-yard.

One hundred-ton crane, act of July 7, 1898.—A contract was entered into for the construction of this object at $100,000, after the receipt of proposals with competitive plans, to be completed in February next.

The Brown Hoisting and Conveying Machine Company are the designers upon the general specifications prepared by the Bureau. The work is in progress at the shops, the materials having been inspected preliminary thereto.

Dry Dock No. 3 (timber).—The repairs upon this dry dock, which were stated in the last annual report to be practically completed, were entirely finished on December 1, 1898. This is the dry dock which failed immediately after having been accepted from the contractor, in April, 1897. The repairs extended over a period of one year and nine months, and cost $171,360.76, $150,000 of which were borne by the special appropriations of $100,000 by act of June 26, 1897, and $50,000 by act of January 28, 1898. The dock has been in use since the completion of the repairs without any signs of further trouble.

The Navy Department has instituted a suit against the contractors who built the dock to recover on account of the cost of repairs rendered necessary by faulty construction.

REPAIRS AND PRESERVATION.

The expenditures under this head during the year, being labor and materials applied to the various objects, aggregated $130,799.63. About one half of this sum was applied to repairs to yard buildings. Other considerable work included repairs to officers' quarters, roads and walks, heating apparatus, water and electric-light works, repairs to dry docks, and miscellaneous repairs.

Building No. 9.—Under this appropriation extensive repairs and alterations were made in building No. 9, formerly a storehouse, to adapt it to use as an electrical workshop and for the care of electrical materials. The repairs so far as made have been of a most substantial character and with a view to making the building as far fireproof as possible.

Building No. 10.—This building, which is the construction and repair joiner shop and power house, has been extensively repaired, an entire new roof having been put upon the main part of the building. New steel and tile floors have been put in, and a complete heating system installed. The building has also been rewired and a complete electric-light installation effected.

Miscellaneous repairs.—Extensive repairs have also been made to the construction and repair blacksmith shop, the plumbers' shop, and the ordnance shop. Building No. 14, recently vacated by the Bureau of Construction and Repair, has been repaired and remodeled to some extent, and is being occupied as a yards and docks workshop. The upper floor of this building accommodates, in addition to the yards and docks woodworking department, the steam engineering and ordnance pattern-makers' division.

MAINTENANCE.

Under this appropriation the expenditures have been $78,145.96. The large items of expense have been for machinery, teams, fuel, electric lights, clearing up the yard, pay of watchmen, and water tax.

The proportion of the appropriation for general maintenance which could be allotted to this yard was insufficient for the proper support of the service, although a large sum.

NAVY-YARD, LEAGUE ISLAND, PA.

The expenditures during the fiscal year have been as follows:

Yard improvements	$199,045.55
Repairs and preservation	41,628.36
Maintenance	42,188.96
Civil establishment	5,454.25
Contingent	300.00
National defense	3,201.08
Emergency fund	22,992.07
Total	314,810.27

YARD IMPROVEMENTS.

Quay wall.—Of the works of improvement under appropriation for Navy-Yard, League Island, which have been completed during the fiscal year may be mentioned three several sections of quay wall which, while practically completed in previous years, were finally closed in the expenditure of the small balances in paving and grading the filling in the immediate rear. These sections were appropriated for in the acts of March 3, 1893, July 24, 1894, and March 2, 1895.

Miscellaneous.—The new boiler house for steam engineering, appropriated for by act of March 3, 1897, was completed during the year and put into service.

The roads and walks to the Reserve Basin, act of May 4, 1898, have been completed as far as the funds allowed. The sum expended during the year was $4,369.76.

The wharf crane, act of March 3, 1897, of 20 gross tons capacity, has been supplied, erected, tested, and accepted.

Weighing scales, act of March 3, 1897, two of 20 gross tons capacity

each, were erected, one near the dry dock and the other on the front west of Board street.

Dredging. The dredging of the fresh water basin and filling in, act of March 3, 1897, which were in progress at the beginning of the fiscal year were carried on until the funds were exhausted, in the continuation of the basin being constructed in the back channel of this navy yard. The completion of this portion of the work closed the contract with the New York Dredging Company, making the full depth of 30 feet at mean low water for a width of 300 feet on the bottom, for a total length of 2,000 feet. The entrance to the basin from the Schuylkill River is 26 feet at mean low water, with a bottom width of 200 feet. The material excavated under contract with the above-named company amounted to 1,168,419.81 cubic yards, at a total cost, including inspection, surveys, and incidental expenses, of $99,999.94.

Dredging and filling in, at a cost of $20,000, were authorized by act of May 4, 1898. This work was along the Delaware River front, including the slips upon this front, and along the sea wall east of Broad street. The total amount removed was 81,144 cubic yards, under a contract with the River and Harbor Improvement Company.

Boilers for electric-light plant. Under a special appropriation for steam generators for heating and electric-light purposes, Heine Safety boilers were installed in the place of the old plant removed, at a cost of about $5,500, and are now in service.

Cribs for mooring vessels. Fifty-six thousand dollars were appropriated by act of May 4, 1898, for cribs for mooring vessels in the back channel. Five of these, with their approaches, were constructed from the shore to the 30-foot depth of the Reserve Basin, which have been availed of for properly securing vessels placed in reserve in this basin. These works were completed in January, and afforded moorings for many vessels going out of commission since the close of the war. At the present time there are fifteen vessels accommodated.

West wall of causeway. Under the last act for the construction of the west wall of the causeway across the back channel, this work has been continued and completed save the concrete arch over the waterway connecting the east and west sides of the back channel.

Extension of reserve basin. Under appropriation by act of May 4, 1898, for an extension of the reserve basin, amounting to $120,000, a contract was entered into with the Bowers Hydraulic Dredging Company, under date of October 14, 1898, for the necessary dredging and filling in. During the fiscal year about $56,000 of this appropriation were expended, and about 240,000 cubic yards of material excavated. As in other contracts of this character, the material taken up in the process of dredging was deposited upon the yard for the purpose of raising its surface up to grade.

New coping for timber dry dock.—Under a special appropriation by Congress, the sum of $64,000 was made available for the construction of a new coping for the timber dry dock at this yard. Examinations of this work made more than two years ago showed that the upper portions, being those above mean low water, had decayed very seriously, requiring very extensive renewals, and, in the case of those parts at the entrance, involving enough movement of the side structure to create fear that the caisson would become fast in the groove, rendering it inoperative, if, indeed, serious collapse did not occur, and in order to obviate this last danger it has been the practice to shore

the abutments every time a vessel is taken in and the dock emptied of water. The repairs were not undertaken during the war with Spain, but are now under way, and it is expected that a few months will render the dock again safe for use for several years.

New dry dock.—Under an appropriation for four timber dry docks, one of which is required to be at the League Island Navy-Yard, examinations and surveys were made of the site proposed for this dock, which was recommended by a board of naval officers appointed for the selection. The location recommended is upon the Delaware River front, 1,040 feet west from the present timber dry dock. Plans and specifications were prepared for this work, for which the limit of cost is $825,000, and the work was advertised for bids before the end of the fiscal year.

REPAIRS AND PRESERVATION.

Under this head the expenditures for labor and material have amounted to $41,628.36. Of this sum nearly $18,000 have been applied to the yard buildings, about $6,500 to wharves, landings, etc., and about $6,000 to roads and walks. Three thousand dollars were applied to the dry dock and about $4,500 for repairs of a miscellaneous character.

MAINTENANCE.

For the general maintenance of the yard the expenditures amounted to $42,188.96. One-third of this was for the purchase of coal, which has become a very large item of expense at this as well as at all of the working yards.

Other considerable items of expense are teams, furniture for houses and offices, cleaning and clearing up yard, and attendance upon heating and lighting plants and fire engines.

NATIONAL DEFENSE.

Engine house for ship-fitters' shop.—Under appropriation National Defense, January 1, 1899, an engine house was built in connection with the ship-fitters' shop, to contain the engines operating the machinery in this building. Its construction grew out of the urgent need for this machinery during the war.

EMERGENCY FUND.

Steel storehouse.—A steel storehouse not appropriated for specifically by Congress, but allotted for from the Emergency Fund of January 1, 1899, was contracted for, completed, and accepted in February, 1899. The need for this building was very urgent during the war with Spain, which led to its construction. Its cost was $22,992.07.

NAVY-YARD, WASHINGTON, D. C.

The expenditures during the fiscal year have been as follows:

Yard improvements	$70,093.44
Repairs and preservation	54,837.06
Maintenance	21,432.05
Civil establishment	4,478.00
National defense	3,061.35
Emergency fund	3,064.60
Total	156,966.50

YARD IMPROVEMENTS.

The expenditures for improvements at the Washington yard during the fiscal year were $70,093.44. The principal outlays under this head were for a new storehouse for guns, authorized by act of May 4, 1898, and for the improvement and increase of the electric-light plant appropriated for by acts of May 4, 1898, and July 7, 1898. The works mentioned were very nearly completed during the fiscal year and some progress was made upon the new roofs for south gun shop and the quadrangle building.

REPAIRS AND PRESERVATION.

The chief expenditures for repairs were upon the yard buildings, roads and walks, tracks, and heating apparatus. The largest item was for bringing to grade the western portion of the yard, where several improvements have been carried on during the last two years, and it became necessary to raise the grade of the streets in this portion to conform as nearly as possible to the grades of the city of Washington in the vicinity of the yard. The expenditures for this item were about $17,000, and so much more work of this character is necessary that the Bureau has elsewhere recommended an appropriation for grading and paving.

MAINTENANCE.

The expenses for general maintenance were of a miscellaneous character, nearly one-third of the whole being for coal and other fuel. The other principal outlays were for machinery, maintenance of teams, furniture for houses and offices, and cleaning and clearing up the yard.

NATIONAL DEFENSE.

The expenditures under this appropriation were for installing additional machinery and wiring for lighting the shops for night and day work during the war with Spain.

NAVY-YARD, NORFOLK, VA.

The expenditures during the fiscal year have been as follows:

Yard improvements	$67,846.10
Repairs and preservation	75,988.55
Maintenance	45,265.75
Civil establishment	8,490.63
Contingent	753.46
National defense	3,144.40
Total	201,488.89

YARD IMPROVEMENTS.

Extension of tracks for locomotive crane.—This work consisted of laying tracks from the head of the timber dry dock to both sides of the granite dry dock. The amount expended was $12,570.11.

Repairs to timber dry dock.—A special appropriation was made by Congress on July 7, 1898, amounting to $15,000, for repairs to the timber dry dock, and the entire sum was expended during the fiscal

year in removing the decayed altars on the south side of the dock and renewing them in substantial concrete construction. Further repairs are needed to the timber work of this dock, and an appropriation for continuing it is elsewhere requested.

Dredging.—The dredging, under act of March 3, 1897, was completed by the expenditure of $2,858.93.

Extension of quay wall.—The only improvement which remained uncompleted at the end of the fiscal year was the extension of the quay wall act of May 4, 1898. Materials were purchased for 150 linear feet of wall, and foundation piles driven, the necessary dredging was done, and about 72 linear feet completed from low-water line to coping. The unexpended balance will be sufficient to complete 144 linear feet.

Paving and grading. These improvements, under the same act, were carried on during the year, the full amount of the appropriation having been expended, and granite-block paving laid upon Brown avenue and Breese street, curbing built, etc. Other expenditures under the head of improvements were inconsiderable in amount.

REPAIRS AND PRESERVATION.

A large amount of work has been done under this appropriation, considerable outlay having been made upon the yard buildings in the way of repairs to roofs, floors, walls, painting, plumbing, etc., amounting to $17,000, and upon wharves, landings, etc., nearly $10,000 were expended. Under this latter head the marine railway was repaired and the cradle widened, so that launches and other small craft can be readily hauled out for repairs. Wharf and landing facilities were built for the use of the receiving ship *Franklin*, and accommodations for the enlisted men have been provided in the way of a washhouse. The expenditures upon the electric light and waterworks were very considerable, amounting to nearly $15,000, out of which an extension of the salt-water fire-service mains was made, and complete fire protection installed in buildings Nos. 30 and 36. Extensive repairs were made to the railroad track, including frogs, switches, etc.

Repairs to dry docks. The repairs to the dry docks under this appropriation amounted to $10,617.49. These repairs included thoroughly overhauling the boilers of the pumping plant, installing a new boiler in the caisson of the timber dry dock, new keel blocks, bilge blocks, etc., and putting the dock appurtenances into very good condition.

MAINTENANCE.

More than one-fourth of the amount expended under this appropriation was for pay of watchmen. The other large items were for running the electric-light plant, including fuel for the same, and cleaning and clearing up the yard. A modern fire-alarm system, the Gamewell, was introduced to replace the old system, which was not efficient. The new system is in excellent order and is a great improvement.

PURCHASE OF CEDAR GROVE PROPERTY.

The property known as Cedar Grove, which lies upon the east bank of the south branch of Elizabeth River, opposite the Navy-Yard, Norfolk, Va., was authorized to be condemned for purchase by act of May 4, 1898. Proceedings were accordingly instituted by the United States District Attorney, under the direction of the Department of Justice,

and the lands were appraised at the rate of $87.50 per linear foot of water front, measured upon the Port Warden's line. The commissioners stated that their appraisement was at a price per linear foot of front in order that if, upon resurvey, the frontage was found to differ from that on the plat, the price could be increased or diminished accordingly. Another survey was accordingly made under the direction of this Bureau, the results of which were materially different from those of the survey which was before the commissioners and upon which they condemned the land. The owners of the Cedar Grove property, through their attorneys, declined to accept this latter survey as correctly locating the dividing line between the Government lands and the Cedar Grove property, and the United States District Attorney recommended for several reasons that the Cassell survey, which was the one before the commissioners at the time of the appraisement, should be accepted as defining the correct boundary between the properties. The Attorney-General so recommended, unless the Department believed the Cassell survey to be incorrect.

After a very careful study of the deeds, surveys, and other data bearing upon the matter, the Bureau was confirmed in the opinion previously formed that the Cassell survey was erroneous; that to take title according to it would be to pay the claimants for a considerable extent of water front now belonging to the Government, to amount to over $8,000, and that if the decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia in the case of Groner *v.* Foster should be held to govern in the division of the water front between contiguous owners the overpayment might amount to very much more than the sum named. It was therefore recommended that the matter be referred again to the Department of Justice, with request that the boundary line between the Government lands at St. Helena and the Cedar Grove property be determined by a competent court of jurisdiction. The Department of Justice has returned the case to the United States District Attorney with instructions to so proceed.

The appraisement by the commissioners was upon 1,665 linear feet of water front, at $87.50 per foot, amounting to $145,687.50; and Congress by the act of March 3, 1899, appropriated this sum to enable the Department to complete the purchase and take title.

As soon as the location of the boundary line now in dispute is determined by the court, thereby determining the number of feet of water front, the purchase money as fixed thereby will be paid and title and possession taken.

NAVAL STATION, PORT ROYAL, S. C.

The expenditures during the fiscal year have been as follows:

Yard improvements	$111,425.32
Repairs and preservation	18,743.63
Maintenance	11,442.88
Civil establishment	3,819.02
Contingent	11,331.10
National defense	401.44
Total	157,163.39

YARD IMPROVEMENTS.

Artesian well.—Work upon this object was continued during the fiscal year, carrying it down to a depth of 1,640 feet. At this point it had to be abandoned because of the loss of tools in the tube which could not be removed. Up to the time when work was abandoned no satisfactory results had been obtained in respect of either quantity or quality of water. The total expenditures upon the well amounted to $11,126.

Electric light and power plant.—Under the appropriation for an electric light and power plant, act of May 4, 1898, contract was entered into and work carried to completion during the fiscal year, the outlay being $19,852.26.

Of the works of improvement carried on during the year, but which had not been completed, should be mentioned the following:

Dredging.—A contract was entered into for dredging a channel opposite the naval station, act of June 10, 1896, the material excavated to be taken to sea or deposited upon the naval station, as the Bureau might elect. As the price in either case was the same, the Bureau decided to have the material deposited upon shore, for the purpose of raising the grade of the station to a higher level, the high tides during extraordinary storms having in more than one instance overspread the whole or a part of the property. The work of excavation proved much more difficult than was expected, delaying it very much and enhancing its cost to the contractor. In April last, after having incurred a heavy loss, according to its statement, the dredging company expressed its inability to carry the work on unless allowed to deposit the material elsewhere than upon shore. The Bureau did not deem it to be to the interests of the Government to so permit, and operations have not been resumed. The company has been called upon to continue the work, its bondsmen have been notified of the situation and of their obligations in the matter, and the company has finally agreed to resume operations without further contest.

Grading and drainage.—Under the appropriation for grading and drainage a few thousand dollars have been expended to bring to grade lands recently purchased. This has been done with material deposited upon shore under the dredging operations.

Dredging.—Under a further appropriation for dredging the channel, act of May 4, 1898, contract was entered into with P. Sanford Ross, Incorporated, for dredging and carrying the material to sea. Work was commenced in March last, and fair progress is being made, considering its difficult nature.

Locomotive crane.—A locomotive crane for this yard, for which a special appropriation was made, is now under contract for the sum of $39,950, the balance of the appropriation of $70,000 being reserved for the construction of a track to be laid down about the dry dock.

Purchase of land.—Under acts of June 10, 1896, and May 4, 1898, $5,000 and $20,325.50 were appropriated, respectively, for the purchase of lands adjoining this naval station. Condemnation proceedings were instituted for the purpose of acquiring the same, and the purchase has been completed in part only. Lots 20 and 22, shown upon the accompanying plan, have been condemned, the value appraised, and a favorable report received from the Attorney-General with respect to the

validity of the title to be acquired in their purchase. The purchase money has been paid over to the owners, as follows:

Square or lot 20:		
John Johnson	$1,425.00	
Jonathan Brooks	2,500.00	
H. Jenkins ($350) and John Johnson ($100)	450.00	
Janet Jackson	125.00	
		$4,500.00
Square or lot 22:		
R. D. and R. J. Densler	2,500.00	
T. Eaton	1,200.00	
Daphne McLeod	1,098.62	
Clara Smith	64.81⅓	
Eloise Mattis	64.81⅓	
Mary Jane Mattis	64.81⅓	
Violet Chisolm	48.61	
Mary Mack	48.61	
Rosa Mattis	48.61	
Hagar Mattis	48.61	
		5,187.50
Total		9,687.50

Condemnation proceedings with reference to other lots, Nos. 4, 5, 19, and a part of lot No. 6, have been instituted, but the title to these lands, which are marshes and between high and low water, is in dispute, and the validity has been passed upon in a decision of the United States Circuit Court of South Carolina in the case of Niver *v.* Naval Officers and Others, for trespass. This decision places the use and occupancy of the marsh lands in question in the United States Government, but it has been appealed from, and the Department of Justice has recommended that the awards in this case be not paid. When the higher court has handed down a decision, the way will be clear to take possession of these lands for the Government, should the decision of the lower court be sustained, or to make payment to the rightful owner in case the decision first referred to is reversed and the title declared to be in the claimant.

REPAIRS AND PRESERVATION.

One half of the expenditures under this appropriation was upon the yard buildings, and other expenditures were of a miscellaneous character, chiefly upon officers' quarters and the dry dock, that upon the latter object being $2,432.10.

MAINTENANCE.

The principal items of expenditure under this appropriation were for the purchase of water, at about $4,000, and furniture, at about $1,700.

CONTINGENT.

Repairs to dry dock. Under an allotment from this appropriation there was expended the sum of $11,331.10 to repair injury suffered by the dry dock during heavy storms, which, with the outlay mentioned under the head of "Repairs and Preservation," makes a total of $13,763.20.

NAVY-YARD, PENSACOLA, FLA.

The expenditures during the fiscal year have been as follows:

Yard improvements	$55,215.96
Repairs and preservation	15,696.73
Maintenance	17,815.55
Civil establishment	1,930.00
National defense	903.02
Total	91,561.26

YARD IMPROVEMENTS.

Electric-light plant.—Ten thousand dollars of the sum appropriated for yard improvements were used for the installation of an electric-lighting plant, which was completed and put into operation in March of the present year.

Repairs to buildings and wharves.—Another appropriation made by Congress in the Deficiency Act during the war with Spain was $25,000 for repairs to buildings and wharves, which were judiciously and economically spent in putting practically all the buildings into fair condition for service, and in quite extensive repairs to the wharves.

Dredging.—Under an appropriation for dredging, in order to make the yard accessible to vessels of considerable draft, which was deemed necessary at this time, operations were commenced, and at the end of the fiscal year $15,463.58 had been expended. A dredge lent by the War Department was fitted up and the work done by the yard force. The results thus far show a cost very much less than was to be expected if the work had been done by contract, and, indeed, very much less than one offer obtained.

Repairs to coal sheds and appliances. An appropriation was also made by the same act for repairs to the coal sheds and appliances. When this work is completed the yard will be well equipped as a coaling station of moderate extent, and for such other service as it may be called upon to do for vessels stationed in the West Indies.

Floating dry dock.—Under appropriation "Floating Dry Docks, Gulf Coast," there was expended the sum of $3,538.20. This sum was used in preparing moorings for, and fitting for service after having been dismantled, the floating dry dock purchased in New York under the above appropriation and transferred to the Pensacola Navy-Yard for service in docking vessels of small size which may be used in southern waters of our own country and in the West Indies.

REPAIRS AND PRESERVATION.

Many repairs of an important nature were made under this head, including those to yard buildings, roads, drains, railroad tracks, and water and light works.

MAINTENANCE.

The expenditures under this head were for the usual work of a miscellaneous character, those for the pay of watchmen being unusually large on account of the withdrawal of the marine guard during the war.

NATIONAL DEFENSE.

The sum of $903.02 was applied to the work of repairs.

FLOATING DRY DOCK.

Under the appropriation "Floating Dry Docks, Gulf Coast," act of July 7, 1898, a floating dry dock (balance) of 2,200 tons capacity was purchased of the Perth Amboy Dry Dock Company, Perth Amboy, N. J., at a cost of $102,470. As this dock was destined for use in southern waters, it became necessary to sheathe it to protect it against the marine worm. It was taken into dry dock No. 3 at the New York Navy-Yard, properly sheathed with metal, and put into condition for being towed to the Pensacola Navy-Yard, where it had been decided to locate it. When the proper season of the year arrived for its voyage south, two Government tugs towed it to Pensacola, convoyed by the U. S. S. *Machias*. It arrived at Pensacola, having made the voyage without accident of any kind, was again put in readiness for service, and is now available for docking any vessels within its lifting capacity. The entire cost for its purchase, sheathing it with metal, dismantling it for its voyage to Pensacola, and refitting it for service, was $117,759.81. The balance of the appropriation, being $132,240.19, will be turned into the Treasury.

It was intended to purchase two floating docks of this description for service in the South during the war with Spain, but as hostilities ceased and peace was declared soon after the purchase of one, it was decided not to purchase the second contemplated by the act.

NAVAL RESERVATION, ALGIERS, LA.

By the act of May 4, 1898, Congress appropriated for one steel floating dry dock, to be located at the naval reservation, at Algiers, La., to be capable of lifting a vessel of 15,000 tons displacement, at a limit of cost of $850,000.

The invitations for proposals asked for designs of the dry dock based upon general specifications prepared by the Bureau. The competition, therefore, was not upon the price alone, but extended to the merits of the plans submitted. The proposal of the Maryland Steel Company was for a dock not only lower in price than that of its single competitor, but one of greater merit in many respects. The contract was therefore awarded to the Maryland Steel Company at its bid of $810,000. The contract was executed on April 10, 1899. The time for completion is November 5, 1900. The work has begun in the shops, and preparations are being made at the works of the company at Sparrow's Point, Md., for the construction of the dock. After its completion at this point it will be towed to the naval reservation at Algiers and the shore connections made. While the work is progressing favorably, it will be several months yet before operations are begun upon the site at the reservation.

The proposal of this company provided for a lifting capacity of 15,000 tons, but the 2 feet of free board which the Bureau's specifications required were obtained by the construction of gates or bulkheads at either end, and such free board was entirely above the level of the deck. This was decided by the Bureau not to be in accordance with the instructions contained in the specifications, the free board being held to require the elevation of the dock 2 feet above the surface of the water with a maximum load upon the dock. The award was made to the company upon condition that the plan should be so modified as

to give a free board of 2 feet under the latter condition, and such modification having been made in their proposal, the contract was entered into on the date above named.

As the lifting capacity of the dock is 15,000 tons, with a free board of 2 feet, measured from the surface of the water to the floor of the dock, the total lifting capacity when the deck is awash will be 18,000 tons. This will be the maximum load which the dock will carry, and, therefore, the maximum displacement of a ship which it will accommodate.

The total amount expended under this appropriation during the fiscal year was $833.33.

NAVAL STATION, KEY WEST, FLA.

The expenditures during the fiscal year have been as follows:

Yard improvements	$29,644.84
Repairs and preservation	20,499.49
Maintenance	16,260.64
Civil establishment	598.32
National defense	134,430.17
Total	201,433.46

YARD IMPROVEMENTS.

Steam engineering machine shop.—The sum of $29,644.84 has been expended upon this object, which was commenced during the previous fiscal year. It has been completed and made ready for the reception of tools for the Bureau of Steam Engineering.

Coal sheds and coal pier.—The work under the contract for the construction of coal sheds and a coal pier at this station, reference to which was made in the last annual report, and work upon which was commenced just prior to the close of that year, has been continued under many disadvantages, owing to the isolated situation, the few supplies to be obtained in the vicinity, the presence of fever during the summer, and the quarantine regulations, which were carefully enforced. Further difficulty was met with in the character of the material depended upon in founding the piers. The coral rock has proved to be insufficient for the support of the great weights upon ordinary piles, and it has been found necessary to provide disks for all the steel piles entering into the pier in order to get sufficient sustaining power.

With respect to the sheds, the pile foundations and concrete walls were completed in both, and one of them has its lower concrete floor and a portion of the filling put in. Notwithstanding the delays and difficulties in carrying on this work and the prevalence of yellow fever, which has broken out since the end of the fiscal year covered by this report, involving still further embarrassment, it is expected that the works will be entirely finished in the spring of the next calendar year.

Coal-handling appliances.—The coal-handling appliances under contract with the Brown Hoisting and Conveying Machine Company are complete and ready for erection as soon as the work upon the piers and sheds, under contract with the Union Bridge Company, is ready for their receipt.

REPAIRS AND PRESERVATION AND MAINTENANCE.

The expenditures for repairs and general maintenance have been of a miscellaneous character and small in extent.

NAVY-YARD, MARE ISLAND, CAL.

The expenditures during the fiscal year have been as follows:

Yard improvements	$259,741.58
Repairs and preservation	59,197.75
Maintenance	72,223.52
Civil establishment	12,229.05
Contingent	3.60
National defense	3,899.34
Emergency fund	1,008.91
Total	408,303.75

YARD IMPROVEMENTS.

Of the total expenditures at this navy-yard, $259,741.58 were for improvements, the principal work under this head being for roads and sidewalks, washhouse and drying room, and wharf for the receiving ship, dredging, storage shed for lumber, shelter roof for boats, cylinders for the storage of coal, extension of quay wall, and repairs and reconstruction of buildings damaged by the earthquake of March, 1898.

Earthquake damages.—For this purpose during the fiscal year the outlay amounted to $145,683.10. The greater portion of this sum has been spent for replacing the twelve officers' quarters which were so seriously damaged as to be unsafe for occupancy. Many other buildings of the yard which were badly damaged have been repaired, the principal expenditures being upon the steam-engineering shops, including the machine shop, boiler shop, and foundry. The yards and docks machine shop, supplies and accounts storehouse, and construction and repair joiner shop and spar shop also received considerable outlay to place them again in good condition.

Ship-fitters' shed for construction and repair.—This building, appropriated for by act of June 6, 1896, was completed during the fiscal year, the total cost being $30,011.23.

Dredging.—The work of dredging in front of the navy-yard and in the channel of the straits was continued during the year, the expenditures for both purposes being only $12,470.11. This very nearly completes the work to be done under the contracts.

Steel cylinders.—The steel cylinders being constructed for the storage of coal, under an appropriation by Congress, were continued, the foundations having been completed, as well as the shop work on all the steel which has been delivered. A power plant for handling the coal was contracted for and is in course of construction. The balance remaining unexpended under this head will not be sufficient to complete the work.

Dry dock.—One of the four dry docks authorized to be built by the acts of May 4, 1898, and March 3, 1899, is to be located at this navy-yard, and it is one of the two to be built of timber. A board of officers was appointed to recommend a site for the dock, after careful examination and study, and, as the result of its labors, a location was selected to the south of the present masonry dry dock. Plans and specifications were prepared and issued by the Bureau April 5, 1899, and bids were received and opened on June 10, 1899. The award of the contract was made to the lowest bidders, the Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company, for the entire work at their offer of $729,000. The contract was entered into on July 15, 1899, the work to be completed April 1, 1902. The work is now in progress.

REPAIRS AND PRESERVATION.

Under this head there was applied during the year the sum of $59,197.75. Of this the largest expenditure was upon the electric-light plant, amounting to $14,261.84. There was also expended for miscellaneous repairs the sum of $13,874.32, while the yard buildings received from the total only $10,586.02.

Stone dry dock. The expenditures for repairs to the stone dry dock amounted to $4,874.13, but no portion of this was upon the masonry. The greater part was upon the pumping plant, $3,359.85 having been expended for installing four new boilers, and slight repairs upon the fifth boiler.

MAINTENANCE.

The largest item of expenditure under this head was for fuel and attendance upon steam boilers and engines, which amounted to $26,747.78. Other large expenses under this appropriation were for teams, amounting to over $10,000, for cleaning and clearing up yard, at a cost of $8,510, and for water tax, $6,331.85.

The necessary outlays under this appropriation were very heavy, and included the large number of objects, the cost of which must be met, or else the efficiency of the yard will be greatly crippled. This is true of all the yards where much work is done, and renders it exceedingly difficult for the Bureau to meet necessary expenses with the lump appropriation made by Congress under this head.

NATIONAL DEFENSE.

Coal storage bins.—Under an allotment made from this fund coal storage bins for receiving coal placed in stock during the emergency were completed, their total cost having been about $8,500.

NAVAL STATION, PUGET SOUND.

The expenditures during the fiscal year have been as follows:

Yard improvements	$41,611.41
Repairs and preservation	21,198.44
Maintenance	7,659.75
Civil establishment	3,634.88
Contingent	100.00
Total	74,204.48

YARD IMPROVEMENTS.

Shop for construction and repair.—The most important of the improvements was a shop for the Bureau of Construction and Repair. This was completed during the fiscal year, its total cost being $60,000, the amount of the appropriation. The building is ready for use and the machine tools are being installed.

Other improvements of less extent were the building of a small storehouse, an extension of the brick discharge culvert to the dry dock, an extension of the water system, and the construction of a telegraph line between the naval station and Port Blakeley, Wash., a distance of about 7 miles, which gives the station telegraphic commu-

nication with the rest of the world. There was also considerable work done in the way of clearing, stumping, and grading in the vicinity of the dry dock.

REPAIRS AND PRESERVATION.

For the repairs and preservation of the station the expenditures were $21,198.41, applied chiefly to the repairs of the yard buildings, including an extension of the dry-dock pump house to accommodate the electric-light plant.

Caisson or floating gate.—The only other expenditure to be especially mentioned is that made upon the caisson or floating gate, which included increasing the amount of concrete ballast, and the docking of the caisson in a private dock to renew the packing.

COALING STATION, DRY TORTUGAS, FLORIDA.

The expenditures during the fiscal year have been as follows:

National defense	$257,754.61

Coal sheds, piers, and coal-handling machinery.—The work in progress at this station, under contracts for coal sheds, piers, and coal-handling machinery, reported upon in the last annual report of this Bureau, has not been completed. It has been delayed through various causes, partly owing to the difficulties to be overcome in carrying on any extensive improvement upon this little island, situated so far from the mainland, and because, being the location for the quarantine station, all work during the sickly season is very much embarrassed and frequently suspended, owing to the quarantine regulations, and further, because of the difficult character of the foundations encountered.

When these works were decided upon, at the beginning of the Spanish war, the only information the Bureau had to guide it was contained in the report of the board of 1895. That report did not contemplate anything more than ordinary foundations in the construction of the piers, but after the contractors got upon the ground and the work of construction commenced, it was found that the coral rock was nothing more than a thin crust of consolidated comminuted material, and that the substratum was of a consistency which afforded very little support. The question of successfully founding these structures has been one which has required a great deal of experiment and study, and, while the difficulties do not seem to be insurmountable, they will result in considerably increasing the cost of the work and in delaying its completion.

The work was interrupted very much during the fiscal year, owing to the prevalence of yellow fever. At the close of the year better progress was being made, and it is expected that it will be completed early in the next calendar year.

Dredging.—The dredging operations by the Alabama Dredging and Jetty Company have been carried on slowly, due partly to the use of machinery not well adapted to the work, and to the fact that the material proved to be more difficult to remove than was anticipated. After the amount estimated in the contract to be removed had been excavated the Department concluded, in consideration of the fact that conditions had developed which the contractors had not reason to expect from the information laid before them, based upon the report of the board

referred to, to accede to the request of the company and close the contract when they should have done certain work which the Department regarded as necessary to properly complete their contract according to its terms.

The total expenditures at this station during the year have been entirely on account of the two contracts named.

NAVAL STATION, SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO.

The expenditures during the fiscal year have been as follows:

Emergency funds 1898 and June 30, 1899 ..... $19,231.97

The work has been of a miscellaneous character, principally by way of sanitary improvement, including the cleaning of the grounds, buildings, and drains, cleaning and filling of cesspools, and the installation of improved closets and latrines.

Other expenses have been incurred in the installation of a distilling plant, the extension of the fire system and the water supply, also the construction of a temporary sea wall at the low-water level to keep harbor refuse off the grounds.

NAVAL STATION, HAVANA, CUBA.

The expenditures for the fiscal year have been as follows:

Emergency funds 1898 and June 30, 1899 ..... $31,377.37

On January 1, 1899, the Department took charge of the naval station and the Machina and Admiralty works in the city proper. No works of improvement have been carried on and only such repairs have been made as were necessary in connection with the improvement of the sanitary condition of the station and grounds, and a small expenditure for furnishing offices and quarters. Very extensive improvements have been made in the sanitary condition of the properties, including the cleaning of the grounds and buildings, repairing and cleaning sewers and cesspools, improving the drainage, and other matters necessary to preserve healthfulness at these points. The conditions at both the station and the Machina were very bad and insanitary when possession was taken, but only such outlays as were absolutely necessary for the preservation of health and the care of the property were made.

NAVAL STATION, GUAM, LADRONE ISLANDS.

No expenditures have been made at this station from appropriations made for the specific use of this Bureau, but a considerable quantity of materials necessary for putting up temporary buildings for storage of coal and other materials and for officers' quarters, as well as for supplying water, effecting the drainage of the premises, etc., was purchased from the appropriation Emergency Fund for work under the cognizance of this Bureau, and shipped to the station by the *Yosemite* early in the present calendar year.

This purchase included also a supply of tools and appliances necessary for carrying out the improvements.

The amount expended for the above work is covered by the report of expenditures from this fund as made by the Navy Department.

Summary of expenditures, 1898–99.

Public works (improvements)	$1,228,463.95
Repairs and preservation	505,034.91
Maintenance	378,404.81
Civil establishment	69,599.48
Contingent	12,992.96
National defense	419,333.41
Emergency fund	200,797.38
Total	2,814,626.90

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REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE BUREAU OF EQUIPMENT.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
BUREAU OF EQUIPMENT,
Washington, D. C., October 31, 1899.

SIR: I have the honor to submit herewith the report of the operations of this Bureau for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899, together with the annual estimates for funds required for the Bureau during the fiscal year 1901.

The appropriations under the cognizance of the Bureau and its various branches, or from which allotments were made for its purposes during the fiscal year, were as follows:

Naval act, approved May 4, 1898.

Equipment of vessels	$1,189,653.10
Contingent equipment	15,000.00
Civil establishment	15,525.00
Ocean and lake surveys	14,000.00
Increase of Navy, equipment	415,000.00
Depots for coal	250,000.00
Naval Observatory	11,200.00
Total	2,210,378.40

Deficiency act, approved July 7, 1898.

Equipment of vessels	$5,000,000.00
Contingent equipment	20,000.00
Civil establishment	975.00
Ocean and lake surveys	10,000.00
Contingent and miscellaneous expenses, Hydrographic Office	5,500.00
Vessels for auxiliary naval force (allotted)	10,000.00
Emergency fund, Navy Department (allotted)	10,844.64
	5,057,319.64

Urgent deficiency act, approved January 5, 1899.

Contingent equipment	$2,074.00
Civil establishment	975.00
Ocean and lake surveys	20,000.00
Total	23,049.00

Legislative, executive, and judicial act, approved March 15, 1898.

Contingent and miscellaneous expenses, Hydrographic Office	$51,500.00
Pilot Charts, North Pacific Ocean	22,000.00
Contingent and miscellaneous expenses, Naval Observatory	13,700.00
Total	87,200.00

SUMMARY.

Equipment of vessels	$6,489,653.40
Contingent equipment	37,074.00
Civil establishment	17,475.00
Ocean and lake surveys	44,000.00
Increase of the Navy, equipment	415,000.00
Depots for coal	250,000.00
Naval Observatory	11,200.00
Contingent and miscellaneous expenses, Hydrographic Office	57,000.00
Pilot Charts, North Pacific Ocean	22,000.00
Vessels for auxiliary naval force (allotted)	10,000.00
Contingent and miscellaneous expenses, Nautical Almanac Office	13,700.00
Emergency fund (allotted)	10,844.64
Total	7,377,947.04

Of this amount about $5,514,000 were actually expended, or obligated, during the fiscal year. The expenditure of this large amount of money, or that portion of it subjected to the supervision of the Chief of Bureau, has received his unremitting care and attention.

These appropriations were adequate for the requirements of the service under this Bureau, and in case of that for "equipment of vessels," approximately $1,800,000 will revert to the Treasury as an unexpended balance. It is not probable that a deficiency will appear in any of the appropriations.

The expenditures under the Bureau during the year have been large, the natural result of the late war. Not only was there a great drain on the stores and appliance supplied by this Bureau during the war, but numerous and extensive repairs to all ships were necessary after its close. At the six naval stations where this Bureau has facilities for equipment work, repairs to 157 different ships were made during the year.

The following is a summary of the work performed under this Bureau at the various navy-yards and stations during the fiscal year:

NAVY-YARD, PORTSMOUTH, N. H.

Repairs were made during the year to the electrical appliances of the following ships:

Lancaster.	*Piscataqua.*	*Raleigh.*
Machias.	*Potomac.*	

Canvas and rigging outfits were supplied to the following ships:

Essex.	*Frolic.*	*Alliance.*
Machias.	*Piscataqua.*	*Potomac.*

The total expenditures at this yard during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899, were as follows:

	Labor.	Material.	Total.
General maintenance, including office and store labor, shipments, etc	$4,288.08	$1,707.37	$5,995.45
Installation and repair of electrical appliances on board ships	698.04	127.60	825.64
Repairs to miscellaneous equipage on board ships	863.92	179.67	1,043.59
Manufacture and repair, canvas work	4,633.18	4,367.20	9,000.38
Manufacture and repair, rigging work	2,194.70	2,778.81	4,973.51
Manufacture and repair, miscellaneous articles	88.33	375.49	463.82
Total	12,766.25	9,536.14	22,302.39

This yard, so far as equipment work is concerned, has been practically closed for many years. For this reason the facilities for equip-

ment work are poor. The attics of two buildings constitute all the space allotted to this Bureau. They are, in fact, the third stories of two-story buildings and totally inadequate for equipment work on modern ships. A new equipment building, with modern machinery and appliances is urgently needed.

NAVY-YARD, BOSTON.

Extensive repairs and changes were made to the electrical appliances of the following ships:

Amphitrite,	*Detroit*,	*Marblehead*,
Bancroft,	*Helena*,	*Wilmington.*
Castine,		

Minor repairs were made to the electrical apparatus of several other ships.

A new and complete installation of electrical appliances, including searchlights and signal apparatus, was commenced on board of the *Topeka.*

Extensive repairs and alterations were made to the canvas and rigging outfits of the following ships:

Amphitrite,	*Castine*,	*Topeka*,	*Marietta*,
Hector,	*Lancaster*,	*Detroit*,	*Wilmington.*
Marblehead,	*Marcellus*,	*Machias*,	*Wyandotte.*
Seminole,			

The equipment outfit of the new sailing practice ship *Chesapeake* was begun.

CORDAGE.

The following cordage supplies were manufactured during the fiscal year, at a cost of $181,702.97:

	Pounds.
Manila rope	1,004,328
Wire rope	123,292
Hemp rope	90,061
Boltrope	52,446
Copper-wire rope	545
Yacht marline	219
Tarred marline	22,173
Hambroline	503
Round line	9,451
Ratline	27,979
Cod line	26,511
Houseline	10,587
Lead line	10,879
Distance line	425
Log line	4,341
Fishing line	711
Cotton line	8,383
Spun yarn	9,578
Signal halyards	7,856
Hemp seizing	17,649

At the close of the fiscal year there were on hand the following supplies for use in the ropewalk:

	Pounds.
Manila hemp	249,007
Russian hemp	434,044
American hemp	38,547
Wire	1,115,000
Hide yarns	4,230

Hemp for the manufacture of cordage was purchased during the fiscal year as follows:

	Quantity.	Cost.
	Tons.	
American hemp	501 239/2240	$10,393.63
Russian hemp	198 1519/2240	32,269.96
Manila hemp	296 383/2240	61,952.64
Total	545 1781/2240	104,616.23

The ropewalk was much improved during the past year by the introduction of new and modern machinery. The old boilers and engines were completely worn out, having been in use many years.

The transmission of power was formerly by shafting and belting, and in some instances the loss was at least 50 per cent. Much of the small stuff manufactured was laid up by hand. The new plant not only consists of modern boilers and engines, but also an electric plant and motors for use in distant parts of the building. When completed the output will have been increased from three to four times.

Parts of the building have never been heated, making it almost uninhabitable in winter. A hot-water heating apparatus known as the "exhaust hot-water system" has been installed, and it is expected that it will be amply sufficient to render the building comfortable.

In selecting machinery and heating apparatus every precaution has been taken to prevent danger from fire. The alternating system of electric current was chosen largely for this reason.

CANVAS WORK.

There were manufactured in the sail loft 14,311 bags, 4,702 hammocks, and a large number of sails, awnings, tarpaulins, screens, covers, sea anchors, curtains, cots, boat outfits, cushions, and other minor articles

ANCHOR AND CHAIN SHOPS.

There were manufactured during the year 1,408,749 pounds of anchor chain, varying in sizes from ¾-inch to 2½ inches and 8,287 fathoms in length. Three hundred and five anchors of various sizes, with a total weight of 160,266 pounds, were also manufactured. Miscellaneous articles weighing 81,316 pounds were manufactured. The total cost of all was $233,914.25.

There were also manufactured 177,290 pounds of chain studs, galley parts, and miscellaneous articles, at a total cost of $11,723.72.

The anchor plant was formerly too small to make anchors heavier than 6,000 pounds. It has been improved during the past year, so that at present anchors of 10,000 pounds' weight can be manufactured. Anchors for battle ships weigh about 13,000 pounds and are procured by contract.

The amount of iron rolled during the year was as follows:

	Pounds.
Round iron	1,596,691
Anchor billets	76,000

The rolling mill was improved during the year by the addition of a thoroughly equipped gas plant for heating the iron.

The total expenditures at this yard for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899, were as follows:

	Labor.	Material.	Total.
General maintenance, including office and store labor, shipments, etc	$52,669.75	[illegible]	[illegible]
General maintenance, repairs to and maintenance of machinery plant	12,254.04	[illegible]	[illegible]
Installation and repair of electrical appliances on board ships	8,477.48	[illegible]	[illegible]
Repairs to miscellaneous equipage on board ships	5,997.64	[illegible]	[illegible]
Manufacture and repair:			
Canvas work	46,855.66	[illegible]	[illegible]
Rigging work	10,833.90	[illegible]	[illegible]
Flags	64.40	200.90	265.30
Cordage work	45,033.41	250,132.60	295,166.01
Miscellaneous articles	89,960.40	197,011.21	286,971.61
Total	272,146.68	506,322.99	778,469.67

During the past year an electrical construction and repair shop has been established at this navy yard. It has not yet reached any considerable dimensions.

A storehouse for anchors and anchor chains is much needed. At present there are valuable chain cables, costing a quarter of a million dollars, stored in an old wooden shiphouse which is a veritable fire trap. An addition is also necessary to the chain shop and rolling mill in order to arrange the work so that it may be done economically and in accordance with modern practice.

NAVAL TRAINING AND TORPEDO STATIONS, NEWPORT, R. I.

The expenses of the Bureau at these stations during the last fiscal year have been only the salary of a homing-pigeon keeper.

Narragansett Bay affords one of the best harbors for fleet exercise on the Atlantic coast. It is easy of access at any time of day or night; it is visited by the North Atlantic fleet during the summer, often for long periods, and it is the headquarters for the training ships and a squadron of torpedo boats. A coal depot there is for these reasons very much needed.

NAVAL STATION, NEW LONDON, CONN.

The expenses of the Bureau at this station during the last fiscal year have been small, chiefly for coal, water, and ash lighters.

New London, being located near and inside of the outer defenses of the city of New York, is a very important strategic point and affords a valuable harbor for torpedo boats and other small ships. It is also an important site for the storage of coal for war purposes.

In accordance with the recommendation of the coal board, of which Rear Admiral Charles E. Belknap, U. S. N., was president, buildings for the storage of 25,000 tons are now in process of construction.

NAVY-YARD, NEW YORK.

Extensive changes and repairs were made to the electrical appliances of the following ships:

Aileen,	*Ericsson*,	*Mayflower*,	*Panther*,
Brooklyn,	*Foote*,	*Massachusetts*,	*Resolute*,
Buffalo,	*Glacier*,	*New Orleans*,	*Rodgers*,
Cincinnati,	*Indiana*,	*Newark*,	*Scorpion*,
Du Pont,	*Iowa*,	*New York*,	*Texas*,
Enquirer,	*Kanawha*,	*Oregon*,	*Winslow*,
Elfrida,	*Marblehead*,	*Porter*,	*Yosemite*.

Minor repairs to the electrical appliances of several other ships were also made.

The installation of electrical appliances on board of the *Chicago* was completed and that on board of the *Atlanta* brought to a state near completion.

A new electric plant, including a searchlight, was installed on board of the torpedo boat *Cushing*.

The generating sets and other appliances for an electric plant on board of the cruisers *Isla de Cuba*, *Isla de Luzon*, and *Don Juan de Austria* were assembled and shipped to Hong Kong for installation.

Similar outfits were also assembled for installation on board of the *Princeton*, *Vicksburg*, *Annapolis*, and *Newport*.

Canvas and rigging outfits were supplied to the *Chicago* and *Atlanta*.

Extensive repairs to the canvas and rigging outfits of the *Buffalo*, *Glacier*, *Panther*, *Princeton*, *Resolute*, *Scorpion*, and *Yankee* were made.

Minor repairs to the canvas and rigging outfits were made to 25 other ships.

In addition to the above-mentioned repairs, there were manufactured in the sail loft 17,700 hammocks, 12,000 bags, 3,000 coaling bags, 12 collision mats, 12 sea anchors, 100 hospital cots, and sundry other articles pertaining to the outfits of ships and boats.

A large number of flags were manufactured.

The manufacture of curtains, screens, boat cloths, and table covers was commenced. It has been the practice of the Bureau previously to purchase such articles in the open market. It has been found that by purchasing all the materials in large quantities the manufactured product is not only cheaper but very much superior in quality. There will also be a uniformity of pattern.

During the past year the Bureau has fitted up a new electrical manufacturing and repair shop at this yard. Formerly the quarters for this work were cramped and totally unsuitable. The electrical appliances used on board ships are for the most part of special construction and difficult to obtain in the open market. This necessitates means of complete production at navy-yards. In addition to new machinery the repair shop is fitted with an excellent laboratory for the purpose of making accurate tests of all electrical supplies

The total expenditures at this yard during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899, were as follows:

	Labor.	Material.	Total.
General maintenance, including office and store labor, shipments, etc	$66,924.86	$5,628.52	$72,553.38
General maintenance, repairs to and maintenance of machinery plant	15,823.96	9,980.02	25,803.98
Maintenance yards, crafts, tugs, etc	484.54	2,293.62	2,778.16
Chattels, furniture, fittings, etc., for equipment department		3,044.60	3,044.60
Machinery plant, new machinery		14,290.36	14,290.36
Installation and repair of electrical appliances on board ships	84,213.47	82,480.21	166,693.68
Repairs to miscellaneous equipage on board ships	5,865.64	891.63	6,757.27
Manufacture and repair:			
Canvas work	61,499.97	41,895.74	103,395.71
Rigging work	8,438.59	7,968.54	16,407.13
Flags	17,982.57	25,279.45	43,262.02
Electrical supplies	26,873.27	50,803.24	77,676.51
Miscellaneous articles	3,585.44	4,927.38	8,512.82
Total	291,692.31	249,483.31	541,175.62

When the improvements in public works at this yard, now in process of construction or for which appropriations already exist, are completed, this Bureau will be much better prepared for equipment work than it

ever has been before. The new equipment building now being erected was, on account of the rise in the price of material, reduced in length. It should be extended, as originally proposed, in the near future.

NAVY-YARD, LEAGUE ISLAND, PA.

Extensive repairs were made to the electrical appliances of the following ships:

Columbia,	*Texas*,	*Katahdin*,
Miantonomoh,	*Minneapolis*,	*Prairie*,
Uncas,	*Yankee*,	*Yosemite*.

A complete electric-lighting plant was installed on board the *Arethusa*, and she was otherwise thoroughly fitted as a fresh-water supply ship.

A total of twenty ships at this yard received more or less extensive equipment repairs.

The total expenditures at this yard during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899, were as follows:

	Labor.	Material.	Total.
General maintenance, including office and store labor, shipments, etc	[illegible]	$9,124.19	$29,784.09
Installation and repair of electrical appliances on board ships	[illegible]	3,621.60	13,578.39
Repairs to miscellaneous equipage on board ships	3,210.60	1,478.15	4,688.75
Manufacture and repair, rigging work	850.82	948.34	1,799.16
Total	34,678.11	15,172.28	49,850.39

There are practically no equipment buildings at this navy-yard. One is in process of construction from appropriations under the act of March 3, 1899. Another is urgently needed.

Owing to the large fresh water basin now under construction at this yard it is a certainty that many ships will be laid up there in the future. Work on electrical appliances should be done when ships are in ordinary, and it is very desirable to establish at this yard a complete shop for the manufacture and repair of all electrical appliances.

NAVY-YARD, WASHINGTON, D. C.

There are no facilities for equipment work on ships at this yard.

All signal outfits for the naval service are manufactured here. The output for the year was as follows: 18,000 red stars; 18,000 green stars; 2,500 rockets; 1,300 blue lights; 50 sets army signal kits; 100 signal pistols; 250 belts, and 250 holsters.

The total expenditures at this yard during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899, were as follows:

	Labor.	Material.	Total.
General maintenance, including office and store labor, shipments, etc	$14,072.29	$685.45	$14,757.74
Manufacture of signal outfits	7,117.48	3,550.86	10,668.34
Total	21,189.77	4,236.31	25,426.08

A coal-storage house at this yard is very much needed. At present steaming coal for ships is stowed in the open.

NAVY-YARD, NORFOLK, VA.

Extensive repairs and changes were made in the electrical appliances of the following ships:

Cincinnati,	*Wilmington,*	*Terror,*	*Montgomery,*
Katahdin,	*Dolphin,*	*Wasp,*	*San Francisco,*
Manning,	*Lancaster,*	*Yankton,*	*Vixen,*
Scindia,	*Puritan,*	*Eagle,*	*Yosemite.*

Minor repairs to the electrical appliances of 22 other ships were also made.

A new commercial lighting plant was installed on board the collier *Abarenda*, and she was otherwise fitted for one year's service at Pago Pago, Samoa.

Altogether 53 ships were repaired or more or less overhauled during the fiscal year.

The *Yosemite* was thoroughly fitted as a station ship for the island of Guam, her quarters being lighted and otherwise furnished in a manner suitable for the governor of that island.

More or less extensive repairs were made to the canvas and rigging outfits of the following ships:

Abarenda,	*Yosemite,*	*Newport,*	*Leonidas,*
Cæsar,	*Annapolis,*	*Yankton,*	*Vixen.*
Hannibal,	*Dolphin,*	*Badger,*	
Scindia,	*Iris,*	*Essex,*	

Minor work of the same character was done on 22 other ships.

The total expenditures at this yard during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899, were as follows:

	Labor.	Material.	Total.
General maintenance, including office and store labor, shipments, etc	$33,811.02	$2,789.43	$36,600.45
General maintenance, repairs to and maintenance of machinery plant	2,302.49	657.85	2,960.34
Machinery plant, new machinery		1,899.80	1,899.80
Chattels, furniture, fittings, etc, for equipment department		229.75	229.75
Installation and repair of electrical appliances on board ships	14,400.60	7,685.29	22,085.89
Repairs to miscellaneous equipage on board ships	6,345.64	2,036.17	8,381.81
Manufacture and repair:			
Canvas work	16,892.68	7,903.13	24,795.81
Rigging work	6,454.73	7,170.58	13,625.31
Electrical supplies	1,015.05	317.06	1,332.11
Miscellaneous articles	2,070.32	931.27	3,001.59
Total	83,292.53	31,620.33	114,912.86

A storehouse for equipment purposes and increased facilities for the construction and repair of electrical appliances are very much needed at this yard.

NAVAL STATION, PORT ROYAL, S. C.

The sum of $2,936.05 was expended at this station in the equipment department during the fiscal year, chiefly for coaling ships and making minor repairs to tugs.

There are no facilities for equipment work at this station. The only building for the use of this Bureau is an old wooden coal shed. The Bureau recommends the construction of a modern equipment building.

This station can not be useful until there is sufficient plant to do the various kinds of work demanded on shipboard.

Its geographical location is such that it should be made a first-class coaling station. An appropriation already exists for additional coaling facilities.

NAVAL STATION, KEY WEST, FLA., AND DRY TORTUGAS.

The Bureau has no facilities for equipment work at these places. They were of great importance during the late war and may be in the future.

It is recommended that an equipment building be constructed at Key West. A large amount of valuable equipment property was lost here during the late war for the want of a suitable place to store it.

Key West was a most important coaling station during the late war, and the Bureau was obliged to provide a large fleet of coal barges for this service. The larger ships could not approach within 6 miles of the town. The single coal wharf was also totally inadequate for the use of the small vessels which could go alongside of it. These difficulties will be overcome by the new wharves and coal houses now in course of construction at Key West and Dry Tortugas.

The total expenditures at this station during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899, were as follows:

	Labor.	Material.	Total.
General maintenance, including office and store labor, shipments, etc	$3,026.61	$2,827.10	$5,853.71
General maintenance:			
Distilling plant, Key West	3,542.87	3,441.06	6,983.93
Distilling plant, Dry Tortugas	380.16	938.86	1,319.02
Tortugas cable	3,383.56	12.95	3,396.51
Maintenance yard craft, tugs, etc		2,458.55	2,458.55
Repairs to navy coal barges	2,811.82	2,447.32	5,259.14
Repairs to water barge No. 1	16.50	173.56	190.06
Chattels:			
Key West		52.30	52.30
Tortugas cable station		73.05	73.05
Total	13,161.52	12,424.75	25,586.27

NAVY-YARD, PENSACOLA, FLA.

The sum of $6,597.73 was expended in the equipment department for labor and material during the fiscal year, chiefly for the tugs *Tacoma*, *Potomac*, *Choctaw*, and *Powhatan*.

NAVY-YARD, MARE ISLAND, CAL.

Extensive repairs were made to the electrical appliances of the following ships:

Adams,
Iroquois,
Ranger,
McCulloch,
Nero,
Scindia,
Wheeling,
Celtic,
Philadelphia,
Solace.

Minor repairs were made to the electrical appliances of 6 other ships.

A new equipment outfit, including electric generators and other electrical appliances, was supplied to the *Yorktown*.

The equipment outfit for the *Hartford* was nearly completed. This ship is fitted with full sail power and has, in addition, an electric lighting plant and all other modern equipment appliances.

The collier *Justin* was fitted with a small electric generator and electric lights. This is a very excellent vessel, economical in the consumption of coal and a good carrier. The use of electric lights and small electric ventilating fans has become a necessity on board of metal vessels in the tropics in order to preserve health.

Twenty-four ships at this yard have been more or less completely fitted with new canvas and rigging during the year.

The total expenditures at this yard during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899, were as follows:

	Labor.	Material.	Total.
General maintenance, includingoffice and store labor, shipments, etc	$33,810.90	$1,227.85	$35,038.75
General maintenance, repairs to and maintenance of machinery plant	843.53	634.17	1,477.70
Installation and repair of electrical appliances on board ships	15,081.32	10,707.10	25,788.42
Repairs to miscellaneous equipage on board ships	7,219.62	3,298.24	10,517.86
Manufacture and repair:			
Canvas work	28,940.88	17,776.74	46,717.62
Rigging work	6,977.60	8,284.27	15,261.87
Flags	6,895.15	3,642.57	10,537.72
Electrical supplies	8,294.13	6,579.45	14,873.58
Miscellaneous articles	8,353.79	5,045.62	13,399.41
Total	116,416.92	57,196.01	173,612.93

In addition to public works for equipment purposes at this yard already provided for new office rooms are needed. They are now in the sail loft and both are too small. Large coal sheds are necessary. All good coal at this station must be brought from a long distance, and to be able to take advantage of low freights when offered a large stock must be kept on hand. At present coal is stored in the open, where it rapidly deteriorates. A shed for anchors is also required.

NAVAL STATION, BREMERTON, WASH.

The expenses of the Bureau at this station during the last fiscal year have been $1,070.83, chiefly for equipment repairs on small vessels.

Owing to its geographical location the naval station at Bremerton should be fully provided with means for executing any kind of work required on shipboard. Also for the necessary facilities for storing large amounts of coal, with appliances for handling the same rapidly. At present there are no facilities whatever at this station for equipment work. It is urgently recommended that a large equipment building of three stories, which will provide for a rigging loft, sail loft, and electrical construction and repair shop, be erected. Also that coal-storage space be provided for 12,000 tons of coal, with the necessary accessories for handling the same.

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REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE BUREAU OF NAVIGATION.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, BUREAU OF NAVIGATION,
Washington, D. C., September 30, 1899.

SIR: I have the honor to submit herewith a report (marked A) on the movements and duties of the ships of the Navy during the nine months

ending June 30, 1899,[1] a copy (marked B) of the report of the Superintendent of the Naval Academy, a copy (marked C) of the report of the Commandant of the Naval Training Station, Newport, a copy (marked D) of the report of the Commandant of the Naval Training Station, Yerba Buena, a copy (marked E) of the report of the Chief Intelligence Officer, a copy (marked F) of the report of the Governor of the Naval Home.

Estimates for the support of the Bureau and the establishment under its fiscal control are also submitted (marked G).

At such time as the Department may direct, the Bureau will prepare a revision of the Appendix to its report of last year, and will supplement it by a detailed report of the operations in the Philippines and since the publishing of the first edition.

OPERATIONS OF THE FLEET.

The operations of the fleet during the closing months of the active period of the war with Spain were fully covered in the appendix to the Bureau's last annual report. Since that date important operations have been carried on in the Philippines, and much active service has been seen in other waters. The demand for ships for the force in Asiatic waters has made it impracticable to supply vessels to reestablish the important European Station. The Department, however, has detailed a substantial force for the representation of the country and the guarding of its interests in the South Atlantic. The Pacific Station has been strengthened by ships drawn from North Atlantic waters, while the Asiatic Station now has more vessels than ever before. To keep up the force in Asiatic waters, the strength of the North Atlantic command has been reduced to the very lowest practicable limit.

The North Atlantic Station has remained under the command of Rear-Admiral W. T. Sampson, and has pursued, with some interruptions, a consistent programme of drill and instruction for the vessel organizations as units, and for the officers and men individually.

Upon reestablishing the South Atlantic Station, Rear-Admiral H. L. Howison was put in command on March 30, and in order that our flag might be seen in European waters, he was directed to proceed with the Flagship *Chicago* to the waters of his command, by way of the Mediterranean. En route to the South Atlantic the commander in chief touched at Tangier and enforced a long pending money claim of this Government against that of Morocco. The commander in chief touched at Lourenço Marquez, and, leaving his flagship there, visited the capital of the South African Republic. The *Wilmington*, of his command, proceeded to the South Atlantic by way of the northern South American ports, and en route ascended both the Orinoco and Amazon rivers, collecting and transmitting to the Department most valuable information in regard to both regions. The voyage up the Amazon extended to Peru. The full report of this voyage is about to be published in pamphlet form.

The Pacific Station was in command of Rear-Admiral J. N. Miller until October 16, 1898, when he was relieved by Rear-Admiral Albert Kautz. The *Badger* of this command conveyed the Samoan Commissioners of this country, Great Britain, and Germany to the Samoan Islands, and remained there with the *Philadelphia* pending the settlement by the

[1] This corresponding report in the Bureau's report for 1898 was, so far as practicable, carried up to October 1, 1898. Some omissions in last year's report are supplied in that of this year.

Commission of the civil difficulties in those islands. In connection with this duty, a landing party was put on shore from the *Philadelphia* on April 1, to act in concert with a British landing party. The combined party was under the command of Lieut. A. H. Freeman, R. N. The party was ambushed by adherents of the Chief Mataafa, and Lieut. P. V. Lansdale, Ensign J. R. Monaghan, Coxswain J. Butler, and Ordinary Seaman N. E. Edsall of our party, and Lieutenant Freeman and two British sailors were killed. Five American and two British sailors were wounded. All concerned conducted themselves in a most exemplary manner. The conduct of Ensign Monaghan was exceptionally gallant; he was killed while attempting to rescue Lieutenant Lansdale.

In the Philippine Islands the operations of the Navy have been of the most far-reaching character. A period of active hostilities with the insurgents in the islands opened in February, 1899. The many important expeditions carried on and the history of the blockade can only be properly dealt with in a separate volume. The extent of the blockade has been determined by the wishes of the general in command of the military forces in the islands. Incident to the operations in the islands, Lieut. J. C. Gilmore and the following-named party were captured by the insurgents at Baler, April 12; Chief Quartermaster W. Walton; Coxswain J. Ellsworth; Gunner's Mate E. J. Mygard; Sailmaker's Mate P. Vandgit; Seamen W. K. Rynders, O. W. Woodbury; Apprentices D. W. A. Venville, A. Peterson; Ordinary Seamen S. Brisolese, O. B. McDonald; Landsmen L. P. Edwards, F. Anderson, J. Dillon, C. A. Morrisey. So far as known, all are in the hands of the insurgents and have received good treatment. Capt. H. E. Nichols, commanding the *Monadnock*, died while that vessel was in action at Paranaque, Manila Bay, June 10.

The gunboat *Urdaneta*, Naval Cadet W. C. Wood in command, was destroyed at Orani, Orani River, Manila Bay, at some time between the 1st and 22d of September. The insurgents have reported her commanding officer killed. Most of her crew, whose names are as follows, are probably prisoners, though some may have been killed:

Coxswain Benjamin James Green; Seamen William Mitchell and Samuel Stone; Ordinary Seamen Samuel Tilden Herbert and Edward Burke; Apprentice (first class) George Daniel Powers; Machinist (first class) Arthur William Drummond; Fireman (first class) John James Farley; Fireman (second class) Thomas Grey; and one Chinese messman.

STATISTICS.

Fifty-six thousand six hundred and twenty numbers were given to documents received in the Bureau or sent out from it during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899. This number probably represents about 1,000,000 separate papers. The volume of correspondence prepared and handled by the Bureau is 20 per cent greater than it was before the war with Spain. The demands upon the force of clerks are too great to be consistent with the best work, except at the cost of considerable personal sacrifice. The total inadequacy of the Bureau's office facilities is another obstacle to efficient administration. In one office of the Bureau, which is a constant convenience to every branch of the Department, will be found two officers and four stenographers and typewriters working in one room on a clear floor space but 10 feet square. Many other employees of the Bureau work in quarters almost if not quite as cramped as these, and the mass of business transacted and kept up to date reflects great credit upon all of the Bureau's establishment.

The following tables give the statistics of the enlisted force for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899:

	Men.	Apprentices.
Applied for enlistment	38,687	3,069
Rejected for physical disability and other causes	31,346	2,154
Disqualifications waived	204	10
Failed to enlist	261	15
Total number enlisted for the year	7,302	968

Enlistments for the year are divided as follows:

	Men.	Apprentices.
Enlisted for cruise, special service	203	
Enlisted for one year, special service	627	
Enlisted for one year (war with Spain)	1,327	
Enlisted for two years (war with Spain)	5	
Enlisted for three years	2,940	
Enlisted for four years	2,200	
Enlisted during minority		968
Total	7,302	968

Number in service June 30, 1899, with citizenship.

	Native born.	Naturalized citizen.	Alien, declared intentions.	Alien, resident of the United States.	Alien non-resident.	Native born.	Foreign born.	Total.
PETTY OFFICERS.								
Special service	152	88	22	4	1			267
One year (war with Spain)	37	6	4	2	1			50
Three years	1,962	1,197	292	97	36			3,584
Four years	268	136	23	7	3			437
Apprentices (petty officers)						27	5	32
Total	2,419	1,427	341	110	41	27	5	4,370
MEN.								
Special service	243	95	56	35	19			448
One year (war with Spain)	86	10	6	12	4			118
Three years	3,645	706	777	361	369			5,858
Four years	990	203	110	104	111			1,518
Apprentices						2,002	187	2,189
Total	4,964	1,014	949	512	503	2,002	187	10,131
Total, including petty officers, June 30, 1899	7,383	2,441	1,290	622	544	2,029	192	14,501

Three thousand five hundred of this number (14,501) were serving under continuous service. Over 56 per cent of the petty officers are native born, over 32 per cent of the foreign born are naturalized, and 88 per cent of the whole number are citizens of the United States, while 65 per cent of the remainder have declared their intention to become citizens. Over 62 per cent of the other enlisted men are native born, over 12 per cent of the foreign born are naturalized, and 75 per cent of the whole number are citizens; of the remainder, 18 per cent have declared their intention to become citizens. Over 91 per cent of the apprentices are native born. Over 64 per cent of the whole enlisted force are native born.

During the year 14,271 enlisted men and apprentices have been discharged, as follows:

	Men.	Apprentices.
By expiration of enlistment	3,285	219
By purchase	43	53
Services no longer required	9,168	
By medical survey	736	64
Inaptitude and undesirability	336	101
Bad conduct	230	35
Total discharges	13,799	472

One hundred and seven men and 11 apprentices have died during the year. From the date of the circular authorizing enlistments for one year (March 28, 1898) to April 11, 1899, the date of the declaration of peace, 9,767 were enlisted for one year for the temporary force for the war with the Kingdom of Spain. Of this number about 30 remain in the service.

At the conclusion of the war between the United States and Spain, April 11, 1899, of the 856 officers commissioned for service under acts of Congress authorizing a temporary increase in the personnel, all but 29 have been discharged or their appointments otherwise vacated. Of this number 11 were discharged by the 20th of June following the close of the war, the remaining 18, who were appointed under special enactment, being still in the service. The passage of the act of Congress of March 3, 1899, known as the "Personnel Act," by which the officers constituting the Engineer Corps of the Navy were transferred to the line, effected a radical change in the personnel of the service as existing at the date of the passage of the act. The status of more than one-half of the officers of the line and former Engineer Corps was altered necessitating the issue of 458 new commissions. Under the provisions of the act directing the promotion of warrant officers after ten years from date of warrant, 20 boatswains, 14 gunners, 19 carpenters, and 11 sailmakers have been promoted to the newly established grades of chief boatswain, chief gunner, chief carpenter, and chief sailmaker.

Under the provisions of act of Congress approved March 3, 1899, providing for retirement of enlisted men of the Navy, 36 enlisted men availed themselves of the benefits of said act during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899. During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899, 94 applications for service pensions were received. Seventy-five claims were allowed, and 14 were disallowed. Nine claims were pending July 1, 1898, and 14 pending July 1, 1899.

Claims pending July 1, 1898	9
Applications received during fiscal year 1898–99	94
Total	103
Claims allowed during fiscal year 1898–99	75
Claims disallowed	14
Claims pending July 1, 1899	14
Total	103

In compliance with the naval appropriation bill of 1899 and 1900, contracts were signed on April 8 with Messrs. Campbell & Pettus, of

San Francisco, for the establishment of the naval training station on Yerba Buena Island, San Francisco Harbor, and on July 28 with Mr. J. J. Churchyard, of Buffalo, N. Y., for the construction of the new barracks at the training station, Coasters Harbor Island, Newport, R. I. The structure on Yerba Buena Island is now approaching completion, and the foundations of the building on Coasters Harbor Island are well advanced.

BARRACKS RECOMMENDED.

Closely connected with the subject of the new barracks now in course of construction at the two training stations, is the matter of housing all other enlisted men of the Navy who are not on board seagoing ships.

The general service men as soon as enlisted, as well as others awaiting assignment to ships in commission, are still, as in the past, kept on board receiving ships of war, which, roofed over and with their masts removed, are in fact nothing more than floating houses. These vessels are stationed at the several navy-yards as follows—the *Wabash* at Boston, the *Vermont* at New York, the *Richmond* at League Island, the *Franklin* at Norfolk, the *Independence* at Mare Island. These vessels being constructed of wood, constantly require repairs, amounting in the aggregate each year to many thousand dollars. Large permanent crews are required for each ship for their proper care and preservation. In the past these vessels have answered their purposes fairly well, but the time has now come when we should replace them by permanent barracks on shore. This, from every point of view, appears desirable. For the health of the men, for sanitary and hygienic reasons, for drills and discipline, for economy of administration, for proper recreation of the men, and, as I have already mentioned, for reduced cost of repair and maintenance and care taking, permanent buildings should be constructed at or near our several large naval stations.

If an additional reason for this change is needed, it is found in the fact that some of our receiving ships are at times too crowded for either the comfort or health of the men. Several hundred newly enlisted recruits assembled last July and August on board the *Independence* at Mare Island have so crowded that vessel that her commanding officer has been obliged to request the Bureau not to send him any more men, and the Bureau was forced to immediately take steps to reduce the number on board that vessel.

The permanent crews of the receiving ships *Wabash*, *Vermont*, *Franklin*, *Richmond*, and *Independence* amounting in all in September, 1898, to 453 men, this at an average cost of $1.80 per day for pay and maintenance (a large part of them being petty officers), cost the Government $297,000 per annum. Half of this number of men would be sufficient for caring for barracks to accommodate a much larger number of recruits than are now quartered on the receiving ships above named. In other words, there would be an annual saving to the Government of $148,500 if barracks were substituted. This sum is the interest on $4,950,000,[1] an amount twice as great as that which is herein estimated to construct barracks having a total capacity of 6,000 men distributed as follows:

Navy-yard, Boston	1,000
Navy-yard, New York	2,000
Navy-yard, League Island	1,000
Navy-yard, Norfolk	1,000
Navy-yard, Mare Island	1,000

[1] Computed at 3 per cent—a rate always open to the Government.

In short, the annual saving in the one item of care-taking alone, to say nothing of the many advantages of health, comfort, and discipline, is more than sufficient to justify, from a business standpoint, the erection of barracks and the abandonment of hulks. To carry this measure into effect actually represents a net saving to the Government of $148,500 per annum, while, at the same time, the facilities for quartering men are doubled and a perfect modern system is secured.

As there has been some question regarding what has been done by the British Government in this matter of replacing the old hulks and guard ships by barracks, and for the purpose of more fully informing myself on this subject, I visited recently the great British dockyards of Devonport and Portsmouth. In London I also consulted with the permanent secretary of the Admiralty, Sir Evan McGregor, who informed me that it had been decided by the Admiralty to abandon entirely the old system of quartering the seamen aboard hulks, and that in addition to the large and commodious barracks already constructed at Devonport and Sheerness, even a larger and more extensive system of barracks is about to be built at Portsmouth.[1] The seamen's barracks at Devonport are permanent structures, built of stone and in every way are most substantial, and their interior arrangements are such as fulfill all the requirements of health, comfort, and discipline. These barracks consist of six separate buildings already completed and occupied, with several others in course of construction. Each building will readily accommodate 500 seamen, and in an emergency this number may be increased to 800. A large drill hall is included, as well as a gymnasium, where drills and exercises are almost constantly going on. Mess halls and cooking arrangements complete in every detail; washrooms provided with hot and cold water for scrubbing clothing and hammocks, and completely appointed bathrooms—all add very greatly to the health and well-being of the men. A parade ground is provided, as are also grounds for cricket, football, and other outdoor sports, which are in every way encouraged. There are separate rooms and messes in each building for the chief petty officers; a handsome house for the commanding officer, a full captain; also an administrative building with quarters, mess room, and offices for the officers on duty at the barracks or seamen's quarters.

The interest displayed by the British Government in this one matter of properly housing their seamen may be appreciated when we consider the large sum appropriated to the construction of the quarters, as shown by the following from the naval works bill for 1899:

Total estimated cost, 1899.

Naval barracks:	
Chatham	$2,158,250
Sheerness	1,067,000
Portsmouth	3,251,440
Keyham	1,115,500
Total	7,592,190

Not only England, but France, Germany, Italy, Austria, Russia, and Japan have already constructed barracks for seamen. The United States, of all the great maritime powers, is therefore the only country that has adhered to the old custom of quartering its naval recruits and such men not aboard commissioned ships in hulks.

[1] The estimates for the barracks proposed at Portsmouth alone, as shown by the British naval works bill, amount to $3,251,440.

The tendency has been for several years past in some of our receiving ships to get a part of their establishment on shore. This is particularly the case with the *Vermont*, at the New York Navy-Yard, where it has been found necessary for convenience and comfort to erect a variety of buildings and wooden sheds on the Cob Dock. These structures are not laid out on any general plan, but have been added to from time to time as the exigency and crowded state of the ship demanded. They do not comport with the dignity of the Government; on the contrary they are a disgrace, and should in the near future be removed with the *Vermont* herself, and replaced by buildings of a permanent character which will house with comfort 2,000 men.

As our Navy expands by the addition of new ships it will ere long be necessary, in order to commission the new ships as fast as completed, to place in reserve some of the battle ships now in active service. For this purpose League Island seems to possess advantages over our other naval stations, as it not only possesses, in connection with the back channel, a large water front, but it is our only naval station that is located upon a fresh-water river. It is true that there is a short period in the winter when the Delaware River is obstructed with ice, but this is a difficulty offering no serious obstacle that can not be overcome in an emergency. In my opinion it is outweighed by the advantages already mentioned. The fast cruisers *Columbia* and *Minneapolis*, as well as several of the large auxiliary steamers purchased during the recent war, are now laid up in ordinary at League Island.

A vessel in ordinary—that is to say, abandoned by everyone save a watchman—must rapidly deteriorate from lack of care, so that when it becomes necessary to commission her, extensive repairs to both hull and machinery are unavoidable, and, what is yet more important, there are many weeks of delay before the vessel can be ready for service. This state of affairs can be avoided by keeping the ships in reserve instead of in ordinary. With skeleton crews assigned to each ship, who would go aboard the vessels every day, the vessels could be kept in such a state of readiness that they could be commissioned immediately whenever their services were required, as not only would the delay incident to repairs be avoided, but the foundation of a crew for each ship, familiar with all her parts, would always be ready to go into service. To properly carry out this plan, there should be constructed at the League Island yard suitable quarters for the reserve crews, as well as for others of an enlisted force, recruits, etc., and men awaiting assignment to seagoing ships. The receiving ship *Richmond*, now stationed at League Island, is entirely inadequate for this purpose. She was formerly a steam corvette or sloop of war, with one covered deck. She can never accommodate the number of men required to care for ships in reserve; in fact, I consider her now too small for the purpose she is intended. I therefore earnestly recommend that suitable quarters for seamen and officers be constructed on shore without delay at League Island. These quarters should be of a permanent character, built of brick, made fireproof with all modern improvements, and of sufficient capacity to readily accommodate 1,000 men, which number might in an emergency be increased to 1,500.

Similar quarters should also be built at the Mare Island Navy-Yard. The receiving ship *Independence* at the yard is old, and she is at this moment overcrowded. Such buildings would also answer as headquarters for men undergoing training, as well as for those caring for ships in reserve. As our squadron in Asiatic waters must for sev-

eral years to come be a large one, it is very desirable that several hundred trained man-of-war's men should always be ready at Mare Island, upon which the Asiatic squadron can draw to keep the crews at their full number. Without suitable barracks at Mare Island, where men can be properly housed, drilled, and disciplined, it will be quite impossible to maintain this important squadron in the highest state of efficiency.

For the foregoing reasons it is recommended that Congress be asked to appropriate at its next session the sum of $800,000 for seamen's quarters at League Island and Mare Island navy-yards—$400,000 for each yard. The old receiving ship *Vermont* should also be abolished, the temporary wooden buildings now on the Cob Dock, annexes of the *Vermont*, should be removed, and the whole establishment replaced by modern permanent quarters of sufficient size to accommodate 2,000 men—all of such buildings to include proper quarters for the officers on duty with the enlisted force. For this purpose it is recommended that the sum of $800,000 be asked. The old receiving ships *Wabash* at Boston and *Franklin* at Norfolk should also be supplanted by barracks of the type proposed for League Island and Mare Island, at a cost of $400,000 for each yard. The total appropriation for barracks thus recommended amounts to $2,400,000. As shown before, we are now losing the interest on more than twice this sum maintaining an expensive system of hulks with large crews and unsatisfactory results.

The United States should no longer remain behind the other countries in providing suitable quarters for such part of its naval personnel as is not on board cruising vessels. As already shown, we are in this matter far behind every other nation. It is hoped that this obstacle to a proper development of our enlisted force will be removed by Congress.

GUNNERY TRAINING.

The Bureau has continued the training of gun captains. The *Amphitrite* has been on this duty since March 12, and the *Lancaster* was employed on it during the six months required to train one class. It has been necessary, however, to turn the *Lancaster* over to the cruising training service, and the *Amphitrite* now represents our total facilities for training a greatly enlarged enlisted personnel at a time when foreign governments are lavishing money, study, and resources to outstrip us in this all-important matter. The *Fortune* has been assigned as a gunnery vessel for the Training Station, Newport, and will soon be ready for duty.

One of the most important sections of the naval station at Portsmouth, England, and one which I visited with great interest, is Whale Island, on which is located the gunnery training station for instruction of both officers and men. Whale Island is not a natural island, but it has been made from what was originally nothing but a mud flat by filling in with harbor dredgings and excavations. It is now solid land, covering over 90 acres, and has located on it a most complete and extensive establishment for the gunnery training of junior officers and seamen gunners. The buildings are all constructed of brick, including quarters for officers and men, with suitable mess rooms, class rooms, and drill rooms. The principal feature, however, of the establishment is the gunnery drill shed. This is a one-story structure built of iron and brick, over 900 feet in length. In it are mounted guns of all cali-

bers, representing nearly every gun in the British Navy. Constant drills and exercises, supplemented by class instruction in gun sighting, explosives, etc., bring the men to a high state of proficiency. The establishment is known in the British service as "The Excellent," so named from the gunnery school ship *Excellent*, on board which vessel a gunnery school for officers and men was carried on for many years. Attached to the "The Excellent" are a large number of small gun vessels, mounting among them all calibers and types of guns, and on board which details of officers and men under instructions are continually embarked for target and gun practice under way.

THE ENLISTED FORCE AND THE TRAINING OF LANDSMEN.

When our apprentice system is more fully developed, which will be the case after the completion of the new barracks at San Francisco and Newport, it is hoped that the flow of boys from the training ships to the general service will be sufficient to make good the number in the seamen branch of our enlisted force. This is an end much to be desired. At present it is far from being the case.

The fact that it has been difficult to enlist a sufficient number of seamen to supply the wants of the Navy, and that many of them are from the foreign merchant service, entirely ignorant of man-of-war discipline or of the use of arms, has led the Bureau to enlist several hundred native-born young men from 21 to 26 years of age as landsmen. It is proposed to give these men eight or ten months' training at sea on board cruising training ships, with the idea of making of them man-of-wars men. In these ships they will acquire the sea habit—that is to say, they will learn how to live and to care for themselves and their clothing on board a ship of war; they will learn the nature and relations as well as the discipline of the Navy; they will learn how to pull and handle boats, also the drills pertaining to great and small guns and small arms, so that at the end of their stay in these training ships they will be fitted for transfer to the general service on cruising ships of the Navy.

With this object the *Hartford* is about to be commissioned at Mare Island, where some 350 young men enlisted in the Western States will be embarked on board her and the ship sent around Cape Horn into the Atlantic. The *Lancaster* is about to make a similar cruise from New York to the West Indies. The steamer *Dixie* is being fitted at the League Island Navy Yard for a similar purpose, and as soon as she can be made ready some 400 landsmen will be embarked on board her and sent on a cruise to be trained for man-of-wars men. The four years enlistment authorized by the personnel bill will allow as much as one year for this training, and still give time for these men to make a full cruise of three years in a regular ship of war.

It is believed that with the apprentice system fully developed and augmented by the training of landsmen as above outlined, the enlisted force can be kept to the full number allowed. Large numbers of intelligent native-born young men can be found from which man-of-wars men can be made, but they should be given proper training before sending them on board a regular cruiser.

If the quota be kept full by the methods above indicated, it should be sufficient for the demands of the service for two or three years to come. More men could be used advantageously and with benefit to the Government by extending and carrying out fully the system of

keeping vessels in reserve, which, while costing but half as much, makes the vessel almost as ready, dependable, and efficient as if in full commission.

OFFICERS.

In speaking a few paragraphs back of our meager facilities for gunnery training, the Bureau might have noted that much more might be done in this important branch of training if officers were available to undertake the work. This scarcity of officers and the increase in the number required for necessary routine duty has compelled the Bureau to withdraw many officers from the assignments which, while they tend toward progress and development, must yet be pushed into the background in the struggle for bare existence.

The Bureau noted in its report of last year that the slight increase in the number of officers of the new line of the Navy over the aggregate of the old line and Engineer Corps, as provided by the "Personnel Bill" then before Congress, might give but temporary relief. One of the most important features of the bill was stricken out, however, before it became a law, and by the omission of this feature—the change from the six-year to the four-year course at the Naval Academy—the number of commissioned officers intended to be provided was so largely reduced that it becomes necessary to ask that some relief be immediately furnished. The Bureau recommends that this serious omission be corrected and that the largely increased demands for officers for important service be met by increasing the number of officers in each grade by 10 per cent and by providing for the four years' course at the Naval Academy.

Another change made in the bill in the last days before it became a law discriminated in the matter of pay against the Navy as compared with the Army and Marine Corps. This state of affairs is submitted for appropriate action.

Another condition of affairs discouraging to proud and ambitious officers who have risked and accomplished is the ragged and irregular result that seems an inevitable consequence of any effort to give permanent or substantial official recognition to bravery, gallantry, or devotion. Before the outbreak of the war you addressed to the officers of the North Atlantic fleet, through the Admiral, a letter, from which the following is an extract:

> Each man engaged in the work of the inshore squadron should have in him the stuff out of which to make a possible Cushing; and if the man wins, the recognition given him shall be as great as that given to Cushing, so far as the Department can bring this about.

Every effort of the Department to redeem this solemn pledge has been balked. Of the officers who served in the North Atlantic waters three have been confirmed in the recognition urged by the Department—two because their cases were presented at propitious moments, the other because of a misapprehension. The rest, numbering among them every gallant captain at Santiago on July 3 and all the brave captains of the ever ready gunboats, numbering among them officers who risked in many desperate expeditions—cable cutting, as spies seeking information, blocking and blockading harbors, scouting—numbering among them all those who hesitated not, and including at the head of all the able and determined officer who planned, worked out, and executed the whole campaign, and who finally consummated the one victory which was vital to the enemy—he and all the rest have absolutely nothing. The greatest among these has not as much as the medal which was

given to each of the hundreds who shared in a victory won in an hour more propitious for reward.[1]

The Bureau renews its recommendation that the State Naval Militia organizations be federated into a national reserve.

The Bureau is pleased to be able to report that such of its recommendations of last year as have been carried out have given most satisfactory results. Putting the Office of Naval Intelligence on a recognized footing has added greatly to its usefulness. The increase in the enlisted force was timely and indispensable.

Very respectfully,

A. S. CROWNINSHIELD,
Chief of Bureau.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

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REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE BUREAU OF ORDNANCE.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
BUREAU OF ORDNANCE,
Washington, D. C., October 1, 1899.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the annual report of this Bureau, and also to transmit estimates for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1901:

ESTIMATES.

Fuel, tools, material, and labor; maintenance of proving ground and smokeless-powder factory; for target practice; reserve supply of ammunition; conversion of 6-inch guns to rapid fire; purchase and manufacture of smokeless powder; machinery for gun plant, and for instruction of seamen gunners, and for new quarters for watchmen at St. Helena..	$1,805,500
Reserve guns for auxiliary cruisers	250,000
General expenses of the torpedo station	65,000
Fitting Fort Lafayette for magazine purposes	15,000
General repairs to buildings, magazines, machinery, etc	30,000
Naval Militia	60,000
Contingent, freight, etc	30,000
Civil establishment at navy-yards	32,624
Railroad track, grading, etc., for magazine near Norfolk	20,000
Ordnance shop and magazine buildings at Puget Sound	80,000
Improvements at naval magazine, Dover, N. J	100,000
Additional land for naval proving ground	15,000
Toward armament and armor for vessels authorized	4,000,000
Total	6,503,124

BREECH-LOADING RIFLES.

The following table shows the present state of main battery guns whose construction has thus far been authorized and their general

[1] In the original draft of the report the words "won in an hour more propitious for reward" read "won in a more propitious hour." A misconstruction of my meaning in these words as they originally stood has led me to make the present reading correspond exactly with what was meant, and generally understood, in the first place.—A. S. C.

assignment, but does not include batteries for battle ships Nos. 13, 14, and 15, and armored cruisers Nos. 4, 5, and 6 yet to be decided upon:

Class.	Number complete.	Partly completed.	Forgings ordered.	Total guns ordered.	Assignment. New Navy.	Old vessels.	Loaned revenue service.	Not available for issue.	Available for auxiliary and reserve.	Total.
13-inch, 35 caliber	33	1		34	32				2	34
12-inch, 35 caliber	14			14	12				2	14
12-inch, 40 caliber		1	20	20	20					20
10-inch, 30 caliber	24			[1]24	16				4	20
10 inch, 35 caliber	2			2	2					2
8-inch, 30 caliber	9			9	4				5	9
8-inch, 35 caliber	70	2		72	68				4	72
8-inch, 40 caliber	2			2	2					2
6-inch, 30 caliber	123			[2]123	85			2	32	119
6-inch, 35 caliber	6			6	5			1		6
6-inch, 40 caliber	61	7		68	64			1	3	68
6-inch, 45 caliber		1	1	1					1	1
6-inch, 50 caliber			50	50	48				2	50
5 inch, 30 caliber	2			2	2					2
5-inch, 40 caliber	197			[3]197	150	25		1	19	195
5-inch, 50 caliber			61	61	60				1	61
4-inch, 40 caliber	212			[3]212	165	31	4	5	5	210
4-inch, 50 caliber	1	1	42	42	16				26	42
Total	756	13	174	[4]939	751	56	4	10	106	927

[1] Four lost on the *Maine*.
[2] Two lost on the *Maine*; two condemned.
[3] Two condemned.
[4] Does not include 12 6-inch and 8 4.7 inch guns purchased with the *New Orleans* and *Albany*.

The above table shows 959 guns, being an increase of 169 over that shown last year.

GUN FORGINGS.

The following table shows the status of gun forgings:

	3 inch (field).	3-inch (14-pounder).	4-inch.	5-inch.	6-inch.	8-inch.	10-inch.	12-inch.	13-inch.	Total.
Required	101	32	[1]254	[1]260	[2]248	83	[3]26	34	34	1,072
Ordered	101	1	254	260	248	83	[3]26	34	34	1,041
Delivered	101	1	228	199	198	83	26	14	34	884
Not delivered			26	61	50			20		157
Yet to be ordered		31								31

[1] Two condemned.
[2] Two condemned; two lost on *Maine*. Does not include 12 guns purchased with the *New Orleans* and *Albany*.
[3] Four lost on *Maine*.

Assignment of guns of main battery.

Object.	4 inch.	4.7-inch.	5-inch.	6-inch.	8-inch.	10-inch.	12-inch.	13-inch.	Total.
Alabama				14				4	18
Brooklyn			12		8				20
Columbia	8			2	1				11
Iowa	6				8		4		18
Indiana				4	8			4	16
Illinois				14				4	18
Kearsarge			14		4			4	22
Kentucky			14		4			4	22
Massachusetts				4	8			4	16
Maine				16			4		20
Missouri				16			4		20
Minneapolis	8			2	1				11
New York	12				6				18
Oregon				4	8			4	16
Ohio				16			4		20

Assignment of guns of main battery—Continued.

Object.	4-inch.	4.7-inch.	5-inch.	6-inch.	8-in. h.	10-inch.	12-inch.	13-inch.	Total.
Olympia			10		4				14
Puritan	6						4		10
Texas				6			2		8
Wisconsin				14				4	18
Amphitrite	2					4			6
Albany		4		6					10
Atlanta				6	2				8
Baltimore				6	4				10
Boston				6	2				8
Bridge			6						6
Bunker	4		2						6
Chicago			14		4				18
Charleston				6	2				8
Cincinnati			11						11
Lancaster			18						18
Monterey						2	2		4
Miantonomoh						4			4
Monadnock	2					4			6
Newark				12					12
New Orleans		4		6					10
Philadelphia				12					12
Panther	2		6						8
Prairie				8					8
Raleigh			11						11
San Francisco				12					12
Terror						4			4
Yosemite			10						10
Alert	6								6
Adams	6								6
Alliance	6								6
Annapolis	6								6
Arkansas	4						2		6
Bennington				6					6
Dixie			8						8
Connecticut	4						2		6
Chesapeake	6								6
Concord				6					6
Castine									8
Detroit			10						10
Dolphin	3								3
Don Juan de Austria			4						4
Essex									6
Florida	4						2		6
Helena	8								8
Hartford			13						13
Isla de Luzon	4								4
Isla de Cuba	4								4
Mayflower			2						2
Montgomery			10						10
Marblehead			10						10
Machias	8								8
Marietta	6								6
Newport	6								6
Nashville	8								8
Princeton	6								6
Ranger	6								6
Topeka	6								6
Vicksburg	6								6
Wilmington	8								8
Wyoming	4						2		6
Wheeling	6								6
Yorktown				6					6
Protected cruiser No. 14			10						10
Protected cruiser No. 15			10						10
Protected cruiser No. 16			10						10
Protected cruiser No. 17			10						10
Protected cruiser No. 18			10						10
Protected cruiser No. 19			10						10
El Cano	4								4
Scorpion	2								2
Petrel				4					4
Pensacola	1								1
Monongahela	6								6
Bancroft	4								4
Total	212	8	237	214	74	18	32	32	827
Assigned shore stations, revenue cutters, and available for issue									120
Lost on Maine and condemned									12
Total number of guns authorized, including 20 guns purchased with New Orleans and Albany									959

Summary of assignment—main battery.

NOTE.—The batteries of the *New Orleans* and *Albany* were purchased with the vessels, and are not included in the following table:

	4-inch.	5-inch.	6-inch.	8-inch.	10-inch.	12-inch.	13-inch.	Total.
Total number guns made, in progress, or ordered	[1] 254	[1] 260	[2] 248	83	[3] 26	34	34	939
Number required to arm vessels of the new Navy	181	212	202	74	18	32	32	751
Number required for and assigned to old vessels and training ships and loaned to the revenue service	35	25						60
Not available for issue	5	1	4					10
Remaining available for auxiliary cruisers or reserve for Navy	31	20	33	9	4	2	2	106

[1] Two condemned. [2] Two condemned; two lost on the *Maine*. [3] Four lost on the *Maine*.

Assignment of secondary batteries.

Vessel.	14-pounder.	6-pounder.	6-pounder semiautomatic.	3-pounder.	3-pounder semiautomatic.	1-pounder.	1-pounder automatic. Heavy.	1-pounder automatic. Light.	37-millimeter revolving cannon.	Machine guns.	3-inch field.	Total.
Alabama		6	10			2	4			4	2	28
Brooklyn		12				4				4	2	22
Columbia		12				2				2	1	17
Iowa		24				4				4	2	30
Indiana		20				6		1				27
Illinois		6	10			2	4			4	2	28
Kearsarge		20				6				4	2	32
Kentucky		20				6				4	2	32
Massachusetts		20				4		4			2	30
Maine			20			2	4			4	1	31
Missouri			20			2	4			4	1	31
Minneapolis		12				2				2	1	17
New York		8				2				2	2	14
Oregon		20				2				2	1	25
Ohio			20			2	4			4	1	31
Olympia		14				7				1		22
Puritan		6				2			2			10
Texas		12				6			4		1	23
Wisconsin		6	10			2	4			4	2	28
Amphitrite		2		2		4		1	2	1	1	13
Albany		10				4	4			2		20
Atlanta		6				2	2			2	1	13
Baltimore		4		2		2			4	2	1	15
Boston		2		2		2			[1] 4	1		11
Badger					6							6
Buffalo		6								2		8
Chicago		9				2				2	1	14
Charleston		4		2		2			4		1	13
Cincinnati		8				2				2	1	13
Lancaster		6					2					8
Monterey		6				4				2	1	13
Miantonomoh		2		2		2		4		1		11
Monadnock		2		2		2			2			8
Newark		8							2	2		12
New Orleans		10				4		4		2		20
Philadelphia		4		4		2			3	6	1	20
Panther				6						1	1	8
Prairie		6								2		8
Raleigh		8				4				1	1	14
San Francisco		12				4				2		18
Terror		2		2		2			2			8
Yosemite		6								2		8
Alert		4								1	1	6
Adams		2						2		2		6
Alliance		4				2					1	7
Annapolis		4				2				1		7
Arkansas			3			1	4			2		10
Bennington		2		2					2			8
Dixie		4				2	2				1	11
Connecticut			3			1	4			2		10

[1] Two of 47 mm.

Assignment of secondary batteries—Continued.

Vessel.	14-pounder.	6-pounder.	6-pounder semiautomatic.	3-pounder.	3-pounder semiautomatic.	1-pounder.	1-pounder automatic. Heavy.	1-pounder automatic. Light.	37-millimeter revolving cannon.	Machine guns.	3-inch field.	Total.
Chicago		4					2			1		8
Concord		2		2					2	1		8
Castine		4				2				1		7
Detroit		7				2				2	2	11
Dolphin				6						1		7
Don Juan de Austria		4								4		8
Essex		4				2				2	1	9
Fiorida			3			1	4			2		10
Helena		4				4				2	1	11
Hartford		8				2	2			3	2	15
Isla de Luzon		4								4		8
Isla de Cuba		4								4		8
Katahdin		4										4
Mayflower		12								2		14
Montgomery		6				2				2		10
Marblehead		6				2				2		10
Machias		4				2				3		7
Marietta		4				2				1		7
Newport		4				2				1		7
Nashville		4				2				2	1	9
Princeton		4				2				1		7
Ranger		4								1	1	6
Topeka				6				1		1		9
Vicksburg		4				2				1		7
Wilmington		4				4				4		12
Wyoming			8				1			2		10
Wheeling		4								2		7
Yorktown		2		2		4				1		10
Protected cruiser No. 14			8			2				4		5
Protected cruiser No. 15			8			2				4		15
Protected cruiser No. 16			8			2				4	1	15
Protected cruiser No. 17			8			2				4		15
Protected cruiser No. 18			8			2				4		15
Protected cruiser No. 19			8			2				4		15
El Cano		4								2		6
Alvarado				2						2		4
Bancroft				3		1				1		10
Eagle		2								2		4
Gloucester		4		4						2		10
Monagan		6				2				2		10
Petrel		2						2				4
Ingraham				4						3		7
Petrel				2		1			2	2		7
Scorpion		6								4		10
Sandoval				2						2		4
Sylph		1										1
Vesuvius				3						1		4
Vixen		8				4				2		14
Yantic						4						4
Viking				3		2				2		7
Wasp		6								2		8
Iowa				3		4				2		9
Iowa		1								2		6
Indiana										2		4
Massachusetts		6								4		10
Oregon		1										4
Brooklyn		1		1		1		1		1	1	6
Monongahela		4				1	1			2	1	9
Bainbridge	2											7
Barry	1											7
Chauncey	1											7
Dale	1											7
Decatur	1											7
Hopkins	1											7
Hull	1											7
Lawrence	1											7
Macdonough	2											7
Paul Jones	2											7
Perry	1											7
Preble	1											7
Stewart	1											7
Truxtun	1											7
Wilmette	1											7
Worden	2											7
Bailey												4
Bagley					3							3

Assignment of secondary batteries—Continued.

Vessel.	14-pounder.	6-pounder.	6-pounder semiautomatic.	3-pounder.	3-pounder semiautomatic.	1-pounder.	1-pounder automatic. Heavy.	1-pounder automatic. Light.	37-millimeter revolving cannon.	Machine guns.	3-inch field.	Total.
Barney					3							3
Biddle					3							3
Blakely					3							3
Cushing						3						3
T. A. M. Craven						4						4
Dupont						4						4
Dahlgren						4						4
Davis						3						3
De Long					3							3
Ericsson						4						4
Foote						3						3
Farragut		4										4
Fox						3						3
Goldsborough			4									4
Gwin						1						1
Macken ie						1						1
Morris						3						3
McKee						1						1
Nicholson					3							3
O'Brien					3							3
Porter						4						4
Rowan						4						4
Rogers						3						3
Stringham			7									7
Shubrick					3							3
Stockton					3							3
Talbot						1						1
Thornton					3							3
Tingey					3							3
Winslow						3						3
Wilkes					3							3
Total	52	731	245	71	42	238	55	21	37	238	52	1,550

Number of vessels of the United States Navy with assignment of their main and secondary batteries for the years 1897, 1898, and 1899.

Year.	Number of vessels.	Number of guns assigned to main batteries.	Number of guns assigned to secondary batteries.
1897	89	593	963
1898	91	601	1,023
1899	153	827	1,550

Since the date of last report sixty-three guns of various calibers for the main batteries of vessels have been completed—viz, four 13-inch, four 8-inch, eighteen 6-inch, twenty-two 5-inch, and fifteen 4-inch; also twenty-one guns of smaller caliber—viz, twenty 1-pounder heavy automatic and one 3-inch (14 pounder) experimental type gun.

In addition seventeen guns for main batteries have been assembled and are well advanced—viz, one 13-inch, four 8-inch, eight 6-inch, and four 5-inch; and for secondary batteries, twenty 1-pounder heavy automatic and fifty-six 6-pounder semi-automatic.

Twenty-eight guns of ordinary type have been converted to rapid firing—viz, twenty-five 6-inch and three 4-inch.

Forgings have been ordered and are in part delivered for twenty 12-inch, fifty-one 6-inch, sixty-one 5-inch, and forty-two 4-inch, all of new model.

The new-model guns have enlarged powder chambers and are of the

following lengths, viz, 10 and 12 inch, 40 calibers; 8-inch, 45 calibers; 3, 4, 5 and 6 inch, 50 calibers.

The first of the new 4-inch guns, with its mount, has been completed and tested. The gun exhibited excellent ballistic properties, a muzzle velocity of 2,991 foot seconds having been recorded within the limits of chamber pressure for which the gun was designed (viz, 17 tons per square inch), using Navy smokeless powder not especially manufactured for this type of gun. It is expected that still better results will be obtained when the exact size of grain is determined for the powder.

The first of the new 6 inch guns, with its mount, is nearly completed and will soon be tested, and the first of the new 12-inch guns is assembled and in an advanced state.

Two 8 inch nickel-steel guns have been assembled. One of them is to be fitted with a quick-firing breech mechanism of new type, designed by Lieut. F. J. Haeseler, U. S. N., a similar mechanism fitted to a 4-inch gun having given good results.

Work in the gun shop has been considerably interfered with by the erection of a new roof thereon.

The satisfactory performance of the new 4-inch gun, which is made on the same design as regards chamber as the larger calibers, justifies the Bureau in anticipating equally good results from the latter.

The gun steel delivered by the manufacturers has been of excellent quality, and but very few forgings have been rejected.

The process of gun manufacture is rapidly and accurately carried on at the Naval Gun Factory, due to excellent machinery, new and good mechanical devices, and to the intelligence and skill of the operatives. A careful system of supervision and inspection is followed by the officers in charge of the work, and the Bureau has every reason to be gratified with the results attained.

The new guns will be fitted with the "Welin screw" or breech plug, which gives a proportionally larger threaded area than the plugs now in service, and therefore admits of a shorter and lighter plug, which is a matter of considerable importance, especially in the larger calibers.

A new type of breech mechanism has been adopted for the 6-inch and 5 inch R. F. guns of 50 calibers, which possesses several admirable features. It has great power to unlock, has a combination electric and percussion firing attachment, and an automatic ejection of the primer. These guns will not require brass cartridge cases.

The work on gun mounts has progressed simultaneously with the guns. Designs have been prepared for the turret mounts of the four new harbor defense monitors. They have the same general characteristics as the turret mounts for the battle ships of the *Alabama* and *Maine* class of vessels, but the construction has been improved in several important details. The first mount is well under way. A new type of 6 inch mount for the 6 inch gun of 50 calibers has been designed and is nearly completed and will soon be tested. A new type of mount for the 4-inch 50 caliber gun has been designed, manufactured, and tested, with satisfactory results.

A 14 pounder (3 inch) R. F. gun, and mount therefor, have been designed. The gun is completed and the mount nearly ready, and both will soon be tested. This is a new type of gun so far as the Navy is concerned, and is intended for part of the armament of the new "destroyers," and probably will form an important part of the secondary battery of future battle ships and large cruisers. It is designed for 3,000 foot seconds muzzle velocity, and therefore should have great range and a flat trajectory. Its remaining velocity at 3,000 yards

should be 1,400 foot-seconds, which would give it a penetrating power of 1.52 inches of Harveyed steel, or 1.22 inches of Krupp armor at that distance, rendering it a destructive weapon against the unarmored portions and exposed gun positions of an enemy's vessels.

Experience has shown that the pedestal mounts as heretofore made for 4, 5, and 6 inch guns can be greatly improved, and such improvements are now being applied to those for the vessels of the *Kearsarge* and *Alabama* class, and will be adapted to all others as funds and opportunity permit. The alterations consist in the substitution of a steel for a bronze oscillating slide and improved training and elevating gear, both fitted with friction brakes, and also of a change in the rollers giving greater ease of train.

All the new guns are being fitted for a telescope sight and for a bar sight for day and night use. The latter was designed by Lieut. H. D. Tisdale, U. S. N., an officer on duty at the gun factory, who has also been largely instrumental in improving the pedestal mounts above referred to.

Two central pivot mounts have been manufactured for the 8-inch converted guns for the *Boston* similar to those manufactured for the *Atlanta* and *Chicago*, and two others are in process of manufacture for the *Charleston*. All these mounts are fitted with heavy shields.

The type of mount for the 5-inch guns of the cruisers of the *Denver* class is under advisement. Complete batteries—main and secondary—ammunition and ordnance outfits were prepared and shipped to Hongkong, China, for the former Spanish vessels *Isla de Luzon*, *Isla de Cuba*, and *Don Juan de Austria*.

During the year the *Chicago* was supplied with four new 8-inch guns and mounts and fourteen 5-inch R. F. guns and mounts; the *Hartford* with thirteen 5-inch guns and mounts and a secondary battery; small gunboats at Manila with four 4-inch guns and mounts and secondary batteries; the *Adams* with six 4-inch guns and mounts and a secondary battery; the *Ranger* with six 4-inch guns and mounts and a secondary battery; the *Atlanta* with two 8 inch and six 6-inch converted guns and new mounts; the *Philadelphia* with twelve 6-inch guns converted to R. F.; the *Indiana* with four 6 inch 40-caliber R. F. guns and mounts in place of her 30-caliber guns; the *Massachusetts* and *Oregon* each with four 6-inch 40-caliber R. F. guns and mounts in place of their 30 caliber guns; the *Buffalo* with four 4-inch guns and mounts and a secondary battery; the *Brooklyn* with five 5-inch, Mark III, guns to replace injured guns.

New and improved ammunition hoists have been designed and manufactured for the 8-inch turrets of the *New York* and *Indiana*, and similar hoists are in an advanced state for the *Oregon*, *Olympia*, and *Massachusetts*.

Hydro-pneumatic rammers have been manufactured and installed on board the *Oregon*, *Massachusetts*, and *Indiana* in place of the former hydraulic rammers, which were constantly giving out, and others are now in an advanced state for the older monitors, which are now supplied with hydraulic rammers.

All the later ships are to be supplied with the chain rammer, which can be operated by hand or electric power.

A new type of combination primer has been developed at the torpedo station, and promises to give excellent results, and if, after further test, it proves to be wholly satisfactory, it will probably be generally introduced into service.

The question of a means of reducing the temperature of magazines

on board ship by connecting them with the refrigerating plant is now under consideration, and preliminary steps have been taken to introduce such a feature on the battle ships now being built.

Special attention is being given, in connection with the Bureau of Construction and Repair, to providing good means of ventilation for turrets, a matter that the recent war showed was most important.

Owing to the number of purchased vessels added to the Navy during the recent war, the supply of reserve guns has been considerably depleted, and the Bureau recommends that funds be appropriated for manufacturing an increased number. An item has been inserted in the annual estimates for this purpose.

At the Naval Gun Factory at the Washington Navy-Yard, 113 enlisted men have been under instruction and 80 at the torpedo station.

ARMAMENT OF VESSELS UNDER CONSTRUCTION.

The batteries for the *Kearsarge* and *Kentucky*, with their accessories have been completed and shipped to the contractors' works, with the exception of the 5-inch guns and top carriages, which are being held at the gun factory until certain necessary alterations are made to the top carriages. They will be completed by the time the vessels are finished.

The 13-inch guns of the *Alabama* and the turret fittings have been completed and shipped to the works of the contractors. The 6-inch guns are completed and their mounts 75 per cent completed and they will be ready in about two months.

The 13-inch guns and mounts for the *Wisconsin* are completed and ready for proof. The 6-inch guns are completed and their mounts 60 per cent completed and will be ready in about three months.

The 13 inch guns and mounts for the *Illinois* are completed and ready for proof. The 6-inch guns and mounts will be completed in about four months.

The entire ordnance outfit for all the above vessels will be ready in advance of the completion of the ships.

A battery has been completed for the training ship *Chesapeake*.

All the above vessels will receive entire outfits of smokeless powder.

The guns for battle ships *Maine*, *Ohio*, and *Missouri* and the four harbor defense monitors are underway, several sets of forgings having been delivered, and they will be completed far in advance of the vessels. The same applies to the armament of the six cruisers of the *Denver* class.

The launching tubes for all the new destroyers and torpedo boats are completed and their batteries will be ready by the time they are required.

ARMAMENT OF NEW VESSELS.

The main battery of battle ships *Maine*, *Ohio*, and *Missouri* will consist of four 12-inch guns of 40 calibers, mounted in pairs in two electrically controlled balanced turrets, having inclined port plates, and of sixteen 6-inch R. F. guns of 50 calibers, mounted as follows: Twelve on the main deck, ten of which are in an armored central redoubt or casemate and two in bow sponsons; four others are mounted on the upper deck in armored casemates.

The new monitors *Arkansas*, *Florida*, *Wyoming*, and *Connecticut* will each carry two 12-inch 40-caliber guns, mounted in one electrically controlled, balanced, elliptical turret with inclined port plate, and four 4-inch 50-caliber guns, with shields, on the superstructure.

The six cruisers of the *Denver* class will each carry ten 5-inch guns of 50 calibers.

The development of the 12-inch gun has been so great that its adoption for recent vessels, rather than the 13-inch gun on the older vessels, became a logical sequence.

The 12-inch gun has a projectile of but 850 pounds weight as against 1,100 pounds for that of the 13 inch gun, but the muzzle velocity of the new 40-caliber 12-inch gun will be not less than 2,800 foot-seconds against 2,300 foot-seconds of the present 13-inch gun. The muzzle energy of the new 12-inch gun will therefore be 58,221 foot-tons as against 40,404 foot tons for the 13-inch. The penetrating power of the new 12-inch gun at 3,000 yards will be 17.92 inches of Harveyed nickel steel armor as against 15.91 inches for the 13-inch gun, but the racking and battering effect of the 12-inch projectile will be less. The new 12-inch gun will readily perforate any armor afloat or likely to be put afloat, and the Bureau considers it a more suitable weapon for the new battle ships than a gun of larger caliber.

The 6-inch R. F. 50 caliber gun for the new vessels will have a muzzle velocity exceeding 2,900 foot-seconds, with a muzzle energy of not less than 5,838 foot tons. At 3,000 yards they will have the power to penetrate Harveyed nickel steel armor of 5.3 inches in thickness, and they can be fired at the rate of ten rounds per minute. Such rapidity, however, is the proving-ground record, and it is not supposed that such a rate of fire would be practicable in action, unless for a brief interval.

The new 5-inch gun for the *Denver* class and the 4 inch for the monitors will be of 50 calibers and capable of developing a muzzle velocity of 3,000 foot-seconds.

Elements of latest types of naval guns—models of 1897, giving perforation of face-hardened armor at ranges up to 3,000 yards, with smokeless powder and uncapped armor-piercing projectiles, at normal impact.

Calibers of guns.	3-inch.	4-inch.	5-inch.	6-inch.	8-inch.	10-inch.	12-inch.
Length.....calibers..	50	50	50	50	45	40	40
Weight.....tons..	0.87	2.56	7.4	8	18	33.4	52
Weight of projectile.....pounds..	14	32	60	100	250	500	850
Muzzle velocity.....foot-seconds..	3,000	3,000	2,900	2,900	2,800	2,800	2,800
Muzzle energy.....foot-tons..	874	1,999	3,503	5,838	13,602	27,204	58,221
Perforation at muzzle, Harveyed nickel steel.....inches..	4.19	6.12	7.51	9.35	13.57	18.57	23.42
Perforation at muzzle, Krupp armor, inches.....	3.35	4.90	6.01	7.71	10.66	14.86	18.74
Remaining velocity at 1,000 yards, foot-seconds.....	2,328	2,477	2,460	2,516	2,591	2,587	2,619
Perforation at 1,000 yards of Harveyed nickel steel.....inches..	2.98	4.77	6.03	7.74	11.86	16.71	21.42
Perforation at 1,000 yards of Krupp armor, inches.....	2.38	3.91	4.82	6.19	9.49	13.37	16.84
Remaining velocity at 2,000 yards, foot-seconds.....	1,806	2,046	2,087	2,183	2,288	2,391	2,450
Perforation at 2,000 yards of Harveyed nickel steel.....inches..	2.13	3.68	4.85	6.40	10.37	15.04	19.60
Perforation at 2,000 yards of Krupp armor, inches.....	1.70	2.94	3.88	5.12	8.30	12.03	15.68
Remaining velocity at 3,000 yards, foot-seconds.....	1,401	1,690	1,771	1,893	2,068	2,209	2,291
Perforation at 3,000 yards of Harveyed nickel steel.....inches..	1.52	2.85	3.89	5.30	9.06	13.53	17.92
Perforation at 3,000 yards of Krupp armor, inches.....	1.22	2.28	3.11	4.24	6.61	10.82	14.34

With capped projectiles an increased thickness of from 15 to 20 per cent may be perforated.

AUTOMATIC AND OTHER MACHINE GUNS.

There are in service a considerable number of 6-millimeter automatic Colt guns, which, in general, have given good satisfaction. When they have failed it has almost invariably been due to neglect of some necessary precaution in loading the feed belts, or in the care of the piece, or to defective ammunition. When in proper order, with good ammunition, the gun is very efficient. These guns have the defects common to all belt-loading, single-barrel machine guns, namely, great accuracy is required in filling the belts; the parts move with great rapidity and the barrel becomes very hot after a short time, rendering it difficult to adjust any derangement which may occur. A single automatic machine gun should not be relied upon at a critical time unless well supported by infantry. These guns are light and comparatively inexpensive; they require but few men, and should certainly operate in pairs.

The Bureau has ordered a .30 caliber Colt automatic to handle the Army cartridge, for test and experiment. A .30 caliber Gatling, to handle the Army cartridge, has also been ordered.

The Bureau is of the opinion that it will be found expedient to supply each vessel with a number of automatic guns of small arm caliber, according to her class, and one hand-working gun. Under such conditions vessels will be in this respect well equipped for any service.

A new type of fully automatic 3 pounder gun has been tried with promising results. Such a gun has a rate of possible fire at 70 per minute, as compared with 40 for the semi automatic gun. It also has the advantage of having four shots in immediate readiness, viz, one in the chamber and three in the loading hopper. This device can also be attached to the 6-pounder semi-automatic gun, and the Bureau is having one so fitted for experiment.

SMALL ARMS.

Upon the recommendation of the Bureau, a joint board of army, navy, and marine officers was convened in December, 1898, to consider the question of the adoption of a uniform caliber for small arms and machine guns, and of a standard and uniform small arm cartridge for the use of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps.

This board reported as follows:

The board is of the opinion that there are no conditions in the nature of the service peculiar to the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps which require a different caliber for their small arms and machine guns.

Since the board finds no sufficient reason for a different caliber of small arms and machine guns for the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps the board is of the opinion that the same caliber should be adopted for these services, and since interchangeability of ammunition is the special advantage to be gained by the use of a single caliber, a standard and uniform cartridge to the extent of securing interchangeability should be adopted.

As the board is of the opinion that there should be but one caliber of small arms and machine guns for the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, and as great numbers of satisfactory caliber .30 rifles are now in service in the Army and are being manufactured at a considerable daily rate, after large preliminary expenditures for plant, and as, under the prospective enlarged sphere of the Army's action and possible increase in numbers, it will require an immediate additional supply of such arms, the board is further of the opinion that the retention of the caliber now in use is at present imperative for the Army, and therefore, under their previous conclusions, it should also be adopted for the Navy and Marine Corps.

The board, however, while recognizing the desirability of a uniform caliber for both services, does not deem it of vital importance, and is of the opinion that the

change of the Navy caliber might well be postponed until it has been definitely settled whether or not it is advantageous to modify the Army cartridge by the use of a cannelured instead of a rim case.

In considering a standard cartridge the board recognizes that the cannelured case is a suitable one for small arms and machine guns, and that its use in the naval weapons of these classes has been satisfactory. It is further of the opinion that, if found practicable at moderate cost to adapt the present Army rifle to the use of such a case, a cartridge conforming in other external forms and dimensions to the present Army cartridge should be adopted as the standard and uniform small-arm cartridge for the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps.

Without attempting any discussion of the respective merits of the small arms now in use by the Army and Navy, or of the report above quoted, the Bureau is of the opinion that public policy demands the use of a uniform caliber and standard cartridge for both services. Some experiments have been carried on by the Army with a .30-caliber cartridge having a cannelured case, but its adoption at the present time is out of the question, as the Army guns are widely distributed and the alteration required can only be made at an arsenal.

The Army could not change its small arm equipment even if it desired to; therefore the Bureau considers that the logical solution of the case is for the Navy to at once adopt the Army caliber .30 rifle, and its standard ammunition in so far as applies to additional rifles procured for the Navy. A number of additional rifles will soon be required for the Navy, and after consultation with the Department the Bureau intends to supply itself with the present standard Army rifle, to meet these requirements, rather than to go through the long and tedious process of a competitive test of new guns.

At a later period, should it be determined by the Army to change its type of gun, a joint board of army and navy officers might with propriety be ordered to consider the matter.

No matter when the change is made by the Navy to the army caliber, there will be a period during which two calibers will be in use, which will be attended with some inconvenience.

TORPEDOES AND TORPEDO MATERIAL.

Torpedoes.—The manufacture of the fifty short, Mark III, and twenty-five long, Mark I, torpedoes, with Obry gears, noted in the last report, has been completed and the torpedoes are undergoing final acceptance trials at Sag Harbor.

Negotiations have been initiated looking to the development of a new type long Whitehead torpedo, especially adapted to under-water discharge. This new torpedo will embody the most advanced features, and should develop a marked increase in speed and consequent increased range. To this end the development of a nickel steel for air flasks that will permit a working pressure of 1,500 pounds per square inch, with an increased capacity of the flask, has been commenced.

Minor improvements have been made in the Obry gears in service that have added considerably to their efficiency.

Work is now in progress in the development of a greatly modified Obry gear that it is believed will largely increase the scope of action of that device.

The following table shows the number of torpedoes contracted for, those in service, those lost or injured beyond repair, those in use for instruction, and the reserve remaining on hand for the outfit of vessels now under construction:

	Howell.		Whitehead.								Total.
	Mark I, 14.2".	Mark I, 18".	Mark I, 3.55 m.	Mark II, 3.55 m.	Mark III, 3.55 m.	Mark I, 5 m.	Mark Ia, 5 m.	Mark Ib, 5 m.	Mark IIb, 3.68 m.	Schwartzkopff.	
Contracted for or ordered	50	1	100	50	109	125	10	4	8	12	469
In service	10	0	28	23	4	12	0	0	0	0	77
Used for instruction	0	0	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	4
Lost or injured beyond repairs	10	0	17	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	32
Remaining for issue	30	1	52	22	104	113	10	4	8	12	356

Torpedo-launching apparatus.—The 38 5-meter central-pivot tubes and mounts, mentioned in the last report, have been completed and await installation on various vessels.

In accordance with the adopted policy of not placing torpedo tubes on unarmored cruisers, the torpedo outfits have been removed from the *Raleigh*, *Cincinnati*, *New Orleans*, *Detroit*, *Marblehead*, *Montgomery*, *Bancroft*, and *Lancaster*. Tubes will not be installed on the *Albany*, completing at Elswick, England. The after tubes have been removed from the *San Francisco;* the forward tubes being left installed for purposes of instruction and practice only. As extended repairs render it feasible, tubes will be removed from other unarmored vessels that may be provided with them.

The work of manufacturing the adopted type of underwater tube is progressing satisfactorily, and these tubes will be ready in ample time for installation on the battleships for which they are intended.

Air compressors.—The new design of compressor for torpedo boats and torpedo boat destroyers, mentioned in the last report, has been completed. The shop test and preliminary trials of this compressor indicate that, in this design, there has been provided a compressor of marked superiority over any now in service.

The Bureau has always invited criticism and suggestions from the officers of the Navy on the ordnance and ordnance outfits of the vessels to which they were attached, and has received some excellent suggestions and endeavored to profit by them.

ARMOR.

There is no subject under the cognizance of the Bureau demanding more serious consideration at the present time than that of armor for certain vessels now under construction, for which as yet no armor has been contracted for, and for vessels authorized by act of Congress approved March 3, 1899, which, under existing laws, can not be contracted for until the armor therefor has been contracted for.

This is a most unusual provision and attended with considerable difficulty, and is contrary to the practice usually followed. The usual course of procedure is for the shipbuilder to prepare the armor drawings, giving the dimensions, weights, and locations of the plates and to classify them in groups in the order of required delivery, and these tables form part of the armor contract. It is obvious that until several months have elapsed after a vessel has been contracted for the builders can not furnish the desired information. It would, of course,

be practicable to make an armor contract in general terms for the approximate number of tons required, but it is not necessary to contract for the armor until from six to ten months after the vessel has been contracted for.

The armor situation at present is as follows: The contracts for the *Kearsarge* and *Kentucky* have been completed. Armor is now being manufactured for battle ships *Alabama*, *Illinois*, and *Wisconsin*. There remains to be delivered for these vessels, 832 tons for the *Alabama*, 1,255 tons for the *Illinois*, and 394 tons for the *Wisconsin*, a total of 2,481 tons. Of this amount about 1,000 tons will probably be delivered during the next six weeks. The armor contracts for these vessels will probably be completed by January 1, 1900, or thereabouts.

The above contracts were not made until June, 1898, one year and nine months after the vessels had been contracted for, and, in consequence, the Bureau is unable to meet the requirements of the shipbuilders, although the armor contractors are ahead of their contracts in deliveries. The result is that the vessels referred to will probably not be completed as soon as would otherwise be the case.

The delay in contracting for the armor for these vessels was due to the fact that Congress had limited the price which might be paid to $300 per ton, at which price no bids could be obtained. When, by subsequent action, Congress raised the limit of price to $400 per ton contracts were at once made for armor for these vessels on that basis.

In the Bureau's last annual report it was stated under the head of armor that "there is but little doubt that armor of a superior quality to that previously used can be manufactured," and in the early days of December last, a few days after the assembling of Congress, the Bureau addressed a letter to the Department setting forth such information as it possessed concerning the improved armor commonly referred to as being made by the Krupp process, recommending its adoption, and naming the price asked by the manufacturers. That letter, or copies thereof, was sent by the Department to the Senate and House Naval Committees for their information. Congress, however, at its last session, adhered to the $400 limit for the seven vessels authorized by act of Congress approved May 4, 1898, namely, three battleships (Nos. 10, 11, and 12) of the *Maine* class and four harbor-defense monitors (Nos. 7, 8, 9, and 10) of the *Arkansas* class, and fixed the limit of cost at $300 per ton for the armored vessels authorized by act of Congress approved March 3, 1899, viz, three battle ships (Nos. 13, 14, and 15) and three first-class cruisers. (Nos. 4, 5, and 6.)

As the contracts for the hulls and machinery of the *Maine* class of battleships were not made until October, 1898, and the keel of the first one only laid February 15, 1899, the matter of their armor did not press particularly; and, moreover, the manufacturers had all the work they could perform up to about January 1, 1900, for the *Alabama* class, and as the Bureau felt that it was its duty to make every effort to supply armor of the very best and most resisting quality that could be procured in order that the prestige and fighting qualities of these fine vessels might not be impaired, no armor was contracted for for the battleships of the *Maine* class, except a small quantity to be hereafter referred to, though the law allowed $400 a ton for armor "of suitable quality" for them; neither the Bureau nor the Department considered the armor heretofore ordered, that is, the ordinary face-hardened armor, "of suitable quality" for the new vessels.

In order to ascertain if the best quality of armor, and such as was desired, could be procured for the price authorized, and in order to

attract bidders, the Department grouped together the armor required for all vessels authorized, and on March 29, 1899, published advertisements in leading daily papers in Boston, Mass., New York, N. Y., Philadelphia, Pa., Atlanta, Ga., Birmingham, Ala., Chattanooga, Tenn., Pittsburg, Pa., Cleveland, Ohio, Chicago, Ill., and San Francisco, Cal., inviting bids for about 24,000 tons of armor plate and appurtenances for seven vessels authorized by act of Congress approved May 4, 1898, viz: three battleships (Nos. 10, 11, and 12 of the *Maine* class, and four harbor-defense monitors (Nos. 7, 8, 9, and 10 of the *Arkansas* class, for which $400 per ton might be paid, and for six vessels authorized by act of Congress, approved March 3, 1899, viz: three battleships and three first class armored cruisers, for which $300 per ton might be paid. To be exact, 24,590.5 tons of armor, for which $8,385,700 might be paid.

The circular, prepared in connection with the Department's advertisement, stated in general terms the quality of the armor required, and a table therein showed the ballistic tests to which it would be subjected for acceptance. The velocities given in this table are considerably higher than those now or heretofore used in this country for the acceptance tests of service armor for United States vessels, but not higher than are used abroad or in this country for armor manufactured by the Krupp process for vessels built for foreign powers. Experimental plates of such character had been made in this country and tested at the naval proving ground with excellent results, quite equal to those attained abroad, and the manufacturers had signified their readiness to undertake its manufacture for service use if satisfactory arrangements as to price could be made. Such armor is now being made in this country for foreign vessels being built in the United States.

May 31, 1899, was specified as the date for opening the bids, and notwithstanding the unusual amount of armor called for, the large sum of money involved, and the long period over which the deliveries might extend, only one bid was received, and that named a price of $450 per ton, a sum in excess of that authorized, and fixed the date for beginning delivery as January, 1904. It was ascertained, on inquiry, that the bidders had no manufacturing plant whatever, but were dealers, on a moderate scale, in scrap iron and steel, and their bid was not deemed worthy of serious consideration. About the middle of the year, the contractors for the harbor defense monitors began to send in the armor drawings, and made request for early deliveries, and, in order not to complicate matters, and that the Department might not be embarrassed by claims for delay, growing out of the non-delivery of armor, and, because the vessels themselves, being of low free board type, offered but small targets and might be expected to operate near or in harbors where they would receive the support of the land defenses, the Bureau recommended to the Department, though very reluctantly, that the ordinary face hardened armor should be contracted for, for these vessels.

The Department, approving the same, contracts were made in August and September, 1899, for about 538 tons of armor for each vessel, and for 38.86 tons of armor for each of the vessels of the *Maine* class; the latter consisting of four small diagonal plates and an armored tube for each vessel, necessary in the early stages of their construction. This armor, aggregating 2,268.58 tons, was contracted for at $400 per ton, the price authorized by Congress for armor for these vessels. All the armor for the four monitors should be completed by the end of April, 1900.

There remains yet to be contracted for, for the three battle ships of the *Maine* class 7,358 tons; for the three battle ships authorized by the act of March 3, 1899, about 3,000 tons each; for the three first class cruisers authorized by the same act, about 1,700 tons each, a total of 21,458 tons approximately.

By January, 1900, the contracts should be made for the armor for the three vessels of the *Maine* class; to defer it longer will most likely delay the completion of the vessel beyond the contract date. Armor of good quality can be brought, presumably for $400 per ton, unless the rise in the price of pig iron may affect this, as all other branches of the steel industry. Such armor as can probably be procured for $400 per ton is not the best armor that can be made, and hence is not suitable for the vessels in question. Armor plates of very fine quality, having great powers of resistance, can be and frequently are made of nickel steel, treated by the ordinary process of supercarburization, but the manufacturers will not guarantee them to stand a ballistic test beyond a certain point, there being too much uncertainty in the process of manufacture to warrant it. With the so-called Krupp process, treatment can be carried on until satisfactory results are obtained, and much higher ballistic properties can be guaranteed. In the Krupp plate the hardened face is thicker and the plate is tougher throughout and possesses remarkable immunity from cracking under numerous heavy impacts. The manufacturers consider it more difficult to make than the armor now being manufactured for the Department, and a less quantity can be turned out in a given time than of the present armor. To continue the use of ordinary face-hardened armor, rather than that made by the Krupp process would, in the opinion of the Bureau, be inexcusable, and would throw great discredit on the new vessels of the Navy.

The Bureau urges that the matter be laid before Congress, as soon as it assembles, and that it be urgently requested to make such provision in the early days of the session, by joint resolution or otherwise, as will enable the Department to make contracts not later than January, 1900, for the best quality of armor that can be obtained for the three vessels of the *Maine* class; also for the six armored vessels authorized by the act of March 3, 1899, removing the restriction therein contained, which provides that the vessels shall not be contracted for until the armor therefor is contracted for, and that limiting the price of armor to $300 per ton for the vessels authorized by that act.

The question of a Government armor factory should have no bearing upon the supply of armor for the *Maine*, *Ohio*, and *Missouri*, as it would, under any circumstances, be impracticable to obtain it from such a source in time to complete the vessels above referred to.

The Bureau considers it incumbent upon it to recommend the use of the best armor that can be procured for the new vessels, and that to consent to the use of any but the best, without protest, or an urgent appeal, would be a serious dereliction of duty on its part, and on this account has not favored the making of contracts, under existing conditions, for armor for the three vessels of the *Maine* class until the matter could again be presented to Congress. No detriment or inconvenience to the Government or its interests has been caused by this delay; but, as previously stated, armor for the above vessels should be contracted for by January, 1900.

If, after a further presentation of the case, Congress decides to adhere to the present limitation, the Department will probably be obliged to procure armor similar to that heretofore and now being used, but will

have the consciousness of having performed its duty in the matter and will be free from further responsibility.

It is quite evident that the building of armored ships of war must soon be discontinued by this Government, until the vexed questions of the source of supply and cost of armor are disposed of.

NAVAL MAGAZINES AND NAVY-YARDS.

Boston, Mass.—During the past year the magazines and shell houses at Chelsea, Mass., have been put in a good state of repair. The main magazine has had a new roof and new floors, and its ventilation has been improved, and the buildings in general are in suitable condition to meet the probable present requirements of the station. They are badly located, however, not easily accessible, and the growth of the city will soon render the site untenable. Already large commercial establishments have been created in the immediate vicinity, rendering it inadvisable to store large quantities of powder at that point. Therefore the Bureau is utilizing it as a storage place for unloaded projectiles.

A new site for a magazine outside the city limits should be procured, if possible, as it is only a question of a comparatively short time when the present site will have to be abandoned.

A barge or lighter for carrying ammunition to and from ships in the harbor is required, and an item for the purchase of the same has been inserted in the annual estimates under the Bureau of Construction and Repair.

The Boston yard is poorly equipped so far as facilities for ordnance purposes are concerned, the fine shops, etc., formerly assigned for ordnance purposes having, some years ago, been turned over to the equipment department, and no subsequent provision has been made for ordnance purposes. A suitable building with machine-shop facilities should be erected for ordnance purposes; but in view of more pressing needs elsewhere, no request for an appropriation for the same is made at this time.

The nitcr depot at Malden, Mass., is in fair condition.

Navy yard, New York.—This being the principal station for fitting out and for repairing vessels and the chief depot for accumulating, storing, and distributing supplies, demands larger and better facilities than any other yard on the Atlantic coast. Heretofore, of late years, the growth of the Navy has been much more rapid than the navy-yard facilities for carrying on work or for caring for materials. The means and appliances at the disposal of the Bureau were meager in the extreme, as there was not only a lack of modern tools and machine-shop facilities, but of space in which to prepare or receive ships' ordnance outfits, or to store the increasing volume of valuable material. The present outlook, however, is much better, as building No. 13, now exclusively devoted to ordnance purposes, contains an excellent machine shop, equipped with modern tools, and being divided by a fire wall affords some needed storage space. A large fireproof storehouse (building No. 24) is now in process of construction, intended for the storage of torpedoes, small guns, and miscellaneous ordnance material. Building No. 8 is also being remodeled for ordnance purposes. When these buildings are both completed the ordnance department at this yard will be in a very satisfactory condition.

The barge *Victor*, with steam derricks, etc., has been purchased for ordnance purposes at this yard, and is a useful acquisition.

Ordnance dock.—The conditions at this point are far from satisfactory both as to buildings and grounds, the former being small and of inadequate size to meet present, to say nothing of future, requirements. Their condition is such as not to warrant further expenditure for repairs to any extent, and therefore the Bureau has requested the Bureau of Yards and Docks to estimate and ask for, in its annual estimates, funds for the following improvements at this point: (*a*) A two-storied storehouse for the storage of unloaded projectiles and other ordnance materials; (*b*) a one storied storehouse for the collection and preparation of shipments and to afford additional storage facilities; (*c*) a one-storied building for the storage of guns and mounts; (*d*) a slip on the Wallabout side to afford more convenient approach to the new buildings, and for the accommodation of boats and lighters; (*e*) an extension of the arc electric light system of the yard to the ordnance dock. The grounds are in need of grading and filling in, and the water front on the Wallabout side is in a very bad state.

Fort Lafayette, New York Harbor.—This old fort, now being used as a naval magazine, has been considerably improved during the past year. A new dock, with a storehouse thereon, has been constructed, affording good landing facilities for boats and material. A substantial breakwater has been built for the protection of the wharf, and with it affording shelter for small boats and launches. The approach has been dredged out, giving a channel having not less than 12 feet at low water; consequently the dock can be reached by deep-draft tugs and barges at any stage of the tide. Two new sheds for the temporary storage of ammunition have been built against the walls of the fort—one inside and one outside. A new fireproof roof, covering in the parapets of the fort on three of its faces, has also been built, greatly improving the condition of the casemates thus covered. The walls of the fort and the ceilings, sides, and floors of the casemates which were in a dilapidated condition have been cemented and pointed, and heavy iron shutters have been fitted to openings leading to storage spaces for ammunition. Appliances for extinguishing fire have been installed, and the place has been put in as satisfactory a condition as the funds available for the purpose would admit; but as work will have to be carried on at this point for several years to come, further improvements will be necessary, and a moderate sum is asked for for this purpose.

Naval powder depot, Lake Denmark, N. J.—At this point, which is one of the principal depots for reserve supplies, a new fireproof two-storied storehouse 50 by 200 feet has been erected; also a new office building. The railroad tracks and sidings have been extended, and heavier rails and new sleepers have been substituted for the old ones over a considerable portion of the railroad. The buildings, generally, have been put in thorough order and repainted. The roads have been improved and new culverts built where needed to prevent their washing away. The fire service has been extended. Further enlargement is, however, essential, as the facilities are inadequate for the storage and preparation of ammunition; consequently items as follows have been included in the Bureau's annual estimates: (*a*) A new storehouse; (*b*) a new magazine; (*c*) a small light, heat, and power plant connected with a small machine shop; (*d*) a new wagon shed; (*e*) additional railroad tracks and sidings; (*f*) water reservoir; (*g*) extension of fire system; (*h*) grading and road improvements.

The varied and exacting duties pertaining to the Bureau at the New York navy-yard have been conscientiously and satisfactorily performed

by the inspector of ordnance, Commander William Swift, U. S. N., whose wise judgment, industry, and devotion to duty have enabled the Bureau to successfully carry on without hitch of any kind an immense amount of important work. All the improvements at Fort Lafayette and at Lake Denmark, as well as those at the navy-yard, were projected by him and executed under his immediate supervision to the entire satisfaction of the Bureau and to the great advantage of the Department.

Navy-yard, League Island, Philadelphia.—Current work pertaining to the station, of great volume and important character, has been carried on at this point during the past year up to February 7, 1899, by Commander E. Longnecker, U. S. N., inspector of ordnance, on which date he was relieved by Lieut. Commander N. E. Mason, U. S. N.

Commander Longnecker's services extended through the period of the war with Spain, during which, prior to and after, he rendered most efficient service, not only at the yard but in connection with the extensive improvements at Fort Mifflin, in projecting and building the new magazine buildings.

At League Island a new ordnance machine shop and storehouse is in process of erection by the Bureau of Yards and Docks. Much delay has arisen, due to the rise in price of structural materials and to the fact that the appropriation was so small that no bids were received within its limits, necessitating the revision of plans and the readvertising for bids. When the building is completed and the machinery, for which provision has been made, is installed the Bureau's facilities will be fairly good for present needs.

Naval magazine, Fort Mifflin.—Much attention has been given to the development of this important establishment, it being one of the principal depots for the storage, preparation, and distribution of ammunition for the Navy. The constantly increasing demands of the service soon revealed the fact that increased facilities were necessary, and the necessary funds therefor having been appropriated by the last Congress, contracts have been made for an additional magazine, a fixed ammunition house, two gun-cotton houses, fire plant, tramway, two filling houses, and the remodeling of old buildings for watchmen's quarters and storehouse; and during the past year contracts have been made for a new wing to the wharf, for repairs to the dikes, and for the extension of the railroad tracks. The War Department has been requested to transfer to the Navy Department an additional tract of land at this point, in order that the boundaries of the magazine site may be extended, and thus rendered more secure against encroachment. The grounds have been inclosed by a wire fence to exclude trespassers. Congress at its last session authorized the purchase of a steam lighter for this station. Telephone service has been established between Fort Mifflin and the navy yard, which was much needed. When the present improvements are completed it will be one of the best powder depots in possession of the Department.

Bellevue magazine, Washington, D. C.—A new wharf has recently been built, and such work has been performed as was necessary to maintain the buildings and grounds in good condition.

Naval Gun Factory, Washington.—Treated under a separate head in another part of this report.

Navy-yard, Norfolk.—This station, being next to New York the principal station for repairing and equipping vessels and for distributing supplies, has carried on a large volume of work for the Bureau. The yard facilities are only fair, but Congress at its last session having

appropriated for a new building for ordnance purposes, the Bureau's facilities will be improved.

St. Helena, being a part of the "reservation," though across the Elizabeth River, is devoted exclusively to ordnance purposes. Minor repairs have been made to the wharf and buildings, but the place is not in a satisfactory state and needs to be improved. A small appropriation has been asked for building new watchmen's quarters, which are urgently needed.

Fort Norfolk.—This point is now used for the storage of unloaded projectiles and for torpedoes. It has had numerous minor repairs made and is in good condition for present uses, except the sea walls, which will soon require repairing.

Craney Island.—This site, formerly used as a magazine, belongs to the War Department, but remained in charge of the Navy Department until recently, when it was turned over to the local authorities for quarantine purposes.

St. Julians Creek.—The magazines at this point are comparatively new and in good condition, but were found to be too small for the requirements of the station, and during the past year contracts were made for the erection of three additional magazine buildings; for water pipes and hydrants, water tank, and windmill for fire service; for a new stable and wagon shed; for an extension of the railroad tracks, and for grading and filling in, and an option has been taken upon an adjoining tract of land, and the necessary steps have been taken to obtain State authorization to include the same in the Government reservation. Additional funds are now estimated for for watchmen's quarters and further grading and filling in and for a slip for boats. When these improvements are completed the place will be in a very satisfactory condition.

Port Royal, S. C.—A small magazine for the storage of powder has been erected at this point.

Mare Island Navy-Yard.—A new filling house has been erected at the magazine site at this point and additional machine-shop facilities have been arranged for; also for the construction of two steel lighters for ordnance purposes.

Naval station, Bremerton, Puget Sound.—The Bureau has no facilities at this station, and as vessels now go there to dock it is necessary to land their ammunition at San Francisco. This might prove a source of serious embarrassment; therefore the Bureau has asked for funds for the erection of two magazines and an ordnance shop at Bremerton.

Japonsky Island, Sitka, Alaska.—Slight repairs have been made to existing buildings at this point.

It will be seen from the foregoing that extensive improvements of an important character and of a permanent kind have been made during the past year to this part of the naval establishment.

New magazine near New York.—The Bureau regrets to report that thus far it has been unable to obtain a site for this purpose, and for which Congress appropriated funds at its last session. A few suitable sites were considered, but as soon as it became known that it was contemplated to use them for magazine purposes prices were put at a very high figure and opposition was at once encountered, much of it of an unreasonable character, but to such an extent that it was deemed inexpedient to further consider them. Many sites have been offered, but most of them did not fulfill the requirements. The Bureau is still on the lookout, and hopes ultimately to obtain a suitable place at a reasonable price.

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REPORT OF CHIEF OF THE BUREAU OF CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
BUREAU OF CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR,
WASHINGTON, D. C., *September* 27, 1899.

SIR: In obedience to the Department's instructions, I have the honor to submit herewith a report of the work done under the cognizance of the Bureau during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899, together with estimates for appropriations required for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1901.

The estimate marked "A" is for the salaries of employees in the Bureau.

The estimate marked "B" is for the general repair of vessels at navy-yards and on foreign stations; the purchase of stores, materials, machinery, tools of all kinds, preservation of machinery and stores, and for the proper performance of all work not otherwise provided for under the cognizance of this Bureau.

The estimate marked "B Special" is for the construction of a steel lighter for general yard use at the Navy-Yard, Portsmouth, N. H., and the purchase or construction of a steel lighter for ordnance purposes at Navy-Yard, Boston, Mass.

The estimates marked "B 1 Special" are for the improvement of construction plants already installed at the several navy-yards and naval stations and the commencement of the installation of a plant at Algiers, La.

The estimates marked "C" are for the pay of such clerks and writers at the several navy yards as are indispensable to the proper and systematic transaction of the work.

ESTIMATES, APPROPRIATION CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR, 1900-1901.

Estimates of the appropriations required for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1901, by the Bureau of Construction and Repair, Navy Department.

Detailed objects of expenditures and explanations.	Estimated amount required for each detailed object.	Total amount to be appropriated under each head of appropriation.	Amount appropriated for current fiscal year ending June 30, 1900.
A. *Salaries.*			
Chief clerk (appropriated)	$2,000.00		
One clerk of class 3 (appropriated)	1,600.00		
Increase of pay to class 4 (submitted)	200.00		
One clerk of class 3 (appropriated)	1,600.00		
One clerk of class 2 (submitted)	1,400.00		
Two clerks of class 1, at $1,200 each (appropriated)	2,400.00		
One clerk of class 1 (submitted)	1,200.00		
One assistant draftsman (appropriated)	1,400.00		
One assistant messenger (appropriated)	720.00		
One laborer (appropriated)	660.00		
		$13,180.00	$12,180.00
NOTE.—One draftsman, $1,800, omitted from estimate of this Bureau and estimated for by Secretary's Office. In compliance with the provisions of the act approved February 24, 1899, the following force now employed in the Bureau and at present paid a per diem compensation, as herein below stated, from appropriation "Increase of the Navy, Construction and Machinery," is recommended to be transferred to the regular establishment. The services of this force are absolutely necessary for the regular and permanent work of the Bureau in addition to the present permanent force.			
One clerk of class 1, at $4 per diem, $1,252 per annum (appropriated)	1,252.00		

Estimates of the appropriations required for the fiscal year, etc.—Continued.

Detailed objects of expenditures and explanations.	Estimated amount required for each detailed object.	Total amount to be appropriated under each head of appropriation.	Amount appropriated for current fiscal year ending June 30, 1900.
A. *Salaries*—Continued.			
Nineteen clerks of class E, at $3.26 per diem, $1,020.38 per annum each (appropriated)	$19,387.22		
Four clerks of class D, at $3.04 per diem, $951.52 per annum each (appropriated)	3,806.08		
One chief draftsman, at $7 per diem, $2,191 per annum (appropriated)	2,191.00		
Three draftsmen in charge, at $7 per diem, $2,191 per annum each (appropriated)	6,573.00		
One leading draftsman, at $6 per diem, $1,878 per annum (appropriated)	1,878.00		
Twenty-seven draftsmen, at $5.50 per diem, $1,721.50 per annum each (appropriated)	46,480.50		
Four assistant draftsmen, at $4 per diem, $1,252 per annum each (appropriated)	5,008.00		
Two copyist draftsmen, at $3.26 per diem, $1,020.38 per annum each (appropriated)	2,040.76		
One minor draftsman, at $2.75 per diem, $860.75 per annum (appropriated)	860.75		
One minor draftsman, at $2.20 per diem, $688.60 per annum (appropriated)	688.60		
One model finisher, at $3.50 per diem, $1,095.50 per annum (appropriated)	1,095.50		
Four laborers, at $2 per diem, $626 per annum each (appropriated)	2,504.00		
One laborer, at $1.68 per diem, $525.84 per annum (appropriated)	525.84		
One laborer, at $1.50 per diem, $469.50 per annum (appropriated)	469.50		
		$94,760.75	
Grand total		107,940.75	
NOTE.—This estimate omits the following employees borne upon the rolls of this Bureau, but regularly employed in the respective offices or bureaus mentioned below:			
Office of Naval War Records:			
One draftsman, at $5.50 per diem, $1,721.50 per annum			
One special laborer, at $2 per diem, $626 per annum			
Office of Judge-Advocate-General:			
One copyist, at $3.26 per diem, $1,020.38 per annum			
One special laborer, at $2.80 per diem, $876.40 per annum			
One special laborer, at $1.50 per diem, $469.50 per annum			
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery:			
One copyist, at $3.26 per diem, $1,020.38 per annum			
One special laborer, at $3.04 per diem, $951.52 per annum			
			$101,446.43
Grand total			113,626.43
B. *Construction and repair of vessels.*			
For preservation and completion of vessels on the stocks and in ordinary; purchase of materials and stores of all kinds; steam steerers, pneumatic steerers, steam capstans, steam windlasses, and all other auxiliaries; labor in navy-yards and on foreign stations; purchase of machinery and tools for use in shops; carrying on work of experimental model tank; designing naval vessels; wear, tear, and repair of vessels afloat; general care, increase, and protection of the Navy in the line of construction and repair; incidental expenses, such as advertising, freight, foreign postage, telegrams, telephone service, photographing, books, professional magazines, plans, stationery, and instruments for drafting room (appropriated, act of Mar. 3, 1899)	6,000,000.00	6,000,000.00	3,000,000.00
B. *Special.—Steel lighter for navy-yard, Boston, Mass.*			
For the purchase or construction of one steel lighter for ordnance purposes at the navy-yard, Boston, Mass. (submitted)	10,000.00	10,000.00	
Steel lighter for navy-yard, Portsmouth, N. H			
For the construction of 1 steel lighter for the use of the navy-yard, Portsmouth, N. H. (submitted)	50,000.00	50,000.00	

Estimates of the appropriations required for the fiscal year, etc.—Continued.

Detailed objects of expenditure and explanations.	Estimated amount required for each detailed object.	Total amount to be appropriated under each head of appropriation.	Amount appropriated for current fiscal year ending June 30, 1900.
B 1. *Special.—Improvement of construction plants.*			
For repairs to and improvement of plant at navy-yard, Portsmouth, N. H. (appropriated)	$25,000.00	$25,000.00	$25,000.00
For repairs to and improvement of plant at navy-yard, Boston, Mass. (appropriated)	25,000.00	25,000.00	25,000.00
For repairs to and improvement of plant at navy-yard, New York, N. Y. (appropriated)	25,000.00	25,000.00	25,000.00
For repairs to and improvement of plant at navy-yard, League Island, Pa. (appropriated)	25,000.00	25,000.00	25,000.00
For repairs to and improvement of plant at navy-yard, Norfolk, Va. (appropriated)	25,000.00	25,000.00	25,000.00
For repairs to and improvement of plant at navy-yard, Pensacola, Fla. (appropriated)	5,000.00	5,000.00	25,000.00
For repairs to and improvement of plant at navy-yard, Mare Island, Cal. (appropriated)	25,000.00	25,000.00	25,000.00
For repairs to and improvement of plant at naval station, Port Royal, S. C. (appropriated)	5,000.00	5,000.00	25,000.00
For construction plant at naval station, Algiers, La. (submitted)	25,000.00	25,000.00	
For repairs to and improvement of plant at Puget Sound Naval Station, Wash. (appropriated)	25,000.00	25,000.00	25,000.00
C. Civil establishment.			
At navy-yard, Portsmouth, N. H.:			
One clerk to naval constructor (appropriated)	1,400.00		
Two writers, at $1,017.25 each (appropriated)	2,034.50		
At navy-yard, Boston, Mass.:			
One clerk to naval constructor (appropriated)	1,400.00		
One writer, at $1,017.25 (appropriated)	1,017.25		
One writer, at $1,017.25 (submitted)	1,017.25		
At navy-yard, New York, N. Y.:			
One clerk to naval constructor (appropriated)	1,400.00		
Three writers, at $1,017.25 each (appropriated)	3,051.75		
At navy-yard, League Island, Pa.:			
One clerk to naval constructor (appropriated)	1,400.00		
One writer, at $1,017.25 (appropriated)	1,017.25		
At navy-yard, Washington, D. C.:			
One clerk to naval constructor (appropriated)	1,400.00		
At navy-yard, Norfolk, Va.:			
One clerk to naval constructor (appropriated)	1,400.00		
Two writers, at $1,017.25 each (appropriated)	2,034.50		
At naval station, Port Royal, S. C.:			
One clerk to naval constructor (appropriated)	1,400.00		
At navy-yard, Pensacola, Fla.:			
One writer, at $1,017.25 (appropriated)	1,017.25		
At navy-yard, Mare Island, Cal.:			
One clerk to naval constructor (appropriated)	1,400.00		
Two writers, at $1,017.25 each (appropriated)	2,034.50		
At Puget Sound naval station, Wash.:			
One clerk to naval constructor (submitted)	1,400.00		
		25,824.25	23,407.00
D. *Increase of the Navy—Construction and Machinery.*			
On account of hulls and outfits of vessels and steam machinery of vessels heretofore authorized (See joint letter below.)	18,733,101.00	18,733,101.00	5,992,402.00

WASHINGTON, *September 5, 1899.*

SIR: We have the honor to submit herewith, in duplicate, joint estimates (inclosures 1 and 2) of the amounts required by the Bureaus of Construction and Repair and Steam Engineering, under appropriation "Increase of the Navy, Construction and Machinery," for work on new vessels authorized by Congress, to June 30, 1901, as per statements in detail herewith (inclosures 3 and 4), viz;

Sheet D.

Under Bureau of Construction and Repair:		
For fiscal year 1899–1900	$7,901,277	
For fiscal year 1900–1901	9,140,770	
		$17,042,047
Under Bureau of Steam Engineering:		
For fiscal year 1899–1900	5,726,964	
For fiscal year 1900–1901	4,640,970	
		10,367,934
Aggregate		27,409,981
Balance in Treasury available for above July 1, 1899 (less the sum of $260,000, for one gunboat to take the place of the *Michigan* on the Great Lakes, authorized by act approved May 4, 1898, said vessel to be built as soon as permitted under treaty)		8,676,880
Appropriation required for fiscal year 1900–1901		18,733,101

This amount, $18,733,101, is the estimated amount required to be appropriated for work on new vessels authorized by Congress for "Increase of the Navy, Construction and Machinery," for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1901.

Very respectfully,

PHILIP HICHBORN,
Chief Constructor, U. S. N., Chief of Bureau.

GEO. W. MELVILLE,
Engineer in Chief, U. S. N., Chief of Bureau.

The increase in the estimate under Class B, "Construction and repair of vessels," over the amount asked for last year is required for the maintenance and repair of the large number of ships now in commission or about to be commissioned, and for extensive repairs to the older vessels of the "New Navy." It has been and will continue to be found necessary to expend comparatively large sums in connection with the repairs of the older vessels, in making the alterations necessary for their efficiency according to modern ideas and practice. For instance, the alterations and repairs to the *Cincinnati* and *Raleigh*, now under way, will require an expenditure of about $500,000 under this Bureau.

The estimate is based upon expenditures during the last year and those of the first two months of the present year, during which time it has been found necessary to exceed the proper proportionate monthly allowance for the various yards.

The steam lighter for the Portsmouth Navy-Yard, estimated for under Class B Special, is necessary for handling moorings, transporting stores, machinery, guns, boats, ammunition, and drafts of men, and for handling weights or for use as a tug or a water boat.

In another place in this report the Bureau has pointed out the necessity for funds for the improvement of navy-yard plants, estimated for under Class B 1 Special.

NAVY-YARD PLANTS.

During the past two years the condition of the navy-yard plants, taken as a whole, has been much improved by the expenditure of the special appropriations for that purpose. This work, however, can not

be regarded as completed, even in the case of the yards which have been continuously active, and thus received most attention, while the needs of some of the other yards are pressing. Every consideration of sound policy demands that the existing plants now in good condition should keep pace in the matter of improvements with outside establishments, while defective plants, particularly those at yards properly situated with respect to labor and material markets, should be placed in efficient condition and so maintained.

In the latter category particular attention is invited to the needs of the navy-yards at Boston, Mass., and League Island, Pa., in the matter of buildings for the construction plants.

There is included in the estimate marked "B 1 Special" the sum of $210,000 for repairs to and improvement of navy yard plants, being $5,000 each for the Port Royal Naval Station and Pensacola Navy-Yard and $25,000 each for the navy-yards at Portsmouth, Boston, New York, League Island, Norfolk, and Mare Island, and the naval stations at Puget Sound and Algiers, La.

The location of a dock of large capacity at Algiers, La., renders necessary a small plant for repair work. It should be in working order as soon as possible after the completion of the dock, which, without the plant, would be almost useless. The Bureau of Yards and Docks has been asked to estimate for the buildings required, and the $25,000 asked for under this Bureau is to begin the installation of the necessary tools, etc.

The Bureau has an appropriation available for a small construction plant at the naval station Key West, but is unable to begin the installation until it secures a suitable building, for which the Bureau of Yards and Docks has been asked to estimate.

In another place, pages 25 to 40, the Bureau submits the usual extracts from the reports of naval constructors on the needs of the yards. It will be noted that the amounts asked for in the estimates are required to cover pressing and immediate needs, and that still greater sums could in many cases be expended to advantage.

DOCKING FACILITIES.

Dry docks.—The completion of the additional dry docks now authorized and appropriated for will, to a certain extent, remedy the unfortunate condition now arising from lack of docking facilities, particularly with reference to the larger vessels. It should be pointed out, however, that the present programme does not affect the two most important navy-yards, viz, New York and Norfolk, at each of which a new dock capable of taking the largest vessels is urgently needed.

The naval constructor at New York reports that during the past fiscal year dry dock No. 1 has been occupied 336 days; No. 2, 190 days, and No. 3 204 days. No. 3 is the only one of these docks capable of taking a vessel larger than the *New York*.

At Norfolk the larger dock is only capable of taking vessels of the size of the *Texas* at light draft. During the past fiscal year it has been occupied 285 days and the other dock 292 days.

The number of battleships in commission will be doubled in the near future, and the time is not very far distant when extensive repairs to the earlier ones may be required. It is important that the yards capable of handling this work properly in other respects should not be crippled by inadequate docking facilities.

Marine railways.—The large number of torpedo craft built or building and the growing list of other small vessels call for special docking facilities, which can, in the Bureau's opinion, be best met by the installation of marine railways. Torpedo craft especially, owing to their light scantling, require frequent sighting of the bottom to prevent dangerous corrosion. At present it is necessary to regularly dock them in one of the large dry docks—an expensive process, and one, furthermore, which aggravates the present lack of docking facilities for large vessels. The first cost of these railways will not be great, the amount will soon be recovered to the Government by the saving effected, and the installation will release the large docks for their legitimate purposes.

In view of the above, the Bureau has urgently to recommend two such marine railways at the navy-yard, New York, and one each at the following yards: Portsmouth, N. H.; League Island, Pa.; Norfolk, Va.; Port Royal, S. C., and Mare Island, Cal.

The needs discussed above have been brought to the attention of the Bureau of Yards and Docks.

NEW CONSTRUCTION.

The act of Congress making appropriation for increase of the Navy for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1900, approved March 3, 1899, provided for the construction of three seagoing coast-line battle ships, sheathed and coppered; three armored cruisers, sheathed and coppered, and six protected cruisers, sheathed and coppered. Under the provisions of this act the preliminary designs were begun for the battle ships and armored cruisers, but work thereon has been suspended, owing to the clause in the act forbidding the letting of contracts for hulls until after the armor shall have been contracted for at a price within the limit set by Congress.

The designs for the six protected cruisers have been prepared, and the following circular defining their chief characteristics has been issued:

Circular defining the chief characteristics of six sheathed and coppered cruisers authorized by act of Congress approved March 3, 1899, making appropriations for the naval service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1900, and for other purposes.

The following are extracts from acts of Congress applicable to said vessels, viz:

Act of March 3, 1899:

"That for the purpose of further increasing the naval establishment of the United States the President is hereby authorized to have constructed by contract * * * six protected cruisers of about 2,500 tons trial displacement, to be sheathed and coppered, and to have the highest speed compatible with good cruising qualities, great radius of action, and to carry the most powerful ordnance suited to vessels of their class, and to cost, exclusive of armament, not exceeding $1,111,800 each; and the contracts for the construction of each of said vessels shall be awarded by the Secretary of the Navy to the lowest best responsible bidder, having in view the best results and most expeditious delivery; * * * and not more than two of the protected cruisers herein provided for shall be built in one yard or by one contracting party; and in the construction of said vessels all of the provisions of the act of May 4, 1898, entitled 'An act making appropriations for the naval establishment for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899, and for other purposes,' shall be observed and followed."

Act of May 4, 1898:

* * * "And in the construction of all said vessels all of the provisions of the act of August 3, 1886, entitled 'An act to increase the naval establishment,' and amendments subsequently made thereto as to materials for said vessels, their engines, boilers, and machinery, the contracts under which they are built, except as to premiums, which are not to be offered, the notice of any proposals for the same, the plans, drawings, and specifications therefor, and the method of executing said con-

tracts, shall be observed and followed, and said vessels shall be built in compliance with the terms of said act, save that in all their parts said vessels shall be of domestic manufacture." * * *

Act of August 3, 1886:

"SEC. 7. That the Secretary of the Navy shall not contract for the construction or completion of any of said vessels, or of their engines, machinery, or boilers, until drawings and specifications of the same shall have been provided or adopted by him; and after said drawings and specifications shall have been provided, adopted, and approved as aforesaid, and work shall have been commenced on any contract made therefor, such plans and specifications shall not be changed in any respect when the cost of such change in the execution of the work exceeds $500, except upon the written order of the Secretary or Acting Secretary of the Navy; and if changes are thus made, the actual cost thereof and the damage caused thereby shall be ascertained, estimated, and determined by a board of naval officers to be provided for in the contract; and in any contract made pursuant to this act it shall be provided in the terms thereof that the contractor shall be bound by the determination of said board, or a majority thereof, as to the amount of increased or diminished compensation said contractor shall be entitled to receive, if any, in consequence of such change or changes. In every contract to be made under this act there shall be prescribed a period within which the work provided for in said contract, or specified portions thereof, shall be completed, and the completion of such work within the periods prescribed shall be insured by penal provision. For the construction or completion of such vessels hereinbefore provided for as the Secretary of the Navy shall propose to have constructed or completed by contract, as well as also for the engines, boilers, and machinery hereinbefore provided for, he shall invite proposals from every American shipbuilder and other person who shall show to the satisfaction of the Secretary of the Navy that within three months from the date of the contract he will be possessed of the necessary plant for the performance of the work in the United States which he shall offer to undertake, and such contract shall be let to the lowest and best responsible bidder or bidders, after at least sixty days' advertisement, published in five leading papers of the United States, inviting proposals for the work proposed, which work shall be subject to all such rules, regulations, superintendence by naval officers during construction, and provisions as to bonds and security for the quality and due completion of the work as the Secretary of the Navy shall prescribe; and no vessel, boiler, engine, machinery, or portion thereof shall be accepted unless completed in strict conformity with the contract; and the authority given hereby shall take effect at once. The Secretary of the Navy shall have the power to reject any or all bids made under the provisions of this act."

1. In the act of Congress making appropriations for the naval service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1900, approved March 3, 1899, provision is made, under "Increase of the Navy," for six protected cruisers of about 2,500 tons trial displacement, to cost, exclusive of armament, not exceeding $1,141,800 each.

2. To carry out the provisions of the above-quoted act the Department, in advertising for these vessels to be built by contract, will invite proposals as follows:

Class I.—For the construction of the hull and machinery of each of said vessels, including engines, boilers, and their appurtenances and spare parts, and for their equipment complete in all respects except as hereinafter stated, and for the installation of ordnance and ordnance outfit, in accordance with the plans and specifications provided by the Secretary of the Navy.

Class II.—For the construction of the hull and machinery of each of said vessels, including engines, boilers, and their appurtenances and spare parts, and for their equipment complete in all respects except as hereinafter stated, and for the installation of ordnance and ordnance outfit, in accordance with plans and specifications submitted by the bidder.

3. In order that ample time may be given to all ship and marine engine builders who may desire to submit their own plans of the hull and machinery, or of either, this circular, defining the general requirements of the Department for the vessels referred to, is issued.

4. Bidders may, if they so desire, adopt the plans and specifications of the Department for the hull and machinery, or any part of either, and embody them in their plans and specifications to be submitted with their proposals.

5. The specifications submitted by bidders under Class II must contain certain customary general requirements usually embodied in specifications prepared by the Department, and must be so drawn as to fully cover the detailed requirements of the Bureaus of Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, Ordnance, and Equipment, of the Navy Department, for further information concerning which application should be made to the respective bureaus concerned; and no proposals under this class will be considered unless accompanied by full and complete specifications of the hull and machinery, including engines, boilers, and their appurtenances and spare

parts, and equipment, with such calculations of weights, displacement, and stability as will demonstrate the satisfactory strength and stability of the whole structure.

6. Vessels under Class II must not exceed, on full-load displacement, the maximum draft contemplated in the Department's design.

7. Copies of the Department's specifications will be furnished upon application, in which bidders under Class II must show by erasure and additions the exact nature of the hull and machinery, including engines, boilers, and their appurtenances and spare parts, and equipment, complete in all respects, that they propose to build and furnish.

8. In considering bids submitted, the Department will give due preference, other things being equal, to such designs as are considered best adapted for the United States naval service, and to such bids as guarantee the shortest time for completion, the greatest speed, the greatest coal capacity, and the greatest amount of hull protection in the form of a protective deck.

9. The Department will reserve the right to reject any and all bids not considered advantageous to the Government, and no bids will be considered which propose to furnish vessels of less than 3,000 tons trial displacement, or of less than 16½ knots speed, on trial, or having a bunker capacity of less than 700 tons of coal.

10. Trial displacement is to be understood as meaning the vessel complete, with two-thirds coal, plus two-thirds of ammunition, plus two-thirds of total stores and provisions; crew, and 40 tons of fresh water for steaming purposes.

11. Bids must state specifically the price of each vessel.

12. Each vessel is to be built, fitted, and equipped complete for sea by the contractors, with the exception of sea stores, ordnance and ordnance outfit, and such other articles as are hereinafter enumerated to be supplied by the Government.

13. The contractors will fit and secure in place all ordnance and ordnance outfit.

14. Bidders under either class must state specifically the time of completion for each vessel included in their bids.

15. The maximum time allowed for completion will be limited by the Department to thirty months for each vessel, and no bids will be considered which propose to exceed that limit of time. Failure to complete vessels within the times specified in the contracts will involve penalties as follows, namely, $300 a day for the first month succeeding the expiration of the period fixed by the contracts; $400 a day for the second month; and $600 a day thereafter until the vessels are delivered, as prescribed by the contracts.

16. The speed trial of the proposed vessels (which shall be made only when the vessels are practically completed in all respects) will be conducted subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by the Department; and if, on trial, the average speed shall equal or exceed a speed at sea of 16½ knots for four consecutive hours, the vessels shall be accepted, in so far as the speed is concerned. If the speed fall below 16½ knots and exceed 15½ knots an hour, the vessel will be accepted at a reduced price, the reduction being at the rate of $25,000 a quarter knot deficiency of speed from 16½ to 16 knots, and at the rate of $50,000 a quarter knot deficiency of speed from 16 to 15½ knots. If the speed fall below 15½ knots an hour the vessels will be rejected. In case of rejection any money that may have been paid the contractors on account shall be refunded.

17. The following elements and qualities are obtained and provided for in the Department's design, and their equivalent must be obtained and provided for in all designs submitted:

18. The hull is to be of steel, sheathed and coppered, having double bottom and close water-tight subdivisions.

19. The arrangements of decks above water are to provide ample free board and berthing accommodations.

20. It is contemplated to fit two masts, with gaffs and signal yards, and fitted for fore and aft sails.

21. It is contemplated to supply 10 boats, namely, 1 steam cutter, 1 sailing launch, 4 cutters, 2 whaleboats, and 2 dingies; all of which must be stowed so as to be as far as practicable free from injury from the blast of the guns. The two whaleboats are to be so carried as to be rapidly lowered under all conditions of weather. Boat davits, cradles, etc., to be furnished as necessary; and good arrangements provided for hoisting and lowering all boats with facility and rapidity.

22. Each vessel to be provided with a water-tight deck extending from stem to stern, the sides sloping and joining the vessel's side below the water line. The slopes of said water-tight deck, abreast the engine and boiler spaces, for a distance of not less than 105 feet, to be protected by nickel-steel plates secured thereon, 2 inches in thickness by 8 feet in width. A belt of cellulose of approved type will be provided, extending the entire length of the vessel at the water line and above the water-tight deck.

23. Each vessel will have flush upper deck, with hammock berthing extending from about the fore to the main masts. The extremities to be fitted with portable

rails to be let down so as to give an unobstructed fire to the main battery guns, to be mounted on the upper deck.

24. No woodwork is to be incorporated in the hull or fittings, except such as is indispensable.

25. The spar deck only is to be of wood, and this is to be laid on a complete metal deck.

26. The lower decks will be covered with linoleum or other approved covering.

27. All woodwork used in the construction of the hull, except the underwater external sheathing, is to be fireproofed by a process satisfactory to the Department.

28. The vessels will be fitted with bilge keels

29. The hull is to be subdivided by a suitable number of water-tight bulkheads.

30. A complete system of drainage of all water tight compartments, double bottoms, etc., with manifold connections to the steam and hand pumps, is to be provided.

31. Special care is to be observed to provide for commodious and well-ventilated engine and fire rooms, and the system of ventilation is to extend to all living spaces, coal bunkers, ammunition rooms, holds, and storerooms.

32. All magazines are to be insulated by properly ventilated air spaces of about 4 inches, separating them from adjoining inclosures, and they are to be fitted with proper arrangements for lighting, flooding, and draining.

33. The coal bunkers are to be well arranged, with ample facilities for rapid coaling and for supplying the fire rooms with coal, and small subdivisions of the bunkers are to be avoided as far as practicable.

34. A fire main of approved material, extending the greater length of the vessel, is to be provided. It is to be led as far below the water line as practicable, with risers leading to the principal compartments and decks, each riser being fitted with a shut-off valve at its outlet and another near its junction with the main pipe. The main pipe is to be connected to both steam and hand pumps, with the necessary shut-off valves.

35. Ample provision is to be made for the accommodation of a complement of 27 officers and 263 men.

36. Commodious and well-ventilated wash and bath rooms (with fresh and salt water pumps and connections), and water closets connected to the flushing system, are to be provided for the crew.

37. Suitable and well-ventilated sick quarters, with bath and water closet, are to be provided.

38. Proper accommodations are to be supplied for bags and hammocks, and mess and clothes lockers sufficient for the crew.

39. Provision for carrying an abundant supply of fresh water for drinking and cooking purposes—not less than 3,000 gallons—is to be made by means of water tanks, with usual pipe connections.

40. A spacious, accessible, and well-ventilated dynamo room, of proper size to accommodate the electric plant, will be required.

41. The galley space to be commodious and well ventilated and fitted with usual lockers, dresser, shelves, etc., with fresh and salt water hand pumps and necessary connections.

42. Provisions must be made for chain lockers, cold-storage rooms, paint locker, oil room, with necessary copper tanks, drip pans, etc.; pantries, water-closets connected with the flushing system or with tanks, bathrooms, flag locker, dispensary, offices for paymaster, commanding officer, executive officer, navigator, and engineer; ship's library, drying room; firemen's wash room, with clothes lockers; general storeroom, general workshop, prison, sail room, and other usual storerooms, all to be completely fitted up.

43. Provision will be made for carrying not less than four months' allowance of provisions and one year's allowance of clothing and small stores.

44. The following machine tools of approved make and design will be furnished and installed in the general workshop, with proper shafting, countershafting, spare parts, and tools:

One screw-cutting gap lathe, as large as can be accommodated.
Two screw-cutting gap lathes of convenient size
One Universal milling machine, No. 2.
One drill press for drills up to 1¼ inches.
One column shaper, about 15-inch stroke by 24-inch traverse.
One emery grinder—two 12 by 2 inch wheels, one wheel fitted with surface table.
One large grindstone.
One sensitive drill.
Six bench vises, with pipe holder and other fittings.

45. The following auxiliary machinery, in addition to that pertaining to the main engines and their dependencies, is to be supplied, is to be operated by steam power,

and is to be installed complete, with all the necessary steam and exhaust piping and fittings, viz:

Steam steering engine.

Anchor engine, with capstan above.

There will be two ash hoists from each fire room—one on each side—both hoists for each fire room to be operated by one ash-hoisting engine.

Dense-air ice machine of approved type, with capacity of 1 ton a day.

Engine for running machine tools in general workshop.

Evaporating and distilling plant, in two units, each having a capacity of 4,000 gallons a day.

46. The following auxiliary machinery is to be supplied and will be electrically operated, viz:

Blowers for hull ventilation.

Six electric winches for hoisting ammunition.

Two deck winches, having four independent hoisting drums—two at each side of the vessel—each double winch to be capable of exerting 10 horsepower.

47. Good means of interior communication throughout the vessel will be required by means of electric bells, voice pipes, helm and battle indicators, etc., with annunciators of approved type.

48. Commodious pilot house, well located and completely fitted with steam steering wheel, engine-room telegraphs, drawers, lockers, transom, etc.; also, a berth for the commanding officer, in an adjoining inclosure, to be provided.

49. At least one additional hand and steam steering wheel will be required on the upper deck, aft, in addition to the above.

50. A flying bridge will be required, with steam steering wheel, engine-room telegraphs, voice tubes, etc.

51. Platforms for search lights will be required.

52. Anchor davits, awning stanchions, towing and mooring bits and chocks, chain controllers, compressors, etc., are to be provided in accordance with usual practice.

53. Provision is to be made for carrying and handling 2 bower and 2 sheet anchors of standard navy type, with billboards, tripping gear, etc.; though but 3 anchors will probably be carried.

54. The following data cover the general requirements for engines, boilers, and appurtenances:

55. Engines, 2, vertical, four-cylinder, triple-expansion, of about 4,500 combined indicated horsepower. These engines to be located in separate water-tight compartments on opposite sides of a fore-and-aft midship bulkhead; each to be provided with approved auxiliaries and dependencies, including pumps, feed heaters, feed-and-filter tanks, etc.

56. Twin screws.

57. Boilers, 6, of water-tube type, of about 4,700 horsepower. This includes the indicated horsepower of the main engines and the auxiliaries. There will be two air-tight boiler compartments, with athwartship fire rooms. Approved auxiliaries must be provided for forced draft and pumping facilities.

58. Weight of propelling and all auxiliary machinery and steam heating installation, not to exceed 405 tons.

59. Weight of engineer's stores, tools, and spare parts, not to exceed 22 tons.

60. Forty tons of reserve feed water for the boilers will be required.

61. Two funnels, 70 feet high above grate bars, will be required.

62. The vessel is to be heated by steam throughout.

63. The electric generating plant, etc., is to be supplied by the contractors, and will consist of 4 generating sets, each with a rated output of 300 amperes at 80 volts, with necessary wiring, fittings, and accessories complete; 2 30-inch search lights; 1 night-signaling set; 2 truck lights; approved means of interior communication; instruments, tools, and stores.

64. The total weight of the four units complete must not exceed 32,000 pounds, with a total weight for the whole installation of 33 tons.

65. The following articles will be supplied by the Government;

Ordnance and ordnance outfit.

Masts and spars.

Boats, boat equipments, and outfits.

Blocks.

Cooperage; mess and other chests.

All furniture except standing or portable berths.

Anchors and chains.

Standing and miscellaneous rigging.

Sails and running rigging.

Hawser and tow lines.

Table linen.

Bags and hammocks.

Rugs and curtains for officers' quarters.
Mess utensils and tableware for all messes.
Navigating instruments.
Oil lamps and lanterns.
Flags and signal outfits.
Stores of all kinds except electric, and tools.

66. The contractors will supply all necessary rigging for handling and securing boats—awnings, hammock cloths, tarpaulins, hatch covers, hose, galleys, and steam cookers, with spare parts, and canvas outfit except sails.

ORDNANCE.

67. All ordnance material will be supplied by the Government and will be installed by the contractors, and all securing bolts for gun mounts will be supplied by the contractors.

68. Suitable gun platform, with adequate support, must be provided for all guns of the main and secondary batteries.

69. Patterns of sockets for port sill and rail mounts for secondary guns (if required) to be furnished by the contractors.

70. The main battery will consist of ten 5-inch guns of 50 calibers in length, mounted as follows: One forward and one aft on the midship line on the upper deck, and four on each side on the deck below; the forward pair of guns to train from right ahead to 60 degrees abaft the beam; the after pair of guns to train right astern to 60 degrees forward of the beam; the four waist guns to train at least 60 degrees forward and abaft the beam. Provision must be made for securing all the gun-deck guns in a nearly fore and aft position, thus leaving an unobstructed side.

71. The secondary battery will consist of not less than eight 6 pounder rapid fire guns, two 1-pounders, and four machine guns, so disposed as to give a large arc of fire; also one field gun.

72. The weight of this battery, with its mounts and accessories, will be 98 tons. The weight of ammunition to be carried will be 153 tons.

73. The outfit of small arms, ordnance stores, and equipments will weigh 3 tons.

74. Suitable means must be provided for a rapid and efficient supply of ammunition for all guns of the main and secondary batteries.

75. An armory, suitably fitted up for the storage of 140 rifles and 80 revolvers, and other small articles, will be required.

76. Magazines and storerooms of sufficient size to accommodate the prescribed allowance of ammunition, infantry equipments, and stores must be provided.

77. The magazine to contain the ammunition for the main and secondary batteries should be of such capacity that about one-half of the total supply may be stowed in each end of the vessel.

78. The quantity of ammunition to be carried will be as shown in the following table, in which is included the number and dimensions of the packages. In addition sufficient space for convenient handling should be allowed.

Allowance of ammunition and stowage space required.

Type of cartridge.	Rounds.	Rounds in each box.	Boxes.	Dimensions of each box.			Weight of 1 box.	Total weight.
				Height.	Breadth.	Length.		
				Inches.	*Inches.*	*Inches.*	*Pounds.*	*Pounds.*
5 inch (shell)	2,500	1	2,500	17.34	[1]6			280,000
Tanks, 5 inch powder	2,500	1	2,500	36	[1]7.45			
6-pounder	4,004	11	364	15.625	9.75	20.6	125.2	45,572
6-pounder, sal	297	11	27	14.4	10.65	16.9	27	729
1-pounder	1,200	60	20	21.61	9.77	13.685	126	2,520
Colt, 6 mm., ball	40,000	1,000	40	18.75	7.25	12.75	62	2,480
Rifle, 6 mm., ball	70,000	1,000	70	14.375	8.25	10.75	64	4,480
Rifle, 6 mm., blank	7,000	1,000	7	14.4	8.25	11	39.5	287
Rifle, caliber .22 ball	60,000	10,000	6	14.5	5.5	11.9	64	384
Revolver, caliber .38 ball	15,000	3,000	5	14.13	8.63	9.63	103	515
3 inch field	153	17	9	26.37	11.19	16.30	310	2,710
Tanks, sal. powder	1,700	100	17	22.25	16.5	16.5	218	3,686
Total								343,363

[1] Diameter.

General dimensions, etc., of the Department's design.

Length on load water line (trial displacement)	feet	292
Extreme breadth at load water line, about	do	44
Trial displacement	tons	3,200
Mean draft at trial displacement	feet	15¾
Greatest draft, full load	do	16½
Total bunker capacity not less than	tons	700
Coal carried on trial	do	470
Feed water carried on trial	tons	40
Speed on trial not less than	knots	16½
Two triple-expansion 4-cylinder engines, of about	horsepower	4,500
Six water-tube boilers, of about	do	4,700
Full-load displacement	tons	3,500

Twin screws.

Summary of principal weights—Department's design.

	Tons.
Guns, mounts, shields, etc	98
Ammunition, ordnance stores, and outfit	156
Machinery, complete, not to exceed	405
Engineer's stores, not to exceed	22
Fresh water for steaming purposes	40
Total coal	700
Boats and outfits	13
Masts and spars	14
Electric plant and electric outfit	33
Equipment, including anchors, chains, rigging, etc	72
Miscellaneous stores and water	34
Officers, crew, and effects	38
Provisions, clothing, and small stores	74

79. The work of constructing these vessels shall be done in accordance with this circular and the plans and specifications to be provided or adopted by the Department; but in any case where there may be a discrepancy between said specifications and this circular the specifications shall prevail.

JOHN D. LONG, *Secretary.*

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., July 22, 1899.

Work upon the design of gunboat No. 16, to replace the U. S. S. *Michigan*, has been suspended, pending definition of the characteristics that will be permitted under treaty with Great Britain.

ADDITIONS TO THE NAVY.

There is given below a tabulated statement of data relative to trials and acceptances of vessels since the last annual report:

Name of vessel.	Type.	Date of trial.	Speed required by contract.	Speed obtained on trial.	Date of preliminary acceptance.	Date of final acceptance.	By whom built.
		1898.	*Knots.*	*Knots.*	1898.	1898.	
Princeton	Composite gunboat.				July 25	Dec. 6	Dialogue & Sons.
Gwin	Torpedo boat					Sept. 28	Herreshoff Manufacturing Co.
McKee	do					Nov. 8	Columbian Iron Works.
Morris	do					Nov. 14	Herreshoff Manufacturing Co.
Rodgers	do					Sept. 26	Columbian Iron Works.
Talbot	do					Sept. 28	Herreshoff Manufacturing Co.
					1899.	1899.	
Mackenzie	do	Dec. 12	20	20.11	Jan. 7	June 2	Chas. Hillman Ship and Engine Building Co.
Farragut	do	Dec. 2 1899.	30	30.13	Jan. 30	July 3	Union Iron Works.
Rowan	do	Jan. 6 1898.	26	27.074	Jan. 31	May 10	Moran Bros. Co.
Davis	do	Nov. 24 1899.	22.5	23.41	Jan. 26	June 7	Wolff & Zwicker.
Fox	do	Feb. 18	22.5	23.13	Mar. 13	Aug. 14	do
Chesapeake	Practice ship				July 22		Bath Iron Works.
Penacook	Tug			12		[1] Feb. 9	Navy-yard, New York.
Pawtucket	do			12.20		[1] May 27	Navy-yard, Mare Island.
Kearsarge	Battleship	Sept. 25	16	16.816			Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co.

[1] Completed.

In addition to the new construction added, as given by the above table, the following Spanish vessels sunk during the war with Spain have been raised and added to the Navy:

Name.	Type.	Name.	Type.
Reina Mercedes	Cruiser.	Isla de Cuba	Gunboat.
Don Juan de Austria	Gunboat.	Isla de Luzon	Do.

The following seventeen vessels have been added through purchase or capture on the Asiatic Station:

Name.	Type.	Name.	Type.
Albay [1]	Gunboat.	Panay [1]	Gunboat.
Bulusan [1]	Do.	Paragua [1]	Do.
Calamianes [1]	Do.	Petrelita	Tug.
El Cano	Do.	Rapido	Do.
Guardoqui [1]	Do.	Samar [1]	Gunboat.
Manileno [1]	Do.	Sureste	Tug.
Mariveles [1]	Do.	Urdaneta [1]	Gunboat.
Mindoro [1]	Do.	Vasco [1]	Do.
Pampango [1]	Do.		

[1] Purchased by War Department and transferred to Navy Department.

All available information concerning these vessels will be found in the tables of particulars.

VESSELS DROPPED FROM THE NAVY.

There is given below a tabulated statement showing the vessels dropped from the Navy since the last annual report, together with the disposition of each:

Name.	Type.	Status.	Disposition.	Appraised value.
St. Louis	Auxiliary cruiser	Chartered	Returned to International Navigation Co.	
St. Paul	do	do	do	
Harvard	do	do	do	
Yale	do	do	do	
City of Pekin	Transport	do	Returned to Pacific Mail Steamship Co.	
Arctic	Ice boat	Leased	Returned to city of Philadelphia.	
Buccaneer	Converted yacht	Borrowed	Returned to William R. Hearst.	
Free Lance	do	do	Returned to Augustus Schermerhorn.	
Algonquin	Revenue cutter	Transferred from Treasury Department.	Returned to Treasury Department.	
Calumet	do	do	do	
Corwin	do	do	do	
Grant	do	do	do	
Gresham	do	do	do	
Hamilton	do	do	do	
Hudson	do	do	do	
Manning	do	do	do	
McCulloch	do	do	do	
McLane	do	do	do	
Morrill	do	do	do	
Perry	do	do	do	
Rush	do	do	do	
Thetis	do	do	do	
Windom	do	do	do	
Woodbury	do	do	do	
Armeria	Light-house tender	Transferred from Light-House Board.	Returned to Light-House Board.	
Mangrove	do	do	do	
Maple	do	do	do	
Suwanee	do	do	do	
Albatross	Fish Commission vessel.	Transferred from Fish Commission.	Returned to Fish Commission.	
Fish Hawk	do	do	do	
Ajax	Single-turreted iron monitor.	Regular Navy	Appraised for sale	$13,000
Comanche	do	do	Sold to J. Pantoskey, Bercovith & Livingston, $6,581.25.	1,200
Passaic	do	do	Appraised for sale	11,000
Wyandotte	do	do	Sold to Chas. G. Davis, $12,631.52.	
Governor Russell.	Auxiliary gunboat	Purchased for war service.	Appraised for sale	35,000
East Boston	do	do	Sold to A. J. Philip, $38,091.	30,000
Vulcan	Repair ship	do	Sold to Michael Jenkins, $175,750.	100,000
Niagara	Distilling ship	do	Sold to H. P. Booth, $75,563.	60,000
Enquirer	Converted yacht	do	Transferred to War Department at appraised value.	20,000
Scipio	Collier	do	Sold to L. Luckenbach, $80,125.	25,000
Hector	Collier	War prize	Appraised for sale	50,000

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SUMMARY SHOWING THE NUMBER OF VESSELS IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY.

REGULAR NAVY.

FIRST-CLASS BATTLE SHIPS	12
FIRST-CLASS BATTLE SHIPS SHEATHED	3
SECOND-CLASS BATTLE SHIP	1
ARMORED CRUISERS	2
ARMORED CRUISERS SHEATHED	3
ARMORED RAM	1
STEEL SINGLE-TURRET MONITORS	4
DOUBLE-TURRETED MONITORS	6
IRON SINGLE-TURRET MONITORS	9
PROTECTED CRUISERS	13
PROTECTED CRUISERS SHEATHED	8
UNPROTECTED CRUISERS	4
GUNBOATS	12
LIGHT-DRAFT GUNBOATS	3
COMPOSITE GUNBOATS	6
TRAINING SHIP (NAVAL ACADEMY)	1
SPECIAL CLASS	2
GUNBOATS UNDER 500 TONS	19
TORPEDO-BOAT DESTROYERS	16
STEEL TORPEDO BOATS	36
SUBMARINE TORPEDO BOAT	1
WOODEN TORPEDO BOAT	1
IRON CRUISING VESSELS	5
WOODEN CRUISING VESSELS	7
SAILING VESSELS, WOODEN	6
TUGS	17
WOODEN STEAM VESSELS UNFIT FOR SEA SERVICE	11
WOODEN SAILING VESSELS UNFIT FOR SEA SERVICE	6
TOTAL NUMBER OF VESSELS IN REGULAR NAVY	215

AUXILIARY NAVY.

MERCHANT VESSELS CONVERTED INTO AUXILIARY CRUISERS	7
CONVERTED YACHTS	25
CONVERTED TUGS	27
STEAMERS CONVERTED INTO COLLIERS	17
SPECIAL CLASS	12
TOTAL NUMBER OF VESSELS IN AUXILIARY NAVY	88
GRAND TOTAL	303

STANDARD BOATS IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY.

Type of boat.	Length, extreme.	Breadth, extreme.	Depth from top of gunwale to lower edge of rabbet.	Weight. Hull.	Weight. Total, including outfit.	Maximum number of men boat will carry.	Weight of provisions and water.	Corresponding freeboard.	Sail area.	Area of load water plane.
	Ft. in.	*Ft. in.*	*Ft. in.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*		*Lbs.*	*Ft. in.*	*Sq. ft.*	*Sq. ft.*
Steam cutters	40 0	9 0	4 7 1/2	8,064	18,720	60	600	1 9 1/4	372.4	212.8
	36 0	8 9	4 6	7,037	16,001	53	530	1 9 5/8	318.58	182.6
	33 0	8 7	4 5	5,510	13,476	48	480	1 9 1/2	301.90	172.5
	30 0	8 0	4 2	4,390	10,901	40	400	1 8 3/8	283.75	145
	28 0	7 8	4 0 7/8	4,007	9,470	35	350	1 7 1/8	218.82	125
Launches	33 0	9 3	3 8	3,591	5,910.5	64	640	1 10 1/4	505.50	168.5
	30 0	8 6	3 5	2,705	4,797.5	50	500	1 9 1/4	458.25	152.75
	28 0	7 5	2 8	.....	.....	40	400	1 1 1/4	290	.....
Cutters	30 0	8 0	2 10	2,262	3,384.5	45	450	1 4	315	126
	28 0	7 5	2 8	1,952	3,006.5	40	400	1 2 1/4	290	114.75
	26 0	6 11	2 6	1,560	2,526.5	30	300	1 0	240	94.5
	24 0	6 6	2 6	1,142	2,059.5	28	280	1 0	209	.....
Barge	30 0	6 11	2 8	1,712	2,960	38	380	1 0 1/8	293.75	117.5
Whaleboats	30 0	6 10	2 5	1,767	2,722.25	28	280	1 1 3/8	287.75	111.5
	29 0	6 8	2 5	1,499	2,441.75	25	250	1 0 5/8	260	104
	28 0	6 6	2 5	1,346	2,268.25	22	220	1 1 3/4	240	96
	24 0	5 11 1/4	2 2 1/2	1,050	1,888.50	18	180	.....	173.65	.....
Gig whaleboat	30 0	6 2	2 5	1,365	2,391.25	20	200	1 2 3/8	236.8	94.75
	28 0	6 0	2 5	1,140	2,139.25	16	160	1 2 3/8	212.5	85
Dinghies	20 0	5 6	2 2	710	1,279.50	12	120	1 2 1/4	134.4	59.7
	18 0	5 4	2 1	612	1,150.50	10	100	1 0 1/2	126.32	56.14
	16 0	4 6	1 10	324	684.75	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
	14 0	4 4	1 8	250	549.75	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

Very respectfully,

PHILIP HICHBORN,
Chief Constructor, U. S. N., Chief of Bureau.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

REPORT OF CHIEF OF BUREAU OF STEAM ENGINEERING.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
BUREAU OF STEAM ENGINEERING,
Washington, D. C., October 2, 1899.

SIR: In obedience to your order of July 11, 1899, the following annual report of the operations of this Bureau during the past year, together with the estimates for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1901, is respectfully submitted:

APPROPRIATIONS, STEAM MACHINERY, 1898–99.

Amount appropriated for fiscal year ending June 30, 1899; act approved May 4, 1898	$990,000.00
Amount appropriated for six months ending January 1, 1899; act July 7, 1898	5,250,000.00
Total	6,240,000.00
Labor in navy-yards and stations in repair of steam machinery, boilers, etc., of naval vessels fitting for sea service, preservation and repair of tools, handling and preservation of materials, stores, etc	$1,404,231.08

Purchase of materials, stores, machine tools, freight, and incidental expenses	$1,672,036.61	
Payments for labor and materials furnished and performed by private contractors outside the navy-yards and stations, and for repairs of machinery of naval vessels in emergency	266,625.18	
Payments for repairs, materials, freight, and incidental expenses for ships on foreign stations	174,646.40	
Total	3,517,539.27	
Less repayments by transfers in adjustment of appropriations	28,012.78	
Total expenditure		$3,489,526.49
Balance in Treasury September 1, but unavailable for current expenses		2,750,473.51

GENERAL OPERATIONS OF THE BUREAU.

While the legislation of the last Congress provided for an increase of the Navy by appropriating for three seagoing coast-line battle ships, three armored cruisers, and six protected cruisers, the limitations placed upon the price of the armor and the clause which prevented contracts being made for the hull until the armor for the first two classes of the above vessels had been contracted for, presented insuperable obstacles in the way of proceeding promptly with the building of the same, the price of armor mentioned in the bill being far below that for which any manufacturer would deliver it.

On this account the immediately necessary designing work in this Bureau upon new ships was confined to plans for the machinery of the six protected cruisers, as will be noted under the head of work in the drawing room.

Plans of general arrangement of machinery for the armored cruisers, however, have been pursued to such a degree as is warranted by the available outlines, so that when the matter of cost of armor is adjusted and further progress of plans justified, the completion of the designs will be a matter requiring but little time.

The usual extensive and laborious duty connected with the working out of details for machinery already under construction, and the examination and correction of designs submitted by contractors, have been continued in a manner highly satisfactory in results. The matter of designing the internal arrangements of machine shops at New York, Port Royal, Key West, and Mare Island has also demanded considerable attention, in order to provide for the most efficient disposition of tools when installed.

In my last annual report I alluded to the extraordinary conditions which were then prevailing, and included the general items of importance in the machinery repair work of this Bureau up to the date of writing that report, October 1, 1898, at which time the cessation of hostilities had about taken effect. Necessarily the results of the extraordinary duties of the various ships under such circumstances were not fully realized by the Bureau until the return of the fleets to the repair stations, but it was a matter of gratifying surprise to the Bureau to find the extent of needed repairs as limited as it was, being generally confined to portions of the machinery such as boiler tubes and condenser tubes, which are most readily affected by the extreme conditions prevailing in war times. The generally excellent condition of the engines of our

ships after these trials is a reflection of a highly complimentary character upon the Bureau's control of the designs of the machinery and upon the efficiency of the officers under whose direct charge their operations were conducted.

The matter of completely repairing all the ships, both of the regular Navy and those retained from the auxiliary fleet, was taken promptly in hand as ships returned to the various yards, and the aggregate cost assumed small proportions compared with what might have been anticipated. Most of this work has now been effected, and yet, owing to the unexpected retention of very many of the auxiliary ships for use in naval service, the estimates made by the Bureau in the last annual report for current expenses, 1899–1900, fell far short of the amount actually required, as at the time of the report it was the general impression that upon the close of the war most of the auxiliary ships would be sold or otherwise disposed of. A portion of the large balance remaining in the Treasury from the emergency fund under this Bureau (between two and three millions) could be very properly reappropriated for this unanticipated work, by special legislation, and obviate the necessity of asking for further provision for current work in the coming deficiency bill. I desire to call your attention to the above circumstances in view of the necessity of thus further providing for the expenses of the present fiscal year.

The general lessons from the war were in no way indicative of any desirable change in the machinery of our ships, with the exception of increasing the evaporating plants, and the adoption with all practical and economical promptness, of the water-tube type of boilers. The matter of increasing the evaporating plants has been expeditiously accomplished, and at present these individual plants on shipboard are about equal to any anticipated emergency. As regards the adoption of the water-tube type of boiler, the Bureau is progressing with such proper speed as is necessary to avoid mistakes and to obviate sacrifice of still useful boilers of the older type. As fast as the present outfit of Scotch boilers becomes unreliable or inefficient the newer type is being substituted. This has obtained already on the *Alert*, *Atlanta*, and *Chicago*, and a further substitution of Babcock & Wilcox type of water-tube boilers for the old Scotch boilers on the *Cincinnati* and *Raleigh* is in active progress. These steps are important and are the direct results of the unqualified success of this type of boiler on the *Marietta* and *Annapolis* in our own service and on various other ships not of the Navy, and renders their adoption, to the extent already made, absolutely safe. Much interest also attaches itself not only to the trials of the battle ships now building which will have the Niclausse and Thornycroft types of water-tube boilers, but especially to the future preservation of the several types of these boilers during the years of that ordinary naval service which will not call for more than a very limited use of the entire plant. The status of water-tube boilers at the present time is much more doubtful regarding the possibilities of protection from deterioration while not in use than regarding their efficient output during actual service. This ability or inability to properly protect such boilers is of most vital importance, and largely governs the annual cost of repairs to naval machinery.

I would call attention to the completion of the *Rainbow* as a second distilling ship and also to the success with which the *Iris*, the first distilling ship, has been operated. This latter is noted under its separate heading in this report.

While not desiring to allude prominently again to the *Vulcan* or its work as a repair ship (the subject having been fully exhausted in my last report and in the public periodicals), I can not pass this by without again urging the advisability of properly designing and building a repair ship, which, while being constructed with a view to the utmost efficiency for such service in times of emergency, may be retained without use (in ordinary) and without serious deterioration for many years. The promptness with which the *Vulcan* was fitted up during the first excitement of the war does not indicate that a waiting policy is the wisest one, for by accident alone the absolutely necessary work demanded of that ship was well within her capacity. There is no good reason for failing to provide a ship which would be even far more efficient than the *Vulcan* was and one perfectly self sustaining in any climate or location. The *Vulcan* herself proved to be of but temporary fitness, as, after the war, the hull was found to be in such bad condition as to make it proper to strip the vessel and effect her sale.

During the year a number of torpedo boats have been completed and turned over to the Government, a synopsis of their trials being herein placed under separate headings.

Among the special items of navy-yard work on naval vessels I would note the following, a complete list of all vessels repaired being included elsewhere under separate yard headings:

Chicago.—Installation of new machinery completed, trials successfully made and ship sent on a regular cruise.

Atlanta.—Reconstruction of machinery and installation of new boilers practically completed and ready for steam trial.

Cincinnati and *Raleigh.*—Preliminary work on complete rearrangement of fire-room plants and improvements in entire conditions obtaining in machinery spaces. The space originally allotted for the boilers of these two ships was not governed by a full appreciation of the requirements for successfully operating the plant. The limits of the machinery compartments were fixed in a certain arbitrary proportion and the problem forced upon this Bureau of installing the requisite power to secure a specified speed. This was accomplished only at a sacrifice of operating space and the well foreseen results were that the fire rooms were almost unbearably hot under full-power conditions. A change recommended by me and prompted by economy was to remove two auxiliary boilers and spread the remaining boilers to advantage in increasing fire-room space available for working the fires, but the decision of the board on construction, now approved, has included a replacement of the entire Scotch boiler plant by water-tube boilers, and with the increased pressure to be used, new H. P. cylinders are necessitated, of smaller diameter. Undoubtedly the result, while reducing the rated speed of these ships, will really increase the speed that can be properly maintained and will greatly add to the efficiency of the vessels.

In powering a ship efficiently, and with a guaranty of securing readily the full I. H. P. of design, the space for machinery must be the primary consideration and a liberal allotment made for it according to the needs, not as gathered from published data of foreign ships (of whose actual working conditions we can never be sure), but from those known to be proper by this Bureau, whose professional experience and knowledge should be accepted without question.

Alert.—Installation of water tube boilers is well in hand at Mare Island, Cal. The type selected is that of the Babcock & Wilcox Co. A test of one of these particular boilers was made prior to shipment from the works, under the direction of this Bureau and by its own

officers, a synopsis of the test being included herein under tests and experiments. The showing was most satisfactory. In this change in the *Alert* it will be seen by the accompanying drawings that a saving in space and weight was made by which the coal capacity was increased by about 32 tons, and at the same time a somewhat greater horsepower was secured, owing to the ability to burn economically more coal upon the new grate surface than was possible upon the grate surface of the old boilers.

Mohican.—Old boilers removed from the *Swatara*, but still in efficient condition, were placed in this vessel, her old boilers having been condemned as worn out in service.

Hartford.—Installation of new machinery very nearly completed at this writing and an early dock trial expected. The work on this and preceding two ships has been done at the navy-yard, Mare Island.

Monterey.—Practical renewal of boilers (caused by pitting of tubes) is in hand. This ship has the Ward type of water-tube boiler and the renewal in sections can be made without serious difficulty by the engineer force of the ship and without the necessity of tearing up the decks, a feature worthy of notice in connection with several of the types of water-tube boilers now being used by this Bureau.

Iowa.—Complete retubing of boilers and condensers has been carried out.

Also the completion of the retubing of the boilers of the *Minneapolis* was included in the year's work.

The captured ships *Isla de Cuba*, *Isla de Luzon*, and *Don Juan de Austria* have had extensive repairs to machinery done at Hongkong under contracts made by the commander in chief of the station under the emergency appropriation, and no doubt these vessels will render good service when finished.

In connection with special work I desire to call your attention to several casualties which have occurred since my last report, in order that there may be no misconception of their import.

The *Wilmington* and *Helena* both have had mishaps to their propeller shafts, which, while not totally disabling the ships, indicate to the Bureau the propriety of installing new outboard shafts of greater strength. A large factor of safety was used in the design, but owing to the small diameter and great length of the outboard sections of these shafts they appear to have been greatly strained, probably more by springing and surging in a seaway than by the normal pressures brought upon them. New shafts are being made for both of these ships and will no doubt prove efficient.

The shafts of the *Marietta* and *Wheeling* have also proven defective through imperfect fitting of casings by the contractors, which permitted corrosion to take effect unseen beneath the brass. The present shafts of these ships are serviceable, but new end sections will be supplied as soon as possible for the *Marietta* in order to secure her against possible casualty, and new end sections for the *Wheeling* are now in the shops at Mare Island being fitted for that vessel.

Another casualty has been reported, viz, that of the cracking of the low-pressure cylinder liner of the port engine of the *Chicago*.

This did not materially disable the ship, although the first dispatches indicated that the low-pressure cylinder would have to be put out of use and the port engine run compound. The vessel has safely reached a home port, using the cylinder referred to, and necessary repairs will be made after careful examinations.

The after low-pressure cylinder frame of the port engine of the *Cin-*

cinnati was broken while getting the ship under way, but the cause of the accident was not traced by the board which reported upon the same. The engines of this ship are of the four cylinder, triple expansion type, and the engines were readily and successfully operated after disconnecting the cylinder whose frame was cracked, so that return to the home port was but slightly delayed. These frames were cast iron.

One of the most serious casualties during the year was that resulting in the destruction by fire of the steam engineering buildings at the navy-yard, New York, on February 15, 1899. The only buildings of the plant that were saved were the foundry, copper shop and a part of the boiler shop. It has apparently been impossible to locate the cause of this disastrous fire, but it is with no little pride that the Bureau points to the efficient manner in which its work was continued at that yard. The timely assistance afforded by the permitted use of the shops of other departments in the yard tided over the immediate difficulties, and with the greatest possible dispatch a temporary machine shop was erected on an adjacent lot and installed with such a complete tool outfit as has already enabled the Bureau to withdraw its force from all other shops in the yard and carry on its own work within its own buildings. At the same time all necessary steps were taken for the reestablishment of a permanent machinery plant at that yard, for which a prompt appropriation of $750,000 was made by the Congress, then in session. When finished this will undoubtedly be one of the most complete and efficient plants in the world, every advantage being taken of the latest devices of proven excellence.

The Bureau has seen fit to adopt an electrical drive for these shops in view of the advances made in that direction by the most progressive outside establishments, and also paying due attention to the indications of a still more rapid advance in the future. Contracts have been let for the power plant, and a most exhaustive requisition for proper outfit has been formulated after a thorough and extensive individual study of modern tools. In these shops no steam will be used outside of the power house proper, except for heating. The latest pneumatic appliances will also be installed where of established merit and of economic advantage.

Close inspection of construction of machinery for new ships at the various shipyards has been maintained, and several tests and experiments of interest have been conducted by the Bureau, as noted under separate heading in this report.

PERSONNEL.

I approach the subject of the personnel with some hesitancy, owing to my inability to see indications of the desired result from the operations thus far of the personnel bill. It was my earnest hope that upon the taking effect of that bill the whole trend of detail would be toward the complete amalgamation of line and engineering interests in the Navy with the most favorable outlook for the protection of the rapidly advancing engineering science. My belief in the spirit of the bill was that it contemplated most essentially vast additions to the number of officers who would give earnest attention to engineering matters and in no way aimed to augment the forces available for merely former line or deck duty. The comprehensive union of the line and engineering vocations I still hope will be the result of the personnel change, and I earnestly request that no Departmental regulations may be formulated or permitted to exist which will in any degree tend to destroy

this belief or prevent such a construction of the intention of the bill. Briefly, the fate of the reconstruction of the personnel hinges upon the provisions made for future and continuous supply of efficient engineers in the Navy. The duties of the line were believed to be perfectly compatible with a professional excellence in engineering matters by an individual. A not unwarranted expectation is that preference for the mechanical part of these combined duties will be shown by a great number owing to the intense interest attaching itself to this field of work and to its almost universal application to the progressive arts of the age. The only plausible scheme, therefore, is to insist upon the present line officer adapting himself as soon as possible to the new conditions, and increasing, where lacking, his knowledge of mechanical engineering. Primary instruction has already been given to every graduate of the Naval Academy. Necessary practice is easily attained. Departmental regulations insisting upon alternations for the present watch officers in deck and engine room duties will accomplish the latter end. Efficient and complete instruction at the Naval Academy will enable the future line officer even more rapidly than now to grasp the new work and control it successfully. The practical instruction of the present watch officer, as above suggested, is a fundamental and vitally necessary feature which, in my opinion, should govern the rulings of the Department from now on.

I must invite your particular attention in this connection to the status of steam and mechanical engineering of to-day. Various outcroppings in the shape of electrical, hydraulic, and pneumatic specialties divert the thoughtless into considering these fields fundamentally separate rom that of steam engineering, while the fact remains that the man educated fully in "steam engineering" is in the very front rank of the advancing workers in such specialties. The principles of the side branches are of extreme simplicity, those governing the construction of the mechanisms being essentially the same as obtain in good mechanical engineering.

It is only necessary to push aside the more or less plausible superficialities which would lead to a misjudgment of these facts, and look for a moment upon the real requirements, to realize how fundamentally important and distinct are the duties of a mechanical bureau, and also to be convinced of the wisdom of using every exertion to provide the highest special talent for its future operation. I regret the matter of combination of bureaus has been even speculated upon. This regret, I assure you, in no way comes from motives other than the belief in the impossibility of a successful issue of such a scheme. Not only is the trend of modern mechanical work in all branches toward increased specialization, but the wisdom of such a trend is never questioned by the leading talent in the outside world of constructive work.

I deem it pertinent in this connection to briefly review the character of the work of this Bureau and to note its increasing extent and importance in all branches.

The first and most important of the duties of the Bureau are those of superintendence of design of new machinery and of improvements to existing plants. The extreme accuracy necessary for and the numberless details attached to the design of modern power plants makes it absolutely requisite to have engineers of experience and ability as personal superintendents. The Bureau has heretofore carefully selected its men for this particular duty, and the results have proven the wisdom of the course pursued as well as the efficiency of these workers.

Following this work, and still pertaining to actual Bureau work, are

the duties of overseeing methods of repair and desired improvements to existing machinery; guarding and adjusting the expenditures at the various stations for material and for new tools; developing the qualities of material by constantly studying the improvements in the manufacture of iron and steel and formulating the requirements in specifications, in order to secure to the Government the very best possible material; testing and experimenting with improved devices which give promise of economy, and of collating data by means of which machinery design is improved and work expedited.

The results of preserving this central control of the Bureau's operations are seen in the preservation of uniformity of design and in the adoption generally, in all the repair stations, of the very best methods of work, consequent upon which uniformity great economy to the Government ensues.

Besides this actual Bureau work, it is necessary to have representatives personally superintend the constructive and repair work to the machinery of ships at navy-yards and stations. The experienced and educated engineer is nowhere more fitly placed than here. They act as skilled doctors for the disabled elements in the naval establishment, and wherever the guardianship of the Bureau's interests at such places is left to inefficient hands the results are speedily shown in the character of the repairs made. It is in the highest degree economical to have engineering talent of the highest order at the head of the steam engineering departments at these yards, so that ships sent forth from them in apparent cruising fitness may prove most truly to be so.

Of but slightly less importance is the superintendence of the work done by the shipbuilding yards on machinery for new ships. No one who has not studied the intricacies and difficulties connected with the installation of the power plant of a modern battle ship can conceive of the numberless interferences while in course of construction which must be reconciled by personal superintendence, and always with a view to the efficient operation of the plant. Such a superintendence is of untold value, and makes all the difference between an ever available and ready vessel for service, and one which is constantly seeking a navy-yard for changes or repairs. Such work is necessarily arduous, and the limit of personal endurance must be considered in providing proper numbers.

After this, and clearly connected with it, comes the necessity of having inspectors at the producing mills for closely watching the output of material and attending to the physical and chemical tests of the same, in order that condemnation may not take place at the machine shops after transportation, and attendant long delays be experienced.

The following figures will give an idea of the great improvement in the manufacture of steel material for the engines and boilers of war vessels, brought about by the system of inspection now carried on, and aided by the desire of the American manufacturers to stand preeminent in this line of work, an ambition which frequently caused them to do work at a small profit or no profit at all, taking their reward in the advertisement gained and the prospect of future business.

The item of large engine forgings of steel, principally shafting, will illustrate the point in question, when we compare the steel specifications for the *Maine* and *Texas*, dated 1888 and 1889, respectively, with the requirements for the same class of material for battle ships, monitors, torpedo boat destroyers, and torpedo boats now under construction, appropriated for by the act of Congress approved May 4, 1898.

The specifications for machinery steel for the *Maine* and *Texas* required

a tensile strength varying from 56,000 to 70,000 pounds per square inch, with an elongation of from 16 to 20 per cent in 2 inches, both depending on where the test piece was taken; while the specifications for the new vessels, dated 1898, just ten years later, require for high-grade shaft forgings, nickel steel, oil tempered and annealed, a tensile strength of at least 95,000 pounds per square inch, an elastic limit of 65,000 pounds per square inch, with an elongation of 21 per cent in 2 inches. All the shafting for torpedo boats Nos. 24 to 35 was made of this material, while in the battle ships, monitors, and torpedo-boat destroyers the crank shafts alone were made of nickel steel, simply annealed, with a tensile strength of 80,000 pounds per square inch, an elastic limit of 45,000 pounds per square inch, with an elongation of 26 per cent in 2 inches, the remainder of the shafting for these vessels being of the higher grade quality previously mentioned. The possibility of thus reducing machinery weight without sacrifice of endurance and strength is clearly obvious.

One of the most important duties clearly under this Bureau, and one which the personnel bill has made even more important, if possible, than heretofore, is that connected with the instruction in engineering branches of the cadets at the Naval Academy. This special instruction in the combined course should never be left to the control of other than engineers of great practical experience as well as high theoretical attainments, and I deem it a privilege to guard the character of the course by nominating officers of peculiar fitness for this work.

Lastly, the apportionment of efficient officers to the ships in the Navy as heads of the steam engineering department is clearly one of moment, and illustrates in the present state of the roster the necessity of putting into effect such regulations as will immediately bring to the front officers of the former line best fitted for conducting such work, and which will lead to eventually producing the line engineer of experience who will be able to succeed to the positions of still higher importance noted above. I would ask that you take into consideration the vital importance of establishing alternation of deck and engine-room duty for the present watch officer of the line, in order that there may be no future shortcomings and no sad or disastrous deficiency in guarding these interests.

ASSISTANT TO THE BUREAU.

In my last annual report I repeated my former recommendations that a request be made to include provision in the naval appropriation bill for the detail of an experienced engineer officer as assistant to the chief of this Bureau. I have been placed in embarrassment by the failure to secure this desired addition, especially at times when the technical work has been so arduous and important as to make it unwise to commit official decision to the hands of the chief clerk who, while of the highest competence in his regular capacity, can not be held to be a technical expert upon the more abstruse points in the science of steam engineering. As the law stands the chief clerk is acting chief of the Bureau whenever I am absent, but there is every reason to relieve him from such entangling duty and to secure an engineer officer as permanent assistant. Most of the other naval bureaus have had this provision made for them, and I request that you will lay stress upon this matter in your recommendations this year.

WARRANT MACHINISTS.

I feel it necessary to draw your attention to the necessity of governing the duties of this new grade of mechanics in such a way as will secure to the service their continued skillful assistance as direct operators and repairers of machinery. With the official elevation which comes with a warrant there is not unreasonable apprehension that these men will desire a severance from actual manual care of the machinery of our ships, and will expect to act merely as engineering supervisors below. This, of course, would be wholly inconsistent with the interests of the service, as at no previous time in naval history has there been a greater demand for the highest mechanical skill in the persons of those who have direct charge of marine motive power. Clear and definite regulations are needed on this point at the start, in order that no ambiguity may foster discontent with simple duty or lead to hopes of further official elevation. The engineer officer is and must be the line officer of the future; the warrant machinist must recognize the necessity of his expert mechanical work as well as the distinction he is given by reason of his excellence in it.

The legislation and operation of the same upon this subject was as follows:

The act to reorganize and increase the efficiency of the personnel of the Navy and Marine Corps of the United States, approved March 3, 1899, contained a provision authorizing the appointment of 100 warrant machinists. A set of examination questions was prepared for the candidates for these positions, covering in no slight or superficial way the information which it was felt these prospective warrant officers should possess. Examinations under the supervision of officers of the Navy were held in various parts of the world, and the written papers of the candidates, all of whom were men already in the service, were placed before a board of officers in Washington for decision as to the value and order of merit of these papers.

One hundred and seventy three candidates submitted papers, and it is interesting to note that of this number 10 received more than 90 per cent of the maximum marks attainable, 79 received more than 80 per cent, 109 received more than 75 per cent, and 129 more than 70 per cent of the maximum. It was accordingly possible for the board to recommend that the 100 appointments be given in order of merit as shown by this examination, and that no candidate whose mark fell below 75 per cent of the maximum be appointed. This was done and the 100 appointments made, the lowest successful candidate having received 750 out of a possible 1,000.

When the character of the examination is taken into consideration, together with the fact that these men were machinists by trade, in active service afloat, and had thus little time for special preparation, the high averages made reflect especial credit upon the intelligence of the enlisted men of the artificer branch of the Navy.

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REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, U. S. NAVY.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
BUREAU OF MEDICINE AND SURGERY,
Washington, D. C., October 1, 1899.

SIR: In obedience to instructions contained in Department's letter of July 11, 1899, I have the honor to report the operations of this Bureau for the past year, accompanied by a set of annual estimates for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1901, and a statistical report showing the health of the Navy for the year 1898. The report embraces a statement of the condition of the naval hospital fund, the naval medical establishment, and other matters of interest pertaining to the duties of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.

A review for the past year of the various measures relating to the management of the medical establishment, and of all other matters coming under the general and immediate control of this Bureau, shows a satisfactory record in the administration of this department of the naval service and affords gratifying evidence of continued professional and executive efficiency in all work, the responsibility for which, in a greater or less degree, devolved upon the medical officers of the Navy.

As soon as peace was declared, the Medical Department of the Navy commenced to reduce expenses, and to place itself on a peace basis. There had been no unnecessary accumulation of stores or material, and it had nothing to condemn, sell, or destroy. Everything purchased for war has since been utilized. Of the $100,000 appropriated by Congress for this Bureau, for war purposes, $37,000 has been returned to the Treasury. The ambulance ship *Solace*, that rendered such effective service during the war, is now used partly as a transport, but furnishes excellent accommodations for the sick in their transfer from the fleet at Manila to the naval hospital at Yokohama or Mare Island. Those invalids requiring mainly change of climate and rest for recuperation are disembarked at Yokohama and soon return to their proper station for duty, while the more severe cases, and those unfit for service, are transferred to the naval hospital at Mare Island for further treatment or discharge from the service.

The rehabilitation and renovation of all naval hospitals, which was inaugurated several years ago by the Bureau, has been steadily continued. The ward capacity in many of them has been increased, and in several of the hospitals the number of beds has been more than doubled. The necessity for this large increase in hospital accommodations for the care and treatment of the sick and wounded of the Navy is readily understood when we consider the several enactments made by Congress during the past few years, in which liberal provision is made for the progressive increase in the personnel and material of the naval establishment.

To meet the extra demands made upon the Navy by the acquisition and establishment of navy-yards and naval stations in several of the harbors of our new possessions, and to fit them out with a suitable equipment, it became necessary for the medical department of the Navy, in order to anticipate the requirements of the service, to make preparations and provide ample accommodations for the treatment of our officers and men who were detailed for duty in our several foreign possessions. Such action, moreover, was imperatively necessary in the Philippine Islands, where, owing to the assembling of a large fleet of vessels, and the further fact that these islands are situated well

within the tropics, it was only reasonable to anticipate that much sickness would prevail and that the establishment of a hospital at Manila was indispensable to the efficiency of the fleet and to the welfare of the patients. A naval hospital with the necessary furniture, instruments, etc., and a complete administrative outfit, has been organized and placed in commission at Cavite, Philippine Islands, and the building occupied for this purpose is so arranged and constructed that it can be enlarged and its capacity doubled whenever the interests of the service may require it.

The U. S. S. *Yosemite*, before leaving the United States, was fitted out with medical supplies, instruments, and furniture for the establishment of a small hospital at Guam, Ladrone Islands, should the requirements of the service make it necessary. At the naval stations, Havana, Cuba, and San Juan, Porto Rico, small buildings have been procured for hospital purposes and have been properly fitted up for the reception of naval patients whose illness may be of a temporary character and who can be comfortably cared for in these establishments until in a suitable condition to be transferred north to a naval hospital.

Medical Corps of the Navy.—The steady increase in the enlisted force of the Navy that has taken place during the past two years, and also the passage of the personnel bill, which has added more than 3,000 officers and men to the strength of the Marine Corps, calls attention very forcibly to the necessity for Congressional action, in which suitable provision should be made for an enlargement in the number of officers in the Medical Corps of the Navy.

The reasonableness for such proposed action should appeal strongly to all who are interested in the welfare of the Navy, and particularly to those entrusted with legislative functions and upon whom the responsibility rests for maintaining the present and future efficiency of this branch of the naval establishment. The number of medical officers, now allowed by law, is far below the number required for the diversified duties which they are called upon to perform, and it is earnestly hoped that proper provision will be made by Congress, during its coming session, to remedy a condition which is detrimental to the efficiency of the corps, to the interests of the service, and, indirectly, to the country at large. It is impossible to meet the requirements of the service with the present number of medical officers. Every one who is not sick is on duty, and the Bureau has been unable to supply officers for needed recruiting and other duty. I have the honor, therefore, to request that your approval may be given to proposed legislation for a small increase in the lower grades of the corps. It is recommended that the corps be increased 5 surgeons and 20 assistant surgeons, and that the volunteer assistant surgeons, who served during the war with Spain and who are now in service, be transferred to the regular naval service and included in the number of assistant surgeons allowed, and that in their cases the present legal limit of age on admission be waived. There are now 18 in the service and many of them are desirous of entering the regular service but are over 30 years of age, which is the limit prescribed by law for admission. The addition of 5 surgeons will give promotion, without however any increase of rank or pay, to 5 of the senior passed assistant surgeons who have been over ten years in the service. It is also earnestly requested that provision be made in the same act for placing assistant surgeons in the Navy on an equality with assistant surgeons in the Army in regard to rank and pay. At present they are lower in rank and receive less pay, with the inevitable sequence, the Army can get all the candidates they need, and the Navy can get

scarcely any. Qualified medical men who wish to enter Government service naturally go where they can get the best rank and the best pay, and that service unfortunately is not the naval service. There are now 4 vacancies for assistant surgeons and there will probably be 8 additional from retirements during the next year, and it is the earnest hope of the members of the corps who are proud of its history and of its achievements that it will not die out from lack of recruits.

United States naval hospital corps.—The wisdom of Congress in making suitable provision for the better care and treatment of the sick ashore and afloat by the passage of the bill establishing a hospital corps for the Navy has been fully demonstrated, and during the short time that the organization has been in existence it has proved its usefulness and efficiency. All of the naval hospitals are now supplied with trained nurses, and hospital apprentices, when enlisted are sent to a naval hospital, where they are thoroughly instructed in all that pertains to their duties before they are sent to sea.

The officers in charge of the United States Naval Laboratory, Brooklyn, N. Y., and the medical storehouse, Mare Island, Cal., have performed their duties satisfactorily and efficiently, filling all requisitions promptly, and meeting every demand made upon them during the past year. A small one-story fireproof brick building has been recently constructed adjoining the naval laboratory, which will hereafter be utilized as a storehouse for all liquors and for all medicines of an inflammable or combustible nature.

After much care and deliberation in its preparation, and with the view of meeting the requirements of the service, a new supply table, intended for the use of all ships and shore stations, has been issued by the Bureau. Improvements have been made in the outfits of surgical instruments recently issued, and all of the larger naval hospitals have been furnished with surgical cabinet cases. The installation in each of the naval hospitals of an X-ray apparatus, to which attention was called in one of the Bureau's former reports, has been attended with most satisfactory results and has contributed largely to accuracy in diagnosis, and has proved of great value in the prognosis and treatment of difficult surgical cases.

An examination of the professional work of medical officers ashore and afloat exhibits care and accuracy in the preparation of all official papers, and a commendable zeal in the performance of their duties.

NAVAL HOSPITAL FUND.

The condition of this fund is as follows:

Balance on hand July 1, 1898	$185,932.27
Transferred to the credit since July 1, 1898	90,983.54
Credit by appropriation for fiscal year 1899	20,000.00
	296,915.81
Expended since July 1, 1898	161,698.17
Balance on hand June 30, 1899	135,217.64

ESTIMATES.

In addition to the sums annually appropriated by Congress, estimates have been submitted for the following work:

Naval hospital, New York.—"For removing old boilers condemned as worn out and worthless, and furnishing and installing two new water-tube boilers at the naval hospital, New York, $5,000."

The old boilers have been in use for many years. They have been repaired and patched until they are now beyond repair. They have been surveyed under the direction of the Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering, who condemns them as unfit for further repairs.

Naval hospital, Mare Island, Cal.—"For new boiler house, boilers, and equipment for naval hospital, Mare Island, Cal., $10,000."

The present boiler house is an old building, out of repair. It was originally placed in a ravine below the hospital, and the drainage was through the tules to the river. The tules, having been recently filled by dredging from the river, has made the site of the boiler house lower than the adjacent land. The cost of a new boiler house would be but little more than the cost of repairs to the old building and the building of new sewers and installing a new pumping system to lift the drainage to a higher level. The boilers are old and worn out and can not be further repaired.

Naval hospital, Newport, R. I.—"For an addition to the naval hospital at the naval training station, Newport, R. I., $20,000.

This addition is rendered absolutely necessary in order to accommodate the sick of a largely increased number of apprentice boys at the station. One hundred and twenty five thousand dollars was appropriated at the last session of Congress for additional barracks, and these will soon be ready for occupancy, and the number of apprentices will be doubled. The present hospital only accommodates 24, and it has often been filled. It will be simply impossible to afford proper hospital accommodations to the sick apprentices with the present hospital building after an additional number of boys occupy the new barracks.

GENERAL REPAIRS AT NAVAL HOSPITALS.

Naval hospital, Widows Island, Maine.—No work, except such minor repairs as was deemed necessary for the preservation of the building, has been done at this hospital during the past year. The Bureau has recently authorized certain repairs in connection with the rebuilding of the wharf, taking off the top as far as the stringers and putting in new girders. As the Department has had no occasion to use this hospital in the past, and as there is slight probability that such necessity will arise in the future, only such repairs will be made as may be necessary to preserve the building from deterioration and until such time as the hospital grounds and building can be satisfactorily disposed of by the Government.

Naval hospital, Portsmouth, N. H.—Many improvements and repairs have been made at this hospital during the past year. The frame stable, the construction of which was referred to in the Bureau's last annual report, has been completed and is now occupied. The stable cellar has been concreted and a gate for entrance into the stable grounds has been erected. An outside kitchen has been constructed and furnished with a range. The roof on the hospital porch has been repaired and covered with copper, and nine closets have been fitted up in the hospital building proper. It was found by the medical officer in charge of the hospital that during stormy weather there was a good deal of leaking through the north wall of the building. Although a number of storms have occurred since this work was done, there are no indications that water has penetrated through the walls at any place where the repairs were made. The laundry drain, which became blocked up during the past year, has been repaired, and gives no further trouble. A new washing machine and mangle have been installed, and after certain

changes were made in the machine plant they were found to work satisfactorily.

Besides the above repairs, the hospital has been furnished with a new outfit of iron bedsteads, pillows, air mattresses, rubber matting, stair pads, crockery, etc.

Naval hospital, Chelsea, Mass.—A new line of electric-light conductors extending from Broadway to the main building, also a new line of ten iron posts and electric lights extending from the main entrance to the hospital building along the road and in the grounds, have been erected; and the new iron fence, for the erection and completion of which Congress made special appropriation, has been painted, and adds much to the appearance of the hospital grounds. The ward for contagious diseases has been painted utside and inside; the wainscoting of the corridors has been revarnished and repainted; the floors and other woodwork of the east halls, of the nurses' rooms, of the lavatories and water closets, have been renovated and painted. The ceiling of the main porch in the hospital building proper has been pointed and painted, and the following minor repairs have also been made, viz: Painting the ambulance stable and the exterior and interior of the boat house, repairing the chimneys and papering the rooms of the senior medical officer's quarters, concreting the floor of the laundry and installing a new laundry plant, repairing the roof, walls, and partitions of the laundry, shingling the boiler house, repairing the roof of the blacksmith shop, putting down a new floor and repairing the ceiling in one of the wards of the main building, repairing the fire boxes of the steam boilers, and installing a new steam-heating apparatus in the attic of the main building. In addition to the above repairs, the hospital has been furnished with a complete outfit of mattresses, pillows, aseptic chairs, and bedside lockers, and a large amount of miscellaneous bedding, table furniture, etc.

Naval hospital, Newport, R. I.—This hospital, erected in 1895 and 1896, requires constant care to retain it in serviceable condition. Several of the wards and rooms have been replastered, the woodwork painted, and uneven floors planed off, baseboards painted, and drains cleaned out and placed in order. A stable for the ambulance and cart, and a small outbuilding in which the implements and tools for use on the grounds could be stored should be constructed. A shallow pond near the main building is a source of annoyance to the hospital employees and patients, and should be either filled up or properly drained.

Naval hospital, New York.—The work of rehabilitating this hospital, which was inaugurated several years ago by the Bureau, has been practically completed, and the hospital and court buildings are now equipped and in a condition to meet any demands that may be made upon the medical department of this station. The new hospital building recently erected has been placed in commission and has increased the capacity of the hospital by 100 beds. The operating room has been refitted and furnished with an additional supply of aseptic furniture, and is now in excellent condition for all operative work. The water-closets, bath rooms, and drainpipes have all been overhauled during the past year, and all the plumbing in the hospital has been carefully repaired. The roadways throughout the hospital grounds have been graded and guttered, the main avenue being paved with adamantine brick, and the roadway between the court and kitchen buildings has been kosmocreted. The floor of the morgue has been concreted and satisfactory repairs made to all sewer connections. The cemetery has been enlarged so as to include an area capable of accommodating 100

additional graves, the grounds have been kept in order, and a number of trees and shrubs have been planted throughout the inclosure. The roof of the main building, which had been in a leaky and unsatisfactory condition for several years, has been thoroughly repaired, and will require no further attention for many years to come. The laundry machinery has been repaired and placed in good condition. The machinery and boilers at this hospital have been in use for many years. They are old and worn-out, and an estimate has been submitted, for transmission to Congress, for installing two new water tube boilers at this hospital, at a cost not to exceed $5,000. The sanitary condition of the hospital has been satisfactory during the year. The drainage and sewer system has been improved and is now in excellent condition. A careful analysis and microscopic examination of the water supply furnished the hospital show that it is free from all objectionable impurities.

During the year a number of cases of contagious and infectious diseases, including measles, scarlet fever, diphtheria, and erysipelas, have been treated in the annex building in the hospital grounds, and upon their discharge to duty all clothing, bedding, etc., of such cases were subjected to a thorough process of disinfection by means of formaldehyde.

Naval hospital, Philadelphia, Pa.—The following repairs and improvements have been made at this hospital during the past year, viz: A new improved upright hot-water boiler, having an interior copper steam coil and fitted with thermometer and automatic controller, was installed in the kitchen and properly connected with the steam and water systems of the hospital. Since this improvement was made an abundant supply of hot water has at all times been available. The north wall of the kitchen, for a space covering 70 square feet, has been lined with vitreous tiling, and a galvanized iron canopy has been placed near the ceiling in the same locality, to carry off escaping steam into the chimney. The south kitchen wall, near the sink, part of the adjoining window frame, and the sill of the latter were lined with slate, and the wooden ceiling of the kitchen was repaired. One of the most marked improvements made during the year was the laying of a cement pavement around the entire hospital building in place of the old brick one, which was very much out of repair. This work included the cementing of the sides and floors of areas in front of the hospital, the resetting of all curbing and of the granite steps at the east and south fronts, the substitution of cement steps for the old wooden ones at the terrace west of the hospital, the lining with cement of the inclined area leading to the basement at the north end of the hospital, and building a cement stairway against the same. The above work has been satisfactorily completed, and has added much to the appearance of the grounds immediately around the hospital. The roof of the main hospital building was overhauled and thoroughly repaired, and all the ornamental iron cresting, which was falling to pieces at the spouts of the mansard, and the ornaments on the dormers, were removed. All old tin in the gutters was cut out and replaced with new. The woodwork on all the dormer windows was faced with tin, and the woodwork on all the window frames, molding, etc., was renewed where necessary. The rain leaders, which remained embedded in the walls, were replaced with heavy corrugated galvanized-iron spouting and fixed to the outside of the building. The electric converters and wires carrying the current into the main building, which previously had been attached to the roof and were considered unsafe, were removed and set up on heavy poles.

In the engine department the following repairs were made, viz: The

two main boilers were scaled and cleaned; new joints were placed on main stop valves on top of boilers; new connections of 1¼-inch extra heavy iron pipe for water columns of main boilers, with 2½-inch heavy brass petcocks for same. New bridge walls and arch with best fire brick were built under large boilers. The flooring of the ash pits was repaved. Two sets of grate bars and two bed plates were set in place. New liners were fixed to doors of main boilers, and the large Worthington pump was overhauled and put in working order.

Numerous repairs of a minor character were made to the steam, hot and cold water, lighting, and ventilating, and heating systems of the hospital and annexes.

Naval hospital, Washington, D. C.—During the past year only minor repairs and improvements have been made to the grounds and buildings of this hospital. All the woodwork, ceilings, and walls of the building, from basement to attic, have been painted; and the floors, walls, and the outside of the stable have also been painted, as well as the disinfector, iron fence surrounding the hospital, flagstaff, and all tin roofs. One galvanized-iron hot-water boiler 5 feet high and 22 inches in diameter, with a water pressure of 200 pounds, has been installed and all necessary connections made. The boiler in the kitchen has been repaired and put in excellent condition. Besides the above work, minor repairs have been made to the drains, water pipes, etc., whenever it was necessary.

Naval hospital, Norfolk, Va.—The following repairs and improvements were made at this hospital during the past fiscal year, viz: Sixty-three feet of the sea wall, which had been seriously damaged by the storms of last winter, have been rebuilt. The stable has been extended and repaired, and the cemetery wall has been repaired and painted, and 4,500 feet of road in the hospital grounds has been shelled and graded. New gates at entrance to hospital grounds have also been installed. The boilers have been retubed and put in serviceable condition. Within the past month the medical officer in charge of the hospital has informed the Bureau that, owing to the recent storms, extensive repairs to the entire sea wall will have to be undertaken during the next year.

Naval hospital, Port Royal, S. C.—At the beginning of the year 1898 the Bureau erected in the northeast corner of the station and on a site selected for hospital purposes two Ducker portable hospitals, with an annex containing a kitchen and a mess hall.

A cyclone of great severity visited the station on the evening of August 30, 1898, and completely wrecked both the portable hospitals. These have since been replaced by two frame buildings, and the hospital, as it stands to-day, is admirably fitted for the needs of the station. The office, mess hall, lavatory, and storeroom occupy a frame building measuring 16 feet 6 inches by 42 feet. There are two pavilion wards, each with a capacity of 10 beds, and also a small building for the kitchen, which is connected with the office building by a raised platform. The office and the pavilion wards have piazzas on all sides.

In his annual report for the year 1898 the medical officer of the station recommended the construction of a small operating room to be built on the rear of the eastern ward; also the construction of a water-closet and bathroom, and a small outbuilding in which to store coal. The above work has been authorized and the several improvements as recommended have been completed.

In a communication recently received by the Bureau from the medical officer in charge of the hospital, attention is called to certain defects in the ventilation of the buildings, and suggesting measures for its

improvement. His recommendations were approved, the work authorized, and the repairs have been completed.

Naval hospital, Pensacola, Fla.—A plant for furnishing the hospital with a larger supply of water has been installed during the past year, and, with the exception of a few minor defects which can easily be remedied, has worked satisfactorily. The plant consists of a windmill, driven well, tower, and tank having a capacity of 5,000 gallons, and the necessary pipes and connections to supply the hospital and surgeon's quarters with an abundance of water. An old cement lined ice house has been repaired and converted into a cistern, and connected by an underground iron pipe with the down spout of the hospital. The gutters of the hospital roof and verandas have been repaired, and the hospital grounds have been cleaned up and put in excellent order. Six grates were furnished and placed in position at the hospital, and the hearths around the grates have been extended for 12 inches.

Naval hospital, Mare Island, Cal.—The destruction of the old hospital building by an earthquake, which occurred on the evening of March 30, 1898, was fully referred to in the Bureau's last annual report. Since the publication of this report, additional information has been received in this connection from the medical officer in charge of the hospital, from which it appears that the seismic area was extremely limited. The center of the shock extended from east to west along the north shore of San Pablo Bay, through a space of only some 15 miles long by 3 or 4 miles wide, and in which area all damage was done, although the shock was felt through a radius of 50 miles. No lives were lost and only one person was painfully injured. The hospital building was seriously damaged, especially in the center of the two towers, and so much so as to render any repairs to the same out of the question. The great weight of the roof tanks (two in number, with a combined capacity of 5,000 gallons, and nearly full of water) probably had much to do with the great injury to the central part of the building, the wings containing the wards being less affected. None of the other buildings in the hospital grounds were materially injured. The residence of the medical inspector in charge, a frame building, suffered but little damage, there being a few cracks in the plastering and probably some settling of the timbers.

As it was impossible to utilize the building for hospital purposes, an order was received from the commandant of the station to transfer all patients (enlisted men) to the marine barracks, a portion of which was fitted up and designed for use as a hospital, while sick officers were temporarily placed on board of the *Pensacola*. The portion of the building utilized as a temporary hospital consists of several apartments in the south wing of the barracks. There are 3 main wards for patients on the second floor, measuring about 50 by 25 feet, occupying the full depth of the building and opening on the eastern front on a broad balcony or veranda. The heating is by stoves and the lighting by electricity; and the large number of windows affords ample ventilation. Two of the wards are continuous and the third is separated from them by a narrow hall. A room 27 by 25 feet, on the second floor, is occupied by the hospital apprentices.

In close proximity to the wards are two bathrooms, which are utilized for hospital purposes. On the ground floor beneath the wards, and corresponding in size to a single ward, is a mess hall, and the cook house, outside and in the rear, is but a few yards distant.

At the extreme northern end of the barracks, on the second floor, is a small ward 27 by 16 feet, now utilized for patients with tubercu-

losis, while an adjacent room is occupied by the hospital employees. All the accessory work of the hospital—the shop, stables, laundry, steam-heating plant—is still conducted in the grounds of the old hospital. A large temporary frame building of rough boards, 100 by 40 feet, has been constructed, where the offices, storehouse, dispensary, etc., are situated, there being no suitable space for the same at the barracks.

Recently the Bureau has directed that all officers on arriving at San Francisco or Mare Island, requiring hospital treatment, should be sent to the French Hospital in San Francisco. The provisions for the treatment of the sick above referred to are only of a temporary character, and it is more than probable that within the next few months the new naval hospital, an account of which will be found among "special improvements and repairs at naval hospitals," will have been completed and placed in commission.

Naval hospital, Sitka, Alaska.—The annual report of the Bureau for the year 1898 called attention to the inadequacy of the hospital accommodations of this station and recommended the construction of a small building to be located upon the Government reservation which would meet the requirements of the station. No repairs, except of a minor character, have been made on the building now used for hospital purposes during the past year, as it would be a useless expenditure of money to renovate the present structure, which is old and in danger of tumbling down from the rottenness of its timbers, and its condition has grown steadily worse during the present year. If this station is to be permanently occupied more adequate provision should be made for the care and treatment of naval patients.

Naval hospital, Yokohama, Japan.—The hospital grounds and buildings are in good condition and no very extensive repairs have been required during the past year. There has been but little damage to the buildings from earthquakes and storms. In June, 1898, a portion of the bank which had given way in the previous year was again washed down by an unusually heavy rain, but it was soon restored and placed in such a condition that it is not likely to fall again. The rear verandas have been repaired and painted where necessary, and the upper veranda is now being covered with canvas. All of the buildings have been painted, the lower ward has been repainted, and the upper ward, which was in a very bad state of repair, has been replastered and painted. During the past year the post-mortem room has been repaired and fitted up.

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REPORT OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS.

HEADQUARTERS U. S. MARINE CORPS,
Washington, D. C., September 30, 1899.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the condition and services of the United States Marine Corps for the past year:

Since the date of my last report I have made a personal inspection of the marine barracks at the navy-yards, Portsmouth, N. H.; Boston, Mass.; New York, N. Y.; League Island, Pa.; Norfolk, Va.; Pensacola, Fla.; the naval stations, Newport, R. I., and Port Royal, S. C., and the Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md.

All the posts visited were found to be clean and well cared for.

Certain improvements are required at several of the stations, as mentioned below.

Five thousand dollars are asked for in the estimates for the purpose of raising the roof of the marine barracks, navy yard, Portsmouth, N. H., to provide needed additional accommodations for men. In a short time the construction of a large dock will be commenced in the yard, necessitating the employment of a large force of laborers, which will make it necessary to materially increase the strength of that command. Owing to the large number of men to be employed the commandant of the station during my recent inspection stated that he would require more marines when this work was commenced. The proposed method of providing additional room seems to be the most economical which could be adopted, as last year the marine barracks, navy yard, Boston, Mass., was raised one story without difficulty and at small expense.

Fifteen thousand dollars for necessary repairs at the marine barracks, navy yard, New York, are included in the estimates. This sum is required to enlarge the barracks to meet the demands of the service. For many years the men's quarters at New York have been overcrowded, necessitating the use at times of double bunks, which is undesirable from a sanitary point of view, and should not be continued.

The condition of the building used as a marine barracks at the navy-yard, League Island, Pa., has become such that a new and modern barracks is an absolute necessity. In former reports I have invited attention to the fact that the League Island barracks is a small wooden structure built several years ago as a temporary shelter, and is entirely unsuitable for a permanent barracks. The building is in a very dilapidated and insanitary condition, and if a new barracks is not erected in the near future extensive repairs will be necessary to make it possible to continue even temporarily the use of the structure for barrack purposes. In the estimates submitted by the quartermaster for the next fiscal year $100,000 is asked for for the construction of a modern barracks of fireproof material at League Island which will be adequate to quarter the command that will have to be regularly kept at the station. The fact that the strength of the Marine Corps has been doubled in the past year is worthy of consideration in this connection, and it is earnestly urged that the amount asked for may be allowed, the estimate being as small as is consistent with the erection of a plain, substantial, fireproof barracks of the required size.

As will be seen by my report of last year a satisfactory site for the marine barracks, navy-yard, League Island, Pa., has already been allotted by the Department. I found upon my recent inspection at the station that in the proposed plans it is contemplated to run a railroad through the navy yard, connecting with the trunk lines. If this is consummated it will be a great convenience to the corps, as men can be assembled there without trouble whenever battalions or large bodies of men are required.

A number of repairs were needed at the marine barracks, navy-yard, Norfolk, Va., which have been completed, and the barracks has also been thoroughly painted inside and out. Electric lights have been placed in the men's quarters, which make the men more contented, as the gas did not sufficiently light their quarters. The expense for electric light is much less than for gas.

In the act approved March 3, 1899, an appropriation was made for the erection of a marine barracks and 3 sets of officers' quarters at the Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md., as follows: Barracks, $50,000;

commanding officer's quarters, $9,000; two sets of officers' quarters, $14,000; clearing and grading, laying of sewers, etc., $8,000.

Plans were made by Mr. H. I. Cobb, architect, and proposals were requested for the erection of these buildings. Only three bids were received; one from Mr. William Roussey, $10,841 for the two sets of junior officers' quarters; one from P. J. Carlin & Co., $93,000 for barracks, $15,500 for commanding officer's quarters, and $24,000 for two sets of junior officers' quarters, and one from Mr. W. M. Crilly, $108,761 for the barracks, $16,530 for commanding officer's quarters, and $26,000 for two sets of junior officers' quarters.

It will be seen that the above bids were largely in excess of the appropriation. It was necessary, therefore, to reject all the bids and it will be impossible to commence the construction of the work proposed under the present appropriation. It is to be regretted that the bids did not come within the amounts appropriated, as the men are now quartered on board ship, and while they have been made as comfortable as possible under the circumstances, it is very inconvenient for men at a station not to be quartered at a regular barracks on shore.

The reason for the excess of the bids for the construction of the barracks and quarters over the amount appropriated is that the cost of material and labor is now much more than it was when the estimates were submitted by the quartermaster in September, 1898. In view of all the facts it is respectfully urged that the Secretary of the Navy request Congress to continue available for the next fiscal year the money appropriated for the erection of barracks, and quarters at Annapolis, namely: $50,000 for barracks, $9,000 for commanding officer's quarters, and $14,000 for two sets of junior officers' quarters, and that the appropriation be increased $45,000 for barracks, $5,000 for commanding officer's quarters, and $6,000 for the two sets of junior officer's quarters. If it is the intention of the Department to construct these buildings of fireproof material an increase of 25 per cent on each building over the increase just mentioned should be provided. The Superintendent of the Naval Academy has asked for an increase of the command on numerous occasions, and as the grounds have been extended, and a large amount of work is going on there at present, this request will have to be granted in the near future.

Four thousand five hundred dollars is included in the estimates for the erection of a building for the use of the Marine Band as a practice room, and as enlisted men's quarters at the marine barracks, Washington, D. C. The present band room was made for the original band of 30 pieces. By the act of March 3, 1899, the size of the band was doubled, rendering the present practice room entirely insufficient for the purpose. The construction of this building will enable the present band room to be used as quarters for enlisted men, which are very much needed at this post. The sum asked for is very moderate, and it is hoped that it will meet with the approval of the Secretary.

The repairs to the officers' quarters at the marine barracks, navy-yard, Mare Island, Cal., referred to in my last report as nearing completion, have been finished, and the quarters are once more in good condition. Only minor improvements, small in cost, remain to be completed. These are on the wing of the barracks occupied temporarily by the Navy as a hospital. When this portion of the building is vacated by the Medical Department of the Navy the few repairs needed thereon will be completed without delay.

A system of electric lighting has been installed in the marine barracks, and one set of officers' quarters at the naval station, Port Royal,

S. C. This system was introduced under the supervision of the civil engineer attached to the station, the Department having granted authority for him to superintend the work. This was a much-needed improvement, as it has heretofore been necessary to depend upon coal oil lamps for illumination, which were both unsafe and unsatisfactory. Port Royal is an isolated station, and as there are no outside amusements for the men when off duty at night, the electric lights will add much to the cheerfulness and attractiveness of their home.

On July 28, 1899, the commandant of the naval station, Port Royal, S. C., recommended that the strength of the marine barracks at the station be increased to 60 men, stating that the additional men were required on account of the extension of the limits of the station both along the water front and the two land sides, together with the new works of improvement about to be commenced, necessitating an increase in the number of posts. On August 2, 1899, the Department approved my recommendation that the desired increase be allowed, and the additional men will accordingly be sent to Port Royal as soon as they are available, which, it is hoped, will be in a very short time.

The tract of land known as "Lot 20*a*," at Sitka, Alaska, which was made a part of the naval reservation at that station by Executive order, has finally been taken possession of by the commanding officer, Sitka, but it has been impossible to begin the construction of the officers' quarters appropriated for by the act of June 10, 1896, as the contractor was, by direction of the Department, released from the obligation of his contract, upon his application, based upon the fact that during the lapse of time occasioned by the controversy over the title of the Government to the land upon which the quarters were to be built the price of materials and labor had very greatly advanced. Owing to this advance, it is estimated that $3,500 will be required to erect the officers' quarters in question, and that amount is included in the quartermaster's estimates submitted to the Department for the next fiscal year, being $1,000 more than the original appropriation. As soon as this money is appropriated new bids will be procured, a new contract made, and the work advanced as rapidly as possible, as it has been unavoidably delayed for nearly two years.

Owing to the increased duties of the marines in Alaska since the discovery of the gold fields, bringing many unruly characters there, the strength of the post will have to be increased, and therefore it is essential that the officers' quarters should be finished as soon as possible to give more space in the barracks, a portion of which is now occupied as officers' quarters.

Upon the recommendation of the commanding officer, Sitka, Alaska, an additional large water tank has been erected at this station, the capacity of which is double that formerly in use. A small fire which occurred there showed that the old tank was entirely inadequate to supply enough water for the command and permit of keeping a sufficient reserve supply to extinguish any serious fire which might occur. The loss occasioned by the fire mentioned above amounted to but a few dollars.

The marine barracks and officers' quarters at the Puget Sound Naval Station, Bremerton, Wash., referred to in my last report as nearing completion, have been completed and turned over to the Government, and are now occupied by the officer and marines at that station. With the completion of these quarters and barracks the commanding officer is provided with a suitable residence and the men are well housed and

comfortable, which tends to make them more contented at this isolated station.

Attention is invited to that portion of the quartermaster's report, hereto appended, relating to the condition of the building occupied as offices at these headquarters. This building is a wooden structure, in which nearly all the records of the corps are stored. The building was inspected by the inspector of buildings of the District of Columbia October 22, 1897, and reported by him to be in bad condition and in danger of collapse. In view of this fact a special estimate for the erection of a new building for use as offices at these headquarters was submitted to the Department November 5, 1897. As the Secretary did not approve this estimate, it was not renewed in the estimates, but I feel it my duty to again call attention to the necessity for the erection of a new office building at these headquarters. Every precaution has been taken to make the building as safe as possible by removing heavy weights from the second story, lining all flues to prevent danger from fire, etc.

During the severe storm of October 2, 1898, at Port Royal, S. C., the marines at that station rendered excellent service in saving and protecting Government property. In a letter dated October 8, 1898, to the commandant of the corps, the Secretary of the Navy quotes the following language from the report of the civil engineer of the above-mentioned station: "The marine guard rendered conspicuous and commendable service throughout the storm in protecting and saving Government property," and in the same letter reference is made to the language used by the commandant of the naval station, Port Royal, in his indorsement forwarding the above-mentioned report of the civil engineer, as follows:

> The marine guard was the only available force and rendered valuable service in saving property, and especially in helping women and children, whose houses were partially submerged on the island by the tide, and who came to the station in considerable numbers for safety, and who were fed and, in some cases, given dry clothing and cared for until the storm abated. This valuable body of men, always distinguished for faithfulness and gallantry, were invaluable in their services, and I have pleasure in commending their faithful and gallant labors. I respectfully hope that the Department will be pleased to commend them.

* * * * * * *

I desire to refer here to the many courtesies extended to the Marine Corps by the Quartermaster General of the Army, by Col. Charles Bird, quartermaster, U. S. A., and by Lieut. Col. Oscar F. Long, quartermaster, U. S. A., in connection with the transportation of marines and supplies on army transports. These officers have greatly facilitated the movement of officers and marines and the shipment of supplies during the past year, by allowing the Marine Corps to take advantage of the army transportation service whenever a request was made upon them.

In conclusion, I beg leave to invite the attention of the Department to the fact that all the regular appropriations of the corps and the several allotments made for the Marine Corps from the national-defense appropriation during the war with Spain have been carefully and judiciously expended, every purchase, large or small, being properly substantiated by vouchers, and that there have been no irregularities, checkages, or disallowances of any kind, and no complaints about rations, clothing, or any other supplies furnished, and I feel justified in stating that the record of the corps which I have the honor to command was most creditable during the war with Spain.

Very respectfully,

CHARLES HEYWOOD,
Brigadier-General, Commandant.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

INDEX TO VOLUMES 1 AND 2.

	Page.
Adjutant-General of the Army, report of the	782–821
Agriculture, report of the Secretary of	671–732
Aguinaldo, Emilio:	
Correspondence with Gen. E. H. Otis	1015–1018, 1027–1037, 1088, 1093, 1208–1210
Correspondence with Gen. Wesley Merritt	1013
Correspondence with United States military authorities	1176–1195
Alaska:	
Agricultural work in	696
Conditions in (President's message)	51
Postal service in	624, 646
Public lands of	427
Salmon fisheries	82
Animal industry	710
Army:	
Army and Navy board proposed	845
Burial of soldiers who died in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Philippine Islands	890
Camps	806
Clothing and equipage supplies	858
Convictions by general court-martial in 1899	848
Deaths among volunteers	793
Desertions in 1899	853
Distribution of	734
Distribution of regular and volunteer forces	783
Expenditures for commissary supplies	896
Expenditures for medical and hospital supplies	906
Expenditures for quartermasters' supplies	856
Health of	749
Hospitals	911
In Cuba	800
Inspection and condemnation of property	840
Inspection service	838
Laws regulating size of	733
Mileage	920
Military reservations in the Hawaiian Islands	811
Organization	769
Organization of army corps	801–806
Organization of volunteer regiments	793
Pay and rank of officers	809
Pay of officers and men in 1899	919
Personnel of Inspector-General's Department	822
Post exchanges	816
Present composition	782
Promotion of officers in	774
Recruiting service	803–809
Regular, organization of the	783
Résumé of, for 1899	820–821
Sickness in Antilles	833
Transportation	861
Transport service	862
Volunteers, record of the	787–793
Work of commissary officers in Philippines	902
Work of quartermasters in Philippines	885

	Page.
Army War College	773
Artillery service	819
Assistant Attorney-General for Post-Office Department, report of	636-646
Auditor for the Post-Office Department, report of the	666-670
Austro-Hungarian Government's indemnity from (President's message)	12
Banking and currency, laws recommended for	130-138
Banking institutions, foreign	261
Banking, international and intercolonial	243
Bank-note currency, recommendations relative to	234
Banks:	
Condition of	232
Savings	258
Bering Sea, seizure of American vessels in (President's message)	24
Boer States, relations with (President's message)	20
Bolivia, insurrection in (President's message)	12
Bond-aided railroads	531
Bonds, State, owned by United States	126
Boston Navy-Yard	1464
Brazil, relations with (President's message)	13
Brevets recommended by Maj. Gen. H. W. Lawton	1220
Brooke, Maj. Gen. John R., report on civil affairs in Cuba	1266-1282
Brooklyn Navy-Yard	1468
Bulacan, province of, expedition of Major-General Lawton into	1224
Canteen, Army	763-766
Capital, combinations of (President's message)	9-11
Casa Grande Ruin	401
Cavite province, report of expedition into, by Brig. Gen. Loyd Wheaton	1363-1365
Census:	
Report of the Director of the	602-604
Taking of Twelfth (President's message)	39
The Twelfth	357-359
Central Pacific debt	127
Chief Signal Officer of the Army, report of the	923-939
Chile, relations with (President's message)	15
China, relations with (President's message)	16
Chinese exclusion	93-96
Chippewa ceded lands	315
Civil service, Executive order relating to (President's message)	56
Coast and Geodetic Survey	115
Coast defenses	762
Coin, minor	207
Coins and coinage	66
Coinage	67
Deposits	66
Imports and exports	68
Legislation recommended	69
Production of gold and silver	69
Purchases	66
Silver quotations	68
World's coinage	69
Colombia, relations with (President's message)	13
Commissary-General of Subsistence of the Army, report of the	896-905
Construction and Repair, report of the Chief of the Bureau of	1526-1541
Cuba:	
Affairs of (President's message)	26-28
Civil report of Maj. Gen. John R. Brooke	1266-1282
Conditions at Santiago in 1899	985
Customs affairs	1275
Imports and exports of	77
Improvements at Santiago	987
Mail service in	613
Operations of army in	741-745
Organization of civil government for Havana	969
Sanitation of Havana	974
Situation in Havana in December, 1898	954
Troops in, during 1898-99	947
Cuban army	1277
Cuban cable concessions	931

	Page.
Cuban relief work	962
Cuban roads and railroads	989
Cuban telephone concession	970
Currency:	
Paper, in circulation	205
Report of the Comptroller of the	232–262
Curtis Act, Indian Territory under	335
Customs	80
Reorganization of districts	80
Smuggling	81
Special agents	80
Undervaluations	81
Davis, Brig. Gen. George W., report of, on civil government of Puerto Rico	1283–1358
Dawes Commission	339
Debt:	
Public, tables showing outstanding principal of	139
The public	204
Director of the Mint, report of the	219–231
Education:	
Growth of common schools	361
In Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Philippine Islands	363
Schools in Alaska	362
Enlisted men of Army, retired list for	817
Equipment, report of the Chief of the Bureau of	1486–1495
Farms, abandoned	722
Finances, national (President's message)	6
First Assistant Postmaster-General, report of the	641–643
Foreign commerce	74–80
Foreign mails	627
Forest reservations	439
Forest reserves, area of	440
Forests, the public	317
Forestry work under Agricultural Department	682
Fourth Assistant Postmaster-General, report of	662–666
Free delivery:	
Post-offices	618
Benefits of	619
Growth of	618
Rural	642
Freedman's Hospital	404
General Land Office:	
Recommendations of the Commissioner of the	443–444
Report of the Commissioner of the	414–414
General Superintendent of Railway Mail Service, report of the	650–653
Geological Survey, work of the	359
Germany, relations with (President's message)	18
Gold bullion, deposits of	222
Gold reserve, increase of	210
Gold standard (President's message)	7
Government Hospital for the Insane	401
Government railroad to Pacific coast	529
Great Britain, relations with (President's message)	19
Greater Republic of Central America, disruption of (President's message)	11
Guam Naval Station	1485
Havana Naval Station	1485
Hawaii:	
Annexation of (President's message)	50
Imports and exports of	77
Hawaiian Islands, military reservations in	811
Hobart, Garret A., death of (President's message)	5
Homestead entries	414
Hot Springs Reservation	395–401
Howard University	406
Iloilo, capture of	1064–1076
Immigration	89–92
India rubber trade	723

	Page.
Indian affairs, report of the Commissioner of	444–469
Indian affairs:	
Appropriations	323
Commissions	327
Education	324, 327, 445
Leasing of lands	331
Sale of lands	332
Indian commissions:	
Crow, Flathead, and other	453
Chippewa	454
Five Civilized Tribes	455
Puyallup	455
Indian day schools	450
Indian reservation schools	449
Indians:	
Administrators and guardians for	457
Sale of liquor to	328, 456
Inspector-General of the Army, report of the	822–848
Insular government, views of Secretary of War on	751–760
Insular possessions, experiment stations in	695
Interior, report of the Secretary of the	307–413
Internal Revenue, report of Commissioner of	278–306
Collections for fiscal year	279
Receipts for past ten years	279
Stamp division	297
Tobacco division	299
International cable regulations	938
International Union of American Republics, work of (President's message)	31–32
Irrigation investigations	697
Italy, lynching of subjects of (President's message)	20
Japan, treaty and relations with (President's message)	22
Joint High Commission, work of (President's message)	19
Judge-Advocate-General of the Army, report of the	848–855
Judge-Advocate-General of the Navy, report of the	1451–1460
Key West Naval Station	1481
La Laguna, province of, expedition into, by Maj. Gen. H. W. Lawton	1212
Land, bounty business	425
Land claims, private	424
Lands:	
Agricultural patents issued	420
Area of public	308
Cash sales of public	414
Indian	415
Mineral patents issued	420
New acquisitions	434
Number of entries for 1899	418
Protection of public	314, 437
Public, disposed of in 1899	307
Railroad and wagon-road grants	421
Railway grants	429
Sale of Indian	459
Surveys in Alaska	427
Surveys of	426
Swamp-land patents	421
Unallotted or tribal	458
Vacant public, area of	426
Lawton, Maj. Gen. H. W.:	
Report of, on expedition to the province of Bulacan	1224–1254
Report of, on expedition to the province of La Laguna	1212–1224
Report of, on expedition to the province of Morong	1254–1257
League Island Navy-Yard	1471
Life-Saving Service, work of	123–125
Light House Establishment, work of	120–123
Mail:	
First-class, amount of, handled	651
Loss of registered	631

	Page.
Mail—Continued.	
Postage paid for, in 1899	608
Weight of, transported in 1899	608
Mailing matter, abuse of second-class privileges	606
Legislation to correct	607
Major-General Commanding the Army, report of the	917–951
Mare Island Navy-Yard	1482
Market, foreign, for American products, President's message	41
Marine Corps, report of the commandant of the	1559–1563
Marine-Hospital Service	93
Yellow fever	101
National quarantine law	104
Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua	411
Merchant marine, American, President's message	8
Mexico, relations with, President's message	23
Military Academy	814
Military governor of—	
Cuba, report on civil affairs of Cuba	1266–1282
The city of Havana, report of the	951–982
The Department of Santiago, report of the	983–991
The Philippine Islands, report of the	1009–1212
Puerto Rico, report of the	991–996
Military information division	812
Military instruction at colleges	837
Military postal expenditures	618
Military telegraph cables	925
Mint, Director of, report of	219–231
Money in circulation in the United States	182
Money-Order Service	622
Money, standard of	128
Moneys, public	72
Morong, province of, expedition into, by Major-General Lawton	1254
National banking act (President's message)	17
National-bank notes:	
Lost and destroyed	254
Redemption of	218
National banks	72
National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers	835
Naval militia	1417, 1450
Naval prisoners	1459
Navigation:	
Recommendations of Commissioner of	111–114
Report of the Chief of the Bureau of	1495–1506
Navy:	
Armament of new vessels	1514
Armor	1445, 1518
Asiatic Squadron	1388
Barracks for enlisted men	1433
Bounty	1458
Bounty and prize money	1419
Civilian witnesses before naval courts	1453
Coaling stations	1409
Consolidation of bureaus	1440
Cost of new	1392
Expenditures	1436
Gunnery training	1503
Guns	1413
Health of	1416
Increase of (President's message)	37
Increase of recommended	1440
North Atlantic Squadron	388
Ordnance	1412
Pacific Squadron	1388
Personnel	1403
Powder	1414
Prize claims	1456
Report of the Assistant Secretary of the	1449–1451
Report of the Secretary of the	1387–1448

	Page.
Navy—Continued.	
Rewards for officers	1447
Sale of condemned vessels	1435
South Atlantic Squadron	1388
Submarine boats	1402
Torpedoes	1517
Trans-Pacific cable survey	1408
Vessels dropped from	1401
Vessels under construction	1390
New London Naval Station	1467
New York post-office	621
Nicaragua Canal, construction of (President's message)	15
Nicaragua, insurrection at Bluefields (President's message)	14
Norfolk Navy-Yard	1474
Ordnance, report of the Chief of the Bureau of	1506–1525
Otis, Maj. Gen. Elwell S., report of	1009–1212
Pacific cable	760, 937
Pacific railroads	267
Sale of (President's message)	40
Pan-American Exposition at Buffalo (President's message)	32
Parcels-post convention	627
Paris Exposition (President's message)	17
Pasig River, report of expedition along, by Brig. Gen. Loyd Wheaton	1258
Patent Office:	
Organization of	471
Review of, by Secretary of the Interior	354–357
Patents:	
Applications for, received in 1899	469
Granted in 1899	469
Report of the Commissioner of	469–473
Withheld and expired in 1899	469
Paymaster-General of the Army, report of the	919–923
Peace Conference, the, at The Hague (President's message)	33–35
Penny postage, possibilities of	610
Pensacola Navy-Yard	1479
Pension affairs, review of, by Secretary of the Interior	346–354
Pensions (President's message)	38
Pensions:	
Agencies	487
Amount paid for pensions in 1899	475
Biennial examinations of pensioners	490
Causes of delays in adjudication of	492
Causes of rejection of	493
Civil	504
Disbursements in 1899	475
Ex-slave fraud	505
From war with Spain	486
Guardians	491
Number on rolls	473–474
Operation of act of June 7, 1888	488
Pensioners dropped from roll in 1899	475
Report of the Commissioner of	473–528
Revision of list of attorneys	482
Revision of the laws	491
Table showing amount paid for pensions on account war with Spain	513
Table showing amount paid for pensions under act of June, 1890	514
Table showing appropriations for pensions and disbursements for 1899	510
Table showing disbursements for pensions, fees, etc., and number of pensioners on the rolls each year since July 1, 1865	519
Table showing money disbursed at each pension agency in 1899	511
Table showing names and ages of surviving widows and daughters of Revolutionary soldiers on rolls June 30, 1899	524
Table showing number of pensioners in each State and Territory and in each foreign country and amount paid to each in 1899	521
Table showing number of pensioners of various classes dropped from roll during year 1899	509

Pensions—Continued. Page.
Table showing number of pensioners on roll, increase during the year, and value of the roll 508
Table showing original pension claims filed and allowed each year since July, 1861 520
Table showing pension certificates issued in 1898 525
Philadelphia Commercial Museum (President's message) 33
Philippine cable 933
Philippine Islands:
Acquisition of (President's message) 12
Chinese exclusion 1043
Conditions in (President's message) 42–50
Conditions prior to outbreak of February 4, 1899 1095–1105
Estates of Filipinos confiscated 1047
Government of (President's message) 49–50
Imports and exports of 77
Mail service in 616
Military operations in 734–741
Operations following outbreak of February 4, 1899 1106–1151
Peace Commission (President's message) 43
Proclamation from President Aguinaldo 1085
Proclamation to Filipinos 1076
Rebellion in (President's message) 42–43
Return of Spanish prisoners 1057
Revenues 1167
Sanitation of Manila 1050
Sickness of troops 1049
Summary of principal events connected with military operations 997–1009
Porto Rico:
Administration of laws in (President's message) 37
Agriculture 1311
Budget for 1897–98 and 1898–99 1325
Civil government in 995
Coffee 1314
Communications on 994
Crimes and prisons 1294
Currency 1305
Education 1299
Financial statistics 1342
Franchises and privileges 1318
Future civil government 1345
Government for (President's message) 53–54
Hurricane of 1899 996, 1343
Imports and exports of 77
Judiciary 1302
Mail service in 616, 1322
Mortgages 1333
Municipalities 1336
Operations of Army in 745–747
Policy of the military government 1290
Politics 1334
Population 1291
Provincial deputations 1287
Public property 1317
Report on civil government by Brig. Gen. George W. Davis 1283–1358
Sugar 1312
The clergy 1298
Tobacco 1316
Trade statistics 1309
Troops in 992
Under present régime 1288
Under Spanish régime 1283
Porto Rican cables 933
Port Royal Navy-Yard 1476
Postage stamps for insular possessions 660
Postage stamps issued in 1899 659
Postal cards issued 659

	Page.
Postal carriers' eight-hour law	622
Postal deficit	605
Postal employees, salary of	641
Postal estimates for 1901	606
Postal frauds	638
Postal laws:	
Revision of	630, 639
Violations of	634
Postal mail routes	624
Postal revenues and expenditures	605
Postal routes:	
Expenditures for	644
Number and length of	644
Postal service:	
Alaskan	624, 646
Automobiles for	625
In insular possessions	613
Pneumatic tube	625, 649
Postmaster-General:	
Recommendations of the	634
Report of the	605–635
Postmasters:	
Salaries of	641
Appointment of	603
Post-office consolidation	623, 642
Post-office expenditures	628
Post-office inspectors	631
Post-office receipts	629
Post-offices:	
Discontinued	633
Establishment of	664
Number of	633
Private	665
President's message	5–57
Public documents, sale of	364
Public road work	702
Puget Sound Naval Station	1483
Quartermaster-General of the Army, report of the	856–895
Railroad affairs, review of, by Secretary of the Interior	367–369
Railroads:	
Bond-aided—	
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe	552
Central Branch Union Pacific	550
Central Pacific	535
Chicago and Northwestern	557
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy	560
Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul	562
Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific	565
Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha	567
Choctaw and Memphis	569
Dubuque and Sioux City	571
Hannibal and St. Joseph	572
Missouri, Kansas and Texas	574
Missouri Pacific	576
Northern Pacific	578
Santa Fe Pacific	555
Sioux City and Pacific	547
St. Louis and San Francisco	588
St. Paul and Duluth	590
Texas and Pacific	597
Union Pacific	531
Report of the Commissioner of	529–601
Railway Mail Service	626
Railway post-office lines, number of	650
Record and Pension Office, report of the chief of	931–946
Register of the Treasury, report of	262–278

	Page.
Revenue-Cutter Service	106
Bering Sea patrol	108
Personnel	108
Revenues and expenditures, by months	163
Rice, introduction into the United States	725
River and harbor improvements	766
Samoan Islands, relations with (President's message)	24
San Juan Naval Station	1485
Santiago:	
Agriculture	1379
Department of, report on, by Brig. Gen. Leonard Wood	1359–1386
Mineral resources	1368
Opportunities for investments	1372
Public lands	1368
Railroads	1367
Recommendations in regard to civil government	1376
Taxation	1378
Santo Domingo, insurrection in (President's message)	14
Second Assistant Postmaster-General, report of the	644–653
Secret service, work of	125
Seed distribution	717
Sequoia and General Grant national parks	392–394
Shafter, General, promotion of	767
Silver bullion, deposits of	225
Silver coin, fractional	207
Silver, movement of	207
Sinking-fund bonds	153
Soil investigations	686
Soldiers' Home, District of Columbia	837
South African war (President's message)	20
Southern Pacific	594
Spain:	
Peace treaty with (President's message)	42
Relations with (President's message)	26
Spanish indemnity certificates	266
Steamboat-Inspection Service	114
Steam Engineering, report of the Chief of the Bureau of	1541–1550
Sugar-beet production	719
Surgeon-General of the Army, report of the	906–918
Surgeon-General of the Navy, report of the	1551–1559
Tea growing in the United States	719
Territories, the:	
Alaska	369–374
Arizona	374–377
Indian	383–385
New Mexico	377–379
Oklahoma	380–383
Texas fever investigations	711
Third Assistant Postmaster-General, report of the	653–662
Transport service	747
Treasurer, report of the	198–218
Treasury:	
Report of the Secretary of the	59–138
Operations of	64
Receipts and expenditures	59
Fiscal year 1899	59
Fiscal year 1900	63
Fiscal year 1901	63
State of	202
Treasury notes, retirement of	205
Treaties, commercial reciprocity (President's message)	30
Trust funds	216
Trusts, legislation for (President's message)	9–11
Turkey, relations with (President's message)	29
Venezuelan Arbitration Commission (President's message)	30
Volunteer soldiers, medals for (President's message)	35

	Page.
War Department:	
Estimates of appropriations for 1900	779
Expenditures of, for 1899	778
War, report of the Secretary of	733–781
Washington Navy-Yard	1473
Weather Bureau	673
Wheaton, Brig. Gen. Loyd:	
Report of expedition along Pasig River	1258–1260
Report of expedition in Cavite Province	1260–1265
Wood, Brig. Gen. Leonard, report of, on Departments of Santiago and Puerto Rico	1359–1386
Yards and Docks, report of the Chief of the Bureau of	1460–1486
Yellowstone National Park	385–389
Yosemite National Park	389–392

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